

SMAIL ČEKIĆ

**THE AGGRESSION
AGAINST THE REPUBLIC OF
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA**

- PLANNING, PREPARATION, EXECUTION -

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

A FOREWORD TO THE ENGLISH EDITION	11
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS	13

VOLUME ONE

I

ATTACK ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONCEPT OF DEFENCE OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

1. Constitutional Determination of the Armed Forces of the SFRY	21
2. Break-Up of the Constitutional Concept of Defence of the SFRY	40
3. The Illegal Headquarters of Supreme Command	81
4. Reduction of the Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina	99
5. Disarmament of the Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina	133
6. From the Anti-Fascist to the Greater Serbian Army	168

II

THE GREATER SERBIA PROJECT AND THE PLANNING OF THE CRIME

1. The Revival and Escalation of the Greater Serbia Project	197
2. Methods, mechanisms and procedures for the planning and preparation of crime	217

III

THE GREATER SERBIA PROJECT AND THE PRESIDENCY OF THE SFRY UNTIL MARCH 1991

1. The Presidency of the SFRY and Its Parallel Informal Group ...	259
2. The Failure of Introduction of the State of Emergency and the Arranged Military Coup in March 1991	303

IV

DEFINING THE BORDERS OF GREATER SERBIA

1. The War Plan “RAM (FRAME)”	363
2. Realization of the “RAM” War Plan	417
3. Failure of Mobilization and Its Supplement	503

V

CONSTITUTION OF THE GREATER SERBIA FIFTH COLUMN IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

1. The Fifth Column Activity and Organized Destruction of Government Structures in Bosnia and Herzegovina.....	533
2. Crisis Headquarters of the Serb People - Organs of the Occupying Power	586
3. The Greater Serbia Strategic Goals in Bosnia and Herzegovina	613

VI

DIRECT PREPARATIONS FOR THE AGGRESSION

1. Arming of the Fifth Column	645
2. The Integration of Command on Occupied Territories	736
3. Taking the Starting Positions	774

VOLUME TWO

VII

THE ARMED FORMATIONS OF THE GREATER SERBIA AGGRESSOR AND THEIR LOGISTICS

1. The “Yugoslav People’s Army” – Army of Yugoslavia	851
2. Volunteers and Volunteer JNA Units	884

3. Armed Units of the Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina	892
4. “The Army of the Serb Republic of BiH”	931
5. Other Armed Formations and Groups from Serbia, Montenegro, and Croatia	970
6. Armed Formations of the Union of Communists – Movement for Yugoslavia	1002
7. Foreign Mercenaries	1005
8. Logistical Support and Reinforcement in Manpower	1011

VIII

THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA IN THE AGGRESSION AGAINST THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

1. The Croatian Nationalist Ideology	1045
2. The Negotiations in Karadjordjevo and Gradac	1052
3. The Greater Croatia Fifth Column in Bosnia and Herzegovina	1061
4. Occupation of a Part of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina	1086
a) Covert Aggression (November 1991 – January 1993)	1087
b) Overt Aggression (January 1993 – March 1994)	1138
5. Logistical assistance of the collaborationist units of the Croatian Army	1201

C O N C L U S I O N

C O N C L U S I O N	1249
----------------------------------	------

SOURCES AND LITERATURE	1271
-------------------------------------	------

ABBREVIATIONS	1297
----------------------------	------

I N D E X

- Biographical names	1315
- Geographical names	1381
- Relevant state, military and other notions	1431

FOREWORD TO THE ENGLISH EDITION

The work of research titled **THE AGGRESSION AGAINST THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: PLANNING, PREPARATION, EXECUTION**, by Prof. Dr. Smail Cekic, and which is before you, represents the English translation of the identical original published in two volumes in Sarajevo, in 2004. It is a work of historiographical research, whose intent it is to present all documents, data, facts, information and other evidence, and - in the analysis of the above - to prove that Serbia and Montenegro, with their aides, as well as the Republic of Croatia, had carried out an aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, that they have led an unprovoked war against it and that the war was not just a motivated, sudden war, but a war devised and prepared well in advance, carried out abruptly and without announcement and with all the elements of an aggression in the classical sense of the word.

This scientific research is based on relevant documentation approached from a multidisciplinary point of view, i.e. relying on the findings of various scientific disciplines. It is a work of historiography, as it reconstructs the actual happenings - including their ideological, political, military and other (i.e. overall) activities, which constitute the act of aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The author of this very important historiographic testimony proves with ample strong arguments the a priori thesis that the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1991-1995) was, in fact, an aggression in the classical sense, a crime against the peace and security, not just an “ordinary” or civil war, and that the Bosniaks have been victims of genocide - the biggest crime committed in Europe since the end of World War II.

This is not just the first work of its kind, but also the most complete and best work so far that with a statement broadly documented and clearly explained studies, analyses and indicates the character of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The specificity and diversity of the relevant documentation, in particular, its inaccessibility to the national and global scientific and other audiences has conditioned the specific methodology of proving the facts, which in turn meant that the documentation takes up a third of the physical volume of the Study.

That circumstance has also meant that the specific local military terminology, as well as the terminology of the used legal acts and bylaws, or the terminology unique to the socio-political system in Bosnia-Herzegovina to its independence (1992), could not have been avoided. Hence phrases such as “self-management”, “working people and citizens”, “ethnic groups and minorities” and other lexemes uncommon to the English language, appear in parts of the book. A note by the interpreter points the meaning or context of usage where needed.

However, the preservation of the factual integrity of the work was our supreme principle while preparing the English edition, in particular, the fact that the book is intended to serve the global academic audience, and this very principle has in places even been enforced at the expense of the linguistic simplicity of the sentence. We most sincerely apologize to the reader, convinced that, given the specificity and seriousness of the presented matter, our intention remains understandable.

We also wish to remind that the text of the Study quotes the used sources and literature in the original form, i.e. not translated into English, where the letters unknown to English - such as č, ć, dž, š and ž, have been omitted. At the end of the book, a list of sources and literature used, as well as registries of personal and geographic names, appear bilingually.

The Publishers

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

Throughout their history, Bosnia and its population, the Bosniaks in particular, have been **crucified between significant ideological and political divisions** in the Balkans and the European continent. Bosnia has been on the border between the Western and Eastern Roman Empires (i.e. between Rome and Byzantium), and then between Eastern and Western Christianity, as well as subsequently, between the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires.

In the Middle Ages, numerous crusades and conquering quests were launched against Bosnia, which has existed as a state since at least the mid-10th century, as well as against its independent Bosnian Church. As a prominent kingdom, Bosnia was successful in defending its statehood up to the mid-15th century. Weakened by these wars and internal conflicts, yet subject to ever increasing Ottoman pressure, without aid from the Christian West – expected after the christianisation of King Stjepan (Stephen) Tomas and the papal coronation of Stjepan (Stephen) Tomasevic – Bosnia finally fell under Ottoman rule in 1463.

As a far-end Ottoman province, Bosnia was an appropriate starting ground for further conquests into Central Europe. After the defeat of the Ottomans in the Vienna War (1683-1699), Bosnia had become a borderline Ottoman province, exposed to permanent attacks by Austria and Venice. In those wars, lasting throughout the 18th century, Bosnia had managed to defend itself using its own forces, and secured a key victory at the battle of Banja Luka in 1737.

The 19th and 20th centuries brought Bosnia into the focus of conflicting Serbian (from the East) and Croatian (from the West) interests, with the Bosniaks squeezed in between. Historically viewed, since the end of the Ottoman rule in 1878, until today, Bosnia **has been at the frontline of opposed Serbian and Croatian grand-state interests**. This involves claims which are part of the broader Serbian and Croatian hegemonic

agenda towards Bosnia and the Bosniaks, with the aim to conquer and divide Bosnia, as well as to eradicate the Muslims biologically and spiritually.

The conquering aspirations of genocidal character by neighbours from both East and West towards Bosnia and the Bosniaks are often expressed in the writings of a number of Serbian and Croatian historians and politicians. Serbian and Croatian nationalist historiography and politics **have repeatedly denied** Bosnian statehood and **contested** the history of the Bosniaks, their culture, language, faith, and tradition. In contesting the past of the Bosniaks, representatives of such historiography and politics **also tend to forge their ethnic origins, identity, and national status.**

Based on such nationalist ideology and “grand state projects”, Bosnia and the Bosniaks have been subjected to numerous crimes, particularly in the 20th century. Thorough research on the roots, causes, aims, scope, and consequences of these crimes is still lacking; this is particularly true of crimes committed at the end of the 20th century.

In recent years, numerous discussions have been conducted in the world and numerous books published about the break-up of the former Yugoslavia and the conflicts during and after its dissolution. The aim of these efforts is to offer an answer to the question of the failure of the joint Yugoslav state, and among others, to establish the character of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In that regard, two main theses are in circulation:

a) **that an aggression was launched against Bosnia and Herzegovina and that genocide was committed against the Bosniaks, and**

b) **that a civil war had happened, that it was an internal conflict among three sides, a tribal and historical hatred among Yugoslav peoples and incessant ethnical and religious strife.** The term used instead of genocide as a euphemism is “**ethnic cleansing**”.

Having researched into these problems for a number of years, we have come upon numerous documents, data, facts, information, and other evidence, which clearly indicate the origins, causes, aims, and character of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, particularly in Bosnia

and Herzegovina. In the end, this has led to the creation of this Study. Given the status and availability of relevant archive materials, we have focused on **the planning, preparation, and execution of the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina**, and exactly this is the subject, aim, and content of this Study. The aspects and scope of the genocide and other crimes committed remain open for investigation.

The Study has mainly been done based on relevant, unpublished documents of the aggressor countries, which we have been able to obtain so far. In addition, we have also found significant data in numerous memoir-like written by those directly involved into the events, in official reports of the United Nations and its various organs, in reports by non-governmental organizations, in data provided by the institutions of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in media reports, in published works scientific works, and the like. A very voluminous scientific apparatus substantiates the results of the research.

The Study does not pretend to fully reconstruct the developments in the Western Balkans of the late 20th century. Given the nature and unavailability of relevant documentation, a broader reconstruction of warfare operations and battle activities has not been included.

The Study presents terms and entities of varying character and level, which, among others, is conditioned by the nature of the available documentary base. Therefore, the footnote apparatus contains extensive listings of personal and geographic names, as well as of legal, military and other relevant terms.

Given the problem in focus and the amount of data presented, the Study has been divided into two volumes for easier use. Nevertheless, the Study has been designed as a whole, with content proportional to the role of the individual states in the aggression. The table of contents for both volumes is found at the beginning of both books, whereas the references, a list of abbreviations used and indexes for both volumes, are located at the end of the Study.

**THE AGGRESSION
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- PLANNING, PREPARATION, EXECUTION -

VOLUME ONE

I

**ATTACK ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONCEPT OF DEFENCE OF THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA**

1. Constitutional Determination of the Armed Forces of the SFRY

According to the 1974 Constitution of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, its “working people and other citizens, nations and minority groups”, with the aim of building a socialist society based on “self-management”, in consistent pursuit of a policy of peace, **“whilst rejecting aggression, war or aggressive pressures of any kind”**, and **“determined to use all available forces and means, armed combat and other forms of popular resistance, in order to protect and defend their freedom, the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and the socialist self-management order of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia”**, have organized and built a system of national defence **“as an inseparable part of the socialist order”**. At the same time, they were **“aware that the more developed national defence is as a form of social organization, the larger is the capacity of the society to defend itself and the preparedness of the country, and the smaller the chance of an act of aggression”**.¹

The national defence system of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia was, according to this Constitution, instituted as **“a single system of organization, preparation and participation of the joint State, the Republics and Autonomous Provinces, the Municipalities, Entities of Associated Workforce, local communities, interest-based and other self-management entities, political and other social organizations, working people and other citizens in armed combat and all other forms of resistance, and in the performance of other**

¹ USTAV SFRJ, USTAVI SOCIJALISTICKIH REPUBLIKA I POKRAJINA (hereinafter referred to as: USTAV SFRJ...), Belgrade, 1974, p. 9

tasks of interest for the defence of the country". The decisive form of confronting an aggression under the national defence system was armed combat.²

The armed forces of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, according to its **Constitution**, formed a single unit consisting of **"the Yugoslav People's Army, as a joint armed force of all the nations and minority groups, of all working people and other citizens"**, and of **"the Territorial Defence, as the highest form of organized armed popular resistance"**. The armed forces of the SFRY were established to **"protect the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity"**, and the constitutionally **"established social system of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia"**. **"Every citizen using arms or participating in any other way in the resistance against the aggressor"** was a member of the armed forces.³

Obligatory military service applied to all citizens. **"It is an undeniable right and obligation of the nations and minority groups in Yugoslavia, of its working people and other citizens, to protect and defend the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and the social order of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia as established by its Constitution."** Nobody had the right to **"declare or sign an act of capitulation, or to accept or admit occupation of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia or of a part of it."** No one had the right to **"prevent the citizens of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia from fighting an enemy prepared to attack the country"**. Such enactments were **unconstitutional and were criminalized, as treason, which itself was qualified as "the most serious crime against the nation"**, and declared a **qualified criminal act**.⁴

The rights and duties of the Federation and its institutions, as well as of the individual municipalities, provinces and republics in the area of national defence, were determined by the Constitution mentioned above. Municipalities, autonomous provinces and republics, as well as other recognized forms of social organization were both allowed and

² Ibid.

³ Ibid., p. 53.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 52-53.

obliged to, **“in compliance with the national defence system, establish, organize and instruct territorial defence units, units of civilian protection and other measures necessary for the defence of the country, and, should the country fall under attack, organize popular resistance and direct it.”** The “entities of associated workforce” and other institutions of self-management were to fully enforce **“the right and duty to defend the country according to the law, the plans and decisions of relevant institutions, to provide assets to national defence and perform further tasks of interest for national defence”**.⁵

The Constitution also provided for a **“principle of the most proportionate representation possible in view of the composition of military staff and their appointment to senior positions within the Yugoslav People’s Army”**.⁶

In the **Armed Forces** of the former Yugoslavia, and **“in compliance with the Constitution of the SFRY, the equality of languages and scripts of the nations and minority groups of Yugoslavia was guaranteed”**. **Within the command and training structure of the Army, and in compliance with federal law, one of the languages of the nations of Yugoslavia was to be used, and in parts of it, the languages of nations and minority groups could be used.**⁷

Through its institutions, it was the role of the **Federation**, among other things, to determine **“the fundamentals of national defence”** and ensure **“its implementation”**; to establish **“draft plans and measures for defence”**; to pronounce general drafting; to govern the directing and command structure of the Armed Forces, and to exercise supreme command over them; to establish, organize and command the Yugoslav People’s Army and directed and commanded it, and the like.⁸

The supreme commander of the Yugoslav Armed Forces in times of war and peace was, as provided by the constitution, the

⁵ Ibid., p. 52.

⁶ Ibid., p. 53.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid., pp. 61-62.

Yugoslav **Presidency**. Part of its competences were to **appoint, promote and dismiss generals and admirals, as well as other senior officers as established by law, as well as to appoint and dismiss judges and jurors in military courts, and military prosecutors.**⁹

The Federal Presidency **had carried out measures foreseen in the national defence system by setting up basics of plans and preparatory measures for the defence of the country, providing “guidelines for undertaking measures for preparations and mobilization of sources and forces of the country for defence, and for coordination of plans and measures of various self-management entities”**, determining the **“existence of immediate threat of war”**, ordering **“general or partial mobilization and, should the Assembly of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia have been prevented from convening, pronouncing the state of war”**.

In the case of war, the Presidency was to establish a plan of use of the Armed Forces of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia; furthermore, it determined their role in times of peace.

The Presidency was allowed to delegate **certain tasks of directing and command over the Armed Forces** to the Federal Secretary for National Defence, who was obliged to report to the Federal Presidency about all tasks delegated into his authority.

In order to monitor implementation of established command and management policies, the Federal Presidency was allowed to delegate inquiry commissions to the Federal Secretariat for National Defence and other high-level command posts of the Yugoslav Armed Forces.¹⁰

“At its own discretion or upon proposal by the Federal Executive Council, during the state of war or in case of immediate threat of war”, The Federal Presidency was allowed to pass decrees with force of law on issues usually falling into the competence of the Federal Assembly. The Presidency was obligated, however, to **“submit these decrees for review and confirmation to the Assembly of the SFRY as soon as it could convene”**.

⁹ Ibid., p. 70.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 71.

It was actually possible that, by using decrees with force of law, and certainly only **as an exception, “during the ongoing state of war and if so required by higher interests of defence for the country, specific provisions of this constitution could be suspended, if they refer to the passing of laws, and other general legal enactments; to the undertaking of measures by federal institutions pending approval by authorities of the republics and autonomous provinces; to certain civic and human rights, freedoms, and duties; and to rights of self-management entities, or to the composition and competence of the institutions of government and administration”**.¹¹

The President/Presidency of the Republic was the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. As Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, he/it was to direct and establish basic plans and preparatory measures for the defence of the country, establish a plan of use of the Armed Forces in case of war, and regulate their use in times of peace.¹²

The main feature of the provisions in the Federal Constitution **on national defence** was in that they had set forth the organization and expressed the willingness for broad participation of the society in defence as a whole, and the Territorial Defence as an important segment of defence, and that they had devised a general concept of direct responsibility for all relevant social entities, either on the level of national defence in general, or on the level of organization and preparation of the Territorial Defence.¹³

The constitutions of the socialist republics and autonomous provinces in the former Yugoslavia, the statutes of municipalities, local communities and entities of associated workforce, adopted after the promulgation of the Federal Constitution, had contained all provisions relevant to the development of the Territorial Defence. All social entities, entities of associated workforce and all organizations within the general society, had rights, duties, obligations, and responsibilities related to

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid., pp. 74-75.

¹³ M. Indjic, **TERITORIJALNA ODBRANA BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE**, Sarajevo 1989, p. 144.

the institution, preparation, training, equipment, and armament of the units, headquarters and departments of the Territorial Defence.¹⁴

The Law on National Defence, from 1974 (adopted at the session of the Federal Assembly on April 26), based on the Constitution, had further elaborated the concept of national defence as a single platform for the preparation, organization and participation of the whole population and all social forces in the defence of the country, and particularly the rights and duties of “working people and other citizens”, entities of associated workforce and other social actors, in particular the Federation and its citizens, in the preparation for and subsequent defence of the country. The Law had set norms to determine the role, organization and use of the Armed Forces based on a single system of organization and preparation, utilization, directing and command, drafting, preparedness and provision of assets for the Armed Forces. This Law, in addition to the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA; its determination, organization, composition, and the like), had also set norms for development of all issues related to the Territorial Defence, based on a single system of national defence – i.e. the organization, preparation, utilization, management, command, drafting, preparedness and provision of assets for the units, headquarters and departments of the Territorial Defence.¹⁵

¹⁴ USTAV SFRJ..., pp. 146-147, 239-241, 344-345, 439-440, 541-543, 636-637, 731-732, and 822-823; M. Indjic, aforementioned work, p. 145.

According to the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, promulgated on February 25, 1974, the Territorial Defence was **“the broadest form of organized general national armed defence, and an integral part of the single Armed Forces of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia.**

The Territorial Defence is organized in the Republic and the municipalities as an integral system.

In terms of officer composition within the Territorial Defence, the principle applied shall be one of the largest proportionality possible among the nations and minority groups in the Republic.

If units of the Territorial Defence are organized from among the members of a minority group, the language of that minority group shall be used in commanding and training” (USTAV SFRJ..., p. 174).

Thus, for the first time, the Territorial Defence was fully and constitutionally instituted in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and a firm constitutional basis was provided for its further development.

¹⁵ ZAKON O NARODNOJ ODBRANI, Belgrade 1974, pp. 5, and 13-17.

The directing and command within the Territorial Defence was exercised by the officers of the headquarters and of the units and departments of the Territorial Defence, in compliance with the law and powers delegated onto them by the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. The Chief of Staff of the Territorial Defence Headquarters was responsible for its organization and preparedness to the institution which had instituted the headquarters, and to the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Territorial Defence Command, and the Chief of Staff of the Territorial Defence headquarters of a lower level entity was responsible for the combat readiness and use of the units to the Chief of Staff of the Territorial Defence of the higher level political entity.¹⁶

The Chief of Staff of the units and departments of the Territorial Defence instituted at “entities of associated workforce” reported to the management bodies of those organizations on their organization and preparedness, and to the superior Chief of Staff of the Territorial Defence, whereas for combat readiness and utilization of units and departments, they reported to the competent Chief of Staff of the municipal headquarters or the Supreme Command of the Territorial Defence.¹⁷ When such a unit or department of the Territorial Defence had performed tasks related to the security or defence of its labour organization, the Chief of Staff of the Territorial Unit reported to the management body of that organization.¹⁸

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 19. This precisely established their vertical responsibility – to the superior headquarters of the Territorial Defence, and horizontal responsibility – to the assembly of the socio-political entity that formed them (M. Indjic, aforementioned work, p. 146).

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid. All socialist republics, except for the Socialist Republic of Serbia, had passed on a timely basis their respective laws on national defence, and these laws had specified all that was prescribed in the new Federal law on national defence, taking into consideration all the specific qualities of the socialist republics. This constituted a single approach in the organization and preparation of the Territorial Defence in the country, except for the Socialist Republic of Serbia. The coordination of the various positions on national defence at the level of the Republic of Serbia and its provinces took ten years. Only in 1984, after the positions were coordinated, the Law on the National Defence of Serbia was also passed. This removed an abnormal state in relation to the organization and competences in the Territorial Defence on the whole territory of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, which was also relevant to the whole country (M. Indjic, aforementioned work, p. 146).

The Territorial Defence Headquarters had the role to harmonize, within their jurisdiction, the plans and combat activity of the Territorial Defence, with the plans and combat activities of the Yugoslav People's Army, as well as with the plans and activities of the Territorial Defence established in neighbouring political entities. The units and departments of the Yugoslav People's Army and the units and departments of territorial defence, "which participate in the execution of joint combat tasks, shall be under the supervision of the officer who directs the execution of that task". On territory "temporarily possessed by the enemy", "the Territorial Defence headquarters instruct and command both its own units and the units and departments of the Yugoslav People's Army, unless a separate order provides otherwise".¹⁹

The Republic and provincial Territorial Defence Headquarters were obligated to cooperate with the Federal Secretariat for National Defence in enforcement of the enactments of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, and in the tasks related to preparation of proposals for these enactments, and provision of the required data and expert and other analyses required for the decisions and enactments brought by the Supreme Commander. The Republic and provincial territorial defence headquarters secured the required data and analyses required for the work of the Federal Secretariat for National Defence. In the tasks of managing and commanding the Armed Forces, empowered by the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and in the tasks related to enforcement of enactments and measures of the Supreme Commander, related to the organization, preparation, directing and command over the Territorial Defence, the Federal Secretary for National Defence could issue orders, mandatory instructions and other enactments to the Chiefs of staff of the various Territorial Defence headquarters.²⁰

The Law on General National Defence from 1982 governs the basic rights and duties of "working people and other citizens", of various entities of associated workforce, local communities and other self-management organizations and communities, socio-political and other social organizations, in the defence of independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and the social order established in

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 20.

²⁰ Ibid.

the Constitution of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, and the exercise of the general national defence system, as well as the basics of the general national defence system, the directing and command over the Armed Forces of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, as well as the organization and preparation of the Armed Forces, and other fundamentals relevant to the single organization and implementation of the general national defence system.²¹

The “general national defence” constituted a single system of organization, preparation and active participation of “working people and other citizens”, self-management organizations and communities, socio-political entities, in the deterrence and prevention of aggression and other risks to the country, in armed combat and other forms of general national resistance and in execution of other tasks in order to defend the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and the social order established in the Constitution of Yugoslavia.²²

Chapter IX (*ARMED FORCES*) of the aforementioned law had prescribed common provisions encompassing the Yugoslav People’s Army, the Territorial Defence, management of and command over the Armed Forces, the drafting, combat readiness, provision of assets to the Armed Forces, and other related issues.²³ The Territorial Defence, by this statute, constituted **“the broadest form of organized armed general national resistance and an integral part of the single Armed Forces of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia”**, and it was organized in the various entities of associated workforce, local communities, municipalities, autonomous provinces, republics and other political entities; it included all the armed compositions which were not part of the JNA and the police forces; it consisted of units, departments, headquarters and other joint efforts of “working people and other citizens” in general, national armed resistance. This law also provided the common basis related to the directing and command over the Armed Forces. Thus, the directing and command within the

²¹ **ZAKON O OPSTENARODNOJ ODBRANI**, in: M. Lepusina, ZBIRKA PROPISA IZ OBLASTI OPSTENARODNE ODBRANE with explanations, second amended edition, Sarajevo 1989, p. 341.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid., pp. 370-381.

Territorial Defence was carried out by the commander of the Territorial Defence and the officers of units and departments of the Territorial Defence in compliance with the law. It was also foreseen that the management of the Territorial Defence would be also carried out by the Committees for General National Defence and Social Self-protection (abbreviated as “*ONO and DSZ*”) in situations when, pursuant to the decision of the Presidency of the SFRY, it undertook measures related to the use of certain segments of the Territorial Defence. In such situations, the commander of the Territorial Defence proceeded pursuant to the decision of the Committee for General National Defence and Social Self-Protection. The commanders of the Territorial Defence of the republics reported for their work, combat readiness, use of units and institutions, and for the directing and command, to the Federal Presidency.²⁴

²⁴ Ibid., pp. 372-375. Municipalities, cities and constituted regional socio-political entities, as well as autonomous provinces, had formed the mentioned **Committees for general national defence and social self-protection**, as their coordinating, operational and political bodies, “**with the aim to guide, coordinate the measures and activities in realization of common goals and tasks of the general national defence and social self-protection; monitor and assess, operationally and politically situations significant for the defence and security of the country; support the activities of self-management organizations and other entities in realization of general national defence and social self-protection; act timely and efficiently in preparing and carrying out the measures; and help perform the constitutionally established role and responsibility of the League of Communists in the protection of the socialist revolution and socialist self-management relations in society**” (ZAKON O OPSTENARODNOJ ODBRANI, p. 361).

The **Committees for general national defence and social self-protection** emerged from the need for a better streamlining of development and functioning of the defensive and protective system, particularly in emergency conditions and situations in peace and war, particularly on the temporarily possessed territory. They contributed to the more complete and consistent performance of obligations and realization of rights inherent with all social entities in the area of general national defence and in realization of the leading role of the SKJ (League of Communists of Yugoslavia) in general national defence (M. Indjic, aforementioned work, pp. 204-205).

The **Committees, according to the “STRATEGIJA OPSTENARODNE ODBRANE I DRUSTVENE SAMOZASTITE SFRJ”** of 1987, had special significance for the successful functioning of general national defence and social self-protection. They were formed in municipalities, local communities, and regional entities, entities of associated workforce and other self-management organizations. On the issue of their establishment, composition, basic tasks, rights and duties, and the like, see “**STRATEGIJA OPSTENARODNE ODBRANE I DRUSTVENE SAMOZASTITE SFRJ**”, Belgrade 1987, pp. 79-81.

The “**STRATEGY OF ARMED COMBAT**”, from 1983 and the “**STRATEGY OF GENERAL NATIONAL DEFENCE AND SOCIAL SELF-PROTECTION OF THE SFRY**”, from 1987, thoroughly defined the aim, the basic tasks, and organization, directing and command over the Armed Forces of the SFRY. According to these documents, the Armed Forces of the SFRY constituted a **single armed force of the working class and all working people and other citizens, nations and minority groups of Yugoslavia, and a separate entity of general national defence and social self-protection.** They were **the axis and integral part of the system of general national defence and social self-protection, and the basic bearer of armed combat in a war of general national defence.** They were “**organized, equipped, skilled and aimed at conducting armed combat under all circumstances of in a national defence war, as well as for certain tasks of social self-protection in times of peace, emergency situations and in war.**”²⁵

The Yugoslav Armed Forces, **together with other forces of national defence and social self-protection, secured and defended both current and historical interests of all the nations and minority group, and of all working people and other citizens of the socialist, self-management and non-aligned Yugoslavia, and had a popular, socialist, revolutionary, defensive and thoroughly Yugoslav in character.**²⁶

The Armed Forces of the SFRY had consisted of two equal components: **the Yugoslav People’s Army and the Territorial Defence. The Yugoslav People’s Army was the common armed force of all the nations and minority groups, and of all working people and other citizens of Yugoslavia;** while the Territorial Defence was **the broadest form of organization of working people and other citizens for armed combat and performance of specific tasks of social self-protection, and the broadest form of armed national resistance.**²⁷

²⁵ STRATEGIJA ORUZANE BORBE, Belgrade, 1983, p. 111; STRATEGIJA OPSTENARODNE ODBRANE I DRUSTVENE SAMOZASTITE SFRJ (hereinafter referred to in abbreviation as: STRATEGIJA ONO I DSZ...), Belgrade, 1987, p. 54.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ STRATEGIJA ORUZANE BORBE, Belgrade, 1983, pp. 111-112; STRATEGIJA ONO I DSZ..., Belgrade 1987, pp. 54-55.

The Yugoslav People's Army and the Territorial Defence were parts of an integrated system of armed forces. This integrated system was based in the socio-political order of socialist self-management and the federative system; the character of the armed forces; the indivisibility of Yugoslav territory as a single defence and protection area; the common goal and object of defence and protection; the single doctrine of armed combat; the common bases of the system of provision of assets and healthcare; the single system of directing and command, both at grassroots level, as well as on the level of Supreme Command.²⁸

The Armed Forces of the SFRY were intended to “protect the freedom, independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and constitutionally established social order, further to protect and defend Yugoslavia as a socio-political union of equally righted nations and minority groups, its territorial integrity, its socialist self-management order and independent, non-aligned foreign policy. The protection and defence of these values was the task and obligation of all entities in the society, and the Armed Forces, as the basic bearer of armed combat, had had a decisive role in this.”²⁹

The Armed Forces were “intended for and skilled to conduct armed combat in the whole of Yugoslavia, conceived as a single battleground: on land, at sea and in the airspace; at the frontline, on temporarily occupied territory and in its own background, through application of frontal, insurgent and combined forms of armed combat. They were trained to be successful in conducting armed combat in conditions of both conventional and nuclear warfare. Such preparedness and capacity ensured successful resistance to all forms of armed aggression against the SFRY, in any constellation of powers and in wars of varying duration.”³⁰

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ STRATEGIJA ORUZANE BORBE, p. 112; STRATEGIJA ONO I DSZ..., p. 55.

³⁰ STRATEGIJA ORUZANE BORBE, pp. 112-113; STRATEGIJA ONO I DSZ..., p. 55.

The Armed Forces are organized, equipped and trained for successful conducting of armed combat and for performance of other tasks in accordance with their doctrinarian role, purpose and tasks in the peacetime, under extraordinary circumstances and in the war.³¹

The Yugoslav People's Army, as a common armed force and the main power segment of the integrated armed forces, was the axis of the defence system of the former Yugoslavia, and together with the Territorial Defence, it constituted a base for the other forces of general national defence and social self-protection in performing their defensive and self-protective tasks. It was intended for armed conflict in the whole of Yugoslavia, under all conditions of aggression against the SFRY. In times of peace, the Yugoslav People's Army was a significant cohesion factor in the country, and a significant barrier against all forces and events intended to weaken the unity of Yugoslavia.³²

The Territorial Defence were instituted on the whole of Yugoslavia's terrestrial and maritime territory, set up identically throughout the country, and in accordance with the needs and plans for defence and protection, and the specific conditions of each area of Yugoslavia. The combat activity was to be conducted either in joint action with the forces of the Yugoslav People's Army or independently, relying on the socio-political entities, local communities, entities of associated workforce and other structures of society. The basis of the success of the Territorial Defence, just as of the Armed Forces as a whole, was in that it relied on the population and its support.³³

The Territorial Defence also allowed for massive participation in armed combat; simultaneous conduct of combat operations on all parts of the Yugoslav battleground, i.e. wherever the aggressor could

³¹ STRATEGIJA ORUZANE BORBE, pp. 113-114; STRATEGIJA ONO I DSZ..., p. 56.

³² STRATEGIJA ORUZANE BORBE, pp. 113-114; STRATEGIJA ONO I DSZ..., p. 56.

³³ STRATEGIJA ORUZANE BORBE, p. 120; STRATEGIJA ONO I DSZ..., p. 57.

be found, particularly on temporarily occupied territory; as well as for combat control and securing of the overall territory of the SFRY. The combat activity of the Armed Forces as a whole, particularly of the Territorial Defence, provided the necessary conditions for continuous functioning of the Yugoslav social and political system on the whole territory, and under any conditions of war.³⁴

The operational and well-armed JNA was the **federal component**, and the Territorial Defence the **republic one**, less armed and of poorer mobility, intended to be an element of overall support to the JNA. In mutual relations, both components had equal rights, and in conditions of war, they were supposed to supplement the activity of each other, based on the concept of general national armed resistance. The deployment of the JNA was in competence of the Federal Presidency, whereas for the various Territorial Defence corps, in times of peace, it lay within the competence of the republic and provincial administrations. Such equal organization of the two components of the Armed Forces, established by the 1974 Constitution, prevented a centralization of Yugoslavia and primarily, the prevalence of power by the most numerous people over the other ones.³⁵

The directing and command over the Armed Forces of the SFRY was part of **the integrated system of management for general national defence and social protection, and was determined by the socialist self-management socio-political system, by the relevant concept documents and by the doctrine of armed combat and organization of the Armed Forces.**³⁶

³⁴ STRATEGIJA ORUZANE BORBE, pp. 120-121; STRATEGIJA ONO I DSZ..., pp. 57-58.

³⁵ STRATEGIJA ORUZANE BORBE, pp. 135-139; STRATEGIJA ONO I DSZ..., pp. 58-60; D. Marijan, **JUGOSLAVENSKA NARODNA ARMIJA U AGRESIJI NA REPUBLIKU HRVATSKU 1990. – 1992.** (Hereinafter referred to as: **JUGOSLAVENSKA NARODNA ARMIJA...**), *Casopis za suvremenu povijest*, No. 2, Croatian History Institute, Zagreb 2001, p. 290; S. Biserko, **OD JNA DO SRPSKE VOJSKE**, in: **RATOVI U JUGOSLAVIJI 1991. – 1999**, Compendium of Presentations and Discussions from the Round Table, Belgrade, November 7-9, 2001, Belgrade 2002 p. 218.

³⁶ STRATEGIJA ONO I DSZ..., p. 81; I. Radakovic, **BESMISLENA YU RATOVANJA**, Belgrade 1997, pp. 17-18; M. Indjic, **TERITORIJALNA ODBRANA BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE**, Sarajevo 1989, pp. 146-147.

From an organizational and functional viewpoint, the system of directing and command in the Armed Forces of the SFRY included: - the functions of the **Federal Presidency, as Supreme Command, as supreme institution of directing and command over the armed forces in peace and war**; - the activity of the **Federal Secretariat for National Defence as headquarter organ of the Presidency of the SFRY – Supreme Command**; - activities of the **Committees for general national defence and social self-protection**; - functions of the **commands, headquarters and departments of the Armed Forces at all levels of directing and command, and their organizational and formational structure**; as well as - the cooperation between the **commands and headquarters of the Armed Forces with the leaderships of the various socio-political entities and organizations, entities of associated workforce and other social structures**.³⁷

The directing and command system was organized in levels – **at the strategic, strategic-operational, operational, and tactical levels**.³⁸

The Presidency of the SFRY was the authority that directed the general national defence and social self-protection, and **the supreme body for directing and command over the Armed Forces of the SFRY**

³⁷ STRATEGIJA ORUZANE BORBE, Belgrade 1983, pp. 139-142; STRATEGIJA ONO I DSZ..., Belgrade 1987, p. 81.

³⁸ STRATEGIJA ORUZANE BORBE, pp. 143-145; STRATEGIJA ONO I DSZ..., pp. 81-82.

The strategic level included “directing and commanding over the armed forces of the SFRY in peace and war, as well as over strategic formations at the battlefields. At this level, the directing and command were performed by the Federal Presidency, that is, the Supreme Command, through appropriate strategic commands at battlefields or through commands of the individual operational units of the JNA and headquarters of the Territorial Defence of the socialist republics and socialist autonomous provinces. The strategic commands at battlefields include directing and command over the overall armed forces on the battlefields through the commands of the strategic-operational units and compositions, and the appropriate TO Headquarters” (Ibid., p. 82)

The strategic-operational level included “directing and command over the operational units and formations of the JNA and forces of the Territorial Defence of the individual socialist republics and socialist autonomous provinces”. **The operational level** included “directing and command over operational units and structures”. **The tactical level** “included directing and command over tactical units of the Yugoslav People’s Army and the Territorial Defence” (Ibid.).

in peace and war. It passed guidelines, directives, rules, decisions, orders, and other enactments. On behalf of the Presidency, the President of the Presidency of the SFRY exercised command over the Armed Forces in compliance with the Constitution of Yugoslavia, the federal laws and the decisions and official positions of the Presidency of the SFRY.³⁹

Among other things, the Presidency of the SFRY appointed and dismissed from office, upon the proposal of the competent republic or provincial body, the commander of the Territorial Defence of the republic or the commander of the Territorial Defence of the autonomous province, respectively.⁴⁰

³⁹ **STRATEGIJA ORUZANE BORBE**, Belgrade 1983, pp. 144-145; **STRATEGIJA ONO I DSZ...**, Belgrade 1987, pp. 74, and 81-82. According to the **STRATEGIJA ORUZANE BORBE** of 1983, the Federal Presidency was to establish the system of directing and command over the Armed Forces, in compliance with the Constitution and the Law on General National Defence of the SFRY; to establish the backbone of development plans for the Armed Forces and the development plans for the Yugoslav People's Army; to establish the basic organization of the Armed Forces and the organization and formation of the Yugoslav People's Army; to monitor implementation of the established policy of directing and command over the Armed Forces, to establish the plan for deployment of the Armed Forces in the case of war, and ordered their use in peace; to provide guidelines for undertaking measures for preparation and mobilization of the Armed Forces and guidelines for coordination of the preparations and plans of the Yugoslav People's Army and Territorial Defence; to prescribe measures for preparedness of the Armed Forces in case of immediate threat of war and in other extraordinary circumstances, and to order their enforcement and placing into state of alert; to establish the basics for armament and equipment of the Armed Forces; to establish the military territorial division of the country; to pass basic rules and other enactments pertaining to the strategy of armed combat, mobilization, development and deployment of Armed Forces; to pass rules on training of the Armed forces and military discipline, and other regulations foreseen by federal law; to appoint and dismiss from office, upon the proposal of the competent republic or provincial body, the commander of the Territorial Defence of the republic, that is, the commander of the Territorial Defence of the autonomous province; and also to perform other tasks related to directing and command over the Armed Forces, based on and within the framework of the Constitution of the SFRY and the federal laws (**STRATEGIJA ORUZANE BORBE**, Belgrade 1983, p. 144.).

⁴⁰ **STRATEGIJA ORUZANE BORBE**, Belgrade 1983, p. 144. This provision does not exist in **STRATEGIJA ONO I DSZ...** of 1987.

The Federal Presidency performed the role of the supreme directing and command body for the Armed Forces of the SFRY in war in the capacity of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of the SFRY. The Federal Secretariat performed the headquarter-related tasks of the Supreme Command in war for National Defence.⁴¹

In the role of the supreme instance of directing and command, the authorities directly subordinated to the Presidency of the SFRY were: the Federal Secretary for National Defence, Army, Air Force and Navy Commanders, Commanders of adjacent units, and Commanders of the Headquarters of the Territorial Defence in the respective socialist republics and socialist autonomous provinces, as well as the commanders of temporary strategic formation, if formed.⁴²

According to **THE STRATEGY OF ARMED COMBAT** of 1983, by rendering the decision to deploy the Armed Forces, the Federal Presidency could foresee certain rights and obligations of the Committees for general national defence and social self-protection, in view of use of segments of the Territorial Defence. When, pursuant to the decision of the Federal Presidency, the Committee for general national defence and social self-protection undertook measures in relation to the use of certain segments of the Territorial Defence, the commander of the Territorial Defence would have to proceed in line with the committees' decisions.⁴³

The Federal Presidency was allowed to delegate certain tasks related to the directing and command over the Armed Forces onto the

⁴¹ **STRATEGIJA ORUZANE BORBE**, Belgrade 1983, pp. 144-145; **STRATEGIJA ONO I DSZ...**, Belgrade 1987, pp. 74, and 81-82.

⁴² **STRATEGIJA ORUZANE BORBE**, Belgrade 1983, p. 145. **STRATEGIJA ONO I DSZ...** of 1987 did not contain these provisions, which shows that the decentralization of directing and command was underway.

⁴³ **STRATEGIJA ORUZANE BORBE**, Belgrade 1983, p. 145. Such rights and obligations of the Committee for ONO and DSZ, according to **STRATEGIJA OPSTENARODNE ODBRANE I DRUSTVENE SAMOZASTITE** of 1987 are not foreseen (**STRATEGIJA ONO I DSZ...** of 1987, pp. 79-81).

Federal Secretary for National Defence, who was to report to the Presidency of the SFRY for those tasks.⁴⁴

Directing and command in the Yugoslav People's Army were exercised in compliance with federal laws, by the chiefs of staff of the units and institutions of the Yugoslav People's Army, and in **the Territorial Defence, by the commanders of the Territorial Defence and the chiefs of staff of the units and institutions of the Territorial Defence.**⁴⁵

The commanders of the Territorial Defence and the chiefs of staff of the units and institutions of the Yugoslav People's Army and the Territorial Defence reported to the supervising military officers for their performance, combat preparedness, use of units and institutions, and directing and command, in compliance with the system of directing and command in the Armed Forces, as well as within the scope of their powers. At the same time, the commanders of the Territorial Defence of the socialist republics and socialist autonomous provinces **reported to the Presidency of the SFRY** for the same tasks, as well as to the competent bodies of the socio-political entity in the republic, province or municipality, or to the management and other appropriate bodies of local communities or entities of associated workforce.⁴⁶

Army, air force and navy Commanders, Commanders of adjacent units, as well as of temporary strategic formations and operational compositions were to report to the Federal Secretary for National Defence

⁴⁴ **STRATEGIJA ORUZANE BORBE**, Belgrade 1983, p. 146. In order to enforce the decisions of the Presidency of the SFRY in the area of army directing and command, and in order to carry out the tasks of directing and command over the Armed Forces delegated upon him by the Presidency of the SFRY, the Federal Secretary for National Defence could issue rules, orders, instructions, and other enactments. The Federal Secretary for National Defence exercised the directing and command over the Armed Forces, in compliance with the powers delegated upon him by the Presidency of the SFRY, pursuant to the Constitution of the SFRY and federal laws. Should he have been absent or prevented from performing his duty, the Federal Secretary for National Defence could have been replaced by the Chief of Staff of the General Staff of the Yugoslav People's Army (Ibid., pp. 145-146).

⁴⁵ Ibid. This provision was not contained in **STRATEGIJA ONO I DSZ...** of 1987.

⁴⁶ Ibid. These provisions were not contained in **STRATEGIJA ONO I DSZ...** of 1987.

for their performance of command tasks assigned into his competency by laws and other regulations, as well as of the tasks delegated upon him by the Presidency of the SFRY. **The Federal Secretary for National Defence was the direct commander to the commanders of the republic and provincial headquarters of the Territorial Defence, yet only within the scope of duties delegated upon him by the Federal Presidency.**⁴⁷

⁴⁷ Ibid., pp. 146-147. This provision was also missing from the **STRATEGIJA ONO I DSZ...** of 1987.

2. Break-Up of the Constitutional Concept of Defence of the SFRY

All the Constitutions and laws of the three Yugoslavias – the Democratic Federal Yugoslavia (DFY; 1945-1946), the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (FPRY; 1946-1963), and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY; 1963 onwards), including the 1974 SFRY Constitution, provided that the Armed Forces of the country were intended for defence against an external aggressor. In **THE LAW ON NATIONAL DEFENCE** of 1974 and the first edition of **THE STRATEGY OF ARMED COMBAT** of 1976, the Armed Forces of the SFRY were given a role only in the case of aggression.⁴⁸

THE LAW ON GENERAL NATIONAL DEFENCE of 1982, and the second edition of **THE STRATEGY OF ARMED COMBAT** of 1983, provided that the Armed Forces were established, intended, equipped and trained to conduct armed combat on the whole Yugoslav battleground area, under conditions of any aggression against the SFRY. The Territorial Defence could, **in case of immediate war danger or under other extraordinary circumstances**, pursuant to the approval by the Presidency of the SFRY, also perform the tasks of maintaining public law and order, and other tasks of social self-protection.⁴⁹

⁴⁸ **ZAKON O NARODNOJ ODBRANI**, Belgrade 1974, pp. 11-20; I. Radakovic, aforementioned work, p. 68. This law confirmed: “[in] the state of peace, conditions of war, threats against peace and security in the world, immediate threat of war, or an aggression underway” (**ZAKON O NARODNOJ ODBRANI**, pp. 11-20).

⁴⁹ **ZAKON O OPSTENARODNOJ ODBRANI** (1982), in: M. Lepusina, **ZBIRKA PROPISA IZ OBLASTI OPSTENARODNE ODBRANE SA OBJASNJENJIMA**, Sarajevo 1989, pp. 341-342, and 372-373; **STRATEGIJA ORUZANE BORBE**, Belgrade 1983, pp. 112-124; I. Radakovic, aforementioned work, p. 68; D. Marijan, **ORUZANE SNAGE SFRJ U IZVANREDNIM PRILIKAMA** (hereinafter referred to as: **ORUZANE SNAGE SFRJ...**), *Casopis za suvremenu povijest*, no. 2, Croatian Institute for History, Zagreb 2002, pp. 341-342, and 355-356.

The aforementioned had mentioned **extraordinary circumstances** for the first time. This term had officially emerged in Yugoslavia only in the 1980s, immediately after death of the Supreme Commander (Josip Broz, Marshall Tito), and it had constituted the basis for the introduction of an extraordinary state, either in part or on the whole territory of the SFRY.⁵⁰

In **THE STRATEGY OF GENERAL NATIONAL DEFENCE AND SOCIAL SELF-PROTECTION OF THE SFRY** of 1987, the Armed Forces were also predetermined for deployment under **extraordinary circumstances**, i.e. in the “internal life” of the country.⁵¹

Following the adoption of **THE STRATEGY OF GENERAL NATIONAL DEFENCE AND SOCIAL SELF-PROTECTION OF THE SFRY**, the military leadership passed in 1988 **THE MANUAL OF OPERATIONS OF THE COMMANDS, HEADQUARTERS AND UNITS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE SFRY UNDER EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES**, determining their activity in such circumstances. The task of the Armed Forces was to protect the social order established in the SFRY Constitution against “**counter-revolutionary activity of the forces of external and internal enemies**”.⁵²

ZAKON O OPSTENARODNOJ ODBRANI of 1982, and **STRATEGIJA ORUZANE BORBE** of 1983 provided for three possible statuses: **the state of war, the immediate threat of war, and extraordinary circumstances** (Ibid.).

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ **STRATEGIJA OPSTENARODNE ODBRANE I DRUSTVENE SAMOZASTITE SFRJ**, Belgrade 1987, pp. 55-72, and 132-151; I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, p. 68; D. Marijan, the aforementioned work, pp. 339-340. Based on this document, a whole chapter (“**IV VANREDNE PRILIKE**”) treated this issue: extraordinary circumstances caused by subversive action of internal or external enemy against the SFRY; extraordinary circumstances caused by immediate danger of armed aggression against the SFRY; the role and duties of the entities of the socio-political system under extraordinary circumstances; the role and duties of the civilian protection system under extraordinary circumstances; the role and duties of the system of alert and observation under extraordinary circumstances; deployment of the armed forces under extraordinary circumstances, and the plans for extraordinary circumstances.

⁵² D. Marijan, the aforementioned work, pp. 356-360. This document addressed the basic aspects of the use of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, from the assessment of the situation and planning of units under extraordinary circumstances, their combat preparedness for extraordinary circumstances, use under extraordinary circumstances, directing and command, use of the armed weapons and cooperation with the other entities of the general national defence and social self-protection (Ibid.).

Forces of the Greater Serbia concept, bothered by the Territorial Defence and the concept of the general national defence, carried out the aforementioned evolution of the role of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, making an effort to fully subject them exclusively to the leadership of the Yugoslav People's Army, and to take the constitutional right of management away from the republics.⁵³

The military leadership thus got involved into preparations that had resulted in a catastrophe, regardless of how much it was itself aware of this fact. Nationalist and self-promotional interests were the basic motivation for this, and the essence lay in a transformation of the Armed Forces, from a tool used for defence of the country from external aggression, into a tool used to fight internal "unrests", which were an imminent consequence of violation of the 1974 Constitution and of the guaranteed equality of nations and minority groups.

From the viewpoint that the political and overall well being of Yugoslavia was their exceptional responsibility, the military leadership – following the death of the supreme commander, Josip Broz (Marshall Tito) – committed itself to a unitary development. Furthermore, the leadership of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, ever since it had published the BLUE BOOK, permanently claimed that the 1974 Constitution damaged the "majority" – Serbian – nation, and that the Constitution must be changed in order to reduce the "confederalist" elements contained in it. Their ideal was a Unitarian Yugoslavia, and therefore, a strong JNA to defend it, regardless of conclusions of its top leadership (Tito, Kardelj, and the like) from the 1960s that it cannot survive in such an (otherwise Unitarian) organization. Therefore, the military leadership advocated for a return to the model that existed in the late 1940s and 1950s, and then, for the revocation of the 1974 Constitution, and the like. This leadership saw exactly the "**basis for the break-up of Yugoslavia**" in the 1974 Constitution.⁵⁴

⁵³ I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, p. 68.

⁵⁴ M. Spegelj, **PRVA FAZA RATA 1990. -1992: PRIPREME JNA ZA AGRESIJU I HRVATSKI ODBRAMBENI PLANOVI** (hereinafter referred to as: **PRVA FAZA RATA...**), in: **RAT U HRVATSKOJ I BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI 1991. -1995**, Zagreb-Sarajevo 1999, pp. 39 and 41; V. Kadijevic, **MOJE VIDJENJE RASPADA – VOJSKA BEZ DRZAVE**, Belgrade 1993, p. 108; N. Pasic – R. Ratkovic – B. Spadijer, **PLAVA KNJIGA**, Belgrade 1977.

Having realized this, the leadership of the country took a number of decisions (the “dualist” Armed Forces and the 1974 Constitution) in an effort to prevent this, and created the conditions for further survival of Yugoslavia, met with opposition by the pro-Greater Serbia and pro-Russian forces, seeing a powerful and good ally in the career ambitions of the military leadership. This particularly culminated in the eighties, following Tito’s death, when, relying on the powerful military industry complex and an ever increasing political independence, the military leadership instituted a request for amendment of the 1974 Constitution, sparking up discussions about changes in the concept of general national defence, and launched the motto that the JNA was “**the seventh republic**”, which gave them a basis for their special “responsibility for the destiny of Yugoslavia”.⁵⁵

In 1982, those forces brought Admiral Branko Mamula to the office of Federal Secretary for National Defence, who, during the six years of his mandate, had “reorganized” the Armed Forces of the SFRY, significantly changed the doctrine of general national defence, and done everything to make the JNA an independent factor and expel the republic leaderships out of the system of directing and command over the armed forces.

The military leadership (Admiral Branko Mamula, Generals Stevan Mirkovic, Petar Gracanin, Veljko Kadijevec, Admiral Stane Brovet, General Blagoje Adzic, and others) held a firm position that Tito and Kardelj had made a serious mistake by introducing the 1974 Constitution. For them, any decentralization meant the failure of Yugoslavia. General Mirkovic claimed that the phenomenon of Gorbachev and his **perestroika** and **glasnost** in the USSR marked the death of global socialist ideas, that Gorbachev was the “**undertaker of socialism**” and “**that he can ruin us all**”. General Kadijevec believed that it was only possible to save Yugoslavia by retrieving the socio-economic model of the fifties of the 20th century (M. Spegelj, **SJECANJA VOJNIKA**, Zagreb, 2001, p. 96).

⁵⁵ M. Spegelj, **PRVA FAZA RATA...**, pp. 39-41, and interviews with a number of JNA generals, military theoreticians, historians and other public workers, published in the book: F. Ademovic, **JNA BEZNADJE ZLA**, Sarajevo 1997. After Tito’s death, polemics and activities arose within the military leadership, pushing for changes in the concept of national defence, particularly when Admiral Branko Mamula came to head the Federal Secretariat. However, the greatest changes came when Mamula was replaced by Kadijevec. In essence, Mamula, Kadijevec, Gracanin, and Csanádi were in favour of a centralized defence doctrine, and in favour of reorganization of the defence forces (I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, p. 59).

The military leadership, headed by Admiral Mamula, took the position that “**the JNA shall, if the crisis escalates and the survival comes into question, take control over the country**” (B. Mamula, **SLUCAJ JUGOSLAVIJA**, Podgorica 2000, p. 69).

Having completely analysed the “**Sloga (Unity) ‘83**” military exercise, before a meeting of the top state and army leaders, the military leadership came to the conclusion “**that it is necessary to streamline the overall system of general national defence for actions in the complex conditions of attacks coming from outside and from internal unrests in the country**”. Given that, according to Mamula, this was related to “**the recent experiences of nationalist riots in Kosovo and the deep social crisis already in its second year, it was not difficult to come to this general conclusion.**” However, according to him, “**it was much harder to go forward with the changes required within the armed forces, in order to accomplish a single command and exclude the republic leaderships from it**”.⁵⁶

As the operational component of the Armed Forces of the SFRY based on the tradition of the People’s Liberation War, by 1988/89, the JNA was organized into army districts: **the First Army District** based in Belgrade, **the Second Army District** based in Nis; **the Third Army District** based in Skopje; **the Fifth Army District** based in Zagreb; **the Seventh Army District** based in Sarajevo; **the Ninth Army District** based in Ljubljana, and **the Military Naval District** based in Split. In addition to the aforementioned army districts, there were 2 adjacent units directly linked to the Federal Secretariat of National Defence, **the 2nd Corps** based in Titograd, and **the 52nd Corps** based in Pristina. In addition to the aforementioned districts and corps, the JNA also included **the Air Force Command**, based in Belgrade (Zemun), and **the Command of the Navy**, based in Belgrade.⁵⁷

⁵⁶ B. Mamula, the aforementioned work pp. 59-61. According to Mamula, this problem “**went too deeply into the constitutional system of the country, and it was too ambitious to use the conclusions of a headquarters military exercise to impose a new system of directing and command over the armed forces on the federal and republic leaderships**”. In connection with this, Mamula wrote: “**We will need three years in order to succeed, but not even then throughout to the end**” (Ibid.).

⁵⁷ I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, p. 36; R. Dizdarevic, **IZDAJA VOJNOG VRHA**, in: F. Ademovic, **JNA BEZNADJE ZLA**, Sarajevo 1997, p. 148. The Seventh Army District included almost all of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and parts of Northern and Southern Croatia.

This organization of the JNA “**at the strategic and operational level**”, according to General Kadijevec, “**mainly fit in with the administrative borders of the republics**

Almost all of the districts had actually carried on the tradition of armies from the Second World War (e.g., in 1968, Slovenia became the seat of the Ljubljana Ninth Army, with the tradition of the Ninth Slovenian Corps). The commands of the districts directed the divisions and brigades with tradition from the People's Liberation War (i.e. the Second World War).⁵⁸

The JNA and TO (Territorial Defence) were gradually and secretly trained for deployment in case of internal conflicts. Over a period of two years, the so-called "prompt battalions" were formed (a total of 12/15), prepared for immediate deployment. In addition, the military police battalions (a total of 19, two in each district and 3 in the Federal Secretariat) were strengthened in numbers, armament and equipment. Students of military schools and academies were used to organize and train troops and battalions for action in sudden anti-descent operations. Quick air transport was also organized, and the naval anti-descent boats and ships were built for interventions along the coasts and on the islands. Tactical air landing operations were also undertaken, with the use of helicopters and fire preparation and support. The production and purchase of special police equipment and combat tools for street

and provinces, so that each republic and province had had its "own" army or armies, and Montenegro and the provinces "their own" corps", in which **"the commanders of these armies or corps were mainly officers from those republics or provinces..."** (V. Kadijevic, the aforementioned work, p. 75). According to him, this phenomenon had to stop.

General Ilija Radakovic believes that what Kadijevic said was not true, that the organization of the JNA had **"fitted in with the administrative borders of the republics and provinces"**. In relation with this, he states that the First and Second districts (the Belgrade and Nis ones), except for several garrisons in the South of Serbia, covered the territory of Serbia with Kosovo and Vojvodina, and the Titograd Corps covered the territory of Montenegro; the Third district (Skopje), in addition to Macedonia, also held a part of Southern Serbia; the Fifth district (Zagreb) covered a part of Slovenia (the section between Trieste and Rijeka); the Seventh district (Sarajevo), in addition to Bosnia, also covered a part of Croatia (Eastern Slavonia up to the line of the Nasice – Slavonski Brod – Vinkovci depression). The Ninth district (Ljubljana) was wholly on the territory of Slovenia. The Military naval district "covered" the whole aquatic territory and parts of the land territories of four republics. The Military Air Forces and Anti-Aircraft Defence Forces were located on the whole territory. The Zagreb Army and three more operational and strategic formations also overlapped on the territory of Croatia (I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, p. 36).

⁵⁸ I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, p. 36.

fighting had also started in order to allow control of emerging unrests. The commando training centre was expanded and modernized to train hundreds of officers, contracted soldiers and reserve military conscripts on an annual basis.⁵⁹

A large number of military officers accepted the Territorial Defence and held it as the right solution, even more so because this concept was promoted by the President and supreme commander of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, Josip Broz Tito. Many participated in the building, training and equipping of the Territorial Defence. However, a part of the military leadership held resistance against the concept of the Territorial Defence and its development. This smaller but largely influential part of the military leadership was in opposition to the Territorial Defence, making continuous obstructions, yet not daring to publicly declare itself in the beginning. They made efforts to subject the Territorial Defence to their command (that is, to the JNA), in order to relieve it of the influence of the republics and provinces. Thus, the command over the Territorial Defence was a main concern for which the military leadership was trying to find a solution.⁶⁰

With the federal secretaries for national defence (from Ljubicic to Kadijevic) and a number of generals at the Federal Department and the

⁵⁹ B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, p. 91; D. Marijan, the aforementioned work, pp. 360-361. According to Mamula, the most questionable part was **“the doctrine, particularly the tactical use of the aforementioned and all other units”**. In relation to this, he wrote that **“this involved opportunism – not to show openly that we were preparing for internal conflicts. No one wanted to understand that then. They lived in the belief that internal conflicts of larger scope, particularly civil wars, where the JNA would have to participate, were simply impossible. On the contrary, we would face the accusation from the Army, as if thorough preparations were underway for some very suspicious tasks. The JNA was suspected all the time, and also accused in the second half of the eighties of having escaped from under control of the society and of threatening with anti-constitutional conduct”** (Ibid.).

⁶⁰ R. Dizdarevic, **IZDAJA VOJNOG VRHA**, p. 152; Ibid., **OD SMRTI TITA DO SMRTI JUGOSLAVIJE**, Sarajevo 2000, p. 413; B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, pp. 60-61. Speaking about this, Raif Dizdarevic stated that there were attempts from the General Staff of the JNA to deploy the units of the Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Kosovo, without knowledge of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina (for this, see: R. Dizdarevic, **OD SMRTI TITA DO SMRTI JUGOSLAVIJE**, pp. 413-414).

General Staff, there was certain suspicion against the Territorial Defence – the component of the armed forces under the leadership of competent institutions of the republics and autonomous provinces, in terms of their preparation and right to use them in case of a potential war.⁶¹

Starting from the request for direct command over the Territorial Defence, Admiral Branko Mamula⁶² claimed that the defence concept had integrated **“the idea of a nation-state army, the Territorial Defence”**. In relation to this, he stated that from the experiences of Croatia (1971) and Kosovo (1981) it was seen that **“in case of a serious internal crisis, the TO can be used against the common state and its army”**.

⁶¹ I. Dolnicar, **ZACETNICI RATNE TRAGEDIJE**, in F. Ademovic, the aforementioned work, p. 269. With General Ljubicic, in the belief of General S. Potocar, there was **“some kind of jealousy about the successful development of the Territorial Defence, and with the arrival of Mamula and Kadijevec, the Army top began working on the reduction of its independence”** (I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, p. 67).

Admiral Branko Mamula and General Veljko Kadijevec had a downbeat opinion on the Territorial Defence, believing this component of the Armed Forces to be a danger for the joint state.

⁶² Naval Admiral Branko Mamula was born in 1921 in Slavsko Polje, in Vrgin Most Municipality. He participated in the People's Liberation War of 1941-1945, and is the bearer of the Partisan Order of 1941. He was holder of the highest military duties in the Armed Forces of the SFRY.

In 1979, after his service as the commander of the Naval District in 1970-1979, Admiral Mamula was appointed as Chief of Staff of the General Staff of the JNA. Then, General Nikola Ljubicic was the Secretary of National Defence. In this way, the two highest command functions in the JNA were in the hands of the same nationality (both of them being Serbs), which was the first violation of **“the unwritten law according to which the two highest command functions at the JNA must not be in the hands of the same nationality”**. In 1982, Mamula was appointed minister of defence (Federal Secretary for National Defence – May 15, 1982 – May 15, 1988), at the time when speculations started about the role of the JNA in the Yugoslav crisis. In relation to this, he believed that **“the JNA can not remain exclusively within the barracks, but that it must go out onto the political scene”**, and that the JNA is a first-rate political factor. The negation of the political role of the JNA, was, according to him, **“quite unacceptable based on historical experiences”** (B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, pp. 48-53; S. Biserko, **OD JUGOSLOVENSKE NARODNE ARMIIJE DO SRPSKE VOJSKE**, in: **RATOVI U JUGOSLAVIJI 1991.-1999.**, Compilation of Communiqués and Discussions from the Round Table, Belgrade, November 7-9, 2001, Belgrade 2000, pp. 219).

Therefore, according to him, the **“immediate task that was imposed was to subject armed forces at all levels to a single command, and not only to the Supreme Command”**. This, according to Mamula, **“meant the exclusion of the republic leaderships from the system of command over armed forces and armed combat”**.⁶³

The arrangement of two equal components of the armed forces – the Yugoslav People’s Army and the Territorial Defence meant, in the opinion of the Federal Secretary for National Defence, General Veljko Kadijevic, **“that the unity of the armed forces is virtually being split up in the most authoritative way”**. Starting from such wrongful belief, which is allegedly contained in the 1974 Constitution, general Kadijevic claimed, **“the Territorial Defence was becoming the army of sovereign republics and provinces”**.⁶⁴

⁶³ B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, pp. 55, and 60-61. In relation to this, Mamula wrote: **“A quadrifold unity of the defence strategy - the unity at battlefield, the unity of the armed forces, of armed combat and all types of resistance, and the unity of command, could not be in question”**(Ibid.).

Because of the radicalisation of the situation in the country, particularly after the Kosovo demonstrations of 1981, Admiral Branko Mamula was persistent in demanding a reorganization of the JNA and TO for their preparation for potential unrests and conflicts, as well as a change of the 1974 Constitution (S. Biserko, the aforementioned work, pp. 218-219).

⁶⁴ V. Kadijevic, the aforementioned work, pp. 73 and 76. In relation to this, Kadijevic further develops his “thesis” in a sci-fi wording: **“After such a large, strategic victory of the break-up of the armed forces concept, the next thing to do for the breakers of Yugoslavia is to further concentrate their activities on the break-up of the JNA itself, and they have been doing it in a very organized, persistent and consistent manner”** (Ibid.).

According to Kadijevic, the armed forces of the SFRY consisted of **“two so-called equal components – the JNA and the Territorial Defence – in which the Territorial Defence is both larger in size than the JNA and by its establishment constitutes a starter for the future republic armies”** (Ibid., p. 63). In several places, he presents the unproven claim that the Territorial Defence was not an equal component of the JNA – **“the single armed forces”** (it is, according to Kadijevic, **“an allegedly equal component”**), but **“virtually the republic army of the secessionist republics”** (Ibid., p. 162).

The republic leaderships were not thinking about introducing national armies and paramilitary formations. The Territorial Defence developed within the composition of the defence system in Yugoslavia (I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 67-68).

According to Kadijevic, the 1974 Constitution, **“in the single key element for the functionality of the army – command and management”** made **“a large thump onto the unity of the armed forces”**, because it gave the right to the republics and provinces to **“direct the Territorial Defence, and placed the headquarters of the Territorial Defence under double command – of both the superior commands of the armed forces and at the same time of the leaderships of the republics, provinces and municipalities”**.⁶⁵

Kadijevic marked both the concept of general national defence and the inadequate organization of the armed forces as being the causes for the dissolution of the SFRY. The main reason for such disorganization and lack of preparedness of the Armed Forces of the SFRY he found in the structure of the JNA and TO based on the concept of general national defence then in force. According to him, the armed forces **“were preparing for war over the whole post-war period based on the concept of general national defence, which was quite contrary to the conditions and manner of deployment that had actually happened”**, which was a **“huge handicap”** to their efficient use.⁶⁶

In proving the “claim“ by which the concept of general national defence was a factor in the break-up of the state and the cause of inadequate organization and unpreparedness of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, general Kadijevic used the “arguments” which cannot be sustained. One such argument is his statement that the development of the Armed Forces of Yugoslavia, from the mid-sixties **“until the beginning of the final break-up of the SFRY”**, ran on the lines of **conflict between two positions – “one represented by the majority of army officers, who wanted the Armed Forces to be a single army of the**

⁶⁵ Ibid. Such a solution, according to him, constituted **“a peculiar platform for paralysis of command, and further steps. And in practice, this solution proved as a well selected movement in the function of break-up and weakening of the armed forces in every aspect, and in particular, as a dexterous manoeuvre for the nationally oriented officers in the armed forces”** (Ibid.). This is obviously a delusion by Kadijevic. All the normative enactments governed dual responsibility of the republic and provincial headquarters of the Territorial Defence, to the republic and provincial leaderships and to the supreme commander – the Presidency of the SFRY, as the supreme body of directing and command over the Armed Forces of the SFRY.

⁶⁶ V. Kadijevic, the aforementioned work, p. 95; I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, p. 26.

Yugoslav state, and to be modernized in every aspect in accordance with the general developments in the world and our realistic capabilities”, and the other one, “coming from the society whose principal bearers were Kardelj and Bakaric”, with infrequent membership from the military establishment, whose basic motive was to fully transfer the dissolution process from the federal state onto the army as well”. The alleged theory by Kardelj on armed citizens and the militia-like organization of the armed forces, according to himself, was the basis and the broadest theoretical framework of such a concept.⁶⁷

⁶⁷ V. Kadijevec, the aforementioned work, pp. 71-72; I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, p. 26.

Kadijevic fiercely attacked “Kardelj’s concept” of the army, believing that “a good deal of it” **“was included in the 1974 Constitution, and the appropriate laws on defence and the armed forces, as well as the army practice with lethal consequences for the destiny of the armed forces and for the destiny of the country as a whole, after all”**. In relation to this, the general wrote: **“The theoretical basis for Kardelj’s concept was a quasi-theory of the armed nation. The basic message of this ‘theory’ in Kardelj’s version was that it is not appropriate for a self-management socialist society to have an army such as the JNA, that the rest of the standing professional armies have been outdated, just like the rest of the bureaucratic centralized state system, and that such an army would have to be replaced by the armed nation.”** V. Kadijevec, the aforementioned work, pp., 71-72; I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, p. 17). In spite of the fact that not even a hint of that theory existed in Kardelj’s works, Kadijevic did not mind “concluding”: **“The only thing that matters is to break up the JNA for the same reasons for which the federal Yugoslav state has also been broken up”** (Ibid.).

The concepts of the armed nation, general national defence, broadening of the societal platform of defence, and the like, according to Kadijevic, are a myth and a **“quasi-theory”**. Indicating upon the “most significant segments” of this concept, contained in the 1974 Constitution, Kadijevic wrote: **“In the first place, this is a generalized thesis about the so-called broadening of the societal platform of defence, according to which the defence tasks should not be run by some expert bodies or even less by armies, but indeed by the whole society”** (Ibid.).

Kadijevic’s claim that, according to the Constitution, **the tasks of defence should be run “by the whole society”** is according to general Radakovic, a voluntary and **“logically monstrous construction, which has no confirmation in the document it refers to”**, because the defence in the SFRY, pursuant to the Constitution, is **“a single system of organization, preparation....”**. However, this did not prevent Kadijevic to use a construction to easily and **“logically”** draw out yet another lie: **“In practice, this meant the introduction of a self-management anarchy in the defence affairs as a whole, even in purely expert military affairs”** (V. Kadijevec, the aforementioned work, pp. 72-73; I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, p. 18).

Of such character is also his statement that Marshall Tito (the chief of state, the supreme commander of the Armed Forces) was constantly “**swaying**” between these two concepts, in order to, “**as time passed by, rely more and more on Kardelj’s idea of the system of the armed forces and the doctrine of their use**”.⁶⁸

Kadijevic’s position on the two directly opposed concepts in the policy of development and construction of the Yugoslav Armed Forces was based more on exaggeration of the scope and significance of certain differences that arose in the development of the armed forces, particularly in the process of theoretical planning and operationalization in the domain of military organization of the Society and the system of the armed forces. Although there were different opinions on the system and development of the Armed Forces at varying stages, the major statutory normative enactments (**the Constitution of the SFRY, the Law on National Defence, the Law on General National Defence, the Strategy of Armed Combat, the Strategy of General National Defence and Social Self-Protection of the SFRY**, and the like), contained nevertheless no mention of a militia-like military organization, not even in terms of the spatial structure of the TO, as the broadest form of military organization. These documents defined the armed forces as a single armed power, organized by the modern principles and criteria, and in concordance with the requirements of the concept and doctrine, the needs and objective capacities of the country.⁶⁹

Kadijevic’s claim about Tito’s “**swaying**” and “**reliance towards**” some kind of Kardelj’s concept of the system and development of the Yugoslav armed forces is also absurd, even more so because it is well known that Marshall Tito was continually advocating in favour of the single and modern Armed Forces, and in particular for the JNA equipped in a modern way. Such accusations against Tito become even more stranger the more one has in mind that Kadijevic had supported Tito’s concept of development of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, presenting

⁶⁸ V. Kadijevic, the aforementioned work, pp. 71-72.

⁶⁹ **STRATEGIJA ORUZANE BORBE**, Belgrade 1983, pp. 111-156; **STRATEGIJA OPSTENARODNE ODBRANE I DRUSTVENE SAMOZASTITE SFRJ**, Belgrade 1987, pp. 54-60; I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 26-27.

it as an example of a creative application of Marx's theory of the armed nation to the specific Yugoslav conditions and needs.⁷⁰

The decision on the two-component system of the Yugoslav armed forces arose from the constitutional order of the country and its concept of defence; from the tradition, character and manner of conducting a war that could potentially be waged on Yugoslav territory, whilst relying on the demographic, economic and other capacities of the country; and on other factors of the Yugoslav reality, due to which it was in the first place accepted as an optimum response to a possible aggression or an infringement of the security of the country. A significant influence in accepting such a structure of the armed forces was made by the vivid experiences and lessons from the People's Liberation War of 1941-1945, and from other wars (China, Vietnam, Algeria), as well as from states (Sweden, Switzerland) oriented towards similar solutions in the policy of development and structuring of their forces.⁷¹

⁷⁰ I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, p. 27. So, in the article *Marksizam i vojno orgnizovanje za odbranu*, discussing certain inadequate interpretations of Marx's theory of the armed nation and the possibility of its application onto the Yugoslav reality, Kadijevic advocated in favour of the thesis that the Yugoslav solution, enlivened in the concept of general national defence and the military organization based on it, is the most consistent creative application of Marx's theory, in which Tito's contribution was a decisive one. According to him, Tito **“obviously approached the issue of building the armed forces in a creative way and applying Marxist ideologies, found solutions in compliance with the existing practice... Implementation of the idea of the armed nation and in contemporary conditions was not related to the application of only one military system, whether it involved a militia-like military organization, or a regular army... The JNA and TO are the two basic forms of organization of working people and other citizens, nations and minority groups of Yugoslavia for combat. These are concrete forms of application of Marx's idea on the armed nation at today's level of development of our socialist society and within the framework of existing international relations”** – wrote Kadijevic, concluding that **“the basic line of development of the integrity of the Armed Forces has still remained preserved, thanks, above all, to Tito and his always clear positions on this decisive issue of our defence”** (Ibid., pp. 27-28).

⁷¹ I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, p. 28. The critique of the dual component structure, that is of the TO as part of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, with Kadijevic, as claimed by general Radakovic, had another connotation and represented an attempt to find the justification for their inappropriate use in the emerging crisis in objective developmental

After Tito's death, dogmatic opinions tended to gain weight within the military leadership (Kadijevic belonged followed them, too) which **"brought the country to the bloody plot"** right at the time when the military leadership remained without the Partisan membership and use of their direct experiences from the Second World War and right afterwards.⁷²

Kadijevic's statement lacks argumentation even when he says that an inadequate organization of the system of directing and command was **"a carefully selected move in the function of break-up of the armed forces in every aspect, and in particular as a skilful manoeuvre for the nationalistically oriented officers in the armed forces"**.⁷³ Even more so because the existing system did not present a barrier or a limiting

and organizational weaknesses of the armed forces, (Ibid.). This critique of the concept of the dual component structure of the Armed Forces, according to Radakovic, is also an interesting one when viewed from the viewpoints of earlier theoretic views and advocacy by Kadijevic in some works in which he supported such a solution. In the work MARKSIZAM I VOJNO ORGANIZOVANJE ZA ODBRANU, he (Kadijevic), wrote among other things: **"The relevant factors, even if not the only ones that are decisive for the form of the organization of the armed forces, are the character and in particular the form of armed combat. The concept of general national defence has established that we are preparing ourselves for all the three forms of armed combat: the combined, the frontal and the partisan one, wherein the combined form, according to our doctrine, takes up a dominant position. Application of the combined form of armed combat assumes existence of two components of the armed forces, one of them intended for activity predominantly at the frontline, and the second one, trained to combat in the background of the enemy forces active at the frontline, with the capacity to be converted from smaller or larger parts of each one into the other component."** When comparing what Kadijevic had written earlier on the dual component structure of the armed forces with what he wrote in his book **MOJE VIDJENJE RASPADA – VOJSKA BEZ DRZAVE**, general Radakovic rightfully asks the question: which of these two directly opposing positions is indeed his true conviction? (Ibid., pp. 28-29).

⁷² Ibid., p. 29. After Tito's death, the military leadership declared the doctrine of combined frontal and partisan warfare and the appropriate related structure of the armed forces a delusion, and an intentional fraud. This was a radical revision of the country's strategy, particularly Tito's idea on defence (Dz. Sarac, **BRUTALNA STRATEGIJA NASILJA**, in: F. Ademovic, the aforementioned work, p. 121).

⁷³ V. Kadijevic, the aforementioned work, p. 73; I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 29-30.

factor for successful commandment at any level of military organization of the Armed Forces, either on organizational or on technical terms.⁷⁴

Kadijevic had also criticized the key of the territorial military division of Yugoslavia, and particularly the alleged identity between the army districts and republic borders, which, according to him, had **“a very clear goal – to definitively break up the JNA as a single armed power of the federal state, and to create in their frameworks the armies of the republic, or provincial states”**.⁷⁵ His unfairness lies not only in that he ascribes certain inappropriate political qualifications to a strategic and military expert solution, but also in that he inaccurately interprets and states some significant substantive facts. Kadijevic knew very well that the seeking of the most appropriate solution for the military territorial division of Yugoslav territory, that is, in the delimitation of the army districts, had to be based on a complex criterion, in which the operationally strategic requirements and needs played a decisive role. A simple, superficial analysis of the army districts' borders shows that their determination, in addition to the operationally strategic factors, had to also include other ones (geographical features, political administrative division, economic and demographic potentials, tradition, etc.), which was obvious in the specific solutions that were in effect before the army districts were finally revoked.⁷⁶

It is not true that the commanders of the army districts and corps, which covered the territory of one republic, were officers coming from that republic as a rule, although at an earlier stage this phenomenon had been a rather characteristic one. This can be seen from the fact that before, and particularly immediately prior to the aggression against Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, not a single district commander was coming from the republic whose territory “his” district covered, or that many were replaced due to alleged mistrust. The last commander of the Ninth (Ljubljana) army district was a Serb (Svetozar Visnjic), of the Fifth (Zagreb) district - Zivota Avramovic (a Serb, and before him Konrad Kolsek – a Slovene); the Seventh (Sarajevo) district was

⁷⁴ I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 29-30.

⁷⁵ V. Kadijevic, the aforementioned work, p. 76; I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, p. 30.

⁷⁶ I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, p. 30.

a Croat (Anton Lukezic, before dissolution; or Milutin Kukanjac – a Serb, after reformation). The commander of the Third (Skopje) district was Zivota Avramovic. The commander of the First (Belgrade) district was a Macedonian (Aleksandar Spirkovski), the commander of the Naval district was a Serb (Mile Kandic), and the commander of the Air Force was a Croat (Zvonko Jurjevic).⁷⁷

By putting the concept of general national defence and the organization of the Armed Forces of the SFRY among the causes of the dissolution of the SFRY, Kadijevec called the Territorial Defence a **fraud**, in which he also saw an enemy, because it is from it, according to him, that **“the armies of the republic and provincial states are being formed”**. In an interview given to the Zagreb weekly *“Danas”*, in December 1990, which was also published by *“Narodna armija”* on December 6, he stated: **“The Territorial Defence, as formed in the late sixties and early seventies, is objectively a big fraud”**, which after the breakdown of the political concept in which it was built, also proved **“as the basis and axis of the republic armies”**.⁷⁸

After such critique of the concept of general national defence and certain, according to Kadijevec, inappropriate solutions in the organization,

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ *Narodna armija*, no. 2682, Belgrade, December 6, 1990, p. 9; I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, p. 28; I. Dolnicar, the aforementioned work, p. 269; I. Radakovic, **KADIJEVIC SKRIVA ISTINU**, in: F. Ademovic, the aforementioned work, p. 215; M. Spegelj, **SJECANJA VOJNIKA**, p. 190; D. Marijan, **JUGOSLOVENSKA NARODNA ARMIJA ...**, p. 295; V. Kadijevec, the aforementioned work, pp. 73 and 76. R. Dizdarevic, **IZDAJA ARMIJSKOG VRHA**, p. 51; Ibid., **OD SMRTI TITA DO SMRTI JUGOSLAVIJE**, p. 412. All of these, according to D. Marijan, was the attack against Broz’s **“heritage, the same one the guardian of which the JNA was representing itself to be in public”**. As general Radakovic wrote, Kadijevec had not thought so before. In response to the question why then and later on he believed the TO was a fraud, Radakovic states that Kadijevec might have opted for such a position **“even subsequently, for pragmatic reasons, at the time when the elections in some of the republics were won by opponents of the political top of Serbia and the Army top, who, based on the Constitution and the political position, had received the majority of the Territorial Defence forces and when the army and the part of the Yugoslav top had opted to support the current politics of Serbia and had been deprived of the concept and this segment of the armed forces (in Slovenia, Croatia, and partly, in Bosnia and Herzegovina)”** – I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 215-216.

directing and command system, staffing policy and financing, the Federal Secretary for National Defence and Chief of Staff of the illegal Headquarters of the Supreme Command elaborated measures undertaken by the top military leadership, which were intended, as he said, **“to mitigate the negative, devastating effect of the armed forces concept contained in the Constitution”**.⁷⁹

The military leadership had made efforts in the passing and implementation of the planned measures to go around and skip the applicable constitutional and other statutory provisions, that is, as ironically stated by Kadijevec, **“to identify appropriate expert solutions to cope with and maximally neutralize those solutions arising from the existing constitutional concept.”**⁸⁰ The goal of the decisions **“initiated by the JNA in the area of organization of the armed forces, command and management”** was to **“mitigate the negative consequences of the constitutional solutions in this area”**.⁸¹ Such measures and decisions, mainly viewed from the political and expert military aspects, were rash, controversial, and counterproductive, particularly in the complex internal political situation.⁸²

⁷⁹ V. Kadijevec, the aforementioned work, p. 77; I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 31-32.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ V. Kadijevec, the aforementioned work, p. 100.

⁸² I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, p. 31. The efforts of the military leadership to remove the right to direct the Territorial Defence away from the Republics (and to subject it to the JNA) were “expertly” explained by Admiral Mamula in the following manner: **“On part of the republics, there was no readiness to waive their armies. This was exactly deemed to be a big accomplishment of the sovereignty of the republics. It was requested that the TO be armed just like the JNA, with modern and heavy armament. The TO was larger than the war-state JNA. We had already come to the discussion as to whether to engage divisions or corps within the TO. Therefore, it almost meant two parallel armies. We were imposed with both aspects – political and military – of command and management over the armed forces... The general subjection of the TO to the Supreme Command meant nothing, it was the least factor ensuring single commanding over all the armed forces of the country. At the strategic and operational levels, cooperation and joint activity were organized, and at the tactical level – subjection of the territorial units, if they are active in the responsibility zone of the tactical units of the JNA. The TO Headquarters even then did not subject to the commanding of the JNA. Even if they were angels, the commanders of two parallel army structures on the**

The military leadership claimed that it was necessary to introduce strategic ranks of command and administration, that is, commanding instances at battleground levels.⁸³ Directions for potential solutions were presented. The General Staff was working on this task for more than two years.^{83a} The final decisions were taken in early 1987, i.e. before the Eighth convention of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia. It took the military leadership more than one year to convince the Presidency of the SFRY, the presidencies of the republics and provinces, and the leadership of the Yugoslav League of Communists – in particular Popit’s Commission for general national defence, the Military Council and the National Defence Council, and retired generals from significant war and post-war posts to “**explain**

same territory could not benevolently, timely and successfully organize cooperation under war conditions with constant changes of the combat situation, step back all the time and let each other command. In addition to all of this, the Law on the general national defence and the Strategy of armed combat adopted by the Assembly, that is, the Presidency of the SFRY, provided that the forces on temporarily occupied territory, and this could in a radical option be a major part of the state, would be commanded by the TO headquarters subjected to the republics, and through them to the supreme command – the Presidency” (B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, p. 32).

⁸³ B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, p. 64. According to Mamula, battlegrounds were “**very easy to perceive, both in the geostrategic terms, and by grouping of forces of both blocks along the directions leading into our country or across our country towards deeper goals in the European, Mediterranean or Middle East battlefields**” (Ibid.). Having in mind the fact that this is not so, the admiral was obviously trying to hide that he had joined one (Warsaw Pact) block.

^{83a} Ibid.; D. Marijan, the aforementioned work, pp. 293-294. The plans for reorganization of command in the armed forces of the SFRY, according to Mamula “**had been developed for a long time**” (“**this lasted three or four years**”) – an interview with Branko Mamula, *Slobodna Bosna*, Sarajevo, no. 186, June 8, 2000, p. 23.

Discussions on the proposal for a new organization of the JNA, as proposed by admiral Branko Mamula with his team, against which was General Nikola Ljubicic, were during 1986 also joined by Ivan Stambolic. At Mamula’s proposal on the reorganization of the JNA, he talked to the admiral’s top leadership team at the General Staff of the JNA. On this occasion, he had very carefully listened to “**the very qualified and convincing explications**”, as well as responses to some of his dilemmas related to the Territorial Defence and the new organization of the Army itself. Following this, Ivan Stambolic invited Ljubicic and several generals from Serbia to visit him for a meeting, where he found “**the reasons and advantages of the reorganization of the JNA more convincing**” (I. Stambolic, the aforementioned work, p. 168).

and accept the new structure of directing and command, and reorganization of the armed forces (brigades and corps instead of divisions)”, and in other “important affairs” that were facing them.⁸⁴

The program of changes in the structure of directing and command of the Armed Forces of Yugoslavia was prepared and reviewed for a long time (beginning in 1982), during which some serious differences⁸⁵ were uttered and open suspicion “about the true” intentions and goals of the military leadership was expressed on all sides.⁸⁶ The protagonist

⁸⁴ Ibid. The decision on reorganization of commanding in the Armed Forces of the SFRY, according to Mamula, was brought **“with the consent of the majority, which says that even in early 1987 the majority had opted for preservation of Yugoslavia, the common homeland. Already in late 1987, such a decision would not have been possible to obtain”** (B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, pp. 67-68).

⁸⁵ R. Dizdarevic, **OD SMRTI TITA DO SMRTI JUGOSLAVIJE**, p. 400; an interview with Branko Mamula, *Slobodna Bosna*, Sarajevo, no. 186, June 8, 2000, p. 23; I. Dolnicar, the aforementioned work, p. 269; V. Kadijevic, the aforementioned work, p. 78; I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 4-5. General Radakovic was consulted about the issue (even after he had been pensioned) by the members of the then Presidency of the SFRY (Nikola Ljubicic, Raif Dizdarevic, Veselin Djuranovic, Josip Vrhovec and Stane Dolanc), and on their own initiative. His views were also made known to Lazar Mojsov, and presented separately at the Guard Home, at the gathering of the active and a part of pensioned generals. All of them were reserved for a time, more or less suspecting or even against the upcoming reorganization of the armed forces. Some of them qualified certain proposals even as **“a revision of the concept of general national defence”**, but they finally approved the reorganization (I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 4-5).

General Radakovic was against such reorganization of the Armed Forces, and related to this, against revoking the districts and divisions, and in favour of smaller and cheaper armed forces – the JNA and TO (Ibid.).

Such a position was also supported by general Stane Potocar. He held a noted speech on the reorganization of the armed forces of the SFRY, particularly on the size of the war-state JNA and armed forces, at the meeting of the military leadership with the President of the Presidency of the SFRY and the pensioned military officers at prominent military and political posts since 1976-1986, held on May 17-20, 1986 at the Guard Home at Topside. The meeting was chaired by Admiral Branko Mamula, the Federal Secretary for National Defence, and the vice-general Zorko Csanádi, Chief of Staff of the General Staff of the JNA (Ibid., p. 219).

⁸⁶ B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, pp. 59-72. In relation to this, Mamula wrote: **“[the] Yugoslav ethnic problems were pumping up, and the country was going through a deep economic and social crisis. We were misunderstood even by those**

and proponent of those changes was admiral Mamula, with the support of the majority in the military leadership. Against this were Nikola Ljubicic, as well as many prominent military leaders, who were already pensioned, and some active admirals (P. Simic). Of the republics, Slovenia was the one most fiercely opposing this concept and was the only one who resisted the suspension of the Ljubljana Army District. However, the other republics did not support this. All the republics, with some minor objections, were disciplined in accepting such a reorganization of the armed forces.⁸⁷ The leadership of Bosnia and Herzegovina accepted this reorganization, which was strange, because the seat of the Fifth Military District was not in Sarajevo but in Belgrade, where there was too much concentration of commands, units and institutions of the JNA.⁸⁸

of which we had most expected it. Various motifs were found to stop us, ranging up to the issue of personal envy". This was illustrated by Mamula with "the correspondence between general Nikola Ljubicic, member of the Presidency of the SFRY, the most competent person for military issues in the Presidency, and myself, as minister of defence, from September 1986, when the new solution for the organization of the armed forces had already been found and was being explained to the structures of the leading people in the Federation and the republics" (Ibid., pp. 64-65).

⁸⁷ Ibid. In relation to this, Raif Dizdarevic wrote: **"In a discussion in 1988, Franc Popit said that the Slovenes had communicated their opposition in writing to the then state top of Yugoslavia. They believed that suspension of the army district in Ljubljana was a sign of mistrust against Slovenia – and they found confirmation for their belief in reduction of Ljubljana down to the level of a corps seat. Their objections were not accepted, although they were not ill grounded. In a discussion about the reasons for the reorganization, Branko Mamula told me that one of the motifs for suspension of the army districts was that their seats were in the centres of the republics, so they were exposed to pressures and influences of the republic leaderships and their requests that the commanders of those armies be the generals from these republics. This was also literally repeated to me in a discussion with Kadijevic. Mamula was not hiding that they particularly cared about suspending exactly the Ljubljana army district"** (R. Dizdarevic, **OD SMRTI TITA DO SMRTI JUGOSLAVIJE**, p. 400).

⁸⁸ Raif Dizdarevic, **OD SMRTI TITA DO SMRTI JUGOSLAVIJE**, p. 401. Raif Dizdarevic was surprised at these changes. Asking Mamula and later Kadijevic about the reasons, he got the response that such solutions had been persistently insisted on by Ljubicic, when the proper decision was taken. This was, as he was told by the people then heading the Army top, **"a concession to Nikola Ljubicic, and the decision was a final one and unchanged, because it is part of the broad reorganization which is already being implemented"** (Ibid.).

With the new organization of directing and command over the armed forces, the military leadership allegedly wanted to resolve **“the basic problem”**, which, in spite of **“all the military strategic arguments”**, which were **“relatively convincing in 1982 and rather weakened in 1985 and later on”**, was of socio-political nature. Namely, the strategic grouping, allegedly, under circumstances of growing nationalism, **“should not correspond to the republic borders”**. To this goal, the military leadership had already earlier passed **“the internal decision that the army commanders in the armies whose responsibility zones corresponded with the borders of the republics should not be coming from the pertinent republics, and they and the TO commanders of the republics – except in exceptional cases – should not be of the same nationality”**. Therefore, the new organization of directing and command was supposed to subject the republic and provincial headquarters of the Territorial Defence to battleground commands.⁸⁹

”In spite of the decrease in military and strategic oppositions within Europe, and reduction of danger from the outer attack against the country”, the military leadership insisted on changes in the organization and leadership of the Armed Forces of the SFRY. It had the intention **“to create a single armed force, sticking to the concept of general national defence”**, which was allegedly the ultimate goal of their plan. In spite of the majority JNA’s alleged “feeling” of **“the need for a well and broadly organized Territorial Defence, both as a military organization and as a movement of broadest possible organization of the people in a war of general national defence”**, they had **“perceived as experts”**, **“serious weaknesses of the TO as a parallel military system and organization, with its own system of command and management, background and other services”**. According to them, two armies **“on the same battleground and in the same armed combat under two parallel commands could not be maintained”**.⁹⁰

⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 65.

⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 68. According to Mamula, this was, **”under the political circumstances we were entering in the late eighties, an immediate danger to the survival of the country, its constitutional order, political and territorial integrity”** (Ibid.). However, this in essence meant an open attack against the constitutional concept of the defence of the SFRY.

In order to “**rationalize**” and “**modernize**” the armed forces,⁹¹ and

⁹¹ In the opinion of B. Mamula, the new organization “opened up the opportunities for rationalization and modernization of the armed forces”. According to him, this process “**began with the reduction of very sizeable armed forces of nearly 2.5 million people**”. In early 1987, these forces were reduced by 15%. “**In the peacetime JNA, it was provided that the military composition of 230.000 would be reduced to 180.000, which was a reduction exceeding 20%. The time of military service was reduced to one year, and the initiative also started to introduce several thousand professional soldiers. The expenses for maintenance and equipping of the army were reduced in early eighties from 5.8% down to 4.5%, of the national revenue. Due to constant annual reduction in the value of the Yugoslav dinar, less than 4% was received over several years. The scientific research work in all the areas of modernization of the armed forces was highly valued and secured, in terms of staffing and finance. Of some 2-4% in early eighties, these allocations in the late eighties grew to 8-10% of the total military budget. The system of troop, command, and headquarters training was also modernized. The schooling system was reformed and adjusted to modern requirements of staff training and expanded bases of staffing. Through additional education for lower officers at officer schools and academies, as well as additional military education of reserve officers and their acceptance into active service, we made efforts to improve the national structure of the officer staffing, which was extremely unfavourable for the staff from the Slovene, Croat and Albanian nationalities**” (B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, p. 68).

In late 1987, the decision was brought to suspend the military districts and sections and to transfer the drafting tasks onto the socio-political entities. According to Mamula, this process had started “**much earlier and the testing lasted for some ten years. The National Defence Council assigned the ministry of the defence the task to get rid of the anachronisms of the military districts, which had been suspended by almost all armies. Under aggravated political conditions in the country, it seemed risky for us to let the drafting tasks out of hands, so we stalled on it. I accepted that we make a concession of “broadening the social platform” of drafting when we took the position that the JNA, should the crisis escalate and there be a risk for survival, should take over the control over Yugoslavia. In this case, it did not matter whether the drafting for the armed forces was performed by socio-political bodies or by military districts or sections. However, the JNA gave up the aforementioned position, and some serious problems arose. Slovenia refused to send recruits and military conscripts. The attempt with reestablishment of the military territorial organization in Slovenia did not succeed**” (Ibid., pp. 68-69).

The minister of defence and the Chief of Staff of the General Staff, generals Kadijevec and Adzic, sent objections to Mamula, as to that he “**should not have allowed the suspension of military districts**”. The Admiral admitted that the JNA had found itself facing some bigger drafting problems than were the districts and sections, but he did not believe “**that the drafting in Slovenia and other republics would succeed,**

allegedly in order to accomplish a higher manoeuvring capacity and efficient directing, favouring the corps-based organization, in 1988, the military leadership initiated the discussion and voting on amendments to the Constitution.⁹² In the same year, amendments on the Law on General National Defence were “pushed through” and adopted.⁹³ The essence of these changes, whose protagonist and proponent was Admiral Mamula, was the removal of the dual component system of armed forces (the JNA and the TO), as established in the 1974 Constitution, in order to devaluate and annul the concept of general national defence and place under his control all the military assets and resources in the country, under the strategy of factual takeover of power, that is, establishment of political control over it. A relevant condition to accomplish this was **to take away the right of the republics to lead and instruct the Territorial Defence.**⁹⁴

with all the military territorial authorities”. The problem, according to him, was of political rather than of military nature. **“Many new problems opened up related to the modernization of the armed forces, and some old problems had arisen again”** (Ibid., p. 69).

⁹² M. Spegelj, **PRVA FAZA RATA ...**, pp. 41-47; Ibid., **SJECANJA VOJNIKA**, p., 150; S. Biserko, the aforementioned work, p. 219; I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, p. 36-37; Interview with Branko Mamula, *Slobodna Bosna*, Sarajevo, June 8, 2000, p. 23.

The 1988 Constitutional changes did not satisfy the JNA, which experienced itself as the only institution or force keeping Yugoslavia together, because the relevant amendments for strengthening of the federal state were not accepted. The new constitution would revoke the autonomies for Vojvodina and Kosovo, as were defined in the 1974 Constitution (S. Biserko, the aforementioned work, p. 219).

⁹³ Ibid. Upon the initiative of Branko Mamula, **“with caution and various lobbying efforts”** by the military leadership, the JNA imposed the need for amendments to the Law on National Defence of the SFRY, which were accepted two years later (Ibid.).

Mamula responded to the resistance of the Presidency of the SFRY to changes of the Law on National Defence of the SFRY in the following way: **“This was a good lesson for us, that any future reviews of the concept, strategy and plans for defence must remain internal. We had to seek their verification in the Presidency with caution and joint lobbying efforts”** (B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, p. 51; S. Biserko, the aforementioned work, p., 219). In the opinion of S. Biserko, this indicated the degree of independence of the JNA at the same time (S. Biserko, the aforementioned work, p.219).

⁹⁴ Ibid.

The decisions were rendered with many cunning lobbying efforts by the military leadership, because **“it was already back then that nothing went through without prepared support”**.⁹⁵ These changes revoked the “armies” (army districts) of the land army, whose seats were in the republic centres (except for Montenegro), and the majority of the divisions⁹⁶, and military districts were formed, at which on the

⁹⁵ B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, p. 64.

⁹⁶ M. Spegelj, **PRVA FAZA RATA ...**, pp. 41-47; Ibid., **SJECANJA VOJNIKA**, p. 91; R. Dizdarevic, **IZDAJA VOJNOG VRHA**, p. 148; I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, p.36; S. Biserko, the aforementioned work, p. 219; B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, p. 48.

Admiral Mamula stated two unconvincing reasons in favour of reorganization of commanding in the Armed Forces of the SFRY: of **strategic and political** nature. According to him, the strategic ones derived from **“the expected aggression against the country, if it happens”**, in order to **“oppose against the attack of large groupings into depth”**. Therefore the military leadership believed that **“the former Belgrade and Sarajevo army districts were to be integrated under a single military command, which would have its seat in Belgrade, and in the case of war in Bosnia, in one of the command places which had been built for this army”**. (*Slobodna Bosna*, Sarajevo, no. 186, June 8, 2000, p. 23, Interview by Branko Mamula). Mamula explained these reasons in the following way: **“Within both blocks there have been changes in the manner of grouping the forces and in the doctrine of armed combat they could impose. The technologies provided them the capacity to lead the combat activity in a much more sophisticated, quicker, and more comprehensive manner. For instance, in the grouping from the North, from the territory of Hungary, the first operation could be conducted, which would cover even Sarajevo. Therefore, this is a deep range of forces, air descent and air attack ones, quick surges of the army groupings, new transfer of tactical units, air descents, which in one jump could appear at the depth of up to 100 kilometres, and in the second one they could overcome the barriers such as the Sava, and reach a broad air descent space such as the space of Sarajevo. This required appropriate grouping on our part, which may no longer be shallow. In order to integrate all this space under a single command, which can successfully offer defence in this area, the area needed to be placed under the same command, beginning from those in the border strip, up to all the forces in the depth. This was the basic reason. The affair is too much expert, and this is a very complex issue. The very fact that we have been working on this for several years says how complex it is. I would nevertheless reduce my answer to that the reason of the strategic grouping is the capacity to offer resistance to attacks by large groupings into depth”** (Ibid.).

The second reason for the aforementioned reorganization, according to Mamula, was **“in the politico-social sense, whose basis was a completely opposing idea –that no nationalism can rely on the Army”** (Ibid.).

battleground of the SFRY, four military sectors were established from six army districts (i.e. three land force districts and one naval district).

These were:

- **The Northwest one**, seated in Zagreb – the Fifth Military District,
- **The Adriatic Naval one**, with the command in Split – the Naval Military District;
- **The Central one**, seated in Belgrade – the First Military District;
- **The Southeast one**, seated in Skopje – the Third Military District.⁹⁷

The Northwest military sector, whose Command began operating in Zagreb on December 25, 1988, was formed by merger of the Fifth (Zagreb-based) and the Ninth (Ljubljana-based) armies, and encompassed Slovenia, the Northwest Croatia, a part of Istria including Gorski Kotar, Lika, Kordun, and Banija, and Prekounje from Bosnia and Herzegovina. On this territory, in 1988, four corps were formed. With dissolution of

In a discussion with Raif Dizdarevic about the reasons for revoking of army districts, Mamula told him that one of the reasons was even that their seats were in the centres of the republics, where they were exposed to pressures and influences of the leaderships of the republics, and their demands that the army commanders be generals from those republics. This was repeated to Dizdarevic literally by General Kadijevec as well. In this. Admiral Mamula was not trying to hide that they cared in particular about revoking exactly the Ljubljana army district (R. Dizdarevic, the aforementioned work, p.149).

⁹⁷ M. Spegelj, **PRVA FAZA RATA...**, p. 47; R. Dizdarevic, the aforementioned work, p. 148; S. Potocar, **UROTA GENERALSTABA PROTIV NARODA**, in: F. Ademovic, the aforementioned work, p.105; I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 36-37.

Thus, instead of the armies and divisions, corps were formed (17) and the army districts were planned in a different manner.

Colonel Milan Daljevic was the one who was particularly involved in the changes to the Law on National Defence of the SFRY and suspension of the “armies”. He was in favour of the thesis that **“the ‘armies’ in the republic centres must be suspended among other things in order to prevent their ‘becoming friends’ with the leaderships there”** by which, according to Spegelj, he **“had revealed the secret of the discussions taking place at the military top”**. General Kadijevec too, confirms that the military leadership in that reorganization of commanding and organization of the strategic and operationally strategic units of JNA and TO made in 1987-1988, believed that they made a “significant” success in the fact that the territorial division of the new military areas **“completely neglected the administrative borders of the republics and provinces”** (M. Spegelj, the aforementioned work, p. 44; V. Kadijevec, the aforementioned work, p. 77).

the Ninth Army, two corps were formed in Slovenia: the 14th, seated in Ljubljana, and the 31st, seated in Maribor. The northern part of Istria and the Croatian seaside was the sector of the 13th corps, seated in Rijeka. The Northeast Croatia was the district of the 32nd corps, seated in Varazdin. A major part of Kordun was the zone of the 6th Proletarian Infantry Division, seated in Karlovac. Zagreb with its surroundings made up a separate Command of the Defence of the City of Zagreb. The Fifth Corps of the Air Force and Anti-Aircraft Defence, seated in Zagreb, offered air force support to the fifth military district. The remaining part of the territory of Croatia was divided between the First Military District and the Military Naval District. **The First Military District seated in Belgrade had competency over Slavonia**, through the 17th Corps seated in Tuzla.⁹⁸

The Military Naval District seated in Split almost completely retained its existing organization, the fleet and the three military navy sectors, whereas the novelty was that it now included the newly formed 9th corps. The Military Navy District had competency over the Adriatic Coast and parts of North Dalmatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. North Dalmatia made up the zone of the Ninth Corps seated in Knin, the Fifth Army Naval Sector seated in Pula had competency over the North part of the Adriatic Coast, the Eighth one, seated in Sibenik, over the central part, and the Ninth one seated at Kumbor in Boka Kotorska had competency over the Southern part of the Adriatic Coast.⁹⁹

The Central Military sector was formed by merging the Fifth (Belgrade) and the Seventh (Sarajevo) Armies, whose forces were placed under the military sector command seated in Belgrade. The western border of the sector was: Nasice, Slavonski Brod, Sava – Una, and the Bosnian-Croatian border from Bosansko Grahovo down to Montenegro. Thus, the military sector held the major part of Serbia, the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina (without Prekounje and the municipalities of Neum and Trebinje), and Slavonia.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁸ I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 36-37, 59, and 76. D. Marijan, the aforementioned work, pp. 293-294.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 36-37. In relation to this, general Radakovic wrote: “**How much connection this had with the new organization of Yugoslavia – it is at least indicative**” (Ibid.)

The Southeast Military Sector suspended the Second (Nis) and Third (Skopje) armies, and the independent corps in Podgorica, and “covered” the territory of Macedonia, the southern part of Serbia, Kosovo, and Montenegro.¹⁰¹

The territorial division of the new military sectors completely neglected the borders of republics and provinces, and it corresponded to the projected borders of Greater Serbia. This could best be seen on the example of the Central and Southeast military sectors, which encompassed Serbia, Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro, the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the eastern and western Slavonia. In addition, under the excuse of operationally strategic reasons, the 9th Corps (the Knin Corps) was formed in Knin, which made the strongest land army force of the Adriatic Naval Military Sector, and approximately covered the “Serbian *Krajin*as” in Croatia, and partially in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The western borders of this military sector and the Knin Corps were approximately identical to the borders of the designed Greater Serbia, along Karlobag – Ogulin – Karlovac – Virovitica line.¹⁰² The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was divided in the space, which

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² M. Spigelj, the aforementioned work, pp. 44-45; S. Halilovic, **LUKAVA STRATEGIJA**, Sarajevo, 1997, pp. 69-70; S. Biserko, the aforementioned work, p. 219; D. Domazet Leso, **KAKO JE AGRESIJA PRIPREMANA AGRESIJA NA HRVATSKU ILI PREOBLIKOVANJE JNA U SRPSKU IMPEIJALNU SILU**, *Hrvatski vojnik*, August 1997, p.10; I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, p. 36-37.

This reorganization set forth the western border of the Greater Serbia along the following line: Karlobag – Karlovac – Virovitica. Determination of the border along this line, according to Admiral Domazet, was also accompanied by the new sectoral division in the following way:

“First sector + third sector + 2/3 of the naval sector = Greater Serbia“ (D. Domazet, the aforementioned work, p. 10).

This “pseudo-mathematical expression in the strategic sense“, according to Domazet, was the key of “snatching away the Danube and two thirds of the Adriatic from Croatia“ (Ibid.).

Slovenia, where only corps remained, was the only republic which opposed the suspension of the Ljubljana army district, which carried the traditions of the Ninth Slovenian Corps, and of the “*Boris Kidric*” 14th Proletarian Division, and the subjection to the military sector in Zagreb (this reorganization did not even retain the numerations of the 7th and 9th Slovenian corps from the People’s Liberation War). They also communicated their disagreement in writing to the Presidency of the SFRY. They

mainly fell under the **Central Military District** (Belgrade). The region south of the line Metkovic – Trebinje (the municipalities of

believed that suspension of the Army District in Ljubljana is a sign of mistrust against Slovenia – through reduction of Ljubljana to the level of a corps seat. However, their objections were not accepted (R. Dizdarevic, the aforementioned work, p. 149; S. Potocar, the aforementioned work, p.105; I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, p. 76).

The representatives of Slovenia, particularly the Slovenian generals (they even discussed this with Kadijevic), resisted and were decisively against such a reorganization, believing that the forthcoming changes were an attack against the equality and independence of the republics, full revision of the existing defence concept, and subjection of the Territorial Defence to the Army leadership. The Slovenian leadership, and Popit, as member of the Presidency of Slovenia, directly resisted this. The then President of the Presidency of the SFRY, Lazar Mojsov, requested that Slovenes agree with introduction of the commands of military sectors, and the army top, in terms of the defence issues, began playing the main role and the Presidency of the SFRY slowly stopped being the only and single commander of the armed Forces of Yugoslavia (I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 59, and 67-68).

This reorganization also suspended the Sarajevo Army District. Wondering why the seat of the First Sector was not in Sarajevo, Raif Dizdarevic asked Admiral Mamula, and later also general Kadijevic separately, why it was decided that the seat of this District be in Belgrade, rather than in Sarajevo. Both answered to him that such a solution was consistently insisted on by General Ljubcic when the new organization was accepted. In relation to this, they told Dizdarevic that such a decision was final and unchangeable, because it was allegedly a part of an overall solution, which was then largely already being implemented (R. Dizdarevic, the aforementioned work, p., 150). However, in a discussion in mid-2000, Mamula stated: “We believed that the former Belgrade and Sarajevo armies respectively need to be integrated under a single military sector command, which in peacetime would have a command place in Belgrade, and in the war in Bosnia, at one of the command places which were being built for this army“ (Interview with Branko Mamula, *Slobodna Bosna*, Sarajevo, no. 186, June 8, 2000, p. 23).

Admiral Branko Mamula claimed that **“it had nothing to do with Greater Serbian nationalism”**. In relation to this, he wrote: **”If we integrate, say, Vojvodina, which is multiethnic, exclude Serbia, except Belgrade and a part of Sumadija (a larger part of Serbia and Kosovo, as well as the whole Macedonia, belonged to the second army seated in Skopje), the part of Croatia from Mt. Papuk eastwards and the whole Bosnia populated by Serbs, Croats and Muslims, this multiethnicity of the area says that it has nothing to do with the Greater Serbian nationalism”**. (Interview with Branko Mamula, *Slobodna Bosna*, Sarajevo, no. 186, June 8, 2000, p. 23). Although he states that the program of changes in the structure of commanding began in 1982, and **“the nationalism in Serbia began more openly in 1986...”** (Ibid.), Mamula seemingly forgets that he was the one leading and completing the reorganization of the directing and command over the Armed Forces of the SFRY, exactly at the time when “Prince“ Milosevic was already heading the Greater Serbia movement.

Neum and Trebinje) fell under the **Naval Military Sector** (Split), and Prekounje fell under the **Northwest Military Sector** (Zagreb). Under these changes, divisions were suspended, and corps were formed. Thus, in the central part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the **4th Corps** (Sarajevo Corps) was formed, and the northern Bosnia and Herzegovina and a part of the SR Croatia (Slavonia up to the Pozega basin and Baranja) fell under the territorial competency of the **5th** (Banja Luka) **Corps** and the **17th** (Tuzla) **Corps**.¹⁰³

Suspension of armies and the majority of divisions, as well as formation of military districts with corps, and other changes arising from this, were not verified in practice, and therefore not ultimately implemented. However, from the very beginning, these measures imposed and caused strong reactions in the relevant army circles and in some republics. None of the measures from this complex were assessed as rational, and in particular application to the current situation in the society and the Armed Forces. The essence of the numerous and fierce remarks and objections against such a solution boiled down to the fact that such a solution was obviously **not dictated by operational and strategic needs** and reasons, but primarily by **certain political plans and goals**. Their implementation lay in the primary maximal narrowing down (if not complete eradication) of the influence of the republic state and political leaderships on the policy of development of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, the concept of organization, preparation and use, even in the case of the TO as their significant component and integral part, and in relation to which, pursuant to the Constitution and other regulations, it was the republics that had significant competences. Even a superficial look upon the complex of these measures leads to the conclusion that, exactly because they were dictated primarily by political goals (militant hegemony) and needs, such measures, in the military and expert sense, could be neither optimal nor rational.¹⁰⁴

The new military and territorial distribution (made in 1988/1989) had had some serious drawbacks in terms of both sizes and borders of the

¹⁰³ Z. Suljevic, **VOJNA STRATEGIJA UOCI AGRESIJE NA REPUBLIKU BOSNU I HERCEGOVINU** (manuscript), Ministry of Defence of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo, 1999, p. 36.

¹⁰⁴ I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, p. 32.

newly formed military districts, and in terms of their other characteristics. This could be best seen on the example of the **Central Military District**, seated in Belgrade, which encompassed the majority of the territory of Serbia, almost the whole territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and a part of the territory of Croatia. If this is to be looked at from the strategic aspect (often stated as a priority criterion), it is really hard to find rational reasons for their acceptance, particularly having in mind the earlier solutions that pertained to the regulation of the territory, commanding, cooperation with the government bodies, and the like. The suspension of the “armies”, in their role as highest operational and strategic groupings of the land army, was a problematic and irrational solution, not only due to some traditional and historical reasons (the “armies” also existed in the Serbian army, in the army of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, in the People’s Liberation War Forces, and in the post-war period JNA), but also because the districts, given their composition and strength, the strategic distribution on the Yugoslav territory, the character and preparedness of the territory they were covering and other factors, were more rational and more appropriate for Yugoslavia as an organizational and strategic solution.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁵ Ibid. The big drawback was that Slovenia and Bosnia and Herzegovina remained without operational and strategic commands over the Armed Forces. The military leadership, particularly Mamula and Kadijevic, as claimed by General Potocar, mostly cared about dissolving the Ninth (Ljubljana) Army. In any variant of command organization, one was supposed to have an army command in the centre of Yugoslavia – Sarajevo. In the central part of the country, it was necessary to have strong forces and strong commands, for many reasons, particularly because the central parts of Yugoslavia were to be defended with most resistance, where parts of other armies too could be found on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina (I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 218-220).

These and other precautions presented by Generals Stane Potocar, Mirkovic, Atanasovski, Spegelj, Lukezic, Pozderac, Jerkic and Petric, and then commanders of the armies and of the republic TO headquarters, were not accepted in practice after 1987. (Ibid.).

By the concept of leading of a general national defence war, the commands of armies are a better solution than the commands of military districts, through which one reached a single-effort armed combat, particularly in the early stage of the war, and then, during further activity, in case of transition to the combined form of the armed combat, to remain with the past systematic, legal and theoretical solutions, that is, that the commands of armies unite all combat activities in a given section of the so-called frontline, and the Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence on temporarily occupied territory. The Supreme command would coordinate and guide these two segments (I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, p.217).

In such reorganization, the commands of the military districts were subjected directly by line of command to the Federal Secretary for National Defence, that is, his General Staff. The headquarters of the Territorial Defence of the republics and provinces (in the operational sense) were subjected to the commands of the military districts, instead to the Supreme command (the Presidency of the SFRY), and the headquarters of zones of the Territorial Defence to the commands of corps of JNA, which is the essence of reorganization on subjection of the Territorial Defence to the military top, that is, the JNA. Another thing that was changed was the so-far claim that the forces on temporarily occupied territories were necessarily commanded by the headquarters of the Territorial Defence, because this was allegedly in contradiction with the **“with the relevant principle of the new organization of command, that the commands of military districts command all the forces on the military district territory, regardless of it being partially (or predominantly) possessed by the aggressor forces”**. Hence, the republics were deprived of their constitutional right in competencies regarding the Territorial Defence (the right to instruct them). This meant exclusion of the republic leaderships from the system of directing and command over the armed forces and the armed combat.¹⁰⁶ This completely broke up the constitutional concept of the

¹⁰⁶ M. Spigelj, the aforementioned work, p.45; S. Potocar, the aforementioned work, p.105; V. Kadjevic, the aforementioned work, p.77; B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, pp. 1-6; I. Dolnicar, the aforementioned work, p. 269; D. Marijan, the aforementioned work, p. 291).

The decision on preliminary subjection of the headquarters of the Territorial Defence of the republics to the newly formed commands of military districts, and the TO headquarters to the commands of corps was, according to General Radakovic, **“a segment of the global solution for reorganization of command on the operational and strategic level”**, thereby excluding the republic and provincial leaderships from the policy of development, preparation and provision of material assets and technical equipment to the armed forces. These were obviously primarily reasons of political nature, and not some urgent operational and strategic needs. This could also be seen from the fact that the problem of unifying forces on a certain military district area, their use, and command had already been fairly regulated (in the eighties), and therefore there was no need to bring such a decision (I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 32-33).

Having the most numerous, strongest and best organized Territorial Defence in the SFRY, Bosnia and Herzegovina was opposing such efforts – the political and state leadership was unanimous in that approach. Raif Dizdarevic also participated in such

defence of the SFRY, and undermined the system of directing and command over the armed forces, in which the whole fraud was lying, and this was in line with Kadijevec's statement on the Territorial Defence as **"a big trick"**.¹⁰⁷

This ultimately Unitarian reorganization caused big displeasure in the republics. The most resistance against this reorganization was offered by Slovenia (which "had gone" under Zagreb) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (which "had gone" under Belgrade), whose autonomies were subjected to other republics (according to Mamula, Slovenia and Croatia **"had lost commands of the armies"**). Kosovo and Montenegro offered much objection, which were subjected to Skopje. Montenegro did not have an army, but the independent corps in Titograd was under a similar status. Its subjection to the command of the military sector in Skopje instead of Belgrade was met with resistance.¹⁰⁸

discussions, in his capacity of the President of the Presidency and the General National Defence Council of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,. In reference to this, he claims that other republics too were opposing to subjection of the Territorial Defence to the Army. According to him, everyone **"insisted on the (constitutional – note by editor) solution that the responsibility for building and for managing this defence is to be vested in the republics and provinces. We believed that the unity of the Armed Forces was to be provided through coordination, and in war through single command"** (R. Dizdarevic, the aforementioned work, p. 152; S. Potocar, the aforementioned work, p. 110).

¹⁰⁷ S. Biserko, the aforementioned work, pp. 219-220; I. Dolnicar, the aforementioned work, p. 269. Such solutions, according to Kadijevec, **"have at least to some extent disrupted the already smoothly established control of the republics and provinces over their Territorial Defence and have largely reduced their already legalized influence onto the JNA. This is why the Slovenes have so fiercely resisted such a solution, and to such extent that it has finally been brought even without their consent"** (V. Kadijevec, the aforementioned work, p. 78). This claim of Kadijevec was contradictory, and that, according to Domazet, **"also proves how much the military establishment was an independent political factor and intentionally disrupted the main principles of the JNA about the armed forces of all nations and minority groups, thus converting itself in a planned way into an imperial Serbian military force much earlier than the dissolution of Yugoslavia would happen"** (Ibid.).

¹⁰⁸ I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 36-37, and 67-68; I. Dolnicar, the aforementioned work, p. 269; S. Biserko, the aforementioned work, pp. 219-220; B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, p. 64. According to General Potocar, the SSNO took advantage of the economic and social crisis in order to turn some things backwards in

Placing the headquarters of the Territorial Defence of the republics and provinces and the zone headquarters (not only in operational terms) under the commands of military districts and corps were the main reasons for resistance on the part of the republics. The constitutional position of the republics was significantly disrupted. The bearers of resistance (particularly in Slovenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina) believed that this reorganization of the JNA was the revision of the concept of the general national defence in the field of command and organization of units. The reactions to such reorganization were justified, because many believed, including a large number of generals, that it in essence dissolved the unity of the armed forces and destabilized relations between the federal centre and the republics.¹⁰⁹

During 1988, particularly in the second half of the year, preparations were made for a complete transfer to the new organizational and formational changes, with huge personnel changes.¹¹⁰

In 1988, the military leadership renamed the General Staff of the JNA into the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, aiming to set the General Staff as a superior headquarters to all the headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, not only the JNA headquarters, which was only one component of the Armed Forces of the SFRY. In this way, the headquarters of the Territorial Defence in the republics and

the concept of the general national defence, to devaluate the role of the Territorial Defence, liquidate the Partisan echelon, suspend the districts and divisions, and leave two republics (Slovenia and Bosnia and Herzegovina) without operational and strategic commands. Advantage was given to aviation over anti-aircraft defence, as well as to large armament systems, and the tradition from the People's Liberation War was also disrupted (I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, p. 220).

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ R. Dizdarevic, **OD SMRTI TITA DO SMRTI JUGOSLAVIJE**, p. 400. The aforementioned organizational and formational changes came into effect on January 1, 1989. Instead of Admiral Branko Mamula, who had initiated and lead those changes and was pensioned on May 15, 1988, the office of the Federal Secretary for National Defence, at Mamula's proposal, was filled in by his deputy – general Veljko Kadijevec, who completed those changes, and the office of the deputy was filled in by Admiral Stane Brovet (Ibid.). General Blagoje Adzic, upon the proposal of General Kadijevec, in May 1989, was selected the Chief of Staff of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY (Ibid.; Same Author, **IZDAJA VOJNOG VRHA**, pp. 147-148).

provinces were placed as headquarters subjected to the new General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY.¹¹¹ Through this fraud, the republics were deprived of the capacity of defence entities and lost the right to use their own resources to defend their sovereignty.

The decision was passed and implemented to dissolve the TO of Kosovo (some 60,000 people), because, according to Kadijevic, it was allegedly predominantly composed of **“separatist forces”**. Following that, **“a much smaller Territorial Defence of Kosovo was to be created, consisting of pro-Yugoslav members”** (7,000 people, whereas the rest were deleted from the TO lists).¹¹²

The Army General, Veljko Kadijevic, was born on November 21, 1925, in Imotski (Croatia). During his service, he had held a number of important superior offices at the Armed Forces of the SFRY. He was at the office of the Federal Secretary for National Defence from May 15, 1988 to January 6, 1992, when he resigned from this position due to alleged health problems. By the decision of the “lame” Presidency of the SFRY, dated February 25, 1992, he was pensioned with a large group of JNA generals. These generals were also that no longer fit into the concept of the “trimmed” Yugoslavia, that is, of Greater Serbia.

Mamula personally bore full responsibility for appointments of generals Kadijevic and Adzic to the highest positions at the JNA (B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, p. 153).

¹¹¹ M. Spegelj, **PRVA FAZA RATA...**, pp. 42-43; Same Author, **SJECANJA VOJNIKA**, p. 178. This decision on the renaming of the General Staff of the JNA into the General Staff of the Forces of the SFRY was arbitrarily brought by Admiral Branko Mamula, in his capacity of the Federal Secretary for National Defence.

¹¹² Ibid.; M. Spegelj, **PRVA FAZA RATA ...**, p. 45; S. Biserko, the aforementioned work, p. 218; B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, pp. 36 and 41.

The military leadership, headed by Admiral Mamula, dissolved the TO of Kosovo, where, in addition to the military conscripts engaged in the TO (60,000) there were 250,000 more non-deployed. With this goal, General Asim Hodzic (Chief of Staff of the TO Administration in the General Staff), with a group of officers in Kosovo, studied the situation, and proposed that the TO be reduced to a total of 7,000 conscripts, and that all others be deleted from the TO lists (B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, p. 41).

According to Mamula, **“Kosovo brought into question the concept of Territorial Defence in a multiethnic community with mutually conflicting ethnic groups”**. Therefore, they proceeded with **“the practical solution of the problem”**, by **“actually dissolving”** the Territorial Defence of Kosovo. In order to **“retain the appearance of the Kosovo TO”**, they retained **“the headquarters and only several thousand staff of verified people”** (Ibid., p. 42).

The dissolution and reorganization of the TO of Kosovo, as one of the “major” measures brought by the top state and military leadership, needs to be viewed in the context of the policy conducted towards this province, that is, in connection with other measures and actions arising from such policy, and not only as a primary expert military solution. In spite of the assumption that in an unfavourable situation the Kosovo TO could be used in case of interethnic conflicts too, the manner in which this decision was enforced, and in particular the explanations given by Kadijevic, rightfully raise suspicion as to the justification of its dissolution. How justified these suspicions and dilemmas were can also be seen from his explanation in which he states that, “**after its dissolution, a much smaller Territorial Defence of Kosovo was to be created, consisting of pro-Yugoslav members**”,¹¹³ indicating clearly the true sense and goal of such a decision. Kadijevic did not mind the TO as a form of military organization (which he previously attacked and disputed), only provided that it is composed of “**pro-Yugoslav members**” and that its functioning and activity fit into an already designed concept of so-called transformation of the existing armed forces and their maximal political instrumentalization.¹¹⁴

In addition to this, the military leadership passed an internal plan for the withdrawal of military conscripts from Kosovo in case of danger of war, in order to disburden “**the most significant part of the Southeast Military Sector of the mass of people of whose conduct**” they were not sure of. They had the cover for this part of their Kosovo plan in a similar withdrawal of the demographic surplus of conscripts from Vojvodina and Slavonia into the depth of the state territory – into Bosnia and Serbia.¹¹⁵ This too was one of the major shocks to the constitutional concept of the Armed Forces of the SFRY.

¹¹³ V. Kadijevic, the aforementioned work, p. 78; I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, p. 33.

¹¹⁴ I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, p.33. Kadijevic’s expression “pro-Yugoslav” is translated by General Radakovic with “pro-Unitarian” members.

¹¹⁵ B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, p. 42. These plans “**did not pass in the negotiations in Novi Sad and Zagreb, however, they were logical for us and we operationalized them**”, wrote Admiral Mamula (Ibid.)

The committees for general national defence and social self-protection were dissolved, which, according to Kadijevic, **“meant the removal of one risk which brought confusion into the general management of the national defence system and command over the armed forces”**.¹¹⁶

Dissolution of the “armies” and introduction of corps, with the reorganization of command in the Armed Forces of the SFRY was no military strategic or organizational need, involving on the contrary, reasons of political nature.¹¹⁷ The goal was to break up the existing constitutional defence concept of the SFRY. All measures were intended to serve the centralization, in neutralizing and suspending the Territorial Defence, accompanied by certain staffing consequences. The Domination of Serbian staff was more than obvious. Most key positions were held by Serbs, such as: Zivota Avramovic, Milutin Kukanjac, Mile Kandic, Nikola Uzelac, Savo Jankovic, and the like.¹¹⁸

The structure and the size of the Armed Forces of the SFRY were, after 1988, the following:

¹¹⁶ V. Kadijevic, the aforementioned work, p. 78. Formation of the Committees for general national defence and social self-protection, in practice, according to Kadijevic, **“meant one more huge shock onto the unity of command over the armed forces”**. This was actually not the case, just like there is no room at all for Kadijevic’s **“babbling”** about the reasons for their formation and complication in the system of directing and command: **“The real motives for their formation were that the SKJ (League of Communists) wished to take over the management of all defence affairs through them, including the control and command over the armed forces. The formal and public explanation of their formation was a quite different thing. This is why a big confusion happened in this area, a conflict of jurisdictions with other institutions of defence and public protection, and further complication of the already far too complicated system of directing and command, and thus an increased degree of its non-functionality”** (Ibid., p. 74).

¹¹⁷ S. Biserko, the aforementioned work, p. 220; R. Dizdarevic, **OD SMRTI TITA DO SMRTI JUGOSLAVIJE**, pp. 400-401; S. Potocar, the aforementioned work, p. 213. In reference to this, Dizdarevic wrote: **“... the reasons for the reorganization were not only the military strategic ones, they were also political in nature; with possible far-reaching consequences”** (Ibid.).

¹¹⁸ I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 67-68; S. Biserko, the aforementioned work, p. 220.

The JNA's size was, in times of peace: 180,000 people (15%); in times of war: 1,200,000 people (85%);

The TO's size was, in times of peace: approx. 1,000 people (2%); in times of war approx. 1,200,000 (98%).¹¹⁹

The Land Army (KoV) of the JNA had the following composition: 17 corps of JNA; one Guard division (First Guard Division – Belgrade) and one parachute combat brigade (the 63rd Parachuting Brigade – Nis) as independent units of the General Staff; 2,100 tanks; 1,000 armoured vehicles; 8,000 pieces of artillery and 1,300 anti-tank rocket launchers.¹²⁰

The Yugoslav Navy (JRM) had the following composition: one brigade of torpedo-equipped vessels (14 pieces), one brigade of rocket-equipped vessels and ships (16 pieces), one brigade of patrol boats (4 pieces), one unit of minesweepers (9 pieces), one brigade of submarines (11 pieces), one platoon of naval commandos, and three brigades of naval infantry.¹²¹

The Air Force and Anti-Aircraft Defence (RV i PVO) had the following composition: three corps – the 5th Corps of RV and PVO (Zagreb); the 1st Corps of RV and PVO (Belgrade), and the 3rd Corps of RV and PVO (Nis); the aircraft; 512 fighters and 104 transport airplanes; 152 helicopters; 118 of other types of aircraft; and 5,100 anti-aircraft guns and 2,800 anti-aircraft rockets of various types and calibres (small, medium and high range).¹²²

The changes to the laws on obligatory service and on general national defence in the spring of 1991 further narrowed down the jurisdictions of the socio-political entities. Their function was taken over by the newly

¹¹⁹ ∴ **RAT U HRVATSKOJ I BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI 1991-1995**, edited by Branka Magas and Ivo Zanic, Zagreb-Sarajevo 1999, Chart No. 2: **Struktura i brojnost Oruzanih snaga SFRY u miru i ratu**. Thus, the Armed Forces of the SFRY in wartime (with all potentials) had a size of 2,400,000, of which some 550,000 were in production and logistics, and the rest in combat units.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Ibid.

formed military territorial authorities (military districts and military departments). The system of preparation and implementation of general national defence excluded the socio-political organizations and workers, and the Territorial Defence was reduced to being a “**the special segment of the armed forces**”.

THE LAW AMENDING THE LAW ON MILITARY OBLIGATIONS passed on April 26, 1991,¹²³ transferred all the affairs related to obligatory service from the competent bodies in the republics and autonomous provinces onto the new military territorial authorities. Instead of the entities of associated workforce, local communities, other self-management organizations and communities, socio-political and social organization, socio-political entities and their organs, the “**military territorial authorities of enterprises, local communities and other organizations and communities, were responsible**” for provision of obligatory service and military duties.¹²⁴

The military territorial authorities instituted by the Federal Secretary for National Defence, instead of the competent organs in the republics and autonomous provinces, were the ones whose role it was to secure “**the enforcement of military duties on the territory they were formed for, coordinate enforcement of those duties with the exercise of other rights and duties in the area of general national defence on a given territory, and in relation to this, implementation of required measures and cooperation with competent bodies of the socio-political entity**”. The competent military territorial authority, in

¹²³ **ZAKON O IZMJENAMA I DOPUNAMA ZAKONA O VOJNOJ OBAVEZI**, *Sluzbeni list SFRJ*, no. 30, dated April 26, 1991, pp. 357-358. Following the provisions to Article 315, paragraph 3, of the Constitution of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, on April 26, 1991, the Presidency of the SFRY issued the UKAZ O PROGLASENJU ZAKONA O IZMJENAMA I DOPUNAMA ZAKONA O VOJNOJ OBAVEZI, adopted by the Assembly of the SFRY at the session of the Federal Council on April 26, 1991. On April 26, 1991, the Decree was personally signed by Dr. Borisav Jovic (President of the Presidency of the SFRY), and Dr. Slobodan Gligorijevic (President of the Assembly of the SFRY). A by-law was passed determining that by June 1991, preparatory actions and enforcement of this law were to be carried out (According to a statement by Nihad Halilbegovic, Secretary of the Secretariat for National Defence of the City of Sarajevo, given to the author).

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 357.

addition to the aforementioned affairs, instead of the competent municipal body, also kept military records of military conscripts and conducted other tasks related to the keeping of military records as provided by the mentioned law.¹²⁵

Instead of the competent bodies in the republics and autonomous provinces, the military territorial authority implemented the recruitment plans. All the recruitment duties (examinations, tests and the like) were exercised upon request of the competent military territorial authority (prior to this, upon request of the competent body in the republic or autonomous province). Recruiting was exercised by Recruiting Commissions formed by the competent military territorial authority, instead of being formed by the competent body in the republic or autonomous province. Recruits were selected to attend schools for reserve officers were by a commission formed by the competent military territorial authority, instead of – as it had been before – by the competent body in the republic or autonomous province.¹²⁶

Postponement of military service, organization and execution of military exercises, travel and stays of military conscripts abroad, record keeping for military conscripts, procedure of provision of obligatory service, and other activities, were conducted by the military territorial authorities instead of the competent bodies in the republics or provinces.¹²⁷

THE LAW AMENDING THE LAW ON GENERAL NATIONAL DEFENCE dated May 15, 1991,¹²⁸ mainly excluded the local communities from the system of preparation and exercise of general national defence

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Ibid., pp. 357-358.

¹²⁸ **ZAKON O IZMJENAMA I DOPUNAMA ZAKONA O OPSTENARODNOJ ODBRANI**, *Sluzbeni list SFRJ*, no. 35, dated May 17, 1991, pp. 592-596. Pursuant to Article 315, paragraph 3, of the Constitution of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, on May 15, 1991, the Presidency of the SFRY issued the UKAZ O PROGLASENJU ZAKONA O IZMJENAMA I DOPUNAMA ZAKONA O OPSTENARODNOJ ODBRANI. On the same day, THE UKAZ O PROGLASENJU ZAKONA O IZMJENAMA I DOPUNAMA ZAKONA O OPSTENARODNOJ ODBRANI (from 1982) was signed by Dr. Borislav Jovic (President of the Presidency of the SFRY), and Dr. Slobodan Gligorijevic (President of the Assembly of the SFRY). – Ibid.

and social self-protection,¹²⁹ thereby limiting the participation of broader entities in preparations for war and immediate war danger.

This also indicates the reasons for the suspension of the Territorial Defence units at the level of local communities, which prevented organization of massive resistance by the population in the case of war.

The Associations and unions of reserve military officers, as well as organizations in the areas of technique and sports and other organizations, and their activities in relation to the tasks of general national defence and social self-protection were excluded from the legal scope.¹³⁰ This particularly related to the restriction of involvement of all of their members in general national defence and social self-protection, which meant the exclusion of all the organizations, which could have a significant contribution to the defence of the country.

The workers were in essence excluded from the system of general national defence.¹³¹ Socio-political and other social organizations and associations of citizens were also excluded from preparations for their activities in times of war or in case of immediate war danger and other extraordinary circumstances, as well as in terms of their other tasks in the domain of general national defence and social self-protection.¹³²

The League of Communists, the Socialist Union of the Working People of Yugoslavia, the Union of the Socialist Youth of Yugoslavia, were excluded from the domain of the general national defence and social self-protection, as well as other socio-political organizations and associations¹³³ and Committees for general national defence and social self-protection.¹³⁴

The powers of the Federal Secretariat for National Defence in inspection in the domain of general national defence (“...in enforcement

¹²⁹ Ibid., p. 593.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Ibid., pp. 593-594.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

of the federal laws and other federal regulations, and plans and measures of the bodies and organizations of the Federation...”) were also expanded **to include the tasks related to the exercise of military duties**.¹³⁵ The Military Council excluded all commanders of the Territorial Defence of the republics and autonomous provinces,¹³⁶ which meant that the army had taken over all the competencies of directing and command over the general national defence and social self-protection.

From the broadest form of organized armed general national resistance, the Territorial Defence came to be defined only as a **“special part of the armed forces”**. Organization of the Territorial Defence in base level and other entities of associated workforce (enterprises) and local communities was excluded.¹³⁷

The commanders of the Territorial Defence of the republics and autonomous provinces were appointed and dismissed by the Presidency of the SFRY (“as the highest body of directing and command over the armed forces”), **“following the opinion by the President or the Presidency of the republic”**.¹³⁸ This narrowed down the room for broader consultation and precluded the former proposal from the competent republic or provincial body of the Territorial Defence. The commander of the territorial defence of the republic/province appointed the commanders of the Territorial Defence in municipalities and other socio-political entities in the republics or autonomous provinces,¹³⁹ without any consultation with higher structures.

135 Ibid.

136 Ibid.

137 Ibid.

138 Ibid.

139 Ibid.

3. The Illegal Headquarters of Supreme Command

Having become an independent factor beyond the framework of control by civilian structures of power after the death of the Supreme Commander (Josip Broz Tito), the military leadership presented its opinions and assessments of the current situation in the country and the status in the army (“**...an evaluation... of the most important events and decisive moments...**”), as well as its views on the problems in defence, which derived from such a situation in the country. The army leadership was fully politicised interfered in this way with the political life of the country and influenced political decision making on “the future of Yugoslavia”. These assessments, in particular the interpretations by General Kadijevic, on the developments in Yugoslav society and the armed forces, were subjective, dogmatic and unilateral.¹⁴⁰

The system of socialist self-management and the organization of the state in the SFRY were, according to Kadijevic, in function of the break-up of the SFRY. For Kadijevic, socialist self-management was “**the so-called self-management, which, among other things, had more utopian ideas than the famous utopist Robert Owen**”, and which, according to him, had created fertile soil for “**the creation of ethnic states, that is, for economic preparations and preconditions leading to the dissolution of the SFRY.**”¹⁴¹

¹⁴⁰ V. Kadijevic, the aforementioned work, pp. 35-36, and the like; I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 2, and 68; B. Jovic, **POSLEDNJI DANI SFRJ**, second edition, Kragujevac 1996, p. 286 and others; D. Marijan, **ORUZANE SNAGE SFRJ...**, p. 354. Admiral Branko Mamula and Generals Veljko Kadijevic and Blagoje Adzic, in the assessment of general S. Potocar, were just pure fanatics (I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, p. 68).

¹⁴¹ V. Kadijevic, the aforementioned work, pp. 53-71, and 158. “**The practical consequence of this system**” which “**formally looked like an antipode to the real**

Kardelj's concept of Yugoslavia, accepted in the 1960s, also called by Kadijevic "the concept of dissolution", was according to him a disastrous one. The decision to abandon the policy, which had secured victory in the People's Liberation War and **"gathered the nations of Yugoslavia into one state, and secured the for such a Yugoslavia highest absolute and relative progress in its history to-date"**, according to Kadijevic, was **"of course the most wrongful and most lethal of all in the life of 'second Yugoslavia'"**. According to him, Tito took this decision. He had, as leader of the SKJ and as the Chief of State, also accepted the **"concept of dissolution of the federal state"**¹⁴². This assertion is, however, not correct.

For the military leadership, and particularly for general Kadijevic, the 1974 Constitution **"presented the legal framework"** for the dissolution of Yugoslavia, whose **"consistent application had 'imminently and legally'"** led the country into dissolution. The objective of this constitution was, according to him, to create **"a legal basis for the dissolution of Yugoslavia"**, and prevent the federal state from functioning effectively.¹⁴³

The 1974 SFRY Constitution, **"as well as the legal, political, and economic system of the country based on it"** provided, according to Kadijevic, **"the most significant contribution to the further process of dissolution of the SFRY"**. In the legal system, **"the biggest mistakes – those that contributed the most to the break-up"**, according to Kadijevic, were related to **"the dissolution and total paralysis of the federation"**. In reference to this, **"an exceptionally negative role"**, as Kadijevic claimed, **"was played by the construed institution of the Presidency of the SFRY, as the Chief of State, with jurisdictions and powers, or rather lacking powers that could be applied, which**

socialism of the Eastern European type", was, according to Kadijevic, **"only increased anarchy, [together with the] expulsion of competent people from the economy as technocrats and anti-self-management factors, the dissipation of the economy with the highest possible degree of autarchy, which all presented fertile soil for the creation of ethnic economies as the economic precondition for the creation of ethnic states, that is, as an economic preparation and assumption for the dissolution of the SFRY"** (Ibid., p. 158).

¹⁴² Ibid., pp. 53-71.

¹⁴³ Ibid., pp. 65-68, and 108.

had virtually left the country without a leadership”.¹⁴⁴

For the Yugoslav army, which was **“faced with many serious and difficult problems, the major problem was”**, according to Kadijevic, **“the non-existence of an actual state which would carry out its part of the duties in times of war, and of a real supreme commander in the institution of the Yugoslav Presidency”**. The more so, because **“certain members”** of the Presidency had allegedly **“conducted negative activities against Yugoslavia and against the JNA”**, and which, among other things, **“made normal command [of the Army] impossible”**.¹⁴⁵

The **“break-up of the second Yugoslavia”** began, according to Kadijevic, with the **“errors”** in the ethnic balance policy, made in the early 1960s.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 158. This “blatant stupidity” was later supplemented by Kadijevic in adding some **“even more blatant stupidities on the dying out of the state and taking up of its functions by certain self-management entities”**, with which **“the picture of the misery of the Yugoslav federation, into which its creators have pushed it, became complete”** (Ibid.).

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., pp. 94-95, and 164-165. General Kadijevic wrote about the JNA as **“an army without a state”**, although he had stayed and progressed in it for a long time. In an army which **“was left without a country it should belong to, first legally, through the 1974 Constitution and other appropriate laws, and then even in fact”**, since 1974, from when, according to him, the JNA became **“an army without a state”**, until 1992 (i.e. over a period of 18 years), he was promoted into the highest ranks, and finally was member and commander of the forces for the “defence” against the break-up of the SFRY, which, as he said, had never existed! According to him, the SFRY and the JNA had been destroyed by an insurmountable crises for 30 years (i.e., even as early as 1962), and the very break-up of the SFRY and the JNA lasted for 18 years. Moreover, in such a situation, he was leading **“an army without a state”**? (V. Kadijevic, the aforementioned work, pp. 5, 76, and 94-95).

The power system of the federation, **“without true and clear constitutional powers, lacking personal charisma and the required efficiency of federal institutions had”**, according to Admiral Mamula, **“had barely existed”**. In addition, according to him, **“in the critical period”**, when **“the leadership over the country was taken over by the collective state leadership”**, the army was left **“without a supreme commander”**. For him, **“the collective supreme commander of thirty-something members was an ugly creature facing the JNA and the armed forces after [Marshall] Tito had left”** (B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, p. 14; D. Marijan, the aforementioned work, p. 354).

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., pp. 157-158. These alleged errors, as written by Kadijevic: **“had focused the general development towards the restriction and ‘suffocation’ of common**

In the break-up of Yugoslavia, according to Kadijevec, the following processes had also played a significant role: the introduction of a multi-party system, the influence of big powers – in particular of the USA and Germany, **“the dissolution of the two-pole global structure”**, **“territorial aspirations of some neighbouring countries towards certain parts of Yugoslav territory”**, the activities of the West headed by the USA in destroying the socialist order, and the like.¹⁴⁷

Speaking about factors dominating the break-up process of the SFRY, Kadijevec gives priority to the **“internal factor”**, although **“both [the internal and the external factor] were mutually integrated and dependent”**. In connection with this, he claimed, **“without strong, decisive activity of the external factors, the developments in Yugoslavia would surely not have happened as they have. If nothing else, the separation of individual nations from Yugoslavia would have to happen along much more formal lines, and therefore, with much less blood, maybe even without any serious bloodshed.”**¹⁴⁸

Such an assessment by Kadijevec **“on the significance and interdependence of influences by internal and external factors onto the break-up of the SFRY”** had, according to him, **“general value”** and related **“to the whole process in both content and duration”**. However, **when characterizing this general position towards the flow of events in the final stage of the break-up of Yugoslavia**, Kadijevec claims that **“the foreign factor had taken the more decisive role in managing the Yugoslav crisis, determining the contents and the methods of break-up of the SFRY, after the dissolution of the USSR had begun, when it became clear that the USSR no longer controlled even its internal processes, and that in**

interests of the Yugoslav nations, and towards support and development of the national ones, what imminently lead to the deterioration of the mutual relations ranging up to conflicts of all sorts. This created an ideal environment for the emergence of national, rather than Yugoslav, policies and their leaders, and so the momentum was gaining speed with any new significant development, heading towards conflict and division” (Ibid., p. 158).

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., 159-161.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 161.

particular it cannot influence the processes within spheres of its former vital foreign interests”.¹⁴⁹

Such mythical, firm and strongly negative assessments, in particularly by general Kadijevic, arose from the conclusion that a special war was being waged in Yugoslavia, that **“the management of events in Yugoslavia was predominantly taken over by the ‘foreign factor’”**, that the case involved a counter-revolution, an ever deeper and broader political crisis, and which, **“through a bloody civil war”** would **“imminently”** lead to the dissolution of Yugoslavia, at the point where the military leadership insisted upon a change of the role of the federal Presidency, because the causes were to be found in the drawbacks within the system. In relation to this, they claimed that the essence of all these problems was in the leadership of the country, since Yugoslavia allegedly had no federal institutions of state leadership. They repeated the opinion that, at the level of the Federation, there was no institution to lead the state and that there was need for a change in the role and competences of the Presidency of Yugoslavia, in order to fit with the new circumstances, and that it was the only authority that can take on the role of leading the country out of the crisis. The essence of such manner of through and suggestion was a Unitarian one.¹⁵⁰ It is impossible that these positions

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ R. Dizdarevic, **IZDAJA VOJNOG VRHA**, pp. 156 and 163; Ibid., **OD SMRTI TITA DO SMRTI JUGOSLAVIJE**, pp. 401-409; V. Kadijevic, the aforementioned work, pp. 35-36; I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 36, and 60. According to R. Dizdarevic, in the Presidency this was **“politically and in general unacceptable, and also unrealistic...”**.

“When one analyses the competencies of the Presidency of the SFRY, that is, passing of conclusions or recommendations, selection of the members of the Presidency and their verification, the collective and individual responsibility”, according to Kadijevic, the Yugoslav state was **“clearly left without a Chief of state, that is, without leadership”**. This **“lack of state system”**, according to him, had proven to be **“of crucial nature”**. **“Recognizing this”**, in preparation of constitutional changes in 1988, and **“faced with the crisis in the country which had already up to that time destroyed the social and even more the state tissue of Yugoslavia”**, the military leadership **“was pointing exactly towards this danger”** and proposing **“constitutional changes related to the jurisdiction and functioning of the Presidency of the SFRY”**. The first time, they were refused, **“with a slight admonishment”** that they do not understand it well enough. When they proposed such changes for the second time,

were not influenced by his connections with certain factors within the USSR, particularly the conspiracy group of Yazov.

“**Sensing**” the danger “**of civil war and scattering of Yugoslavia**”, the military leadership had “**developed**” the role of the JNA more precisely in fighting the “**internal enemy**”. Its general assessment was that “**violations of constitutional order were massive in scale, [and] that the country is facing chaos and a civil war**”, advocating in favour of “**consistent**” implementation of the constitutional order through application of the Constitution of the SFRY and measures “**against anyone who may not abide by it**”.¹⁵¹

The radical reduction of external threats¹⁵² and the negative internal developments gave constantly growing emphasis on the **constitutional** role of the Armed Forces in the defence of the constitutionally established order. This meant that the military leadership was more focused on the internal state in the country than on external aspects of security and quality of defence against external dangers, which, particularly in the future, implied certain grave dangers.¹⁵³

“The Mamula doctrine” (developed in 1982-1988) relied on the conservative forces of the USSR in external relations, and on the JNA in

and this time to the Constitutional Commission and the Presidency of the SFRY, they were refused again, “**with an unhidden qualification**” of this proposal as a “**Unitarian**” one (V. Kadijevic, the aforementioned work, pp. 65-66).

¹⁵¹ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 116-118, 132-133, 236-239, 247, 265-269, 276-278, 286-294, and others.

¹⁵² R. Dizdarevic, **IZDAJA VOJNOG VRHA**, pp. 55. Due to its geostrategic position, Yugoslavia was facing a realistic danger from the outside for a long time, particularly in the Cold War era, due to which it constantly strengthened its defence capacity. With the process of easing of tensions between the blocks, and with efforts to and strengthening of the process of negotiation and agreement between the East and the West, the strategic significance of the Yugoslav territory was reduced, and the interest in Yugoslavia, from this aspect, also went downwards (Ibid.).

¹⁵³ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 406-407; R. Dizdarevic, **IZDAJA VOJNOG VRHA**, p. 55. The JNA was systematically prepared for “internal interventions in certain republics”. The authors of the secret plans and the scenario makers of these efforts found it favourable that for a time they had the auspices of the key people in the Presidency of the SFRY (S. Potocar, the aforementioned work, pp. 105-106).

internal relations, in order for it to take over the role of the referee in the rearrangement of the state. In 1985, the arguments for the strengthening of the JNA due to external danger became weaker (with the meeting between Gorbachev and Reagan), because the danger from “**an attack against Yugoslavia with radical aims**” was disappearing,¹⁵⁴ and the “single” armed forces of the SFRY were increasingly focused on soothing internal unrests. All was done so that preparations for internal conflicts would not show.

The crisis and precarious future financing of the army had affected the general mood in the military leadership, which in turn led to the feeling of material insecurity in the military, and hence to the feeling that the JNA does not have equal support in everyone in Yugoslavia.¹⁵⁵

In 1989, the military leadership implacably stood on the side of the “Greater Serbia” nationalist policy of the Serbian leadership and Slobodan Milosevic personally.¹⁵⁶ This leadership, including general

¹⁵⁴ B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, p. 65. In relation to this, admiral Mamula wrote: “**Two superpowers began negotiations on disarmament, reduction of tensions and construction of mutual trust. In 1985, the first meeting between Gorbachev and Reagan happened in Reykjavik. Discussion began on the issue of removal of mid-range and small-range missiles in Europe, and on the reduction of conventional forces and armament of both military blocks. The issue of the reduction of total nuclear potentials of opposing powers was still open. The war between the blocks was losing intensity**” (Ibid.).

Even in the first half of 1991, the JNA was also acting in accordance with “the Mamula Doctrine” (S. Biserko, the aforementioned work, p. 219).

¹⁵⁵ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 408.

¹⁵⁶ R. Dizdarevic, **IZDAJA VOJNOG VRHA**, pp. 157 and 162; V. Zarkovic, **ZAOKRUZENJE SRPSKIH ZEMALJA**, in: F. Ademovic, the aforementioned work, p. 56; S. Potocar, **UROTA GENERALSTABA PROTIV NARODA**, in: F. Ademovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 105-106; A. Lukezic, **KRVAVA BESPUCA JNA**, in: F. Ademovic, the aforementioned work, p. 70; B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, pp. 159-160.

General Kadijevic sided along with the stronger – with Milosevic, who indeed seemed to be the strongest. In his regime, the federal secretary saw the stronger side, **stepping on it and accepting the “Greater Serbia” concept**. With this concept, according to Mamula, he had “**wasted away the JNA**“, which, after being left by the Slovenes, Croats, Bosniaks and others –“**really became ‘Greater Serbian’**” (an interview with Branko Mamula, *Slobodna Bosna*, Sarajevo, no. 186, June 8, 2000, p. 25).

Kadijevic in person, was in an inferior position to Milosevic.¹⁵⁷

In accordance with the Greater Serbia project, the military leadership was in favour of **“a quick creation of a new Yugoslavia”**.¹⁵⁸ The main motivation for such a position, according to Kadijevic, **“was not only in**

Kadijevic, as stated by Mamula, gave up **“at the critical point, in 1991, when he readily came to the point when he should break even and take on the risk”**. In Mamula’s opinion, there were three factors that acted in parallel: Kadijevic was not a general of decisions but of implementation, he did not believe in the capacity of the JNA to exercise his decision and he did not believe that the JNA should keep those nations within Yugoslavia if they do not want to remain. Speaking about this, Admiral Mamula rightfully claimed that the JNA **“was never aimed to keep anyone inside or push anyone out of Yugoslavia. Its constitutional role was very clear – to defend the territorial integrity and constitutional system of the country until the point where the nations of Yugoslavia reached another agreement. There could be no talk about Milosevic or anyone else using the JNA to re-tailor Yugoslavia and create a new state construction, so that all the Serbs would live in one state. And this is exactly what was accepted”** (B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, p. 159).

Given that, according to Mamula, Kadijevic and the heading generals around him (Adzic, Simic, Brovet, and the others) were firmly in favour of the single Yugoslavia, a number of questions were raised, among which the following one: **what guided the military top (and general Kadijevic in person) to abandon the Yugoslav political option and to take on the Greater Serbia one?** In seeking answers to this question, Mamula claims that the realistic assessment of the situation in the country and the mood in the JNA military top could not prompt it to do so. Therefore the JNA leadership must have had its own assessment and be guided by it – **“solely and exclusively by this assessment”**, Mamula claimed. **“And as for the question whether it would lead them to a conflict with the Presidency, the leaderships of the republics and other institutions of the Federation and the republics, should not have borne fear and prevent the Army from exercising its constitutional obligations”**. According to Mamula, Kadijevic knew that the military top had both the solution and plans for such a situation. **“He had accepted, developed, and updated it. Nothing new happened that we had not foreseen. And as those who are insecure and frightened as a rule seek protection under the shield of the stronger, and Milosevic and the budding Serbian nationalism did seem stronger, Kadijevic took sides.”** According to Mamula, this happened in 1989 (Ibid., pp. 159-160).

¹⁵⁷ V. Zarkovic, the aforementioned work, p. 56; I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, p. 2; B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, p. 170.

¹⁵⁸ V. Kadijevic, the aforementioned work, p. 90. In presenting such a claim, general Kadijevic states that this was done because, allegedly, **“the Yugoslav state increasingly disappeared as various developments occurred”**.

the need for the JNA to have its own state”, but allegedly **“primarily in the belief that there are nations in Yugoslavia who really wish to live in a joint state”**.¹⁵⁹ In this, Kadijevic intentionally mixes up the rights of the nations and of the constituent elements of the Federation.

By accepting the Greater Serbian nationalism and directly placing itself under its service, the military leadership was breaking up the common Yugoslav state and at the same time advocating in favour of **“a quick creation of a new Yugoslavia”** of two, or better said, of one only, Serbian nation, because for the holders of the Greater Serbia movement, Montenegro was an integral part of Serbia, and the Montenegrins were Serbs. The military leadership with an empty claim **“that there are nations in Yugoslavia who wish to live in a joint state”** covered up this general political objective.¹⁶⁰ Because of this, the military leadership was trying to enforce the creation of such a state – **“a new Yugoslavia made up of the nations who wished to do so”**¹⁶¹ and **“in a decisive moment of the Yugoslav drama”**, it stepped on the side of the Greater Serbia nationalism, and, for its account and for the account of its nationalist policy on **“encircling of Serbian Lands”**, it accepted a war of occupation as a means of military resolution of the Yugoslav crisis, and used the powerful weapons of the JNA to destroy the villages and cities across Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.¹⁶²

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid. This same objective was formulated by Kadijevic when he claimed: **“...and this is why we need to create such a state”** (Ibid.).

¹⁶¹ Ibid., p.134. Along with this general political objective, Kadijevic also formally accepts the possibility of a **“fair and peaceful farewell from those peoples who do not wish to remain in Yugoslavia”** (Ibid.). This, unfortunately, were just empty words.

¹⁶² V. Zarkovic, the aforementioned work, p. 56; I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, p. 2; B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, p. 170.

Within the military leadership, in 1989/1990, with some individuals, dissatisfaction appeared at the lack of more decisive resistance being offered to the Greater Serbia nationalism and Milosevic's aggressive policy, which was break-up Yugoslavia. The most decisive ones in this critique, addressed to general Kadijevic, were admiral Petar Simic and general Simeon Buncic (R. Dizdarevic, **IZDAJA VOJNOG VRHA**, p. 161).

Admiral Simic was the President of the Committee of SKJ (League of Communists) in the JNA for several years, at the same time when Raif Dizdarevic was in the Presidency. According to Dizdarevic, Simic was politically the most mature personality in the then

The military was increasingly slipping away from under the control of the Supreme Command, placing itself above the Presidency of the SFRY. The leadership of the Greater Serbia movement allowed it to pronounce a non-constitutional body – **the Headquarters of the Supreme Command**. This was particularly obvious in August of 1990, when in Knin the army used MIG airplanes to prevent the intervention by forces of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Croatia against the Knin Chetniks' [*Chetniks* or *Cetniks* is the name of the Serb fascist, collaborationist, traitorous and criminal movement under the leadership of Draza Mihailovic in Yugoslavia during World War Two] armed mutiny, and the subsequent violent military intervention in Pakrac, in early March 1991, when the Ministry of Interior forces tried to carry out their constitutional and legal obligations. Then in Pakrac, the army intervened in the shadow of a military coup – upon the order of president Jovic.¹⁶³

General Kadijevic (Federal Secretary for National Defence, i.e. Minister of Defence) was constantly slipping away from the Prime Minister (A. Markovic), and the Headquarters of the Supreme Command away from the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of the SFRY (Presidency of the SFRY), that is, ever “more visibly under the shield” of Slobodan Milosevic.¹⁶⁴

In several places in his book, general Kadijevic had emphasized the role and accomplishments of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command as the “holder of assessments”. Thus, for instance, he wrote that according to the assessments of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command, in late 1989, “**management of the developments in Yugoslavia was predominantly taken on by the foreign factor**”,

military leadership, with strong moral and political integrity. Due to the position, he was occupying and the political qualities he possessed, according to Dizdarevic, he was a strong barrier against penetration of any, particularly the Greater Serbian, influences onto the military leadership, and he was irreconcilable towards the nationalist phenomena within the JNA. In relation to this, Dizdarevic wrote that he had been exerting a strong personal touch on the activity of the SKJ within the JNA, in which he enjoyed a non-disputable reputation. Unfortunately, after a meeting of the military leadership at Kadijevic's in 1990, Admiral Simic was hit by a deadly brain stroke (Ibid., pp. 161-162).

¹⁶³ S. Mesic, **KAKO JE SRUSENA JUGOSLAVIJA: POLITICKI MEMOARI**, Zagreb 1994, p. 23; I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, p. 68.

¹⁶⁴ S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. 26.

and that for **“two whole years before that** (that is, from 1987 – note by the author), **the Headquarters of the Supreme Command had been indicating that such times was approaching with high speed”**. In addition, according to Kadijevec, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command had **“proven that, unless the other path is taken as we proposed... the dissolution of Yugoslavia is imminent, as well as that this dissolution under such internal and international circumstances may only happen through a bloody civil war, whose dimensions and consequences no one is able to foresee”**.¹⁶⁵

In relation to the issues of foreign factor influence onto the developments in Yugoslavia, the military leadership assessed **“that the foreign factor will, objectively, take on the decisive role in managing the Yugoslav crisis”**. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and of the USSR changed the strategic significance of Yugoslav territory. The outcome of the fighting for the Yugoslav state, or against it, according to the assessments of the military leadership, had also directly depended on the destiny of the Soviet state.¹⁶⁶

The Headquarters of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, according to Kadijevec, **“was regularly observing and analysing all the factors – both internal and external – upon which the security of the country depended, and all major decisions, from decisions in development to deployment plans, which arose from such assessments, were proposed by it to the Presidency of the SFRY as the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces”**. This was done by the Headquarters of the Supreme Command, from May 15, 1988 to January 6, 1992, while Kadijevec was on the post of the Federal Secretary for National Defence and at the same time the Chief of Staff of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command, **“on a constant basis, regardless of whether the Presidency of the SFRY was working in full or, for various reasons, in reduced composition”**.¹⁶⁷

The conclusion of General Kadijevec that the Headquarters of the Supreme Command, while he was the Chief of Staff of this Headquarters,

¹⁶⁵ V. Kadijevec, the aforementioned work, pp. 35-36.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., pp. 29, 31, and 36.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid. p. 6.

regularly proposed measures and **“all major decisions”** to the Presidency of the SFRY as the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the SFRY **“on a constant basis, regardless of whether the Presidency of the SFRY was working in full or, for various reasons, in reduced composition”** was far from true. The more so, because in his book, in spite of the aforementioned conclusion, he claims that the Headquarters of the Supreme Command had **“dual communication”** with the Presidency of the SFRY.¹⁶⁸ He presented a part of the proposal before the whole Presidency, and a part before only those members who were **“working for Yugoslavia”**,¹⁶⁹ that is, for the Fascist creation of Greater Serbia. This was the “four” of Slobodan Milosevic, headed by Jovic. This fact too confirms that this was an illegal body, which was in direct service of the Greater Serbia movement, meaning that this was not a body of the Presidency.

Obvious is also that, in the same book, Kadijevic denies his own words, negating his assessments and conclusions, while simultaneously revealing all the undercover actions and activities planned and conducted under the excuse of “preservation” of Yugoslavia by the leadership of the Greater Serbia movement, by attacking “certain” members of the Presidency of the SFRY, as well as nations for allegedly having actively worked **“on the break-up of Yugoslavia”**, in which they presented themselves as the only defenders of the common state (**“... who were working for Yugoslavia”**).

Among other things, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command proposed the disbandment and disarmament of the “paramilitary” formations in Yugoslavia, and the introduction of an extraordinary state of alert in the country, carried out a military attack on Slovenia,

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., p.120. Such a communication, according to Kadijevic, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command **“had to do and did do it”**, allegedly **“because of the familiar situation in the Presidency of the SFRY at the time** (Mid-1991 – note by the author), **and particularly because of the fact that some of its members were actively working on the dissolution of Yugoslavia, and were big enemies of the JNA”** (Ibid.). About this, also see B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 94.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid. This, as stated by Kadijevic, was **“an exceptionally complex situation for the army”**. However, **“we had no other choice”**, concludes the Chief of Staff of the illegal Headquarters of the Supreme Command.

and then believing after the defeat **“that the only solution for the JNA was to leave Slovenia”**,¹⁷⁰ to plan the forthcoming dislocation of the commands, units and institutions of the JNA from Slovenia,¹⁷¹ to plan and prepare a single operation against Croatia, devise the plan **“RAM”**, and the like.¹⁷²

In the stage of war after dr. Branko Kostic had conducted a military coup in the Presidency of the SFRY (on October 3, 1991), the Headquarters of the Supreme Command **“had, on several occasions, proposed to go ahead with the creation of the new Yugoslav state as soon as possible”**,¹⁷³ while conducting **“further transformation of the JNA**

¹⁷⁰ V. Kadijevec, the aforementioned work, pp. 119-120, and 149-150. In order to effect the departure from Slovenia, **“under the given Yugoslav and international situation”**, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command reviewed three options (**“first, inflict a military defeat against the military formations in Slovenia, and then leave Slovenia”**; **“without bringing in new land army troops, and by use of all available armed air forces, fire and manoeuvre power of the land army already in place in Slovenia, inflict unacceptable losses to the infrastructure of Slovenia...”**, and, **“accomplish the political goals through combined use of political means and threat to use all the available JNA assets...”**). Analysing the **“good and bad sides of all the three options of further use of the JNA in Slovenia”**, the Headquarters of the Military Command opted for the first one, while excluding the second one. Given that, according to Kadijevec, **“some members of the Presidency did not accept the first option...”**, what was stuck to was **“the third option”**. Therefore, according to him, **“further political and military activities in essence went in accordance with such a decision”**, so that on July 18, 1991, the Presidency of the SFRY brought the decision to have the JNA leave Slovenia (V. Kadijevec, the aforementioned work, pp. 120-121).

¹⁷¹ V. Kadijevec, the aforementioned work, pp. 121-122.

¹⁷² Ibid., pp. 121-122. The goal of this operation, according to Kadijevec, was to **“resolve all the tasks that the JNA had in Croatia and at the same time allow for smooth and complete realization of the plan of dislocation of the JNA from Slovenia...”** (Ibid.).

¹⁷³ Ibid., p. 131. In this, according to Chief of Staff Kadijevec, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command **“was not only guided by the assessment that no army, not even the JNA, could successfully wage and win a war without a clearly defined state for which the army was fighting and which properly, as required by modern wars, supports its army, but primarily by the assessment that a counter-offensive should also be launched on the political plan, in a way as to oppose the breakers of the old Yugoslavia; a new Yugoslavia, composed of the nations that wished to continue living within it together, and who will not let such Yugoslavia be broken”** (Ibid.).

into the army of the future Yugoslavia” on the whole of Yugoslav territory¹⁷⁴, and accepting and using the JNA in accomplishing **“the general political goal: the creation of a new Yugoslavia...”**¹⁷⁵

Speaking about the Headquarters of the Supreme Command, it is necessary to offer answers to several questions, such as: what it was like, based on what and when it was formed, how did it function, whom was it made up of, and the like. Was it in late 1989 or in March 1991 that the idea got ripe about the Headquarters of the Supreme Command as the surrogate for the Supreme Commander, when the military leadership concluded that the Presidency of the SFRY could not function as the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces? When and based on whose decision or suggestion was it that Kadijevic placed himself into the centre of events?¹⁷⁶

In relation to self-granted competences of the military leadership, on March 21, 1991, at the expanded session of the Presidency of the SFRY, Franjo Tudjman protested and demanded an answer, stating that, even by the Constitution, **“the Headquarters of the Supreme Command does not exist; what exists is the Secretariat for National Defence, which has a General Staff. The Headquarters of the Supreme Command is to be formed in a state of war. Who was it that decided that [the country was in a] state of war or otherwise in an extraordinary state of alert, and that the Headquarters of the Supreme Command should be**

To this goal, general Kadijevic addressed two letters to the **“four-member Presidency”** (on October 22, and November 7, 1991), presenting certain proposals, with **“assessments”** and **“convictions”** (Ibid., pp. 131-133).

In the explanation of his address to the aforementioned body dated November 7, 1991, Kadijevic assessed **“that it is high time that the decision be made”**. Therefore he proposed **“that the Presidency of the SFRY, as well as the appropriate legitimate bodies of the nations which have opted to continue the common life in the new Yugoslavia, immediately put into function all the institutions of the Yugoslav state, pronounce the state of war and a general drafting obligation...”** (Ibid., p. 133).

Although **“there was no decision in those terms at this stage of the war”**, as proposed by general Kadijevic, nevertheless, according to him, **“a new vision of a new Yugoslavia was rather definite and it constituted a relevant political component of the goals, ideas and plans for the deployment of the JNA”** (Ibid.).

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 134.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 35-36.

mobilized...”¹⁷⁷ Mesic also insisted that answers be given as to based on which regulation (“the Constitution or the law”) the Headquarters of the Supreme Command was formed, at which Jovic was wondering: “Can someone answer this question? Please believe me, I do not know based on which regulation this was established. It can be examined and reported to the Presidency”.¹⁷⁸ However, the answer was never provided.¹⁷⁹

Based on the documents of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command, one may have concluded that **this was the supreme expert and professional body in the area of directing and command over the armed forces**.¹⁸⁰ The Headquarters of the Supreme Command had not existed as an institution in times of peace, but by the chart of command in the Armed Forces of the SFRY, it appeared and was to be formed only in war and during the state of war, where the headquarters-related affairs of the Supreme Command were to be performed by the Federal Secretariat for National Defence. Therefore, it is not possible to claim a legal basis for the formation of this body. This entails that it was formed based on no regulations.

The exact time, at which the Headquarters of the Supreme Command was formed, is also hard to determine. General Ilija Radakovic claims that since 1988 or 1989, general Kadijevec had been the Chief of Staff of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command.¹⁸¹ General Anton Tus claims that this body was formed in December 1990.¹⁸² Based on the documents of the Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina, one can reliably conclude that this body had existed and functioned as early as in April 1990.¹⁸³

¹⁷⁷ S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. 26.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ K. Rotim, **ODBRANA HERCEG-BOSNE**, volume 1, Siroki Brijeg 1997, pp. 81-83.

¹⁸¹ I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 190-191.

¹⁸² A. Tus, **RAT U SLOVENIJI I HRVATSKOJ DO SARAJEVSKOG PRIMIRJA**, in: **RAT U HRVATSKOJ I BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI 1991.-1995.**, Zagreb-Sarajevo 1999, p. 68; D. Marijan, **JUGOSLOVENSKA NARODNA ARMIJA...**, the aforementioned work, p. 295.

¹⁸³ AIIZ, 2-2442. The Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence, Confidential file no. 04/490-1, March 21, 1991,

Based on excerpts from the diary of Borisav Jovic, it can be established that the Headquarters of the Supreme Command was functioning as early as in April 1990.¹⁸⁴ In addition to that, Jovic offers information in saying that this body can safely be spoken of since March 1991.¹⁸⁵

Based on the “view” of General Kadijevec, it is obvious that the Headquarters of the Supreme Command had also “functioned” in late 1989, when it was making “assessments” on the developments in Yugoslavia.¹⁸⁶ Speaking about this, Kadijevec stated that “**two full years before that**” (i.e., from late 1989), the Headquarters of the Supreme Command had been “**indicating**”,¹⁸⁷ which can lead to the conclusion that this body had existed as early as late 1987.

Obviously, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command had existed even before 1988, i.e. at the time when Admiral Mamula was on the post of the Federal Secretary for National Defence.¹⁸⁸ At that point, the

Sarajevo – to the District Headquarters of the Territorial Defence Tuzla, Information on Current Events. The information of the Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina for April 1990, among other things, also states that in April 1990, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command informed the Presidency of the SFRY “**of its assessment of the situation in the country, and proposed measures in order to remove direct risk to the survival of Yugoslavia as a state, which was accepted at the Presidency, but this was not carried out, so the situation had become even more complex and the ways and means to exit such a situation were becoming more and more precarious all the time**” (Ibid.).

184 B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 286. Speaking about the meeting of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of the SFRY (Presidency of the SFRY) on March 12, 1991, in relation to the introductory presentation by General Kadijevec, Jovic states that, among other things, Kadijevec said: “... **Since April last year** (that is, April 1990 – note by the author), **the Headquarters of the Supreme Command informed the Presidency of the SFRY with its assessment of the situation in the country and proposed measures to remove direct risks to the survival of the SFRY as a state. Our proposals were then accepted, but unfortunately, they were not implemented. And it was exactly due to this that Yugoslavia had found itself in a vortex of anarchy, dissolution, and in the beginning of the civil war...**” (Ibid.).

185 Ibid., pp. 286-311.

186 V. Kadijevec, the aforementioned work, pp. 35-36.

187 Ibid.

188 Ibid., p. 36.

Chief of Staff of this headquarters was Mamula, and its members were: generals Kadijevec, as deputy of the federal secretary, and Stevan Mirkovic, as Chief of Staff of the General Staff of JNA, together with others.¹⁸⁹

As Federal Secretary for National Defence, in the period from May 15, 1988, to January 6, 1992, General Kadijevec was the Chief of Staff of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of the SFRY. In addition to the Chief of Staff, the membership of this headquarters was made up of the most senior military leadership: Admiral Stane Brovet (deputy of the Federal Secretary for National Defence), General Blagoje Adzic (Chief of Staff of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY), and generals Cusic, Cibra, and Obradovic.¹⁹⁰

Having in mind the fact that the Headquarters of the Supreme Command could only be formed in a state of war, **where the headquarters-related affairs of the Supreme Command were to be performed by the Federal Secretariat for National Defence**,¹⁹¹ and that this body had been functioning since late 1987, or with certainty since May 15, 1988, it is possible to conclude that – as far as the military leadership is concerned – from that time, the state of war had been in place in SFRY. However, the state of war had not been pronounced. This had obviously been a fraud.

The leadership of the Greater Serbia movement, headed by Milosevic, who was at the same time the supreme commander too, had illegally formed the Headquarters of the Supreme Command and, in accordance with the goals of this movement, granted it broad authorities, such as even including pronouncement of the state of war and authorization of a military coup. This had threatened the Presidency of the SFRY throughout the period

¹⁸⁹ I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 35-36, and 190-191. Admiral Mamula mentions nothing about this.

¹⁹⁰ V. Kadijevec, the aforementioned work, pp. 5-6; B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 286-311. General Kadijevec was very cunningly avoiding to talk about who had made up the Headquarters of the Supreme Command, what was the essential relation between the Supreme Command and the Headquarters of the Supreme Command, and other similar issues.

¹⁹¹ STRATEGIJA OPSTENARODNE ODBRANE I DRUSTVENE SAMOZASTITE SFRJ, p. 82.

Jovic was the President, and in particular on January 25 and in early March of 1991. The JNA had partially left the barracks and some of its actions were frequently beyond the control of the constitutional power (the Kosovo Polje event at Knin; events at Plitvice, Pakrac, and Borovo Selo). On May 15, 1991, Borisav Jovic ceded his constitutional authorities as the chief of state, and transferred them all to the illegal Headquarters of the Supreme Command, which since then, for a month and a half, had virtually ruled Yugoslavia – a ‘chiefless’ state. Mesic’s inauguration was conducted only once this military coup was formally solidified by the arrivals of Sejdo Bajramovic from Kosovo, Jugoslav Kostic from Vojvodina, and with the consent of Croatia.¹⁹²

¹⁹² I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 48, and 190-191.

4. Reduction of the Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina

The formation and development of the Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina had practically begun in 1969, with the formation of **the Main Headquarters of the National Defence of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina**. Once the republic, zonal and municipal headquarters of the Territorial Defence had been formed, development of the Territorial Defence in the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina had been significantly accelerated. In all socio-political entities, entities of associated workforce and local communities, war compositions of the Territorial Defence were formed.¹⁹³

¹⁹³ Milan Indjic, the aforementioned work, Sarajevo 1998, pp. 87-89.

Until 1949, the Territorial Defence as a component of the Armed Forces did not exist, except for some infrastructure of partisan platoons within the composition of the JNA. The experience of the USSR and Inform-bureau attack on the sovereignty of Yugoslavia (1948) forced the leadership of Yugoslavia and President Tito personally to return to the experiences from the People's Liberation War, and the invasion of the member countries of the Warsaw Pact on Czechoslovakia (1968) forced them to practically proceed with its building as a component already tested in the Second World War and in some other countries of Europe (Switzerland, Sweden).

The greatest credit for such a development and growth of the Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina goes to General Franjo Herljevic, who was the first commander of the Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Ibid.).

The "joint units" (partisan brigades and platoons) of the Territorial Defence were formed on the territory of one or more municipalities, and the rest in the "labour organizations", local communities and municipalities. The Territorial Defence consisted of headquarters, units, and institutions. The headquarters of the Territorial Defence existed in peace, whereas the units and institutions were organized and prepared in peace, yet deployed in case of war or immediate war danger or other risks to the country, as well as during exercises in peace. Every socio-political entity had organized an appropriate headquarters of the Territorial Defence: at the republic, district (i.e. in several municipalities), city (i.e. in urban groupings of municipalities) and the municipal level.

In 1969, the units of the Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina consisted of 89,181 members, in Montenegro of 49,000, Croatia 67,571, Macedonia 77,153, Slovenia 31,284, and Serbia (with provinces) of 105,000 members. Bosnia and Herzegovina had then had 117 headquarters of national defence, 469 units and 120 formed “youth platoons” (Macedonia 58, whereas other republics and provinces had no such formations).¹⁹⁴

A year later, the units of the Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina had 138,024 members (75,836 armed), of Montenegro 38,874 (21,850 armed), Croatia 114,912 (114,000 armed), Macedonia 67,548 (41,374 armed), Slovenia 51,563 (36,818 armed), and Serbia with provinces 280,533 (172,464 armed). The percentage of investment into the Territorial Defence from national revenue in Bosnia and Herzegovina was 0.67%, in Montenegro 0.54%, Croatia 0.54%, Macedonia 0.52%, Slovenia 0.32%, and Serbia (with provinces) 0.60% per cent. The largest formations (brigades) and by far the most numerous ones were in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and there was a very small number in Montenegro and Serbia, in regiment formations. The other republics and provinces had no regiment or brigade formations.¹⁹⁵

By the end of 1980, an adequate military organization of units and headquarters of the Territorial Defence was formed, beginning with the local community and the entities of associated workforce, municipalities up to the Republic level, which had covered the whole

The units of the Territorial Defence were formed, according to purpose, into various formational compositions. In essence, two types of units existed – **the tactical ones**, intended for combat activity on a narrower territory of a municipality, and **joint tactical ones**, intended for combat activity on a broader territory of a zone or of a military district.

In addition to the units composed mainly of infantry, the Territorial Defence also had appropriate units of arms and infrastructure, for the purpose of fire support, engineering and other types of securing of combat activities, keeping communications, and the like. For the purpose of backup security (logistics), the Territorial Defence had units and institutions (departments, platoons, troops, warehouses and bases – H. Efendic, the aforementioned work, pp. 88-89).

¹⁹⁴ M. Indjic, the aforementioned work, p. 88.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid. The largest formations and in a very large numbers in relation to the other republics were in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the largest percentage of investing into the Territorial Defence from the national revenue, although Bosnia and Herzegovina was an underdeveloped republic (Ibid.).

territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Then, Bosnia and Herzegovina had over 320,000 members of the Territorial Defence, among which the most numerous were infantry, artillery, and commando and patrol units, which included all arms and infrastructure. In this period, the composition of the Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina also received air force units, with 33 aircraft.¹⁹⁶

The Territorial Defence, expressed in percentages was the most numerous in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and this percentage was increased until 1981, when it had over 400,000 conscripts, classified into 9,868 various formational compositions, among which there were many independent groups, departments and platoons in the formations of units of General National Defence and Social Self-Protection (“ONO and DSZ”).¹⁹⁷ This, in addition to the competences of the republic leadership in performing the tasks of the Supreme Command in the area of defence, was also explained by the fact that Bosnia and Herzegovina was the bulwark of defence of Yugoslavia, so that the partisan component was more numerous. Critically saying, this was partially a product of the experiment of the “ONO and DSZ”. Because of this, in the period from 1981 to 1985, according to its own needs, this de-balance was significantly decreased, and the Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina was reduced down to 310,530 formational places and to 5,082 war units. They were even then (December 31, 1985) filled in with over 100% (313,990).¹⁹⁸ This was their maximum, because since then the reduction of the Territorial Defence had had character of force, that is, of “orders from above”, which did not comply with political decisions, the Constitution, and the law.

The number of members of the Territorial Defence in Bosnia and Herzegovina reached nearly 7.30% in 1987 in relation to the number of population in the Republic, whereas in Kosovo this percentage was 3.20%, Slovenia 3.50%, Croatia somewhat over 3.50%, Serbia nearly 5.5%, Montenegro over 5.5%, and in Vojvodina and Macedonia some 6% each. In addition to the largest percent then had by Bosnia and Herzegovina in the in relation to the population of the republic, there

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., pp.192-193; H. Efendic, the aforementioned work, p. 90.

¹⁹⁷ M. Indjic, the aforementioned work, p. 208.

¹⁹⁸ H. Efendic, the aforementioned work, p. 91.

were also a large number of different variants and types of units, commands, and headquarters.¹⁹⁹

A strong and well-organized Territorial Defence, in not only the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina, did not at all suit the Greater Serbia and Unitarian forces. Five years after the death of the Supreme Commander and President Tito, the military leadership had made a radical revision in the Armed Forces of the SFRY. To this aim, activities were also undertaken in order to suspend the Territorial Defence. This process was conducted **through the reduction in percentage of the involvement of the population on the roster, in the units and headquarters of the Territorial Defence, through suspension of a significant number of headquarters and units into lower ranks of organization, manipulations with staff, takeovers of arms from the Territorial Defence and its placing under the control of the JNA.**²⁰⁰

The reduction of the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina (peace and wartime units and headquarters) had started in 1986, and was conducted in continuity until the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina had begun. In that year, the number of members of the Territorial Defence (297,983) was reduced by 5.6%, and the number of war units (4,220) by 17%. The next year, the number of members of the Territorial Defence (292,024) was reduced by 5.5%, and of the war units (4,221) by 16.9%. In the same year, the peacetime composition of the Territorial Defence was reduced by 663 workplaces or by 32%, and the wartime composition by 89,243 members of the Territorial Defence, or by 30.4% of the existing number. In this way, the percentage of share of the population in the Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina was reduced from 7.23% down to the Yugoslav average of 5%.²⁰¹

The number of members of the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1988 (202,693) was reduced by 35.2%, and of war units (3,440) by 32.3%. The next year, the number of members (198,368) was reduced by 36.1%, and the war units (3,453)

¹⁹⁹ M. Indjic, the aforementioned work, pp. 220-221.

²⁰⁰ H. Efendic, the aforementioned work, pp. 90-91.

²⁰¹ Ibid., pp. 91-92.

by 32.1%. The reduction in the number of members of the Territorial Defence and the war units was drastically reduced during 1990: by 55.8% (138,031) and 59.7% (2,050), respectively. In the next year, this reduction was even more drastically increased, to 72.2% (86,164) and by 82.9% (867), respectively.²⁰²

The overall reduction of the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1988 was some 30% (29.8%), or from 293,603 down to 206,213 members of the Territorial Defence. The largest reduction was made in those municipalities and districts where the majority population were Bosniaks and Croats. Thus, the Territorial Defence was reduced in the City Headquarters of Sarajevo by 44.5%, or from 40,447 down to 22,426 members; in Livno by 43.9%, or from 8,489 down to 4,766; in Gorazde by 42.5%, or from 11,181 down to 6,433; in Sarajevo by 42.3%, or from 16,585 down to 9,568; in Zenica by 35.3%, or from 36,519 down to 23,610, and in Mostar by 33.4%, or from 31,772 down to 20,573. Thus, the Territorial Defence units in Sarajevo, Livno, and Gorazde were virtually halved down in the first reduction. In the districts of Banja Luka and Doboj, the Territorial Defence was reduced by only 10,746 members (Banja Luka by 16% or by 7,496 (from 46,950 down to 39,454), and in Doboj by 13%, or by 3,250 (from 24,744 down to 21,494).²⁰³

²⁰² Ibid. p. 91.

²⁰³ Ibid., pp. 93-94. This can best be seen based on **the Plan for the Reduction of the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina by districts for 1988:**

PLAN FOR REDUCTION OF THE TERRITORIAL DEFENCE OF THE SR OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA BY DISTRICTS FOR 1988

District	Number of members	Reduction down to number of military conscripts	Reduction in percentages
Banja Luka	46,950	39,454	16
Mostar	31,772	20,573	33.4
Sarajevo	16,585	9,568	42.3
Tuzla	59,772	44,585	26.4
Zenica	36,519	23,610	35.3
Bihac	17,145	13,340	22.2
Doboj	24,744	21,494	13.1
Gorazde	11,181	6,433	42.5
Livno	8,489	4,766	43.9
City Headquarters of Sarajevo	40,447	22,426	44.5
TOTAL	293,603	206,213	30.0

(Ibid., p. 93).

In mid-1989, the military leadership had issued an Order, together with the Methodology and Criteria for Expanded Organization of the Territorial Defence (marked STATE SECRET) of the Armed Forces of the SFRY for the period 1990-1995, (i.e. the plan “Jedinstvo – 2” / “Unity-2”, note by translator), with the goal to use the organizational and formational changes to reduce the number and size of the Territorial Defence down to 3-4% of the total number of population. This reduction of the number of members was to be exercised through the reduction of the numbers and membership of the partisan brigades, through suspension of the majority of district headquarters, of the headquarters of the Territorial Defence in local communities and entities of associated workforce, of a number of regional headquarters of the Territorial Defence, and through the reduction of the numbers and membership in “units of spatial structure”.²⁰⁴

Between 1988 and 1990, the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina was constantly reduced in radical steps. The republic headquarters of the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina, mainly based on the Conclusions and Tasks of the Federal Secretariat, i.e. of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, had issued a number of orders, plans and “explanations”; **“in order to conduct timely and organized preparations for implementation related to the reorganization of the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the reduction of its size down to some 3% of the recruited population of the Republic, according to the plan ‘Jedinstvo – III’”** (the mid-term development plan for the period of 1991-1995), during 1990 and 1991, particularly in the second half of 1990, and these acts constituted a strictly confidential military secret (marked MILITARY SECRET – STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL). Thus, General Milos Bajcetic (commander of the Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence) issued an order on September 28, 1990, to the district

²⁰⁴ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2492, Federal Secretariat for National Defence, General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, Deputy Chief of Staff of the General Staff for Territorial Defence, D.T. No. 629-1, August 7, 1989 – to the Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina; H. Efendic, the aforementioned work, p. 94.

The radical and quick reduction of the Territorial Defence had been particularly strong since the arrival of General Veljko Kadijevic to the post of Federal Secretary for National Defence, and his siding with Slobodan Milosevic, as well as listening to Admiral Branko Mamula, who was still pulling the strings.

headquarters of the Territorial Defence (marked Strictly Confidential, no. 05/5-5), regulating the preparations for the reorganization of the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina according to the plan “**Jedinstvo – III**”, “**in order to expand and perfect its organizational and formational structure and reduction of the number of people from 4.8 down to some 3%...**”. This “**reorganization**” was to encompass all the peacetime and wartime headquarters, units, and institutions of the tactical and geographical structure of the Territorial Defence.²⁰⁵

The formational number of members of the war units of the Territorial Defence, “**within their planned reorganization**”, was supposed to be reduced to the average of some 3% of the recruited population from socio-political entities, with the percentage varying by municipality from 2.4% to 3.5%; however, the percentage of some 3% was to be secured for the District, that is, for the City of Sarajevo.²⁰⁶

The numeral reduction of the Territorial Defence of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina down to some 3% of the recruited population from socio-political entities was to be implemented through the enforcement of organizational and formational changes (formation

²⁰⁵ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2503, Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence, strictly confidential, no. 05/5-5, September 28, 1990 – to the District Headquarters of the Territorial Defence; H. Efendic, the aforementioned work, pp. 94-95. The preparations and reorganization of the Territorial Defence were to start on October 1, 1990, and finish no later than July 1, 1994. In this, the Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence had to determine the number and type of tactical and geographical war units “**to be formed at the level of the Republic, district and municipalities. The number, kind, and type, that is, the variant of the geographical headquarters and units of the TO formed at the level of the local communities and basic entities of associated workforce will be determined directly by the municipal headquarters of TO, depending on the needs and the allowed number of recruited military conscripts in all compositions**” (Ibid.).

The explanations for this reorganization were covertly designed with well expressed formulations behind which it was hard to discern the criminal intentions of the holders of the Greater Serbia movement (“**in order to create more favourable conditions for a more substantial and better quality of completion, quicker tempo of equipping, modernization of training and better quality training of the war units, in accordance with the funding capacities of the socio-political entities (the Republic and the municipalities)**”).

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

and dissolution of war units of the Territorial Defence) planned in the “Mid-Term Development Plan for the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the Period of 1991-1995”. In this, one was to ensure that at the level of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina the superior relation be retained between the tactical and geographical structures of the Territorial Defence in the proportion of 20 to 80 percent.²⁰⁷

The alleged “reorganization” and the **numeral reduction of the Territorial Defence** was to be implemented in the following way:

a) **the peacetime district headquarters of the Territorial Defence were to be restructured by new formations, and the City Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Sarajevo and the municipal headquarters of the Territorial Defence were to be restructured by new framework (“individual”) formations;**²⁰⁸

b) **the compositions of the district headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Banja Luka, Mostar, Tuzla and the City Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Sarajevo Corps were to include one battery of light 128 mm rocket launchers each;**²⁰⁹

c) **the Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence was to draft war formations for 7 (seven) new commands for the defence of the cities within the jurisdictional scope of the Territorial Defence, to be formed in Banja Luka, Prijedor, Bihac, Doboje, Mostar, Tuzla, and Zenica;**²¹⁰

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

²⁰⁸ Ibid. The drafting of the peacetime formations for the aforementioned headquarters of the Territorial Defence was then underway. Their restructuring was to be completed “**within the timeframe to be regulated in a separate order of the Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence on restructuring of the peacetime Headquarters of the Territorial Defence**” (Ibid.).

²⁰⁹ Ibid. The body for the backup of the Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence was in charge of regulating which municipal headquarters of the Territorial Defence (i.e., from the composition of the previously formed partisan brigades of the Territorial Defence – type II) will fill in the aforementioned district headquarters of the Territorial Defence. The dissolution of the district headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Gorazde and Livno was, respectively, “**to be regulated by separate order**” (Ibid.).

²¹⁰ Ibid. The aforementioned municipal headquarters of the Territorial Defence were to be restructured by the new formations, but their composition was to include one battery each of light 128 mm rocket launchers from the composition of the previously

d) the Republic Headquarters was to draft a new Decision on classification of the war municipal headquarters of the Territorial Defence in variants, based on the number of the recruited military conscripts within the military scope of the Territorial Defence;²¹¹

e) through dissolution of the nine partisan brigades of the Territorial Defence, the manoeuvring structure of the Territorial Defence was to be reduced by some 34%²¹², while ensuring the growth of the manoeuvring structure of the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina in war by 25% of its new size in numbers;²¹³

f) The reduction of the numeral status of the membership of the Territorial Defence in the war units of the Territorial Defence of geographic structure, formed at the level of socio-political entities, was to be carried out through the restructuring of their individual compositions, in particular of the units of the Territorial Defence of a higher into a lower type, and through the dissolution of a number of such units;²¹⁴

formed partisan brigades of the Territorial Defence, type II. The backup body of the Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence was in charge of regulating the issue as to which batteries of light 122 mm rocket launchers would be surrendered by the municipal headquarters of the Territorial Defence (Ibid.).

²¹¹ Ibid. A number of the municipal headquarters of the Territorial Defence, by the new Decision, were to be restructured from the higher into a lower variant. The restructuring of headquarters, as well as the time frames for completion of the tasks “**were to be regulated in a separate order on the restructuring of the Municipal Headquarters of the Territorial Defence Corps**” (Ibid.).

²¹² Ibid. The reduction of the manoeuvring structure of the Territorial Defence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was to be carried out by dissolution of the following nine partisan brigades of the Territorial Defence: two from the Banja Luka District, three from the Tuzla District, three from the City Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Sarajevo, and one from the Zenica District. The dissolution of the partisan brigades, the time for completion of tasks, as well as the organizational composition of the partisan brigades of the Territorial Defence “**which are not to be dissolved, were to be regulated in a separate order**” (Ibid.).

²¹³ Ibid. The manpower, the armament and other material assets of the partisan brigades of the Territorial Defence to be dissolved were to be used for potential growth of the existing partisan brigades of the Territorial Defence (the ones not to be dissolved) in wartime or pursuant to a separate order by one more battalion (Ibid.).

²¹⁴ Ibid. This was to be carried out in the following way:

The numeral status of military conscripts engaged in the war units of the Territorial Defence, formed at the level of the local communities and entities of associated workforce, was to be reduced by some 55% of the then number and size of such units;²¹⁵

a) through **restructuring**: of 8 units of the Territorial Defence of type I into units of the Territorial Defence of type II; of 2 units of the Territorial Defence of type I into a unit of the Territorial Defence of type III; of 17 units of the Territorial Defence of type II into a unit of the Territorial Defence of type I; and through **dissolution**: of 12 units of the Territorial Defence of type III; and the 2 anti-parachute units and the pontoon platoon of the Territorial Defence of Gracanica. Which units of the Territorial Defence would be restructured, or dissolved, as well as the time frames for completion of the tasks, **“was to be determined by the Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence in an order on organizational and formational changes in the Territorial Defence”** (Ibid.).

b) through **increasing** of the war units of the Territorial Defence of geographical structure, formed at the level of the socio-political entities by the 25% of its new size. This was to be done in such a way as to allow the units of the Territorial Defence to change type in case of war, or by a separate order, from a lower into a higher type (type III into type II, or type II into type I), and that the unit of the Territorial Defence of type I may receive 1-2 platoons more into its composition. In relation to this, it was to be ensured that all the dissolved units of the Territorial Defence of type III may be formed again (Ibid.).

²¹⁵ Ibid. This was to be implemented through the dissolution of the firing infantry compositions of those units (regional headquarters of the Territorial Defence, squads, platoons, and divisions), that is, the restructuring of these units from the higher into lower units. At this, it was required to form a smaller number of units, but larger in size, so that the total number of the recruited military conscripts by municipalities does not exceed the allowed number and percent. The special units of the Territorial Defence, formed at the level of local communities and entities of associated workforce (river, lake, mountain, ski units, and the like) were not to be dissolved. All the restructures were to be done based on the existing war formations, and the implementation of the organizational and formational changes (dissolutions and restructures) of the war units of the Territorial Defence of the local communities and entities of associated workforce **“was to be begin immediately, and to be completed by no later than December 31, 1990”**. January 31, 1991 was the deadline for submission to the Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of the report on implementation of this task, with the decisions and information on changes in wartime units, **“in order to allow for timely entry of the changes in the Review of the Mobilization Development of the Territorial Defence of the Republic”**. This order was the final one for such restructures (Ibid.).

Work was to continue on the preparations for further expansion of the backup system in the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina.²¹⁶

For the wartime units of the Territorial Defence, of tactical and geographical structure, determined for growth of the forces of the Territorial Defence in war by some 25% of the new size in numbers of the Territorial Defence, it was foreseen that a **database** would be kept at the Municipal Secretariats for National Defence, while the armament and other tangible assets for them were to be kept at warehouses of war reserves, where they had been kept thus far.²¹⁷

Along with the implementation of changes in organization and formation, by the aforementioned decision, there was also a plan to make a new Review of the Mobilization Development of the Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Republic Headquarters was obligated to submit the proposals for changes of individual development elements on a timely basis, in concordance with the provisions of PRAMOS, to the subjected headquarters of the Territorial Defence.²¹⁸

Upon analysing the aforementioned order, it is obvious that it was a **fraud**, whose aim it was to suspend the Territorial Defence of the SR of

²¹⁶ Ibid. To this aim, through redistribution of armament and equipment of the dissolved units of the Territorial Defence, the possibility was created for quick formation of the backup bases of the Territorial Defence of the District (City Headquarters of the Territorial Defence). This formation was to be regulated in separate order of the Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence, including the regulation of the period for implementation of this task (Ibid.).

²¹⁷ Ibid. Those war units were not to be entered into the Review of the Mobilization Development of the Territorial Defence of the Republic, nor in the reports on filling in of the Territorial Defence. Those units were not subject to planning or conducting of any training, except for the officers of the command units, who were foreseen for planning and implementation of the applied form of officer training.

The detailed explanations related to directing of all the units of the Territorial Defence determined for growth of the Territorial Defence units in war were to be regulated in a separate order of the Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence and in the growth plan, **“which were to be drafted and submitted to the subjected headquarters of the Territorial Defence no later than by October 30, 1990”** (Ibid.).

²¹⁸ Ibid.

Bosnia and Herzegovina (rather than only reduce it). Thus, for example, the proportion of the geographical and tactical structure and growth of the Territorial Defence in the case of war was a simple fraud. The essence was in that the light 128 mm rocket launchers be taken away for the needs of the new commands in Banja Luka, Prijedor, Bihac, Doboj, Mostar, Tuzla, and Zenica. Even the manner of implementation of reduction of the numeric status of military conscripts engaged in the wartime units of the Territorial Defence formed at the level of the local communities and entities of associated workforce (by dissolution of the firing infantry squads of these units, that is, by restructuring of those units from higher into lower types) confirmed this. Furthermore, even the segment of the order regulating **that no training was to be planned or conducted** with wartime units of the Territorial Defence of the geographical and tactical structure, determined for growth in war by some 25% of the new size in numbers, says enough to confirm the fraud. The more so, because this training itself was forbidden in 1991.²¹⁹

In a strictly confidential Order (marked MILITARY SECRET and dated October 1, 1990), General Milos Bajcetic had regulated the dissolution of nine partisan brigades of the Territorial Defence for wartime deployment, and their command for development in peace and the suspension of further mobilization development,²²⁰ and the changes in the mobilization development of the partisan brigades of the Territorial Defence which were not dissolved (“**which [were] not**

²¹⁹ Ibid. H. Efendic, the aforementioned work, pp. 94-95.

²²⁰ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2504, Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence, strictly confidential no. 05/5-6, October 1, 1990 – to the District (City) Headquarters of the Territorial Defence. These are the following brigades:

- 7th Krajiska Partisan Brigade of TO Banja Luka;
- 15th Krajiska Partisan Brigade of TO Banja Luka;
- 1st Tuzlanska Partisan Brigade of TO Tuzla;
- 2nd Tuzlanska Partisan Brigade of TO Tuzla;
- 25th Eastern Bosnia Partisan Brigade of TO Lukavac;
- 13th Central Bosnia Partisan Brigade of TO Bugojno;
- 4th Sarajevska Partisan Brigade of TO Ilidza;
- 5th Sarajevska Partisan Brigade of TO Novo Sarajevo;
- 6th Sarajevska Partisan Brigade of TO Vogosca.

to be dissolved”) and forces for growth of the manoeuvre structure of the Territorial Defence.²²¹

In accordance with the reduction of the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina down to 3%, in late October 1990, the Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence also made a detailed “analysis” of the organization of the peacetime composition of the Territorial Defence, that is, of its Headquarters. In relation to this, it was concluded that the Headquarters of the Territorial Defence could be reduced by a certain number of formational positions, without disrupting the system of directing and command over the Territorial Defence and its efficiency in terms of building up of the combat preparedness. This would allegedly be accomplished through a better systematisation of workplaces and mergers of jobs of two or more workplaces, where the scope of work had decreased due to the numeric reduction of the Territorial Defence.²²²

The numeric status of the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in spite of the aforementioned organizational and formational programs for its restructuring based on the plan “Jedinstvo – III”, was not reduced to the 3% of engaged population of the Republic, even by the end of October of 1990.²²³

In order to carry out the tasks related to the restructuring of the Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the reduction of its numeric size down to 3% of the engaged population of the Republic, in accordance with the plan “Jedinstvo-III”, general Milos Bajcetic issued a decision, again marked strictly confidential, no. 05/5-7, dated

²²¹Ibid.

²²² AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2505, Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence, Confidential no. 05/12-1 October 23, 1990 – to the Presidency of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

²²³ Ibid. In the Explanation of the new peacetime formations of the Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the commands for development of partisan brigades of the Territorial Defence, dated October 23, 1990, sent to the Presidency of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina, general Milos Bajcetic claims that the Territorial Defence shall be reduced down to the 3% by the end of 1991.

October 23, 1990, regulating the dissolution and restructuring of the units of the Territorial Defence from a higher into a lower type.²²⁴

The order of the Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina dated October 24, 1990, meant, among other things, an effort for preliminary subjection of the batteries of light 128 mm rocket launchers and 120 mm mortars, which remained as “surplus” after the dissolution of the partisan brigades of the Territorial Defence. However, this order was not fully executed, because some headquarters, units and institutions, such as, for instance, the City Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Sarajevo, did not surrender the weapons and ammunition.²²⁵

224 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2506, Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence, strictly confidential no. 05/5-7, October 23, 1990 – to the District Headquarters of Territorial Defence. This order foresaw the **dissolution** of 12 units of the Territorial Defence (type III: Sipovo, Bosansko Grahovo, Gorazde, Kalinovik, Kupres, Gacko, Konjic, Ljubinje, Neum, Han Pijesak, Kresevo and Trnovo) and 2 anti-parachute units of the Territorial Defence (types I and II: Ilidza and Mostar); **restructuring** of 17 units of the Territorial Defence (type II into units of the Territorial Defence type III: Bosanski Novi, Skender Vakuf, Srbac, Bihac, Foca, Visegrad, Capljina, Grude, Listica, Ljubuski, Mostar, Prozor, Stolac, Kiseljak, Vitez, Zepce, and Hadzici); **restructuring** of 8 further units of the Territorial Defence Corps (type I into units of the Territorial Defence type II. Bijeljina, Brcko, Zenica, Centar Sarajevo, Novi Grad Sarajevo, Novo Sarajevo, Stari Grad Sarajevo, and Travnik); **restructuring** of 3 units of the Territorial Defence (type II into units of the Territorial Defence type I: Lukavac, Tuzla, and Visoko); **restructuring** of the Unit of the Territorial Defence type I in Trebinje into a Unit of the Territorial Defence type III; **restructuring** of the Unit of the Territorial Defence type III Ilidza into Unit of the Territorial Defence type II (Ibid.).

The dissolution and restructuring of the units of the Territorial Defence from higher into lower “types”, based on this order, was allegedly directly linked to the Plan for Growth of the Territorial Defence by 25% in wartime. This activity was to be started in January 1, 1991, and be completed no later than by June 30 of the same year (Ibid.).

225 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2507, Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence, strictly confidential no. 05/5-7, October 24, 1990 – to the District-City Headquarters of Territorial Defence; H. Efendic, the aforementioned work, pp. 95-96. In relation to this, Hasan Efendic wrote: **“Given that these weapons had been paid for by the socio-political entities, from their funds, we from the Territorial Defence of Sarajevo did not want to give up our weapons without being paid their countervalue. As the Republic Headquarters of the**

In mid-November 1990, general Milos Bajcetic ordered the restructuring of the Independent Light Artillery Division of the Anti-Aircraft Defence 40 mm M.1 Sarajevo, and the Light Artillery Battery of Anti-Aircraft Defence 40 mm Vogosca into the Light Artillery and Rocket Division of the Anti-Aircraft Defence 40 mm M.1 and “Strela-2M” (“Arrow” – 2M, note by translator).²²⁶

General Milos Bajcetic had also issued the decision marked Strictly Confidential, no. 05/12.4, dated December 10, 1990, regulating the formation, completion and funding of the commands for the development of partisan brigades of the Territorial Defence.²²⁷

The implementation of the reduction of the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina was approached based on the decisions of the Presidencies of the SFRY and of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Territorial Defence Corps was not ready to pay this to us, we did not surrender the weapons with the ammunition nor did we proceed as per the order. It is interesting that no sanctions were imposed upon us, but the order was changed. The formation of the defence commands of the cities never happened due to the aggression against Slovenia and Croatia committed by the same ones that were ordering the suspension of the Territorial Defence and were doing various intrigues with ‘surplus’ armament”. (H. Efendic, the aforementioned work, pp. 95-96).

²²⁶ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2510, Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence, marked strictly confidential no. 0515-4, November 15, 1990 – to the City Headquarters of Territorial Defence Sarajevo.

On March 15, 1991, the commander of the City Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Sarajevo, Colonel Hasan Efendic, notified the Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the implementation of the restructuring of the Light Artillery Division of the Anti-Aircraft Defence 40 mm M.1 and the Light Artillery Battery of Anti-Aircraft Defence 40 mm Vogosca-Sarajevo. Filling in with manpower of the Light Artillery and Rocket Division of the Anti-Aircraft Defence 40 mm M.1 and “Strela -2M” was done using 571 military conscripts (or, 98%) and 71 motor vehicles (or, 84%). By March 15, 1991, the backup security was also regulated (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2510, Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Assembly of the City of Sarajevo, City Headquarters of the Territorial Defence, strictly confidential, no. 05/1123-3, March 15, 1991 – To the Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo.

²²⁷ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2511, Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence, strictly confidential no. 05/12-4, December 10, 1990 – to the District Headquarters of Territorial Defence Banja Luka and others.

and the conclusions and tasks of the Federal Defence Secretariat – General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY. The organizational and formational changes had significantly reduced the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina, thereby suspending war assignments for a large number of military conscripts. Having this in mind, the Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina proposed that the manpower from the dissolved units of the TO be planned for growth of the Territorial Defence in the war of up to 25%. This proposal was submitted to the Federal Secretary for National Defence, as well as to the Council for the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The proposal was accepted, and its implementation followed. (The Republic Headquarters of the TO drafted a specific plan for growth of the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina in war, through lower organizational and formational units). However, difficulties were met in the implementation of this idea, because this matter was not regulated in the law and PRAMOS. Therefore, the Republic Headquarters of Territorial Defence of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina had referred this problem to the Federal Defence Secretariat – General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, i.e. its Third Administration.²²⁸

On April 9, 1991, the Federal Secretary for National Defence (Third Administration, document marked strictly confidential, no. 840-2), provided the opinion that such a growth of the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina in war by 25% has no basis in the law and in PRAMOS, and that, given the organizational and formational changes and the numeric reduction of the Territorial Defence, there is not even a need for its regulation. The numeric status of the Territorial Defence, according to the military leadership, was to amount from some 45,000 (1%) up to 67,500 (1.5% of the population).²²⁹ In this

²²⁸ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2529, Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence, strictly confidential no. 05/506-3, April 15, 1991 – to the City Headquarters of the Territorial Defence Sarajevo and to all the district headquarters of the Territorial Defence.

²²⁹ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2528, Federal Secretary for National Defence, General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, Third Administration, strictly confidential no. 840-2, marked as secret, April 9, 1991 - Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to

opinion, the military leadership had in particular stated that in the current situation, **“it was not constructive to discuss the growth of the Territorial Defence in the event of war, given that some relevant issues of the organization of the Armed Forces of the SFRY in the future system of Yugoslavia had not yet been resolved”**.²³⁰

In accordance with the aforementioned opinion, on April 15, 1991, general Milos Bajcetic suspended all activities on the growth of the Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the event of war by 25%, with a note that the military conscripts, the database, the military equipment and mobilization plans of the units foreseen for the growth need to be treated **“like the units being suspended”**.²³¹

During 1991, according to the “Jedinstvo” plan, and based on the conclusions, assignments and guidelines received from the Federal Defence Secretariat and the completed analysis of the implemented organizational and formational changes of compositions and units of the Territorial Defence of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, within the Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the proposal was made for a new organizational structure of the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and its further **reduction to below 2% of the total population of the Republic**. This proposal, among other things, foresaw the wartime dissolution of all the headquarters and units of the Territorial Defence in the local communities and entities of associated workforce (i.e. public enterprises), whose dissolution was evaluated as **“the most significant planned organizational and**

the Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence; Ibid., inv. No. 2-2529, Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence, strictly confidential no. 05/506-3, April 15, 1991 – to the City Headquarters of Territorial Defence Sarajevo and to all the district headquarters of Territorial Defence.

²³⁰ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2528, Federal Secretary for National Defence, General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, Third Administration, strictly confidential no. 840-2, secret, April 9, 1991 - Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence.

²³¹ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2529, Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of Territorial Defence Corps, strictly confidential no. 05/506-3, April 15, 1991 – City Headquarters of Territorial Defence Sarajevo and all District Headquarters of the Territorial Defence.

formational change in the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina“ during 1991.²³²

In order to implement the tasks related to the reorganization and numeral reduction of the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina, on June 19, 1991, the commander of the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina issued an Order (marked strictly confidential, no. 05/5-7), regulating the method and time for dissolution of the headquarters and units of the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina in local communities and entities of associated workforce, with the timeframe for completion running out on November 1, 1991. The order of the commander of the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina dated July 9, 1991, had foreseen the dissolution of three partisan brigades and organizational changes, as well as changes in mobilization, in other partisan brigades of the Territorial Defence.²³³

According to the aforementioned orders, based on which the major planned organizational and formational changes were carried out on the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1,157

²³² AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2535, /Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence Corps/ - to the Federal Secretariat for National Defence, attn. Deputy Chief of Staff of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY for the Territorial Defence; Ibid., inv. No. 2-2536, /Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of Territorial Defence.../ Information on the status and some problems in the TO SR BiH; Ibid. inv. No. 2-2536-1, Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of the TO, December 6, 1991 – to the Presidency of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina; Ibid., inv. No. 2-2538, Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of the TO , strictly confidential no. 05/1518-1, December 13, 1991 – to the Federal Secretariat for National Defence, General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, attn. Deputy Chief of Staff of General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY; H. Efendic, the aforementioned work, pp. 96-97.

²³³ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2535, /Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of Territorial Defence/ - to the Federal Secretariat for National Defence, attn. Deputy Chief of Staff of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY for Territorial Defence; Ibid., inv. No. 2-2536, /Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of Territorial Defence.../ Information on the status and some problems in the TO SR BiH; Ibid., inv. No. 2-2536-1, Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of Territorial Defence, December 6, 1991 – to the Presidency of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina

headquarters and units of the Territorial Defence in local communities and entities of associated workforce were awaiting suspension, with a total of 41,553 military conscripts, which accounted to 57% in relation to the total number of headquarters, units and institutions of the Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, together with three partisan brigades (whereby the number of manoeuvring units would be reduced by 18% in relation to its previous amount).²³⁴

In drafting the proposed organizational and formational changes and further reduction of the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the **wartime and peacetime compositions for the Territorial Defence of the Republic were established**. Each socio-political entity (i.e. municipality) in the Republic “...**shall form the wartime municipal headquarters, the anti-commando unit, the backup base and the communication unit**”. The geographical structure of the Territorial Defence was to be “**significantly reduced by suspending all the headquarters and units formed in the local communities and public enterprises, and the number of manoeuvring units should be reduced proportionally to the geographical structure, by dissolving three partisan brigades of the Territorial Defence**”.²³⁵

The peacetime composition of the Territorial Defence hence envisaged the following:

- retention of the existing organizations of the district and City headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Sarajevo (five district headquarters of the Territorial Defence of type I: Banja Luka, Mostar, Tuzla, Zenica, Sarajevo, and the City Headquarters of the Territorial Defence Corps of Sarajevo, with 120 employees, and three district headquarters of type II: Doboje, Bihac, and Livno, with 48 employees);

- retention of 14 commands for the development of the partisan brigades of the Territorial Defence, with a total of 48 employed persons;

²³⁴ Ibid.

²³⁵ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2538, Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of Territorial Defence, strictly confidential no. 05/1518-1, December 13, 1991 – to the Federal Secretariat for National Defence, General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, attn. Deputy Chief of Staff of General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY; H. Efendic, the aforementioned work, p. 96.

- retaining, in all municipalities, of the municipal headquarters of the Territorial Defence in three variants, with a total of 616 formational positions (through the framework formations of the Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence).²³⁶

By the thus completed organizational and formational changes, the total number of headquarters, units and institutions of the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina was to be reduced from 2,036 down to 698 (or 66% less!), and the number of military conscripts from 131,627 down to 80,596, or 61% less in relation to the formational status on January 1, 1991. The Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in relation to the number of population, was to be reduced from 3.2% down to 1.8%. In the total structure of the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the existing proportion between the geographical and tactical entities of 20:80 percent was to be changed in favour of the tactical structure, equalling 27:73 percent.²³⁷

The contents and the schedule of implementation of the organizational and formational changes **of the wartime composition of the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina** were regulated by the commander of the Territorial Defence of the Republic, in compliance with the following established plans and orders:

²³⁶ Ibid. Such an organizational and formational structure of the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina was in place at the time of aggression against the Republic (H. Efendic, the aforementioned work, p. 97).

²³⁷ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2538, Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence Corps, marked strictly confidential no. 05/1518-1, December 13, 1991 – to the Federal Secretariat for National Defence, General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, attn. Deputy Chief of Staff of General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY; Ibid., inv. No. 2-920, Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo, December 23, 1991, Platform for Negotiations of the Presidency of the SR Bosnia and Herzegovina with the Federal Secretary for National Defence. Counting by formational status, as of January 1, 1991, the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina had a total of 2,036 headquarters, units and departments, with 131,627 military conscripts (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2536 /Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence/, Information on the situation and certain problems in the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina).

1. - Formation of eleven batteries of light 128-mm M-71 rocket launchers.

These batteries were formed by June 15, 1991, as war units of the following district and municipal headquarters of the Territorial Defence:

- District Headquarters of the Territorial Defence in Banja Luka – 3 batteries (at the District Headquarters of the Territorial Defence and at the Municipal Headquarters of Territorial Defence of Banja Luka, one each, and a further one at the Municipal Headquarters of the Territorial Defence in Prijedor);

- District Headquarters of the Territorial Defence in Bihac – 1 (at the Municipal Headquarters of the Territorial Defence, Bihac);

- District Headquarters of the Territorial Defence in Dobojski – 1 (at the Municipal Headquarters of the Territorial Defence, Dobojski);

- District Headquarters of the Territorial Defence in Mostar – 2 (at the District Headquarters of the Territorial Defence, and at the Municipal Headquarters of the Territorial Defence, Mostar; one each);

- District Headquarters of the Territorial Defence in Tuzla – 2 (at the District Headquarters of the Territorial Defence, and at the Municipal Headquarters of the Territorial Defence, Tuzla, one each);

- District Headquarters of the Territorial Defence in Zenica – 1 (at the Municipal Headquarters of the Territorial Defence, Zenica);

- District Headquarters of the Territorial Defence in Sarajevo – 1 (at the Municipal Headquarters of the Territorial Defence, Novo Sarajevo).²³⁸

²³⁸ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2538, Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of Territorial Defence Corps, marked strictly confidential no. 05/1518-1, December 13, 1991 – to the Federal Secretariat for National Defence, General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, attn. Deputy Chief of Staff of General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY.

These war units were formed in the composition of the partisan brigades of the Territorial Defence, while they were linked to the municipal headquarters of Territorial Defence in previous organizational and formational changes, where the partisan brigades of the Territorial Defence were created and, meanwhile, disbanded (Ibid.)

2. - Suspension of the Pontoon and Bridge Engineering Units of the TO

The implementation of this order (dated July 5, 1991) suspended 5 pontoon units (located at the municipal headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Laktasi, Bosanska Krupa, Capljina, Gracanica and Zvornik), with a total of 795 military conscripts, and 2 bridge engineering units (at the municipal headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Teslic and Konjic), with a total of 156 military conscripts.²³⁹

3. - Formation of three Pioneer Units of the TO

These pioneer units were formed at the municipal headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Bosanska Gradiska, Bosanska Dubica, and Visegrad, with a total of 288 military conscripts.²⁴⁰

4. - Dissolution of TO headquarters and units at the level of local communities and entities of associated workforce (public enterprises).

This order envisaged the suspension of 164 headquarters and 993 units (i.e. a total of 1,157 headquarters and units), which accounted for 57% of the total number of headquarters, units and departments of the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Once the implementation deadline (November 1, 1991) had expired, the Territorial Defence of the Republic was left with 382 headquarters and units of Territorial Defence in local communities and entities of associated

These organizational and formational changes, according to General Vukosavljevic (the commander of the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina), had allowed for a stronger composition of the district and municipal headquarters of the Territorial Defence, for a total of 660 military conscripts; and complete preparedness for implementation of the tasks on the formation of commands for the defence of cities, which were also supposed to include those units just formed at the level of municipal headquarters of the Territorial Defence (Bihac, Prijedor, Banja Luka, Doboj, Mostar, Tuzla, and Zenica) – (Ibid.)

²³⁹ Ibid.

²⁴⁰ Ibid. The suspension of the pontoon and bridge engineering units and formation of the pioneer units of the Territorial Defence “adjusted the structure and purpose of the engineering units to the overall changes of the compositions and units of the Territorial Defence, and at the same time, reduced their numeric size“ (Ibid.).

workforce (public enterprises) that had not been dissolved based on various decisions (the majority (234) was in the area of the Banja Luka District). This was 33% less than projected.²⁴¹

In the implementation of this obviously largest organizational and formational change, in 1991, the Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence were faced with the most difficulties, discrepancies and open resistance. A number of municipalities had refused to implement this order, referring to a recommendation of the Ministry for National Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, that these units be used to form municipal units of the Territorial Defence, which was qualified by the Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a creation of a paramilitary grouping. On October 8, the Republic Headquarters of Territorial Defence had referred the matter to the Federal Secretariat for National Defence.²⁴²

In relation to the implementation of the order for suspension of all the headquarters and units of the Territorial Defence at local communities and entities of associated workforce, the status in the districts in the first half of December 1991 was as follows:

- In the **District of Bihac**, there were 70 headquarters and units of Territorial Defence in local communities and entities of associated workforce. Two municipalities, Titov Drvar and Bosanski Petrovac, with a total of 12 such headquarters and units, had refused to execute the order, and in two municipalities this was only partially implemented (in the municipality of Bosanska Krupa, one unit of Territorial Defence

²⁴¹ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2536-1, Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of Territorial Defence, December 6, 1991 – to the Presidency of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This information, according to General Hasan Efendic, is not true. In relation with this, he claims that many headquarters of Territorial Defence had informed the Republic Headquarters that they had suspended the headquarters and units in the local communities and entities of associated workforce, without having actually done that. Speaking about this, he states that this was not done in the City of Sarajevo. According to him, some municipal headquarters had formed new units, such as for example: Gradiska, Jaycee, Bihac, and the like. The municipalities in which there was a majority of Serbs did not suspend the headquarters and units of territorial defence, while having formed new units (H. Efendic, the aforementioned work, p. 98).

²⁴² Ibid.

at local community level was not dissolved – the unit of the Territorial Defence Cops of the Local Community of Buzim);

- In the **District of Livno**, there were 24 headquarters and units of the Territorial Defence in local communities and entities of associated workforce. Of this, only two units were not dissolved (in the municipality of Glamoc – the unit of the Territorial Defence of the Local Community, and the Autonomous Ski Unit of the Territorial Defence), for which transformation into municipal units of the TO was sought;

- In the **District of Mostar**, where there were 194 headquarters and units of the Territorial Defence in local communities and entities of associated workforce, the execution of the order was refused in six municipalities and appropriate “transition” of these headquarters and units into municipal units was sought (i.e. the municipalities of Grude, Citluk, Ljubuski, Siroki Brijeg, Neum and Prozor, with a total of 72 headquarters and units of Territorial Defence);

- In the **District of Sarajevo**, where there were 86 headquarters and units of the Territorial Defence at the level of local communities and entities of associated workforce, the order was not executed in five municipalities (Breza, Fojnica, Kiseljak, Kresevo and Visoko) and those headquarters and units were “transformed” into municipal ones, whereas in one municipality (Olovo) the execution of this order was conditioned with another demand (with the change of type of the local Territorial Defence unit). Thus, 41 headquarters and units of the Territorial Defence of municipalities and entities of associated workforce remained;

- In the **District of Tuzla**, where there were 212 headquarters and units of the Territorial Defence in local communities and entities of associated workforce, the order was not executed only in the municipality of Banovici (“transformation” of those units into municipal ones was sought), and in this district there were hence 9 undissolved headquarters and units. During the implementation of these decisions, there were many further problems (in the municipalities of Orasje, Gracanica, Kladanj), however, they were solved.

- In the **District of Zenica**, where there were 66 such headquarters and units of the Territorial Defence, in two municipalities (Zepce and

Vitez), the order was not executed and at the same time “transformation” of these units into municipal units of Territorial Defence was sought (a total of 11 war units of Territorial Defence).

- In the **districts: Gorazde, Livno and the City of Sarajevo**, a total of 276 headquarters and units of Territorial Defence in local communities and entities of associated workforce was suspended.²⁴³

In the first half of December 1991, the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina, without the district of Banja Luka, encompassed a total of 148 units of Territorial Defence in local communities and entities of associated workforce (public enterprises), which were not dissolved, and, given the issued order and demands, treated by the Republic Headquarters as paramilitary formations. For the District of Banja Luka, the commander of the Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina had ordered the amendment of the aforementioned order for dissolution of all headquarters and units of Territorial Defence in local communities and entities of associated workforce (enactment marked strictly confidential, no. 05/5-9 dated August 30, 1991), based on a request from the District Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Banja Luka, as well as on the assessment of the current social and political movements and the organizational and formational capacity of the Territorial Defence of this district “under new circumstances”. This amendment had suspended the dissolution of the headquarters and units of the Territorial Defence of the local communities and entities of associated workforce (previously, these units and headquarters had fully been suspended in three municipalities: Kljuc, Sanski Most, and Sipovo, which was a total of 43 headquarters and units of the Territorial Defence), and the total number of such headquarters and units was increased up to 234, from 229 headquarters and units. The structure was changed, too, so that mainly headquarters and units of the entities of associated workforce were transformed into local community units (only three municipalities retained the wartime units of the Territorial Defence in the entities of associated workforce, that is, enterprises).²⁴⁴

²⁴³ Ibid.

²⁴⁴ Ibid., AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2535, /Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence Corps/ - to the Federal Secretariat for

5. - Dissolution and Organizational and Formational Changes in the Other Partisan Brigades of the Territorial Defence.

The aim of this order was to reduce the number of partisan brigades of the Territorial Defence, from 17 down to a total of 14 (that is, to disband three of them), in order to “balance the proportion between the units of the tactical and geographical structure, and provide for more adequate coverage of the territory” through new deployment of these war units. Thus, (the deadline for execution was December 15, 1991) the dissolved ones were: the 11th Herzegovina Partisan Brigade (Mostar), the 1st Posavina Partisan Brigade (Brcko), and the 12th Central Bosnian Partisan Brigade (Zenica). Hence, the number of military conscripts was reduced by 4,497. The **restructuring** was also done to the 8th Krajina (Bihac), 14th Herzegovina (Konjic), 3rd Tuzla (Tuzla), 11th Central Bosnian (Zenica), as well as to the Partisan Brigade of the Territorial Defence “Veljko Lukic-Kurjak” (Bijeljina).²⁴⁵

Several problems arose in relation to this organizational and formational change:

- The restructuring was not done to the 10th Herzegovina Partisan Brigade (Mostar), as, since the municipalities of Capljina, Ljubuski and Siroki Brijeg refused to execute the order, its 3rd battalion was not formed;

- The “filling in” plan was not prepared and implemented, as it was returned by the Secretariat for National Defence of the Municipal

National Defence, attn. Deputy Chief of Staff of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY for Territorial Defence; Ibid., inv. No. 2-2536, /Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of Territorial Defence.../ Information on the status and some problems in the TO SR BiH; Ibid., inv. No. 2-2536-1, Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence Corps, December 6, 1991 – to the Presidency of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

²⁴⁵ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2538, Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of Territorial Defence, marked strictly confidential no. 05/1518-1, December 13, 1991 – to the Federal Secretariat for National Defence, General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, attn. Deputy Chief of Staff of General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY.

Assembly of Mostar on claims of missing jurisdiction, referring to the decision of the Government of the Republic.²⁴⁶

In addition to all the organizational and formational changes of the wartime composition of the Territorial Defence of the Socialist Republic Bosnia and Herzegovina, a creation or rearrangement of the light artillery divisions of anti-aircraft defence (20/3 mm and “Strela-2M”) in the municipal headquarters of the Territorial Defence in Tuzla was also ordered (the deadline for execution was March 15, 1992), which was to include the 3 existing anti-aircraft defence batteries (two from Lukavac and one from Tuzla). The communications centres of the Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence were also suspended, based on a request by the SSNO (Federal Secretariat) General Staff of the Armed Forces – Second Administration (telegram, marked strictly confidential, no. 936-1, dated August 27, 1991).²⁴⁷

The planned organizational and formational changes **of the peacetime composition of the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina** in 1991 pertained exclusively to the composition of the municipal headquarters of the Territorial Defence. In accordance with the determined schedule, in June of that year, the Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence had drafted a proposal for the new framework peacetime formations of the municipal headquarters of Territorial Defence, of variants I, II, and III. In the proposed framework, there were to be 616 formations at level of municipal headquarters, of variants I, II, and III, whereas the number had then equalled 1,149, which meant a reduction by 533 formational positions, or 46%.²⁴⁸

This reduction, if arranged by the types of headquarters, should have looked as follows:

²⁴⁶ Ibid.; AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2536, /Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of Teritorial Defence/, Information on the status and some problems in the TO SR BiH.

²⁴⁷ Ibid.

²⁴⁸ Ibid.; AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2538, Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of Teritorial Defence, marked strictly confidential no. 05/1518-1, December 13, 1991 – to the Federal Secretariat for National Defence, General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, attn. Deputy Chief of Staff of General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY.

At the time, there were 26 municipal headquarters of Territorial Defence of variant I, in which 14 persons each were allocated by the framework peacetime formations apportionment, whereas this proposal provided for 27 headquarters with 8 persons each, which is a reduction of 148 persons in variant I;²⁴⁹

At the time, there were 51 municipal headquarters of Territorial Defence of variant II, in which 11 persons each were allocated by the framework peacetime formations apportionment, whereas this proposal provided for 36 headquarters with 6 persons each, which is a reduction of 345 persons in variant II;²⁵⁰

At the time, there were 32 municipal headquarters of Territorial Defence of variant III, in which 7 persons each were allocated by the framework peacetime formations apportionment, whereas this proposal provided for 46 headquarters with 4 persons each, which is a reduction of 40 persons in variant I.²⁵¹

In this way, the Territorial Defence of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina would “**still**” have 109 headquarters of Territorial Defence.²⁵²

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

²⁵⁰ Ibid.

²⁵¹ Ibid.

²⁵² Ibid. The aforementioned reduction in the numbers of formational positions, according to general Vukosavljevic, would create “**more favourable conditions for the further improvement of filling in of the headquarters, by moving persons from the suspended formational positions to those, which were not filled. The majority of the municipal headquarters of the Territorial Defence is not 100% filled in, according to the formational standards adopted by the Assemblies of the Socio-political entities, which, in turn, had affected the preparation of a proposal for these formations in terms of a significant percent of reduction in the number of formational positions**” (Ibid.).

This proposal was given to the Presidency of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina for review, and later in the second week of December 1991, the Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence expected its approval. “**In the meantime, there had been many attempts by the new bodies of power in the municipalities that, before their acceptance and submission to the municipal headquarters of Territorial Defence, the numeral reduction and change of structure of the peacetime composition of the municipal headquarters of the Territorial Defence be proceeded with, as well as demands for change of variants**” (Ibid.).

The implementation of the aforementioned orders was faced with resistance, difficulties, and problems, which had **“to a good extent”** affected the numeric reduction, status, and further development of the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina. A number of the municipalities had openly refused to carry out the aforementioned orders of the Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence. Namely, following a recommendation of the Ministry for National Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina dated September 6, 1991, and addressed to the municipal assemblies, units of Territorial Defence were to be formed at the level of municipalities (transition of the headquarters and units of Territorial Defence from the level of local communities and entities of associated workforce into municipal units), and this had directly affected the failure to carry out the order on suspension of all the headquarters and units of the Territorial Defence in local communities and entities of associated workforce. This had, in turn, slowed down the schedule for dissolution of the headquarters and units of the Territorial Defence in local communities and entities of associated workforce.²⁵³

The peacetime filling in of the headquarters of Territorial Defence was implemented at 80%, and the Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence was satisfied with the filling in, the more so because they had expected organizational and formational changes. The problem for them was to fill in working posts requiring a university degree. Of the total number of working posts requiring a university degree, only 40% of workers had possessed such a degree (Ibid.).

²⁵³ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2535, /Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of Territorial Defence/ - to the Federal Secretariat for National Defence, attn. Deputy Chief of Staff of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY for the Territorial Defence; Ibid., inv. No. 2-2536, /Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence Corps.../ Information on the status and some problems in the TO SR BiH; Ibid., inv. No. 2-2538, Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence Corps, strictly confidential no. 05/1518-1, December 13, 1991 – to the Federal Secretariat for National Defence, General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, attn. Deputy Chief of Staff of General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY; Ibid., inv. No. 2-2536-1, Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence Corps, December 6, 1991 – to the Presidency of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Thus the conduct of the Ministry for National Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina was qualified by the Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence Corps of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an attempt **“to create military organizations of the TO SR BiH”** (Ibid; AIIZ., inv. No. 2-2536-1, Socialist Republic

By December 23, 1991, 158 headquarters and units were not dissolved, due to which they were treated as paramilitary formations by the Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina. These were those units for which the Ministry for National Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina had given the explanation that they should be “transitioned“ into municipal units of the Territorial Defence (these are the headquarters and units of the Territorial Defence at the level of local communities and entities of associated workforce in the municipalities of Bosanska Krupa, Titov Drvar, Bosanski Petrovac, Glamoc, Grude, Citluk, Ljubuski, Siroki Brijeg, Neum, Prozor, Breza, Fojnica, Kiseljak, Kresevo, Visoko, Olovo, Sokolac, Banovici, Zepce and Vitez).²⁵⁴

The system of directing and command too was disrupted in some regions, on the link between the district headquarters of Territorial Defence

of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of Territorial Defence, December 6, 1991 – to the Presidency of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina).

The major problems faced by the Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence Corps of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina in late 1991 in the implementation of the planned organizational and formational changes of headquarters and units of the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the opinion of the Republic Headquarters of Territorial Defence, boiled down to “two key issues”:

“- insufficient cooperation and confusion of jurisdictions, particularly strong in the conduct and activity of the Ministry for National Defence;

- a ‘duality’ of work in the field of National Defence (a part of the military record documents was taken over by the military territorial authorities, and part of the records was retained at the Federal Department, which significantly made it harder for the headquarters of the Territorial Defence to operate)” - AIIZ, inv.

No. 2-2536, /Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of Territorial Defence.../ Information on the status and certain problems in the TO SR BiH; Ibid., inv. No. 2-2538, Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence, marked strictly confidential no. 05/1518-1, December 13, 1991 – to the Federal Secretariat for National Defence, General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, attn. Deputy Chief of Staff of General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY.

²⁵⁴AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2538, Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence, strictly confidential no. 05/1518-1, December 13, 1991 – to the Federal Secretariat for National Defence, General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, attn. Deputy Chief of Staff of General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY; H. Efendic, the aforementioned work, pp. 96-97.

and the municipal headquarters of the Territorial Defence in late December 1991, even disconnected, **“which created insurmountable barriers in the execution of assigned tasks”**. Thus, for instance, within the District Headquarters of the Territorial Defence in Mostar, the municipal headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Citluk, Grude, Listica (Siroki Brijeg), Ljubuski, Neum, Posusje and Prozor, where the Croatian Democratic Union had gained power, had refused **“any cooperation and they had virtually, on their own initiative, excluded themselves from the system of directing and command over the Territorial Defence, including the system of directing and command over the Armed Forces”**, for an extended period of time. In addition to that, the District Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Mostar could not **“fully exert influence on the work of the municipal headquarters of the Territorial Defence in Gacko, Nevesinje and Bileca”** either, where the Serbian Democratic Party was in power, with **“a special case [at] the Municipal Headquarters of Territorial Defence in Trebinje, where municipal structures of power had usurped the right to manage and command the Territorial Defence”**.²⁵⁵

In some municipalities, various financial and other pressures were intentionally made on the employees at the headquarters of the Territorial Defence. Certain municipal bodies of power threatened to pass decisions suspending the municipal headquarters, and in certain municipalities, arbitrary dismissals and appointments of the commanders of headquarters of the Territorial Defence were done, whereas this was within the scope of affairs of the commander of the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina. There were efforts **“to recruit reserve officers and military conscripts from the composition of the Territorial Defence, and along with rumours about its suspension, to use this**

²⁵⁵ Ibid. The political events in Bosnia and Herzegovina at that time (since late September 1991) had also affected the status of the Territorial Defence of the Republic, in particular its combat preparedness. Among other things, there was a serious disruption in the unity of directing and command, which resulted in break-up of the Territorial Defence as an integral part of the Armed Forces of the SFRY. This process of disbandment of the Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina was then under way, which was paralysing the system of directing and command, particularly at the level of the Republic Headquarters and all the ten district headquarters (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2537, Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence, marked strictly confidential, no. 01/1144-1, October 1, 1991, INFORMATION).

in order to speed up the break-up of the units of territorial defence for the creation of paramilitary armed formations“.²⁵⁶

During 1991, there was also a major problem with the appointment of the commanders of municipal headquarters of the Territorial Defence. In this year, giving in to requests by ruling parties, new commanders were appointed for municipal headquarters of the Territorial Defence in 62 municipalities.²⁵⁷

In one part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence treated the non-dissolved units and headquarters as paramilitary formations, and in the municipalities with a Serb majority population, such as the Banja Luka region, it suspended the dissolution of the headquarters and units of the Territorial Defence in local communities and entities of associated workforce, and formed new ones, not treated as paramilitary, but as “desirable”.²⁵⁸ In those municipalities, in accordance with the war goals of the Greater Serbia movement, and particularly in late 1991 and early 1992, there was also “transitioning“ of Serb TO conscripts into “volunteers“ of the JNA, as well as the formation and mobilization of the armed formations of the Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Serb Territorial Defence and Militia.²⁵⁹

The work of the headquarters of the Territorial Defence was also made significantly harder and more complex by the fact that a part of the military records had been taken or snatched by the military territorial authorities,²⁶⁰

²⁵⁶ Ibid.

²⁵⁷ Ibid. General Hasan Efendic wrote during 1991, “[that] **there was a big bustle for the positions of commanders of municipal headquarters of the Territorial Defence among the ruling parties. Thus, only during this year, 62 municipal TO commanders were appointed upon demand of the ruling parties. Particularly big pressures were made by the SDS (Serbian Democratic Party), through General Vukosavljevic. The result was that of the 14 commanders of the partisan brigades of the Territorial Defence, only two were not Serbs and JNA officers**” (H. Efendic, the aforementioned work, p. 100).

²⁵⁸ H. Efendic, the aforementioned work, pp. 98-99.

²⁵⁹ See pp. 884-930 of this work.

²⁶⁰ H. Efendic, the aforementioned work, p. 99. The military territorial authorities (military districts and municipal secretariats for general national defence) were subjected to the Republic Secretariat for National Defence. Their main tasks were drafting and mobilization of the members of the Armed Forces and Civil Protection (Ibid., p. 99, note 20).

and another significant portion of this documentation was kept at the municipal secretariats for national defence. Many headquarters were not ready to provide the military records for their conscripts, the young draftees in particular, to the military territorial authorities, that is, to surrender them to the commands of the JNA.²⁶¹

According to the information available, as of December 31, 1991, the Territorial Defence had had 86,184 members (37,223 Bosniaks, 29,276 Serbs, 14,326 Croats, and 5,339 “Others”).²⁶² However, the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina existed only in such municipalities, which were not covered by the “Serb autonomous regions” and “Croat communities”.

In late 1991 and early 1992, the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina had practically broken down into three parts:

a) **The “Serb Territorial Defence”**, organized, trained, equipped and mobilized by the JNA, with the participation of the Serbian Democratic Party (a number of headquarters and units from the Banja Luka District had even participated in combat activities against the Republic of Croatia);

b) **The “Croat Territorial Defence”**, organized, trained, equipped and mobilized by the Croatian Army, with the participation of the Croat Democratic Union;

c) **The legal Territorial Defence**, mainly remaining in the municipalities where Bosniaks were the majority and where a larger number of headquarters and units were preserved in a reduced composition. Unlike the so-called Serb and Croat ones, this one had made up the spine of organized resistance to the aggression, together with the forces of the Ministry of Interior, the Patriotic League, the Green Berets, and other self-organized groups of citizens.²⁶³

Simultaneously to the reduction and an attempt to dissolve the Territorial Defence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, staffing changes were also made, as well as purges, set-ups, and manipulations,

²⁶¹ Ibid., pp. 99-100.

²⁶² Ibid., pp. 97-100.

²⁶³ Ibid.

dominated by staff of Serb nationality. They had accepted the Greater Serbia nationalist ideology, policy and practice, and then they were involved in the creation of the Serb armed formations, strengthening existing ones, in municipalities with a Serb majority, which had excluded themselves from the system of directing and command over the Territorial Defence of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and provided armament, equipment and training to the Serb population for the aggression and other forms of crimes.²⁶⁴

The actual intentions are also affirmed by the fact that the Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina had also suspended the territorial patrolling service of the Territorial Defence and taken the complete documentation away to Pale, based on a telegram (marked strictly confidential, no. 931-1), dated August 27, 1991, and without knowledge of the Bosnia-Herzegovina presidency.²⁶⁵

²⁶⁴ Ibid., pp. 108-113.

²⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 99. The Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina had a developed system of territorial patrolling service, covering the whole Republic with communication centres, posts, and observation points. The majority of these centres had communication equipment and observation accessories. Regular training was provided to the manpower available (Ibid.).

5. Disarmament of the Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina

After the exclusion of the republic leaderships from the system of directing and command over the Armed Forces of the SFRY (i.e. the denial of the right to direct the Territorial Defence), and in order to accomplish its own war goals, the Greater Serbia movement came to the conclusion that it must paralyse and disarm the Territorial Defence of all the republics (except for Serbia and Montenegro, and the part of Bosnia and Herzegovina where Serbs were the majority). To this aim, armament from the Territorial Defence was to be removed and stored into military warehouses, under the control of the JNA.

Through the organizational and formational changes in the Territorial Defence of the SFRY in 1988 and 1989 (when a number of units of the Territorial Defence had been dissolved and restructured, and the TO itself largely reduced in size), the leadership of the Greater Serbia movement produced a phenomenon most easily described as “surplus armament and other military equipment”. This caused the emergence of a “surplus” in large quantities of armament in the Territorial Defence, and in particular, of 7.9-mm rifles, trophy machines guns, and 82-mm mortars, which “had to be taken away”. In order to take away the “surplus” armament and other military equipment from the Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic Headquarters decided that the “surplus” armament of the headquarters of the Territorial Defence was allegedly taking up needed warehouse space, which was insufficient in most headquarters, and on January 5, 1990, it approached the Federal Secretariat for National Defence with a request to undertake measures in order to effect **the confiscation of the surplus armament and ammunition as soon as possible.**²⁶⁶

²⁶⁶ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2495, Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence, confidential no. 06/2-51-45, January 5, 1990

During 1988 and 1989, the following quantities of surplus armament were withdrawn from the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina:

- automatic rifles 11.43 mm	890 pieces
- carbines 7.62 mm	6,803 pieces
- rifles 7.62 mm (s)	30 pieces
- rifles 7.9 mm M2y	146 pieces
- rifles 7.9 mm M 24/47	11,715 pieces
- rifles 7.9 mm M 24/52	3,148 pieces
- rifles 7.9 mm M 98 (n)	7,872 pieces
- rifles 7.9 mm M 98/48	2,661 pieces. ²⁶⁷

Following quantities of “surplus” armament were to be withdrawn from the Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1990:

- carbines 7.62 mm	111 pieces
- rifles 7.9 mm M 24/47	470 pieces

– to the Federal Secretariat for National Defence; Ibid., inv. No. 2-2499, Federal Secretariat for National Defence, General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, Deputy Chief of Staff of the General Staff for TO, confidential no. 831-15/89, February 1, 1990 – to the Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina; Ibid., inv. No. 2-2503, Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence, strictly confidential no. 05/5-5, September 28, 1990 – to the District Headquarters of the Territorial Defence; Ibid., inv. No. 2-2505, Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence, confidential, no. 05/12-1, October 23, 1990 – to the Presidency of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina; Ibid., inv. No. 2-2507, Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence, strictly confidential, inv. No. 06/1-79-123, October 24, 1990 – To the District/City Headquarters of the Territorial Defence; Ibid., inv. No. 2-2532, Territorial Defence of Sarajevo, strictly confidential, no. 06/386-2, May 10, 1991 – Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo.

The surplus armament and other military equipment, according to a opinion of the Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, constituted allegedly **“a serious problem to the units and headquarters of the Territorial Defence in terms of placement, storage and maintenance”** (Ibid.).

²⁶⁷ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2495, Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence, confidential no. 06/2-51-45, January 5, 1990 – to the Federal Secretariat for National Defence.

- rifles 7.9 mm M 24/52	537 pieces
- rifles 7.9 mm M 98 (n)	522 pieces
- rifles 7.9 mm M 98/48	31,105 pieces
- machine guns 7.62 mm M 26DP	508 pieces
- machine guns 7.9 mm M 34	402 pieces
- machine guns 7.9 mm M 42	134 pieces
- machine guns 7.9 mm M 26(c)	136 pieces
- machine guns 7.9 mm M 30(c)	13 pieces
- machine guns 7.9 mm M 37(c)	702 pieces
- heavy machine guns 7.9 mm M 42	14 pieces
- heavy machine guns 7.62 mm (a)	61 pieces
- mortars 82 mm (i)	8 pieces
- mortars 82 mm M 37	58 pieces
- mortars 82 mm (n)	22 pieces
- mortars 82 mm M 31/46	12 pieces
- mortars 82 mm 41	2 pieces
- anti-aircraft guns 20/1 M 38 (n)	6 pieces
- anti-aircraft guns 20/1 M 30/38	6 pieces
- anti-aircraft guns 20/2 M 38/51	8 pieces
- rifles 7.9 mm	13,580 pieces
- hand grenade launchers M 57	525 pieces
- mortars 82 mm M 38/(s)	6 pieces
- recoilless guns 75 mm M 20	60 pieces
- heavy machine gun 8 mm, type "Breda"	4 pieces
- rocket launcher M 20	9 pieces
- submachine gun 9 mm "Stan"	150 pieces
- bullets 7,62 mm (s)	1,754,000 pieces
- bullets 7.62 mm (a)	150,000 pieces
- bullets 75 mm (a)	2,800 pieces

- bullets 20 mm (n) 15,000 pieces.²⁶⁸

The Federal Secretariat for National Defence, having in mind the phenomenon of “surplus” armament and other military equipment, caused by the “large organizational and formational changes”, had issued an order (marked MILITARY SECRET, CONFIDENTIAL) on February 1, 1990 to all the republic and provincial headquarters of territorial defence on the **withdrawal, that is, confiscation, of the surplus armament from the Territorial Defence**. This order specified the method and site for the “withdrawal” of the armament and ammunition from the units and headquarters of the Territorial Defence,²⁶⁹ the collection time,²⁷⁰ and the schedule for withdrawal of the technical and material assets by the republics and provinces. In this, the Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina was the one to withdraw the most technical and material assets in relation to the other republics and provinces, and Serbia the least.²⁷¹

²⁶⁸ Ibid.

²⁶⁹ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2499, Federal Secretariat for National Defence, General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, Deputy Chief of Staff of the General Staff for TO, confidential, no. 831-15/89, February 1, 1990 – to the Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In relation to this, it was ordered that: **“all quantities of armament and ammunition that exceed the quota per formation, or that are reported as surplus, be withdrawn from the units and headquarters of the Territorial Defence of the socialist republics and socialist autonomous provinces into the Backup Base of the JNA, except for the armament kept in reserve by the headquarters of territorial defence”**.

The armament and ammunition **“shall be taken over by the Backup Bases of the JNA, as is...”** (Ibid.).

²⁷⁰ Ibid. The gathering of arms was supposed to be completed by late April 1990.

²⁷¹ Ibid. Thus, for instance, of the total number of 7.9 mm rifles M 98/48 which, by the Federal Department of Defence plan were to be withdrawn (53,938), 30,594 were to be withdrawn from the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and not a single one from Serbia. The total number of hand grenade launchers to be withdrawn was 525, all to be withdrawn from the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while not a single one was to be withdrawn from the Territorial Defence of the other republics.

With the dislocation of the armament and ammunition of the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina into warehouses of the JNA, all the mobilization

After the completed reorganization of the war units of Territorial Defence, only the City Headquarters of the Territorial Defence in Sarajevo disposed with the following surplus armament and military equipment:

- pistols 7.65 mm	800 pieces
- pistols 7.9 mm	5,411 pieces
- rifles 7.62 mm (PAP)	850 pieces
- automatic rifles 7.62	2,367 pieces
- machine guns 7.62 mm	700 pieces
- machine guns 7.9 mm	139 pieces
- heavy machine guns 7.9 mm	24 pieces
- signalling pistols	50 pieces
- launching bullets "Strela"	9 pieces
- anti-aircraft guns 20/1	12 pieces
- mortars 60 mm	36 pieces
- mortars 82 mm	36 pieces
- recoilless guns	40 pieces
- hand grenade launcher M 57	380 pieces
- sniper rifles	100 pieces
- bullets 7.62 mm	1,333,530 pieces
- bullets 7.65 mm	100,620 pieces
- bullets 7.62 mm for submachine guns, semi-submachine guns and light machine guns	3,241,750 pieces
- bullets 7.9 mm	1,757,160 pieces

plans were also thoroughly reworked (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-24975, Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence, marked strictly confidential, no. 06/1-79-26, June 6, 1990 – to the Commands of organizational mobilization of the Republic Headquarters of the TO; Ibid., inv. No. 2-2498, Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence, marked strictly confidential, no. 06/1-79-27, June 6, 1990 – to the District – City Headquarters of the Territorial Defence).

- ammunition bags, two-sided 6,341 pieces.²⁷²

The military leadership, and Kadijevec in particular, believed that the Territorial Defence needed to be **“maximally paralysed in those parts of the country where it could serve as a basis for the formation of armies of secessionist republics, that is, of secessionist forces”**.²⁷³

The massive armament of people, **“primarily through the Territorial Defence, somewhere even by giving out arms by hand or as close as possible to the people, due to the alleged need for quick mobilization”**, practically meant, according to general Kadijevec, **“the arming of the republic armies in the way which will be the most difficult to control by the JNA”**, and which, at the same time, **“was the preparation of the ‘republic armies’ for their opposition to possible interventions by the JNA”**.²⁷⁴

The foremen of the Greater Serbia movement, in particular the military leadership, used **a part of the officers in the Territorial Defence** to try and keep this component of the armed forces **maximally beyond the control of the “secessionist” political leaderships**. They had **“partially succeeded in this, everywhere more than in Slovenia”**. In this, the Territorial Defence **“of the Serb parts in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina was used by them in the military activity together with the JNA”**.²⁷⁵

²⁷² AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2532, Territorial Defence of Sarajevo, strictly confidential, no. 06/386-2, May 10, 1991, - Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo.

²⁷³ V. Kadijevec, the aforementioned work, p. 94; S. Biserko, the aforementioned work, p. 222.

The maximum paralysis of the Territorial Defence in the western part of Yugoslavia, according to Kadijevec, constituted one of the **“relevant orientations”** of the basic idea for the **“use of the armed forces”** (V. Kadijevec, the aforementioned work, p. 93-94).

²⁷⁴ V. Kadijevec, the aforementioned work, p. 73.

²⁷⁵ V. Kadijevec, the aforementioned work, p. 94; R. Dizdarevic, the aforementioned work, p. 151. In the SFRY, according to General Kadijevec, there were secessionist republics, secessionist political leaderships, secessionist forces, secessionist parts of the country, and even **“members of secessionist peoples”** (V. Kadijevec, the aforementioned work, pp. 94-95).

The JNA “**had placed the main sources of weapons purchase**” in Yugoslavia “**under its own control, by taking over the weapons that belonged to territorial defence**”, that is, by illegally confiscating them, “**and by controlling purchases from the national arms industry**”.²⁷⁶

The decision on the disarmament of the Territorial Defence was brought on May 14, 1990, a day before the regular rotation on the post of President of the Presidency of the SFRY, because the holders of the Greater Serbia movement were waiting for the mandate of Janez Drnovsek to expire, who was then President of the Presidency of the SFRY (until May 15), knowing all too well that he would not have agreed with it. Thus, the Chief of Staff of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, General Blagoje Adzic, issued an **Order** on May 14, 1990, marked strictly confidential no. 19-1, on “**the confiscation and securing of arms and ammunition of the ‘ONO and DSZ’ in the warehouses of the JNA**”.²⁷⁷ The next day, the Command of the First Army District, in compliance with the aforementioned order by general Adzic, **and in order to allow for the alleged “safer storage and preservation of arms and ammunition of the Territorial Defence”**, issued an Order (marked strictly confidential, no. 1-90) to the Fourth, Twelfth, Seventeenth, Twenty-Fourth, and Thirty-Seventh Corps for the **confiscation, storage and preservation of “the complete arms and ammunition from the Territorial Defence in the warehouses of the JNA**”.²⁷⁸

In this order, Lieutenant-general Aleksandar Spirkovski, commander of the First Military District, had specified the method of organization for

²⁷⁶ V. Kadijevec, the aforementioned work, p. 111.

²⁷⁷ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-917, Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence, 06/1 No. DT 06/-1-79, Sarajevo, September 13, 1990 – to the Presidency of the SR BiH; R. Dizdarevic, the aforementioned work, p. 151; Ibid., **OD SMRTI TITA DO SMRTI JUGOSLAVIJE**, p. 412.

The decision on the confiscation of armament from the Territorial Defence and its placing under the control of the JNA was, according to the opinion of general Kadijevec, “**one of the most significant measures for paralysation of the disastrous constitutional concept of armed forces**”. Kadijevec wrote that “**many had protested against that decision, particularly the Slovenes**” (Ibid., p. 78), but without any success.

²⁷⁸ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-916, Command of the First Military District, strictly confidential, no. 1-90, May 15, 1990 – to the Fourth Corps and others. This order was published by Hasan Efendic in the book: **KO JE BRANIO BOSNU**, Sarajevo, 1998, pp. 102-103.

confiscation, storage and preservation of the arms and ammunition from the Territorial Defence in the warehouses of the JNA and the time frame for implementation (with a deadline set on May 21, i.e. within 6 days), as well as the time for submission of a report on the execution of the order (by June 1, i.e. within 15 days), with the note that for **“any doubts or ambiguities”**, the corps should contact **“the appropriate institutions”** of the First Army District.²⁷⁹

The aforementioned measures were aimed at the complete disarmament of the Territorial Defence of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. These goals were insidiously covered by the formulation on the **“storage and preservation”** of the complete armament and ammunition of the Territorial Defence in the warehouses of the JNA. This was obviously a trick, particularly present in the constataion that the **“confiscation of armament and ammunition from the headquarters and units of the Territorial Defence, for the implementation of activities planned”**, will be approved by the Command of the First Military District, **“upon proposals of the commands of the corps”**, which will issue **“special instructions”** in order to govern **“the method of entry, maintenance and storage, as well as the procedure in confiscation and return of the armament and ammunition into warehouses”**. This, among other things, again confirmed the suspension of responsibilities and the total elimination of the Territorial Defence from the system of directing and command.²⁸⁰

Two days after Borisav Jovic came to the head of the Presidency of the SFRY, the Greater Serbia movement undertook measures **“to have the armament removed and transferred from civilian warehouses of the TO in Slovenia and Croatia into military warehouses”**, in order to prevent the **“abuse of the Territorial Defence weapons in potential conflicts, or for forced secession”**. In his diary for May 17, Jovic wrote the following: **“We have practically disarmed them. Formally, this was done by the Chief of Staff of the General Staff, but factually upon our** (referring to the leadership of the Greater Serbia movement; note by the author) **order. The Slovenians and Croatsians have fiercely reacted, but they had no options left”**.²⁸¹

²⁷⁹ Ibid.

²⁸⁰ Ibid.

²⁸¹ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 146.

The next day, Milan Kucan phoned Borisav Jovic, who was spending the weekend in Niksic (near Kragujevac in Serbia), complaining about **“the confiscation of arms“**. On this occasion, Kucan told him **“that the people have been resisting, that there may be victims”**, that he had convened a session of the Presidency of Slovenia because of this and requested negotiation, and then the two of them agreed to be in contact again **“on Monday afternoon“** and arrange for a meeting.²⁸²

On May 21, 1990, Jovic was visited by Kucan and Drnovsek to talk **“about the confiscation of arms from the Slovenian TO”**. Veljko Kadijevic and Anton Stari, Secretary-General of the Presidency of the SFRY, in addition to Jovic, also attended this meeting on the side of the Greater Serbia movement. **“Kucan was speaking in broad terms: they were not informed by anyone. The arms were first transferred and only then did they learn of it. They do not know the essence, the reasons, or the goal. They understand this as disarmament. They believe this to be endangering the sovereignty of the Republic. He believes the explanation of the General Staff to be insufficient. He thinks that the Constitution provides no coverage for such a measure. They had bought the weapons. They are responsible for the command of the TO, and they were now treated in such a way that their arms are taken away without them being told so. He believes that this is a political intervention, and that this indicates an imposition on their sovereign rights. Maybe the direct cause for this is the climate that was created in Slovenia after my inauguration address, and the critiques of this address in Slovenia and Croatia. The political situation in Slovenia is very difficult because of confiscation of the arms, and he is not sure how it can be resolved.”**²⁸³

²⁸² Ibid. When asked by Kucan **“if they can come together and talk about confiscation of arms”**, Jovic answered:

“Of course we can, I told him. Let him call back on Monday morning and we will arrange for a meeting. Otherwise, I told him, I have heard on the radio about this initiative, I do not know what it is about, but I recommend that they do not come into conflict with the army, to surrender the weapons, and on Monday we will correct everything if needed.”

Although he was pretending to be an uninformed president (**“...I do not know what this is all about...”**), what was important for Jovic was that the Slovenes **“surrender the weapons”**, and, if needed, they **“would correct everything”** in a day or two (Ibid.).

²⁸³ Ibid., p. 147.

At the time, Kucan demanded:

- “ - **that they be accurately informed what this was all about,**
- that their arms be returned, and they will ensure the conditions for their preservation,**
- that the commander of the TO for Slovenia be replaced, and,**
- that a way be found, in order for the tensions to be reduced”.**²⁸⁴

The explanation by general Kadijevec did not satisfy Kucan for many reasons, and first of all, his false “explanation“ that “**this measure has been taken in the whole country, and not only in Slovenia**”, while presented, in addition to the non-argued reasons, even some false ones for its undertaking.²⁸⁵

According to Kadijevec, “**the whole territorial defence was disarmed before the armed conflicts in Yugoslavia had begun**”.²⁸⁶ This statement hence speaks about the lies and intrigues played, first of all, on the Presidency of the SFRY.

The confiscation of weapons from the Territorial Defence **was made without the approval of the Presidency of the SFRY** and it was in contravention with the official concept of the general national defence and in the relation towards the Territorial Defence as a component

²⁸⁴ Ibid.

²⁸⁵ Ibid. Jovic wrote about this as follows: “**Veljko explained that the measure has been undertaken in the whole country, and not only in Slovenia, because the warehouses are poorly secured, and the interethnic and general political situation has suddenly deteriorated; that this is the exclusive jurisdiction of the army (keeping weapons and handling them); that this is not the issue of the Republic and that they (the republics) keep meddling into military affairs, when they do not have the right to do so. If they provide good keeping conditions, a return of weapons may be reviewed, but this requires at least one armed unit, rather than an armed guard, which will prevent weapons from being taken away in the case of an attack. All their competencies were, however, retained, including the use of weapons from military warehouses for training, exercises, and the like.**

Of course, Kucan was not satisfied” (Ibid.).

²⁸⁶ V. Kadijevec, the aforementioned work, p. 94.

of the armed forces equal to the JNA.²⁸⁷ Passing such a decision had no coverage in the Constitution of the SFRY. This, among other things, meant restrictions for the republics' sovereign rights. The more so, because the armament and ammunition was the property of the republics and autonomous provinces rather than of the JNA.

General Kadijevic justified such a move by claiming that the weapons are exclusively in the competency of the army, rather than the republics, which, according to him, did not have the right to that. He was calming down the republics by stating that there is a possibility to return the weapons if they ensure **“good protection conditions”**.²⁸⁸

The implementation of the decision on the confiscation of weapons from the Territorial Defence (May 1990) had caused serious suspicion as to its true purpose, and not only with the republic leaderships and headquarters of the Territorial Defence, but also with the majority of objective and unbiased people, including the largest number of JNA

²⁸⁷ D. Marijan, the aforementioned work, p. 293. In his diary for May 21, 1990, among other things, Jovic states that the Presidency of the SFRY passed the decision “that all the republic territorial defence units be deprived of their weapons and that they be placed under the control of the JNA” (B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 146). This is not true, because the Presidency of the SFRY had never passed such a decision, as was confirmed by Jovic himself. Namely, in his diary for May 17, speaking about undertaking measures “to confiscate the weapons in Slovenia and Croatia from civilian warehouses of the TO and transfer them into the military warehouses”, he decidedly states that the disarmament of the TO of Slovenia and Croatia was formally done by the Chief of Staff of the General Staff, general Adzic, and “factually upon our order”, that is, the order of the leadership of the Greater Serbia movement (Ibid.).

Raif Dizdarevic claims that on May 23, 1990, that is, subsequently, the Presidency of the SFRY passed a decision **“to confiscate the arms and weapons of the TO, for the purpose of better protection and keeping, and to transfer them into military warehouses”** (R. Dizdarevic, **OD SMRTI TITA DO SMRTI JUGOSLAVIJE**, p. 413; Ibid., **IZDAJA VOJNOG VRHA**, p. 151). The same is also claimed by Anton Lukezic (A. Lukezic, **KRVAVA BESPUCA JNA**, in: F. Ademovic, the aforementioned work, p. 77) and Hasan Efendic (H. Efendic, the aforementioned work, p. 102).

The available sources indicate that such a decision was not brought by the Presidency of the SFRY, but by the leadership of the Greater Serbia movement, and formally by general Adzic, Chief of Staff of the General Staff – on May 14, 1990.

²⁸⁸ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 147.

officers. The weapons were not confiscated from the Territorial Defence of Serbia and Montenegro, except in the municipalities with a Muslim majority (such as, for instance, Plav). This decision affected Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina most, whereas a part of the weapons (1/3) from the territorial defence of Slovenia and from many units of the territorial defence in Western Herzegovina were also kept at their disposal.²⁸⁹

The implementation of this measure led to a phenomenon not only indicative but also concerning, that is, to the varying attitudes towards the TO units in the various republics, even in the application of the ethnic criterion as basic guideline in its implementation. The practice had shown that the arms were only taken from the non-Serb units of the Territorial Defence (Kosovo, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina), which caused protests, serious resistance, even armed opposition. In addition to this, some units of the Territorial Defence in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina of Serb composition, during the implementation of this measure, even received additional quantities of armament, and large quantities of weapons and military equipment were distributed to those citizens of Serb nationality who were not even

²⁸⁹ I. Radakovic, p. 33. At the time when the military leadership was disarming the Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro were speedily modernizing the overall echelon of the Territorial Defence and Militia, in which special attention was directed on the purchase of Howitzers and long-range artillery (H. Efendic, the aforementioned work, p. 101).

According to D. Marijan, on May 23, 1990, several days before the HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union) took over power in the Republic of Croatia, the JNA had taken away the weapons of the Territorial Defence of Croatia and “**stored**” them into its own warehouses (D. Marijan, **JUGOSLOVENSKA NARODNA ARMIIJA ...**, p. 292).

The disarmament of the republic TO units (conducted everywhere except in Serbia and Montenegro), according to General Radakovic, can be considered a pure military coup. “**The JNA, as the axis and a part of the armed forces of the SFRY, disarming the other equal component! Can this hence be called ‘preparations for the open military action’ against the two republics? Of course it can!**” claims Radakovic.

The disarmament of the TO of Slovenia was only partially successful in that republic (I. Dolnicar, **ZACETNICI RATNE TRAGEDIJE**, in: F. Ademovic, the aforementioned work, p. 269). Namely, according to I. Veselinovic, some 70 per cent of the TO armament was taken away, whereas in Serbia it was left in the TO warehouses, including the ones in Vojvodina (I. Veselinovic, **JNA U MINULOM RATU**, in: F. Ademovic, the aforementioned work, p. 233).

military conscripts. These arms, together with what the JNA intentionally left while withdrawing from some republics, served not only for the creation of armies in the newly formed Serb collaborationist para-states (Republic of Serbian Krajina and Republika Srpska), but also for the creation of numerous Serb paramilitary armed formations.²⁹⁰

The confiscation of weapons from the Territorial Defence was simultaneously accompanied by organizational and formational changes in the First and Fifth, and the Navy Military Districts. In the First Military District, the 10th Motorized Brigade in Mostar was transformed from the type “B” into type “A”, in which the most significant act was the installation of the armoured and motorized battalion into its composition based on type “A” categorization.²⁹¹ In Banja Luka, the 329th Armoured Brigade was restructured from type “B” into type “A” classification, and its composition included the Armoured and Motorized Battalions (the Armoured was seated in Benkovac, Croatia; and the Motorized in Knin, Croatia).²⁹²

The biggest changes were made in the Fifth Military District. In late June 1990, the 6th Proletarian Infantry Division was suspended, as well as the Command of Defence of the City of Zagreb. The broader region of Zagreb, including Kordun and Banija, went into the composition of the newly formed 10th Corps. The creation of the 10th Corps seated in Zagreb was beyond “the regular activities in the organizational and formational changes based on the Plans ‘Jedinstvo 2 and 3’”. The newly formed Corps was expanded by additional compositions of the 32nd Corps, i.e. the 140th Motorized Brigade of type “A”. The 4th Armoured Brigade located in Jastrebarsko and Karlovac was transformed from type “B” into type “A” and subjected

²⁹⁰ I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 33-34.

²⁹¹ D. Marijan, the aforementioned work, p. 293; D. Marijan, **ORUZANE SNAGE SFRJ...**, p. 361. The units of “A” classification had from 60 to 100%, the “B” ones from 15-60%, and the “R” ones up to 15% of manpower according the wartime plan of organization and formation of units. The “A” classification units had the staffing base made up of the soldiers in regular army service. Such units, by the Yugoslav doctrine of use and plans for mobilization development, very quickly reached wartime formations and were ready for quick deployment (Ibid).

²⁹² The same author, **JUGOSLOVENSKA NARODNA ARMIIJA ...**, p. 293.

to the command of the 10th Corps. The creation of the 10th Corps divided the JNA from the Territorial Defence of the City of Zagreb. In the 32nd Corps, the 265th Motorized Brigade from Bjelovar and Koprivnica was transformed from type “B” into type “A”. In the 13th Corps, the 13th Proletarian Motorized Brigade in Ilirska Bistrica and Rijeka was transformed from type “B” into type “A”. There were also changes in Slovenia, where in the 14th Corps, the First Armoured Brigade in Vrhnika was also transformed from type “B” into type “A”. These changes in the restructured units significantly strengthened the fire and attack power, and their mobility outside the usual communications was increased. The Headquarters Units of the Command of the Fifth Military District, i.e. the 580th Mixed Anti-Tank Artillery Brigade in Virovitica and Krizevci, were also transformed from type “B” type “A” classification.²⁹³

With the reclassification into “A” units in the Fifth Military District, the military leadership was trying to overcome the lack of manpower in the territories where Croats were the majority, relying on recruits from other parts of Yugoslavia. Insisting on armoured and motorized units was quite logical, since they had war-technical equipment in their composition, which was more demanding in terms of handling, yet most effective in terms of combat.²⁹⁴

Although Borislav Jovic, in his diary of May 17, does not mention the measures that, just like in Slovenia and Croatia, **“the weapons from the civilian TO warehouses should be confiscated and transferred**

²⁹³ Ibid., p. 293-294. The majority of the aforementioned units, according to the research done by D. Marijan, “before the outbreak of open conflict in the summer of 1991, was working on creation of what the JNA promotion called ‘the padding zones’, whereas this actually meant prevention of work of the legal bodies of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Croatia” (Ibid., p. 294).

²⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 294. In relation to this, D. Marijan states that reliance on such units was in concordance with the favourable effects they had in Kosovo in the early and late eighties (Ibid.). Speaking about this, he quotes B. Jovic, who was told by general Kadijevec on June 8, 1990: “that they had brought a decision to form special motorized corps in the regions of Zagreb, Knin, Banja Luka, and Herzegovina, which would be capable, as needed, to function like in Kosovo” (B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 152; D. Marijan, the aforementioned work, p. 294).

into military warehouses” in Bosnia and Herzegovina, **“the dislocation of armament and ammunition”** of the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina was executed based on the order issued (formally) by the Chief of Staff of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, marked strictly confidential no. 19-1 (dated May 14, 1990), to be carried out **from May 18 through 23, 1990, except for the regions of Bihac and Banja Luka, where it was finished on June 13, 1990.**²⁹⁵ This action **“pertained to the armament and ammunition of the Territorial Defence, and for the other entities, upon desire and explicit request”**, in which the armament and ammunition of the units of the Territorial Defence formed by labour organizations, was skipped.²⁹⁶

The Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina was disarmed in the spring of 1990, before the multi-party elections took place, and without visible opposition, in which the explanation was accepted that its arms will be better kept at the JNA warehouses (then, the President of the Presidency was Obrad Piljak, the commander of the Territorial Defence was Milos Bajcetic, and the republic Secretary for National Defence was Muharem Fetahagic).²⁹⁷

²⁹⁵ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-917, Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence, DT 06/1-79, Sarajevo, September 13, 1990 – to the Presidency of the SR BiH, Information on the Action of Safer Securing of Armament and Ammunition of the TO of the SR BiH.

In informing to this effect the Presidency of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina, lieutenant-general Milos Bajcetic, commander of the Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence, among other things, states: **“The purpose of the measures undertaken by the Armed Forces is to secure a better and more appropriate warehousing of the armament and military equipment of the Armed Forces, as well as safer keeping”** (Ibid.).

As claimed by general Ilija Radakovic, the JNA “was keeping” the arms and military equipment of the Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina sufficient for some 130,000-150,000 soldiers (I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, p. 127).

²⁹⁶ Ibid.

²⁹⁷ In the opinion of S. Potocar, the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina gave up immediately at the disarmament action – it surrendered its arms in silence and did nothing to make up what it had missed, which was very successfully done by Slovenia, with the manoeuvring structure of national protection (S. Potocar, **UROTA GENERALSTABA PROTIV NARODA**, in: F. Ademovic, the aforementioned work, p. 110).

Before May 16, 1990, **the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina** was storing armament and military equipment at 653 places,²⁹⁸ depending on the circumstances and the development needs of the TO. The situation varied much by districts, so that the arms and military equipment were kept as follows: Doboj – 20, Tuzla – 128, Banja Luka – 134, Bihac – 32, Sarajevo – 14, City Headquarters of the TO, Sarajevo – 117, Livno – 19, Zenica – 31, Gorazde – 22, and Mostar – 136 sites.²⁹⁹

At those positions, outside the JNA locations (conditionally called “warehouses”), in safes, containers, basements, accessory premises, shelters, etc., as property of labour organizations, of the Secretariat of the Interior, schools, socio-political organizations and socio-political entities, as well as in the combined facilities of the headquarters of the Territorial Defence; this included 165,860 pieces of various armament, as well as 58,894,000 pieces of ammunition of various calibres up to 14.5 mm.³⁰⁰

The warehousing space, in which armament and military equipment of the Territorial Defence were kept, from the aspect of storage and conditions of keeping, in the assessment of the Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence, was not satisfactory. The territorial defence had built or adapted 156 facilities – warehouses, where armament and ammunition could be kept under normal conditions. In addition to this space, there was also the JNA warehousing space with good conditions, as leased by the Territorial Defence (50 warehouses), and with exceptions, part of the spaces at labour organizations. However, over 50% of the used warehousing space was not at all in good conditions in terms of storage, and almost 30% was only partially good-conditioned.³⁰¹

²⁹⁸ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-917, Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence, DT 06/1-79, Sarajevo, September 13, 1990 – to the Presidency of the SR BiH. The number of the facilities then used by the Territorial Defence was larger by 50 in the ownership of the JNA, as being used by the 90 municipal headquarters of the Territorial Defence for storage of the ammunition over 14.5 mm.

²⁹⁹ Ibid.

³⁰⁰ Ibid. This total quantity of armament and ammunition of the Territorial Defence by May 16, 1990 was outside the JNA facilities, and later on, it was even larger.

³⁰¹ Ibid. The armament and ammunitions of the headquarters of the Territorial Defence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was “kept” (1991) in the following JNA warehouses:

After the measures undertaken, the major part of armament and ammunition was gathered at 48 JNA locations. At these locations, 20

1) **The District of Banja Luka:** “Trn” Warehouse in Banja Luka (Municipal Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Banja Luka); “Mali Logor” Barracks Banja Luka (District Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Banja Luka); “Krcmarice” – Banja Luka (Municipal Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Bosanska Gradiska and Banja Luka – ammunition only); Barracks “Kozara” Banja Luka (municipal headquarters: Srbac, Celinac, Kotor Varos, Laktasi, Prnjavor and Skender Vakuf); “Palanciste” Prijedor (municipal headquarters: Bosanska Dubica, Bosanski Novi, Prijedor – armament in the barracks – and Sanski Most); “Stara Kula” – Mrkonjic Grad (municipal headquarters: Mrkonjic Grad, Kljuc, and Sipovo) and the warehouse of Jaycee (municipal headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Jaycee);

2) **The District of Bihac:** Barracks “Grmec” – Bihac (municipal headquarters of Territorial Defence of Bihac, and the District headquarters of Territorial Defence of Bihac); “Golubic” – Knin (municipal headquarters of Territorial Defence of Bosansko Grahovo and Titov Drvar); “Svodna” – Bosanski Novi (municipal headquarters of Bosanska Krupa, Cazin and Velika Kladusa); “Ripac” (Municipal headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Bosanski Petrovac);

3) **The District of Doboj:** “Rabic” – Derвента (municipal headquarters: Bosanski Brod, Bosanski Samac, Derвента, Modrica, and Odzak); “Bare” – Doboj (Municipal headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Doboj); “Donje Sevarlije” – Doboj (District Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Doboj); “Gornje Sevarlije” – Doboj (municipal headquarters: Maglaj, Teslic, and Tesanj);

4) **The District of Gorazde:** Warehouse “Ustikolina” – Foca (municipal headquarters of Territorial Defence: Cajnice, Foca, and Gorazde, and the District Headquarters of Territorial Defence); Barracks “Kalinovik” – Kalinovik (Municipal headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Kalinovik); Warehouse “Rudo” – Rudo (Municipal headquarter of the Territorial Defence of Rudo); and warehouse “Visegrad” – Visegrad (Municipal headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Visegrad);

5) **The District of Livno:** Warehouse “Doljani” – Donji Vakuf (District Headquarters of Livno and municipal headquarters of Territorial Defence: Livno, Duvno, Glamoc, and Kupres);

6) **The District of Mostar:** Warehouse “Duzi” – Trebinje (municipal headquarters of the Territorial Defence: Bileca, Ljubinje, and Trebinje); “Tasovcici” – Capljina (municipal headquarters of Territorial Defence: Capljina and Neum); “Gabela” – Capljina (municipal headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Citluk, Ljubuski, Neum, Nevesinje, Posusje, Stolac, and Bileca); “Bacevici” – Mostar (municipal headquarters of Territorial Defence: Gacko, Grude, and Listica); “Ljuta” – Konjic (municipal headquarters of Territorial Defence: Jablanica, Konjic, and Prozor); “Jasenice” – Mostar (District Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Mostar, and the municipal headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Mostar); “Juzni Logor” – Mostar (Municipal headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Mostar – armament);

municipal headquarters and the Republic Headquarter of Territorial Defence had 32 warehouses in ownership of the Territorial Defence,

7) **The District of Sarajevo:** Warehouse “Semizovac” – Semizovac (District Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Sarajevo); “Ilijas” – Ilijas (municipal headquarters: Breza, Fojnica, Kresevo, and Vares); Barracks “Han Pijesak” – Han Pijesak (municipal headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Han Pijesak); Barracks “Kiseljak” – Kiseljak (municipal headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Kiseljak); “Koran” – Pale (municipal headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Olovo and Sokolac), Barracks Visoko (municipal headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Visoko); “Visegrad” – Visegrad (municipal headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Visegrad);

8) **The District of Tuzla:** Warehouse “Ljubace” (municipal headquarters of Territorial Defence: Banovici, Kalesija, Kladanj, and Zivinice); Barracks “Bijeljina” – Bijeljina (municipal headquarters of Territorial Defence: Bijeljina and Ugljevik); “Kozlovac” – Tuzla (municipal headquarters of Territorial Defence: Bratunac, Lukavac, Srebrenica, Srebrenik, Sekovici, Tuzla, and Zvornik); “Krepsic” – Brcko (municipal headquarters of Territorial Defence: Brcko, Gradacac, Lopare, and Orasje); “Donje Sevarlije” – Doboj (municipal headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Gracanica); “Gornje Sevarlije” – Doboj (municipal headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Lukavac – ammunition); Barracks “Husinska Buna” – Tuzla (municipal headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Vlasenica); “Mali Zvornik” – Zvornik (municipal headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Zvornik); Barracks “Han Pijesak” – Han Pijesak (Municipal Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Zvornik);

9) **The District of Zenica:** “Doljani” Warehouse – Donji Vakuf (municipal headquarters of Territorial Defence: Bugojno, Donji Vakuf, and Gornji Vakuf); “Kaonik” – Busovaca (municipal headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Busovaca); “Ilijas” – Ilijas (municipal headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Kakanj); Barracks “Travnik” – Travnik (municipal headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Novi Travnik and Vitez); “Slimena” – Travnik (municipal headquarters of Territorial Defence: Travnik, Zavidovici, and Zepce); Barracks “Josip Jovanovic” – Zenica (District Headquarters of Territorial Defence of Zenica and the municipal headquarters of Territorial Defence of Zenica);

10) **The City Headquarters of Territorial Defence of Sarajevo:** Warehouse “Faletici” – Sarajevo (Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence and municipal headquarters of Territorial Defence of Centar, Stari Grad, and Novi Grad municipalities); “Hadzici” – Hadzici (City Headquarters of Territorial Defence of Sarajevo, and municipal headquarters of Territorial Defence of Hadzici and Ilidza); “Ilijas” – Ilijas (municipal headquarters of Territorial Defence of Ilijas); “Toplik” – Lukavica (municipal headquarters of Territorial Defence of Novo Sarajevo); “Krupanjska Rijeka” – Pazarić (municipal headquarters of Territorial Defence: Novo Sarajevo, Trnovo, and Vogosca); “Koran” – Pale (municipal headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Pale), and “Semizovac” – Semizovac (municipal headquarters of Territorial Defence of Vogosca). – AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2512, LIST of the JNA warehouses storing arms and ammunition of the headquarters of Territorial Defence of the District of Banja Luka; Ibid., inv. No. 2-2513, LIST of the JNA warehouses storing arms and ammunition of the headquarters of

where the status did not change. At the JNA locations, 45 municipal headquarters of territorial defence, all the district headquarters of territorial defence, and the Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence dislocated the complete armament and ammunition. However, in 64 municipal headquarters of territorial defence, developing 452 war units and 120 headquarters of territorial defence, outside the JNA locations, 20,789 pieces of arms and 2,476,338 pieces of bullets and other lethal materials were kept at 442 places – warehouses and headquarters of the Territorial Defence. These assets belonged indeed to the wartime units of the Territorial Defence, which were developed by labour organizations, sized from a platoon up to a partisan brigade, and the headquarters of the Territorial Defence had retained a portion of the armament used for the self-protection of the personnel and headquarters of the Territorial Defence.³⁰²

The problem of security, except for the JNA warehouses, was even more difficult and more precarious. Before 1987, two breaks and robberies happened in the Territorial Defence, as well as nine cases of stealing from warehouses, labour organizations and school centres. 13 rifles were stolen, of which seven were not found by September 13, 1990 (5 rifles from the School Centre of Breza, and 2 from the Mostar “background bodies”), together with a certain quantity of ammunition. The security conditions were still insufficient and inadequate, at which

Territorial Defence of the Districts of Bihac and Dobojo; Ibid., inv. No. 2-2514, LIST of the JNA warehouses storing arms and ammunition of the headquarters of Territorial Defence of the Districts of Gorazde and Livno; Ibid., inv. No. 2-2515, LIST of the JNA warehouses storing arms and ammunition of the headquarters of Territorial Defence of the District of Mostar; Ibid., inv. No. 2-2516, LIST of the JNA warehouses storing arms and ammunition of the headquarters of Territorial Defence of the District of Tuzla; Ibid., inv. No. 2-2517, LIST of the JNA warehouses storing arms and ammunition of the headquarters of Territorial Defence of the GRSTO (City Headquarters of Territorial Defence of Sarajevo; note by the author); Ibid., inv. No. 2-2518, LIST of the JNA warehouses storing arms and ammunition of the RJ (wartime units; note by the author) of Territorial Defence of the District of Zenica; Ibid., inv. No. 2-2519, LIST of the JNA warehouses storing arms and ammunition of the headquarters of Territorial Defence of the District of Sarajevo.

³⁰² Ibid. Thus, the problem of storage was not fully resolved. In the first half of September 1990, the process was underway of return of the surpluses obtained from the JNA. Up to that time, over 70,000 pieces of armament were returned, and later on, an additional number of 34,000 pieces of armament were returned.

“the possibility of control was small, and the forces for interventions of limited capacity”.³⁰³

Within the whole system, there were omissions in the keeping of armament and military equipment of the Territorial Defence, because the security measures simply amounted to the door attendant, the guard, the duty police officer, and periodical patrolling. Only labour organizations with special production and some larger labour organizations had satisfactory security measures.³⁰⁴

No facility has the security prescribed by the Rules of Service in the Armed Forces. Only 20 garrisons had the option for the intervention of the JNA units. Technical protection was provided with due care, but due to the lack of funding, only 60 warehouses of the Territorial Defence and labour organizations were protected with sufficient security measures, which was below 10% of the total number of warehouses.³⁰⁵

³⁰³ Ibid.

³⁰⁴ Ibid.

³⁰⁵ Ibid. Having in mind that the Territorial Defence is a component of the Armed Forces, that the arms must have a unique treatment, that all the headquarters of Territorial Defence must keep a part of the armament (pistols and rifles) for protection of personnel, documents, war flags, plans and facilities of the Territorial Defence, by September 13, 1990, the labour organizations nevertheless were left with a lot of armament and ammunition which was mainly kept under worse conditions than the one found in the warehouses of the headquarters of Territorial Defence. Starting from this, on September 13, 1990, the Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina proposed to the Presidency of the SR BiH the following measures:

“1. Once the JNA provides the keeping conditions, gather all the remaining armament and ammunition, thus ensuring a single method of keeping and storage for the TO.

The commander of the TO of the SR BiH to issue a special criterion to regulate how much armament and ammunition is to be left to the STO (headquarters of Territorial Defence; note by the author) for provision of security to plans and facilities of the TO.

2. Gather data and positions of the RO (labour organizations; note by the author) and the executive bodies of the DPZ (socio-political entities; note by the author) and by the end of 1990, resolve the problem of NVO (armament and military equipment; note by the author) of the dissolved war units in RO and the surpluses created through reduction of these units. We propose that these surpluses from the RO be surrendered to the STO without reimbursement” (Ibid.).

The Republic Secretariat for National Defence, starting from its competencies established by law and other regulations, reviewed the status of the armament, ammunition and other military equipment procured for the needs of the Executive Council of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the republic bodies and administrative organizations, as well as for the appropriate municipal state bodies for their war-time operations. The data was gathered based on the appropriate reports received from the qualified services for general defence in those institutions and organizations. In a similar way, the bodies of the socio-political entities of the Republic, the Assembly of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Presidency of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina officially adopted appropriate conclusions. Several thousand pieces of weapons and some ammunition were procured, as shown below:

- for the needs of the institutions of the Republic, 1 light machine gun was purchased, as well as 5 7.9 mm rifles, 77 semi-submachine guns, 210 submachine guns, 5 automatic rifles and 765 pistols;

- for the needs of the institutions of the districts, 105 guns;

- and for the needs of the municipal institutions, 592 7.9-mm rifles, 281 semi sub-machine guns, 419 submachine guns and 4283 pistols.³⁰⁶

The procurement of arms, ammunition, and other equipment for the needs of the bodies of socio-political organizations of the Republic and of the municipalities was done applying a special procedure, and by September 13, 1990, the Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence were not introduced to their quantities or storage.³⁰⁷

Personal armament and two combat sets of ammunitions for the officials were kept by themselves in appropriate metal safes, and for all other workers in case of war deployment, they were kept with the handlers on official premises. The exception was that the submachine guns, hand grenade launchers and signalling pistols for the needs of the republic bodies were kept together with the Common Affairs Service of the republic administration bodies, which was a serious problem and was not at all in compliance with the prescribed criteria.³⁰⁸

³⁰⁶ Ibid.

³⁰⁷ Ibid.

³⁰⁸ Ibid.

The arms and other military equipment for the needs of the municipal institutions in the majority of cases were kept in the prescribed manner in the warehouses of the Territorial Defence.³⁰⁹

After reorganization was made during 1989 **within the bodies for internal affairs in the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the number of the reserve members of the police was reduced**, there was a considerable improvement in the supply of the Ministry of Interior forces with armament and other material and technical assets. Thus, on September 13, 1990, the total reserve composition of the police forces was equipped with 26,439 submachine guns, 9,386 semi-submachine guns, 2,980 light machine guns, 119 sniper rifles, 205 hand launchers

³⁰⁹ Ibid. The Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina, **“in spite of all the efforts”**, by September 13, 1991, could not exert a comprehensive insight into the status of protection and keeping of the armament procured for the needs of the bodies of socio-political organizations, which did not exclude **“potential violations of the prescribed criteria for their keeping”**. Given the **“present issues related to the conditions of keeping of the armament and other military equipment”**, the Republic Headquarters at the time proposed the following measures to the Presidency of the SR BiH:

“1. The armament procured for the needs of the bodies at the level of the Republic should be confiscated and placed into the military warehouse of Hadzici, and those for the needs of the district bodies, into the warehouses of war reserves of the district headquarters of TO.

2. The armament, ammunition and other military equipment purchased for the needs of the bodies of DPO of the Republic, should be confiscated and transferred to the RSTO, and those from the DPO bodies and municipalities, to the district or municipal STO. The transfer is to be based on proper documentation, with a separate record to be made as to the transfer.

3. To assign the appropriate handler at the Common Affairs Service of the republic administration bodies, in order to systematize an updated record and keeping of armament, ammunition and equipment assigned for keeping into the military warehouse of Hadzici.

4. To assign appropriate municipal bodies which have not so far ensured conditions for proper keeping of armament, ammunition, and other equipment to do so in a similar way as proposed for the republic bodies.

5. Given that there have been practices of giving away of the assigned armament when transferring to another duty, or when pensioning by the officials, which is not in compliance with the regulations, this armament needs to be withdrawn, recorded and given for keeping to the Common Affairs Service” (Ibid.).

with appropriate ammunition sets, 12,682 pistols and 113 automatic pistols with ammunition sets, and 20,618 hand grenades, 5,205 launcher grenades, as well as with 1,919 bazooka grenades.³¹⁰ In relation to the total number of reserve compositions of the police forces, in compliance with the provisions of *The Quotas for Consumption and Dispensable Assets, Arms and Military Equipment* for the first 90 days of the war, the reserve was also secured with 2,600 pieces of semi-submachine guns, 1,600 hand grenades, 300 launcher grenades, and 200 bazooka grenades. The police authorities, in relation to the total number of projected working positions from the wartime organization chart, then missed 22,066 pistols and ammunition sets.³¹¹

The police authorities, in addition to the shown reserve, then also disposed of the following quantity of surplus arms, grenades, mines and other explosive devices: 2,821 semi-submachine guns M-59/66 of 7.62 mm, 43 bazookas M-57, 8 sniper rifles M-76 of 7.9 mm, and semi-submachine guns of 7.62 mm, 5,631 hand grenades, 2,819 launcher grenades (cumulative and immediate explosion), 483 bazooka rockets, 5,098 rifles M-48 of 7.9 mm, 1,114 machine guns M 56 M49/57 of 7.62 mm, 539 light machine guns M-53 of 7.9 mm, and 14 snipers M-69 of 7.9 mm.³¹²

The armament and ammunition of the reserve composition of the police forces was mainly kept at its own warehousing space, at the premises of the territorial defence or the JNA, and was secured in an appropriate way. In cooperation with the competent military institutions, the police authorities regularly ensured conduction of the required technical controls of the arms and ammunition. Information collected on controls completed in the first half of September was used to exert insight into the condition of the arms and other equipment, the required measures were taken to remove the omissions observed, and to improve the conditions of warehousing and securing of the armament and other materials and technical assets.³¹³

³¹⁰ Ibid.

³¹¹ Ibid.

³¹² Ibid.

³¹³ Ibid.

The Republic Secretariat for Internal Affairs, based on the proposal of the Coordination Board of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina dated October 26, 1976, had imported for the needs of the municipal committees of the League of Communists 4,367 pieces of machine guns *Heckler-Koch* MP5 A3 9mm, and 873,400 pieces of 9 mm calibre bullets.³¹⁴

In addition, this Secretariat, upon the request of certain republic institutions and entities, and upon payment, had delivered 90 pieces of machine guns *Heckler Koch* MP5 A3 9mm, and 18,000 pieces of 9mm/d bullets, as follows: to the Presidency of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina – 8 pieces, to the Executive Council of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina – 35 pieces, to the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina – 19 pieces, to the Assembly of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina – 10 pieces, to the Republic Committee of the Socialist Union of Working People – 6 pieces, to the Republic Council of the Socialist Alliance – 6 pieces, to the Union of Veterans' Associations of the People's Liberation War (SUB NOR) of Bosnia and Herzegovina – 1 piece, to the Republic Committee of the Union of Socialist Youth of Bosnia and Herzegovina – 1 piece, and to the Post and Telegraph Authority in Sarajevo – 4 pieces.³¹⁵

According to the gathered data of the Republic Secretariat for Internal Affairs of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina, by December 31, 1989, there was a total of registered 342,131 pieces of weaponry, as follows: 312,488 pieces registered with **natural persons**, 19,403 registered at **bodies, organizations and enterprises**, and 10,240 pieces registered with **sports shooting and archery organizations**. In relation to this, it is well worth noting that of the 312,488 pieces of arms registered with the natural persons, 126,088 were hunting weapons, and 171,038 were pistols and revolvers.³¹⁶

During 1989, natural persons had submitted to the public security stations in the Republic 58,639 applications for approval of weapons

³¹⁴ Ibid. The Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina later succeeded to exchange the machine guns 9mm Heckler – Koch for submachine guns 7.62 mm with the JNA (2,157 pieces).

³¹⁵ Ibid.

³¹⁶ Ibid.

purchase; bodies, organizations and enterprises submitted 361 applications; and sports shooting and archery organizations submitted 135 applications. In addressing these applications, the public security stations issued decisions approving purchase of weapons to natural persons (25,883 pieces), to bodies, organizations and communities (348 pieces), and archery organizations (135 pieces).³¹⁷

In addition to the Territorial Defence, the Secretariat for Internal Affairs – Police Forces, and the Secretariat for National Defence, there were also other entities of ONO and DSZ that disposed of arms and ammunition. Having this in mind, the Republic Headquarters of Territorial Defence approached the managements of the organizations that it had established and that, up to 1976, had purchased arms from and registered them with the Ministry of Interior. The Republic Ministry of Interior established that there were certain irregularities in the proportion and use of these arms, and by September 13, 1990, it could not offer exact data on the actual status. This is why the Republic Headquarters of Territorial Defence had approached the Presidencies of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Socialist Union of Working People, the Union of Socialist Youth, the Sport Shooting and Archery Union, the Union of Hunting Societies, the Skiing Union, the Mountaineering Union, and the Council of Independent Trade Unions. By September 10, 1990, only 4 organizations submitted data, incomplete as it was, too.³¹⁸

Confiscation of the arms and ammunitions from the Territorial Defence – **“for keeping at the JNA”** – was **“successfully”** implemented by July 17, 1990, in all municipal headquarters. In certain socio-political entities there was an unfavourable response, even sending telegrams to the Assembly and Presidency of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the commander of the Territorial Defence (Listica, Ljubuski), as well as organized opposition to such a decision (the rally in Ljubuski organized by the Croatian Democratic Union Initiation Board in this town). There were objections and remarks in some other municipalities

³¹⁷ Ibid. The number of applications for issuance of approval for purchase of weapons in 1990 was significantly increased in relation to 1989.

³¹⁸ Ibid.

by bodies of power too, which included a blatant case of attacking, labelling and disqualifying the commander of the Municipal Headquarters of the TO of Posusje, and of the Territorial Defence overall.³¹⁹

Confiscation, storage and keeping of the arms and ammunition of the TO of Bosnia and Herzegovina was performed in the warehouses of the JNA, which were mainly located on the territories with majority Serb population, which at the same time had directly participated in their “securing”, or at the border areas towards Serbia and Montenegro.³²⁰ In this, the warehouses, in addition to the internal guard, were also secured with mine fields, which was unprecedented in peacetime, then with anti-aircraft guns and machine guns. The local Serb population was used for external security of the warehouses, around which the roads were quickly built to allow quick and smooth withdrawal of armament, ammunition and equipment, that is, the distribution to the mobilized Serb population.³²¹

The Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina issued a Decision marked strictly confidential no. 06/5-5, dated September 28, 1990, regulating the method and time of implementation of the tasks with all the wartime units of the Territorial Defence which were subject to the organizational and formational changes in the forthcoming mid-term plan.³²² In order to implement the tasks

³¹⁹ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2420, Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence, strictly confidential no. 04

³²⁰ H. Efendic, the aforementioned work, p. 104. Certain socio-political entities responded to such concern-causing and upsetting practice fiercely, but in vain. The mild objections by the political leadership of Bosnia and Herzegovina were, according to him, explicitly responded by Belgrade in the sense that **“formation and potential nationalist abuse of parts of the TO must not be allowed [leading to their transformation] into republic armies of some secessionist forces”** (Ibid.).

³²¹ Ibid.

³²² AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2507, Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence, marked strictly confidential no. 06/1-79-123, October 24, 1990 – to the District/City Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Sarajevo; Ibid., inv. No. 2-2509, Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence, strictly confidential no. 02/8-145-1, November 22, 1990 – District/City Headquarters of the Territorial Defence, Sarajevo.

of background provision of tasks and procedures with armament and other equipment of the war units of the Territorial Defence which needed to be dissolved, that is, reconstructed, on October 24, 1990, the commander of the Republic Headquarters issued the Order, strictly confidential no. 06/1-79-123, establishing the procedure with armament and military equipment, and other material assets of the war units of the Territorial Defence with organizational and formational changes, and which regulated the method and time of implementation of tasks with war units of the Territorial Defence which were subject to these changes.³²³

In all the headquarters of the Territorial Defence, in compliance with the aforementioned and other documents, “redistribution” was made of the surpluses of armament and military equipment, and other material assets, in compliance with the organizational and formational changes and priorities for proper “filling in” to the war units. In addition, background securing (filling in with armament and military equipment) was made for the new war units within the framework of the 25% growth of the Territorial Defence in wartime.³²⁴

The Presidency of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina passed a new decision on October 19, 1990, on the withdrawal of armament and equipment into military warehouses.³²⁵ Four days later (October 23), the Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence, in compliance

³²³ Ibid.

³²⁴ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2520, Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, District Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Dobož, strictly confidential no. 06/482-3, Dobož, January 30, 1991 – to the Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo; Ibid.; inv. No. 2-2522, Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, district Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Livno, strictly confidential no. 06/1-81-4, February 20, 1991 – to the Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo; Ibid., inv. No. 2-2523, Assembly of Municipality of Mostar, Municipal Headquarters of Territorial Defence, strictly confidential no. 06-77-2/91, Mostar, February 28, 1991 – to the District Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Mostar; Ibid., inv. No. 2-2524, socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, District Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Tuzla, strictly confidential no. 06/1-189-37/90, Tuzla, March 14, 1991 – to the Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo.

³²⁵ H. Efendic, aforementioned work, p. 104.

with the aforementioned conclusion of the Presidency of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina, **“as well as the created organizational and formational changes in the units and headquarters of the Territorial Defence, in compliance with the concept of ONO and DSZ, for the purpose of reduction of the Territorial Defence and secure keeping of the armament and military equipment”**, again issued a decision directed to the district and City Headquarters of the Territorial Defence about gathering and submission **“of the remaining arms into JNA warehouses”**. In this strictly confidential document, which also bore the mark MILITARY SECRET, Lieutenant-General Milos Bajcetic, the commander of the Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina, determined the manner and time of confiscation and gathering of **“the overall armament (except for weapons with calibre over 12.74), ammunition and mines and explosive devices from the public enterprises and other entities of the ONO and DSZ.”**³²⁶

³²⁶ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-918, Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence, strictly confidential no. 06/1-79-121, Sarajevo, October 23, 1990 – to the District/City Headquarters of the Territorial Defence. H. Efendic, aforementioned work, pp. 104-106.

The district headquarters of the TO and the City Headquarters of the TO, pursuant to this order, were obliged to use the municipal headquarters of the TO to organize the confiscation and gathering of the overall armament, except the arms over 12.74 mm, then of ammunition, mines and explosive devices, by November 10, 1990. The municipal headquarters of the TO were obligated to gather **“all the quantities of armament, ammunition and mines and explosive devices into protected facilities secured by guards, to allow public enterprises and other entities of ONO and DSZ to transport the armament in their own transportation means up to the place – the location of the facility determined by the Municipal Headquarters of the TO.**

If the armament, ammunition, mines and explosive devices are already securely stored in the social and public enterprises, which is to be assessed together with the bodies of Ministry of Interior, and if it is more cost-efficient, then confiscation is to be conducted directly, without prior gathering”. In this, the command of the First Military District regulated **“the confiscation and transportation of he gathered armament, ammunition, mines and explosives of the TO, and its storage into the warehouses of the JNA, with other TO armament and ammunition.”**

The transfer of the armament, ammunition and mine and explosive devices was to be done **“based on proper documentation”** and a record was to be made as to that effect.

The District Headquarters and the City Headquarters of the TO was obligated to submit to the Republic Headquarters of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina **“...accurate**

On October 31, and November 5, 1990, on the eve of multi-party elections, the Command of the First Military District issued orders (of strictly confidential nature) on the confiscation and “more secure” storage and preservation of the arms and ammunition of public enterprises and units of the Territorial Defence.³²⁷ Based on those orders, the Republic Headquarters of Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina issued orders on the method of confiscation, transportation and storage of the armament and ammunition of the Territorial Defence, with the specified deadlines for execution.³²⁸

Nine District Headquarters of Territorial Defence (Sarajevo, Mostar, Zenica, Tuzla, Dobo, Livno, Bihac, Gorazde and Banja Luka) and the City Headquarters of TO Sarajevo had, by November 13, 1990, surrendered 17,460 pieces of **weapons**³²⁹ and 2,230,949 **bullets**

data on the quantities and types of armament and ammunition of the TO, public enterprises and other entities of ‘ONO and DSZ’, places of locations of the gathered TSR into the facilities of OpSTO and the number of required motor vehicles by November 10, 1990”.

The execution of the aforementioned order, whose deadline was November 10 – a day before the elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, lay in the jurisdiction of the district and City Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Ibid.).

³²⁷ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-917/5, /Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence/, Confiscation of Armament and Ammunition from DT STO.

³²⁸ Ibid.

³²⁹ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-917, Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence, strictly confidential no. 06/1-79, Sarajevo, September 13, 1990 – to the Presidency of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina; Ibid., AIIZ, inv. No. 2-919, Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence, mark strictly confidential no. 06/1-79-125, Sarajevo, November 13, 1990 – to the Presidency of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

By November 13, the following quantity of the technical and material assets were surrendered: 2,243 pistols of 7.62, 7.65, and 9 mm; 302 light machine guns 7.62 and 9 mm; 5,324 semi-submachine guns 7.62 mm; 5,068 submachine guns 7.62 mm; 171 sniper semi-submachine guns 7.9 mm; 2,591 rifles 7.9 M-48; 14 hunting rifles and carbines; 511 ? M-57; 16 grenade launchers 60 mm; 3 pistols 6.35 mm; 12 signalling pistols 26 mm; 11 carbine rifles 7.62 mm; 4 hand rocket launchers 90 mm; 8 hand rocket launchers 64 mm; 1,182 PM 7.62, and 7.9 (Ibid., List of Surrendered Armament and Ammunition by the Public Enterprises and their Storage into the JNA Facilities).

and “other lethal materials” (i.e. ammunition).³³⁰ The aforementioned armament and ammunition were placed into the JNA facilities.³³¹ However, not even by that time had all the public enterprises surrendered the armament and military equipment (total of 44), mainly in Bosanska Krajina and West Herzegovina, which made up a total of 1,306 pieces of weapons and 32,748 of ammunition and other lethal materials. Namely, these were **municipalities with a Croat or Serb population majority.**³³²

Given that those enterprises did not surrender nor did they wish to surrender the armament and ammunition, on November 13, 1990, the Republic Headquarters of Territorial Defence requested from the Presidency

³³⁰ Ibid. By November 13, the following quantity of the ammunition was surrendered: 461,639 bullets 7.62 for pistol and light machine gun; 1,530,169 bullets 7.62 mm for semi-submachine guns, submachine guns and machine guns; 20,612 bullets 7.65 for pistols and light machine guns; 13 bullets 6.35 for pistols; 920 grenades for 60 mm hand launcher; 858 hand grenades, defensive; 48 anti-tank hand grenades; 758 mines 82 mm; 60 grenades 82 mm for recoilless gun and 796 grenades for hand launchers M-57 9 (Ibid., List of Surrendered Armament and Ammunition by the Public Enterprises and their Storage into the JNA Facilities).

³³¹ Ibid. The Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence informed the Presidency of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina to that effect on November 13, 1990, and it was concluded that they had completed the assigned task.

³³² Ibid. In Bosanska Krajina, 13 enterprises had not surrendered armaments and military equipment: Municipality of Sipovo (*Grandma, Garcia, Triko, Gipsara, Vitorog, Aluminka, and S. Solaja Health Centre*); Municipality of Bosanska Gradiska (*Podgradci*); Municipality of Banja Luka (*Energoinvest, and Rudi Cajavec*); Municipality of Bosanski Petrovac (*SIP Ostrelj*) and Municipality of Titov Drvar (*Papir and Grmec*).

In West Herzegovina, 40 enterprises had not surrendered armaments and military equipment: Municipality of Citluk (*Soko, IPV, Vinarija, Ferokomerc, Graditelj, Bauxite Mines, Derma, UNIS, Biljopromet, Ivan Krndelj Primary School, Frotea, Secondary School Centre, Agroplod, Drvorad, Health Centre, Elektro, and Brocanac*); Municipality of Ljubuski (*Naprijed, Trgokop, and Famos – TDV*); Municipality of Livno (*Livno-putevi, and Elektro-Livno*); Municipality of Duvno (*Kablovi*) – Ibid.

On the territory of the District Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Tuzla, three enterprises (*OK SSRNJ Brcko, OK SK Tuzla, and OK SK Gracanica*) had not surrendered armaments and military equipment (Ibid., The List of Public Enterprises and Other Entities which have not and will not surrender the armament and ammunition).

One public enterprise on the territory of Ilidza (*Bosanka, Blazuj*) had not surrendered armaments and military equipment, too (Ibid.).

of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina, among other things, **“in order to fully execute the task of return of the NVO (arms and military equipment; note by the author), into the facilities of the JNA”**, through the presidents of municipalities, **“they undertake the most energetic measures against those who have not yet surrendered the NVO”**.³³³

The JNA had also taken away from the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina arms of calibre over 14.5 mm, not encompassed by the Order of the Republic Headquarters of October 1990. To this aim, Lieutenant-General Drago Vukosavljevic, the new commander of the Republic Headquarters of Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in late 1991, enforced obtaining of the order from the military leadership, which pertained only to Bosnia and Herzegovina, to surrender the anti-aircraft guns and other weapons into military warehouses.³³⁴

Through orders from the military leadership, the JNA commands, the Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence and the Presidency of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina, since May 1990, the JNA had illegally taken away from the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina the armament, ammunition and other military equipment, which had been bought by the socio-political entities and business entities from their own means. For the purchase of armament, ammunition and equipment, and their adequate storage and keeping, for which warehousing capacities were built and furnished, the working people and citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina had voluntarily given away significant funds.³³⁵

³³³ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-919, Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence, strictly confidential no. 06/1-79-125, Sarajevo, November 13, 1990 – to the Presidency of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

³³⁴ H. Efendic, the aforementioned work, pp. 106-107. This order was opposed by the Territorial Defence of the City of Sarajevo. General Vukosavljevic responded to this by organizing the stealing of the anti-aircraft guns from the labour organization “Zrak” with the assistance of the special units of JNA.

³³⁵ Ibid., p. 107. The materials and technical assets of the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina had in 1988 been stored in 632 various facilities and warehouses:

Many municipalities, particularly since mid-1991, with increasing actions calling for the destruction of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the fifth-columnist Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina, had initiated undertaking appropriate measures and seeking return of confiscated armament, ammunition and equipment of the Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Discussions were held at municipalities on this, appropriate conclusions were adopted, and requests were sent to a number of addresses in the Republic, including the Presidency, the Government, the Assembly, the Ministry of Defence, the Republic Headquarters, and the like.³³⁶

Pursuant to an order by the SSNO of May 1990, and the decision of the Presidency of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the 124th session dated October 19, 1990, all the armament and ammunition of the headquarters, units and institutions of the Territorial Defence, as well as labour organizations and local communities, **“had to be withdrawn into the JNA warehouses”**, allegedly for the purpose of **“permanent and better security, because there had been some evident attacks on the property of the Territorial Defence”**.³³⁷ General Drago Vukosavljevic (the commander of the Republic Headquarters of Territorial Defence

- in 383 facilities of labour organizations, secured by labour organizations;
- in 148 facilities of the JNA, secured by the JNA;
- in 71 facilities of the Ministry of Interior of the Territorial Defence, secured by the Ministry of Interior, and
- in 30 facilities of the Territorial Defence secured by the Territorial Defence with its own forces (Ibid.).

These facilities stored:

- 269,356 pieces of infantry fire weapons;
- 18,240 60-120 mm mortars, grenade launchers and anti-aircraft guns;
- 211 anti-tank and anti-aircraft rockets;
- 84,724,089 pieces of bullets for infantry fire weapons;
- 580 tons of mines and explosive devices and ammunition of calibre 15.4 mm, and
- Over 2,000 of radio stations, telephones and other material and technical assets, whose value amounted to 600,000,000 US dollars (Ibid).

³³⁶ Ibid.

³³⁷ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-920, Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence Corps of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo, December 23, 1991, Platform for Negotiations of the Presidency of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the Federal Secretary for National Defence.

of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina), having in mind the previous positions and decisions of the Republic Headquarters of Territorial Defence, which were in concordance with the Directives of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, issued an order on July 17, 1991 to the commanders to the municipal headquarters of the Territorial Defence (marked MILITARY SECRET, STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL) on **“more secure storage of armament and ammunition”**. The commands were ordered to immediately proceed with **“the organized dislocation of the remainders of armament and ammunition into the JNA warehouses”**, which using **“receipts and material checklists”** were to be surrendered to the authorized bodies (the Republic Headquarters of Territorial Defence and the District Headquarters of Territorial Defence), and **“which will surrender them for safekeeping to the instructors of (personnel responsible for the) technical and military assets”**.³³⁸

According to an insight by the Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina, by December 23, 1991, the arms and ammunition of the headquarters, units and departments of the Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina had been fully withdrawn, except for the weapons and ammunition of calibre over 12.7 mm, to be withdrawn by the end of that year.³³⁹

Certain municipalities and party leaders provided resistance to the withdrawal of the “surplus” armament obtained from the JNA by the

³³⁸ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2534, Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence, strictly confidential no. 03/891-1, July 17, 1991 – To the Commander of the Territorial Defence. The security organ was in charge for execution of this order, for insight and control of the confiscation. The legal affairs organs were obliged to file disciplinary and criminal charges against the offenders to the Office of the Military Prosecutor in Sarajevo.

General Vukosavljevic had approved in this order, **“in order to secure the mobilization plan and procedures during mobilization”**, the use of 2-3 formation pistols and one machine gun each, which were to be kept along with the mobilization documents (Ibid.).

³³⁹ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-920, Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence Corps of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo, December 23, 1991, Platform for Negotiations of the Presidency of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the Federal Secretary for National Defence.

Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina at its formation. Certain leaders also commented and publicly protested against the dislocation of the weaponry of the units and headquarters of the Territorial Defence from one JNA warehouse to another, which was done “**for security reasons and in order to create a unified area**” for the units that were withdrawing from Slovenia and Croatia.³⁴⁰

There was also resistance in the execution of the withdrawal of the anti-aircraft guns of 20, 37, and 40 mm (267 pieces), which were, together with ammunition, to be withdrawn by the end of 1991 from the various labour organizations, for which there was an existing decision by the Presidency of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina, dated October 19, 1990.³⁴¹

On March 11, 1992, in reviewing information about **the demands for return of confiscated arms, ammunition and military equipment of the Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina**, the Presidency of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina revised its own decision, dated October 19, 1990, “**pertaining to the withdrawal and storage of arms and other military equipment of the Territorial Defence of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina into JNA warehouses, and concluded that this decision should be put out of effect.**”. Furthermore, the Presidency concluded at this time “**that it was necessary to begin negotiations with the competent institutions of the JNA on returning the confiscated weapons and ammunition of the Territorial Defence in the Republic, and on other related issues**”, which was to be the task of the Ministry for National Defence.³⁴² However, the weapons

³⁴⁰ Ibid.

³⁴¹ Ibid.

³⁴² AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2869, Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, no. 02-011-194/92, Sarajevo, March 12, 1992; H. Efendic, the aforementioned work, p. 108.

According to Hasan Efendic, this was “[**but**] **one more in a row of belated decisions**”. In relation to this, he states that it had not been known at the headquarters of territorial defence that the Presidency of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina had passed such a decision. Namely, according to Efendic, the Presidency of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina “forgot to announce **its most important decision**, that is, forgot to inform the people who were hiding the weapons of the TO, and thus risked being arrested or

confiscated, or better said, plundered by the military leadership from the Territorial Defence, had already been placed into JNA warehouses and distributed to Serbs.

The confiscation of weapons from the Territorial Defence had clearly been of use to the planning and preparations for the aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the genocide against the Bosniaks.

liquidated by the military police of the JNA, that it had legalized their patriotic efforts. If we had known, we would have acted differently and we would have made much more pressure, because then we would have had the legitimate positions of our supreme command. This session was also attended by general Milutin Kukanjac, as the commander of the Second Military District, who had already, in his headquarters at Bistrik, developed the working plan for the occupation of Sarajevo and arrest of all the breakers of “Yugoslav unity” (Ibid.).

6. From the Anti-Fascist to the Greater Serbian Army

The Yugoslav People's Army (JNA), built into the foundations of the new Yugoslav state, was since its very formation a political army, and all the time until the dissolution of the SFRY, it relied on the revolutionary ethics of equality of nations expressed in the motto of "brotherhood and unity". Its political role during the fifties was significant and, at certain points in time, even a decisive one. In essence, it was subjected to the civilian power and the Party at Federal level, and during the life of Josip Broz – Marshall Tito, it was directly connected to him, related to all the major issues.³⁴³

The role of the JNA in the political life of the SFRY since 1970 had been becoming ever more significant, after which, upon the death of the supreme commander, it was slowly slipping away from under the control of the civilian control and imposing itself as an independent factor in the Federation. The delegitimization of the political system, whereby the supervisory mechanisms of the society were becoming ever weaker, had created a vacuum at the federal scene slowly taken over by the Army.³⁴⁴

With the reduction by 30% in numeric size and the reorganization of the commands and units (1986), the JNA wanted to "get rid" of the old People's Liberation War staff that was the alleged "obstacle" to its future development. During this reduction, a large number of the remaining officers who were decisive for the People's Liberation War and participated in the post-war development of the JNA, were sent into retirement. These very same officers had believed in the common state and fought for its multi-ethnic composition.³⁴⁵

³⁴³ S. Biserko, the aforementioned work, p. 217.

³⁴⁴ Ibid.

³⁴⁵ An interview with Branko Mamula, *Slobodna Bosna*, Sarajevo, no. 186, June 8, 2000, p. 23.

From the beginning of the fulfilment of the Greater Serbia concept (i.e. from mid-1988), when the Greater Serbia nationalism was demonstrated before millions of Yugoslavs, destroying all in its way,³⁴⁶ the position of the non-Serbs in the JNA became ever more complex. Its top leadership **“had lost courage and trust in the Army and its abilities of independent action. Officers from other ethnic groups became upset, the reputation and power of rule over the big army mechanisms was lost, with holes open for penetration from the side and insertion of various nationalist, anti-Communist, defeatist and destructive options into the army composition”**.³⁴⁷

By that time, the Greater Serbia ideas had run deeply into the JNA, too, in which the Serbs had always been the most numerous group, and which had for years created an image of itself as the last defence barrier of Tito’s Yugoslavia. The army which itself had been “a sizeable political factor” and guardian of the socialist country could not remain a peaceful observer of the political changes in the SFRY,³⁴⁸ and had already had

³⁴⁶ B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, pp. 120-12. This was done with a well-developed scenario, which brought to resignations and removals of the legal authorities in Vojvodina, Montenegro and in Kosovo. In relation with this, Mamula wrote:

“On July 9, 1988, some thousand Serbs and Montenegrins came to Novi Sad to demonstrate their dissatisfaction with the policy of the Vojvodina leadership. Three months later, on October 5, the third protest rally was held in Novi Sad, and on October 6, the Presidency of the Provincial Committee of League of Communists of Vojvodina submitted collective resignation.

Mass rallies in Titograd and Kolasin were held against the political leadership of Montenegro on August 20 and 21. Three months after that, the rallies were repeated and on November 27, the police fought with the workers of the Niksic Steelworks at Zuta Greda, and on January 10 and 11, 1989, under the pressure of a mass demonstration in Titograd, the then leadership of Montenegro had submitted resignation.

The leading persons from Kosovo: Kaqusha Jashari and Azem Vllasi were dismissed on November 17, 1988. Mass demonstrations by Albanians began. In February 1989, they organized a strike of coalminers at Stari Trg. And so the events continue flowing until Gazimestan, in June 1989, and further on” (B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, p. 120).

³⁴⁷ B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, p. 121. Mamula’s position on the independent functioning of the Army is strange.

³⁴⁸ D. Marijan, **JUGOSLOVENSKA NARODNA ARMIJA ...**, pp. 289-290.

the role of the dominant entity in resolution of the Yugoslav political crisis. The top generals of the JNA had abused the JNA for purposes of the Serbian regime and turned it into its policy instrument.³⁴⁹

The strategic use of the JNA, the tasks it received and selected and the manner of their execution were not dictated by the requirements and assumptions of the defence concept, but by specific political and military goals and decisions of the current state and military leaderships and other political factors, primarily of Serbia and Montenegro.³⁵⁰

The JNA had a constitutional obligation to preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country, because it was only the JNA that disposed with the units and assets of force, allowing such an accomplishment. Yet, instead, the JNA participated in the break-up of Yugoslavia. The military leadership was not ready to take on its own part of the responsibility for the destiny of the country tailored to fit all its peoples. It helped the JNA lose its relevant features, go through a breakdown, and disappear from the historical scene. Just like the SFRY, the JNA was defeated from the inside when it started denying and abandoning itself, the bases on which it had been formed, the function which provided it the power and the sense, and thus politically and morally it was disbanded, becoming an easy prey, mainly to the Greater Serbian nationalist policy.³⁵¹

³⁴⁹ M. Hadzic, **ARMIJSKA UPOTREBA TRAUMA**, in: F. Ademovic, the aforementioned work, p. 189.

³⁵⁰ I. Radakovic, **KADIJEVIC SKRIVA ISTINU**, in: F. Ademovic, the aforementioned work, p. 216. The JNA strategy was defined by Kadijevec as **“reclaiming of the borders of the future state”** (V. Kadijevec, the aforementioned work, p. 144, and other).

³⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 2; B. Mamula, **UZROCI I POSLJEDICE RATOVA U JUGOSLAVIJI 1991. - 2001.**, in: **RATOVI U JUGOSLAVIJI 1991. - 1999.**, The Compilation of Communiques and Discussions from the Round Table, Belgrade, November 7-9, 2001, Belgrade 2002, p. 213.

Objectively, in 1990, according to Admiral Mamula, **“it was only possible to save the JNA and Yugoslavia through decisive actions of the military leadership. However, this top leadership of the Army [then] sustained quite new, different assessments, and the Army went astray. The justifications, that the Army can not be filled in with military conscripts from the majority of the republics, and that they will not be will be willing to pay the funding for sustenance of the Army any longer, are not the cause, but the consequences of the army siding up Serbia and Milosevic”** (B. Mamula, **SLUCAJ JUGOSLAVIJA**, p. 121).

This leadership placed the JNA into the service of the Greater Serbia project.³⁵²

Under such a leadership, the Armed Forces of the SFRY, as a powerful integrative factor, were “dissolved” and then they sided with the Greater Serbia movement, as the side most prepared to accept the maintenance of the “fourth strongest army” in Europe (and the conceptually closest one), as even their careers and “survival” in their posts depended upon it.

In “saving” the JNA and Yugoslavia, according to Mamula, the reasonable choice could only have been a **coup d'état**, taking over control and establishing order in the country, creating a space for quick preparation of the negotiations on the future of the country, with participation of the representatives and institutions of the international community (B. Mamula, **UZROCI I POSLJEDICE RATOVA U JUGOSLAVIJI 1991. - 2001.**, p. 213).

As written by Ivan Stambolic, **“the JNA had in fact participated in the break-up of Yugoslavia in most cruel ways. It acted in a completely contrary direction than the one that it had solemnly sworn before its peoples. Instead of threatening with huge forces to obstruct all the forms of violence in the country, all the paramilitary vandalisms, even the propaganda instigating war, as well as special forms of war, it sided along with the war waging will of the political leadership of the largest nation in Yugoslavia and turned the guns against the other, smaller nations”** (I. Stambolic, **PUT U BESPUCE**, Belgrade, 1995, p. 243).

³⁵² B. Mamula, **UZROCI I POSLJEDICE RATOVA U JUGOSLAVIJI 1991. - 2001.**, p. 213. The JNA could, must, and should have preserve Yugoslavia. The leadership of the JNA, according to Kadijevic, **“did not want to take on the political role of the saviour of Yugoslavia, because it believed that the JNA can not play such a role”**. However, the JNA did not defend Yugoslavia, because it had accepted the Greater Serbia project and fought for the realization of fascistic goals. To this aim, the JNA participated in the break-up of Yugoslavia and then in the aggression and other forms of crimes in Slovenia, Croatia, and particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Because of this, Kadijevic was deftly hiding the actual reasons why the JNA did not defend Yugoslavia, intentionally turning facts upside down (**“the JNA did not defend Yugoslavia from the policy which was destroying it. It did not succeed in this, because Yugoslavia was not wanted by some of its peoples, which voted for sovereign national states in referendums. This involves political rather than military constellations. It is wrong to give to the army such tasks that must be resolved exclusively through political means, based on the will of the people. Just as the army can defend the new Yugoslavia, because the Serbian and Montenegrin peoples have opted for it, the JNA could not defend the SFRY, because under the created conditions, some of its people did not want it”** – V. Kadijevic, the aforementioned work, pp. 149-150, and 164).

As such, the JNA could not be a factor of support to the democracy and pursuit of peaceful solutions, nor could it be a deterrent from the conquering quests and genocide. It was a factor of instigation and the main physical force of such an ideology, policy, and practice.³⁵³

By the seventies and early eighties of the 20th century, the military leadership was multi-ethnic, and its national structure and orientation was a Yugoslav one. Then, for instance, the top military leadership included only four Bosniak generals.³⁵⁴

³⁵³ Dz. Sarac, **SUROVA STRATEGIJA NASILJA**, in: F. Ademovic, the aforementioned work, p. 126. General Kadijevic openly lied that the JNA “**could not secure the solution to the Yugoslav crisis through a peaceful way, although it had tried this to the maximum extent**”. In this context, Kadijevic had also ridiculously claimed: “**This task could objectively not be executed by the JNA, since those who kept the keys to war or peace in Yugoslavia in their hands, opted for war. Of course, the issue of war or peace is a first-class political issue, so in accordance with this, the range of purely military influence was restricted to deciding on war or peace, [and should war have been the selection], then [the decision] is to be predominantly executed through military means**” (V. Kadijevic, the aforementioned work, p. 164).

It was at first covertly, and then publicly, that the JNA sided along with the Serbian insurgents in Croatia, and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the *Chetnik* groups into its units. Thus, for instance, the Serb insurgents in Knin, on July 11, 1991, mobilized its headquarters and units, and then under protection of armoured and motorized units of the JNA, which openly stood on their side, constructed their paramilitary structure (S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. 23; D. Marijam, **JUGOSLOVENSKA NARODNA ARMIJA...**, pp. 303-304).

³⁵⁴ R. Dizdarevic, **IZDAJA VOJNOG VRHA**, pp. 157-158. These were: **Dzemil Sarac** (a long-time President of the Committee of the SKJ in the JNA, and one of the most reputable personalities in the military leadership); **Enver Cemalovic** (a long-time commander of the Air Force and Anti-Aircraft Defence), **Rahmija Kadenic** (the commander of high military and war schools, and before that, for several years, he was the commander of the Army), and **Asim Hodzic** (a vicesecretary at the Federal Secretariat, and before that, heading the Military intelligence Service). All of them were pensioned within a period of several years (Ibid.).

Then the federal secretary for national defence, general Veljko Kadijevic, declared himself as a Yugoslav (his father being a Serb, and his mother and wife Croats). His deputy Admiral Stane Brovet – a Slovenian. The Chief of Staff of the General Staff Stevan Mirkovic, who was later replaced by Blagoje Adzic – both of them Serbs. The President of the Committee of the SKJ at the JNA was Admiral Petar Simic – a Croat from Bihac. The commander of the Military Air Forces, Anton Tus – a Croat. The

In the eighties, the JNA was abruptly repressing the resistance of a portion of its staff (active and retired) through processes of degeneration into an army not belonging to “its people”. It gave up on its best traditions, symbols, political and military goals, war plans, even Tito³⁵⁵. Its multiethnic structure was being systematically destroyed, the efforts for the most proportional possible ethnic shares in the staffing structures of the Army had been completely lost. The JNA was converted into an entity and a tool of the totalitarian and Nazi-like regime, a tool for aggression and genocide.³⁵⁶

Under the conditions of a deepening crisis in the society, in the eighties, the JNA was also subject to intensive processes of divisions, reduction of the active and reserve personnel, strengthening of the nationalist forces among the officers, and getting closer with the ruling and influential nationalist and clerical factors, primarily the ones in Belgrade.³⁵⁷

In the period from 1980 to 1991, almost all the participants of the anti-fascist People’s Liberation War had been pensioned, except general Kadujevic,³⁵⁸ which, among other things, affected the ethnic composition. In May 1988, the broader leadership composition of the Federal Secretariat for General Defence included only one Bosniak – General-Major Fikret Jakic (at a marginal office), and several more in the units of the JNA and the Territorial Defence.³⁵⁹

commanders of army districts also in the military top: Zivota Avramovic – a Serb, Martin Spegelj – a Croat, and his deputy Konrad Kolsek – a Slovenian, Bozo Grubisic – a Croat, Anton Lukezic – a Croat, and his replacement Aleksandar Spirkovski – a Macedonian (Ibid.).

³⁵⁵ Dz. Sarac, **SUROVA STRATEGIJA NASILJA**, in: F. Ademovic, the aforementioned work, p. 118; A. Lukezic, **KRVAVA BESPUCA JNA**, in F. Ademovic, the aforementioned work, p. 70.

³⁵⁶ Dz. Sarac, the aforementioned work, p. 118.

³⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 123.

³⁵⁸ R. Dizdarevic, the aforementioned work, p. 158; The statement of General Ibrahim Alibegovic given to the author. The first group of 70 and then the one of the 40 generals of JNA were expelled from the active service, and the cleansing was continued on, “**until such time when the ‘so called Tito’s non-nationalist nest’, as called by the Serb nationalist and anti-communists, was eradicated**” (an interview with Branko Mamula, *Slobodna Bosna*, Sarajevo, no. 186, June 8, 2000, p. 25; B. Mamula, **SLUCAJ JUGOSLAVIJA**, p. 161).

³⁵⁹ Ibid.

For a number of years, the JNA was subject to the process of the growing numeric predominance of staff from among the Serbian people, and reduction of some other nations, particularly the Bosniaks,³⁶⁰ which lead to the domination of the Serbian staff. Thus, the JNA was predominantly Serb from the personnel aspect – the largest number of staff (i.e. senior and junior officers) was Serbian, in which this ratio was non-proportional to the structure of the population.³⁶¹

After formation of the Democratic Federative Yugoslavia / Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia, the officer staff was Serb in majority. Thus, in 1947, 63% of the military and political leaders of the officer staff of the JNA were from among the Serbs and Montenegrins (52% Serbs, and 11% Montenegrins).³⁶²

In the forthcoming period (1947-1991), the number of Serbs was increased. Thus, in 1981, the structure of the national composition of the officer staffing of the JNA was fully dominated by the Serbs and

³⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 159. All the military schools, as a rule, had the largest number of applicants from Serbia and from among the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, as well as from among the Montenegrin people. The lowest number was from among the Slovenes. It was sufficient to determine the percentages in order to have all leave a negative reflection on the equal (proportional) growth. There was a reduction in the already insufficient number of the applicants from among the Croats, Bosniaks, and Albanians. Right after 1980, the officer personnel composition contained only three percent Slovenes, fourteen percent Croats, the numbers of Bosniaks and Macedonians had been somewhat increased, but the number of Serbs both then and later on was over fifty percent. The ethnic disproportion among the trainees of the military schools produced the ethnic imbalance in the officer staffing composition (Ibid.).

³⁶¹ Ibid., pp. 159-160; B. Vuletic, **INSTRUMENT BIROKRATSKOG SUSTAVA**, in: F. Ademovic, the aforementioned work, p. 187; R. Dizdarevic, the aforementioned work, pp. 159-160; W. Zimmermann, **ORIGINS OF A CATASTROPHE**, Zagreb 1997, p. 8.

³⁶² M. Abazovic, **KADROVSKI RAT ZA BIH (1945.-1991.)**, Sarajevo 1994, pp. 118 (See: **ORUZANE SNAGE JUGOSLAVIJE 1941. – 1948.**, Belgrade 1982, pp. 222-226, and others). From among the other “recognized” nationalities, this number was: Croats 22%, Slovenes 8.40%, Macedonians 4%, Albanians 0.10%, and “Others” 2.50%. As from among the Muslims, that is, Bosniaks, the data is missing, because at the time they did not “exist” (they were named as Serbs, Croats, or other nations).

Montenegrins. In this structure, their share was 66.2% (Serbs 60%, Montenegrins 6.2%).³⁶³ Then, the share of the Muslims, because they were “treated” as a separate national category, was 2.4% in the JNA, whereby, given their share in the total population of the SFRY (8.4%), their representation was insignificant.³⁶⁴

The Serbs and Montenegrins also dominated in the structure of the senior officer staffing of the JNA. In 1981, the Serbs had 77 **generals**, the Croats 22, Montenegrins 19, Slovenians, and Macedonians 12 each, Yugoslavs 7, Muslims 3, and Albanians 1.³⁶⁵ Serbs had 1511 **colonels**, Montenegrins 257, Croats 219, Yugoslavs 123, Macedonians 103, Slovenians 72, Muslims 28, Others 18, Hungarians 6, and Albanians 5.³⁶⁶ **Colonel-majors** Serbs were 3896, Croats 661, Yugoslavs 422,

³⁶³ *Danas*, no. 468, Zagreb, February 5, 1991, p. 16; M. Abazovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 119-120; See. “**Podružbljanje varnosti in obrambe**”, 1983-1984, RK ZSMS, Ljubljana, p. 18.

³⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

National Structure of the Officer Staff of the JNA in 1981:

Nations and minority groups	Percentage of population (a)	Percentage in the professional army (b)	(b) as a % of (a)
Montenegrins	2.5	6.2	+ 248
Croats	22.1	12.6	- 57
Macedonians	5.8	6.3	+ 108
Muslims	8.4	2.4	- 28
Slovenes	8.2	2.8	- 34
Serbs	39.7	60.0	+ 151
Albanians	6.4	0.6	- 9
Hungarians	2.3	0.7	- 30
Yugoslavs	1.3	6.7	+ 515
Others	3.3	1.6	- 48

(*Ibid.*).

³⁶⁵ *Danas*, no. 468, Zagreb, February 5, 1991, p. 17; M. Abazovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 121-122; Thus, the Serb **generals** in comparison to their share in the structure of population were in excess by 38%, Montenegrins in excess by almost five times; with the Muslims, this share was lower than almost five times, with Croats by almost 30%, and with the Albanians by 12 times than their share in the total population.

³⁶⁶ *Ibid.* The number of **colonel** Serbs was by almost twice larger than appropriate according to their share in the total population, and Montenegrins in excess by almost four times, whereas from among the other nations this number was much lower. Thus, for instance, the number of Muslims was more than seven times lower.

Montenegrins 411, Macedonians 394, Slovenians 142, Muslims 109, Others 73, and Albanians and Hungarians 12 each.³⁶⁷ **Majors** of Serb nationality were 2102, Croats 364, Yugoslavs 360, Macedonians 236, Montenegrins 225, Muslims 82, Slovenians 68, Others 46, Hungarians 14, and Albanians 8.³⁶⁸

The Serbs also dominated in the organization of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia of the JNA in relation to the members of other nations and nationalities.³⁶⁹

The ethnic equality was in particular expressed among the trainees of military schools, which was producing ethnic imbalance in the officer staffing structure. This was reproduced “in all the officer echelons, so the Serb staff dominated both in numbers and ranks“.³⁷⁰

The ethnic inequality in the command structure, particularly among the officer staff, dominated by the Serbs, in the later development

³⁶⁷ Ibid. **Colonel majors** Serbs were in excess by 75%, and Montenegrins by almost three times. The number of Macedonians and Yugoslavs exceeded their numbers in the total share in population. In this category, the number of Muslims was lower by over five times.

³⁶⁸ Ibid. **Majors** Serbs were in excess by 65%, Montenegrins by two and a half times, and Macedonians by 25 (counting in absolute numbers). The Muslims were in shortage by almost four times. For more details on the ethnic structure of the senior officer staffing of the JNA in 1981, cf. below:

Ethnicity	Generals		Colonels		Colonel-majors		Majors	
	Ideally	Actually	Ideally	Actually	Ideally	Actually	Ideally	Actually
Montenegrins	4	19	60	257	158	411	90	225
Croats	30	22	463	219	1612	661	692	364
Muslims	14	3	209	28	548	109	313	82
Macedonians	9	12	140	103	366	394	209	236
Slovenes	12	12	183	72	480	142	274	68
Serbs	56	77	850	1511	2228	3896	1272	2102
Albanians	12	1	181	5	474	15	271	8
Hungarians	3		44	6	117	15	67	14
Yugoslavs	8	7	127	123	334	422	191	360
Others	6	-	84	18	221	73	126	46

(Ibid.).

³⁶⁹ M. Abazovic, the aforementioned work, p. 121. Thus, the SKJ in the JNA in 1984 had 52.21% of Serbs, 13.42% of Croats, 10.37% of Yugoslavs, 5.91% of Montenegrins, 5.76% of Muslims, and 1.74% of Albanians.

³⁷⁰ R. Dizdarevic, **IZDAJA VOJNOG VRHA**, pp. 159-160.

of the JNA, in particular from 1990 through 1992, allowed for a penetration of the nationalist indoctrination and conversion of a large number of military officers of Serb nationality into the officer staff and the military of the Greater Serbia policy, aggression, and genocide.³⁷¹

In order to form an ethnically clear army, the JNA was unmercifully and radically performing the “**cleansing**” of (commanding) staff on ethnical and political grounds from all the commanders who did not reconcile with letting down of those principles on which the army had been founded. All those who had opposed nationalism and its ever-deeper roots in this environment were removed from active service. The most responsible offices were assigned to the tested Nazi-oriented and obedient elements, immediately executing political orders. This way, the JNA degenerated into an army that was not the army of its people, but an aggressor army.³⁷²

The cleansing of the JNA on the ethnic and political grounds was much more intensified in 1990, ranging from sergeants up to generals. In the JNA units, that is, the Greater Serbia army units, only commanders of the Serb ethnicity remained, if they blindly, obediently, and readily implement the dirty Fascist policy.³⁷³

The majority of the JNA, evolving from communism and Unitarianism, ended up in orthodoxy and Greater Serbia nationalism,

³⁷¹ R. Dizdarevic, the aforementioned work, pp. 159-160. As written by W. Zimmermann, “**the Serb officers, when pressed by the developments to take a choice, opted to follow Milosevic**” (W. Zimmermann, the aforementioned work, p. 8).

³⁷² A. Dzubo, **VOJNA SILA U SUNOVRATU ZLOCINA**, in: F. Ademovic, the aforementioned work, p. 18. Dz. Sarac, the aforementioned work, p. 121; *Slobodna Bosna*, June 19, 2003, p. 17. As written by Stane Potocar, the JNA was subject to mass cleansing. “**In the republics, the commanders appointed were no longer the officers of the same ethnicity, in accordance with the population structure. The ethnic composition was relevantly changed, and those who were on good terms with certain republics were removed. There was a very high rate of premature retirement, and even redeployments, in order to create a single ethnicity army**”. (S. Potocar, **UROTA GENERALSTABA PROTIV NARODA**, in: F. Ademovic, the aforementioned work, p. 105).

³⁷³ A. Lukezic, the aforementioned work, p. 73. Up to 1991, a thorough replacement of the staff in the JNA on the territory was made in Slovenia and Croatia (M. Spegelj, **SJECANJA VOJNIKA**, p. 46).

as the punching fist of this nationalism. This **“had led the Army into a bloody pathlessness, until it came to its final jury in the conflict with all the Yugoslav nations, including the Serb one”**.³⁷⁴

Since 1989, the military leadership, including general Kadijevic too, had sided along with the Greater Serbia nationalist policy of Slobodan Milosevic, and was in the hands of the Belgrade regime. This leadership, **“at a decisive point of the Yugoslav drama“** stood on the side of this nationalism, and for the account of itself and its policy on **“rounding up the Serbian lands”**; it also used its powerful JNA weapons to destroy villages and towns across Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.³⁷⁵

Particularly since 1990, the JNA was under the political control of Serbia, and fully depended on Milosevic, because **“Serbia was a firmer platform to rely on“**. The Greater Serbian plan for the defence of **“Serb lands”**, along the borderline at Karlobag-Ogulin-Karlovac-Virovitica, **“was imposed on it as the only solution, based on the ‘take it or leave it’ principle”**. For the other scenario, Milosevic and

³⁷⁴ I. Stambolic, **UDARNA PESNICA VELIKOSRPSKOG NACIONALIZMA**, in: F. Ademovic, the aforementioned work, p. 241.

According to Ivan Stambolic, the JNA **“was acting in a direction completely opposite from the one to which it had solemnly sworn before its peoples. Instead of using its immense force to threaten, to prevent all forms of violence in the country, to all the paramilitary vandalisms, even the propagandist ones, instigating war, as a special form of warfare, it sided along with the war-waging will of the political leadership of the largest nation in Yugoslavia and turned its weapons against the other, smaller nations”** (Ivan Stambolic, **PUT U BESPUCE**, Belgrade 1995, p. 243.)

³⁷⁵ V. Zarkovic, the aforementioned work, p. 56. In late 1989 and early 1990, when the political crisis and the conflicts in the SFRY culminated, the JNA was becoming more and more open in placing itself in the service of the nationalist policy of Milosevic. The JNA leadership was gladly siding up with Milosevic, who exercised a full political victory at the Eighth Session of the CK SK of Serbia (1987), at the time when the extremist Greater Serbia forces were winning, and in implementing the **“bureaucratic anti-revolution”**, were breaking up the federal bases of the state, seeing in him a **“firm-handed Bolshevik-like hope”**. Namely, having understood that it was losing its positions and privileges, and also weakened the Greater Serbia ambitions and Chetnik ideology, the JNA saw its only chance in Milosevic’s aggressor plans. This is why it had so openly sided up with Milosevic’s nationalist aggression policies (N. Durakovic, **PROKLETSTVO MUSLIMANA**, Sarajevo 1993, pp. 245-246, 283, and 285-286).

Jovic were “**preparing blackmail – to form an army of Serbia and abandoning of the JNA**“. Having no more “**moral and political power to resist**”, the JNA accepted the “**Greater Serbian political and military concept and lost the Yugoslav soil from under its feet**“.³⁷⁶

As of March 1991, from “**the joint armed force of all the nations and minority groups of and all the working people and citizens**”, as defined in the Constitution of the SFRY,³⁷⁷ the JNA had become an armed force of Serbia and Montenegro (later the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) and their collaborationists in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. This way, the JNA “**got its own state**”, sought in panic by general Veljko Kadijevic. Then, it was placed under the command of these two republics. Therefore, its occupying activities in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina represented the main form of armed participation of Serbia and Montenegro in those wars of occupation. This illegal supreme Command had functioned as of then in the following composition: Borisav Jovic, Jugoslav Kostic, and Sejdo Bajramovic (Serbia), Branko Kostic (Montenegro), and general Veljko Kadijevic (JNA).³⁷⁸

³⁷⁶ B. Mamula, **SLUCAJ JUGOSLAVIJA**, pp. 187-188, and 209; B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 146; **THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA**, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, PROSECUTOR AGAINST SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC (Hereinafter referred to as: **ICTY**, Case No. IT-02-54-T), The Hague, May 31, 2002, paragraph 964. As claimed by Admiral Mamula, the President of the Presidency of the SFRY Borisav Jovic was used to subject the JNA to pressure, and “**its ministry did not sustain – it abandoned its program for the solution of the Yugoslav crisis and accepted Milosevic’s**” Greater Serbia program (B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, p. 291).

Arguing that the JNA had accepted Milosevic’s Greater Serbia program, where he scolded Slobodan Milosevic and Veljko Kadijevic, Branko Mamula made a slip of the tongue and admitted that the SSNO had “**its own program for resolution of the Yugoslav crisis**”, which was also unacceptable. Maybe this would have been revealed, had Kadijevic coordinated his uncommitted coup with Yazov of August 19, 1991, which would have been the reason for his refusal to do so in March 1991, when he was so ordered by Slobodan Milosevic and Borisav Jovic.

³⁷⁷ **USTAV SFRJ...**, p. 53; I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, p. 163.

³⁷⁸ I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, p. 163. The official authorities in Serbia never admitted this fact. The reason for this was explained by D. Dragojlovic (a minister in the Government of Serbia) in his address to the municipal representatives in Valjevo: “**We can not say, because of the international public, that Serbia was in a war with Croatia, because then Serbia would be the aggressor...**” (Ibid.).

The President of the Republic of Serbia – Slobodan Milosevic – took over the actual command over the JNA and executed it through his group of members (“**the Serbian block**”) in the Presidency, which no longer had the legitimacy to govern the joint state, and as of October 1991, he did the same in the so-called “rump Presidency” of the SFRY.³⁷⁹

The process of “**ethnic transformation of the JNA, appropriate with the new future Yugoslavia**”, that is, the Greater Serbia, was to be “**conducted during the war, and in the least painful way possible, but also efficiently, which was not easy at all...**” In this, “**there were also mistakes with individuals, either having removed those who had not deserved so, or that those, that had to be removed, had not been duly removed (!)**”.³⁸⁰

The transformation of the JNA “**into the army of the future Yugoslavia, both by internal ethnic and organizational structure, and by territorial location**“ was completed “**on the whole Yugoslav territory**“. This process was particularly conducted after the JNA got the assignment to realize the general political goal of “**the creation of a new Yugoslavia**”.³⁸¹ In this, Milosevic had already been the key figure in the transformation of the multiethnic JNA into a Serbian army.³⁸²

The military leadership had began “**even earlier with the process, that all those commanders who do not agree with the policy followed by the JNA – out of ethnic or other reasons – may and should leave**

The international community did not accept the explanations that the war is being waged by the JNA only, as a “stateless army”, and that allegedly Serbia and Montenegro have nothing to do with that war, and it introduced sanctions against these two republics (Ibid.).

³⁷⁹ B. Mamula, **UZROCI I POSLJEDICE RATOVA U JUGOSLAVIJI 1991-2001**, p. 213; ICTY, Case No. IT-02-54-T, paragraph 956.

³⁸⁰ V. Kadijevec, the aforementioned work, p. 133. According to Kadijevec, “**both had significant moral effects onto the army, profusely used by the enemies in order to undermine the moral of the army and to wear away their eagerness for combat, focusing in particular on that the goal that the JNA is fighting for is not clear. Mobilization problems were being implied, as well as problems of movement of the mobilized units outside their republic borders**” (Ibid.).

³⁸¹ Ibid., p. 134; ICTY, Case No. IT-02-54-T, paragraph 973.

³⁸² ICTY, Case No. IT-02-54-T, paragraph 973.

it”. However, “the real dissipation on ethnic grounds in the JNA started with the armed conflicts in Slovenia. This particularly pertained to the officers of Slovenian ethnicity who had been in office in Slovenia for an extended period of time.”³⁸³

Throughout its existence, the JNA had an unbalanced ethnic structure of the command segment, particularly of the general and other higher officer ranks. On the eves of the attack on Croatia, the JNA had 12.6% of Croats, which was a shortage of –53% in relation to their share in the population of the SFRY. There were 2.8% of Slovenians, with the shortage of –66%; Muslims 2.4%, with a shortage of –78%; Albanians 0.6%, with a shortage of –66%. The share of Serbs of 63.2% in the officer population was a surplus of + 51%; there were 6.2% Montenegrins, with a surplus of + 148%, and there were 3.6% Yugoslavs, with a surplus of + 45%.³⁸⁴

In July of 1991, the JNA was becoming ever more ethnically pure – a Serb army. All the Slovenians (or almost all of them) had withdrawn, the majority of Croats were withdrawing at the time, and there were almost no Albanians or Bosniaks at all, whereas the number of Macedonians was neglectable.³⁸⁵ In spite of this, it had kept this name for 11 more months.

In the operational commands, mainly the ethnically unsuitable officers were dismissed at a quick pace, particularly those from Zagreb,

³⁸³ V. Kadijevec, the aforementioned work, p. 118.

³⁸⁴ D. Marijan, the aforementioned work, p. 289. The ethnic structure of the officer staff in the JNA in Slovenia and Croatia in the summer of 1991, according to the statistics of the Command of the Fifth Military District, as of July 6, 1991, was absolutely in favour of the Serbs, there were 57% of them, followed by Croats 12%, Slovenes 6%, Montenegrins 5%, Yugoslavs 4%, and members of the other ethnicities 16% (Ibid., p. 302).

³⁸⁵ S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. 97. On July 5, 1991, Slobodan Milosevic and Borisav Jovic required from General Veljko Kadijevec, among other things, to fully eliminate the Croats and Slovenes from the army (B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 349).

In late 1991 and early 1992, the ethnic composition of the commanders of the Fifth Corps of the JNA was 99% of Serb ethnicity (ICTY, Case No. IT-02-54-T, evidence –testimony of the JNA colonel O.S., June 4, 1996, p. 11).

where 142 of them requested demobilization (in Virovitica, even 10 Serbs – active officers requested to be demobilized). As a response, General Adzic demanded, “the traitors have to be shot dead on site, without mercy or second thought”.³⁸⁶

In early September 1991, military conscripts, after having gone through a completed propaganda campaign, were en masse refusing to wear “Titovka” (Tito’s cap), with the five-pointed star, and to enter army premises with Tito’s pictures on the walls. General Vuk Obradovic was the one particularly insisting on removing Tito’s pictures out of the army premises.³⁸⁷

In 1991, particularly in July, the JNA came into ultimate crisis. It had been a difficult defeat it had suffered in Slovenia. Then, it definitely accepted the approach that the Yugoslav concept did not exist anymore. And then it abandoned the communist symbols, specifically, the five-pointed star. However, this did not involve the replacement of symbols only, it also involved **“the change of the character and purpose of that army, even the composition of that army”**, that is, **“the army, its role and its purpose were changed”**.³⁸⁸

Milosevic withdrew the JNA from Slovenia onto the “Serb borders” in Croatia, and then into Bosnia and Herzegovina. The JNA was also withdrawn from Macedonia into Serbia, that is, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, when it was created as a new state in April 1992.³⁸⁹

The quick withdrawal of the JNA from Slovenia was the reason for the JNA **“to get cleansed”** of all the “vacillating” soldiers and officers, in order to bring to the command positions the new, **“tested”**, more militant, already openly Chetnik-oriented staff. In those terms, one needs to also consider the fact that on a number of occasions larger groups of JNA commanders were pensioned, at which many older

³⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 100.

³⁸⁷ **RAT I MIR GENERALA VUKA OBRADOVICA**, *Profil*, no. 16, pp. 198-209.

³⁸⁸ Interview with Branko Mamula, *Slobodna Bosna*, issue no. 187, June 15, 2000, p. 37.

³⁸⁹ B. Mamula, **UZROCI I POSLJEDICE RATOVA U JUGOSLAVIJI 1991-2001**, p. 213.

generals had not accepted the Fascist conversion. In this way, the Greater Serbia fascists were also preparing the population for the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina in terms of staffing. This is how the “**ethnic cleansing**” was done in the main JNA departments, and they were filled in with “suitable” Serb staff. This resulted in the JNA converting itself into a predominantly single-ethnicity army, with an openly Chetnik ideology; converting into “**a militant neo-fascist creation fully in service of the Greater Serbia policy and a specific sort of nationalist junta, headed by the dictator Milosevic, which committed crimes unprecedented in modern history**”. At the same time, upon the orders of the Federal Secretariat for National Defence, the JNA did not give up on the party and other political propaganda, directly interfering with the political life of Bosnia and Herzegovina.³⁹⁰

All available methods were used to remove the Albanians, Muslims, Croats, and Slovenians from the JNA, and trained Serb “**volunteers**” were brought to replace them.³⁹¹

The expulsion of the red five-angled star and its replacement with the tricolour mark, and subsequently with Chetnik cockades, as well as removal and throwing away of Tito’s pictures into garbage,

³⁹⁰ N. Durakovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 245-246, 283, and 285-286; **AGRESIJA NA REPUBLIKU BOSNU I HERCEGOVINU IZ DANA U DAN; DOKUMENTI O AGRESIJI NA REPUBLIKU BOSNU I HERCEGOVINU**, Information Office of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo, 1993, May 9, 1992; *Oslobodjenje*, January 20, 1992.

³⁹¹ *Slobodna Bosna*, no. 22, Sarajevo, March 26, 1992, p. 5. In the units of the Second Military District, in mid-February 1992, there were 244 colonels, of which 180 Serbs, 45 Muslims, 14 Croats, 3 Slovenes and 2 Hungarians. From April 1 through 27, 1992, “**the off-flow of staff was large**” and in this period the JNA was left by 148 Muslims, 46 Macedonians, 38 Serbs, 36 Croats, 17 Albanians, 10 Hungarians, and 6 Slovenes. This shortage of officers was made up by transferring into Bosnia and Herzegovina of the officers and junior officers of the Serb ethnicity from the territories of Serbia and Montenegro (*Oslobodjenje*, August 16, 1992).

In April 1992, the JNA ranks were left by a large number of Muslims and Croats, whose places were filled in mainly by the staff from Serbia and Montenegro. Thus, for instance, on April 22, 1992, the list of 110 officers and civilians serving in the Command of the Second Military District planned for dislocation contained only 13 Muslims (*Ibid.*).

speaks enough about the *ravnogorska* [a location in Western Serbia and a synonym for the cetnik fascist, so called “Ravnogorski” movement of Draza Mihailovic] orientation of the JNA. In spite of the numerous mass crimes in the Second World War, the Chetnik movement was amnestied in Yugoslavia. This ideology took the JNA into its hands, as well as the federal diplomacy, federal and other institutions. The SANU Memorandum was the basic political reading at the Federal Secretariat for Defence. The Socialist Party of Serbia and the Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina exerted the strongest political influence onto the JNA.³⁹²

After the withdrawal of the JNA from Slovenia and Croatia into Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Serbs held all the leading positions in the JNA.³⁹³

³⁹² N. Durakovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 245-246, 283, 285-286, and others; *Slobodna Bosna*, no. 3, November 14, 1991, p. 3.

The majority of the Serb officers in Sarajevo were active members of the Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina (.: RATNI ZLOCINI U BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI, Reports by Amnesty International and Helsinki Watch, the Anti-War Campaign of Croatia, Centre for Peace, Non-Violence and Human Rights, Library *Dokumenti*, no. 2, Zagreb, 1993, p. 107).

³⁹³ S. Biserko, the aforementioned work, p. 220. This process of “**division**” and “**dissipation of the JNA on the ethnic basis**”, according to General Kadijevec, in spite of being a “**serious**” and “**difficult**” problem, was also “**imminent**”. In relation to this, he wrote: “**The ethnically mixed formations of the JNA inevitably lead to a situation where the members of the JNA had to wage war even against the members of their own ethnicity, and that in the communities where they fought, their families were found too, so that one can view the whole drama in which many members of the JNA were found, including the JNA as a whole. Many efforts were required to overcome this internal problem. Therefore, the dissipation of the JNA inevitably happened on ethnic grounds. In order to avoid major surprises, including the official positions on a couple of occasions– that all the active officers and civilians in the JNA who wish to leave the JNA for any reasons can do so, peacefully and without apprehension. We believed that this measure was more appropriate with the character in the traditions of the JNA rather than the measure that all the members of the secessionist ethnicities be expelled from the JNA regardless of their personal commitment. Even now, I believe that this is a more correct approach, both from the aspect of the needs of this time and the past, and from the aspect of the future. In spite of all these measures, it was not possible to avoid all surprises**” (V. Kadijevec, the aforementioned work, pp. 95 and 165).

Of the 200,000 forces, that the JNA had in late October 1991, according to Jovic, 70% were Serbs, and of the 100,000 reservists, 75% were Serbs.³⁹⁴

In the fall of 1991, and in early 1992, the staff cleansing of the JNA was intensified. Some hundred generals and a major number of active commanders had been prematurely retired.³⁹⁵

The “rump Presidency” of the SFRY, **“as the highest body of directing and command over the armed forces of the SFRY (!), within the framework of transformation and reduction of the Yugoslav People’s Army and the Armed Forces of the country as a whole”**, on February 25, 1992, passed the decision on the termination of active military service for thirty (30) generals and admirals of the JNA, including general Kadijevic, **“and on making them available before retirement”**.³⁹⁶

³⁹⁴ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 403.

³⁹⁵ A. Lukezic, the aforementioned work, p. 75; Dz. Sarac, the aforementioned work, p. 118.

³⁹⁶ AIIZ, inv. No. 7-52, PRESS RELEASE OF THE (“RUMP”) PRESIDENCY OF THE SFRY; Ibid., inv. No. 7-51, Command of the Second Military District, confidential no. 1/813-4, April 29, 1992. – To the Military Engineering Directorate (attn. Commander). These were the following generals and admirals: Army General Veljko Kadijevic; Admiral Stane Brovet; Lieutenant-General Aleksandar Spirkovski; Lieutenant-General Zvonko Jurjevic; Lieutenant-General dr. Aleksandar Stamatovic; Lieutenant-General Andrija Silic; General-Major Ivan Hocevar; Lieutenant-General Marko Kulic; Lieutenant-General Djordjije Zvicer; Lieutenant-General Mladenko Maksimovic; Lieutenant-General Milan Grujic; Lieutenant-General Teodor Troho; Lieutenant-General Bozidar Bozovic; Lieutenant-General Velisav Dobrivojevic; Lieutenant-General Tomislav Trajkovski; Vice-Admiral Dragoljub Bocinov; General-Major Angel Oncevski; General-Major Kosta Colovic; General-Major Tomislav Radovanovic; General-Major Milovan Ristic; General-Major Vojislav Radovic; General-Major Mile Kucinic; General-Major Jerko Crmanic; General-Major Mile Babic; General-Major dr. Mihajlo Djuknic; General-Major Trajce Krstevski; General-Major Vlado Trifunovic; General-Major Boca Perevski; General-Major Mitar Arsovski, and General-Major Trajko Postolovski (Ibid.).

The termination of active military service for the aforementioned group of high military commanders was, according to general Kukanjac, conditioned **“predominantly by the demands objectively imposed by the transformation and reduction of the armed forces”**. The majority number of the generals and admirals whose active military service had been terminated, according to him, had already met requirements for pension, and that the decision for termination of service in the JNA for a smaller number of the

At this session, the decision was also brought for appointment of a number of generals to new offices:

- Lieutenant-General Zivota Panic, as deputy Chief of Staff of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY;

- Lieutenant-General Vladimir Stojanovic, as Commander of the First Military District;

- Lieutenant-General Bozidar Stevanovic, as Commander of the Army Air Forces and Anti-Aircraft Defence;

- Lieutenant-General Dmtar Trbojevic, as deputy Chief of Staff of the General Staff in charge of the Air Force and Anti-Aircraft Defence;

- Lieutenant-General Zivan Mircetic, as commander of the Centre of Higher Military Schools of the Air Force and Anti-Aircraft Defence;

- Lieutenant-General Dobrasin Prascevic, as Chief Inspector of the Armed Forces of the SFRY;

- Lieutenant-General Nikola Mandaric, as Chief of Staff of the First Military District;

- Lieutenant-General dr. Milorad Dragojevic, as assistant to the Federal Secretary for National Defence for the military commerce sector;

- General-Major Ljubomir Bajic, as Chief of Staff of the Command of the Air Force and Anti-Aircraft Defence;

- Colonel Radomir Sekulic, as assistant to the commander of Air Force and Anti-Aircraft Defence in charge of moral training.³⁹⁷

General Veljko Kadijevic has been the participant and creator of the transformation of the JNA into the Greater Serbia army. In addition, he has also been the key person in the conversion of the JNA into an aggressor army.³⁹⁸

generals was **“conditioned by the changes in the ethnic structure of the Army, and has essentially arisen from the changes occurring in the state system of the SFRY”**

– Ibid.

³⁹⁷ Ibid.

³⁹⁸ A. Lukezic, the aforementioned work, p. 77. General dr. Vuk Obradovic too, as the chief of cabinet of minister Kadijevic, who was closely related to the top of the SPS and the ruling regime of Serbia, **“did everything in order to translate the JNA**

For only half a year during 1991/1992, Milosevic pensioned 135 generals of the 200 that were in the regular composition of the JNA. They did not correspond to the nationalist criteria of the new army he was forming. They were not sufficiently reliable, they felt themselves to be Yugoslavs, and to have been tricked, at least a large part of them. Among them, at the time was the whole top of then already former JNA.³⁹⁹

On May 8, 1992, the leadership brought the decision to accept the resignation of the Chief of Staff of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Yugoslavia, general Blagoje Adzic, and to appoint to this position general Zivota Panic, and the decision to dismiss the commander of the Second Army District, general Milutin Kukanjac.⁴⁰⁰ At the same

from the Yugoslav onto the Greater Serbia program”. He had exercised major influence on general Kadijevic. Each decision of minister Kadijevic was previously discussed with Obradovic, who “prevented anyone who could have influenced the JNA or minister Kadijevic, and he used all available means and resources to that effect”. Obradovic’s “role” in the conduct of the JNA was more significant than that of the top generals surrounding Kadijevic, including general Adzic, whom Kadijevic considered incompetent. The responsibility of general Obradovic for the inglorious end of the JNA is known to senior military commanders. He himself knew that very well, and he made a show of his departure from the JNA, “before it fell apart, and his star at the top of the regime in Serbia was extinguished” (B. Mamula, **SLUCAJ JUGOSLAVIJA**, p. 160).

³⁹⁹ B. Mamula, **UZROCI I POSLJEDICE RATOVA U JUGOSLAVIJI 1991.-2001.**, p. 213.

⁴⁰⁰ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, 452. In his memoirs, Jovic wrote about this as follows: “We fought a lot on the responsibility of Milutin Kukanjac, because he allowed that the whole command of the Second Military District falls into the trap of the Muslims in the heart of Sarajevo, where a number of people were killed and where the army suffered a complete fiasco. The members of the Presidency were unanimous in the assessment that this is a mistake in the evaluation of the Command and in the poor security, but [he also had] mistakes preceding these, such as the completely incautious extended delay of the Command and the military schools in the heart of Sarajevo, which was the nest of the Muslim separatist insurgency. We believed it normal that Kukanjac should be dismissed due to this.

Adzic was a fiery opponent to this. He said that it was himself in person who approved each move by Kukanjac, and that if we remain with this position, he will submit resignation, because he is then also responsible, although he does not agree with our evaluation.

The matter ended in the adoption of his resignation and by the dismissal of Kukanjac” (Ibid.).

time, the decision was taken on termination of service and retirement of 38 generals and admirals.⁴⁰¹

⁴⁰¹ Ibid., p. 453. These are the following generals and admirals: General-Colonels: Zivota Avramovic, Andrija Raso, dr. Nikola Cubra, Slavoljub Djokic, Dusan Uzelac, and admiral Mile Kandic;

Lieutenant-Generals: Milan Ruzinovski, Zivan Mircetic, Marko Negovanovic, Branko Stankovic, Tihomir Grujic, Spiro Nikovic, Dragutin Djurickovic, and vice-admiral Miodrag Jokic;

General-Majors: Aleksandar Vasiljevic, Jovan Pavlov, Simeon Tumanov, Mato Pehar, Dusan Merzel, Rajko Lapcic, Dusan Koturovic, Slobodan Mikic, Milan Pujic, Dr. Branislav Popovic, Radovan Djuric, Jovan Supic, Milan Aksentijevic, Savo Jankovic, Zoran Kostovski, Ratko Milicevic, Dragoje Vasovic, Anto Karanusic, Branislav Kuzmanovic, Milos Baros, Vojislav Djurdjevac, Muharem Fetahagic, Mirko Nikolovski, and Jovan Popovic (Ibid.).

Such a decision had also been made in late 1991 for a similar number of generals and admirals, however, at that time, “careful analysis had been made, and full agreement reached, with the military leadership”, which was not the case on May 8, 1992 (Ibid.).

The “technique” that preceded the enactment of the decision on May 8, 1992, was recorded by Jovic in his memoirs:

“Just like with the decision brought late last year (that is, 1991; note by the author), Branko Kostic was constantly making some lists for dismissals, and made efforts, in a number of informal contacts with the members of the Presidency, to announce them and obtain consents. Late last year, his lengthy list was screened by Kadijevic, corrected by him as much as possible, and agreed upon by him in person. Now, however, this did not happen. Several times, Branko tried to obtain my consent to the dismissal of the generals, and myself, being very busy, and insufficiently informed about these people, told him that I can not give a blank agreement just like that. As I have to travel abroad, if he is in a hurry, let him consult Slobodan Milosevic, and I will accept what Milosevic accepts.

When I returned from my trip, the decision was signed and announced. Sloba Milosevic called me, asking me when and why we dismissed general Marko Negovanovic, who is the minister of National Defence in the Serbian government. Branko Kostic never proceeded as per the arrangement, he did not consult Milosevic and he passed the decision with three members of the Presidency (himself, Jugoslav Kostic, and Sejdo Bajramovic). They had no idea about my discussion with B. Kostic, they believed that he could not do it without agreement with me and Slobodan” (Ibid.).

According to Jovic, the decision was formally lawful, **“but it was a pure piece of imprudence on the part of Branko to act like that. Slobodan and I refrained from public comments, and Marko Negovanovic remained the minister in the government of Serbia, as a civilian (retired general).**

Throughout 1991, with support by certain institutions of the Socialist Republic of Serbia and the Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the JNA was working on the destruction of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The transfer of the air force, armoured and motorized, infantry and artillery units, as well as assets from Slovenia and Croatia into Bosnia and Herzegovina (a number of corps of the land army, together with the air force and anti-aircraft defence forces) created a **high concentration of military forces** on this small territory.⁴⁰²

In accordance with the Greater Serbia project, of genocidal character, the JNA waged an aggression against the Republic of Croatia, where, together with the Serb collaborationists, it occupied one third of this republic, and then an aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with participation of the Serb collaborationist armed units from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro, at which it committed all forms of crimes, including the genocide against the Bosniaks.⁴⁰³

Branko Kostic had begun this prosecution of the generals under the influence of Nedeljko Boskovic, a pensioned colonel of the military intelligence service, who imposed on him in order to reactivate him, to promote him into a General and to appoint him the Chief of Staff of the military intelligence service. From this position, he began retaliation against the military staff. There are, of course, such who needed to be dismissed, but all that was happening and how it was happening was not normal. At least in my opinion” (Ibid., p. 454).

The decision of the “rump” Presidency of the SFRY on pensioning of generals of May 8, 1992, was, according to general Milutin Kukanjac, “**an unprecedented idiotism, a shame**” (TV *Srna*, the show “My Guest – My Truth”, hosted by Risto Djogo, July 12, 1994).

⁴⁰² M. Bojic, **JNA JE RADILA NA RUSENJU R BIH**, in: F. Ademovic, the aforementioned work, p. 85.

⁴⁰³ According to Kadijevec, “**the JNA executed these tasks imposed on it under exceptionally unfavourable international and internal circumstances**”. He formulated their execution in a way as the JNA had done the following:

“in Croatia, together with the Serb people, liberated the Serbian Krajina and made Croatia accept Vance’s peace plan”;

“in Bosnia and Herzegovina, relevantly helped that initially the JNA, and then the army of Republika Srpska placed on its feet by the JNA, can liberate the Serb territories, protect the Serbian people, and create favourable military advantages for the exercise of the interests and rights of the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina through political means, to the extent and under the conditions as allowed by international circumstances” (V. Kadijevec, the aforementioned work, p. 162).

The JNA constituted the basis from which three armies were formed: the Army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, with its collaborationist forces: the Army of Republic of Serbian Krajina, and the Army of Republika Srpska.⁴⁰⁴

According to Kadijevec, unlike in Slovenia, where **“the politics made an assessment that it had nothing to fight for”**, in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the JNA was **“fighting for the right of the Serb people to be able to determine its future on its own”** (Ibid., p. 163).

These were the tasks imposed on the JNA by the Greater Serbia movement, which it had executed. The occupying, aggressor and genocidal actions of the JNA in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, according to Kadijevec, were liberating in character. In addition, we need to emphasize that general Kadijevec openly forges historical facts, by presenting numerous falsehoods, such as the following ones, particularly underlined by him: **“that the JNA was executing all the tasks without any exertion of any form of terror or retaliation against the civilian population, that it offered energetic resistance against any attempt for such action on the part of individuals or groups, and had prevented them”** (Ibid., p. 163).

⁴⁰⁴ V. Kadijevec, the aforementioned work, 163. According to Kadijevec, **“this was done in accordance with the given internal and international circumstances in a very organized way”**. This task, according to him, was **“very relevant”** and it was **“prioritised by the leadership of the JNA”** (Ibid.).

The substantiation for this **“priority”** was formulated by Kadijevec in the following way: **“...because the other nations in Yugoslavia had, in various ways, started creating their own armies, and the Serb and Montenegrin nations considered the JNA their own army, just as they considered the Yugoslav state their own state, so, in accordance with this, it was the obligation of the JNA to provide the new Yugoslavia and the whole Serb nation with their own army, without which on this territory and under the conditions imposed by the enemies, there is neither freedom nor life”** (Ibid., pp. 163-164).

Obviously, general Kadijevec was using these banal terms to try to cover up the occupying and genocidal intentions of the Greater Serbia movement, in particular of its armed forces – the JNA.

In summing up the JNA’s **“overall results”**, **“the conditions under which it accomplished them at the international and internal levels”**, according to Kadijevec’s general assessment, **“from the strategic aspect”**, **“what the JNA did was objectively realistic; that it did not do what objectively it could not do; that some tasks of political nature had been incorrectly distributed within it; that in the execution of its tasks, particularly in the last year, it was facing many serious and difficult problems...”**. According to him, at this, **“it proved a high degree of capability, patriotic awareness and combat moral with the huge majority of those JNA commanders who remained true to the goals it was fighting for, which was a**

In this way, the JNA was formally transformed into three Serb armies,⁴⁰⁵ although it was clear that this was a single Greater Serbia army, with a single General Staff in Belgrade, and all the other features characteristic of a single-ethnicity army in the service of the Greater Serbia (all of the three functioned under a single command in Belgrade). At the same time, this marked the end of the JNA, which, in service of the Fascist policy, turned into a force and weapon for killing, displacement, plundering, mass persecutions, rape, and the like.⁴⁰⁶

In the service of a genocidal policy, the JNA (generals Kukanjac, Uzelac, Perisic, Jankovic, Djurdjevac, and the like) lead the preparations, trained and armed the members of the SDS, and then of the armed formations of Serb slaughterers, *seseljevci*, *arkanovci*, “*beli orlovi*” – and other criminals.⁴⁰⁷ Mladic and other generals were issuing orders to use the artillery to destroy Sarajevo, in particular those parts where there were “**not too many**” Serbs (“**...aim for Velusici... aim for Velesici and also Pofalici, there is not much Serb population there...**”), and

decisive factor for the JNA to execute the tasks I have mentioned, under conditions rarely known in the history of warfare” (Ibid., pp. 164-165).

Any comment is really superfluous here. General Kadijevec is openly admitting and bragging about that even in the process of intentional extermination of certain peoples and the barbarian destruction of their material assets and general civilized heritage, “[the JNA] **proved a high degree of capability, patriotic awareness and combat moral within the huge majority**” of the JNA commanders.

⁴⁰⁵ V. Kadijevec, the aforementioned work, p. 163; S. Biserko, the aforementioned work, p. 226. In this way, the JNA was reduced down to the Serbian-Montenegrin army, equalling its structure with the nationalist positions of the SANU (I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, p. 223).

⁴⁰⁶ A. Lukezic, the aforementioned work, p. 71; S. Biserko, the aforementioned work, p. 226.

⁴⁰⁷ A. Lukezic, the aforementioned work, p. 73; A. Dzubo, the aforementioned work, p. 18. According to General Dzubo, the JNA was training and arming the Serb criminals in Bosnia and Herzegovina and other armed Serb formations in Yugoslavia. Together with this military force, the Serbian regime set off into the occupation and enslaving of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Some younger generals, unable to change the situation for the better, withdrew prematurely from active service, because they did not want to accept such a nationalist Greater Serbia orientation (A. Dzubo, the aforementioned work, p. 18).

then the civilians and their buildings. General Kukanjac stated publicly (on TV) that **it was him who enabled the plundering of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the removal into Serbia of a part of the vital industry, that he has taken everything that is under occupation of the collaborationist Republika Srpska**, and he even criticized his colleagues for having lost some of those occupied areas in the combat with the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that he had surrendered **“the Command of the Second Military District in full order”** to general Mladic, and the like.⁴⁰⁸

The holders of the Greater Serbia movement, that is, Serbia and Montenegro, under the excuse of “the protection of the Serb people”, with and through the JNA, by way of an aggression and genocide, formed the so-called Republic of Serbian Krajina, occupied the major part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, installing the paramilitary Republika Srpska and its collaborationist army. It did not wage conquest wars so that the Serb nation can exercise its right to plan its own future, but so that the door could be open for an idea of Greater Serbia, under the motto of “All Serbs in a Single State”.⁴⁰⁹

⁴⁰⁸ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2678, Command of the Fourth Corps, File No. 75-1, May 7, 1992, The Developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the relation and reflection of the overall status of the JNA; *Slobodna Bosna*, February 20, 1998; TV *SRNA*, the show “My Guest - My Truth” hosted by Risto Djogo, July 12, 1994; A. Lukezic, the aforementioned work, pp. 73-74; **VRIJEME BESCASA**, Compilation of works GENOCID NAD BOSNJACIMA U DVADESETOM STOLJECU, Zenica 1994, pp. 47-48.

⁴⁰⁹ A. Lukezic, the aforementioned work, p. 70.

II

THE GREATER SERBIA PROJECT AND THE PLANNING OF THE CRIME

1. The Revival and Escalation of the Greater Serbia Project

The Serbian intellectual, political, and military leadership had kept itself in place by abusing the name “Yugoslavia”, by way of which, since as early as 1918, it had enjoyed full supremacy over this geopolitical territory and over the nations inhabiting it. Under the given constellation of powers and within the framework of the anti-fascistic coalition, the State was reconstructed by abandoning the Greater Serbia hegemony and by accepting the Platform of the National Liberation Movement, and the federative system of the country it had successfully fought to enforce. When this political formula was exhausted in the second half of the 1980s, under influence of the Greater Serbia tendencies, the Yugoslav state came under a crisis which had required a responsible reconstruction of the common state on the basis of an actual, not just declarative equality.

The crisis of the Yugoslav socialist state had definitely brought the Greater Serbia hegemony established decades ago into question. Its direct executors and beneficiaries, from army and police officers, diplomats, party members and apparatus, all the way to the SANU – the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, the universities, as well as the radio, TV and other media, felt endangered in their monopolistic positions. Such increased demands for actual equality in the distribution of powers and social functions, mainly obtained through the 1974 Constitution, were accused as a threat to the Serbian people. These Greater Serbia forces had assessed that the forthcoming confusion on the international level will make it easier for them to finally fulfil their wartime goals, established as early as in the 19th century (“**All Serbs in one State**”).¹

¹ S. Cekic, **AGRESIJA NA BOSNU I GENOCID NAD BOSNJACIMA 1991.-1993.**, Sarajevo 1994, p. 26; V. Zarkovic, **NACIONALIZAM I SLOM JUGOSLAVIJE**, in: **STVARANJE I RAZARANJE JUGOSLAVIJE**, Compilation of Works from the Round Table **STARANJE I RAZBIJANJE JUGOSLAVIJE**, Belgrade, December 5-7, pp. 227-237.

The disruption of the strongly privileged position of the Serbs in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia had caused resistance throughout the period of the “new Yugoslavia”, culminating with Rankovic’s coup attempt in 1966, and frequently met support in the “Greater Russia” aspirations of the USSR. In the seventies, this showed as resistance against the 1974 Constitution, both during its preparation and immediately after its adoption. It was primarily reflected through the resistance against its shifts towards the actual equality of the non-Serbian nations and ethnic minorities, as well as its dual component armed forces concept. Only two years after the Constitution had been adopted, Draza Markovic ordered the drafting of the “Blue Book” about “**the injustice done to the Serbs**”.² The death of Josip Broz Tito in 1980 symbolized the disappearance of an important integrating factor of the SFRY. As early as in late 1981, Petar Stambolic threatened that the Serbs **will rely on their “power and numbers”**, and the next year, he had revived the issue of the “Blue Book”. The escalation of revival of the Greater Serbia movement could no longer be stopped, particularly once the Literary Association of Serbia and the SANU had stepped onto the scene.³

Afraid of the inevitable loss of solid material support, its second such integrative factor – the JNA and its leadership (since 1982, Admiral Branko Mamula and his successor and trainee, General Veljko Kadijevic)⁴ had started searching for a solution for its own position. The reorganization

² N. Pasic – R. Ratkovic – B. Spadijer, **PLAVA KNJIGA**, Belgrade 1977; I. Stambolic, **PUT U BESPUCE**, Belgrade 1995, pp. 65-70.

³ M. Kreso, **AGRESIJA NA REPUBLIKU BOSNU I HERCEGOVINU - AMBIJENT POCINJENOG GENOCIDA**, in: **GENOCID U BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI 1991-1995**, Compilation of Works of the International Congress for the Documentation of the Genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bonn, August 31 through September 4, 1995, Sarajevo 1997, pp. 45-50.

⁴ General Nikola Ljubicic, the President of the Presidency of the Republic of Serbia, appointed Admiral Branko Mamula in 1982 to the post of the Federal Secretary for Defence, who had, in the following years, relevantly changed the doctrine of general national defence and transformed the JNA from an instrument of defence against external aggression, into an instrument for internal conflicts in the country, and accelerated the domination of Serbian and dogmatic staff, with an ambition to be an arbiter for a potential rearrangement of the country. Later on, Ljubicic proposed, supported and offered support to Slobodan Milosevic for the head function in Serbia, and thus took on the infamous role of a Serbian Hindenburg.

of the system of command and suppression of the territorial defence had changed the role of the Armed Forces. Instead of defence from external aggression, it intended to impose itself as a referee of the inner crisis. The support was seen in the conceptually similar aspirations of such forces in Serbia and the USSR.⁵

The political developments in the SFRY since 1986 had been characterized by open manifestation and strengthening of nationalism. This nationalism, generated in Belgrade, within the Serbian intellectual, political and military leadership, had led to an internal crisis in the State, which shook the foundations of socialist Yugoslavia and allowed to use the Greater Serbia project as a fundament for the break-up of the joint Yugoslav state. In essence, this involved a **fascistic, nationalist program and a nationalist, aggressive policy** encumbering the Serbian nation with a mythological past. The best known and most comprehensive program of this kind was contained in the opinions of the SANU,⁶

⁵ For the author's interpretation and basic sequence of events, see: Branko Mamula, **SLUCAJ JUGOSLAVIJA**, Podgorica 2000.

⁶ **The Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts**, formed as the "Society of Serbian Awareness" in 1842, was involved, in addition to the study of cultural and other problems of Serbia and the Serbian people, in the design and projection of the development and objectives of the Serbian state, even of the Greater Serbia ones, once they became a current topic.

In 1945, its previous status was re-established (i.e. the status it had before the occupation time), and the removed president Aleksandar Belic was reinvested. Unlike the previous 400 printed sheets each year, after the liberation of the country, and as early as in 1952, it had already reached over one thousand printed sheets each year. At the time, it had 36 full-time and 35 associate members, and over 1,000 associates and employees. Nothing had relevantly changed during the course of forty years. The Academy remained under the influence of the old members and ideas, new members were hardly admitted, even in the field of natural sciences.

The reconnection into functioning, in which at a time in the past it used to be a dominant factor, began no later than in 1984. In November of that year, the prominent Academician and writer Dobrica Cosic proposed that the Academy provide its position on the need for involvement "**in general societal and national problems**" (A. Belic, **SRPSKA AKADEMIJA NAUKA**, in: ENCIKLOPEDIJA JUGOSLAVIJE, Volume 1, Belgrade 1955, pp. 32-41.). Two years later, its MEMORANDUM saw the light of day, and "speeches" followed – one after the other – all containing nationalist and war-instigating topics.

“where the Serbian nationalist program was designed and drafted”,
in particular in its Memorandum (the program for the creation of

All the Academicians of the SANU (except for two) had supported the Memorandum, in which they stated their position in favour of the broaching of the Serbian national issue in Yugoslavia, and the directions for its solution, “that is, for a certain policy of solution of the Serbian issue” (M. Minic, **RATOVI U HRVATSKOJ I BOSNI I HECEGOVINI 1991.-1995.**, Sarajevo – Munich – Novi Sad – Zagreb 2002, p. 89).

Dobrica Cosic was the main ideologist of the **MEMORANDUM** of the SANU, a nationalist project, formulating all the Serbian “injustices“ and determining the direction of the Serbian nationalist policy (S. Biserko, **PRINUDNI IZLAZAK IZ SENKE**, HELSINSKA POVELJA, no. 60, Belgrade, January 2002, pp. 1-2). One of the authors of the Memorandum was the Academician Mihajlo Markovic. On June 9, 1992, on the first channel of the Belgrade TV, participating in a discussion among several well-known politicians from several political parties and in the capacity of the Vice President of the Socialist Party of Serbia, in presenting his opinion on the actions by the Academicians who were asking for the resignation of the President of the Republic of Serbia (Milosevic) and the Government of Serbia, he stated among other things, that he is proud of being one of the authors of the Memorandum (M. Minic, the aforementioned work, p. 90).

The Memorandum exerted major influence on the official policy of Serbia in the resolution of the Yugoslav crisis and the Serbian national issue within it, for the purpose of the realization of the Serbian nationalist program. Instead of a democratic policy for the resolution of the issue of ethnic relations in Yugoslavia, including the Serbian national issue, one was applied which had arisen out of nationalist positions, and mainly implemented by the state government, headed by Slobodan Milosevic, the president of the Republic of Serbia. Milosevic and the Government of Serbia conducted such a policy, jointly formulated with participation of the Academicians of the SANU (Ibid.).

The authors of the Memorandum had exclusively addressed the Serbian national issue. They had criticized the policy conducted in Yugoslavia in the war and after the war towards Serbia, the Serbian people and the Serbian national issue, especially since:

- the Serbian people were left in an unequal position;
- Serbia was in an unequal position within Yugoslavia;
- The Serbian people were divided into several republics (since 24% of the Serbs lived outside of Serbia);
- The Serbian people did not receive their own state (the Serbian nation “did not receive the right to have its own state”);
- Serbia was lagging behind in economic development, and the like (Ibid., pp. 91-96).

In this way, a very broad awareness on a position of inequality, on being disadvantaged, on the anti-Serbian coalition and the coalition against Serbia and the Serbian people, and other things, was being created. Hence the “spiritual condition” was ignited with Serbs in Serbia and outside Serbia, that the only solution for the Serbian people is that **“all Serbs should live in one state”**, and that this must be accomplished either in a peaceful way, or by way of arms (announced for the first time at the rally of millions at Gazimestan) – Ibid., p. 97.

“Greater Serbia”, “**the nationalist testament**”, “**the manual of nationalism**”), which “**had expressed the very political idea, deeply rooted and rich in tradition, from Garasanin’s ‘Nacertanije’ to Moljevic’s program of a ‘Homogenous Serbia’**”.⁷ This political concept “**understood and accepted Yugoslavia as an expanded Serbia for which the AVNOJ-wise concept of regulation of interethnic relations, based on the full equality of the Yugoslav nations and their republics in a common federation, meant in turn inequality for the Serbs, as the majority nation**”. For these reasons, “**the authors of the Memorandum condemned the decisions of the AVNOJ (Antifascist Council of the People’s Liberation of Yugoslavia; note by the translator) as an ‘anti-Serbian creation’, rejecting the AVNOJ-based borders, ‘because they had divided the Serbian people’, and because due to them, ‘the Serbian nation did not receive the right to have its own state’**”. They “**used certain very hard words**“ to describe the condition of the Serbs in Yugoslavia, and in relation to this, they concluded that “**one can not imagine a worse historical defeat than the one suffered by the Serbs in Yugoslavia**“, “**so that the solution of the Serbian issue imposes itself as a task of top priority**”. They saw a solution in the rearrangement of the Yugoslav state ensuring the Serbian nation, as the major one, a dominant position in the centralized Yugoslav federation. Were this not attainable, the Serbs “**would have to seek another alternative, i.e. the unification in a Greater Serbia, of the Serbian ethnic area.**”⁸

⁷ Moljevic’s Treatise, dated June 30, 1941, is actually a perhaps somewhat modified reconstruction (based on the notes and memories) of a similar project of the Serbian Culture Club (from the 1930s), and of its president and ideologist Slobodan Jovanovic.

⁸ V. Zarkovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 227-229. For this, see also: I. Stambolic, the aforementioned work, pp. 117-131; M. Minic, the aforementioned work, pp. 89-90.

The Memorandum of the SANU, written by the leading Serbian intellectuals, clearly proclaimed the aspirations for Greater Serbia. This document, among other things, states that “**the solution of the national issue**” of the Serbian nation was prevented by the Communists at the end of World War II, because “**it did not receive its own state like other nations did**”. The only way to ensure the true “**existence and development**” of the Serbs, according to the Memorandum, was in “**territorial unification of the Serbian people**” through the integration of all the Serbs into a single Serbian national state (“**the establishment of the full national integrity of**

Starting from such concepts, the Serbs imposed the model of Yugoslav identification which **“aimed at denial of the national**

the Serbian people, regardless of which republic or region it inhabited, is its inherent historical and democratic right”) – see: N. Cigar, GENOCID U BOSNI –POLITIKA ETNICKOG CISCENJA (hereinafter referred to as: **GENOCID U BOSNI...**), Sarajevo 1998, p. 34.

The majority of Serbian Academicians were convinced that the war was purposeful for the Greater Serbia, **“they trusted those who were waging it, they trusted those who were intentionally or unintentionally instigating it, and believed in those allegedly victorious battles leading into a certain defeat in the war”** (M. Tomanic, the aforementioned work, p. 61).

“In the political games”, according to Slavoljub Djukic, **“the Memorandum of the SANU was labelled as the detonator and omen of the dissolution of Yugoslavia. It was used as the basis for the term ‘Memorandum Serbia’, whose ‘baby was Slobodan Milosevic’. The roots of all later events, ‘the anti-bureaucratic revolution’, the ideas of ‘Greater Serbia’, even the war itself, were lightly sought after in this charter, and the hearty support offered by many Academicians after the Eighth Session to the Serbian President had only confirmed the thesis that all the evil actually came from this reputable institution”** (S. Djukic, the aforementioned work, p. 57).

Without hesitation, Ivan Stambolic pronounced the Memorandum as the necrology of Yugoslavia. The authors of the Memorandum and of the nationalist concept, wanted, according to Stambolic, **“to use their writing to dig out the ‘stone of AVNOJ’ from under Yugoslavia. And it was a stone built into the foundations of our multiethnic community. It was immediately clear where this could take us, just as it did. The very paranoid spirit of accusing all others of hating us was nothing else but the inverted hatred of the creators of the Memorandum against the non-Serbian nations...”** (I. Stambolic, the aforementioned work, pp. 117, and 119-120).

According to the Academician Dr. Branko Pavicevic, the **Memorandum of the SANU** was a document synthesizing the concept of opposition to the AVNOJ Yugoslavia in the clearest way, and objectively calling for its destruction (Introductory word of Academician Branko Pavicevic, the president of the Organizational Board of the same-named Round Table. See: **RATOVI U JUGOSLAVIJI 1991-1999**, The Compilation of Communiqués and Discussions from the Round Table, Belgrade November 7-9, 2001, Belgrade 2002, p. 16).

According to Milos Minic, **“The Memorandum of the SANU became the conceptual and political instrument of the nationalist orientation of the predominant segment of the Serbian public in Serbia and outside [of it]”** (M. Minic, the aforementioned work, p. 96).

Admiral Mamula claims that **the Memorandum “had encircled the division of Yugoslavia and laid the basis for the formation of Greater Serbia. Until then, Garasanin’s ‘Nacertanije’, as the basis of the foreign policy of Serbia, was considered the most radical program of Serbian expansionism in the Balkans, and later on as**

specificities of the other peoples”, particularly Bosniaks, **“while retaining privileges of the majority nation, towards *serbization* of Yugoslavia, that is, towards Yugoslavia as an expanded Serbia”**. The Greater Serbian nationalism was always pro-Yugoslav as much as it suited its view of the order in the common state, that is, it started becoming anti-Yugoslav when it started realizing that the Unitarian concept of the state will not go.⁹

In accordance with its general concept, the Serbian nationalism turned to the concept of Greater Serbia, that is, encircling of the **“Serbian lands”** and implementation of the policy of **“All Serbs in one State”**. The Serbian policy opted for implementation of its program for **“the state of all the Serbs”** at any price, even using arms. This meant focusing towards fascistization and cutting Yugoslavia to pieces, as well as forced changing of the republic borders.¹⁰

the basis of every state construction of Greater Serbia... [T]he Memorandum advocates for hatred and conflicts with Croats and Slovenes, with whom they had been living together for seventy years, accusing other religions for a conspiracy against Orthodoxy” (B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, p. 289-290).

⁹ V. Zarkovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 227-237.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 231. In the eighties of the 20th century, the Serbs had a flaming desire to form Greater Serbia. Then **“the seeds of dreaming of a large Serbian state”** were sown **“into the Serbian souls”** by the **“intellectual elite”**. These were primarily individual writers, Academicians, and officials of the Serbian Orthodox Church (certain Bishops were **“the leading constructors of the building called Greater Serbia”**). For the Serbian political elite too, the concept of Greater Serbia was the goal (M. Tomanic, **SRPSKA CRKVA U RATU I RATOVI U NJOJ**, Belgrade 2001, pp. 5, 7-8, and 38).

“A new Serbian order” was to be set up on the territory of the SFRY – the Greater Serbia, **“consisting of the AVNOJ-based Serbia, Montenegro, and their ‘annexed’ parts of other republics of the former SFRY”**, as explained by the Academician Milorad Ekmečić. In relation to this, he wrote in December 1988: **“...violence is the midwife of the creation of national states, and even more so, the wartime violence. Each nationalism begins with the creation of fairytales or epic songs, and this is therefore noble nationalism. I tell my students about an anecdote from the beginning of the past century in Prague. In the City Café, people gathered and sat around, just as we are now, at a table. Then someone went in and asked what would happen if the ceiling of the café went down on their heads. The response was that this would be the end of the Czech national movement”** (Ibid., p. 9).

After the Eighth session of CK SK Serbia (1987)¹¹, the radical nationalist and fascistic group of Slobodan Milosevic broke onto the

The Program Declaration of the Serbian Radical Party (February 1991) states that it would advocate for **“the revitalization of a free, independent and democratic state at the level of the Balkans, encompassing the overall Serbian population, meaning that within its borders, in addition to the presently imposed Serbian federal unit, it will also comprise Serbian Macedonia, Serbian Montenegro, Serbian Bosnia, Serbian Herzegovina, Serbian Dubrovnik, Serbian Dalmatia, Serbian Lika, Serbian Kordun, Serbian Banija, Serbian Slavonia, and Serbian Baranja”** (S. Biserko, **OD JNA DO SRPSKE VOJSKE**, in: *RATOVI U JUGOSLAVIJI 1991.-1995.*, Compilation of Communiqués and Discussion from the Round Table, Belgrade, November 7-9, 2001, Belgrade, 2002, p. 223).

This program was even then an informal program of the Serbian regime, based on which the scenario was conducted for rounding up Greater Serbia. The socialists kept the conspiracy as a measure of **political slyness**, and parties such as Seselj’s had a role in the revelation of war goals. The program of his party states that the goal of the state system is Greater Serbia (Ibid.).

¹¹ The holders of preparations of the Eighth Session were Milosevic and general Nikola Ljubicic. In this, the role of general Ljubicic was decisive in the levering of forces between Milosevic and Stambolic at this session of the CK SK of Serbia (B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, pp. 112-117; I. Stambolic, the aforementioned work, p. 188). Without general Nikola Ljubicic (the national hero and the long-time minister of national defence), it was hard to think that Milosevic would ever have triumphed (S. Djukic, the aforementioned work, p. 70).

The army openly supported the “Eighth Group”, including admiral Mamula, which was decisive for the outcome of the Eighth Session. In claiming so, Stambolic states that the Committee of the SKJ in the JNA, at a suddenly convened meeting on the eve of the Eighth Session, at which admiral Mamula and **“all the top people of the Army”** spoke, offered the (implicit) support to **“what was happening later”**. In relation to this, he wrote, **“The press had broadly reported on those speeches, and this was on the very day when the Eighth Session was about to begin. At the Eighth Session, Mamula was often quoted by the winning forces, and the very military session would be used up to the maximum. Now, put down the facts onto the table: Nikola, the General, supporting Milosevic, the Military Committee had held a session, they are quoting each other... I must say that this had had a relevant effect on the people in the conference room and on the course and outcome of the Eighth Session... Relevant. I could not believe that the Army was not aware of what it was doing...”** (I. Stambolic, the aforementioned work, pp. 188, 244, and 246).

Speaking about the support from the army to the Eighth Session, Stambolic states that this support could not be unanimous, not even among the army leaders (Ibid., p. 243).

Admiral Mamula claims, despite admitting that he had spoken at the session of the Committee of the SKJ in the JNA, that he and the group of generals surrounding him (Mamula’s line in the JNA) did not support Milosevic, which is strongly denied by

scene, handling the paroles on the general endangerment of the Serbs and the program **“All Serbs in one State“**. Since then, the Serbian nationalism of criminal nature became the state policy **“jointly backed” by the republic state apparatus, the mass media, the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Literary Association of Serbia, as well as “well-known Serbian nationalists and many who until recently had been Communists”**. In the summer and fall of 1988, in order to disseminate the nationalist indoctrination of the masses, a nationalist-populist movement was created, and the so-called **“anti-bureaucratic revolution”**, that is, the

Stambolic. Among other things, Admiral Mamula states that **“no particular support to Milosevic”** was then perceived among the active composition in the military, unlike a number of pensioned generals. He also presents the information that the active General M. Djordjevic, at the Eighth Session of CK SK of Serbia had opposed **“any coup-like method of Milosevic”**, whose disagreement was allegedly **“relevant to the JNA, more than what he in person represented on the Serbian political scene and in the JNA itself”** (B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, pp. 115-117).

Immediately after the Eighth Session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia, General Petar Gracanin placed himself at the service of Milosevic’s **“bureaucratic anti-revolution”**, followed by General Aleksandar Janjic, and others (B. Vuletic, **INSTRUMENT DEMOKRATSKOG SUSTAVA**, in: F. Ademovic, **JNA BEZNADJE ZLA**, Sarajevo 1997, p. 189; B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, pp. 116-117).

According to I. Stambolic, the Eighth Session of the CK SK of Serbia **“was really the war horn raising the Serbian nationalists up to their feet, and into a quest to destroy Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia had already been doomed at that time. What was left was only its horrible death-rattle in blood, which is still going on...”** (I. Stambolic, the aforementioned work, p. 19).

The leadership of the Serbian Communists, who had given the decisive blow to the Union of Communists of Yugoslavia after the Eighth Session of CK SK of Serbia, according to Vidoje Zarkovic, placed itself among the Serbian nationalists. Namely, that leadership accepted **“the statements of the Serbian nationalists on the AVNOJ-based Yugoslavia as an anti-Serbian creation and their concept for the solution of the allegedly unresolved Serbian ethnic issue. The essence of this concept was such a rearrangement of the SFRY, which would allow the domination of the most numerous nation in the centralized federation. And if this were not accepted by the other nations, then one should go for the creation of Greater Serbia, under the motto of ‘All Serbs in one State’, and at the price of a bloody war, in order to rearrange the AVNOJ-based borders and of ethnic cleansing, in order to realize those nationalist goals.”** (V. Zarkovic, **SAVEZ KOMUNISTA JUGOSLAVIJE U VRTLOGU KRIZE**, in: **RATOVI U JUGOSLAVIJI 1991-1999**, Compilation of Communiqués and Discussion from the Round Table, Belgrade, November 7-9, 2001, Belgrade 2002, p. 30).

“bureaucratic anti-revolution”, as the mass rallies were called, putchist acts of dismissal of legitimate power and establishment of the hard, centralist, unlimited power, with its foremost rows headed by the most prominent Serbian nationalists. **“All was pushed aside, the worker strikes, the social dissatisfaction: the Serbian cause became the symbol of life and the value above all others. The rallies looked like national festivals”**. The rallying mass **“was dragged in front of each state institution that was finger-pointed for ‘pulling down’... This ‘selected army’, with the Chetnik cockades over the heads of Njegos, Vuk, Slobodan Milosevic... with bloodthirsty mascots, paroles, banners, conspirative fur hats, *gusle* [A traditional Serb music instrument], knives clenched in between teeth... with a whole iconography of the darkest populist kitsch, pronouncing on site verdicts by roaring, calling names, chanting, applauding to each curse, each threat and verdict. All those who were not in the mob were pronounced traitors, enemies, anti-Serbs, immoral...”** Patriotism was proven **“by the masses gathered, and the people had the feeling that for the first time, they were breathing freely. The state institutions ceased functioning: the rallies became the most powerful weapon in the hands of power”**. What happened next was **“the big head-cutting of the main people in the committees, municipalities, enterprises, institutions. The membership was particularly crazed by the demagogic propaganda that Yugoslavia was endangered by the other Yugoslav nations, but only not by the Serbs, so that, just as Ljubicic had foreseen, it could only be defended by the Serbs and the Yugoslav National Army! Yet, such a defence meant a death verdict for Yugoslavia. What else could it be when it meant that the Serbs and the JNA would shoot other Yugoslav nations also making up this Yugoslavia thing, all of this allegedly just in order to save Yugoslavia!”**¹²

¹² S. Djukic, **ON, ONA I MI**, Belgrade 1997, p. 84; V. Zarkovic, the aforementioned work, p. 230; I. Stambolic, the aforementioned work, pp. 20-21.

The war of occupation and the formation of Greater Serbia were supported by virtually all the Academicians of the SANU (M. Tomanic, the aforementioned work, p. 37).

According to Slavoljub Djukic, many leading Academicians **“became Milosevic’s political servants...”**. After the Eighth Session, they offered him **“heartly support”**, thereby confirming **“the thesis that all evil comes from this reputable institution”** (S. Djukic, the aforementioned work, pp. 57-59).

Milosevic's nationalist policy and practice of mass rallies and putsch methods ("bureaucratic anti-revolution") had **dismissed** the legally elected leaderships and removed the undesirable people in positions in Serbia, Kosovo, Vojvodina, and Montenegro. Through a revision of the 1974 Constitution, the autonomies of Vojvodina and Kosovo were also revoked (with the adoption of the 1989 Serbian Constitution), whereby **Serbia was the first republic to proclaim secessionism, destroy the constitutional order of the SFRY** (making a coup against the federal Constitution), **and started with the process of formation of Greater Serbia even before multi-party elections.** In Montenegro, a collaborationist regime was formed. The process of Serbian homogenisation was accelerated, particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this way, the Serbian nationalism solidified its positions in Kosovo, Vojvodina, and Montenegro, and through a change of the powers in the federal institutions, primarily in the Presidency of the SFRY, the JNA and the SKJ, it broke up the federal foundations of the SFRY and became stronger for the upcoming attempts at rearrangement of Yugoslavia, using its own model.¹³

In Milosevic's policy, the scholars had an important place. "**Writers, Academicians, scientists and many public personalities were his reliance at the time of the nationalist euphoria. They accepted him as the ethnic leader, granted him fame and helped him strengthen his power...**". (Ibid., p. 26). The University of Belgrade was "**the bastion of support to Milosevic**" (I. Stambolic, the aforementioned work, p. 248).

When, overwhelmed with rapturous applause at the rallies of millions at Gazimestan, Usce, and other places, Milosevic was "**sharing in the delusion of his fans in a nationalist ecstasy**" (I. Stambolic, the aforementioned work, p. 96).

¹³ V. Zarkovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 227-237; I. Stambolic, the aforementioned work, pp. 20-21, 24, and others; S. Djukic, the aforementioned work, p. 88; S. Oro, **O ULOZI SPOLJNOG I UNUTRASNJEG FAKTORA U RAZBIJANJU SOCIJALISTICKE FEERATIVNE REPUBLIKE JUGOSLAVIJE**, in: STVARANJE I RAZARANJE JUGOSLAVIJE, Compilation of Works from the forenamed Round Table, Belgrade, December 5-7, 1996, p. 255; N. Cigar, the aforementioned work, p. 44; B. Jovic, **KNJIGA O MILOSEVICU**, Belgrade 2001, pp. 10, 12, 41, 50, and 60; same author, **POSLEDNJI DANI SFRJ**, second edition, Kragujevac 1996, pp. 132 and 153; S. Mesic, **KAKO JE SRUSENA JUGOSLAVIJA**, Zagreb 1994, pp. 22 and 313; B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, pp. 57 and 286.

The Serbian nationalist rallies organized and financed by Milosevic targeted Muslims. The following slogans were shouted at them: "**Muslims, your black days have come, Tito is no longer there to defend you!**"; "**We love you Slobodan,**

The mass support Milosevic had received was quickly transformed into the nationalist Greater Serbia movement of fascistic character. Using the power of this movement, Milosevic established an authoritarian order, which allowed him to bring up the issue of Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina as an interstate issue which could only be resolved by the formation of a state of the Serbian people in those republics, exactly based on the theses promoted by Dobrica Cosic and the circle surrounding him: the endangerment of the Serbian people and the exhaustion of the Yugoslav framework, and the need to change the 1974 Constitution, pursuant to which Serbia was allegedly discriminated in relation to the other republics.¹⁴

because you hate the Muslims”; “I come second, who comes first, let’s drink Turkish (Muslim) blood!”, and the like. Arms were also requested by the masses at those set-up rallies (N. Cigar, the aforementioned work, pp. 44-45).

The nationalist rallies in Bosnia and Herzegovina were prepared with the help of the protesters who were transported from Serbia in buses, and who were organized with the support of the Government of Serbia (Ibid., p. 46).

The murder of Yugoslavia had largely started **“in the name of the people – Serbian people!”** and **“under the democratic title called ‘popular phenomenon’”** – wrote Ivan Stambolic. According to him, the break-up of Yugoslavia was continued **“with this same thumping fist of millions which had already blown away the “unsuitable” heads in Montenegro, Vojvodina, Kosovo... and together with them, it blew off the independence of a republic and the autonomy of two provinces. And then, it was Slovenia’s turn...”** (I. Stambolic, the aforementioned work, p. 21).

Borisav Jovic, one of the People’s Liberation War veteran soldiers of the Eighth Session, at which he cried: **“let us get our minds back together!”**, and all allegedly for the purpose of preserving Yugoslavia, subsequently the president of the Socialist Party of Serbia and of the Assembly of Serbia, which passed the secessionist Constitution **“as the first official document violating the legal system of Yugoslavia and indicating the secession of Serbia”**, then the president of the Presidency of the SFRY, claimed **“that, since its creation, Yugoslavia has been doomed to fail”** (I. Stambolic, the aforementioned work, p. 239).

According to admiral Mamula, the homogenisation of Serbs **“was in due course when the relics of Prince Lazar were circling around Serbia, to arrive at Gracanica [Monastery] at the St. Vitus’ holiday of 1989”**. (B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, p. 289).

¹⁴ S. Biserko, **PRINUDNI IZLAZAK IZ SENKE, HELSINSKA POVELJA**, No. 60, Belgrade, January 2003, p. 1. The Serbian nation eagerly accepted Milosevic. The motto **“Slobo the Serbian, Serbia is with you!”** was created spontaneously **“from the depth of soul of the Serbian people. No one wrote it upon order, it was the real reflection of the overall mood of the nation...”** (B. Jovic, **KNJIGA O MILOSEVICU**, Belgrade 2001, p. 8).

The populist movement promoted Milosevic into a national hero, into the leader of all the Serbs. Slobodan Milosevic **“abused the communists and anti-communists, nationalists and the Chetnik emigration, scholars, the Serbs across the Drina River and the Church”**. **“The wave of populism crossed the Drina River, where it had found strong support”**.¹⁵

The ceremonial excavation of mass graves and transportation of Serbian bones, in organization of the Serbian Orthodox Church, from one monastery in Yugoslavia to another, at places to be called “the Serbian lands“, **“was celebrated as a national holiday and incited awareness on the undefeated people”**. The relics of (the Serbian) Emperor Lazar **“were spitefully marched past across the whole ‘Serbian territory’, in order to raise nationalist temperature”**.¹⁶

¹⁵ S. Djukic, the aforementioned work, pp. 26, 29, and 85. Milosevic’s arrival onto power was supported by the majority of the Serbian people (B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, p. 115).

¹⁶ I. Stambolic, the aforementioned work, p. 21; S. Djukic, the aforementioned work, p. 85; L. Silber, - A. Little, **SMRT JUGOSLAVIJE**, Belgrade 1996, p. 82; M. Tomanic, the aforementioned work, p. 21.

The very act of the ceremonial excavation of the mass graves and **“the transportation of Serbian bones“**, in the opinion of Ivan Stambolic, **“was calling upon the ‘holy revenge’, ‘tooth for tooth, eye for an eye’. Such excavation, this digging into old wounds, in the tensest moment of interethnic relations, equalled the excavation of war hatchets. Finally, did the relics of Prince Lazar have to be marched past so spitefully across the ‘whole Serbian territory’, the future war grounds, exactly in the days of the nationalist spark flying in this whole area? What was the intention of this instrumentalization of a Emperor and a saint if not to raise the nationalist temperature? What was this act messaging to the other nations in that overheated atmosphere? Finally, if nothing was to be messaged to them, was there any thinking about what this could mean at this threatening moment?**

It was clear that these processions are provoking and upsetting all those who were not Serbs, even those Serbs who were aware as to where this all was leading to, but who remained silent”. (I. Stambolic, the aforementioned work, p. 21.).

“The church processions... in those heated days before the armed fighting“ and **“excursions”** across Bosnia and Herzegovina, in which the relics of Prince Lazar were carried around, seemed to be an omen. These “promenades” were accompanied with warnings to the enemies of **“the blooded and always suffering Serbs”** that **“we will do everything to eradicate their race and their descendants so thoroughly that even history will not remember them”**. Obviously, the aim of these “promenades” was the

A significant segment of **Serbian scholars** refused the socialist prefix and took on the leading role in the revival and escalation of the Greater Serbia nationalism in the eighties and nineties of the twentieth century. The Serbian scholars (scientists, Academicians, writers, and other public personalities) “**provided the legitimacy to the new regime by giving them their support**”. The planners and leaders of the aggression were “**the ethnically oriented intellectuals, the so-called nationalist elite**”, who proclaimed that Serbia, through the heritage of the People’s Liberation War, was thrown back into shade, and that it was denied the role of the Piedmont as the only creator of Yugoslavia, whose federal system was not at their will. This is why long preparations were made to present the People’s Liberation War (NOR) in the most negative colour possible, detrimental to the national interests of the Serbian and Montenegrin nations. There were remembrances of the *Ustashas*’ [Croat Fascists in the World War Two] mass murders of the Serbs, which needed to be avenged in the new war, and then statements were presented that the Partisans had killed Serbs, particularly at the Srem frontline area, and protected Ustashas, etc. In this way, they were silently going over and distorting the truth about the anti-fascistic People’s Liberation War of the nations of Yugoslavia.¹⁷

Many NOR veterans converted into convinced nationalists, and their veteran organizations were mainly supporting the aggression policy of the Serbian regime, too. “**The last representatives of the Partisan generation, who had ruled Serbia for over four decades, were removed from politics with the completion of the Eighth Session**”.¹⁸

The Serbian nationalism from the 1990s started appearing not only as a traditional and anti-system nationalism, with the platform defeated

recruitment of the Serbian people for crimes. (I. Stambolic, the aforementioned work, p. 21; N. Cigar, the aforementioned work, p. 46). However, this travelling and showing around of the relics of Prince Lazar in public was celebrated as a holy national rite. Ljubinka Todorovic warned the Serbian leadership that this “**travelling exposition, and return of the Chetnik symbols, such as the two-headed white eagle of the Serbian royal house and the iconography of the Serbian Orthodox Church will upset the delicate balance in Yugoslavia**” (L. Silber – A. Little, the aforementioned work, p. 82).

¹⁷ S. Djukic, the aforementioned work, p. 84.

¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 75-76.

in People's Liberation War, but also as a "legal nationalism", within the very system and within the SKJ. And it was exactly this "**party**", "**communist nationalism**" that was the most deserving for the "doing in" of both the socialist system, and of Yugoslavia.¹⁹

With the aim to realize the dream of a large, ethnically clean state up to the Kupa and Drava rivers, in which "**all the Serbs would be in a single state**", special attention was attached to the affirmation of the nationalist policy among the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. There was a stubborn campaign led on terms of that their rights and even their survival can only be ensured in a single state of the Serbian nation. The strife for the single Serbian state was declared as their most important task. Unless this goal can be accomplished in a peaceful way, it was supposed to be realized using force. It was claimed that no victims are big enough to accomplish this goal, and that the opportunity to have it realized was "**now, or never**".²⁰

The Greater Serbia nationalists, blinded with the megalomaniac goals and with the assessment that those goals were to be accomplished "**now, or never**", acted arrogantly, relying mainly on force. All the other proposals for a rearrangement of Yugoslavia (including an asymmetric federation, a confederation, a union of sovereign states) provided as compromises in order to preserve the unity of the Yugoslav peoples and to avoid potential tragic consequences of their division were arrogantly refused by them. They assessed that the Bosniaks and Macedonians will have to side up with and stay in SFRY, because "**realistically, they have no other choice**", and if the Bosniaks in Bosnia and Herzegovina do oppose, their resistance will be very quickly overpowered by the JNA.²¹

¹⁹ V. Zarkovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 227-237.

²⁰ Ibid., pp. 232. Whole groups of Serbian Academicians ("**...the group of the so called 'immortals' ...**") had been troubling themselves for years "**over the maps of Bosnia, trying to find at least a goat path that could be walked the way from Belgrade from Karlovac, exclusively through Serbian cities and villages!**" (I. Stambolic, the aforementioned work, pp. 125-126).

²¹ Ibid., pp. 234-236. There were a number of options for the potential Yugoslavia. However, the Greater Serbia forces were in favour of "**either the one [we] want, or none at all!**". They refused any idea on the reforms of society on the line of strengthening democracy, and they did not allow any varying options, except: "**Either Yugoslavia**

Under the conditions of strengthening nationalist policy and a less decisive position of the leadership of the SKJ and the state leadership

will survive as it is, or there will be no Yugoslavia”, which, under the given circumstances, meant, as rightfully claimed by Ivan Stambolic, the death verdict against Yugoslavia (I. Stambolic, the aforementioned work, p. 239).

These forces, in fact, wanted nothing else but Greater Serbia, with the Yugoslav name for camouflage (S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. 102).

Four republics, including the Republic of Croatia and Mesic in person, advocated in favour of the union of sovereign states as the best way and the only possible solution. This model of the Yugoslav community, presented at the time when Serbia had already revoked certain significant elements of the 1974 federal Constitution, was met with knives pulled out. Serbia, supported by Montenegro, in which Milosevic had installed the power by using rallying campaigns in 1988, initiated “the modern federation”, that is, a Unitarian state, based on the principle: “one citizen, one vote”. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia were in favour of compromise solutions and sovereignty of the republics, with the important affairs (businesses, foreign affairs, the military) to be under a centralized administration. The weak Presidency of the SFRY had tried to find a solution in the negotiations among the presidents of the republics, that is, the presidents of the republic presidencies. Milosevic and Bulatovic, with the agreement of the military top, regularly insisted only on the “strong Yugoslavia”, waiting secretly “for the right moment” to launch a military intervention and jump up at the “secessionist republics”. After the defeat in Slovenia, they attacked Croatia, in which they had previously organized “the ‘log’ revolution”, converting it gradually (by arming and sending smaller or bigger Chetnik groups from Serbia, and then by involving the regular army in an armed mutiny (Ibid., pp. IX, VII, XIII, 2, 3, 8, 21, 31, 37).

Their basic motto of “**strong Yugoslavia**” boiled down to the program of “**all Serbs in one State**”, that is, to the program of geographic expansion of Serbia to cover the whole, or almost the whole of Yugoslav space. (Ibid., pp. 3, and 31) Milosevic declared himself as in favour of unified Yugoslavia, because he did not really care a bit about it, he only cared “**about the state in which all the Serbs would live together**” (Ibid., pp. 3, 31, and 39).

The Sarajevo summit at Stojcevac (Sarajevo), on June 6, 1991, of the republic presidents did not provide any steps further, either. The proposal by Gligorov and Izetbegovic, according to Dr. Kostic, “**was a physical merger of two concepts, the federal and the confederal**”, which was not acceptable for them. They were “**just in favour of the preservation of Yugoslavia as a single state community of the international legal entity**”. In relation with this, in a threatening voice, Jovic had for weeks announced exertion of force, stating that “**the Serbian people in Croatia and Bosnia may only be taken out of Yugoslavia by way of war**”. In this, immediately before passing the decision on independence of Croatia, on June 25, he threatened with the use of force: “**If Slovenia and Croatia go away... the state of war will be introduced in the country, ‘regardless of whether or not it will be publicly announced’**”. General

in confronting the ever-stronger nationalism, the military leadership of the JNA accepted the Greater Serbia nationalist policy. The leadership of the JNA became **“an instrument of the Serbian regime”**, whose task, according to general Veljko Kadijevic, the minister of the army, was to **“protect the territories with Serbian population, to arm them and to secure the borders of the future, projected Yugoslavia”**. By using the cruellest actions imaginable, the JNA participated in the break-up of Yugoslavia. It sided along with the **“warrior will of the political leadership of the largest nation in Yugoslavia, turning its weapons against the other, less numerous nations”**. The JNA, and later the Army of Yugoslavia, siding along with the Greater Serbia nationalism and its fascistic policy in **“rounding up the Serbian lands”**, used powerful weapons **“that had been, purchased by all of our peoples over years, with great affection for their army, not sparing their scarce means – for the devastation of villages and cities across Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which meant the destruction of Yugoslavia”**.²²

The Serbian hegemony concept, which had tailored Yugoslavia in 1918 and survived the revolution and almost half of a century of the socialist rule, buried Yugoslavia finally down. Due to the inability to snatch absolute influence in the Presidency of the SFRY and the Central

Kadijevic was warning and threatening: **“No one must touch into the integrity of Yugoslavia by passing unilateral enactments”** (Ibid., pp. 42-43, and 47).

At the 17th Session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (1988), Kadijevic stated that **“Yugoslavia can only be a federal state or there will be no Yugoslavia”**. Based on this, one could conclude that he was a committed federalist, believing that the equality of all the parts of the community is the basis on which this state should rely and by which all its key institutions must be guided, including the JNA, which he was himself heading. However, his federalism and the equality of the peoples of Yugoslavia were something else (I. Radakovic, **KADIJEVIC SKRIVA ISTINU**, in: F. Ademovic, p. 212).

²² S. Djukic, the aforementioned work, p. 114; I. Stambolic, the aforementioned work, p. 243; V. Zarkovic, the aforementioned work, p. 235. **“With the Yugoslav political top, the top of the Army, as well as the provincial leaderships and the majority of the media siding along with the policy of blood, soil, force and speed”**, the chances to stop the bureaucratic revolution, according to Ivan Stambolic, were definitely over. (I. Stambolic, the aforementioned work, p. 249).

Without the JNA and its arms, there would never have been bloodshed and devastation, as Ivan Stambolic rightfully claims (Ibid., p. 243).

Committee of the SKJ, at the Fourteenth Congress (January 20-23, 1990), the Greater Serbia-oriented politicians broke up the SKJ as an integrative factor of the Federation. By revoking the autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina, but keeping their votes in the Presidency of the SFRY, they made efforts to ensure the possibility to vote all the others down, which ultimately led to the paralysis of the Presidency in a stalemate position.²³

By converting the General Staff of the JNA into the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY (1988) and by excluding the republics and provinces from the system of directing and command over the armed forces and the armed combat, the method of directing and command in the armed forces was significantly changed. Hence, the

²³ S. Cekic, the aforementioned work, p. 28; V. Zarkovic, the aforementioned work, p. 231; N. Durakovic, **PROKELTSTVO MUSLIMANA**, Sarajevo 1993, pp. 180-181. After “**reasoning**” his political opponents in Serbia at the Eighth Session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia, Milosevic decided to “**reason**” the leadership of the SKJ, as well. In the intention to win for himself the supreme power in Yugoslavia, he forced the convening of an extraordinary congress of the SKJ. Because the proposals on the confederal arrangement of the country and the transformation leading towards European integration did not receive necessary support, the Slovenian delegates had left the Congress. Then Milosevic, leading a fierce battle against Markovic’s reforms, which were allegedly aimed against the interests of Serbia, proposed in the upcoming discussion that the Congress determine the new quorum without the Slovenes and continue working, “**trying to isolate them and leave them by themselves**” (B. Jovic, **KNJIGA O MILOSEVICU**, Belgrade 2001, pp. 52-56; same author, **POSLEDNJI DANI SFRJ**, second edition, Kragujevac 1996, pp. 92-93; N. Major, **RASPAD DRUGE JUGOSLAVIJE**, in: **RATOVI U JUGOSLAVIJI 1991-1999**, Compilation of the Communiqués and Discussion from the Round Table, Belgrade November 7-9, 2001, Belgrade 2002, p. 45; B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, p. 166).

Such a manoeuvre by Milosevic meant “**the beginning of the end of any opportunity for reaching an agreement, even for the functioning of Yugoslavia**”, that is, the beginning of the break-up of Yugoslavia. However, the Croats did not either want to participate in the work of the Congress without the Slovenes. In such a situation, the delegates from the JNA proposed to stop the Congress and to convene its subsequent resumption, whereby the Congress stopped working “**until further notice**”. Thus, Yugoslavia was left without the holder of the supreme power, whose dissolution, in spite of the optimistic statement by Anto Markovic, the president of the Federal Executive Council (SIV, i.e. the Government of Yugoslavia), that Yugoslavia will keep on even without the SKJ, thoroughly shaking up the whole system of power in the country. The state organs were not able to function without the Party (N. Major, the aforementioned work, pp. 45-46; B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, p. 170).

republics and provinces were denied of their constitutional rights in the management over the Territorial Defence Corps. The subjection of the Territorial Defence to all the headquarters of the JNA in their zones of responsibilities was implemented. **By staging the crisis of the Presidency of the SFRY in Yugoslavia (in March of 1991), a sequence of covered-up state coups was initiated.** This sequence was finalized by Branko Kostic, on October 3, 1991, with the putsch at the Presidency of the SFRY.²⁴

The basic standpoint, in essence, was in the Nazi ideology, with relevant fascistic features. This ideology was developed and formed in the numerous Greater Serbia program documents (“**Nacertanije**”, “**Gorski Vijenac**”; the policy of the Kingdom of Serbia; the linguistic mechanism of Vuk Karadzic; the documents of secret and semi-military organizations; the materials of the Corfu Declaration of 1917; “**the racial prejudice**” of Jovan Cvijic; the nationalist programs of the Serbian bourgeois circles, best expressed in the **Serbian Culture Club** and its genocidal program document known after Moljevic’s tractate “**A HOMOGENOUS SERBIA**”; the genocidal program of the Chetnik movement of Draza Mihajlovic; the program documents of the SANU, in particular the Memorandum; the historic, philosophic and literary works, documents of the Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the like). In the heart of this ideology lay a pathological hatred against anything that was not Serbian or Orthodox. The hatred against the Bosniaks and Islam is more than present in Serbian historiography, literature, and politics. This genocidal ideology has motivated the biological and spiritual eradication and destruction of the Bosniaks, because they were the main obstacles to the realization of the Greater Serbia concept.²⁵

²⁴ S. Cekic, the aforementioned work, pp. 28-31; same author, **AGRESIJA NA BOSNU I GENOCID NAD BOSNJACIMA 1991.-1995.**, in: **RATOVI U JUGOSLAVIJI 1991.-1999.**, Compilation of the Communiqués and Discussion from the Round Table, Belgrade November 7-9, 2001, Belgrade 2002, pp. 312-312.

²⁵ S. Cekic, **AGRESIJA NA BOSNU I GENOCID NAD BOSNJACIMA 1991.-1993.**, Sarajevo, 1994, pp. 27-28; same author, **HISTORIJA GENOCIDA NAD BOSNJACIMA**, Sarajevo 1997, pp. 9-11.

All the Greater Serbia plans and Chetnik genocidal program documents announce that the formation and organization of a homogenous Serbia (ethnically clean Serbian state), to encompass “**the whole ethnic territory populated by the Serbs**”, is the “**first and foremost duty**” of all Serbs. The September 1941 program of the Chetnik movement of Draza Mihajlovic, among other things, states:

The fifth-column **Serbian Democratic Parties of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina** were most directly used in the service of the break-up of the Yugoslav federation and in the completion of the Greater Serbia state project. A number of activities and procedures were undertaken in order to destroy the legal order in Bosnia and Herzegovina.²⁶

a) [we need to] **“define the borders of the de-facto Serbian lands and make sure that only the Serbs remain as their inhabitants”**, and

b) **“have the quick and radical cleansing of cities particularly in mind, as well as their filling in with fresh elements”**.

The Instruction of Draza Mihajlovic dated December 20, 1941, decisively defines the goals of the Chetnik forces:

1. **“create a Greater Yugoslavia, and in it a Greater Serbia, ethnically clean within the borders of Serbia – Montenegro – Bosnia and Herzegovina – Srem – Banat and Backa”**;

2. **“cleanse off the state territory of all ethnical minorities and non-ethnical elements”**;

3. **“create immediate joint borders between Serbia and Montenegro, as well as Serbia and Slovenia, by cleansing Sandzak of its Muslim population and cleansing Bosnia of the Muslim and Croat populations”**;

4. **“cleanse off”** Kosovo of the Albanians;

5. **“in the areas cleanse off of ethnic minorities and non-ethnic elements, populate Montenegrins (poor, ethnically proper and honest families are eligible)”**, and the like.

The whole Serbian policy from the early 19th century until today is dominated by the idea of a large, powerful and **“invincible”** Serbia in the Balkans, exclusively populated by Serbs (**“all Serbs in one State”**, **“Serbia will either be big and strong, or none at all”**, **“the state, territorial and cultural unity of all the Serbs”**, and the like).

The Serbian intellectual, political and military leaderships, in an effort to form Greater Serbia pursuant to the project policy, had been using all means available to indoctrinate their people for almost two full centuries with false epic and mythical memories that all the troubles they had undergone and still undergo were allegedly caused by the “Turks”, that is, Muslims – Bosniaks. Therefore, they have started into mass murders of Bosniaks across Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sandzak, and Montenegro.

All the nationalist Greater Serbia program documents openly emphasize the eradication of the Bosniaks: **by means of physical and spiritual destruction, through persecution onto other territories which do not fall into the domain of the so-called “Greater Serbia” (such as Turkey and Albania) and by forced conversion into Orthodoxy**. Due to this, the Bosniaks have been fallen victim to a number of genocides committed by Serbian and Montenegrin genocidal policy (Ibid.).

²⁶ S. Cekic, the aforementioned work, pp. 28-31; same author, **AGRESIJA NA BOSNU I GENOCID NAD BOSNJACIMA 1991-1995**, in: **RATOVI U JUGOSLAVIJI 1991-1999...**, pp. 312-312.

2. Methods, mechanisms and procedures for the planning and preparation of crime

The basis for conceiving the crime was found by the revived Greater Serbia movement in the past and in a non-scientific valorisation and falsification of the past up to the level of myth mania and glorification. The constant glorification of the Serbs up to the level of **“heavenly people”**, ascribing all the credit for past victories only to the Serbian nation, and all the fault for defeats to the others, the neglect and losership in peace are leitmotif of this valorisation. The general “deprivation of rights” of the Serbian people was observed in all areas of political and social life. Various fake data on the deprivation of rights and the deprived status of the Serbs and their exploitation by others was pompously presented, as well as on Yugoslavia **“as the graveyard of the Serbian ethnicity”**, in which **“the national and ethnic survival of the Serbian people was gravely endangered”**; in the AVNOJ-based Yugoslavia, where **“an anti-Serbian coalition”** existed, the Serbian nation was broken up and suffering. **“Yugoslavia was an utopian dream of the Serbian people”**, whose interests **“were betrayed in the first Yugoslavia, and in the second one, [Tito]’s one, they were humiliated and brought to biological annihilation”**; **“the tragedy of the Serbian nation is an ordeal with no end”**; **“since its appearance as a historical entity in the Balkans, it has constantly been exposed to the issues of identity, religion, territory and survival”**; **“the communist-Bolshevik ideology began intentionally destroying Serbia and inflicting major damage to the Serbian Orthodox Church”**, etc. Intentionally and constantly, the **“theory of the whole world against the Serbs”** was mentioned, at which the Serbian intellectual elite was using myths, fairytales, epic folksongs, that is, forgeries, lies and only partially true facts.

In the activity of the Greater Serbia ideologists in the planning and preparation of the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and

Herzegovina, special attention was paid to the location of this Republic, without which, according to them, there could be no realization of the Greater Serbia genocidal project, as well as to the Bosniaks, i.e. the Muslims, as the majority nation. They negate the state borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina, considering them to be artificial, administrative borders and the like, and claim that Bosnia and Herzegovina “is a Serbian country”. Starting from such a standpoint, they believe that the Bosniaks are Serbs of Muslim religion.

Through ideological preparations of the crime, the Serbian nationalism had particularly used and abused the religion of Islam, in order to represent it in a negative context, stating that it is merely in the function of war. It involves, as they emphasize, the so-called Islamic fundamentalism as the source of the militant or bellicose Islam. Along with this, certain allegations related to jihad and mujahideen appear, aimed at designating Islam as a religion spread by terrorism, force and even armed combat.

Such positions, in particular present with the intellectual, political and spiritual leadership of Serbia may be illustrated with a number of their public presentations and numerous documents initiated and drafted by them, indicating upon their role in the ideological and other forms of preparations for the crime in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In essence, this involves a well-devised and developed ideology, again accepted by the Serbian people in the 1980s and 1990s. This people was educated and psychologically prepared on epical and mythical fundamentals for the crimes for whose execution the “**elite nationalists**” were in charge of.²⁷

²⁷ M. Tomanic, the aforementioned work, pp. 6-9.

After Tito’s death and mass demonstrations in Kosovo in 1981, according to admiral Mamula, the course in Serbia was “**traced by Serbian scholars, gathered around the Serbian Academy of Sciences, the Literary Association and the ‘Knjizevne Novine’ literary gazette (at Francuska 7), around the Orthodox Church, and a part of the press and periodicals. A broadly established and planned propaganda war was initiated against the existing system and against Tito. The press attacked the foundations of the system, while the writers and artists focused on Tito’s personality. The Serbs were called upon to gather themselves up, raise their heads, speak out, and they were taught in the ‘Book about Milutin’ that the evil does not**

In the 1980s, **“in clouds of tobacco smoke and alcoholic evaporations”**, under the roof of the Literary Association of Serbia, in the Literary Club at Francuska 7 in Belgrade, **“instead of seeing white mice, Serbian writers had visions of the Greater Serbia”**. Under the ceiling of this club, **“many plans were developed as to how to create a Serbia as large as possible”**.²⁸

The Literary Association of Serbia gathered **“the main players of the events in Serbia during the eighties”**. This was **“the Serbian three-leaved flower (UKS-SANU-SPC – capital letters in the original; note by the author) whose intoxicating scent would take away the brains of many Serbs and allow Slobodan Milosevic to take them – out of their minds – by their hands and into what the very SPC will call a failure in mildest terms, when evaluating the accomplishments of the Serbian nation in the 20th century”**.²⁹

In the 1980s, Academician Dobrica Cosic spoke about the endangerment of the Serbian people, not only in Kosovo, but also in

only come from the Turks and Germans, but also from the Croats and Slovenes, that their opponents are in the house, that they should be cautious and prepared. The evil of nationalism was sown into Serbian souls and the drama that would befall all of them was being prepared” (B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, p. 289).

²⁸ Ibid., p. 10.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 12. Speaking about this, M. Tomanic concludes: **“The ceiling of the Literary Association of Serbia did not fall down, but therefore the roof of the Government of Serbia fell, as devised and projected under this ceiling. Under the fallen dreams of the designers and the fallen roof of Greater Serbia, numerous Serbs suffered, as well as even many more members of the other nations from the territory of the former SFRY”** (Ibid.)

The Literary Association was where all the Serbian nationalist leaders had passed through: Jovan Raskovic, Jovan Opacic, Vuk Draskovic, Vojislav Seselj, Radovan Karadzic, and others. In relation with this, Dobrica Cosic was very proactive, **“giving written lectures and instructions to the future leaders. The preparations gone so much ahead of their way, so that the leading intellectuals from the SANU and the Literary Association of Serbia were setting the pace for Milosevic”**. Thus, on September 14, 1989, at a meeting of the Literary Association of Serbia, Vuk Draskovic advocated for formation of the **“Serbian Krajina”** in Croatia, when Tudjman and the HDZ didn't even exist in Croatia yet (**“the communists were in power, Yugoslavia existed”**) – B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, pp. 292-293).

other parts of Yugoslavia, and particularly by the Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina.³⁰

In the autumn of 1981, after the JNA and the federal police had suppressed the Albanian protests in Kosovo, Dobrica Cosic secretly encouraged a group of Kosovo Serbs, dissatisfied at their position, to get organized, seeking changes in Kosovo.³¹ He had organized a petition by Kosovo Serbs, signed by 215 Serbian intellectuals, because the Serbs from Kosovo were constantly visiting him **“in order to complain, because no Serbian leader had taken care of them”**. They were practically secretly working with Cosic, in which the police was **“tailing and chasing them”**.³²

Cosic **“was articulating and guiding in a certain sense”** the actions of the Serbs in Kosovo. This was **“taken over and inherited”**

³⁰ Ibid., p. 100. In the inaugural speech at the time of his admission to full-time membership of the SANU in 1977, among other things, Dobrica Cosic emphasized that **“the Yugoslav state was, in essence, unfavourable for the Serbs”** (S. Biserko, **PRINUDNI IZLAZAK IZ SENKE**, HELSINSKA POVELJA, no. 60, Belgrade, January 2003, p. 1).

³¹ L. Silber – A. Little, the aforementioned work, p. 41. The Serbs from Kosovo, according to Dobrica Cosic, **“complained of their position, and I advised them to write a petition and present their requests”**.

Cosic was not the only one supportive of the Kosovo Serbs. **“They had a secret helper in the Serbian government, too”**. Dobrica Cosic connected the Serbs from Kosovo, that is, **“the protesting group of various composition, calling themselves the Committee of Serbs and Montenegrins”**, headed by **“a trio of local Serbian activists, Miroslav Solevic, Kosta Bulatovic, and Bosko Budimirovic”**, even with the highest state bodies and officials of Serbia. Thus, the Kosovo Serbs had secret support even from the Serbian Government and personally by president Dusan Ckrebic (Ibid., pp. 41-42).

³² S. Biserko, the aforementioned work, p. 1. The leaders of the Kosovo Serbs (Miroslav Solevic, Kosta Bulatovic, Bosko Budimirovic, and the like) came to D. Cosic in 1985 to complain. Cosic advised them to organize the signing of a petition. After that, some 50,000 Serbs from Kosovo signed the petition. This movement was later institutionalised. On April 2, 1986, Ckrebic received them at the Assembly of the SR Serbia, when he pronounced the key sentence: **“Now you are at the right place!”** (M. Vasic – F. Schwarm, **ZADAH ZLOCINA – SRPSKE PARAVOJNE FORMACIJE 1990.-2000.**, in: **RATOVI U JUGOSLAVIJI 1991-1999**, Compilation of the Communiqués and Discussion from the Round Table, Belgrade November 7-9, 2001, Belgrade 2002, p. 237).

from him by Slobodan Milosevic, who **“had not exactly become famous for his defence efforts for the Serbs in Kosovo. Only once he took the power, did he realize that this was a very serious matter”**.³³

In April of 1986, Cosic agreed, **“with the Kosovo activists”** as to **“how they need to fight, what they need to do and what forms of resistance they need to offer”**. In relation to this, he admitted **“he had helped them with everything they did. I cooperated with them in their illegal strife”**.³⁴

In 1984, Academician Dobrica Cosic, when speaking about **“the burdens of the past and challenges”** of the future, sought that SANU should also state its position on the need to become involved in **“general social and national problems”**.³⁵ Even before the **Memorandum**, he had been advocating for a more proactive participation of intellectuals in political life, because **“in the near future, they will be facing decisions harder than those we took back in 1941... [As] public persons, as scientists and artists who were joined in the Academy, thus accepting its role in the life of the Serbian nation, we have no right to loathe politics and ideology as pertaining to the Serbian destiny and future. Nobody can prevent us today from thinking in public about our own destiny”**.³⁶

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ L. Silber – A. Little, the aforementioned work, pp. 41-42.

³⁵ M. Tomanic, the aforementioned work, p. 11. In accordance with such demands, the Assembly of the SANU, held on May 23, 1985, concluded that there was need to **“point out the most current social, political, economic, welfare, scientific and cultural problems”**, and it was unanimously decided that this be done through a text in the form of a **memorandum**. In June, the Presidency of the SANU appointed the **“Board for the preparation of the Memorandum on Current Social Issues”**, which started working late that year. *Vecernje Novosti* got hold of the uncompleted text of the **“Memorandum”** and published it on September 24-25, 1986 (Ibid.).

³⁶ S. Biserko, the aforementioned work, p. 1. Cosic was then active on several sides: he was preparing for potential changes of the Constitution, he was preparing the campaign on the deprivation of the Serbian people, and was opening the space for placing of the **Memorandum**. His view of the position of the Serbs in Yugoslavia dominated at the cultural level and in historiography, where books addressing these issues were produced en masse, dominated by the myth about Jasenovac, and in relation to this, the genocidal nature of the Croatian nation (Ibid.).

Cosic was the inspirer and organizer of all the quests by Serbs from Kosovo in Belgrade, such as the arrival of a larger group of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo (some 3,000 Kosovo Serbs), which in Belgrade, during the session of the CK SKJ initiated by Slobodan Milosevic on June 16, 1987, and dealing with the situation in Kosovo, was demonstrating in the Park of Pioneers in front of the SFRY Assembly building, in order to make pressure on the CK, demanding suspension of the Kosovo autonomy.³⁷ Since April 1987, Cosic had the support of Slobodan Milosevic for this too, who, since his first visit to Kosovo Polje on April 24, 1987, **“for the first time represented himself as the protector of all the Serbs”**, where, shouting **“No one dare strike you”**, **“he acquired the contemporary motto for the gathering of the Serbs”**.³⁸

Thanks to such attitudes, Dobrica Cosic and the circles around the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (the SANU) were heading for the break-up of Yugoslavia. Thereby they had largely prepared the grounds for Slobodan Milosevic, who had made his Greater Serbia nationalism public, taking it as **“the basis of his own and the state’s policy”**. Milosevic stood at **“the head of the mass nationalist front”**, inflaming Serbia **“with the memorandum statements on the endangerment of the Serbs and with the cries of ‘Rise, rise, thou Serbian!’”**³⁹

³⁷ I. Stambolic, the aforementioned work, pp. 170-171. L. Silber – A. Little, the aforementioned work, p. 47.

³⁸ L. Silber – A. Little, the aforementioned work, pp. 44-45. With this sentence, according to Solevic, Milosevic **“was promoted into a tsar”**. This phrase, Solevic said jokingly, **“ensured him a mythical status among the Serbs”**. This episode, reported Silber and Little, **“gave him a ready-made formula for waking up ethnic sensitivity”**. That was the first time that Milosevic **“felt the attraction power of the masses”** (Ibid., pp. 44-45).

Milosevic’s speech in Kosovo Polje **“gave the tone to the atmosphere. The speakers spoke one after another and attacked the party leaders, the Albanians, demanding introduction of a state of emergency, the suspension of Kosovo’s autonomy, even the expulsion of the Albanians...”** (Ibid.).

According to Ivan Stambolic, Milosevic was **“transformed, inflamed by Kosovo”**. His address and his promise in Kosovo Polje were incessantly broadcast on Belgrade TV. **“This was what launched him upwards. His message had come upon fertile soil in Serbia”** (Ibid., p. 46).

³⁹ I. Stambolic, the aforementioned work, pp. 145, and 194-195.

While publicly proclaiming himself an anti-Titoist, allegedly committed to the democratic Yugoslavia, Cosic was actively participating in and advocating a **“new constitution”**, because of his view of the 1974 Constitution as the end of Yugoslavia, as **“this was a Constitution imposed onto the Serbian people, discriminating the Serbian nation against the other Yugoslav peoples”**. According to him, the **Memorandum convincingly revealed the non-democratic constitutional system of Tito’s Yugoslavia, established by the 1974 Constitution”**.⁴⁰

Having never recognized the **“AVNOJ-based borders”**, Dobrica Cosic was advocating for a **“plebiscite”**, with the right to self-determination of peoples, rather than the republics, because, according to him, the **“AVNOJ-based borders” “were Communist, provisional, based (except for Slovenia), neither on ethnical, geopolitical, nor on economical or communicational criteria.”**⁴¹

Cosic was deeply affiliated with the project of the destruction of Yugoslavia and the formation of a new Serbian state, which would unify all the Serbs. He was actively involved in the formation of the Serbian Democratic Party in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1990); he was in regular contact with Jovan Raskovic, a psychiatrist from Croatia, and Radovan Karadzic, another psychiatrist, from Bosnia and Herzegovina. He personally strove towards and enforced his appointment as president of this party in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He advised **“the people from Bosnia who came to him to get connected to Radovan Karadzic”**, to whom he kept very close contact, and **“Radovan often phoned him at night, to inform him what he was working on and what was happening in Bosnia and Sarajevo, seeking advice and support. And he also needed the money for the party”**.⁴²

⁴⁰ S. Biserko, the aforementioned work, p. 1.

⁴¹ Ibid., pp. 1-2. Cosic was advocating for the **“democratic approach of self-determination and peaceful division”**, in which he sought the same rights for the Serbs in Croatia, and was ready, as he himself said, **“to grant the same rights to the Albanians in Kosovo”**, because, allegedly, this principle was a universal one for him (Ibid.)

⁴² Ibid. Cosic’s responsibility for the planning and preparation of the crime, particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina, is indisputable. In addition, he also had the command responsibility for the period 1992.-1993., when he was the president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, at the time when this state participated in the aggression

As early as in the mid-1980s, as well as later on, for instance in March 1990, the Academician Dobrica Cosic said that **“Yugoslavia was outdated and that it can not survive”** (**“that it is not worth fighting for its survival”**), and in relation to this, he advocated the thesis on **“the inevitable dissolution of Yugoslavia”**. He substantiated this assessment with the fact that **“no Yugoslav nation, for some reasons of their own, is satisfied with its respective position nowadays”**. Having this in mind, he believed that if the Serbs wanted to confirm **“political maturity”**, they must replace **“their traditional Yugoslav feeling with the traditional and democratic representation of all national interests. Let us once and for all stop liberating, saving and taking care of others, convincing them that without us they would fail”**. When asked – **“[but] if they do not want to be with us, what then”**, Cosic replied: **“If they do not wish to live with us in a democratic federation, let us also respect their will to be happy by themselves”**. This was decidedly expressed by Cosic in a letter to the Congress of the Serbian intellectuals in Sarajevo, on March 28, 1992.⁴³

In the nineties, almost all the Academicians, writers, and artists supported the Greater Serbia movement and the Greater Serbia nationalism. Milosevic had individual discussions with many who had offered him support.⁴⁴

against Bosnia and Herzegovina and the genocide against the Bosniaks. His name is associated with two crimes in Serbia too (Strpci and Sjeverin), which are a direct extension of the policy and practice of the genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina, In Geneva, in the capacity of the president of the FRY, he had signed the **Memorandum on Humane Dislocation** with Tudjman (Ibid.).

⁴³ S. Djukic, the aforementioned work, p. 127; B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 125; M. Tomanic, the aforementioned work, pp. 101, 126, 191, and 193. In the discussion with Jovic, on September 11, 1990, Cosic re-emphasised that **“there is not any longer a single serious reason for the existence of Yugoslavia”** (B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 193).

⁴⁴ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 103-131. In the meeting with Milosevic, on March 25, 1990, there was also discussion, according to Jovic, about the significance of the unity of the Serbian leadership. He said to Milosevic **“that he did not believe there was any danger”**, however, he had also indicated the need for expansion of the unity to include the scholars: **“so that writers, artists, Academicians, and the like be more on our side. The workers should also not turn against us or due to social problems”**. He was then given the answer by Milosevic **“that almost all the Academicians,**

The first open announcement of the crime was constituted in Milosevic's warlike speech at Gazimestan, on June 28, 1989, where, **"in an aggressive and spiteful mood, the Serbs from the whole world flocked to participate in the ceremonial unison of all the Serbs under a single leader"**. Six centuries after the Kosovo battle, in front of a million people, including the top representatives of Yugoslavia and guests from other republics, at the site of the death of Emperor Lazar, Milosevic sent his message: **"Six centuries after the Kosovo battle, we are fighting battles again. These are not armed battles, although even such ones are not excluded"**. Namely, Milosevic then held a warrior-like speech in which, threatening, he implied a further conquering quest, repeating his decisiveness, pronounced several months before: **"If we can not work, we can fight"**. In this, the million of his followers then vowed, **"just like in the poem, in the legend, Emperor Lazar besought his subjects"**. Promising that he would retrieve **"the national fame"** of Serbia, at the rallies of millions at Gazimestan, Usce, and other places, received massive and frenetic applauses, sharing in **"the delusion of his fans in a nationalist ecstasy"**.⁴⁵

In addition to his **"hearty"** support for the policy of Serbia, **"in particular the striving for constitutional changes"**, Dobrica Cosic was advocating for and addressing the issue (1990) **"of the aspiration**

writers and artists are with us, and that we must involve them more into the common action – both in the country and abroad. He has had individual discussions with many and this is the belief he acquired based on that" (Ibid.).

⁴⁵ I. Stambolic, the aforementioned work, pp. 29, 91, and 96; S. Djukic, the aforementioned work, p. 85; L. Silber – A. Little, the aforementioned work, p. 83.

The mass of millions at Gazimestan on June 28, 1989, at Vidovdan, **"while the leader of the overall Serbian nation Slobodan Milosevic was landing in a helicopter 'from the heavens' down to sacred Serbian land, among the people who believed in destiny in their mythology..."**, was chanting: **"Prince Lazar, you were unlucky, you did not have Slobo walking side by side with you"** (M. Seferovic, **PREBOLI ZLA**, Zagreb 2001, pp. 30-31).

At Gazimestan (1989), Milosevic signalled the intention of his government to expand the nationalist program beyond the borders of Serbia. His emphasis on that **"the Serbs always liberated themselves on their own and, whenever possible, they also helped others liberate themselves"** makes an impression, writes Cigar, that Serbia was decisive in using the force to change the long established internal borders in Yugoslavia, in an effort to "liberate" the Serbs outside Serbia, as sermonized in the Memorandum (N. Cigar, the aforementioned work, p. 45).

for a state of the Serbs, which, in the division of territory with Croatia, should encompass as many Croats in Serbia, as many Serbs remain in Croatia". To this goal, he had established **"close cooperation with the Serbian parties in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro. He personally influenced Jovan Raskovic to form the Serbian Democratic Party"**. The leadership of the SDS of Bosnia and Herzegovina, headed by Karadzic, according to him, was very 'intelligent' and very reliable. In Montenegro, he relied on the People's Party of dr. Kilibarda, in which he was also counting on the Communists. All of them consulted him about their activities.⁴⁶

In the first half of February 1990, Slobodan Milosevic **"foresaw"** the war again. In discussion, after the session of the Presidency of the SFRY on February 13, also attended by the presidents of presidencies of the republics and provinces (**"Kosovo as the topic"**), in the office of Borisav Jovic, and in presence of Veljko Kadujevic, Petar Gracanin, and Dragutin Zelenovic, he stated: **"There will be war, by Jove!"**⁴⁷

On the eve of the first multi-party elections in Serbia, in December 1990, Milosevic promised to implement the fascistic project of **"All Serbs in one State"**.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 193. All of them consulted Dobrica Cosic about their activities

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 108. And he was responded by Jovic: **"We won't let that happen, by Jove!"** – **"We have had enough warring and killing in the two world wars. Now we are going to evade it, by all means!**

- **There will be no war of that kind they would like to see – added Veljko – but there will be a war as there has to be, and this is in order not to let them strike us. Pera [Petar Gracanin] complained that day-by-day, the opponents of Socialism and Yugoslavia have been taking ever-stronger positions, automatically pushing us back and acting revengefully. Sloba comforted him by saying that there was nothing to worry about.**

Veljko said: Gorbachev is to be blamed for everything. He has sold the idea of socialism and communism very cheaply. He has broken up the Warsaw Pact, destroyed the socialism in East Europe, destabilized the USSR, and the worst for us is that he had spoiled the balance of powers in Europe and placed all the Communists on the defendant's stall. Now we have to defend ourselves although we had died to defend the country and to build it" (Ibid.).

⁴⁸ M. Tomanic, the aforementioned work, p. 92. The Greater Serbia nationalists claimed that **"there would be blood up to the knees"**, unless **"all the Serbs were in**

After taking tanks out onto the streets of Belgrade and against his people (March 9, 1991)⁴⁹, and after a three-day session of the Presidency of the SFRY (Supreme Command of the Armed Forces), on March 12, 14, and 15, 1991, did not accept the proposed decisions (submitted by the Headquarters of the Supreme Command) of the Serbian leadership

one state". Due to this, they never wanted to recognize the republic borders (calling them **"Tito's dictate"**, **"administrative solutions"**, **"historical injustice against the Serbs who win in wars and loose in peace"**, which **"will no longer be tolerated"**). These theses were constantly presented at the sessions of the Presidency of the SFRY. In relation to this, Jovic and Dr. Kostic stated at almost each session **"that the Serbs in Croatia are a sovereign people and must be allowed to decide as to what state and what kind of state they wish to live in"** (S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. 160).

⁴⁹ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 283; I. Stambolic, the aforementioned work, p. 160).

"When on March 9, Milosevic was kneeling in front of the students", wrote Ivan Stambolic, the JNA **"responded to his invitation without having to, and for the first time in half a century, it drove tanks out to the streets of Belgrade to oppose the people. After that, these "military vehicles" as mildly called by 'Politika', by the logic of things and psychology, could not any longer return to the barrack hangars"**. Writing about this, Stambolic states that the Army **"had already occupied Serbia itself with the arrival of Ljubicic to the head function in Serbia"** (I. Stambolic, the aforementioned work, p. 31).

About the demonstrations of the opposition and the use of army in Belgrade, March 9, 1991, in his notes, Borisav Jovic states: **"Opposition demonstrations in Belgrade. They are exerting unprecedented violence: crashing shop windows, taking goods out of stores, they have demolished the whole main street – Terazije and M. Tita, the Assembly of Serbia and the Presidency, even the government building in Kneza Milosa St., they entered the official buildings, etc. The police have failed, they even have two killed casualties.**

I am spending my weekend in Niksic. Slobodan Milosevic calls me and requests military intervention. I talk to Veljko Kadijevic. He is in a dilemma – whether it is necessary and how politically acceptable this will be, but he does not oppose, he just thinks that I need to secure the decision of the Presidency. I leave it a little while longer to observe the situation and then to be in contact again.

Sloba calls me again. Very upset. Veljko also calls me. He says they are now demonstrating in front of the General Staff and that they want to break in. I make phone consultations with the members of the Presidency whom I could reach (all except Mesic and Drnovsek). I give the order to Veljko to take the army out on the streets and to cover the areas in front of all the state institutions at risk. Slobodan will send an official written request which we will approve tomorrow at the session of the Presidency" (Ibid.).

(i.e. the leadership of the Republic of Serbia), as well as by President Jovic in person, **on declaring a state of emergency** (military coup) on the whole territory of the SFRY and raising the combat preparedness of the Armed Forces, including the mobilization of a portion of units,⁵⁰ and the Communiqués of the “Headquarters of the Supreme Command” in the night of March 15, 1991, on what measures the JNA will undertake,⁵¹ on March 16, Slobodan Milosevic announced that **“Yugoslavia is done with”** and that the decisions of the federal bodies do not bind Serbia any longer at all. In this way, Milosevic announced the secession of Serbia from Yugoslavia.⁵²

On March 15, 1991, Milosevic ordered the mobilization of the reserve composition of the special police units, **“the recruitment and formation of new police forces, and the Government was assigned to prepare the appropriate formations which will make us secure in any case, in view of defending the interests of our Republic, and by Jove, also the interests of the Serbian people outside Serbia”**.⁵³

⁵⁰ For more details, see: B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 286-311; B. Bogicevic, **RAT JE BIO PLANIRAN**, in F. Ademovic: **BEZNADJE ZLA**, Sarajevo, 1997, pp. 29-37; L. Silber – a. Little, the aforementioned work, pp. 134-135, and 140-143; S. Oro, **O ULOZI VLADARSKIH TEZNJI U YU RATOVI 1991.-2001. GODINE**, in: **RATOVI U JUGOSLAVIJI 1991-1999**, Compilation of Communiqués and Discussions from the Round Table, Belgrade, November 7-9, 2001, Belgrade 2002, pp. 81-82.

The attempt of the Greater Serbia nationalists, lead by Milosevic, Jovic and Kadijevec, to force out at the session of the Supreme command (March 12-15, 1991), the bringing of the decision on introduction of the extraordinary state in SFRY failed. In order to provide the Army with an opportunity to act on its own and to take over the power into its hands, the conspirators resorted to resignations. Jovic submitted his resignation from the duty of the President of Presidency of the SFRY in order to **“leave the space for the Army to take over the power and disarm the paramilitary units, and the army did not do this”** (B. Jovic, **POSLEDNJI DANI SFRJ**, pp. 286-311); S. Oro, the aforementioned work, pp. 81-82). Thus, Milosevic did not succeed in using the JNA to place SFRY under his control (S. Oro, the aforementioned work, pp. 81-82).

⁵¹ L. Silber – A. Little, the aforementioned work, p. 143.

⁵² Ibid., pp. 143-144; B. Bogicevic, the aforementioned work, p. 37.

⁵³ **BOGAMI CEMO DA SE TUCEMO**, *NIN*, April 12, 1991, p. 41. In his address to the nation on March 16, 1991, among other things, Slobodan Milosevic stated: **“... I have ordered the drafting of the reserve composition of the special units and urgent formation of additional police forces. Yugoslavia has entered the final stage of agony... The Republic of Serbia will no longer recognize any decisions of the**

In accordance with the Greater Serbia project, on March 16, 1991, in a closed meeting (i.e. secret session), with municipal officials (200 Serbian municipality presidents), Slobodan Milosevic announced the conquering war goals of Serbia, that is, that war was the solution to the Serbian national issue. Then, among other things, he particularly pointed out the issues of the borders, which, according to him, **“were the essential, state issue”**. In relation to this, he stated: **“The borders, as you know, are always dictated by the strong, never by the weak. Therefore, the essential thing for us is to be strong... We simply believe that it is a legitimate right and interest of the Serbian people to live in a single state. This is the beginning and the end. After all, why do they need those Serbs who bother them so much in Knin, Petrinja, Glina, Lika, Banija, Kordun, Baranja, if this problem is such a large one? ... And if we have to fight, we are going to fight alright. And I hope that they will not be crazy enough to fight us. Because if we can not work well and conduct business [sic], at least we will know how to fight well!”**⁵⁴

Presidency under the existing circumstances, because this would be unlawful.” (L. Silber – A. Little, the aforementioned work, p. 144).

⁵⁴ S. Djukic, the aforementioned work, p. 113; I. Stambolic, the aforementioned work, p. 28; L. Silber – A. Little, the aforementioned work, p. 144-145; **BOGAMI CEMO DASE TUCEMO**, *NIN*, April 12, 1991, p. 41-42; N. Cigar, the aforementioned work, p. 55. L. Silber and A. Little wrote the following on this meeting: “While the public was staggering out of shock, the Serbian municipal officials were invited to attend an important meeting. Even before dawn, the republic police received an order to execute an unusual task. They phoned all the 200 mayors in Serbia, telling them to expect an urgent message. Soon after, all the municipal mayors were delivered a telegram inviting them to be at the Assembly of Serbia at 6 in the morning. The mayor of Valjevo, Slobodan Djukic, the only opposition mayor, described that it was an unusual sight to see 200 luxury black cars parked in front of the parliament. However, the unusual feature of this scene was weak in comparison with the confusion in the building itself.

Everyone believed that the convention of the secret session was related to the vacuum, which followed after Jovic’s resignation, and of course, in case of need to coordinate the measures to overcome this crisis. Throughout that day, Djukic was shuffling the various options that were in the game.

Bidding farewell to his family, he even thought for a moment that he could be arrested in Belgrade. However, Bora Petrovic, deputy president of the Assembly, immediately tried to remove any speculations on any intention to introduce a state of emergency. There was an impression that the politicians who had convened the session did not have an established agenda, Djukic stated about the session. Later, he even remembered that the

Two days later (on March 18), regardless of the fact that the arranged military coup had not happened, in a meeting with 200 students and

speakers were raving about some stupidities on the situation in the economy. The mayors were loudly protesting. Jovan Cvetkovic from Svetozarevo said: 'Comrades, you have made us come to this session from hundreds of kilometres' distance to tell us about the same things we can read about in the papers'. They were outraged at the fact that Milosevic was not there.

The outraged mayors started leaving the conference room. Cvetkovic was at the head of the mutiny.

I asked the chair what this was about – Yugoslavia was falling apart and we were supposed to receive some important information, but none of the responsible was in attendance.

Where is Mr. Milosevic, where is the president of the Government?

Finally, the president of the Assembly, Slobodan Unkovic, promised to call Milosevic. The session was postponed by an hour. It was exactly at this closed session that Milosevic clearly made it known that he is ready to push the Croats and Slovenes out. "After the session, I understood that he was adamant about creating a Yugoslavia without Catholics", said Djukic. That evening and during the following week, Milosevic revealed his vision of the crash of Yugoslavia.

'This is the final dissolution of Yugoslavia we have here. It is true that the Slovenes want to separate themselves. It is also true that the Croats wish to separate themselves. However, I do not think we should put the Muslims in here. I do not think that the Muslims have an interest in separating out of Yugoslavia. As for the Muslims, there is major indoctrination of a certain portion of the Muslims, but our assessments are that the majority of Muslims wish a good, tolerant, cultural and, I would say, civil, neighbourly, and friendly relation in terms of the Serbian people and in terms of the other nations in Yugoslavia. Ultimately, they too live in several republics. They do not care about the dissolution of Yugoslavia either, that is, it is not logical that the dissolution of Yugoslavia would be in the interest of the Muslims, unless we speak of some deep roots, blood relations and everything else there may be.'

Milosevic also spoke about the steps that the Army could undertake. And when Cvetkovic, annoyed, asked him about the Serbian strategy ("... **what will happen if Yugoslavia falls apart...**"), Milosevic responded that it certainly would not be announced on the radio. His next sentence, nevertheless, leaked into the public and echoed across Yugoslavia:

'And if we need to fight – we, by Jove, shall fight! In addition, I hope that they will not be crazy enough as to fight us. Because if we cannot work well and conduct business, at least we know how to fight well!'

The army has the constitutional responsibility and duty to defend the Yugoslav constitution. I do not doubt that the Army will not carry out its constitutional responsibility, because the Presidency has stopped functioning. Here we do not have a coup in question, because the military would act in compliance with the constitution if tomorrow they disarm the HDZ" (L. Silber – A. Little, the aforementioned work, p. 144 -146).

professors at the University in Belgrade,⁵⁵ Milosevic repeated his message to the presidents of the Serbian municipalities almost word by word, ceremonially promising that **“all Serbs will live one State”**, which was obviously showing that it was all over with Yugoslavia,⁵⁶ and that Milosevic was making rush preparations for the war of occupation.

In order to “defend” **“the interests of the Serbian nation outside Serbia”**, Milosevic was in permanent contact with the Serbian leadership in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. He managed the political and military actions of the leaderships of the SDS in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Milosevic had regular, even daily contacts with Radovan Karadzic. In relation to this, at the secret meeting in Belgrade on March 16, 1991, he stated to the presidents of the Serbian municipalities that **“he had been in contact with our people from Knin, from Bosnia”**, that **“there were huge pressures going on”**.⁵⁷

In March 1991, **the Serbian Academicians** formed an Initiative Board for the formation of the **Serbian National Council**, which was supposed to be the **“supreme national institution to represent the interests of the Serbs, regardless of where they may live”**, in order to find **“an integrative goal for the Serbian nation pertaining to it as a whole”**.⁵⁸ This publicly announced the goals of the Greater

⁵⁵ L. Silber – A. Little, the aforementioned work, p. 146 – 147). During the demonstrations at the Terazije square, in March 1991, the students turned against Milosevic. **“They hated him. He was also left by the intellectuals who had helped him grow from a clumsy communist apparatchik into a Serbian national saint. During the Terazije demonstrations, the nationalists joined the independent intellectuals in protests against communism. The nationalists understood that Milosevic was using them to strengthen his own power, not because he was sharing their convictions”** (Ibid.).

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ **BOGAMI CEMO DA SE TUCEMO**, *NIN*, April 12, 1991, p. 41; N. Cigar, the aforementioned work, p. 55; **THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR FORMER YUGOSLAVIA**, Case no. IT-02-54-T, PROSECUTOR AGAINST SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC, The Hague, May 11, 2002, paragraphs 960-963.

⁵⁸ *Javnost*, March 30, 1991, p. 2; M. Tomanic, the aforementioned work, pp. 39, and 59. The members of this initiating board were the Academicians Dobrica Cosic, Mihajlo Markovic, Matija Beckovic, etc.

Serbia movement – the formation of a single “**Serbian state**”.⁵⁹

The initiative for the formation and goals of the Serbian National Council was also supported by the Serbian Orthodox Church, major scientific and cultural institutions in Serbia, as well as a number of political parties in Serbia and beyond.⁶⁰

Starting from the **Memorandum** assessment and with the formation of the state of the South Slav people, the Serbian nation “**did not resolve either its social or political issues**”, that “**its aspiration for freedom, unity and a democratic state, for the realization of a political and spiritual unity in the contemporary organization of the society has not been realized**”, which was expressly confirmed “**by the position of the Serbian nation after WWII and contemporary events**”, and that “**the Serbian people in the present provisional state is not ready to lose historical time any more**”, the Serbian National Council (in the first half of April 1991) adopted a **Declaration on Serbian National Unity**. This document, with the goal of forming a single Serbian state, among other things, also adopts the position on **the necessary change**

⁵⁹ Ibid. On March 27, 1991, Academician Mihajlo Markovic acquainted the public with the initiative for the formation of the **Serbian National Council**, which would work on the formation of a unified Serbian state. Dobrica Cosic promised that the drafting of the Declaration of the Serbian National Council will fulfil the expectations of “**our political nation**“. According to Matija Beckovic, the Declaration had to contain “**what is indisputable among the Serbs**”, and he proposed that Tomislav Karadjordjevic be the president of the Serbian National Council (Ibid.).

⁶⁰ Ibid. The Initiating Board, which upon formation became the leading body of the Council, was made up of the following Academicians: Dobrica Cosic, Mihajlo Markovic, Matija Beckovic, who had proposed Tomislav Karadjordjevic to be the president of the Council, and many others, in addition to Milosevic’s Socialist Party of Serbia, Kostunica’s, Raskovic’s and Karadzic’s Democratic Party of Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia, Draskovic’s Serbian Revival Movement, the Church, and non-party individuals.

The quest for the common “**integrative goal of the Serbian people**“ – the formation of the “**Serbian State**”, “**involved the participation of the SDS SR BiH, of the SDS from Croatia, of the Democratic Party of Serbia, of the Socialist Party of Serbia, of the SPO, as well as of clergy and independent, non-party individuals**”, among which was also Dobrica Cosic. The objective was to draft a Declaration of Serbian Union (*Javnost*, March 30, 1991, p. 2).

of the “**present state and political system of Yugoslavia**”; “**the rearrangement of the common state**”; on accepting such a form of government “**which does not split its national unity and does not put its national identity at risk**”; “**the existing inter-republic borders cannot be considered state and thus unchangeable borders**”, and the like.⁶¹

It is undisputable that these were the war waging goals uttered by Milosevic on March 16, in the closed meeting with the still sleepy mayors of Serbia, emphasizing that “**it is a legitimate right and interest of the Serbian people to live in one state**”. However, he was upset that his intentions were published. He was particularly upset by the “**supreme national institution**” which will not be himself in person, or at least headed by him, so after several months, the Serbian National Council died away.⁶²

In the realization of the Greater Serbia aspirations, Milosevic abused all forms of social, political, religious and professional organizations of the Serbs, converting them into mechanisms for the creation of an environment of hatred against those who would fall victim to the realization of these aspirations and, of the environment of justification for undertaking all forms of crime prepared by the removal of all obstacles to the realization idea of Greater Serbia. He had abused those organizations them in planning, preparing, inciting and executing his criminal actions, but also for masking and covering up.

The powerful federal instances of power were particularly abused and manipulated – starting from the Presidency of the SFRY (in which the functions of Vice President, President and Member were performed from May 15, 1989, until April 27, 1992 by Borisav Jovic, primary associate and follower of Milosevic), both as the Chief of State and the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, and the military

⁶¹ *Javnost*, April 13, 1991, p. 1. The draft of the **Declaration** was published on April 9, 1991, in a number of papers, and the adopted text was published on April 13, 1991.

Immediately before he became President of the Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, Dobrica Cosic openly stated that “**the peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina cannot be preserved by recognizing the communist-established, existing borders of the republic**”, or “**internal, administrative borders**” (N. Cigar, the aforementioned work, p. 53).

⁶² M. Tomanic, the aforementioned work, p. 39.

leadership, through the federal secretaries for national defence and interior affairs (General Veljko Kadijevic, General Blagoje Adzic, Admiral Stane Brovet and Petar Gracanin) – to the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, the Literary Association of Serbia, the Serbian Orthodox Church (itself already indoctrinated with ideas of Greater Serbia), and the political parties formed based on these ideas, with or without the Serbian prefix, as well as the whole media, state, representative, administrative, and “self-management” systems of Serbia and Montenegro, from which any “undesirable elements” had been removed by 1989.

All the others, the other republics, the other nations and minority groups and their organizations, associations or parties, were pronounced enemies of the Serbs and the Serbian people, with their elimination desirable by all means, unless they bow to the given “solutions”. The Serbian history, their versions of the memory of historical epochs in the Balkans, the Serbian literature, the Serbian orientalistics, political organizations, media, funding and even military force were all abused for these aims.⁶³

Speaking to the Assembly of Serbia, in April 1991, Milosevic had again **openly brought up the need for territorial expansion with the use of force**. In relation to this, he particularly emphasized in his speech “**we [the Serbs] have to show that we are unified in Serbia, if we, as the largest and most numerous republic, want to dictate the course of events. The issue of borders is a vital thing for the country. As you know, it is always the strong, and never the weak, who dictate what the borders will be. This is why we have to be strong.**”⁶⁴

Stating that he had ordered the mobilization of reserve police troops in Serbia, Milosevic then implied the future actions in support of the “endangered” Serbs outside Serbia and he revealed that “**he was in contact with our people [the Serbs] in Knin and Bosnia**”, an obvious allusion to the establishment of a strong fifth column. When asked what the strategy of Serbia was, Milosevic responded: “**Should we broadcast**

⁶³ N. Cigar, **ULOGA SRPSKIH ORIJENTALISTA U OPRAVDANJU GENOCIDA NAD MUSLIMANIMA BALKANA** (hereinafter referred to as: **ULOGA SRPSKIH ORIJENTALISTA...**), Sarajevo 1998, p. 43.

⁶⁴ N. Cigar, the aforementioned work, p. 55.

everything I intend to do on the radio? I think we cannot do it: if we have to fight, we really will fight. I hope that there are not too many out there, who are willing to fight us. Therefore, if we do not know how to work and profit, we will at least know how to fight well (followed by an applause)”.⁶⁵

At the rally in Banja Luka, organized by the SDS of Bosnia and Herzegovina, attended by some 70,000 people, on March 9, 1991, Jovan Raskovic said among other things: “...**the Serbian people have the right to their state, even if it were called Serbia**”.⁶⁶

In the **interview** to the daily *Novosti* (Belgrade), dated May 19, 1991, Momcilo Krajisnik, M.A., the President of the Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, presented a number of elaborations, **in which he denied the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state**. In those terms, at the time, among other things, he stated:

“The Yugoslav federation is a state, and a confederation means a number of small states, principalities. This means the break-up of a common state and nobody can convince me that the confederation is in the interest of any nation. Making small states out of one state, not rounded up either economically, or politically, or nationally, cannot bring anything good to anyone.

It is also an illusion that Bosnia and Herzegovina can ever be independent without Yugoslavia. Any coalition to the detriment of a third nation means trouble for all, and in the SDS, I would always fight against that. In a sovereign and independent Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Serbian nation sees, not exactly without reason, and in spite of the fact that there are some exaggerations, **an Islamic state** [underlined in the original by the authors: Zeljko Vukovic and Radivoje Gutic]. This apprehension is based on the fact that the idea on an Islamic state has been know for a long time, that there are those who were advocating it in the past, and those who still wish to see it created.”⁶⁷

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ *Javnost*, March 9, 1991, p. 2.

⁶⁷ *Novosti* (Nedjelja), Belgrade, May 19, 1991, p. 6.

Elements of ideological preparation for the crimes in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina were, among others, also expressed in a discussion between Dobrica Cosic and Radovan Karadzic from the second half of 1991:

“D.C. (Dobrica Cosic) – You are, you, let me really use this category, your policy is an existential one. You are finishing a historical process.

R.K. (Radovan Karadzic) – Yes, yes.

D.C. – The Yugoslav people have two pillars, they have the unification of the South Slavs, and the unification of the Serbs. The unification of the South Slavs has historically failed, but the unification of the Serbs has not, right now, it is being historically won or lost.

R.K. – Yes, but it is natural that it is starting from those who are the most endangered.

D.C. – Yes, both from those who are endangered and, after all, this is our ideology from Karadjordje [(Petrovic) The leader of the first Serb uprising against the Turks (1804.)]. The tactics, this strategy of yours, I do not know what would happen if you were just what you are.”⁶⁸

The joint Communiqué of the Regional Board of the Serbian Democratic Part of Old Herzegovina, in Foca, dated April 20, 1991, from a matting attended, in addition to the **“representatives of the authorities and people”** of the municipalities of Kalinovik, Foca, Gorazde, Cajnice, Visegrad and Rudo, also by Prof. Dr. Novak Kilibarda, president of the People’s Party of Montenegro, and Prof. Dr. Mitar Cvorovic, president of the Club of Montenegrin Delegates, among other things, states that **“this is a historic moment to use democratic means and fight for the overall unity of the Serbian people...”⁶⁹**

After their **“frivolous bauble”** of March 1991, the Serbian Academicians **“began with a new game”** in September 1991. Then

⁶⁸ AIIZ, audio materials, tape 001-208.

⁶⁹ AIIZ, inv. No. 3-1082/3, Regional Board of SDS Stara Hercegovina, Foca, April 20, 1991, JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ.

they formed the **Serbian Assembly**, which was supposed to be “**an association of independent scientists, writers, artists and intellectuals, aiming at the improvement and protection of national interests**”. Academician Pavle Ivic was elected president.⁷⁰

In spite of the fact that it existed for just a short time and published just several declaration, the Assembly succeeded in completing a **significant engineering task** – it drafted the ethnic maps outlining the future Serbian state.⁷¹ These ethnic maps show “**the Serbian territory**”, clearing indicating “**the territory where the Serbs are the majority: from Sibenik, across Lika, the Bosnian Krajina, along the Sava river to Bijeljina, the Serbs are the majority everywhere. In the centre of Bosnia are the Muslims. The Serbs also cut through Sandzak, and along the Drina River, so that the Muslims cannot be unified. This is the future territory of Serbia.**”⁷²

Certain prominent Serbian individuals, in particular the Academician Vasilije Krestic had “discovered” the idea on the inability of joint life for all the nations in the nineties, which was not a “discovery” at all. Such a thesis had also been advocated by Adolph Hitler and his Nazis, then by Ante Pavelic and his Ustashas, and many others.⁷³

Such a thesis was also accepted by “**many reputable and intelligent Serbs, even the first man of the Serbian Orthodox Church, His Eminence Patriarch Pavle**”.⁷⁴

⁷⁰ M. Tomanic, the aforementioned work, pp. 59 and 100. According to Academician Ivic, the Assembly was supposed to be a replacement of the Serbian National Council. At the time, he promised that the mistake from several months ago, when the formation “**of a similar organization failed due to party and personal antagonisms**”, would now be corrected.

⁷¹ Ibid. These Nazi maps were submitted by the Assembly to the Congress of Serbian Intellectuals, held in Sarajevo, in March 1992.

This fascistic project involved the work of a group of Academicians, headed by Dobrica Cosic (B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 193).

⁷² B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 193. This information was presented by Dobrica Cosic to Borisav Jovic during their discussion on September 11, 1991.

⁷³ M. Tomanic, the aforementioned work, pp. 62, 65, and 71.

⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 71. Serb Patriarch Pavle, “when he explained to lord Carrington and the whole Serbian nation that certain parts of Croatia must be annexed to Serbia and

In the 1980s, **Serbian intellectuals** (beyond official ruling circles), with the support of the Serbian Orthodox Church, took over the leading role in drafting the Greater Serbia national program. With the rise of Milosevic's personal power in the League of Communists of Serbia and with his acceptance of the nationalist program, the authorities in power proceeded with their efforts "full steam ahead". The moral and intellectual support offered by the Serbian opposition parties, the intellectual community of the whole ideological spectre, and the hierarchy of the Serbian Orthodox Church helped Milosevic convince the masses to support and accept the fascistic ideology, policy and practice.⁷⁵

The intellectual elite of Serbia in the 1980s directed the Serbian nationalism against the Muslim community. They believed that the presence of Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina stood in the way of the formation of Greater Serbia.⁷⁶

Before the break-up of Yugoslavia, influential personalities in Serbia started forming stereotype images of the Muslims as alien, inferior

other territories of the former Yugoslavia where the Serbs were the majority, and that the Serbs ('the victims') can no longer live with Croats ('the perpetrators'), warned that 'this horrid truth also needs to be understood by all former Yugoslavs and the whole civilized Europe'" (Ibid.).

⁷⁵ N. Cigar, **GENOCID U BOSNI ...** , p. 34.

In his quest for power, Milosevic was using everything, even the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, Serbian history with the Serbian versions of the memory of the history of the Balkans, Serbian literature and the Serbian orientalistcs. (N. Cigar, **ULOGA SRPSKIH ORIJENTALISTA...** , p.11).

Thanks to Milosevic, the Serbian communists, and non-communist secular nationalists with the Serbian Orthodox Church, "**got married out of interest**". Speaking about this, N. Cigar states that "**this was a symbiosis of the red, the brown and the black, which was to provide the initial momentum and structure to Serbian nationalism**" (N. Cigar, **GENOCID U BOSNI...** , p. 43).

Milosevic brought the nationalists into the streamline of political events, ensuring the machinery in the form of political organization, media, funding and military force, which had "**transformed the initial feelings into a specific state program**" (Ibid.).

⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 35. The anti-Muslim campaign of strong intensity, as claimed by N. Cigar, was caused by the fact that the Muslims were the obstacle to the implementation of the Greater Serbia fascist and criminal policy. Serbian politicians openly threatened the Muslims, should they decide to stand in the way of the Greater Serbia nationalist program (Ibid., pp. 47-48).

persons, threatening everything that the Serbs deem valuable. Such positions were accepted by the majority of the Serbian national elite, including leading intellectuals, political personalities, and the clergy.⁷⁷

The Serbian media were openly libelling Islam, which comments often bordering racism. Such ideas and positions were particularly presented by Vuk Draskovic. He was fiercely attacking **“the frantic offensive of the non-tolerant Islam in Bosnia, Kosovo, Sandzak and Herzegovina... and the resurrection of the Sharia tradition (i.e. of Islamic religious law), and... the strategy of jihad (holy war), aimed at formation of an Islamic state in the Balkans”**.⁷⁸

The Muslims were presented as a non-nation, as Serbs who had been converted to Islam, whose identity, as written by Vuk Draskovic in the manifest of the Serbian National Revival (a nationalist organization) was artificially created by Josip Broz. Rallying against the threat of **“militant Islamic fundamentalism”**, Draskovic insisted on the formation of Greater Serbia, which was to include Bosnia and Herzegovina. In relation to this, he revealed a map with the changed borders and areas populated predominantly by Muslims as placed under Serbian control. Mirko Jovic (president of the Serbian National Revival and the leader of the *“White Eagles”* armed formations) stressed that they are not **“only interested in Serbia, but in a Christian, Orthodox Serbia, without mosques and without infidels”**. At this, some Serbian intellectuals included into their arguments a clear tone of racism, as for instance, Dragos Kalajic, who, among other things, claimed that the Bosnian Muslims **“do not belong to the family of nations”**, that they **“are of desert origin”**, and originate **“from a specific gene of the Ottoman army”**, etc.⁷⁹

The extremists among Serbian intellectuals strengthened their anti-Islamic and anti-Muslim positions after they had switched from Academician activities to political action, with the support of Milosevic. Academician Dobrica Cosic continued arguing that, for instance, the

⁷⁷ Ibid. The presentation of the Muslims, that is, Bosniaks, in such a light, that was to be expanded on all the strata of society, was in the service of and in compliance with the political goals of Belgrade (Ibid.).

⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 36.

⁷⁹ Ibid., pp. 37, and 46.

Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina are being endangered by Muslims, and the Belgrade media, were persuading the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, under an orchestrated campaign, that they really are endangered.⁸⁰

State-owned media were openly announcing that Belgrade was also making political preparations for the use of force against Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosniaks. Ungrounded accusations were launched en masse, such as, for instance, that the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the help of **“the Catholic and German clique”**, intends to form **“an Islamic fortress in the heart of Europe”**, aimed at **“blowing off the Serbs”**. *Narodna Armija* claimed that the Muslims intend to form an Islamic state, which would allegedly include Bosnia and Herzegovina, Southern Serbia (Kosovo), Macedonia, Greece, Bulgaria, and Albania.⁸¹

The Greater Serbia nationalists helped create the climate favourable for action, i.e. for crimes, representing the Serbs **“as willing to do a favour to Europe, by attacking the Muslims”**. In relation to this, Dragos Kalajic (the nationalist spokesman) even claimed that Europe should be grateful to the Serbs for this “favour”, because, according to him, an Islamic state in Bosnia and Herzegovina would serve as a springboard for mass migration of Muslims into Europe, with the ultimate goal to establish a Muslim majority in Europe, and then to Islamise and destroy it. At this, he concluded **“it is obvious that the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, by defending its freedom from the Islamic threat, are also defending Europe and the Europeans”**.⁸²

The Serbian politicians, intellectuals, religious officials, and the media kept attributing the qualities of **“fanatics”**, **“terrorists”**, **“extremists”**, **and “fundamentalists”** to the Muslims, and they always represented them as **“provocative”**, involved in aggression or attacks, thus equalling Islam with violence. They all created the impression that violence was inherent with the Muslims, and Belgrade media even spoke of the **“conquering blood”** running in the Muslims. The paper *Jugoslovenska*

⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 45.

⁸¹ Ibid., pp. 55-56.

⁸² Ibid.

Armija (Yugoslav Army) asked a leading Serbian orientalist to analyse the differences “**between them and us, the Muslims and the Christians**” for their readers. According to this paper, the Muslims were nothing else but completely “**poisoned Islamic fundamentalists**”.⁸³

The propaganda campaign against the “Islamic fundamentalism” ensured a favourable base for the Serbian political elite to build the image of endangerment, and, as written by Cigar, “**to form a symbology based upon emotions**”. This tactic was, on the one hand, used as a tool for mobilization, and on the other, as a tool to convince the local and international public about the correctness of the Greater Serbia policy.⁸⁴

In the anti-Muslim campaign, the crimes against Muslims in Serbia and Montenegro throughout the course of history were reassessed as correct, and even as deserving praise. This position had also found its place in the “scientific” works of the nineties, applauding to and justifying the policy and practice of massacre used by bishop Danilo Popovic in the early 18th century, in order to eradicate the Muslims on the territory of the Old Montenegro.⁸⁵

Historian Mile Nedeljkovic used his book titled *KRST I POLUMESEC* (The Cross and the Crescent; Belgrade 1993), in order to convince the

⁸³ Ibid., p. 89.

⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 81-82.

⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 54. Thus, Predrag Milosevic, the author of the book “*SVETI RATNICI*“, Gornji Milanovac/Prishtina, 1989, wrote: “**The Turks (local Muslims) were the real symbol of all evil in this world, the devil’s seed... However, Njegos’s sense of justice and fairness was highly developed ... (just) as it can only be with an Orthodox ruler. Thus, without mercy he could wipe out the Turks, as an embodiment of evil and injustice. He and his servants were reminded by those heads (of the Muslims) every day that evil can and must be fought against, and that this is the foremost Christian and human duty. The fight against evil was also Njegos’s obligation to God. He yearned for revenge, revenge without mercy... For Njegos, revenge was a holy, divine deed! Yes, he was in favour of peace and love among people, but among people only: this did not pertain to the beasts with human faces**” (Ibid., pp. 54-55).

Such genocidal positions against Muslims were also shared by political personalities. Radovan Karadzic “**carried along the works of his favourite author, Njegos, with him, frequently referring to [his words]. Njegos was elevating the violent eradication of all the traces of Muslim presence to heaven**” (Ibid., p. 55).

readers that Bosnia and Herzegovina had always been Serbian and Orthodox, labeling the Muslims as Serbian converts. Based on such a fascistic thesis, he justifies the genocide against Muslims in Serbia in the 19th century, describing those crimes as a liberation from “traitors”. In relation to this, he wrote “[j]ust like every other] social group that was associated with the occupier (the Ottomans), [... the Muslim] population that had based its position and property on the exploitation and plundering of the oppressed population, had disappeared in Serbia, too”.⁸⁶

Serbian orientalists – or those who referred to themselves that way – and “**islamologists**” had placed themselves into the service of the fascistic and genocidal Greater Serbia policy. Their works and such tectonic generators of hatred were seen and well remembered only in the anti-Jewish and anti-Semitic Europe, overwhelmed by fascism, the Europe from the thirties and forties of the 20th century.⁸⁷

The Serbian “**orientalism**” and “**islamology**”, politically and nationalistically oriented, were calculated to produce hatred against the victim – the Muslims, and to destroy the victim and take over its *lebensraum*. Thus, “scientific” support for the actual crime against the communities that stood in the way of “Greater Serbia” was needed.⁸⁸

The Serbian orientalism makes a symbiosis with nationalism and all that it entailed. The propaganda campaign by the “orientalists” had forged the way ahead for genocide and other forms of crime, suggesting to the perpetrators that thus they were “doing a good deed” for the Serbian nation, defending “endangered” Orthodoxy, that is, Christianity, and Europe.⁸⁹

In order to justify such serious criminal actions, they also needed serious arguments. They were found in the allegedly scientifically confirmed

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 88. When writing about this, Nedeljkovic claims that this process of eradication of that Muslims in Serbia was so successful that nowadays it had been fully forgotten as “snow melted ages ago” (Ibid.).

⁸⁷ N. Cigar, **ULOGA SRPSKIH ORIJENTALISTA...**, pp. 59-63.

⁸⁸ Ibid., pp. 12, and 16-19.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 12, and 14-39.

insinuation that the Muslims constitute “an existential threat” to the Serbian nation. It was not far away to get from there to the justification of the already started and broadly committed genocide. Ultimately, the alleged scientific analysis transformed into sheer justification of crime.⁹⁰

The Serbian orientalists had been on the front line of anti-Islamic movement since as early as 1980, and they had widely contributed to the genocide against the Muslims, creating and making this process intellectually reasonable and acceptable among all the strata of the Serbian people.⁹¹

The writings and public statements by Serbian orientalists were practically always closely associated with the political context and goals. It was obvious that, by intellectually attacking Islam and the Muslims, they were trying to ensure scientific support for nationalist ideology, policy, and practice.⁹²

⁹⁰ Ibid., pp. 12-13, and 39-59.

⁹¹ Ibid., p. 16. The key factor in the campaign against Islam and the Muslims were also the Serbian orientalists, i.e. orientalists from Serbia. They had significantly contributed to the anti-Islamic and anti-Muslim attitude and mood within the broad circles of the Serbian people, particularly in Serbia. These orientalists were presenting Islam and the Muslims as retrograde, and a threat to modern civilization. (For more details, see: N. Cigar, **GENOCID U BOSNI...**, pp. 38-40, and elsewhere, and his work: **ULOGA SRPSKIH ORIJENTALISTA...**, pp. 16-48).

⁹² Ibid., pp. 16-17 ,and 59-65. The Serbian orientalists were using their “expert studies” for attacks against Muslims at the intellectual level, and for the defence of government policy. At the time of the execution of the crimes against the Bosniaks, their arguments served as the basis for the justification of genocide and other forms of crime in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition to providing an abstract Academician form, their speeches also provided the war criminals with additional scientific explanations and justifications (N. Cigar, **GENOCID U BOSNI...**, p. 88).

The Serbian orientalists, just like other scientists, in cooperation with the propaganda of the Serbian authorities, strengthened their warnings on the alleged Islamic danger in 1993. Thus, for instance, Darko Tanaskovic, identifies the “economic, diplomatic and particularly the demographic jihad”, directed both against the Balkans, as well as against Western Europe. According to Miroljub Jevtic, the threat allegedly grew into an “cruel plan” based on which the Muslims will form a mediaeval state. Going further, Jevtic pronounces the Muslims incapable of coexistence, characterizing Islam as alien to everything “merciful and non-violent towards those who have a different way of thinking from the prevalent Islamic doctrine” (Ibid.).

In the planning and preparation of the crime, a special place belongs to the significant portion of the hierarchy in the **Serbian Orthodox Church**. Certain episcopos of this church, in particular Metropolitan [Orthodox Archbishop; note by the translator] Amfilohije and Bishop Jeftic, believed that they will realize the fascistic Greater Serbia project in cooperation with Dobrica Cosic, Natonije Isakovic, and other Academicians,⁹³ then with Slobodan Milosevic, Vuk Draskovic, and others. Involving themselves in political, military and other issues, the Academicians and episcopos were drafting maps of Greater Serbia, believing that suspension of Kosovo's autonomy was the starting point on the path of the state integration of the territories they considered Serbian.⁹⁴

In the eighties, almost everyone at the Serbian Orthodox Church supported Slobodan Milosevic, **“because he gave them hope for realization of their ideas through his actions”** – about **“the united Serbian lands”**.⁹⁵

In order to form Greater Serbia, Church officials also worked on the destruction of Yugoslavia. In relation to this, Bishop Atanasije Jeftic spoke: **“Away with Yugoslavia, and into a muddy river”**.⁹⁶

⁹³ M. Tomanic, the aforementioned work, pp. 13, and 241.

Academicians Dobrica Cosic, Antonije Isakovic, Matija Beckovic, and others had significant influence in the Patriarchy. They **“pulled in the Serbian Orthodox Church, [for it] to become involved in politics, current events, and out onto ‘thin ice and rotten planks’”** (Ibid., p. 17).

In January 1985, **“thanks to their openly anti-Communist and nationalist attitude, as well as exceptional literary activity”**, the Literary Association of Serbia admitted three young and reputable monks – theologians, professors of the Theology College, called the ‘Justinians’ (Amfilohije Radovic, Irinej Bulovic, and Bishop Atanasije Jeftic) – Ibid., pp. 11-12.

⁹⁴ Ibid., pp. 13, and 241. The Serbian Orthodox Church deemed the territorial expansion to be legitimate, because it claimed that the areas populated by the Bosniaks were Serbian lands (N. Cigar, the aforementioned work, pp. 40-41).

⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 26; N. Cigar, **GENOCID U BOSNI...**, p. 85.

⁹⁶ M. Tomanic, the aforementioned work, p. 235. **“At the time of the Serbian national revival, after forty years of Communist darkness”**, the Serbian Orthodox Church presented its views through a member of the Literary Association of Serbia, Atanasije Jeftic, with his book **“NOVI ZLATOUSTI VLADIKA NIKOLAJ”** (The New Bishop Nicholas Goldmouth) and presented to the readers **“some of the positions most fundamental for the Serbian nationalist state”** (B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, p. 289).

The Serbian Orthodox Church contributed to the emphasis on the danger coming from Islam, and to the creation of the feeling that the presence of this religion in the region was illegitimate. The media of this Church often published anti-Islamic texts and openly promoted the creation of Greater Serbia. Thus, in 1991, Dragomir Ubiparipovic, a priest from Bosnia and Herzegovina, wrote in *Glas Crkve (The Voice of the Church* – official bulletin of the SPC) **“Serbia and its nation can see themselves in between two powerful world religions (Islam and Catholicism) ... In such a situation, existence in national and religious terms is at major risk”**. In relation to this, he sees the new national strategy as the only salvation, whose **“essence must be in the search for an exclusive Serbian nationalist ideology... The New, amended Nacertanije (the political program from the nineteenth century for the creation of an expanded Serbian state) must clearly and indubitably set up the borders of the new Serbian state, (and) must defend our people in the other states. Serbia, as a state, must be inevitably formed within its ethnic borders, and nobody has the right to make concessions or betray [our] national interests.”**⁹⁷

The Serbian Orthodox Church strengthened its “assessments” that Muslims are “faulty” human beings, and that they are Serbs who have betrayed their roots. Claiming that the Muslims are of Serbian origin, the Church offered them to accept them under the condition that they leave “the wrongful” path and convert into Orthodoxy. Dragan Protic, Archdeacon and professor of the Theology Faculty of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Belgrade, openly stated that he believes that such a conversion is possible if pressure is made onto Muslims, to accept Orthodoxy. He believed that the Muslims were strayed Orthodox Serbs, and with a stance of superiority, he mentioned that **“the Serbian Orthodox Church is happy to accept those who have left Orthodoxy, but who repent and return”**.⁹⁸

In the end of 1993, Serb Patriarch Pavle addressed the foreign public (in an interview to an Austrian newspaper) with the claim that they know only the general history of the Balkans. In relation to this,

⁹⁷ N. Cigar, **GENOCID U BOSNI...**, pp. 41-42.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 89-90.

he confidentially argued that the Serbs are the indigenous population in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that the Muslims had arrived together with the Ottoman conquerors. There was a characteristic accusation by Patriarch Pavle that the Muslims wish to bring Christians into a position **“of rightlessness”**, which was allegedly prescribed in the Qur’an and Sharia. In addition to this, he claimed that the Qur’an **“proclaims holy war as a tool for religious expansion. This concept is alien to Christianity”**. The Episcopo of Zvornik and Tuzla, Vasilije, summed up the positions of the Serbian Orthodox Church about Muslims by saying: **“We Serbs know very well that the following rules apply to a portion of the Muslims: the more infidels they kill, the closer they are to heaven”**.⁹⁹

The Serbian Orthodox Church, and particularly some of its bishops, were opposed to “the AVNOJ-based” borders. An extraordinary session of the Holy Assembly of the Serbian Orthodox Church, held on January 16 and 17, 1992, issued a communiqué claiming that, for half a century, the Serbian nation **“had already been politically crumbled and divided by unnatural borders cutting through its living organism”**. These borders were allegedly **“planned by the Communist International, enforced by the neo-fascistic and Ustasha occupation, and established and expanded – against the will of the Serbian people – by Tito’s communist dictatorship through his strongly anti-Serbian AVNOJ”**. Due to this, the bishops claimed, **“the Serbian Orthodox Church, or the Serbian people, never recognized the artificial and illegitimate ‘AVNOJ-based’ internal borders, established on no historical or ethnical grounds, through the arbitrary rule of the Communist guerrilla under the conditions of occupation and civil war”**.¹⁰⁰

The regular session of the Holy Assembly of the Serbian Orthodox Church, held on May 14-28, 1992, adopted a document called “The Memorandum of the SPC”. It repeated that, after the war, the Serbian people **“became victims of Communist tyranny”**, and that **“the conditions in our country were primarily the consequence of Communist tyranny”**. It was reiterated that the inter-republic borders

⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 86.

¹⁰⁰ M. Tomanic, the aforementioned work, p. 96.

“cut through the living organism of the Serbian people, dividing their centuries old homes, sanctuaries, graves, monasteries, and cultural monuments”.¹⁰¹

By not recognizing internal borders and by accusing the Communists for the allegedly half a century of political crumbliness and division of the Serbian **“living organism”**, the leadership of the Serbian Orthodox Church was preparing and inviting the Serbian nation to change these borders, i.e. to get ready for crime.

The demands of the bishops of the Serbian Orthodox Church were identical to the demands of Milosevic and the majority of the Serbian political parties. Thus, for instance, in the program of the Serbian Radicals in 1991, one of their main goals was: **“to restore a free, independent and democratic Serbian state to encompass the whole Serbian people, all the Serbian lands, meaning that within its borders it shall have, in addition to the presently existing imposed ‘Serbian federal unit’, a ‘Serbian Macedonia’, ‘Serbian Montenegro’, ‘Serbian Bosnia’, ‘Serbian Herzegovina’, ‘Serbian Dubrovnik’, ‘Serbian Dalmatia’, ‘Serbian Lika’, ‘Serbian Kordun’, ‘Serbian Banija’, ‘Serbian Slavonia’, ‘Serbian West Srem’, and ‘Serbian Baranja’”.**¹⁰²

At the regular session of the Holy Episcopal Assembly held in May 1990, the bishops of the Serbian Orthodox Church demanded, **“that the competent state authorities allow the excavation of those murdered and buried in the pits from the war [WW II; note by the author], and their dignified burial at shrines and other appropriate places”.**¹⁰³

The excavation of Serbian bones, instead of **“being carried out in peace and silence, in a dignified atmosphere, as deserved by those for whom this was allegedly done in the first place”**, on the

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p. 110.

¹⁰² Ibid., p. 78. Three years later, the radical Greater Serbia, as written by M. Tomanic, was perceptibly reduced, because “the Program of the SRS from 1994 had somewhere dropped Serbian Dubrovnik and Serbian Macedonia. The goal of the radicals was now a state which within its borders would have the ‘currently existing Republic of Serbia, the Republic of Montenegro, the Republika Srpska, and the Republic of Serb Krajina” (Ibid.).

¹⁰³ Ibid., p. 40. This demand was repeated twice more, at the extraordinary session of the Assembly, in December 1990, and at the regular session of the Assembly, in May 1991.

territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Croatian ‘pits’ and mass graves was done in the presence of cameras, lights, journalists, politicians, scientists, etc. **“The people could see horrid images on their TV screens, with hundreds of skulls and bones laid down on foil”**.¹⁰⁴ This way, by opening “old wounds” and indicating upon the genocide against the Serbs in the NDH [fascist state in Croatia during WWII; note by the translator], the Serbian Orthodox Church was calling upon the Serbs to protect themselves from the alleged danger of becoming again the victims of genocide, i.e. to retaliate and commit crimes.

The excavation of bones from the pits, initiated by the bishops of the Serbian Orthodox Church, was transformed **“into a ‘ceremony’, into an awkward parade which, as proven later on, having only aimed at having the blood of the ever ‘violent, forceful, fiery people’ (Jovan Cvijic) boil up even more. When this blood was heated enough, commands in the interest of the nation came ‘from above’, accompanied with instructions and arms”**.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., pp. 40-41. On occasion of the excavation of bones from the Golubinka pit, Radovan Karadzic, President of the SDS of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dr. Nikola Koljevic, member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and painter Milic od Macve went down into the pit to see it (See: *Javnost*, December 8, 1990, p. 1).

Bones were excavated of victims from the pits of Jagodnjaca, Pandurica, Golubinka, Surmanci, then in the areas of Zitomislici, Prebilovci, Majevisa, Banja Luka, and elsewhere (For more details, see: *Javnost*, October 19, 1990, pp. 7 and 12; October 27, 1990, p. 10; November 3, 1990, p. 12; November 17, 1990, pp. 10 and 12; November 24, 1990, p. 8; December 1, 1990, pp. 1 and 10; December 8, 1990, pp. 1, 10, and 12; December 15, 1990, p. 10; December 22, 1990, p. 10; December 29, 1990, p. 7; January 5, 1991, p. 7; January 12, 1991, p. 7; January 19, 1991, p. 10; February 2, 1991, p. 10, and others).

M. Tomanic rightfully wonders that there was not a single Serbian bone excavation going on in Serbia. In relation to this, he claims that the bishops of the Serbian Orthodox Church were “deaf to the cries of Abel’s blood coming from immediate vicinity”. The more so, because Bishop Atanasije Jeftic named certain places in the Belgrade area where there were mass graves. Mere mention was enough for the victims in Serbia, but not for those from the Herzegovinian and Croatian mass graves – but their bones were supposed to be dug out from depths of 50 m or more. This job also involved the work of speleological experts, for which the Serbian Orthodox Church decorated some of them even with the Medal of Saint Sava of the 1st grade (Ibid., pp. 41-42).

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 130. Speaking about this, M. Tomanic concludes that “in the end, with drinking, singing and dancing, the Muslims of Trebinje were either killed or expelled, and their shrines destroyed” (Ibid.).

Patriarch Pavle and other episcopos of the Serbian Orthodox Church, heating up the hatred, sent messages to the Croatian, Bosnian and Kosovo Serbs to take up arms and “defend themselves” from the Croats, Muslims, and Albanians. In 1991, the Patriarch claimed **“there is no third option for the Croatian Serbs but to take up arms or flee”**. Dragan Terzic, the editor-in-chief of *Pravoslavlje* [Orthodoxy], in a fashion similar to the head of the Church, claimed that the Bosnian Serbs **“do not wish to live in a Jamahiriya similar to Libya, and that under the rule of the mujahideen they would have the same status already ‘enjoyed’ by the Christians in Islamic countries, that is, they would be slaves, which they had already experienced during the five centuries of Islamic occupation”**.¹⁰⁶

In Serbia, the episcopos were calming the spirits down in telling the Serbs **“to suffer as true Christians would”**, and calling upon continuation of the war in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, **“until their dream on the unified Serbian lands is realized.”** **“For the salvation of one’s own life and property, the Orthodox canons do not recommend killing, they even sanction it, but the fight against ‘the crescent, the Islamic aggression’ (Atanasije Jeftic), ‘for the honourable cross and for the golden freedom’, for ‘Greater Serbia’, and for ‘the salvation of the cross with three fingers’ indubitably required killing. THE INTERESTS OF THE SERBIAN CHURCH, SERBIAN STATE AND SERBIAN NATION”** [capitals in the original; note by the author], in the interpretation of the Serbian Orthodox Church, **“were the only reasons because of which the Orthodox Serbs could ‘legally’ kill and not fear punishment on the Day of Judgment because of it”**.¹⁰⁷

In the nineties, a number of senior church officials in the Serbian Orthodox Church publicly showed readiness for crimes. In September 1991, at the Komogovina monastery in Croatia (between Glina and Kostajnica), Bishop Filaret acquired **“global fame”** thanks to the famous photograph in which he poses in front of a Serbian cannon and armed vehicle, holding a machine gun in his hand. On this photograph, which went around the world, Academician Rastislav Petrovic is also to be

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., pp. 101, and 230.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 231.

seen with Filaret, **“thus proving that the Serbian Church and the Serbian Academy were jointly under way into an adventure of state creation, which will cost the Serbs a dear price”**.¹⁰⁸

Bishop Filaret also remained in memory as a participant in one of the prime time news programmes of Serbian TV, **“when, holding a child’s skull in his hand, he told the viewers that the little girl’s head had been cut off by Muslims with an axe, in front of her living mother”**,¹⁰⁹ which was a lie.

Under its cassocks, the Serbian Orthodox Church was concealing and covering criminals. It offered help to Arkan in organizing, funding, and arming his armed formations. The criminal Arkan had provided bodyguards to the Metropolitan of the Serbian Orthodox Church Amfilohije from Montenegro who, in turn, used them to intimidate dissidents. In July 1993, on the day of the Saint protector of Belgrade, Arkan marched side by side with Patriarch Pavle in the holy procession moving along the city streets. In the same month, Patriarch Pavle personally headed an official delegation in a trip across Bosnia, where he presided in religious ceremonies with major publicity, attended by the political and military leadership of the Serbian collaborationists.¹¹⁰

Staring from the assessment that the Muslims constitute a secret threat to the Serbs, patriarch Pavle also supported and justified the Greater Serbia policy. He commented such a position of his to a foreign reporter in the following way: **“My daughter’, he said to me shrugging his shoulders, ‘if you are asking me if I think that the Serbs in Bosnia should give up on everything they have done for their lives, what**

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., pp. 91, and 234. In the opinion of M. Tomanic, in addition to the Literary Association of Serbia and the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, the Serbian Orthodox Church was the **“third petal of the flower”** (Ibid., pp. 11-37).

The majority **“of the people in black”** – the episcopos and the clergy of the Serbian Orthodox Church, according to Tomanic, were **“enveloped around the neck of the Serbian people, suffocating it slowly but surely. Very forceful and passionate hearts beat below those black coats...”** (Ibid., p. 5).

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 235. A reporter of *Ilustrovana Politika*, Bogosav Marjanovic, found out that this had all been a lie. For more details on this, see: M. Tomanic, the aforementioned work, p. 235).

¹¹⁰ N. Cigar, **GENOCID U BOSNI...**, p. 86.

am I going to answer to you? Do you think that killing is a wrong thing? Naturally? However, do I think that an honourable man should give up when faced with crooks? If this is the choice, then I have to say: yes – and then I would be a politician as well, because I believe that the Serbs must fight now like never before, in order to preserve not only their church but themselves as well!”¹¹¹

The Serbian Orthodox Church provided priests for the Serbian armed formations and collaborationist army of Republika Srpska, as well as encouraged operations against Bosnia and Herzegovina and the genocide against Bosniaks. Thus, the recruits of this collaborationist army pronounced their oath before orthodox priests, and the Orthodox clergymen blessed them before they left for “actions”. The Serbian Orthodox Metropolitan Nikolaj, during his visit to a motorized infantry unit, encouraged its members by telling them: **“We have always won wars.... The Lord will not leave us alone this time either”**. He raised their morale, convincing them that the fight **“is in the interest of the Serbian people”**. On some occasions, the Serbian Orthodox clergy took initiative in the crimes. Thus, the priest in Trebinje told the gathered Serbs **“that this town will be Serbian, because it has always been that way”**, and then he took an apartment and several shops whose Bosniak owners were forced to leave for himself.¹¹²

The Serbian genocide against Bosniaks and other forms of crime in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina were denied at all levels of power, as well as by the Serbian Orthodox Church.¹¹³

All crimes in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina perpetrated by members of the Serbian armed units were explained by the bishops **“as acts of furious revenge, distraction and craziness of individuals (Bishop Atanasije Jeftic), and bloodthirstiness of individuals (Patriarch Pavle)”**.¹¹⁴

¹¹¹ Ibid., pp. 86-87.

¹¹² Ibid., p. 87.

¹¹³ Ibid., pp. 108-134.

¹¹⁴ M. Tomanic, the aforementioned work, p. 108. However, the facts speak differently. In relation to this, M. Tomanic states a portion of the text from the Russian

The Serbian Orthodox Church was also covering up the devastation and destruction of all 16 mosques and other Islamic sacral buildings in Banja Luka, including the beautiful Ferhadija Mosque. In all its official documents, such as from the Extraordinary Session of the Holy Archbishopric Assembly in “a cleansed” Banja Luka “without minarets”, in November 1994, crimes against Bosniaks and Islamic sanctuaries were nameless, abandoned phrases.¹¹⁵

The Serbian Orthodox Church offered “**honest and hearty assistance**” to the Serbian state media in concealing the crimes against Bosniaks in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.¹¹⁶ The top of this Church was constantly rejecting all the facts on organized genocide and other forms of crime against the Bosniaks, claiming that these were “accidental” and “individual incidents”.¹¹⁷

The Serbian bishops were constantly trying to “**create and preserve the image**” before the Serbian nation, “**that the war waged in Bosnia and Herzegovina was one of justice and defence.**”¹¹⁸

The leadership of the Serbian Orthodox Church was exceptionally close to the political leadership of the Serbian collaborationists in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. “**All the hopes of the Serbian Orthodox Church, in particularly ‘the three As’ (Metropolitan Amfilohije, bishops Atanasije and Artemije), were placed into the hands of the ‘the three Ks’ (Karadzic, Krajisnik, and Koljevic), and,**

magazine *Izvestija*, dated November 25, 1992 (by author Evgeniy Vostrukov, taken over from the book **GENOCID U BOSNI...**, by Dr. Norman Cigar (pp. 83-84), speaking about a Russian mercenary, who went through the training provided by the Centre for Special Training of the Serbian Armed Formations in Erdut, directed by Zeljko Raznatovic Arkan with the support of the Serbian police forces, and he stated: “**The philosophy of brutality was forced into the heads of the solders – ‘A Serbian patriot is unmerciful to his enemies, he has no right to save their children, women or elderly’ – our Russian bandit was abhorred**” (Ibid.).

¹¹⁵ Ibid., p. 109.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., p. 126.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., p. 134.

¹¹⁸ Ibid. A high-level official delegation of the Serbian Orthodox Church made efforts in April 1993 to convince their hosts in the Vatican that there had been no aggression in Bosnia and Herzegovina (N. Cigar, the aforementioned work, p. 86).

of course, Biljana Plavsic, ‘the new heroine of Kosovo’ (referring to an epic folksong; note by the translator), **as she was called by metropolitan Amfilohije**”.¹¹⁹

The officials of the Serbian Orthodox Church, **“just like supervisors”**, were present at almost all the sessions of the “Assembly of Republika Srpska”. The bishops of this church, and the politicians and generals of the Serbian collaborationists regularly emphasized the exceptionally good cooperation.¹²⁰

The supreme official of the Serbian Orthodox Church for Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Metropolitan of Dabar Bosnia, Nikolaj Mrdja (appointed at the regular session of the Holy Bishops Assembly, in May 1992), who was deemed in his former capacity as Bishop of Dalmatia by many, to be **“the ideologist of the ‘log’ revolution”**, appears in many joint photographs with Karadzic and Mladic. In many sessions of the

¹¹⁹ Ibid., p. 110. In illustration of the “dialectical unity” between the Serbian Orthodox Church and the political leadership of the Serbian collaborationists in Bosnia and Herzegovina, M. Tomanic repeated an assessment of Dragomir Ubiparipovic, a priest from Sarajevo, published in the magazine *Hriscanska Misao (Christian Thought)*: **“The Church premises and ceremonies had served for the promotion of the key individuals of the SDS, and their commendation to the people. In this measureless support, our tendency to exaggerate was best proven. Some have gone so far that the very main people of the party were puzzled by the and lavish evaluations attention shown – thanks to the alleged messiah roles they had been assigned by the Lord. How would they not have, when the priests approached them with praises unheard of, by which they reminded them there, in front of the people: ‘that the Lord himself had sent them to save the Serbs’... Such inappropriate service of the Church to the politics and the assistance by the Church, in order to gain the trust of the people, this shy symbiosis and joint work in the same field, evidently includes, after all, a joint share of success or failure! Therefore, it is to be expected that the Church should be lavishly awarded by the new authorities, too. But if the issue is brought up as to the responsibility for the consequences of the war, the destruction and the victims, in addition to the political and military leadership, it is to be expected that the Church will also be mentioned”** (Ibid., p. 111).

¹²⁰ Ibid., p. 118. According to the statement by Radovan Karadzic dated November 9, 1990, the clergy of the Serbian Orthodox Church was to sit **“in the front rows, at the places of honour”** at Serbian meetings. (*NIN*, November 9, 1990, p. 10, interview with Radovan Karadzic, SRBI IZVAN BOSANSKOG LONCA).

“Assembly of the Republika Srpska”, he sat in the front row, **“just like a symbol of everything that the leadership over there had done in the war”**.¹²¹

In May 1992, metropolitan Nikolaj “climbed” to Pale, where **“from the hills above Sarajevo, for over a thousand days, he observed how Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic were thoroughly destroying this city”**.¹²²

Bishop Irinej Bulatovic believed that **“Republika Srpska was nothing else but a Serbian land”**.¹²³

Some bishops of the Serbian Orthodox Church even baptized Serbian soldiers and their leaders, and pronounced them heroes.¹²⁴

The crimes and the suffering of the people in Sarajevo and other places in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the opinion of **“the Serbian Orthodox spiritual shepherds, were justified and needed to be continued until their goal – the goal of the Serbian nation, state and church, is accomplished”**.¹²⁵

The bishops of the Serbian Orthodox Church did not agree with the peace plans of the international community, such as the Contact Group plan. They still supported the war goals of Serbian occupation, up until their realization, regardless of the mass and individual murders of civilians.¹²⁶

¹²¹ Ibid., p. 182.

¹²² Ibid., p. 194.

¹²³ AIZ, inv. No. 2-2889, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Supreme Defence Council, DT [marked State Secret – note by S.C.], No. 12-4, August 26, 1995, Belgrade, MINUTES from the meeting of the representatives of the highest political and military leadership of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Republika Srpska, held on August 25, 1995, in the residential facility of the Army of Yugoslavia in Dobanovci, p. 13.

¹²⁴ M. Tomanic, the aforementioned work, p. 232.

¹²⁵ Ibid., p. 121.

¹²⁶ Ibid., p. 123. The Serbian Orthodox Church gave legitimacy to the criminal policy of the Serbian collaborationists in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In April 1993, Serb Patriarch Pavle and Metropolitan Amfilohije openly supported the refusal of the Vance-Owen plan by Serbian collaborationists. At the same time, the Synod

The Serbian Orthodox Church believed that the war should be continued until the desired goal is accomplished. It believed that the great Serbian state was “**worth of both children's tears and children's blood**”.¹²⁷

of the Serbian Orthodox Church again supported the unification of all the territories taken by the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina with Serbia, and he swore the Serbian leaders from Herzegovina not to accept the compromise named ‘Vance-Owen plan’ (N. Cigar, the aforementioned work, p. 85).

¹²⁷ Ibid., p. 129.

III

THE GREATER SERBIA PROJECT AND THE PRESIDENCY OF THE SFRY UNTIL MARCH 1991

1. The Presidency of the SFRY and Its Parallel Informal Group

Movements in general, particularly when emerging, act spontaneously. They consist of a larger number of entities gathered around a certain societal, political, social, or national program (issue). Particularly at emergence, they have no special central body, at least not under such a title, whose function is performed by an organization or an individual simply accepted by a larger number of entities from the various structures and degrees of organization.

This was also the case with the Greater Serbia movement in the late 20th century. It is not possible to precisely determine **the date when the Movement was created, i.e. resuscitated**. It is more probable that, after the defeat in Second World War, it nevertheless maintained itself, “vegetating” in various forms, sporadically relying on other factors or processes in the country or the environment. It is believed that the hanging of Draza Mihajlovic in 1946 eradicated at least his fascistic product. The fact that the Movement’s “minimalist” goals were realizable from the beginning “in concordance with Russia”, allowed him to fit into the Greater Russia concepts of the Soviet Union, and use this to infiltrate its ideas to a significant extent, into the bodies of authority of the New Yugoslavia.

Even the reconstruction of the leadership of the Greater Serbia movement, just as any other organization based on conspiracy and illegal and illegitimate goals, was an arduous task.

The lines of leadership most often went along the path usually referred to at the Hague process as “lines of parallel structure”, even “joint undertakings”, with decisions adopted and made at the so-called “private sessions” of **informal** groups, which often worked **parallel** to legal bodies. In the initial development stage, the head of the Movement

was **Dobrica Cosic** with a group of academicians and writers around him, and later on, from the famous Eighth Session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists (CK SK) of Serbia, held on September 2, 1987, it was **Slobodan Milosevic**, with the so-called “**Serbian coordination**”, i.e. the official political leadership of the Socialist Republic of Serbia.

The personal composition, given the competition and the sporadic highs and lows of group with more or less radical views, could not be constant in the first place. Formally, its central and highest body was formed in March 1991, under the name of **Serbian National Council**, but it hardly actually ever functioned, except for a very short time, at least as an advisory body for Milosevic, who had already ensured the image and the function as **Leader of the Movement**. Just like with other similar movements, a number of individuals of broader political significance and undisputable image as “Serb national champions” would sporadically flash up and be used, primarily, for the propaganda goals depending on current events. Right after that, they would fall back into anonymity.

The high degree of centralization of the New Yugoslavia, favourable to a quick post-war reconstruction, and even more favourable for the development of the socialist relations for which it had opted, led it, just like the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, into failure. As early as the early sixties, the leadership of the country had realized this, initiating decentralization and a high degree of self-management in every aspect. The process was crowned in 1974 with the adoption of the Constitution of the SFRY, which, among other things, maximally **guaranteed the equality of all the nations and minority groups (“nations and nationalities”)**, and **in particular, the equality of all the constitutive entities** (republics and provinces) of the Federation. Within the leadership of Serbia (D. Markovic), this was perceived as “**an injustice against the Serbs**”. It was on this basis that the most recent wave first of Greater Serbia nationalism was revived, to be gradually followed by the Greater Serbia movement, which, first in Serbia, and then also beyond it, came out onto the political scene and gradually began to direct the levers of power.

With the Eighth Session of the SK (League of Communists) of Serbia, the Greater Serbia movement and its leader, Slobodan Milosevic,

definitely came to rule the basic levers of power in the Republic. During that and the following year, undesired officials were removed from the positions within it, and with the change of the Constitution of Serbia, this also happened with both autonomous provinces.

The aspirations of the Movement were not yet accomplished at this. In fact, the conquering of these positions only created the springboard for taking over the powers of the federal state, and for the destabilization of power in the other republics, in particular in those towards which the Movement had had territorial aspirations. Its major claims were against Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the major obstacle was the applicable Constitution of the SFRY. Its first moves were therefore directed towards taking over the Council for the Protection of the Constitutional Order, and towards destabilizing Bosnia and Herzegovina. **The first victim** was the Chairman of the Council, **Dr. Hamdija Pozderac**, and Bosnia and Herzegovina was struck with a sequence of set up affairs. In the joint state, Serbia otherwise enjoyed a privileged position, and the autonomies of the provinces were limited, although the position of the nations and minority groups had become more equal to a significant extent with the 1974 Constitution of the SFRY. The SANU Memorandum considered such a position of the Serbs dissatisfactory, primarily because of their large number.

The attainment of hegemony in the joint state was therefore one of the most probable goals of both the Memorandum and the Greater Serbia movement. This could only be accomplished by either taking over or breaking up federal bodies and centres of power. These included the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and its Central Committee and the National Assembly of the SFRY with its Executive Council and state apparatus. Unlike the one before 1974, the state apparatus was largely reduced, but it was still considerable, particularly in the areas of **defence, internal and foreign affairs.**

With the coming of Slobodan Milosevic to power in Serbia in 1987, the JNA was not yet at his side.¹ As a whole, it was still in favour of the

¹ S. Biserko, **OD JUGOSLOVENSKE NARODNE ARMIJE DO SRPSKE VOJSKE**, in: *RATOVI U JUGOSLAVIJI 1991.-1999.*, Compilation of Communiques and Discussions from the Round Table, Belgrade, November 7-9, 2001, Belgrade 2002, p. 220.

federal, socialist Yugoslavia at that time, but for years before it had been more preoccupied with its own position in the society, in an attempt to change the constitutional concept of defence, to realize **“the plan of taking over responsibility for the country”** and fill in the vacuum created by the death of the President of the state and the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, Marshall Tito. It did not dare contradict the putsch-like manner of Milosevic’s coming to power. True, through the media, Milosevic did seem as though he has the support of the army, so that some names were mentioned in public, mainly those of retired generals from Serbia.²

In 1988, the military leadership was of an opinion that Serbia and Slobodan Milosevic were the only “defenders” of the SFRY. He also benefited from the centralization of power. Since then, the JNA became ever closer to Serbia, while distancing itself from the other republics, particularly Slovenia and Croatia.³

Admiral Mamula claims that, in addition to the call of the intellectual elite for the revival of the Greater Serbia program and the unrests of the Kosovo Serbs, **“the role of general Ljubicic was also decisive in levering the powers between Milosevic and Stambolic at the Eighth Session of the CK SK Serbia”** (B. Mamula, *SLUCAJ JUGOSLAVIJA*, Podgorica 2000, p. 112; S. Biserko, the aforementioned work, p. 221).

In late 1987 and early 1988, according to B. Mamula, **“there was not yet any apprehension that Serbia under Milosevic and the JNA could come and act together”** (B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, p. 121); S. Biserko, the aforementioned work, p. 220). However, the changes in the leadership of Serbia at the Eighth Session of the CK SK Serbia brought the JNA, according to admiral Mamula, into an unfavourable position. In relation to this, he wrote that after the session, in addition to various “suspicions“ against the JNA and accusations of support presented in the publications written on the Eighth Session, and the attempt of the organizer to refer to JNA support immediately after this session, **“a new situation emerged, more burdened with risks to the JNA than the previous one, when we were developing the plan of taking over the responsibility for the country“** (B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, p. 115).

² Ibid. In 1987, General Ljubicic helped Milosevic to take over the power in Serbia. He was then involved into Milosevic’s installation and his support was constantly emphasized; he was further helped by General Petar Gracanin (former Chief of Staff of the General Headquarters, later Federal Minister of the Interior), General Aleksandar Janjic (Commander of the Army in Nis), General Milojica Pantelic, Pero Lalovic, and others (*Slobodna Bosna*, No. 186, June 8, 2000, pp. 22-23; S. Biserko, the aforementioned work, pp. 220-221).

³ S. Biserko, the aforementioned work, p. 221. Serbia was openly making efforts to ensure supremacy in Yugoslavia and in the Balkans. On the other side, the democratically

Since Ante Markovic came to head the Federal Government on January 20, 1989, with the new reform policy, the Federal Executive Council started yielding valuable results. His successes in the monetary system and the intended programmatic reforms in other areas frightened the leaders of the Greater Serbia movement, and Slobodan Milosevic in person, as well as some others (Slovenia and Croatia), who made efforts to discredit the program of the Government (SIV), constantly disrupting both the Program and the Government, as well as president Ante Markovic, who was allegedly working against Serbia and Yugoslavia, was an “American man”, and the like. The attempts by the SIV to exert control over the activities of the army and the law enforcement forces did not work. Generals Kadijevic and Gracanin, who did not even attend the sessions of the Government, had not favoured from the very beginning the coming of Ante Markovic to the post of Prime Minister. The military leadership was trying to disqualify Ante Markovic as a force pushing the country into capitalism.⁴ The League of Communists broke apart

oriented forces, particularly the SIV with Ante Markovic and Budimir Loncar, were trying to preserve the pluralist and democratic internationally and legally recognized system in Yugoslavia (S. Mesic, **KAKO JE SRUSENA JUGOSLAVIJA – politicki memoari**, Zagreb 1994; pp. X-XI).

Serbia was stubbornly destroying all institutions of integration; it disturbed the economic relations in the country, **denounced Slovenia in public**; prevented the work of the Presidency and sharply attacked the Markovic government, in order to block the “other” Yugoslav top as well, thus leaving the only other solution – the JNA, serving the Greater Serbia concept (Ibid., p. 33).

⁴ Dz. Sarac, **SUROVA STRATEGIJA NASILJA**, in: F. Ademovic, JNA BEZNADJE ZLA, Sarajevo 1997, p. 125; S. Biserko, the aforementioned work, p. 221; B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, pp. 171-172.

In early 1990, Ante Markovic was one of the rare Yugoslav political personalities enjoying undivided support and confidence almost throughout the country. After the break-up of the SKJ, he stated that Yugoslavia will keep on existing, even without the Party, “**which deeply upset the leaders whose goals were to retailor the borders and break-up the country**” (B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, p. 173). This was also the case with Jovic, who commented the aforementioned statement by Markovic in the following way: “**Ante Markovic was brisk when he said that the functioning of Yugoslavia does not depend on the SKJ. I suppose he thinks it depends on him in person!**” (B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 93).

According to Kadijevic, Ante Markovic and the SIV were playing “**an overt role at breaking Yugoslavia, in all the events in which the destiny of the country was**

at the extraordinary 14th Congress, the federal institutions (the Assembly of the SFRY and the Presidency of the SFRY) were blocked, and the election laws could not be harmonized among the republics.

With the radical reduction of the external risk to Yugoslavia,⁵ the internal crisis became ever fiercer, the instability increased, and the exhaustion of solutions for the relations in the country and the lack of readiness for radical changes were ever more obvious. In such a situation, the constitutional role of the Armed Forces of the SFRY came increasingly into the spotlight, in view of protecting “**the constitutionally established social system**”. In this way, the military leadership turned increasingly towards the internal situation in the country, which contained serious threats, particularly in view of the future.⁶

being decided”. Markovic and Kadijevec came “**into open confrontation on the public scene**”. Kadijevec completely parted from Markovic and withdrew from his functioning in the SIV, which he had “**announced publicly**”, and Markovic was demanding his dismissal (V. Kadijevec, **MOJE VIDJENJE RASPADA - VOJSKA BEZ DRZAVE**, Belgrade 1993, the aforementioned work, pp. 17, and 110).

According to general Ilija Radakovic, the SIV of Ante Markovic “**had split up along the two most sensitive stitches. Markovic’s team lost the two key players – the federal secretaries for national defence and the interior. At a decisive moment, both had switched to the team of the** (parallel – note by the author) **Presidency of the SFRY, captained by Borisav Jovic.**” According to Radakovic, this became clearer in March 1991, when the Information Service of the SSNO (Federal Secretariat for Defence) communicated that the SSNO does not accept the positions of the SIV regarding the JNA involvement in the famous Belgrade events. Also according to him, the SIV was losing influence over the developments in Yugoslavia, due to the resistance of Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia. Markovic’s Union of Reform Forces and he in person were pronounced traitors and exponents of the Ustashas (I. Radakovic, **KADIJEVIC SKRIVA ISTINU**, in: F. Ademovic, the aforementioned work, p. 222).

⁵ R. Dizdarevic, **IZDAJA VOJNOG VRHA**, in: F. Ademovic, **JNA BEZNADJE ZLA**, Sarajevo 1997, p. 155. Over an extended period of time, actual danger due to its geostrategic position existed from the outside for Yugoslavia, particularly in the clash of the superpowers, due to which it had constantly strengthened its defence capacity. With the process of detente between the superpowers, and with efforts to strengthen the process of negotiation and agreement between the East and West, the strategic significance of the Yugoslav territory had significantly declined, making interest in Yugoslavia from that aspect also advancing in a downward curve (Ibid.).

⁶ Ibid. Unlike the previous situation, from then on, the JNA was systematically preparing for “**internal interventions in certain republics**”. The authors of the secret

In the first half of the 1980s, the military leadership believed that the Army, **“without a real supreme commander, must take on the political responsibility and try to save the country from destruction and war”**. In this, according to Mamula, the military top did not have an intention to **“establish a military regime, even less a dictatorship”**.⁷

In order to **“preserve”** Yugoslavia, the military leadership was preparing the plan, according to which **“all the ruling structures in the republics and provinces, all without exception, had to leave power”**. It was not feasible, **“except for some rare individuals, to use them to any benefit in favour of preservation of Yugoslavia”**.⁸

In the late eighties and early nineties, it became directly involved in current political debates. It was convinced that at the level of the SFRY there is no single body directing the state (a view particularly represented and advocated by General Kadijevic). **“Recognizing”** that **“the state has in fact been left without a head of state”**, in preparation for the constitutional changes in 1988, as well as later on, the military leadership was proposing **“constitutional changes in relation to the responsibilities and functioning of the Presidency of the SFRY”**.⁹

plans and the scriptwriters for these efforts benefited from the fact that, for a time, they had been patronized by the head people of the Presidency of the SFRY (S. Potocar, **UROTA GENERALSTABA PROTIV NARODA**, in: F. Ademovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 105-106).

⁷ B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, p. 8.

⁸ Ibid. In relation to this, Mamula wrote that **“the federal state centre, and the party top, was virtually without political power, and did not constitute a serious obstacle to our plan”** (Ibid.).

The idea of the military leadership in 1989 and in the spring of 1990, according to general Martin Spegelj too, was **“to remove Milosevic and the leaders in the western republics, not only the head people of the newly created parties, but also Milan Kucan and Ivica Racan, because for them, they were all the same ‘nationalists’...”** (M. Spegelj, **PRVA FAZA RATA 1990.-1992.: PRIRPEMA JNA ZA AGRESIJU I HRVATSKI OBRAMBENI PLANOVI**, in: **RAT U HRVATSKOJ I BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI 1991.-1995.**, Zagreb-Sarajevo 1999, p. 39).

⁹ R. Dizdarevic, the aforementioned work, p. 156; V. Kadijevic, the aforementioned work, pp. 65-66; M. Hadzic, **ARMIJSKA UPOTREBA TRAUMA**, in: **SRPSKA STRANA RATA – TRAUMA I KATARZA U ISTORIJSKOM PAMCENJU**, Belgrade, 1996, p. 569; In relation to this, Miroslav Hadzic claims: **“As the crisis was becoming**

Believing that the constitutional competencies of the Presidency of the SFRY were limited and insufficient in the newly created circumstances, and that there is a need to change the role and powers of this body under new conditions, as well as that it is the only one who take on the role of taking the country out of the crisis, the military leadership was advocating in favour of the position that the Presidency needs to take over the leadership of the country.¹⁰ This Unitarian concept, in essence, meant that the Presidency of the SFRY should exceed its constitutional framework and competencies.¹¹

By May 15, 1989, it seemed impossible to manipulate the Presidency of the SFRY, although Milosevic was pulling **“all the strings”, “and not only in Belgrade and Serbia, but also in Bosnia”**, and this was, among others, also indicated the events in front of the Assembly of the SFRY, on February 28, 1989. With the appointment of Borisav Jovic, this can also be tracked from May 15, 1989, during which time he was Vice President, and from no later than when the military summer resort

deeper, the frequency of the ideologically and politically non-compromising approaches of the military top increased, while its competency for effective prevention of the dissolution of Yugoslavia through war decreased. The army intervention in the ‘YU-crisis’ is marked by two constants: the generals were constantly using political action to exceed their competencies, and by lack of any action at all or wrongful action in their areas of responsibility, they encouraged the war destruction of their homeland” (M. Hadzic, the aforementioned work p. 569).

¹⁰ Ibid. With the death of Admiral Petar Simic (on April 11, 1990), the concepts of Admiral Branko Mamula and his protégé Veljko Kadijevic definitely prevailed within the military leadership, and the new Law on National Defence was passed soon.

¹¹ R. Dizdarevic, the aforementioned work, p. 156. In the first half of 1990, starting from the assessment that at the time there was not a single institution in Yugoslavia to discuss with on **“serious”** issues, such as, according to Kadijevic, **“the adherence to the Constitution of the SFRJ and federal laws”**, Kadijevic was advocating in favour of the thesis that the Presidency of the SFRY must take on the function of **“the actual chief of state (i.e. perform all the tasks)”**. In this case, the SIV was to **“be placed under the control of the Presidency”**, in order to be **“harnessed in its independent strife for power and for the creation of a new party and a ‘new’ socialism”**. Using this option, all the changes of the Constitution of the SFRY and all the tasks related to this should have been taken on by the Presidency, including those which were in the competency of the SIV (B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 142).

in Kupari (August 1-2, 1989) hosted the meeting and formation of the **informal group** (Jovic, Kadijevic, Milosevic, and Trifunovic), leading **“private talks”** about the **“future of Yugoslavia”**, that is, about the destruction of Yugoslavia. In this, while accepting the Greater Serbia nationalist ideology, policy and practice, both the military leadership and General Kadijevic in person had the same positions **“on all issues”** as the nationalist leadership of Serbia, the so-called **“Serb coordination”**.¹² In the first half of August of 1989 in Kupari, Milosevic and Kadijevic reached an agreement **“about the political and military involvement of the JNA in the disentanglement of the Yugoslav crisis”**. With this, Kadijevic sided along with Milosevic and the JNA entered **“the dangerous waters of the single-nation Greater Serbia conduct”**.¹³ Since then, secret meetings were held, mainly at Jovic’s office, with Kadijevic, Milosevic, Zelenovic, Bucina, Gracanin, and others.¹⁴

Milosevic organized and held meetings with the members of other forums, which were neither an actual forum, but **informal groups** of selected officials, invited by him for interviews. While doing this, he guided them in advance as to what **“would be smart”**; however, the key decisions were taken by him in person.¹⁵

Milosevic and Jovic consulted each other about important issues a number of times in private, and with other party officials **within the Coordination**, too.¹⁶

¹² B. Jovic, **POSLEDNJI DANI SFRJ**, second edition, Kragujevac 1996, p. 45. In relation to this, Jovic was of an opinion that this, by all means, places Serbia **“closer to the Army”**, and he also thought, among other things, that it was **“clear that for the Army, Serbia was a more solid support”** than the other republics would have been (Ibid.)

¹³ B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, p. 158. Having this in mind, Mamula concluded: **“Nothing worse could have happened to the JNA and to Yugoslavia. This conditioned everything else that would happen in that and the following years”** (Ibid.).

¹⁴ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 45-48.

¹⁵ B. Jovic, **KNJIGA O MILOSEVICU**, Belgrade 2001, p. 59.

¹⁶ Ibid.

All **“the crucial”** decisions were mainly prepared by Milosevic, Jovic, Bogdan Trifunovic, Petar Gracanin, and others (initially Dobrica Cosic, Jovan Raskovic, and others), by jointly assessing the situation.¹⁷ This group was making up the Serb political top. The group composed of the most senior military leadership was represented by generals Kadijevic and Adzic, admiral Stane Brovet, then in the shadow admiral Mamula, and the like.¹⁸ Since 1989, both made up a single group, led by Milosevic, planning and preparing for wars of occupation in the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the genocide against the Bosniaks.

In September 1989, probably continuing Mamula’s connections, Kadijevic visited the USSR, on which he reported to Jovic on September 19, stating, among other things, that **“the army [there] is dissatisfied at its position”**, due to which Kadijevic was **“concerned even for our own future, if certain retrograde processes begin in the USSR”**.¹⁹

The situation in the county and in the world was assessed at these meetings of the group, however, the composition of the participants varied. On September 28, 1989, General Kadijevic reported to Jovic, and not to Drnovsek, **“because he was afraid that he will convey everything to the holders of separatist policy”**, **“that detailed assessment of the situation was done within the JNA following the**

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 12.

¹⁸ M. Spegelj, the aforementioned work, p. 51.

¹⁹ B. Jovic, **POSLEDNJI DANI SFRJ**, p. 49. On the **“current situation in the USSR”**, in his diary for November 18, 1989, among other things, Jovic wrote: **“There is a growing dissatisfaction among the army top. They did not expect that the army and the military production would be affected by the perestroika. They are dissatisfied with the fall of the living standard and reputation within the society...”** (Ibid., p. 69).

The connections of the military leadership of the SFRY with the USSR had existed since long before. There was a certain external influence from the military top of the USSR onto the Yugoslav military leadership, particularly with General Kadijevic, with whom close association existed. Kadijevic’s assessments of Gorbachev’s perestroika were negative, unlike the Soviet military top, which he assessed as positive (R. Dizdarevic, the aforementioned work, pp. 165-167). For more details on this, see: B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 141, 236, 276, 295, and the like.

adoption of the Slovene amendments".²⁰ In October, November, and December 1989, Jovic regularly **"talked"** with Milosevic (**"in private"**), with Kadijevec, Gracanin, and Trifunovic.²¹

On January 8, Gracanin also reported to Jovic. On January 10, he spent **"almost three hours in an open and friendly discussion with Milosevic"**, in a meeting, which, in addition to Milosevic, was also attended by Jovic, Trifunovic, Gracanin, and Zoran Sokolovic. Among other things, the conclusion to maintain a particularly **"close connection and cooperation with the Army..."** was then reached. **"The flag will be carried by the JNA, and we will be supporting them, so that we are not at the head, because this would discourage the Croats and Macedonians. The Army will also accept such a role"**.²²

Beginning in January 1990, Jovic spent more and more time with Kadijevec. On January 19, Kadijevec presented the assessments by the General Headquarters on the situation in Yugoslavia to him. After the Fourteenth Congress of the SKJ had been suspended, on January 26, Jovic invited Kadijevec in order **"to warn him of the threat to the integrity of the country, coming from direct separatist intentions"**. In his wish **"to prevent"** the secession of Slovenia, Jovic pointed towards the need to strengthen the military presence in this republic, then in Kosovo, and on the **"point critical to the security of the country and to the constitutional order, [in] the ethnically mixed environments, and in particular Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, even Macedonia"**, where **"interethnic conflicts and bloodshed could take place"**.²³

Starting from the assessment that Yugoslavia was threatened by internal rather than external elements, Jovic emphasized that the JNA, **"if so prepared and appropriately deployed, must be ready for action within hours, on all fronts"**. In relation to this, Kadijevec informed him

²⁰ Ibid., p. 57.

²¹ Ibid., pp. 57-87.

²² Ibid., p. 88.

²³ Ibid., pp. 91-94.

“that they were developing detailed plans, for any contingency. They are just working on this”.²⁴

In addition to Kadijevic, who had gathered the **“hardcore dogmatic group within the JNA”** around himself, all of them fully on the side of Milosevic,²⁵ General Blagoje Adzic, the chief of staff of the General Headquarters, became ever more involved in the discussions.²⁶ In a meeting with Jovic on February 13, in addition to Adzic, also attended by Milosevic, Kadijevic, Gracanin and Zelenovic, the Informal Group, which, together with the **Serb Coordination**, was exactly the military and political top of the Greater Serbia movement, concluded, **“there will be war”**.²⁷

In the meeting of the Presidency of the SFRY at the seat of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, on February 22, 1990, General Kadijevic reported **“on further steps in the construction of the concept of national defence”**, in which, in addition to **“the development of defence against external enemies in all variants and in the newly formed situation”**, he elaborated in more detail **“the aspect of the role of the Army in fighting ‘internal enemies’”**.²⁸ In a discussion in private with Jovic, on February 26, general Blagoje Adzic fiercely attacked Serb politics, believing that Serbia **“had been left on its own”**, and insisting on the fact that **“force must be used as a starting point, slowly moving to politics afterwards”**.²⁹

²⁴ Ibid., p. 94. Kadijevic said about these detailed plans that **“he would globally inform the whole Presidency”**, and also inform Jovic **“about the details”**. **“He will not inform Drnovsek about the details, because he is afraid that he would convey everything to the holders of separatist policy. Unfortunately. Every defence strategy or plan would become weak, if the opposing side would become familiar with it”** (Ibid.).

²⁵ B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, p. 166.

²⁶ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 95-103, and others.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 108.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 118. Jovic commented these activities in his memoirs: **“The Army felt the threats of civil war and division of Yugoslavia. At least that part of the army which had written the report”** (Ibid.).

²⁹ Ibid., pp.119-120.

In the spring of 1990, the military leadership was more public and more open in presenting its goals and claimed, **“only a strong, Unitarian state can overcome the current crisis, and that only in this way the JNA can retrieve its lost state”**. In this “quest for a state”, the military leadership, including General Kadijevic, literally claimed that it will fight for these socialist and communist ideas with arms.”³⁰

Starting from the assessment that the JNA did not have its state, since it, **“at first on legal grounds, and then also in fact, it became an army without its state”**, in the late eighties and early nineties, the military leadership joined by Milosevic and other holders of the Greater Serbia movement, started searching for a state that they could feel their own. They started creating a state for themselves and establishing its borders, because **“it was completely certain that, without a clearly defined new Yugoslav state”**, the JNA could not survive as it was and as it wanted to be.³¹ This state (Greater Serbia, with its western border on the Karlobag-Karlovac-Virovitica line, which would assemble all Serbs within it) was offered to the military leadership by Milosevic, and the army placed itself into his service,³² which was even admitted by Kadijevic, claiming, **“he is creating a new Yugoslav state... of the Serb and Montenegrin people”**.³³

In March 1990, contacts and discussions were continued between Jovic and Milosevic, as well as with Sokolovic, Radmilovic, Vucetic, and other head people of the Republic of Serbia, as well as with Kadijevic.³⁴ In **“a longer discussion”** on March 21, 1990, Milosevic and Jovic agreed

³⁰ M. Spegelj, the aforementioned work, p. 47. This claim was presented by General Kadijevic to the generals in the meeting held in the fall of 1988 at Topcider, which was also attended by General Spegelj. This meeting was also attended by pensioned Admiral Mamula (Ibid.).

³¹ Ibid., pp. 47-48; V. Kadijevic, the aforementioned work, p. 78.

³² M. Spegelj, the aforementioned work, p. 48.

³³ Ibid.; V. Kadijevic, the aforementioned work, pp. 90, and 93. Kadijevic made efforts to explain that **“the main motivation“** for such a position of theirs **“was not only in the need of the JNA to have its own state, but, primarily, in the belief that there are nations in Yugoslavia who really wish to live in a joint state, so such state should be created“** (V. Kadijevic, the aforementioned work, p. 90).

³⁴ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 123-124, 127-131, and others.

once again about the expulsion of Slovenia from Yugoslavia, stressing that, in their program of political combat, they needed to uphold **“the preservation of Yugoslavia as their goal”**. Jovic claimed, and Milosevic agreed with him that Yugoslavia could, according to them, go on without Slovenia, because in that case, it would make things easier for them; **“It will be easier to deal with the Croats without them”**.³⁵

At the meeting of the official **“Coordination”** in the Republic of Serbia, on March 26, 1990, attended by **“all the head officials of the Republic, of the SK, SSRN, the Trade Union, the Chamber of Commerce, the City”**, as well as Slobodan Gligorijevic-Ajga, the President of the Assembly of the SFRY, opinions were shared **“on the key issues of the political situation and the common orientation for the effort”**. It was assessed that **“the process of dissolution of Yugoslavia was taking place in a similar manner as it happened with the SKJ”**, and that it is irreversible. A further assessment was that Serbia should, be implementing, in such a situation, **“an overt policy for the survival of the Yugoslav federation, but it should also prepare for life without Yugoslavia”**. In case of the **“potential dissolution of the country”**, they were counting on union with Montenegro. They hence concluded that they would not be begging Macedonia.³⁶

At this meeting, the political leadership of Serbia **established its war objectives: to fight for territories**, and establish of a border **“within which there will be no war. Outside this border, war was unavoidable, as Bosnia and Herzegovina will not be able to survive as a state by itself, and fighting for territorial domination is hardly imaginable without bloodshed”**.³⁷

The Serb **“Coordination”** also concluded that Serbia **“will not give its consent to a confederation”**,³⁸ assessing that **“Yugoslavia**

³⁵ Ibid., p. 125.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 131. In a number of places, Jovic mentions the meetings and assessments by the **“coordination”** in the Presidency of Serbia (See: B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 87, and 135), which indicates that this could have been the actual leadership body of the Greater Serbia movement.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid. The political leadership of Serbia refused the option of a confederation: **“The only possible way to accept it, but not a viable one”** was, Jovic wrote, **“to provide**

will probably fall apart...”³⁹, and deciding that Serbia “should immediately proceed with the drafting of a new constitution which would be able to ‘cover’ the new, independent Serbian state”⁴⁰

In the adopted strategy of upcoming activities (**i.e. the break-up of Yugoslavia, establishment of war objectives and the formation of a new independent Serbian state**), the “**Coordination**”, among other things, also determined the position towards all the constitutive elements of the Federation. Thus, for instance, Serbia prevented the other republics from passing new constitutions, whereas it was the first one to adopt a constitution in breach of the Constitution of the SFRY. This strategy of actual behaviour was also accompanied by a plan for the delusion of both the national and global public. In this, they considered lies as “operational disguise”.

Such a concisely presented parallel (and double-faced) activity of the official bodies of Serbia, fully implemented in the years to come, indicates the relevant elements and methods of the Greater Serbia movement and the fact that it had thus far fully mastered the levers of power in Serbia and clearly shown the aspirations to do the same on the federal stage, in order to realize Greater Serbia. At the same time, the

contractual guarantees for the rights to the Serbian nation and other Yugoslav states. Because this would also be a provocative request, and hence non-viable, because the Serb nation would ultimately be tricked, even if everyone would accept this, realistically, Serbia has no reason at all to accept a confederation. That can not be imposed upon us by anyone” (Ibid.).

³⁹ Ibid. According to the assessment of the Greater Serbia movement, that is, the Serbian political leadership, Yugoslavia, as written by Jovic, “... **shall fall apart in a way already clearly visible: the republics will one by one (starting with Slovenia) pass new constitutions, which will be in breach with the applicable Constitution of Yugoslavia, and there will be no consensus about the new Constitution of Yugoslavia. In this way, Yugoslavia will disappear, and the (non-realizable) issue of confederation will be raised, with conflicts occurring due to lack of agreement by the Serb nation in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina with such national positions (i.e. separation from their ‘mother republics’ and conversion into ethnic minorities)**” – Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 132. In relation to this, it was assessed that “**luckily, the constitutional amendments to the Constitution of the SR of Serbia, of February 28, 1989, established state-level competencies of the SR Serbia on its whole territory. Serbia must be ready for the forthcoming developments which are imposed against its will**” (Ibid.).

intentions were covered up with the alleged fight for the preservation and strengthening of the Yugoslav federation. This double-sided politics will remain a constant in the conduct of the Greater Serbia movement.

At the session of the Presidency of the SFRY on April 3, 1990, Kadijevic reported about the situation in the country, in which, starting from the assessment **“that the disruption of the constitutional system of the country is a mass phenomenon, [and] that the country is threatened by chaos and civil war”**, he advocated in favour of **“consistent”** protection of the constitutional order, through the enforcement of the Constitution of the SFRY and through undertaking measures **“against all who do not abide by it, in order to support the integrity of the SIV programme, and not just certain parts of it, and to intensify work on the new Constitution”**. Jovic had been thinking about these proposals for measures and the evolution of the military perception for a long time.⁴¹

Three weeks later (on April 26, 1990), afraid (**“nervous and upset by the situation”**), Kadijevic reported to Jovic (the future President of the Presidency of the SFRY) again, believing that this meeting and the discussion **“were more important than all the sessions and all discussions”** that could be held in Yugoslavia at the time, indicating to him the prevention of the **“ripping apart of Yugoslavia”** and of **“civil war”**, presenting **“the overall assessment of the newly created situation”** (**“of the international situation, and the situation in the country”**) and the proposals **“as to what has to be done”**. In relation to this, he indicated that **“all possible options for action and deployment of the JNA had been developed, [i.e.] that the plans had already been prepared”**, at which, **“just like in Kosovo, in all the critical parts of the country, primarily in Croatia and Slovenia, he had ensured that their control over everything be established within the shortest time possible”**. In presenting such proposals, Kadijevic told Jovic that

⁴¹ Ibid., pp. 133-137; **THE ARCHIVES OF THE INSTITUTE FOR INVESTIGATION OF THE CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN SARAJEVO** (hereinafter referred to as: AIIZ), inv. No. 2-2442, the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence, confidential, no. 490-1, March 21, 1991, Sarajevo – to the District Headquarters of Territorial Defence Tuzla, Information on Current Events.

what **“he can not present anywhere”** what he was about to tell him, because, according to him, there is no institution **“where this can be discussed”**. In relation to this, Jovic states that **“it all boiled down to that it was all good, after all”**, that **“they have set the pace for further work”**, that this should remain the way it is, during his chairmanship of the Council for the Protection of the Constitutional Order, where **“the main things were to happen”**, and then, once he takes on the function of the President at the Presidency, they should continue, since, according to him, **“otherwise it would not be viable, at least that was clear”**. On that day, among other things, Jovic was reasoning: **“Let Slovenia secede if they want to, it would even be better that way”**.⁴²

In late April 1990, in a meeting at General Kadijevic’s office, while assessing the situation in the country, it was agreed that General Adzic would travel to Paris, Admiral Brovet to Moscow (to meet Marshall Yazov), and retired Admiral Mamula to London, to present **“our view of the situation”**, and indicate **“the measures we will undertake, if forced to”**.⁴³

On May 4th and 11th, 1990, the sessions of the Federal Council for the Protection of the Constitutional Order were held on **the situation in the country**. The first one, according to Jovic, achieved **“an exceptional unity on all terms”**, and the second one unanimously adopted **“an exceptionally good document on the situation in the country”**.⁴⁴

The function of the President of the Council for Protection of the Constitutional Order, which he **“fought for very hard”**, and which he

⁴² B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 139-143.

⁴³ B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, pp. 181-182. In early July 1990, Admiral Brovet reported on his trip to Moscow and the discussions he had with Yazov.

General Adzic visited the French Army General Headquarters. In late November 1990, Admiral Mamula visited London (For more details, please see: B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, pp. 181-184).

⁴⁴ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 145. In assessing the session dated May 11, 1990, Jovic wrote in his memoirs: **“Ante Markovic was in Iraq and could not bother us. This provided an excellent basis for a discussion at the Assembly of the SFRY, following the presidential elections”** (Ibid.).

acquired four months later (September 14, 1989),⁴⁵ allowed Jovic to effect

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 48. In mid-May 1989, Slobodan Milosevic agreed with Dragutin Zelenovic, member of the Presidency of the SFRY from Vojvodina, to propose Jovic for President of the Council for the Protection of the Constitutional Order. In addition, Milosevic had also discussed this with Rahman Morina, President of the Provincial Committee of the SK of Kosovo (to influence Riza Sapunxiu, member of the Presidency of the SFRY from Kosovo, to support this), and with Nenad Bucina, member of the Presidency of the SFRY from Montenegro (Ibid., p. 9).

During the discussion between Drnovsek and Jovic on the main tasks of the Presidency, on the division and style of work, etc., Jovic openly said that he was interested in becoming the President of the Council for the Protection of the Constitutional Order. Drnovsek opposed this, believing **“that this could not be, because the federal secretary for interior is [also] from Serbia”**, and Jovic responded to this by saying that **“this is no formal or actual obstacle, if the trust is there. Neither the Constitution nor the laws contain such a restriction. There is apparently traditional mistrust against officials from Serbia involved here”**, wrote Jovic (Ibid., pp. 7-8, 11, 25, 29, etc.).

The first meeting of the Presidency of the SFRY on the agenda, current tasks and assignment of duties, on May 17, 1989, also discussed the issue of the Council for the Protection of the Constitutional Order. Drnovsek, as the President of the Presidency, proposed that he personally lead the Council, until the members from the Presidency from Bosnia and Herzegovina are elected, and that the Jovic and Bucin should be members of the council. This was even adopted this way. However, it was not clear to Jovic **“what these arrangements of Slobodan’s mean. It seems that his partners in discussion are not aware of what kind of a period we are entering, and what such an easy-going and even frivolous conduct means”** (Ibid.).

On August 24, 1989, Jovic agreed with Zelenovic and Bucin as to the **“successful”** solution to the issue of the President of the Council for the Protection of the Constitutional Order, which, as claimed by Jovic, was to be decided upon at the following session. Jovic wrote about this in his memoirs as follows: **“We still need Riza and Vasil. It is pointless talking to them. I will ask Slobo [Milosevic] to arrange that through Rahman and Pancevski.**

Slobo agrees. He will also talk to Vasil in person...” (Ibid., pp. 46-47).

At the session of September 14, 1989, the Presidency of the SFRY adopted a decision on the composition of the Council for the Protection of the Constitutional Order: Borisav Jovic (chairman), and members Bogic Bogicevic and Vasil Tupurkovski (Ibid., p. 48).

On September 25, 1989, the Council for the Protection of the Constitutional Order held a session at which, in reference to the amendments to the Constitution of Slovenia, General Kadijevic also presented **“the concept of action if the Slovenes adopt the amendments”**, which did not satisfy Jovic, because the military top had abandoned **“the prevention of non-constitutional conduct...”**, whereby, according to

the virtually parallel work of the Informal Group, which, as he himself said, had made decisions on everything. It was formed in the first half of August 1989, in Kupari, when many strategic and tactical issues were developed for the realization of complete domination within the SFRY, or for its reduction to a Greater Serbia.⁴⁶ In those terms, it was fully in the function of implementation of the policy of the official **Coordination** of the Republic of Serbia, as established on March 26, 1990.

The order for disarmament of the Territorial Defence (TO) of the non-Serb republics, dated May 14, 1990,⁴⁷ is one of the key moves by the aforementioned Informal Group, that could not be resisted by the Republics. On the next day, the military leadership issued an order to reclassify and reorganize a portion of the JNA units from type B into type A, and to form special mobile units, with the majority of their forces deployed in places dominated by the Serbs.⁴⁸

From the arrival of Borisav Jovic, Milosevic's exponent, as head of the Presidency of the SFRY, on May 15, 1990, the Group was performing its para-function even more thoroughly, implementing the policy established on March 26, at the **Serbian Coordination**. Over the coming period, Borisav Jovic remained in constant contact and had secret

Jovic, **“they had radically withdrawn”**. In relation to this, among other things, he concluded: **“It is a major question whether the Army or Veljko could be trusted, if such major oscillations in the positions occur”** (Ibid., pp. 53-54).

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 45.

⁴⁷ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-917, the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence, no. DT [state secret; note by the author], September 14, 1990 – to the Presidency of SR BiH.

Eighteen days before passing this order (April 26, 1990, in the discussion with Jovic, providing **“an analysis”** of the international situation and **“the domestic political scene”**, Kadijevic indicated the significance of placing of the republic competencies in the TO domain under the control of the JNA (**“The republics even have certain competencies in relation to the territorial defence, which must be placed under JNA control to the maximum extent”**) – B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 139-143.

⁴⁸ D. Marijan, **JUGOSLAVENSKA NARODNA ARMIJA U AGRESIJI NA REPUBLIKU HRVATSKU 1990. – 1992.** (hereinafter referred to as: **JUGOSLAVENSKA NARODNA ARMIJA...**), *Casopis za suvremenu povijest* 33, no. 2, Croatian Institute for History, Zagreb 2001, pp. 293-294.

discussions with Slobodan Milosevic, General Veljko Kadijevic, and Petar Gracanin. While declaring themselves to be advocating in favour of the preservation of Yugoslavia, Milosevic and Jovic were developing plans for a new Yugoslavia.

At the session of the Presidency of the SFRY on May 15, 1990, on the occasion of taking on the duties of the President, in implementing the conclusions of the **Coordination**, Jovic openly (“**clearly and publicly**”) presented his position on the future of Yugoslavia, opening up the process of its dissolution: “**whoever wishes to do so may leave Yugoslavia in peace... and no one can be forced to stay in Yugoslavia, if they do not wish so, but unconstitutional and unlawful arbitrary conduct can not be tolerated**”.⁴⁹

In a discussion with Jovic, on June 8, 1990, Kadijevic (“**confused and disappointed at the decision of the leadership of Serbia to form the Socialist Party**”, because, according to him, this “**meant the definite break-up of Yugoslavia**”) informed him on the **new deployment of the army, on foreign policy undertakings by the military top, on “new information about American actions against Yugoslavia” and about the passing of the decision for the formation of special motorized corps in the regions of Zagreb, Knin, Banja Luka, and Herzegovina, “which can, if needed, be deployed just like in Kosovo**”.⁵⁰

⁴⁹ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 145. On occasion of taking on the duty of the President of the Presidency of the SFRY on May 15, 1990, Jovic held an inauguration speech, which, according to him, “**received very much publicity and was an object of strong division – approval and disapproval**”, in which for the first time he “**clearly and publicly said that whoever wants may leave Yugoslavia in a peaceful way. We need to pass a law on secession and no one can be forced to stay in Yugoslavia, if they do not wish so, but unconstitutional and unlawful arbitrary conduct can not be tolerated.**” (Ibid.). This session was also attended by all the presidents of the republics (Ibid.).

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 152. In relation to this, Kadijevic also informed Jovic that he would be having “**a series of discussions with the ‘foreign factors’ (Brovat in Moscow, Adzic in Paris and London, Veljko would call on the US minister), so that they can explain to them that such US policy towards Yugoslavia would contribute to its dissolution, and will demand that they stop interfering with its internal affairs**” (Ibid.).

Two weeks earlier (April 26), in a discussion with Jovic, speaking about the international situation, Kadijevic stated that he would gladly send General Adzic to France and England “**to visit some military exhibitions**”, where he would “**clearly let**

The new army deployment and the formation of special motorized operational units (rather than corpses) in the regions of Zagreb, Knin, Banja Luka and Herzegovina (the Armour Brigade in Capljina) was directly linked to the plan for the expulsion of Slovenia and Croatia from the SFRY, i.e. the development (or reworking) of the RAM plan, which is evident from these armoured units, and the formation of the “**new Yugoslavia**”, whose “**swift creation**” the military leadership was advocating in favour of.⁵¹

The foreign policy actions of the military top were neither constitutional nor legally possible. The departures of Admiral Brovet to Moscow and General Adzic to Paris and London were not coordinated at the level of the Government. These activities could in any case be in the function of checking the pulse in relation to the plan to expulse Slovenia and Croatia out of Yugoslavia, that is, to form a new Yugoslavia, whereby it would be converted into Greater Serbia.

After Jovic’s speech at the Assembly of the SFRY (May 28, 1990 – “**The official report on the situation in the country and on the basic tasks we are facing**”), in mid-June, the military leadership decided, “**to develop the further course of activities in the protection of the constitutional order**”.⁵²

Milosevic and Jovic’s proposal for expulsion of Slovenia out of Yugoslavia, expanded to also include Croatia, was presented to General Kadijevic by Jovic, in assessing “**the situation in the country based on current events**”, in a discussion on June 27, 1990.⁵³ At the time, Jovic proposed to Kadijevic that he would “**be most happy to force Slovenia and Croatia out of Yugoslavia, by simply cutting the**

them know that we shall not allow the dissolution of the country or the civil war to happen”. This was commented by Jovic in the following manner: “**The dissolution of the country has already started, the English can see that just like we can, or even better than us!**” (Ibid., p. 141).

⁵¹ V. Kadijevic, the aforementioned work, p. 90.

⁵² B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 149-150, and 154. Kadijevic informed Jovic about this on June 15, when he stated that in he would have the proposals prepared within a week’s time.

⁵³ Ibid., pp. 159-160.

border off and by pronouncing that it was their own decisions that had brought them into such a situation". However, by expelling Slovenia and Croatia out of Yugoslavia, Jovic did not know what to do with the Serbs in Croatia. At this, he allegedly did not agree **"with the use of force, but rather placing them** (Slovenia and Croatia; note by the author) **before a fait accompli"**, believing that **"action needs to be developed in this direction, with an option to hold a referendum based on which the final setting of the borders would be decided upon, before their 'final' expulsion"**.⁵⁴

General Kadjevic as well agreed with the "strategy" for the break-up of Yugoslavia, but both of them were concerned about how to secure the majority in the Presidency for such a decision, **"because the Macedonian and the Albanian will boycott, they will be against it"**. In relation to this, they concluded that **"the Bosnian** [Bogic Bogicevic; note by the author] **is the key man, he needs to be worked on"**. In the end, Jovic and Kadjevic agreed to think it over for a week, and then to meet again.⁵⁵

On the next day, Milosevic too agreed once more on the expulsion (**"throwing out"**) of Slovenia and Croatia from Yugoslavia. In the discussion he had with Jovic, about the situation in the country and in Serbia, on June 28, he requested an answer from the President of the Presidency **"...whether the army will execute such an order?"** Jovic answered in the affirmative (the army **"must execute the order"**) and that he should not doubt it, however, he did indicate upon the issues **"of the Serbs in Croatia and the majority in the Presidency of the SFRY which needed to be secured for such a decision"**.⁵⁶

At that time, Milosevic had precisely designed the borders and the method of **"cutting off"** Croatia, by keeping those places in which

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ibid. In the discussion with Kadjevic related to the expulsion of Slovenia and Croatia out of Yugoslavia, Jovic also talked to Petar Gracanin on the same day, who had briefed him **"on the current security situation in the country"** and notified him that the Slovenes had decided **"to dissolve the State Security Service"** (Ibid., p. 160).

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 161.

Serb collaborationist creations were active, within the borders of the future Serb state, that is, Greater Serbia. Namely, he presented **“two ideas: firstly, that the ‘cutting off’ of Croatia be done in such a way as to leave the Lika, Banija, and Kordun municipalities, which have created a community, on our side, and have these people hold a referendum later on, in order to declare whether they want to stay or leave; and secondly, that the members of the Presidency of the SFRY from Slovenia and Croatia be excluded from voting on the decision, because they do not represent the part of Yugoslavia which is adopting it. If the Bosnian [Bogic Bogicevic; note by the author] is in favour, then we have the two-thirds majority”**.⁵⁷

Milosevic had appealed for having this decision adopted as soon as possible (**“no later than within a week”**, **“if we want to save the country”**), because **“without Croatia and Slovenia”**, the future Yugoslavia, that is, Greater Serbia, **“will have some 17 million inhabitants”**, which was, according to him, enough **“for European circumstances”**.⁵⁸

After Slovenia had announced its **“Declaration of Independence”**, and the Kosovo Assembly pronounced **“the Kosovo Republic”** (on July 2, 1990), on July 4, 1990, Jovic discussed the newly created situation with Kadujevic. The general’s assessment was that the Presidency of the SFRY needs **“to manifest, in a concrete manner, that the deployment of the army is about to happen”**, and, in the second stage, to pass **“the actual decision”** for its use. If the Presidency could not pass such a decision, then, according to him, **“other options must be sought”**, which they needed to reach an agreement on. In relation to this, he claimed that **“on this issue, they have a developed plan for Kosovo, Slovenia and Croatia”**, and that **“the plan is also being prepared for the deployment of army in the whole country, which will be ready within days, although this will not be necessary in the rest of the country, unless they introduce a state of emergency in the whole country”**.⁵⁹

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 12. When questioned by Jovic **“which ‘these other options’ are”**, Kadujevic answered: **“if the Presidency is not able to perform its function and to adopt a decision on the defence of the country’s integrity, the army would even**

Ante Markovic categorically refused the involvement of the Army in fighting **“anti-constitutional”** conduct.⁶⁰

On July 13, Kadijevic informed Jovic **“about the new developments in the situation, and on the preparation of the army”**, where the

execute the order issued by only a group of members of the Presidency, although they may not be the qualified majority”. Jovic refrained from commenting this, but in his memoirs, he noted as follows: **“According to Veljko, the Presidency needs to make an assessment of the danger to the territorial integrity and constitutional order of the country, so that these could later be used to undertake emergency measures. He also wanted the SIV to strictly implement the Constitution and the laws, and he wanted the Assembly of the SFRY to pronounce the Slovene ‘Declaration’ invalid, to order the placement of the JNA into an initial status of alert, to determine the timeframe and manner for passing a new Constitution of the SFRY, and a Law on Secession”** (Ibid., p. 162).

The placing of the Army in the first degree of alert, according to Jovic, **“would mean that the army should complete their plans and suspend all leaves, retrieve people back, and the like. At the border, all measures should be undertaken to prevent the realization of Slovene intentions to have their police take over control of the border; in the remaining 12 Slovene municipalities, confiscate the weapons from the TO, etc.”** (Ibid., p. 163).

What was done by the Slovenes and the **“separatists”** in Kosovo, according to Jovic, **“was an attack on the concept of the Presidency of the SFRY”**. Therefore, we needed to **“accelerate the work on the new Constitution of the SFRY, because the things were quickly getting complicated”**. Immediately after discussions with the republics and provinces were completed, a concept was needed to allow the **declaration of the citizens at a referendum”** (Ibid., p. 163).

Jovic further wrote that Kadijevic did not even mention their agreement of June 27, for expulsion of Slovenia and Croatia from Yugoslavia. Therefore he asked him **“why he had not adjusted the whole action to that now”**, and he was answered that **“we first need to try and do the things in the order ‘established’ by the Assembly”**. However, according to Jovic, the Assembly **“had not ‘established’ anything, it was just been acquainted with what we were doing”**. Therefore Jovic concluded: **“this will happen just like with the Slovene amendments. They want to, and they don’t. They can, and then they can’t. An unbelievable instability and indecisiveness. It is hard to say why this is so. Whenever he leaves and then comes back, he brings proposals different than those we had agreed upon, and we are not able to obtain the majority of the Presidency members so easily, even for when the Army agrees, let alone if it Army doesn’t”** (Ibid.).

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 164.

President of the Presidency of the SFRY began doubting **“the value of all these reports he provides whenever he does not show actual decisiveness to do anything radical in order to stop the negative courses”**.⁶¹

After Kadijevec had informed him, based on **“completely reliable sources”** on the policy of the HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union) of Croatia towards the JNA, Jovic concluded that the only solution is to **“set the borders towards them with casualties among the Serbian nation as low as possible, while ensuring that the Serbs in the Krajina areas do not remain in such a Croat state”**. **“To strive towards their defeat and towards teaching them a lesson”**, according to Jovic, is **“a blatant stupidity that would turn back on us, for ever and ever”**.⁶²

Obviously, upon the requests of Jovic’s Informal Group, and in compliance with the goals of the Greater Serbia movement, in spite of Kadijevec’s indecisiveness, in mid-July, the military leadership **made a “definite” plan for the use of the army in the case that the Presidency of the SFRY introduced a state of emergency**.⁶³ Kadijevec informed

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 166.

⁶² Ibid., p. 168. In relation to this, he wrote: **“To strive towards their defeat and towards teaching them a lesson is a blatant stupidity that would turn back on us, for ever and ever”** (Ibid.).

⁶³ Ibid., p. 170. The leadership of the Greater Serbia movement, including its military segment, was stubbornly trying to prove the existence of an emergency (‘extraordinary circumstances’) in the country. After the disarmament of the Territorial Defence, on May 21, 1990, the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY issued a Directive on the Use of the Armed Forces of the SFRY Under Extraordinary Circumstances. Pursuant to this Directive, the commands of the military districts were to develop options for extraordinary circumstances on the whole territory of their districts. The prompt army and military police battalions were the initial force wave, which were (in late July) replaced by all the battalions of type A. (For more details on this, please see the well-grounded study: D. Marijan, **ORUZANE SNAGE SFRJ U IZVANREDNIM PRILIKAMA** (hereinafter referred to as: **ORUZANE SNAGE...**), *Casopis za suvremenu povijest* 34, no. 2, the Croatian Institute for History, Zagreb 2002, pp. 360-374).

The leadership of the Greater Serbia movement had been counting that the first “extraordinary circumstance” was created in the country **“through the organization of the Serbs into partisan units”** in Croatia, in July 1990, and the **“log revolution”** in Knin on August 17, 1990. It is characteristic that directly before this uprising, on

Jovic to that effect (between July 13 and 18), who pointed out that it **“was important to take timely decisions”, which would be proposed by the army.** In addition to this, Jovic also insisted on the approach of **preventive action (“so that we may act preventively”) “as much as possible”.** If the **“announced measures”** are adopted in Slovenia on July 18, Jovic believed that the **“a raised degree of alert”** should be ordered for the army.⁶⁴

In early August 1990, according to the agreement with Jovic (and Milosevic), the army was **“preparing all the proposals”** about which Kadijevic had reported to Jovic during the discussion in Kupari, on August 6. However, the use of the army (i.e. the implementation of those proposals) required an ensured majority at the Presidency, which could happen to **“be delicate”.** In order to bring Bogic Bogicevic, as Jovic wrote, **“to our side”**, they had to impose a session of the Council for the Protection of the Constitutional Order on him, which he was chairman of at the time, whereby he would have to be **“on the side of the law and the Constitution”.**⁶⁵

August 14, the Fifth Military District issued an **Order for the Increase of the Combat Preparedness of Units**, which was followed two days later by the **Directive for the Use of Units of the Fifth Military District under Emergency Circumstances** (Ibid., pp. 369-370; B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 170, and 178-179).

⁶⁴ Ibid. In those terms, Jovic was adamant: **“either they will accept the political approach presented at the Assembly of the SFRY, or we will be forced to use the emergency measures”.** In this, he declared as follows: **“Our goal is to have the peoples declare themselves in a referendum as to whether they wish to remain in the federation or to leave, and this is to be done now while the present composition of the Assembly of the SFRY is still functioning”** (Ibid.).

In his memoirs between July 13 and 18, among other things, Jovic noted down that the Serbs in Croatia **“started to organize themselves into partisan units”**, and that **“the Serbs in the Serb municipalities requested us to leave them the TO weapons”.** In relation to this, he wrote as having said to General Kadijevic **“that they should have left [the weapons] to them”**, but he allegedly did not agree with this, which was commented by Jovic as follows: **“They will get them on their own. And I believe they already have them”** (Ibid.). Obviously, Jovic knew very well that the Serbs in Croatia had been well armed.

⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 175.

Spending the whole day aboard of a ship and at the seaside (at the island of Mljet) on an outing, with Milosevic, Kadijevic and Bogdanovic (the Serbian Secretary for the Interior) with their families, on August 10, 1990, Jovic used the opportunity for **“a broader exchange of opinions”**, where he **“talked many matters over, separately with Veljko and Sloba respectively”**, at which **“they talked very little”** as a group. In relation to this, it was assessed **“that the resolution of the Yugoslav political crisis must be effected while Jovic is still heading the Presidency of the SFRY”**, because afterwards **“they could be completely without power”**. Therefore, the leadership of the Greater Serbia movement assessed that they needed to **“make certain movements leading towards [the solution]”**.⁶⁶

In addition to the assessment that stopping Ante Markovic **“is a big issue”**, among other things, Jovic then told Milosevic that he was no longer sure that Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina would not accept the confederation. If this is to be accepted, Jovic thought that they could do that as well, **“but in that case, Serbia and Montenegro would make up one state and that the citizens from the border areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Serbian Krajina areas should be given the opportunity to declare they wish to live in”**. At this, Milosevic claimed **“that a referendum could resolve the problem of the Serbs from Bosnia along the Drina river”**, however, according to Jovic, he did not like **such an approach**, because he did not see the solution for **“the Serbian Krajina”**, **“which could remain cut off from Serbia.”**⁶⁷

Obviously, over the first three months of Jovic’s presidential mandate, the leadership of the Greater Serbia movement made plans and constituted mechanisms, defining the objectives and the manners to implement the activities in the formation of the unified Serb state. To this goal, a period for the reorganization of the SFRY into Greater Serbia was also established. August already marked the beginning of

⁶⁶ Ibid., pp. 175-176.

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 176. In addition, according to Jovic, Milosevic believed **“that the Macedonians need to stay independent, if they demand so”**.

its implementation. The main goal was not to allow Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina become independent states and take out “the Serb areas” from their composition, that is, the areas they believed were constituent parts of Greater Serbia. Advocating in favour of the survival of Yugoslavia, from mid-1990, Ante Markovic became a “**big issue**” for the leadership of the Greater Serbia movement. They did not favour a prosperous or any other type of Yugoslavia, unless it was Greater Serbia.

The destruction of the republics affected by this began with the well-prepared armed uprising in Knin. “**The Serbs in Croatia stood up to their feet**”, “**they are getting prepared for a referendum on Serb autonomy in Croatia**”, and “**Bosnian Krajina threatens to join the Knin one, even if they need to use arms to do so Herzegovina as well**”, and the like.⁶⁸ In Knin, the President of the Municipality, Babic “**declared the state of war, the town to be defended on barricades,**

⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 178. In the surroundings of Knin, on August 17, 1990, armed civilians of Serb nationality disrupted communications and carried out an attack against the sovereignty of the Republic of Croatia. On the following day, Serb insurgents attacked police stations in Donji Lapac, Titova Korenica, Gracac, Obrovac, Benkovac, Petrinja, Glina, and Drvar na Uni (D. Marijan, **JUGOSLAVENSKA NARODNA ARMIJA ...**, pp. 294-295).

The favourable deployment of the Ninth Corps in Kninska [“Serbian”] Krajina, where Milosevic’s state security service was “**pulling all the strings**”, allowing the Serb insurgents to work “**on the establishment of their own armed units and to expand the insurrection to other parts of the Republic of Croatia**” (D. Marijan, the aforementioned work, p. 295; B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, p. 237).

Those attacks against the sovereignty of the Republic of Croatia also received strong support from the Serbs in Bosnian Krajina and Serbia, at rallies, with invitations to take up arms (D. Marijan, the aforementioned work, p. 294). In relation to this, Admiral Mamula claims that “**the initial armed conflicts of the Serbs with the HDZ police forces in August 1990 gave a broad way to the Chetnik orientations**” (B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, p. 234).

Since August 1990, on the territory of the so-called SAO (Serb Autonomous District of) Krajina in Croatia, the JNA was offering the material, technical and logistical support and organizing the insurgent groups. On the same day when Babic pronounced the “**state of war**” in Knin, on August 17, 1990, in expectance of an intervention by legal authorities, General Adzic threatened publicly: “**If only a single Serb head falls down, there will be bloodshed!**” (S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, pp. 149, and 188-189). For this also see: D. Marijan, **ORUZANE SNAGE...**, pp. 368 and 370).

with the army out on the streets and taking major points and institutions under its command”.⁶⁹

The reaction of the JNA was planned – not to stop the uprising, as they did in Kosovo, but to prevent the legal police forces from doing that.⁷⁰

On September 4, 1990, Veljko Kadijevic communicated **“the most recent assessment of the military and political situation”** to Jovic. The political situation, according to the general, was characterized by **“a clear anti-communist, anti-socialist front”**, which, according to him, **“was first of all, the ‘anti-Serb’ one: Croatia, Slovenia, Kosovo, the strong anti-Serb forces in BiH, the coordination between the HDZ and the fundamentalists, the anti-Serbism in Macedonia and in Montenegro”**. In assessing the concept for the resolution of the Yugoslav crisis, which was presented in May at the Assembly of the SFRY, Kadijevic supported the position of the Presidency of the SFRY, which, according to him, **“was the only acceptable one”**. In relation to this, he brought up three proposals **“in order to unconditionally insist on the concept of the Presidency of the SFRY and fully prevent the policy of ‘fait accompli’ which is being used”**, according to him, **“to create a confederative system in the country”**⁷¹, **“block partial**

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 179. Tudjman sent a telegram to Jovic stating **“that the insurrection in the Serb municipalities in Croatia started after”** Jovic’s **“reception with the delegation of Serbs from Croatia, several days ago”**. In relation to this, Jovic wrote that Tudjman told him **“between the lines”** that it was him who had incited the Serbs to insurgence. Jovic commented such a statement by Milosevic in the following way: **“He either forgot that the insurrection of Serbs came after his arrival to power, or he is pretending to be crazy!”** (Ibid.).

⁷⁰ D. Marijan, **JUGOSLAVENSKA NARODNA ARMIIJA ...**, p. 294. Immediately after the first day, when the armed local Serbs came out onto the road, the JNA sided along with them. The attempt of the special units of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Croatia to crush the insurrection at its beginning was prevented by the JNA – through the use of military aircraft. The SSNO communicated that the reason for the intervention of the Military Air Forces was the flight of Croatian helicopters without prior announcement and approval of the flying corridor (Ibid.; S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. 23).

⁷¹ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 190. Therefore, according to him, **“it is necessary to bring up the initiative to the Assembly of the SFRY as early as in September”**.

constitutional changes”,⁷² and **“strongly and energetically stop any further unconstitutional changes of the country’s system through decisions by the republics, primarily in the sphere of national defence”**. At this, he openly advocated for the use of armed force: **“one must also be ready for the use of arms in Slovenia as early as in September, in Croatia maybe in October, and in Kosovo at any time”**.⁷³

Then Kadijevic also presented the information that the Army **“had updated all the defence plans in case of its own action, including the option for intervention by the NATO forces”**. In relation to this, he stated that **“the Army is fully prepared, although there are certain individuals who have gone out of their minds”**.⁷⁴

On September 12, Milosevic told Jovic that allegedly, in the organization of Ante Markovic, a **“plan was created”** for **“the break-up of the unity of the Serbian leadership”**, whose main part was to bring Milosevic and Jovic apart, **“because the others do not have such specific weight”**.⁷⁵

⁷² Ibid. Such changes, according to Kadijevic, should **“be allowed only if they strengthen the federal Yugoslav state, but not if through partial adoption they destroy its content”**. According to him, the elections in the republics could not be prevented, but he believed that **“it was necessary that they took place in Serbia as soon as possible, because the victory of the Socialist Party would have a positive influence on the decisions of the voters in the other republics, too”**. The federal elections should not be held before passing of the new Constitution, concluded Kadijevic.

⁷³ Ibid. Kadijevic “substantiated” the use of the army in the following way: **“The developments arising from all these events should no longer be dealt with preventively, as before, but left so that unrests can break, and then used to dismiss those who have lead to such a situation. The preventive action of the army would make sense if we wanted to help the ruling political factor to consolidate, which is no longer the case, at least not in Croatia and Slovenia. Therefore, they need to be let play the right cards, and then we will have the arguments to clarify the propriety of our action to the world”** (Ibid.).

⁷⁴ Jovic commented on the aforementioned Kadijevic’s “tactics” for the use of army in this way: **“This new ‘tactics’ is now strange, so that we do not act preventively, but we let them violate laws so we can catch them at work? Haven’t we already caught enough of them at work? Their works are there, but our works are nowhere. I did not comment”** (Ibid., pp. 190-191).

⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 195.

During the activities of the Presidency of the SFRY on the resolution of the constitutional crisis in the country, Jovic did not wish to involve Ante Markovic, “**simply**” because he was allegedly “**against that concept, and would only bother them**”, and he could also influence “**the division in the Presidency**”. In this, he was heartily supported by General Kadijevec, who in his discussion with Jovic on September 14, claimed that the SIV “**is a true anti-communist nest, and the loudest members of the SIV are the ones from Serbia (except for Pero Gracanin) and Vukotic from Montenegro. A part of the SIV does not understand what this is all about and still obeys the boss**”,⁷⁶ that is, Ante Markovic.

While informing Jovic about the conduct of Ante Markovic and the SIV in relation to the Slovenes serving in the army, in a discussion on September 21, Kadijevec mentioned that the President of the Federal Government “**obviously does not wish to take the decision on taking over of the mobilization tasks by the SSNO, and the Slovenes do not want to send recruits to the Army outside Slovenia**”.⁷⁷

While Jovic was in New York, on September 30, Kadijevec phoned him and informed him that “**the things got complicated in Slovenia and Croatia**”, and he believed that Jovic needs to return immediately.⁷⁸

⁷⁶ Ibid., pp. 195-196. In the fall of 1990, General Kadijevec and the military leadership essentially stopped cooperating with the SIV. They took away the constitutional function of the country’s defence from the SIV (I. Vejinovic, **BARBARSKA DESTRUKCIJA**, in: F. Ademovic, the aforementioned work, p. 174).

⁷⁷ Ibid., pp. 195-196. According to Jovic, Kadijevec “**had an apprehension**” of what would happen in Slovenia when the President of the Presidency of the SFRY travels to New York for the session of the UN and the Summit on Children. “**If there are troubles**”, Kadijevec believed that Jovic must return back prematurely. In relation to this, in his memoirs, Jovic noted down: “**I have a feeling that he picked up some insecurity somewhere, just like something crucial could happen in the next few days**” (Ibid.).

⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 197. Jovic decided to stay “**for just one more day to meet George H. W. Bush**”, the US President, whom he met and talked to on October 1, 1990. For this, see: B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 197-201.

During this discussion, Secretary of State James Baker initiated the issue of the overhaul of Iraqi MIG fighter planes in Yugoslavia. Jovic responded as follows: “**This issue is clear. We have the contract from an earlier period, from before the crisis,**

Upon his return from New York, on October 2, Jovic went straight from the airport to the session of the Presidency, at which the decision was passed **“for the SSNO to take over the command over the TO of Slovenia”**, then it was ordered **“that Croatia should stop molesting the Serbs using special police forces in Banija, and that they should release the detainees”**.⁷⁹ At this session, Ante Markovic informed **“that he would not yet take the decision on the SSNO taking over the mobilization of the recruits in Slovenia”**.⁸⁰ Jovic was discussing this with Kadijevec on October 3. **“What if Ante does not take such a decision?”** In that case, according to Jovic, Kadijevec was supposed to inform the Presidency and the Assembly, in which the Presidency would approach the Assembly **“to raise the issue of a possible vote of non-confidence to the SIV”**, whereby they would give Markovic **“10 more days, because he is going to Romania”**. Kadijevec returned to him, **“casually, that only one hundred people need to be ‘removed’, and everything would be alright”**. Even more so, because, according to Kadijevec, **“should the need arise, the Army is preparing such plans”**.⁸¹

to repair 16 Iraqi MIG fighter airplanes. They will not be delivered to Iraq now. Two were disassembled in the workshop, and they were reassembled and tested, that is, they were relocated, in order not to obstruct regular work in the workshop. ‘The planes were stored in a secure place and we guarantee you that they will not be delivered’, I said.

President Bush was grateful for this kind of an attitude” (Ibid., pp. 200-201).

⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 201. On that same day, Jovic received **“some thirty most reputable Serbs from Croatia”**, who claimed **“that the armed conflict between the Serbs and the Croatian authorities is just about to happen”**.

⁸⁰ Ibid. In relation to this, in his memoirs, Jovic noted down: **“I guess he is going to try to convince them that they take this over. [sic] We almost argued about this. I told him that he was digging his own grave. He was very cross. He has to be nice to me, he is just putting up with me, but I don’t know how long I can put up with him.**

He claims that he wants to convince them some more, that he is still trying. And in fact, he is benefiting them. Either he does not dare or he does not want to go against them. The solution is really inevitable. We can not go on like this any longer” (Ibid.).

⁸¹ Ibid. In mentioning such plans, Kadijevec then said that he would show them to Jovic. However, Jovic doubted such decisiveness on behalf of the army. About this, he wrote as follows: **“I am looking at him and keeping silent. This is the first time**

On October 5, Jovic informed Milosevic about his discussion with Tudjman and about his assessment that he and Milosevic stand behind the insurrection of the Serbs in Krajina, and about the message that the three of them should get together.⁸² Milosevic was ready to talk to Tudjman, but Jovic kept dissuading him.⁸³

Three days later (on October 8, 1990), in a phone conversation, Jovic consulted Milosevic on the presentation (i.e. a draft thereof) for the Assembly of the SFRY on the political and security situation, and the proposals for the resolution of the constitutional crisis. The essence of his proposal consisted in that **“the two concepts of the future system for the country: the federal and confederal ones, be**

I hear this. I will take a look at these plans, but I doubt that the army will be so decisive. At least not based on today’s swagger.

The generals still have this obsession on the unity of Yugoslavia, such as it is, without an agreement and without a future. This disagreement is killing us and pushing us backwards. As is the swagger of the army leadership and the constant disorientation. First one thing, than another, and in the end, everything comes too late” (Ibid.).

⁸² Ibid., p. 202. On October 4, 1990, after the session of the Presidency, Tudjman talked to Jovic in his office. He believed that Milosevic and Jovic incited the Serbs in Krajina to an insurrection, which, according to him, was leading to **“a civil war and break-up of the country”**, for which **“they would be held historically liable”**. In relation to this, in his memoirs, Jovic wrote: **“... (What an impudent fellow! He wants to throw his responsibility over onto us!) He wants the three of us to get together and talk. He is kindly asking me to convey this to Slobodan, because the destiny of Yugoslavia depends on us. I told him that his assessments are wrong, that the insurrections of the Serbs in Croatia were caused by his policy after he took power, exerted by the HDZ; but he persistently claims that someone else is to blame. As for Milosevic, I told him that I believe that the three of us do not have the right to resolve the destiny of Yugoslavia. We should talk collectively, with all the republics, but I shall convey his desire to Milosevic”** (Ibid.).

⁸³ Ibid. About this discussion with Milosevic, Jovic wrote: **“I informed Slobodan about Tudjman’s message. He says, let him come over. I dissuade him, because I think that Tudjman is a very unsuitable, nervous, and imbalanced collocutor, who is almost not able to talk reasonably, so there will be no use of it. The only use would be to abuse the very fact that the discussion was held, which would benefit the HDZ, but be detrimental to the Serbs in Croatia.**

Slobodan gives up. He will think it over” (Ibid.).

brought up in referendums in all republics”. Milosevic did not agree with this proposal. He was advocating for an option whereby **“it would be better to follow another way. Namely, those whose assemblies declare in favour of the federation do not have grounds to go for a referendum, because they are within the constitutional framework (the federative one), and those who wish to change the constitutional system should consult their people”**. Assessing that this was **“more logical and practical”**, and that he **“liked this proposal very much”**, Jovic then consulted Tupurkovski, Bogicevic, Bucin, Zelenovic, and General Kadijevic. All of them thought **“that it was better this way, then for everyone to go for a referendum”**.⁸⁴

At the session of the Presidency of the SFRY, expanded to include the presidents of the presidencies of the republics and autonomous provinces, on October 10, the discussion on the final concept of the constitutional changes was held,⁸⁵ which six days later were identified at a **“dramatic session”** of the Presidency (October 16), with preservation of a federal Yugoslavia. According to Jovic, Slovenia and Croatia were

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 203. At this session, Jovic wrote in his memoirs, a discussion was held **“about the final concept we are going to go out with. Slovenia and Croatia are advocating for the concept of confederation, Serbia and Montenegro for the concept of pure federation (as proposed by scientists), and Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina for something in-between: roughly what we are having now, but not functional.**

I accept the Macedonian and the Bosnian positions as alternatives, to keep them in the company, and in order to isolate the Slovenes and Croats.

Upon the proposal for the Presidency to opt for the federal concept, and that both (both the federal and the confederal) be sent to the Assembly, as well as that the referendum be conducted only with those republics which opt for confederation, whereas the others proceed with the drafting of a new Federal Constitution, Kucan and Tudjman went insane. Kucan said that we had played a big trick upon him and that we had played the whole game unfairly. If he had known, he would never have participated in the drafting of the confederal concept.

As soon as he had left the session, he fiercely attacked me in public media.

It meant a bull’s eye hit!

At the session of the Presidency too, Ante Markovic repeated all of his criticism presented in the pamphlet related to the ‘Program’...” (Ibid.).

advocating for the confederation, what according to him meant **“the break-up of the SFRY”**, Macedonia and Bosnia **“wanted the federation, but only provided that Croatia and Slovenia remain in it. Serbia and Montenegro wanted the federation or a rearrangement of the territories of those republics which wished for secession on ethnical principles”**, and Kosovo **“wanted to be a constitutive element of the federation”**,⁸⁶ in fact, it wanted to retrieve this denied capacity.

The approaches of Serbia and Montenegro about **the rearrangement of the territories “of those republics which wished for secession”**, to which they never had the right, represent the essence of all the issues. This officially revealed the goals of the Greater Serbia movement.

As the Assembly of the SFRY had adopted his “Exposé on the Concept for the Constitutional System of the Country on a Federal Basis”, submitted and the Presidency of the SFRY formally and legally obtained the approval from the Assembly,⁸⁷ following which, after the discussion

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 208. In relation to this, providing an assessment of the, according to him, **“dramatic session of the Presidency of the SFRY”**, Jovic wrote: **“Heaven only knows how I succeeded in bringing the conclusion that the five members of the Presidency should opt for the concept of the federation. It somehow worked, because something needed to be accepted”** (Ibid.).

⁸⁷ Ibid., pp. 208-215. On October 17, 1990, the Presidency of the SFRY circulated both variants of the constitutional changes: **the Concept of the New Constitutional System for a Future Federative Yugoslavia**, and **the Concept of the Confederal Agreement among its republics**, to be the subject of further debate in the Assembly of the SFRY, the assemblies of the republics and in the general public, in order to reach a final choice and solution. In this, the Presidency proposed that the Assembly of the SFRY accept the concept of the federal constitutional system for the country, as basis for proceeding towards the drafting and adoption of the new constitution of Yugoslavia (Ibid., pp. 209-213).

On October 19, in a brief speech made as an introduction to the assembly debate on the Report, among other things, Jovic pointed out the advantages of all the options **“within the framework of the right of the nation for self-determination, including the right to secession”** (Ibid., p. 214).

Jovic received a **“long applause”** at the Assembly. He did not **“believe that anyone had ever received such an applause at the Assembly of Yugoslavia. Not even Josip Broz in his best days”**. In relation to this, Jovic commented on this applause in the following way:

“What did this applause mean?”

and declarations in the assemblies of the republics, the drafting and adoption of the new Constitution of Yugoslavia was to be proceeded with, in order to realize the Greater Serbia intentions in a peaceful way and mask this criminal plan, Jovic formally advocated an option that, **“under the conditions of equality, constitutionally and with tolerance and mutual trust”**, they commit **“to finding the solutions on which the destiny of our nations depends...”**. Namely, on October 22, at the SSNO, he had led a (secret) discussion with the military leadership (generals Kadujevic, Adzic, and Brovet, with several more of their associates). They discussed the concept of **“the possible solution of the crisis through military action, unless there is another solution”**. **“In hoping”** that **“this would not come about”**, Jovic believed that **“the plans should exist”**. To this aim, it was agreed **“to further develop the method of decision making and the options of execution, particularly from the aspect of the decisive moment”**.⁸⁸

The next day, on holding of the military exercise on the “Krivolak” testing range in Macedonia (on October 23, 1990), Jovic had “casually” talked to Kadujevic. The General informed him that **“the Military Prosecutor had prepared detailed documentation for institution of the procedure against General Spegelj, commander of the TO of Croatia, and against Boljkovac, Minister of Interior of Croatia.”**⁸⁹

The turnover towards the agreement among the republics? Of course not. Honest and human reaction by the delegates, perhaps? Maybe a recognition that the exit from a dead-end street needs to be sought in an agreement rather than in conflict? The Almighty only knows, but unfortunately the decision makers on the destiny of the people are not the ones sitting here in the Assembly. The question is whether they would be applauding too. I doubt it.

In any case, formally and legally, we received the approval of the Assembly. The conditions are in place for further intensive work on reaching the solution over the following months” (Ibid.).

⁸⁸ Ibid. In relation to this, Jovic “philosophically” concluded: **“if there is an option for illegal armament and anti-constitutional secession from a country, there must also be an option for prevention”**.

⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 217. In addition to that, Kadujevic at the time told Jovic that **“they will take a couple of more days”** to review the whole documentation, and that they would make a decision, however, his belief was that **“most probably they will have to arrest and try them”**, and that this has to be **“absolutely based on arguments, so that we**

When asked by Jovic if **“there were similar documents for Jansa”**, given that the Slovenes **“have gone a lot further than the Croats”**, Kadijevic answered that **“they are also considering that”**, however, he stated that **“it seems to him that Jansa has legalized his actions, [i.e.] he was working based on the decision of the Assembly of Slovenia”**.⁹⁰ Finally, they agreed that on October 29, Kadijevic would provide information that is more detailed to Jovic on the final decision.⁹¹

On October 26, Jovic talked to Milosevic, having taken offence at not being consulted by them **“when they introduced the protectionist laws on taxation of commodities from the other republics”**.⁹² Assessing that **“this was not done intelligently and that it was necessary to set things straight”**, Jovic proposed to Milosevic, among other things, **“to**

prevent having no grounds for the verdict later on”. Because, according to him, there was a possibility for **“mass demonstrations against this, even armed resistance, but also a possibility of an opposite effect – inflicting fear onto others”**, Kadijevic believed that **“all has to be meted out thoroughly”** (Ibid.).

⁹⁰ Ibid. unlike Jansa, who, according to General Kadijevic, worked legally, Spigelj and Boljkovac, according to him, **“directly sought to violate the federal laws with their actions: import of weapons, recruiting of soldiers and officers, and working on breaking up of the JNA”**. Due to this he was thinking about **“how they should arrest them, without having a bloodshed, but they are also ready for that option”** (Ibid.).

⁹¹ Ibid. In relation to this, Jovic believed that such a decision **“was the judicial (prosecutorial) one: they do not need the position of the Presidency, nor do they have the obligation to inform it, because the military prosecutor directly enforces the law in this procedure, and in that procedure he is independent and does not require any political approval”** (Ibid.).

⁹² Ibid., pp. 217-218. On October 23, 1990, Serbia passed a group of laws, through which it factually introduced customs duty on the import of commodities from Slovenia and Croatia and from other republics that were not paying the federal taxes. This was, according to Jovic, **“a step further towards the break-up of the country. Regardless of how much extorted such self-defence is, it will be favourable for the counter attack on the part of the breakers of Yugoslavia. This will also make the work of the Presidency of the SFRY more difficult”**, wrote Jovic (Ibid.).

According to Jovic, Milosevic brought a large number of **“rash and ill-thought decisions without consulting anyone”**. One of them was also a decision on disruption of economic relations with Slovenia, which was to the detriment of Serbia. This decision too, according to him, accelerated the break-up of Yugoslavia and degraded the Serbian economy (B. Jovic, *KNJIGA O MILOSEVICU*, Belgrade 2001, pp. 57-58).

immediately proclaim a waiver of application of all the passed laws if Slovenia and Croatia annul their decisions which have caused the passing of these laws, that is, if they continue fulfilling their duties to the federation".⁹³ Milosevic agreed with Jovic, who **"kept noting down and promising"**.⁹⁴

After being informed by Jovic **"on the intentions against the violators of the martial law in Croatia and Slovenia, and on the broader intentions, if things continue this way"**, Milosevic suggested that action be undertaken **"as soon as possible, but against Croatia only"**, that **"Slovenia should be let alone, and this is to be done only there in Croatia where the Serbs live, if conflict occurs, as it will"**. In this, Milosevic was in favour of having a territorial delimitation of the things, in order to avoid action on the **"whole of the 'democratised' territories"**, as they should be prevented from fighting the Serbian people **"who do not wish to suffer under Croatian rule"**.⁹⁵

The army analysed in more detail all the circumstances in relation to the violation of martial laws in Croatia. In relation to this, on November 2, 1990, General Kadijevic informed Jovic **"that there is reason enough to keep on collecting documentation for a couple of more days, in order to make the indictment incontestable"**, because it did not only involve Spegelj, but **"at least several more participants in the action"**. Such reasoning did not satisfy Jovic, who, having in mind **"the negative side of the things"** – that on November 8, Croatia would bring its own law on national defence that could legalize such activities, believed that it would be best to carry out this action earlier. Therefore, he concluded that it is obvious that **the Army is in a dilemma, that it is**

⁹³ Ibid., p. 218. In addition to this, Jovic proposed to Milosevic **"to caution the SIV that these laws will be applied only if the SIV fails to make Slovenia and Croatia assent to the application of federal laws on their territories, particularly those on the payment of 'development contributions' for underdeveloped areas, particularly for Kosovo"**.

⁹⁴ Ibid. In relation to this, Jovic believed that **"it would be politically better if such things had been communicated on adoption and if Slovenia and Croatia had been given a deadline"**.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

not able to arrest Spegelj and others until it completes the evidence, that **it is not decisive**, and the like.⁹⁶

Jovic ascertained himself of the truth of the aforementioned conclusion even more when Kadijevic told him that, at the time of this action, the most significant thing is that the President of the Presidency of the SFRY be in the country. Jovic's trips to Korea, Japan, and Paris prevented them from passing the decision. In presenting this assessment, Jovic claims that the Army was afraid that, in case of resistance offered by Croatia, without him, the Presidency of the SFRY would not be able to **"agree on military intervention, and this assumption had to be borne on mind"**.⁹⁷

On November 23, Kadijevic informed Jovic **"on the progress of preparations for arrests in Croatia, due to violation of the Law on National Defence"**. Stating that **"the facts required for the institution of a court procedure have been incontestably proven"** and that this **"would be done over the coming days"**, Kadijevic had only two issues that he needed to consult about with Jovic. Namely, firstly, he was in a dilemma **"as to whether General Spegelj first needs to be arrested and the procedure conducted, and should approval be sought after the arrest from the Government of Croatia, given the immunity status, or sought first"**, and secondly, whether Jovic and Ante Markovic need to be formally informed before or after the arrest?⁹⁸

As for the first issue, Jovic and Kadijevic agreed **"that they should follow the law: to seek approval from the Government of Croatia first"**. In case Croatia fails to grant the approval, **"then the Croatian government has fully identified itself"**, following which general Spegelj would **"probably be arrested again, under pressure by the public, once all the facts are revealed"**. As for the second issue,

⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 220.

⁹⁷ Ibid. Such an apprehension of the military top was commented by Jovic as follows: **"Strange things: now they can't because of themselves, tomorrow they can't because of me, and everything is very urgent. Veljko claims that there are no other reasons. Can't they arrest them all first and then 'complete' the indictment? Obviously they are in a dilemma, they are not decisive..."** (Ibid.).

⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 227.

it was agreed **“Ante does not need to be formally informed, because he could start making complications”**.⁹⁹

At the reception on the occasion of the Day of the Republic, US Ambassador Zimmermann inquired with Jovic **“whether we are going to use the army in order to prevent the secession of Slovenia”**, and he was answered **“that we shall not, if the majority of voters pass such a decision”**.¹⁰⁰

On December 10, General Kadijevic prepared an information intended for the Presidency, **“on the creation of a parallel HDZ army in Croatia** (that is, the reserve units of the police; note by the author) **and the proposed Decision of the Presidency inviting Croatia for a voluntary disarmament of this army within 10 days”**, and **“if not, then the legally provided actions of criminal prosecution and disarmament would be conducted”**.¹⁰¹ The next day, the SSNO furnished the information on unauthorized formation of the armed paramilitary formations in SFRY, that is, the units of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Croatia¹⁰² to the Presidency of the SFRY.

⁹⁹ Ibid., pp. 227-228.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 228. Warren Zimmermann suspiciously told Jovic that **“some of the generals”** do not agree with this position of his, whereas the President of the Presidency of the SFRY answered him **“that some of the civilians do not agree, either, so what?!”**. In relation to this, Jovic claims that the Ambassador of Austria made inquiries **“to the same effect, under the pretence that Austria is afraid that due to potential conflicts on the territory of Slovenia, Slovenes could begin fleeing to Austria en masse”** (Ibid.).

On the same day (November 28,), Jovic talked to Drnovsek (upon his request), who asked him **“how we were to proceed if the Slovenes pass a decision on secession at the referendum”**. In relation to this, Jovic presented the following position: **“We will reach an agreement. We shall pass a law on delimitation, and once the procedure is conducted, let them go ahead with the secession. If their referendum fails, their government should resign...”** (Ibid.).

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p. 229. In relation to this, Jovic was planning to present these proposals at the session of the Presidency of the SFRY on December 12.

¹⁰² V. Kadijevic, the aforementioned work, p. 111; D. Marijan, **JUGOSLAVENSKA NARODNA ARMIJA ...**, p. 297. In early December 1990, Kadijevic stated: **“all armed formations shall be disarmed, if constituted beyond the single armed forces established by the Constitution of the SFRY”** (*Narodna armija*, December 6, 1990). This interview was taken from the magazine *Danas* (Zagreb) – D. Marijan, the aforementioned work, p. 297.

On December 12, the information on the “paramilitary” organizations in Croatia and the measures that needed to be undertaken was postponed by some ten days by Jovic, in consultation with General Kadijevec, for both formal and actual reasons.¹⁰³

On December 22, 1990, Croatia passed a new Constitution, “**which makes Croatia independent**”, which was followed by a Statute of the Collaborationist Serb Area of Krajina, which did not recognize “**the new Croatian constitution**”. On the next day, the second round of elections was held in Serbia and Montenegro, and in Slovenia, **the referendum for independence**. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, “**the Serbs have homogenized and won one third of seats the Parliament**. In Macedonia, there is suspense. In Kosovo, silence”.¹⁰⁴ The economic program had failed. The ideas of the Presidency for drafting a new constitution were virtually “**on thin ice**”, because Slovenia was dominating with its ‘no’, and Croatia as well was supportive of it”.¹⁰⁵ “**The single economic market of Yugoslavia was falling apart. The republics were competing in introducing duties on commodities and property of owners coming from other republics. The revenues in the federal budget are almost not being paid at all. Croatia and Slovenia are forming their respective armies. The Serbs in Knin as well. The Presidency can never seem**

¹⁰³ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 230. About the reasons for the postponement of the aforementioned information and the measures that needed to be undertaken, Jovic wrote: “**The formal reason was the request by Mesic and Drnovsek that we wait for Tupurkovski to return from Australia, and the actual reason was not to disturb the public until the second round of elections in Serbia is completed. So that nobody can impute on us that we had in any way influenced the voters. It was agreed that in the meantime, Veljko and Mesic should talk to Tudjman, to use the time to create a public opinion on that everything was attempted to be done through an agreement, before we may undertake any drastic steps**” (Ibid.).

Jovic was “aware” of the postponement of the aforementioned information and of the measures that needed to be undertaken, claiming that “**time is not our ally. Time is working against us!**” (Ibid.).

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 231. In assessing one of the most significant developments in Yugoslavia in late December, in his memoirs for December 23, among other things, Jovic wrote that “**the Army had become depoliticised**”. This was not altogether true, because the role of the JNA in the political life of Yugoslavia and in the nineties of the 20th century was a crucial one.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

to ‘catch some air’ and pass the decision on disarmament”.¹⁰⁶

The economic policy for 1990 was not executed in its relevant points.¹⁰⁷ At the session of the SIV, on December 24, no agreement was reached on the policy and budget for 1991. According to Jovic, Chairman Markovic **“proposed a budget for the army which comprised the full liquidation of the military industry. It only allowed for their salaries and food for the army forces, and reduced further procurement of weapons down to zero”**, which Kadijevec refused and proposed a compromise: **“instead of a 10%, only a 5% reduction”**.¹⁰⁸

During the discussions in Serbia on the economic policy and budget of Yugoslavia for 1991, on December 26, attended by Slobodan Milosevic, Stanko Radmilovic, Jugoslav Kostic, Radoman Bozovic, Dragutin Zelenovic, and Borisav Jovic, Milosevic insisted that the Presidency should demand resignation by Ante Markovic.¹⁰⁹ In addition

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid. In relation to this, Jovic ill-foundedly claims that Ante Markovic **“was really the one who brought the economy to a halt.”**

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 232. On December 25, General Kadijevec talked to Markovic again, **“and he offered him to accept this compromise, but in that case the JNA and Veljko must declare as being alongside with the SIV. So, that [Markovic] may declare unity”**. In relation to this, Jovic claims that Kadijevec had **“established four conditions for the unity”** to Markovic:

Firstly, that the Federation is not just the place (as desired by the Slovenes and Croats), but also a player in negotiating about the future of the country.

Secondly, that the Federation is not only the SIV, but also the Presidency and the Assembly of the SFRY, and that he does not try to pretend that he is responsible for all (Ante responded to him at this as follows: ‘Then why is the Presidency constantly against us?’).

Thirdly, in addition to the Economic Policy Program for 1991, the SIV also needs to offer minimal functioning of the federal state required for the execution of this program.

Fourthly, if this is not adopted, that he should file for his resignation” (Ibid.).

Jovic wrote that Ante Markovic had, **“as if, agreed with such conditions. I really doubt it. He was seeking to trick Veljko, to gain him to side up with the SIV, and to get away with empty promises once again”** (Ibid.).

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 233. Jovic was convincing **“that we can not accomplish that, because the others do not agree. Let that be sought by the delegation of Serbia at the Council of**

to this, the Serbian leadership, or better say Milosevic, because **“they all do what Sloba says”**, rejected the program – it did not want to accept it due to Ante Markovic, **“because they did not accept him”**,¹¹⁰ which could lead to the resignation of the Government, and that, according to Jovic, was **“very risky”**, primarily for the Serbs in Croatia. According to him, the conditions should have been created for them to **“defend”** the Serbs (**“for us to defend the Serbs”**), because if they **“fall apart”** (**“if we fall apart”**), they will **“have destroyed”** (**“we will have destroyed”**) the Serb people in Croatia.¹¹¹

On December 26, the Assembly of Serbia adopted a decision on the budget for the first quarter of 1991, and in relation to this, decided that fifty per cent of the sales tax be retained for its own financing (whereas they were legally entitled to keep only 25%). In this way, the SFRY **“was brought to a collapse, as nobody was paying his or her revenues”**. Such a decision was not **“understood”** by Borisav Jovic. Milosevic convinced him **“that they are only doing the barter for the part owed to them by the Federation for support of agriculture and for the underdeveloped, and now this turns out to be their planned source of revenues for regular financing”**. Yet, for Jovic, this was an attempt to liquidate the Federation. For very practical reasons,

the Republics of the Assembly of the SFRY. He does not like it, he says that it will not have the same force. Well, maybe not, but the Presidency will not agree with it, we have no majority for such a request!” (Ibid.).

¹¹⁰ Ibid. In relation to this, Jovic admitted that **“true, the program is nothing special either. I advise them to be practical, to attack the weak points of the program, and if they do not succeed, they can demand the government to resign”** (Ibid.).

¹¹¹ Ibid. Jovic substantiated the survival of the federal government in the following manner: **“We can not remain without a government, that would be very dangerous. We could not form another one, and we would only speed up the break-up of the country. When I tell this to them, they respond – well, let it fall apart, it is better now than when Ante destroys us altogether.**

It is not exactly so. I ask them, what are we going to do tomorrow, when a civil war breaks out in Croatia, and all the HDZ members are armed. We need to create the conditions for us to defend the Serbs. If we fall apart, we will have the Serb people in Croatia destroyed.

Nothing helps. Everybody sticks to their respective standpoints. What can I do...” (Ibid.).

he claimed that it was early **“to liquidate the state, we will need it as a mechanism for the defence of our own people outside Serbia”**. In relation to this, he wondered: **“How do they intend for us to fund the army or, how do they intend for us to defend the Serbian people without the federal army?”**¹¹²

At the 1990 SFRY elections, all the old leaderships in all the republics fell, **“except in Serbia and Montenegro. Yugoslavia was halved on the basis of ideology”**.¹¹³ At the referendum, Slovenia opted for an independent state.¹¹⁴ **“Serbia is unified. In addition, Serbs, for the first time in the post-war history across Yugoslavia, are unified. The Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina are on the side of Serbia, Montenegro as well”**. This is, according to Jovic, **“naturally the biggest event in Yugoslavia in 1990, significant for the future”**.¹¹⁵

In 1990, Slobodan Milosevic (heading Serbia) and Borisav Jovic (heading the Presidency of the SFRY) finally gave up on Yugoslavia, and focused the Greater Serbia nationalist program on the formation of a state with **“17 million inhabitants”**.¹¹⁶ The leadership of the Greater Serbia movement was persistently making efforts to bring up the army onto the political scene, in order to prevent the Croatian and Slovene proposal for confederal agreements and to prevent the control of the Croatian authorities over the expansion of the insurrection in parts of Croatia.¹¹⁷

¹¹² Ibid., p. 234.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Ibid. In presenting this fact, with a great relief, Jovic stated: **“Good luck to them”**.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., pp. 234-235. In assessing the events in Kosovo during 1990, Jovic stated: **“The Albanian separatists have been cornered. Nobody is supporting them any longer. Any attempt by them in the Assembly of Yugoslavia or in the Presidency of the SFRY to put the Kosovo issue on the agenda will be refused. This is an issue of Serbia. Could anyone believe only two years ago, that something like this would happen?”** (Ibid., p. 235).

¹¹⁶ B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, p. 292; B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 161.

¹¹⁷ S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. XI.

2. The Failure of Introduction of the State of Emergency and the Arranged Military Coup in March 1991

The beginning of 1991 was marked by a diversion by Serbia into the payment system of the Federation (18.2 billion dinars, that is, 2.6 billion German marks). The diversion was executed upon a formal decision of the Assembly of Serbia, and in fact, with the knowledge, support, and approval of Slobodan Milosevic.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁸ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 239-241, and 246. Jovic learned about this as early as on January 4, 1991, in discussion with Kadijevic, when the General received the following message: “...**an urgent session of the SIV in the afternoon. He checks by phone what this was about. He was told that they had obtained an extremely important document about the diversion into the payment system of the country. He will send Brovet to attend the SIV session. I tell him, this is Serbia, one hundred percent, otherwise nothing else would be so urgent**” (Ibid.).

The Assembly of the Republic of Serbia undertook a diversion into the payment system of the SFRY, published in a confidential issue of the *Sluzbeni glasnik*, and Ante Markovic was informed about this (Ibid.).

According to Jovic, “**the SIV was dramatizing this issue to an ultimate extent by suspending all foreign currency operations (including payments abroad), all banknote emission credits, etc. It ordered control of all the national banks of the republics and autonomous provinces**” (Ibid.).

At the session of the SIV on January 4, Ante Markovic, Bozidar Marendic and Aca Mitrovic demanded that “**all the responsible persons in Serbia be arrested**”. However, according to Jovic, who was “**especially**” informed about this session in the morning of January 5, and during the day by General Kadijevic, the SIV got divided and finally took the stand that “**the thing be examined and the money returned, if it has been used**”.

On the same day, Jovic phoned Milosevic and told him everything. “**He was already contacted by Ante Markovic. Sloba knows everything, but he is minimizing the problem. He says the others are doing this too, and we are the only ones who get prosecuted. The Slovenes have thus purchased 2 billion dollars in foreign currency reserves and taken it out of the country, and Ante did not even stir his little finger.**” (Ibid., pp. 239-240).

The assessments of the military leadership, primarily of General Kadijevic, that Yugoslavia would be attacked with all means available, in connection between the external and internal enemies, were in fact concealing the plans agreed on March 26 and June 28, 1990, for the break-up of Yugoslavia, establishment of war objectives, and definition of **“the new Yugoslav state” (“... of the Serb and Montenegrin nations...”)**, and expulsion of Slovenia and Croatia from the SFRY, in a plan later referred to as RAM (*see infra, IV.*). The proposals for an urgent dissolution and disarmament of the paramilitary formations and reaction to external interference, and acceleration of the establishment of the “League of Communists – Movement for Yugoslavia” (SK – PJ), on the whole territory of Yugoslavia were all in that function.¹¹⁹ General

In relation to the diversion of Serbia into the payment system of the SFRY, on January 8, 1991, Jovic **“criticized”** Stanko Radmilovic, the President of the Executive Council of Serbia. In his memoirs, he wrote the following about this: **“Discussion with Stanko Radmilovic at the SPS (before the meeting on concrete issues). I criticize him a little bit about what the heck they have done with the emission, and with the revenues belonging to the Federation.**

He explains that without this, they would certainly lose the elections, because half of the republic would not receive salaries and pensions. Ante was amazed and astounded at us not having bankrupted, and we’ve smarted him out. That’s the essence.

Sloba was apparently avoiding to inform me, because from the function of the President of the Presidency of the SFRY, I could not have justified that.

At the end of the discussion, Sloba came by, and Stanko said to him: ‘Please protect me from the criticism of the President of the Presidency of the SFRY!’. Sloba responded as follows: ‘I will protect you in the part where you took the money, but I will not protect you in the part where you proposed to pass laws and decisions. All of this could have been executed even without formal decisions of the Assembly. This is what all the others have done!’.

And they have, in great quantities, both before us and more than we did” (Ibid., p. 241).

At the session of the Presidency of the SFRY on January 10, 1991, according to Jovic, Ante Markovic **“made efforts to focus on the Serbian diversion into the payment system of the country”**. However, Jovic allegedly did not **“give him the opportunity to impose this issue”** (Ibid., p. 246).

¹¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 161, 236-238, and others. The author and implementer of the idea for formation of the SK – Movement for Yugoslavia was Admiral Branko Mamula. In late 1990, together with several generals and prominent political and public personalities,

Kadijevic also proposed to introduce **a state of emergency**, which clearly showed that the practice did not execute the decisions of the Presidency of the SFRY, but of its rump composition, and of the parallel Informal Group, headed by Milosevic and Jovic, which advocated for military rather than a political solution of the Yugoslav crisis.

With the use of force it disposed of (**the JNA**) and in a “democratic” way (“**declaration of the people**”), this Informal Group made efforts to destroy Yugoslavia and ensure the formulation of a single state of all the Serbs. In this way, in order to find a solution “favourable” to the Serbian nation, that is, for the formation of Greater Serbia, the Group insisted on the declaration of the Yugoslav peoples, rather than on an agreement among the republics.¹²⁰

he formed and became one of the most prominent members of the SK – Movement for Yugoslavia, also referred to as the “Generals’ party” (R. Dizdarevic, **IZDAJA VOJNOG VRHA**, in: F. Ademovic, JNA BEZNADJE ZLA, Sarajevo, 1997, pp. 161-163; D. Marijan, **JUGOSLAVENSKA NARODNA ARMIJA...**, p. 295; B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, pp. 189-194; *Slobodna Bosna*, no. 186, June 8, 2000, p. 23).

General Kadijevic and a number of other military leaders, even after Mamula was retired, were associated to him (Kadijevic was his protégé and proposed by him as his replacement). After the formation of this political party, whose member was also General Kadijevic, and which was a pro-Milosevic organization, he did not expose himself in public within it, but his influence, particularly in the beginning, was of major importance. According to Raif Dizdarevic, Mamula left “**the impression of a man who is very skilful in working behind the scenes**”. In relation to this, Dizdarevic rightfully indicates upon the issue of “**his role in the treason of the military top**”. The more so, because “**there are indications that he was active from the background, particularly in the Serb areas and among the Serb officers in Croatia**” (R. Dizdarevic, the aforementioned work, pp. 161, and 163).

¹²⁰ Ibid., pp. 238-239, and 263. Borisav Jovic in particular insisted on a “**new agreement of the Yugoslav people**”, rather than on a new agreement among the republics. The leadership of Serbia believed it was not enough for the republics to declare themselves. Therefore Jovic, in accordance with this, claimed that each “constituent” nation of Yugoslavia has the right to declare about whether it wants to stay in or leave Yugoslavia. Such a perception of the right to national self-determination lead towards the dissolution of Yugoslavia, that is, it contained “**the germ of the coming war**“, as claimed by Nándor Major (N. Major, **RASPAD DRUGE JUGOSLAVIJE**, in: **RATOVI U JUGOSLAVIJI 1991.-1999.**, Compilation of the Communiques and Discussions from the Round Table, Belgrade, November 7-9, 2001, Belgrade 2002, p. 47).

On January 4, 1991, general Veljko Kadijevic provided “**a detailed and lengthy**” information to Jovic “**on the most recent assessment of the army**”, explaining “**the general situation in the world, from the point of view of the US global strategy**”.¹²¹ In relation to this, he presented an unrealistic assessment that the West will attack Yugoslavia “**with all means available**”, in order “**to finish off the change of power in it at any cost**”. Borisav Jovic also agreed with this assessment, but he added that “**the frontline will not only be reduced to Yugoslavia, because this would mean that the US is abandoning its global strategy**”, but that “**they would go further on the global level**”.¹²²

The attempt of the Informal Group to push through **the right of the peoples**, instead of the rights of the republics (and provinces), meant a direct violation of the relevant provisions of the Constitution, the imposition of Unitarianism, change of borders, etc.

¹²¹ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 236. On this occasion, General Kadijevic, among other things, stated that “**the division of the USSR has been stopped. All the people, except Gorbachev, who have been working on the division of the USSR have left (Yakovlev, Shevardnadze, and others). The question is whether the Americans will be able to fully rely on Gorbachev. In any case, the USA has the intention to further destabilize the USSR. The USSR military envoy told Veljko that the army and the party had given a deadline to Gorbachev until the end of March to stop the dissolution of the USSR, or they will undertake other measures.**” At this, according to Jovic, Kadijevic was trying “**to draw a rather far-fetched conclusion that the USA will not succeed to fell the Socialist rule in the USSR and that the USSR will succeed to resist dissolution**”.

When Kadijevic assessed that the West would “**help Gorbachev if he is the holder of a dictatorship...**”, Jovic assessed that it is illogical that the West should help out Gorbachev “**maintain the unity of the USSR through dictatorship**”, because, according to him, Gorbachev “**is just a favourable person for the realization of US goals, and their goal is the complete destruction of the USSR in both state, economic, and political terms. Maybe Gorbachev has such goals, but the US have different ones, and this is clear**”, concluded Jovic (Ibid., pp. 236-237).

¹²² Ibid., p. 237.

The “**assessments**” and “**evaluations**” of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command about the eternal danger, which was in connection with the Serb part of the Presidency of the SFRY, were accepted by some within the Presidency of the SFRY as undisputable, whereas the others deemed them unacceptable, believing that the external dangers **were intentionally construed and overemphasized** in order to **mask the main** internal breakers of Yugoslavia as well as possible. No external aggression threatened Yugoslavia, as it was claimed, but this danger was made up by the military leadership, so that under

Starting from the conclusions that Yugoslavia would be in the centre of western interest, Kadijevec presented the assessment of the western tactics towards Yugoslavia, which was based on **“that the correlation between internal and external factors jointly working on the destruction of the constitutional order had already been created”**.¹²³

In such a situation, according to him, **“four big issues”** existed that required determination and endurance in their solution.¹²⁴

the disguise of “saving Yugoslavia” from external danger, the SFRY could be recomposed into a “Serboslavia” (S. Oro, **VOJNI VRH IZMISLIO SPOLJNU OPASNOST**, in: F. Ademovic, **JNA BEZNADJE ZLA**, Sarajevo 1997, p. 66).

¹²³ Ibid. In this area, according to Kadijevec, **“there were two lines involved. The first one is the destruction of the leftist forces in Serbia and Montenegro, as well as at the level of the Federation, primarily through corresponding economic policy which will cause unrests and insurrections, constantly demanding new elections until the leftist forces fall down.**

The second one is the action to divide Yugoslavia, under which there will be an attempt to compromise Serbia as a “hard liner”, and if this fails, then they will really go for the division of Yugoslavia, and isolation of Serbia and Montenegro. They seem to prefer this at the moment” (Ibid.).

¹²⁴ Ibid., p. 238. These are:

“1. Keep an eye on the economic policy of the government and do not let it realize the first goal: insurrections, strikes, and new elections. A strategy to prevent this of needs to be developed in detail.

2. In no way should the dying down of the federal state be allowed through the fait accompli policy, primarily focusing on the issue of financing the federation and on the exclusion of federal institutions from the discussions on the future of Yugoslavia.

3. The conspiracy (between external and internal enemies) must be sanctioned, as it is directed against the JNA and Yugoslavia. As an urgent matter, either the proposed decisions related to paramilitary organizations should be taken, or court proceedings instituted. Reaction should be offered against external interference into our internal issues (by the USA and by Vranitzky).

4. We need to accelerate the creation of the SKJ – Movement for Yugoslavia, on the whole territory of Yugoslavia“ (Ibid.).

Jovic commented Kadijevec’s proposal for formation of the SKJ – Movement for Yugoslavia in the following manner: **“As though he did not see the experience of Ante Markovic with forming parties. He was totally defeated at the elections“** (Ibid.).

The conspiracy made up **“by the external and internal enemy, directed against the JNA and Yugoslavia”**, according to Kadijevec, needed to be attacked (**“it must be attacked”**). To this aim, among other things, there was an urgent need that **“either the proposed decisions related to paramilitary organizations be passed, or a court procedure instituted”**.¹²⁵

Kadijevic further proposed that in the case of any attempts **“to resolve the issues by using the ‘fait accompli policy’, they must be reacted to from within the legal framework, including the introduction of a state of emergency”**, unless another option is deemed viable.¹²⁶

In accordance with his global evaluations of the position and situation in the country and in the world,¹²⁷ being more politician than general, Kadijevec brought up the four principles that needed to be used as a starting ground in the negotiations with the republics on the political future of Yugoslavia: **“each nation must be given the opportunity to choose a solution (but not the republics, or the minority groups)”**; **“a confederation is not a state. There are Unitarian and federal states (even with a minimum of federal functions)”**; **“each nation can be given the opportunity to choose to remain or to go...”**¹²⁸ and a single procedure and single control can be provided **“for the declarations of a nation, which needs to be governed by a law”**.¹²⁹

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ According to Raif Dizdarevic, general Veljko Kadijevec liked to give global evaluations of the position and situation in the country, assessments of the developments and general views of the problems and their resolution. In spite of the fact that some of his assessments were sometimes useful, many have, claims Dizdarevic, mainly been constructions without cover or specific argumentation, and the proposals were undeveloped and without methods to allow their implementation (R. Dizdarevic, the aforementioned work, pp. 163-164).

¹²⁸ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 238. In relation to this, Kadijevec stated that, in addition, each nation can be given “the right explanation as to what this means, instead of using political manipulation to bring the nation into a delusion as to what they are to decide about”.

¹²⁹ Ibid., p. 238-239.

In relation to the paramilitary organizations, Kadijevic believed that the army, which he called the “**HDZ army**”, must be dismissed, “**and its arms surrendered**”.¹³⁰

The aforementioned assessments and proposals of the army which were not the original positions of General Kadijevic, but of the political leadership of Serbia (more exactly, of Milosevic and Jovic), taken over and accepted by Kadijevic, were assessed as acceptable by Jovic, “**regardless of any omissions in the analysis related to our state**”, although he believed that “**the action should be accelerated, rather than constantly postponed**”.¹³¹

In accordance with the assessments and proposals of General Kadijevic of January 4, which Jovic agreed with, on January 5, 1991, Jovic was thinking about the need for agreement on his own and Milosevic’s presentations on January 10, at the meeting in the Presidency of the SFRY with the presidents of the republics, discussing the political future of Yugoslavia. According to Jovic, Milosevic was to represent the Serb nation, and he was to represent Yugoslavia.¹³²

As wanted by Jovic, Milosevic should have said “**that the right to self-determination belongs to nations**”, and that “**the Serb nation is starting from the point that today it has its own single federative state, and wishes to use that point as a nation to decide about its future**”. In relation to this, he presented a Greater Serbia thesis that “**the Serb nation wishes to live in a single state, with equal civic rights, with single internationally recognized borders, a single army, currency and market**”.¹³³

In supporting the right of the Serb nation to “self-determination”, Jovic saw the key role in the JNA. He was supporting the thesis that the “defence” of the aforementioned right of the Serb nation is “**practically impossible without the JNA**”. In this, he presented a false assessment

130 Ibid.

131 Ibid.

132 Ibid., p. 240.

133 Ibid. In presenting this thesis, Jovic diplomatically continues: “**Whoever wishes to live with it on an equal footing is welcome**”.

that **“the Serb nation is not armed”**,¹³⁴ and that therefore it needed the JNA.

The leadership of the Greater Serbia movement abused the principle of self-determination and thus threatened Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina that the Serbs, wherever they are in majority, have the right to their own state, which included their right to join Serbia, in order to gather all the Serbs in a single state, which in turn meant the occupation of those republics. This clearly stated political threat was even supported by that leadership by threatening with a military intervention, thus initiating **“the big battle”**.¹³⁵

For the holders of the Greater Serbia movement, the state could be either **“Unitarian or federal”**, whereby, according to them, the Serb nation did not want to think about a confederation, because this is not a state. The most favourable form for functioning of Yugoslavia for them was **“a federation with minimum level of functions which will be efficiently performed”**. This, according to them, practically meant the denial of secession for the republics, **“because they do not have such a right, only nations do”**.¹³⁶

Jovic was supposed to say declaratively **“that any discussion about the future must be started on the premise that Yugoslavia exists, as do its Constitution and laws, its institutions with certain rights and competencies”**, and that any change of the Constitution of the SFRY and the laws **“can not be executed without the decision of the federal bodies of authority”**. For him, **“any discussion about the future based on a fait accompli policy, implying that there is no Yugoslavia, is unacceptable”**. According to him, **“only adherence to the Constitution and laws of the SFRY, unless decided otherwise, can be the approach for a discussion in which, in compliance with the Constitution, the bodies of the federation will also participate”**.¹³⁷

¹³⁴ Ibid., p. 311.

¹³⁵ Ibid., pp. 240, 246-247, and 311.

¹³⁶ Ibid., p. 240.

¹³⁷ Ibid. Jovic believed that both presentations (by him and by Milosevic) would be facing **“sharp knives, but we have to state even that. The big battle is only beginning”**, concluded he.

The aforementioned “right”, referred to by the leadership of the Greater Serbia movement, and presented by Milosevic, in consultation with Jovic, at the session of the Presidency of the SFRY on January 10,¹³⁸ was no right at all, because it did not have any basis in the Constitution. The right to secession was granted to the constitutive elements of the Federation, the one that they contested, and not to individual nations or minority groups (they were not granted this even by international law). This was actually a fiction by the leadership of the Greater Serbia movement, which they wanted to impose on others too, if this were in their (Serb) interest.

On January 7, Jovic had a discussion with Slobodan Milosevic, presenting to him his opinion on “**what he should say**” at the session of the Presidency of the SFRY, and “**what he** (Jovic; note by the author) **should say**”. On this occasion, Milosevic fully agreed with Jovic, stating “**that he would tell this to anyone, even if they had not consulted each other**”.¹³⁹

The session of the Presidency of the SFRY dated January 9, 1991, in relation to the information supplied on December 11, 1990, by the SSNO “**on the unauthorized import of weapons and formation of paramilitary units in the function of preparation of forced secession from the SFRY, as well as the proposal of the appropriate decisions and measures of the Presidency of the SFRY**”, brought the **Order** to dissolve, within ten days, “**all armed units which were not part of the single armed forces of the SFRY, or of the law enforcement forces**”, and that the enforcement of the Order and the protection of all citizens “**shall be ensured by the units and institutions of the Yugoslav National Army as determined by the federal secretary for national defence**”. This order, which came into effect “**on the day of its passing**”, also ordered the surrender of their weapons, equipment, ammunition and other combat means “**to the closest units and institutions of the Yugoslav People’s Army**”.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁸ Ibid., pp. 246-247.

¹³⁹ Ibid., p. 241.

¹⁴⁰ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2812, Presidency of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, N. [*Naredba* /Order; note by the author.] no. 3, Belgrade, January 9, 1991, ORDER; V. Kadijevec, the aforementioned work, p. 111; B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 241-247; D. Marijan, the aforementioned work, p. 297.

The problem of illegal paramilitary-armed units at the official level of the SFRY appeared in public in early 1991, on the session of the Presidency of the SFRY held on January 9. This issue was brought up as current within the leadership of the Greater Serbia movement in December 1990. However, the paramilitary organizations began much earlier. The first paramilitary-armed men appeared on August 17, 1990, at the barricades in front of Benkovac, following which, as a response to this, there was an expansion in the number and supplementary armament of the reserve police forces of the Ministry of Interior of Croatia.¹⁴¹

The major accusation of the Presidency of the SFRY and the military leadership for formation of paramilitary units pertained to Croatia and was directed against the legal formations of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Croatia.¹⁴² The paramilitary organization of the Serbs and the series of insurrections of the police stations in the Serb municipalities in Croatia, and formation of the Serb paramilitary-armed units on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina were ignored at the level of the Federation and its organs.¹⁴³

¹⁴¹ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 229-230; M. Vasic – F. Schwarm, **MIRIS ZLOCINA – SRPSKE PARAVOJNE FORMACIJE 1990. – 2000.**; in: RATOVI U JUGOSLAVIJI 1991.-1999., Compilation of Communiques and Discussions from the Round Table, Belgrade, November 7-9, 2001, Belgrade 2002, p. 238. The state security service of the Ministry of Interior of Serbia infiltrated two of its agents (Radovan Stojcic – “Badza” and Franko Simatovic – “Frenki”), onto the territory of Croatia immediately after the victory of the HDZ at the parliamentary elections in June 1990, with the aim of starting preparations for the armed insurrection of the Serbs in Northern Dalmatia (Ibid.).

¹⁴² Ibid., pp. 238-239; D. Marijan, **JUGOSLAVENSKA NARODNA ARMIIJA ...**, p. 297. For the Government of the Republic of Croatia, paramilitary units were in the so-called Krajina, and for the JNA, these were the legally organized units of the reserve police forces as an integral part of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Croatia (D. Marijan, the aforementioned work, p. 297).

¹⁴³ M. Vasic – F. Schwarm, the aforementioned work, p. 238. Thus, the preamble of the Order of the Presidency of the SFRY dated January 9, among other things, states: “... **within certain political parties** (read: the HDZ of Croatia; note by the author), **some illegal paramilitary armed units are being formed, which with their existence and their planned terrorist activities constitute direct risk of an outbreak of armed insurrection and interethnic conflicts of the broadest scale, and with unforeseeable**

On January 15, 1991, five days after the session of the Presidency of the SFRY (January 10), which had not even mentioned these “paramilitary” units,¹⁴⁴ Jovic and Kadijevec were “**assessing**” the situation related to the execution of the **Order for Surrender of Weapons and Dissolution of Paramilitary Organizations**. Concluding that allegedly “**the Serbs in Croatia are surrendering their weapons**”, whereas “**the Croats are not**”, they concluded that they “**had to be taken by force, through application of legal sanctions**”. In relation to this, they reviewed “**all the circumstances and options**”. According to them, all led “**into resistance and bloodshed**”. If “**they offer resistance**”, it needed to be broken (“**we need to break it**”). However, they were aware that this will not be easy, because “**the indoctrinated people will be hard to deal with**” (that is, the Croatian people; note by the author). Therefore, Jovic, unlike General Kadijevec, who claimed “**that the army is willing to go for a radical option until the HDZ power is overthrown**”, advocated for the thesis by which it needed to attempt and have the Croats surrender the arms voluntarily. This, according to him, was an attempt to resolve the political crisis without blood. The more so, because he believed that “**blood will be shed (‘we will shed blood’) unless otherwise is possible, only for the territories where those peoples live who want to stay in Yugoslavia [sic]**”. They agreed to attempt at “**one more discussion with Mesic**”.¹⁴⁵

consequences to the safety of citizens, sovereignty and integrity of the country...” (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2812, Presidency of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, N. no. 3, Belgrade, January 9, 1991, ORDER).

¹⁴⁴ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 246-247. This session discussed the issue of **the future of Yugoslavia**. Milosevic spoke about the rights of nations to self-determination and the “**desire**” of the Serb people “**to live in a single state**”. According to Jovic, **the Slovenes and Croatians insisted on some kind of a Yugoslav economic union, “less than a confederation”. The Macedonians do not know what they wish, the Bosnians say they want a federation, but it can be ‘soft’, the Montenegrins are with us...**” The agreement was reached “**to recognize the federal institutions and republics, parallel and in compliance with the Constitution, as well as to hold discussions among the republics, before the following meeting...**” (Ibid., pp. 240, and 246-247).

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 247. About the “assessment” of the situation in relation to the aforementioned order, among other things, Jovic wrote: “**The people are very nervous and they expect decisive action by the Army, this is true, but the Croatian nation**

From January 17 onwards, the negotiations and discussions were conducted among Jovic, Mesic, and Kadijevec, on the one side, and Jovic, Milosevic, Kadijevec and Adzic, on the other, in relation to the disarmament in Croatia.¹⁴⁶ Both Milosevic and the military leadership were preoccupied with the issue of losing the reputation of the JNA with the people. Jovic also ascertained himself of this, when on January 19, at the SSNO, he had a discussion with Kadijevec and Adzic. The generals were not satisfied with **“the confiscation of only 20,000 submachine guns”** from the Croats,¹⁴⁷ on which they had agreed on January 18, first Mesic and Jovic, and which was confirmed on the same day in front of Kadijevec.¹⁴⁸ While expecting Mesic to call, as sought by Kadijevec to see **“what he had done”** in relation to the aforementioned agreement, the generals and Jovic made an arrangement

is decisive in the opposite direction. This is the problem. Would the Army come into conflict with the Croatian nation, and where is the end there? I have to admit that we have big difficulties. Veljko says that the army is willing to go for a radical option until the HDZ power is overthrown. If they do resist, and I am asking them if we can reach another democratically elected government after that, which will be from our side. Not for the socialism, but for Yugoslavia. There is no answer. This is the key to the problem. The aspirations of Croatia are towards secession from Yugoslavia, and they are just pretending to be fighting against bolshevism. The US, which is supporting them, has a goal – to overthrow communist power even if they have to break up Yugoslavia. And, they are working together nicely. And we, in the case of a radical option: we can not reach a new democratic government, we experience a bloodshed, we will have to exercise military rule for at least one year, we will be isolated from the world, with this action we would stop every effort for the disentanglement of the political crisis in a peaceful way, we would accelerate the secession of Slovenia, and increase the resistance of the Albanians. Therefore we need to try and make them surrender their arms voluntarily, in order to discredit them politically, not to overthrow their government, we should judge individuals, not the state, we should hold ‘peace’ in an attempt to resolve the political crisis without bloodshed. We will shed blood unless impossible otherwise, only for the territories where those peoples live who want to stay in Yugoslavia.

We have agreed to attempt at one more discussion with Mesic” (Ibid.).

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., pp. 254-256.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 255.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 254. The only thing that remained, wrote Jovic, **“that tomorrow morning [January 19], Mesic informs from Zagreb that the Croatian authorities have accepted and implemented that”** (Ibid.).

at the SSNO, based on which they **rejected the radical option** (use of the JNA against the Croatian people and forced overthrow of the Croatian government),¹⁴⁹ that General Kadijevic was advocating on January 15.¹⁵⁰

About this agreement, Jovic phoned to inform Milosevic, **“who was about to go insane. He kept saying all sorts of things to me: we will trick the people, this will be delusion, treason, he said all sorts of things. Just like he prefers that we take their arms by force instead of them surrendering them voluntarily.**

I asked him directly – does he want a bloodshed for the thing we may be able to resolve in a peaceful way. In his opinion, this is not the solution. The culprits need to be tried.

- How, we have pronounced abolition for those who surrender the arms, says I.

- Yes, but for all those who have organized all of that: Spegelj, Boljkovac, and the others, to let them stay?

- They shall not stay, they shall be tried, but let us take the arms without blood if possible.

- He thinks that any concession is a mistake. That the Croats will lie.

A heavy discussion” (Ibid., pp. 254-255).

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 255. The contents of this agreement, according to Jovic, were as follows:

“1) We do not favour the radical option of conflict with the nation and forced overthrow of the government, because we can not see a good perspective for exit from such a situation.

2) We prefer the option of prevention, weakening and compromising the current HDZ authorities, with as little conflict with the people as possible, but still without allowing a humiliating position for the army if they do offer resistance.

3) If they agree to surrender the arms, a special option shall be applied in view of unmasking of the HDZ policy, weakening of their power and prevention of their tactics. As an integral part of this, all measures possible shall be taken, in order to discredit the Croatian government due to their illegal arming and anti-Yugoslavian politics.

Generals Kadijevic and Adzic had shown Jovic, while he was with them at the SSNO, a film **“about the anti-state and anti-army activities of the Croatian government, weapons import, orders and preparations for the elimination of certain people, about the arming of the HDZ. All kinds of stuff. It is incredible how they managed to record this. They slipped under their 'skin'”** (Ibid).

¹⁵⁰ Ibid. At that meeting, Adzic also brought up the issue of “potential secession”, claiming that **“no country in the world would do it on a voluntary basis”**. At this, he was responded by Jovic’s words that **“the Army must accept the agreement reached in a democratic political manner, because no one can be forced to stay in Yugoslavia if they do not want it”**. Kadijevic also agreed with Jovic, and Adzic added

On January 21, among other things, Mesic informed Jovic that, in relation to the voluntary surrender of weapons, Croatia has collected arms **“as many as were possible”**, and that, if **“there is an intention to confiscate the arms from the reserve formations of police forces”**, Croatia would pronounce secession, demand a peacekeeping intervention from the UN Security Council, and the like.¹⁵¹ Jovic immediately informed Kadijevic and Milosevic to that effect. Milosevic was **enthralled** at this proposal by Croatia.¹⁵² He then proposed to accept the secession of Croatia (**“as soon as they proclaim secession, we need to accept it...”**), **“however, we should hold the Krajina municipalities militarily, until the people take a plebiscite to decide where they wanted to live”**.¹⁵³

Jovic was only too glad to accept Milosevic’s proposal, because he had **“always been in favour of the option ‘to have them cut off overnight’ from Yugoslavia, so let them ‘go to Europe’”**. However, according to Jovic, this had not been accepted by the Army.¹⁵⁴

On the same day, Kadijevic was reading out to Jovic the most recent recordings of the talks that Spigelj **“had had with his folks”**¹⁵⁵, representing the thesis of **“a non-compromising approach until their**

up on this as follows: **“under the terms you presented in Vranje, that is, that the people should freely state their position at a referendum, rather than this being decided upon by the current authorities, and that the people should also be previously exactly informed about everything that is relevant in relation to such a decision. If the Presidency is to ensure such terms – we shall agree”**. In relation to this, Jovic wrote down: **“This is the opinion of the Chief of Staff of the General Headquarters. I believe that Veljko too is of the same opinion, he is just silent. They do not like the dissolution of the country in the first place, but they will agree, if the peoples so decide”** (Ibid.).

¹⁵¹ Ibid., p. 256.

¹⁵² Ibid., p. 257. In relation with this, Jovic wrote: **“I am calling Veljko to come immediately. I inform Slobodan. He is enthralled: excellent...”**.

¹⁵³ Ibid., On that occasion, Milosevic insisted that Jovic should persuade General Kadijevic that this was a good variant.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid. In relation to this, in his memoirs, Jovic wrote: **“They have 60,000 pieces of ‘Kalasnikov’ automatic guns and 7,000 pieces of special automatic guns for special forces. They had decided to surrender 20,000 pieces to us, and then they changed their mind, because they assessed that we were ready to make concessions”** (Ibid.).

government is totally broken down”, because **“this is the only way to ‘settle’ this”**. However, according to Jovic, he did not take **“into account that we can not have the majority for such a decision at the Presidency, ‘apprehensive’ of wide scale casualties, particularly civilians”**. Planning to see what he should do further on, he believed that **“the initial steps must be the raising of the army’s preparedness level and arresting of those who needed to be prosecuted”**, and **“if they do not oppose – that is alright”**, and **“if they do oppose, we shall decide at that point”**.¹⁵⁶

There was an obvious difference in the positions of the army (General Kadijevic) and the leadership from Serbia (Milosevic and Jovic). The Army was in favour of **“breaking down the Croatian government”**, whereas the leadership of Serbia was in favour of **“protecting the Serb population in the Krajinas”**, however they did not point that out very much at the time.¹⁵⁷

On January 22, 1991, the SFRY Presidency reviewed the SSNO report on enforcement of the Order, and concluded that it had been executed only partially. Therefore, it concluded that the military judiciary and other competent bodies were obliged to act in compliance with the legally prescribed obligations and powers.¹⁵⁸

After the trick that **“the Serbs in Croatia were surrendering arms”**, while **“the Croats were not”**, and after the attempt to disarm the legal reserve police forces of the Ministry of Interior of Croatia, mobilized for the defence against such paramilitary formations, the situation became even tenser. On January 23, Jovic talked to Slobodan Milosevic about the disarmament in Croatia, informing him about plans **“for judicial action (arrests, trials, etc.), but also military action, which has to accompany all of that”**. On that occasion, Milosevic insisted again **“that the military should ‘cover’ the Serb areas in Croatia, so it can retain this territory in case of conflict, and let the**

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid. On the same day, according to Jovic, Izetbegovic requested to hold an urgent session of the Presidency of the SFRY, **“in order to postpone enforcement of the Order for Disarmament”**. In relation to this, Jovic wrote: **“To negotiate with Tudjman and Kucan. The Croats have obviously influenced Izetbegovic...”** (Ibid.).

¹⁵⁸ V. Kadijevic, the aforementioned work, pp. 111-112.

rest secede"¹⁵⁹, which once again corroborates the agreed intention and plan for forced expulsion of Slovenia and Croatia out of Yugoslavia.

On the same day, Kadijevic reported to Jovic about the preparations for execution of the SFRY Presidency Order dated January 9 for dissolution of the paramilitary illegal formations and confiscation of arms. In order to **"intercept any attempts at forced prevention of action by judicial bodies"**, the General proposed **"a whole program of military measures: raising of combat preparedness, regrouping of the army, supplementary mobilization and propaganda activities"** – public information campaign, whereas **"the arrests and hearings have already begun, and everything will go on over the next several days"**. These measures and activities were also supported by Jovic, by assessing that it would be difficult, **"but that there is no other way"**.¹⁶⁰

At the time, Jovic and Kadijevic agreed that, **"since"**, according to Kadijevic, allegedly, **"it was only the Serbs that had surrendered arms"**, **"the Army would protect"** the Serbs **"as much as it could, by the presence of its units"**.¹⁶¹

The next day, Kadijevic informed Jovic **"that the Croats were further raising their preparedness level, in order to attack the Army"**, on which the President demanded **"written information to be supplied to all members of the Presidency"**.¹⁶²

¹⁵⁹ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 257-258. At this, Milosevic emphasized that **"the Serb people in Krajina can not be forced into separation from Yugoslavia; it is only the people that can decide on that themselves"**.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 258. Kadijevic had developed the propaganda activity **"in detail"**.

On January 23, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command informed the public that unless all the mobilized formations on the territory of Croatia were dissolved immediately, the JNA would raise combat preparedness up to the level guaranteeing the enforcement of criminal procedure and of court decisions as based on the law. Part of the JNA units was subjected to the raising of combat preparedness (V. Kadijevic, the aforementioned work, pp. 111-112).

¹⁶¹ Ibid. This agreement was **"explained"** by Jovic by the fact that **"it was only the Serbs"** who had surrendered arms in Croatia.

¹⁶² Ibid. This information, according to Jovic, was needed for the members of the Presidency, **"because they need to know, so that they would not be surprised at what might happen"**. This was used by Jovic to prepare the terrain for undertaking **"military measures"**, and for their justification.

On the same day, Mesic requested to talk to Jovic,¹⁶³ in order to convey to him the message from Tudjman, proposing a meeting of four: Jovic and Milosevic on the one side, and Mesic and Tudjman on the other. The goal of this meeting, according to Jovic, was to discuss **“the manner for resolution of the Yugoslav crisis in the light of Serbo-Croat relations”**. On that occasion, Mesic asked Jovic to inform Milosevic to that effect and to tell him **“that this has nothing to do with the outcome of the tomorrow’s negotiations between Croatia and Serbia, where he would be heading the delegation”**. In agreement with this proposal, Jovic told Mesic **“that at this meeting, Serbia would give consent to the Croats to exit Yugoslavia, provided that they give their consent for the Serbs in the Krajinas to remain in Yugoslavia”**.¹⁶⁴

Milosevic too agreed to this proposal by Tudjman, having been informed by Jovic to that effect on the same day.¹⁶⁵

Due to the **“tension”** in Croatia and Yugoslavia, which had, according to Jovic, **“reached certain drastic proportions”**, on January 25, 1991, the Army had **“raised the combat preparedness up to the highest level, Croatia had mobilized 50,000 of ‘reserve’ police forces. The fear of the Serbs in Knin and in Croatia in general, increased. The Western countries (the USA and England, above all) started even**

¹⁶³ Ibid. In relation to this, Jovic wrote: **“Stipe Mesic is requesting a meeting. I expect a flurry of reactions to the activity we are conducting in relation to the Presidency’s Order for dissolution of the paramilitary illegal organizations and confiscation of arms. I welcome him immediately in a soothing manner, telling him that he should not worry about his power, that only the few directly responsible would be arrested and that the trial would be public. If they do not resist by offering force, no force should be either used by the Army.**

Mesic responded in cold blood – so let them arrest these guys, he would not care. They in Croatia would not resist this. Like, he trusts me and all and like, he will undertake nothing. Who can ever trust him any longer when he had lied so blatantly in saying that they would surrender the arms voluntarily” (Ibid.).

¹⁶⁴ Ibid. Under this condition, given that this involved Greater Serbia, according to Jovic, everything could be resolved, **“but nothing without it”**. In relation to this, in his memoirs, he wrote down: **“Let him mentally prepare himself”**.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 259. Jovic believed that this meeting should be held **“as early as tomorrow, after the official talks between the two delegations”**.

officially making the pressure on us, not to push on Croatia and Slovenia". The talks between the leaderships of Croatia and Serbia about the future of Yugoslavia had yielded no results. Instead, only the differences were corroborated. **"A movie clip about the preparation of the military insurgency in Croatia was played"**, which mined the meeting. Through Slobodan Milosevic, the Serbs from Croatia were making **"pressure on the army to protect them"**, which, according to Jovic, was transferred by him onto the president of the SFRY Presidency. General Kadijevic was **stubbornly refusing to use the Army "with an explanation that there is risk that the army would be labeled 'Serb', and that he would not allow this to happen"**.¹⁶⁶

Obviously, the units and commands of the JNA had not executed the Order of the SFRY Presidency on the dissolution and disarmament of paramilitary formations. General Kadijevic was refusing to use the army, because in that case he would have to dissolve and disarm the numerous Serb armed formations too in the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, formed, staffed and trained, equipped and armed by the JNA, upon orders by the military leadership.¹⁶⁷

Kadijevic was not able to undertake the use of the Army in the **"protection"** of the Serbs in Croatia without the decision of the Presidency. Therefore, Milosevic insisted on this decision to be passed. Under their pressure, Jovic convened a session of the SFRY Presidency for the afternoon of January 25. To this aim, he requested Kadijevic to provide him with information on the situation, and with the proposal.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 259.

¹⁶⁷ According to Mamula, the JNA had never received a clear war assignment from the Presidency that it had not executed, **"so that it would result in the dissolution and disappearance of the country"** (B. Mamula, **UZROCI I POSLJEDICE RATOVA U JUGOSLAVIJI 1991-2001**, in: **RATOVI U JUGOSLAVIJI 1991-1999**, Compilation of Communiqués and Discussions from the Round Table, Belgrade, November 7-9, 2001, Belgrade 2002, p. 213). However, this is not true, as denied by the order of the SFRY Presidency on the dissolution and disarmament of paramilitary armed formations.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid. The basis of the work of the SFRY Presidency was an SSNO Information, on the JNA measures for execution of the SFRY Presidency's Order dated January 1991 on dissolution and disarmament of the illegal armed formations. This document, among other things, states **"that during January 24 and 25, the JNA criminal prosecution**

Among other things, Kadijevec proposed **“that the Army should be prepared [...] if needed, that only then the approval for action be provided to it (by the Presidency)”**.¹⁶⁹ Therefore, **he did not propose involvement of the JNA, but only its preparedness**.¹⁷⁰

The aforementioned proposal by the General did not pass.¹⁷¹

bodies deprived of liberty two active JNA officers and two civilians from the territory of the Republic of Croatia, on grounds of suspicion of having directly participated in the organization and armament of illegal paramilitary organizations and preparing command and terrorist actions and attacks against JNA members, members of their families and military facilities, that is, armed mutiny; that the investigative procedure is underway and that the military judicial bodies have also been undertaking other measures in compliance with their powers and responsibilities as determined by the law.

Then it provides an assessment of the current situation in Croatia. Contrary to the requirements of the SFRY Presidency and official statements of the leadership of the Republic of Croatia, the combat preparedness of the police and other armed formations is strengthened. The members of the illegal HDZ military organization are being transferred to the reserve police formation at a speedy rate, with granting of the official accreditations. Mobilization is also being conducted in the islands, which has not been done so far. The propaganda campaign is being ultimately radicalized. What is being pushed forward is the alleged danger coming from the Greater Serbia hegemony and centralism from Belgrade. The JNA is proclaimed to be a sheer tool of this policy” (Ibid.).

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., pp. 259-260. In relation to this, Kadijevec informed the SFRY Presidency **“that, given the developments, the measures are underway to bring the planned units of the JNA up to the required level of combat preparedness, so the SFRY Presidency is proposed to do the following:**

(1) to require all the participants to respect legality in the conducting of criminal procedure already started, in order to ensure its peaceful implementation and compliance with the law;

(2) to invite the responsible perpetrators to do all in order to reduce interethnic tension and avoid direct conflict;

(3) to order the JNA to be ready and to get involved immediately, if any interethnic conflicts should occur in any part of Yugoslavia” (Ibid.).

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 261. According to Jovic, this understood **“new decision-making if one wished to get involved in the prevention of interethnic conflicts”**.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., pp. 259-261. In relation to this, a real “showtime” was going on at the session of the SFRY Presidency. Janez Drnovsek left the session, revolted, and then came back later.

Ante Markovic summoned a session of the SIV, and concluded **“that this would deteriorate the situation even further”**.¹⁷²

In the night of January 24, 1991, while the SFRY Presidency was convening for the second time that month, **“in order to demand the disarmament of Croatian police”**, Milosevic held a special meeting with president Kucan. At this secret meeting (the Serbo-Slovenian agreement), Milosevic and Kucan agreed about the right of the Slovenes and Serbs to have their respective states.¹⁷³

In assessing the political and security situation as a very critical one, and given that the Serbian leadership could undertake nothing,¹⁷⁴ on January 25 (around 20:00 hours), the SFRY Presidency invited the leadership of the Republic of Croatia (Tudjman, Domljan and Manolic), who had been in Serbia for negotiations, to come to the session of the SFRY Presidency for talks.¹⁷⁵ In the discussion, which lasted **“until after midnight”**, it was somehow “agreed” **“that Croatia would dismiss and disarm the reserve police forces, the Army suspend its combat**

¹⁷² Ibid., p. 259.

¹⁷³ L. Silber – A. Little, *SMRT JUGOSLAVIJE*, Belgrade, 1996, pp. 128, 184, and 185; B. Mamula, *SLUCAJ JUGOSLAVIJA*, p. 209. At this meeting, Kucan claims, **“it became clear that the Serbs would not demand that Slovenia should remain in Yugoslavia... We the Slovenes had told them that we wish the right to our own state. Milosevic said that the Serbs too wanted this right acknowledged for themselves – that is, the right that all the Serbs in Yugoslavia should live in one state. I of course responded that the Serbs have this right too, but in the same way as the Slovenians, without compromising the rights of the other peoples. Milosevic responded: ‘Yes, of course, this is clear’, and it was with that conclusion that we returned to Ljubljana”** (Ibid., p. 128).

¹⁷⁴ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 259. In relation to this, Jovic concluded: **“We can do nothing”**.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., pp. 259-261. As Jovic wrote, Mesic and Drnovsek **“were decisively against that anything should be discussed and decided about Croatia without the presence of its leadership. Tupurkovski was absent, but he agreed on the telephone. Ante Markovic was stubbornly insisting that the third count of the SSNO proposal should not be adopted, because, in his opinion, this would only pour oil onto fire. The extended discussion nevertheless lead to the situation that we invited the Croat leadership which arrived at about 20:00 in the evening”** (Ibid.).

preparedness, and conditions be put in place for normal conduction of the trial in the Order execution procedure”.¹⁷⁶

According to Kadijevic, at this meeting, it was agreed and concluded that on January 26, until 12:00 hours, the reserve formation of the police in Croatia be demobilized, that the degree of combat preparedness of the JNA units be reverted to normal and that the military judicial bodies continue the investigatory and court procedure without interference. At this, according to him, Croatia was “**unusually cooperative in acceptance**

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 259. In his memoirs, Jovic writes about this as follows: “**the discussion with the Croats was long and tiresome. Their thesis was:**

- that they need to arm themselves in defence against the ‘Serb banditry’, but also against

- the fear from a military coup d’état.

We were persuading them that there would be no military coup, and that nobody was going to touch their power, but that individuals would be arrested who were responsible for illegal actions. The Serb issue needs to be resolved in a political, not in a military way.

Nobody believed anybody, but a verbal compromise was somehow found, which I doubt will mean anything durable.

The following public statement was issued:

‘A detailed analysis of the causes which have brought to mutual mistrust and suspicion and tension has shown that there are no reasons that would justify such an instigation of interethnic tensions in the Republic of Croatia and between the bodies of the Republic of Croatia and the Federation. Full agreement to undertake the measures that will decrease this tension has been reached. In this spirit, it was arranged that on January 26, of this year, until 12:00 hours, the reserve formations of the police in Croatia be demobilized, and at the same time, the level of combat preparedness in the JNA units be returned to the normal peace-time conditions. This will create the conditions for fully normal existence and removal of any interethnic confrontations.

It was jointly agreed that this creates the conditions to proceed with the investigatory procedure prescribed by law. It was also agreed that, in conducting of the investigative and court procedure, the military judicial bodies would cooperate with the competent bodies of the Republic of Croatia” (Ibid., p. 261).

The aforementioned compromise was commented by Jovic in the following manner: “**Whether this is an agreement for the sake of implementation or for the sake of catching our breaths, that is yet to be seen” (Ibid.).**

of the positions of the SFRY Presidency and, one would say, ready to sacrifice some of the criminal perpetrators”.¹⁷⁷

The next day (January 26), Jovic talked with Milosevic on the telephone about the aforementioned “results” of the session of the SFRY Presidency and the negotiations between Serbia and Croatia. Milosevic was “**very disappointed at the results of the Presidency session**”. It did not fit into “**his idea (scheme)**”, about which he could not speak to Jovic on the telephone. At this, Milosevic indicated upon the significance of the JNA involvement in Croatia. Namely, he presented the following claim: “**once the army ‘covers’ the Serb territories in Croatia, we will no longer be afraid of the outcome of the Yugoslav crisis. Without that – nothing**”. In relation to this, Milosevic believed that any different development of events was no good for them.¹⁷⁸

According to Jovic, Milosevic still stuck to “**what could even have been possible until recently**”. However, **the army did not want to “cut off”** Slovenia and Croatia from Yugoslavia. According to Jovic, in late January 1991, this was not possible, because “**a war would have broken out along the whole depth of Slovenia and Croatia**”, and “**the JNA was everywhere in the depth of those republics, it had not timely withdrawn onto new positions**”.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁷ V. Kadijevic, the aforementioned work, p. 112. Speaking about this, Kadijevic wrote: “**Soon, however, there was an overturn in the Croatian position. A key role in this was played by Mr. Zimmermann, with his positions that the West would defend the young Croatian democracy, at the same time letting us know that the West would not accept any JNA intervention against Croatia whatsoever, that the problems of paramilitary formations are allegedly difficult, but that they too have to be resolved through negotiations, just like Gorbachev is doing with the Baltic countries. After that, the Croatian government even publicly declared the policy of armament, preventing the work of the military judicial bodies to the maximum, although it was not able to fully prevent them. They kept on reinforcing and arming of the army with a major assistance from abroad. Simultaneously, provocations against the Serb people in Croatia increased, by use of the Ustasha methods from the WWII, even ‘enriched’ with some new inventions, provocations against the JNA members and their families. This caused a logical reaction among the whole Serb people, particularly in Croatia, as well as among the JNA members**” (Ibid.).

¹⁷⁸ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 262.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid. Related to this, Jovic wrote: “**Neither did it want to, nor did it seek to, nor had it received such an order**”.

Starting from the understanding **“that any conflict could last for a very long time”**, and **“that its outcome could not be foreseen in advance”**,¹⁸⁰ then, according to Jovic, in compliance with the assessments and proposals by General Kadijevic of January 4, with which he agreed, it would be best **“to use the force we have at our disposal (the army) and the democracy we wish to impose (the determination of the peoples) to ensure both a peaceful outcome of the crisis and favourable solutions for the Serb people...”**.¹⁸¹ This line, according to him, may have been **“the most fruitful, and with a possibility of success”**. Therefore he would advocate for it **“as long as it is possible”**. In assessing that the Croats cared about imposing the war, he concluded: **“Therefore we must defend ourselves, we have to defend the Serb people, which does not want to leave Yugoslavia by force”**.¹⁸²

In a discussion with Jovic, on January 29, in reviewing the course of implementation of the arrangements from the SFRY Presidency session dated January 23,¹⁸³ Kadijevic proposed **“to prepare an adapted plan,**

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 263. Jovic was afraid of **“‘the labyrinth’ of the peaceful development of events”**. It seemed to him that **“they were stronger within him”**. Therefore, for him, it was **“no wonder that the Croats were striving towards the war option”**.

¹⁸¹ Ibid. In terms of securing a peaceful outcome of the crisis and the favourable solution for the Serb people, Jovic by the way also mentioned that this solution would also be **“for all others if this is possible”**.

¹⁸² Ibid.

¹⁸³ Ibid., p. 264. In the discussion, they assessed **“that Tudjman and the HDZ would understand this as a break and try to continue with the implementation of their policy”**. Therefore, among other things, they concluded that **“the Order of the Presidency must be executed without further ado”**, and **“that there may be no concessions on the part of the military judicial bodies”**. In the meantime, the Croat political leadership, according to them, needed **“to be fought down with all the means available and insert conflict amongst them”**.

Kadijevic and Jovic also agreed that **“the Croato-Slovenian separatism and the approach of destruction towards the constitutional system of the country, the foreign factor and the Federal Executive Council”** **“were the key points”** of their further activity. Kadijevic irresponsibly claimed that **“he is no longer able to participate in the work of the SIV, that they are so arrogant and insolent, that this can not be stood any longer”**, which was accepted by Jovic with relief, stating that he had been speaking about their intentions a long time ago, **“but [Kadijevic] did not believe him”**.

or do a new plan for the defence of the country, with deployment of the military in the western part of the country”. According to him, **“there were enough formal justifications for this, because it is only from there that the foreign intervention danger is looming on us”**. In this way, the western part of the country would have an army **“on a permanent and sufficient basis, without any special movements”**.¹⁸⁴

The SFRY Presidency decisions on the dissolution and disarmament of the “paramilitary” formations in Croatia brought the leadership of the Republic and the President into a difficult position. Tudjman was **“caught by panic, he was frightened and waiting to see whether the JNA would react in a decisive manner. However, the JNA was indecisive”**, and the Croatian leadership did not honor the decisions of the SFRY Presidency.¹⁸⁵

Speaking about this, Jovic continued that allegedly **“all of them together are working on the breakup of Yugoslavia, in coordination, in a rough and unconstitutional way, which can even cause a civil war”**. Therefore he believed that it is hardest **“to unveil and break down the SIV, because it is floating thanks to inter-republic clashes. There is not agreement to pull it down! This is what it is surviving on!”** (Ibid.).

¹⁸⁴ Ibid. Jovic commented on this proposal by saying the following: **“I can not ask him how we shall return from there. He will be cross. He has not yet ‘swallowed’ that he is defending the Serb territories in Croatia. He still believes in the defence of Yugoslavia”** (Ibid.).

¹⁸⁵ B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, pp. 229, and 260. After the partial failure in disarmament, in late January 1991, the JNA was conducting a forceful media campaign against the Republic of Croatia. In relation to this, D. Marijan wrote: **“Several Croat citizens were arrested, and the Court Martial in Zagreb even raised an indictment against Croatian Defence Minister, General Martin Spegelj. The military bulletin *Narodna armija* devoted two full issues to this problem, under the title The Truth about the Armament of the HDZ Terrorist Formations in Croatia, completely distorting it and neglecting the intensive armament of the insurgent Croatian Serbs. In the meantime, lead by the members of the Serb Democratic Party, they were organizing their armed units, for which they had even managed to engage retired officers, which did not slip from observation by the JNA security bodies”** (D. Marijan, the aforementioned work, p. 297).

The working people and citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the official bodies of the Republic provided **“full support to the measures of the Presidency and the resoluteness on execution of the Order for disarmament of the illegal armed forces in the SFRY, particularly where such activity has been identified. Any attempts for break-up and division of the Yugoslav federal community are condemned. The effort is welcomed, as invested by the SFRY Presidency and the republic leaderships**

It is obvious that in January 1991, when the SFRY Presidency was discussing the issue of dissolution and disarmament of the “paramilitary” formations in Croatia, **in daily discussions and arrangements** Milosevic and Jovic were determining the doctrine of abandoning the common state and the strategy of constitution and defence of Greater Serbia. They were making efforts to bring the JNA onto the Greater Serbia concept, so that it should defend the ethnic Serb territories. This was set by Milosevic and Jovic as a war goal of the JNA. Therefore, they were making pressure on generals Kadijevic and Adzic to abandon Yugoslavia and to defend the “Serb” territories only.¹⁸⁶

In February 1991, starting from the assessment that the situation in Yugoslavia **“can not be resolved without a clear and strong announcement of the use of force”**, the military leadership prepared a **new defence plan “against the internal and external aggression”** and made plans **“for overthrowing the governments in Slovenia and Croatia”**.¹⁸⁷

in attempts to seek a solution for the Yugoslav crisis. Also, a large number of citizenry have publicly protested against a statement by a member of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Presidency and the HDZ leader for the area of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Stjepan Kljuic, who, when presented with the possibility of JNA involvement in the execution of the SFRY Presidency’s Order for disarmament of the paramilitary organization and in criminal prosecution of the perpetrators of the aforementioned activities in Croatia, said ‘that the Croats would assist their brothers in Croatia’” (AIIZ, 2-2438, Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of Territorial Defence, confidential no. 04/141-3, February 6, 1991, Sarajevo – to the District Headquarters of Territorial Defence of Tuzla, and others, Information on Significant Factors and Manifestations on the Public and Combat Preparedness of the TO BiH for JANUARY 1991).

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 229. Mamula reminds **“that this was January 1991, that is, the time when at least two thirds of the Yugoslav citizens believed that the preservation of the country can not be at stake; the JNA was preparing to use the force to disarm the Croat paramilitary formations and to open up a war against them; the negotiations of the presidents of the republics on the state form of Yugoslavia would only begin in two months, and the President of the SFRY Presidency and the president of the largest republic abandoned any fight for a joint state...”** (Ibid., pp. 229-230).

¹⁸⁷ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 265-278. In the middle of the second week of February 1991, the military top assessed **“ that the situation in the country can definitely not be resolved without a clear and strong announcement of the use**

The essence of the new war plan (a “**combination of defence against internal and external aggression**”) was in the deployment of the “**military units in both functions at the same time**”. The aim of this plan, which was based “**on two basic assumptions of external action**” (sudden intervention with currently existing forces, and an intervention with mobilized forces), was to ensure (for the leadership of the Greater Serbia movement) a “**new deployment of the army in order to resolve the crisis in the country**”.^{187a} Given that the military leadership had made up the danger coming from “**the internal and external aggression**”, this was obviously a trick.

The plans of the military leadership “**for overthrowing of the governments in Slovenia and Croatia**” were discussed by Jovic with

of force and its use to the extent necessary in order to come out of the crisis without a civil war, and in a democratic manner”. “**The clear announcement of the use of armed forces in the constitutional function**”, based on this assessment, “**may have influenced further developments, and if this were not helpful, then the actual use should have to follow**”. In relation to this, it was assessed that the time is not on their side, “**neither in the state, nor in the army**”, at which “**the dissolution of the state has a direct effect on the dissolution of the army**”, and then they concluded that “**quick action must hence follow**” (Ibid., p. 266).

^{187a} Ibid., pp. 265-266. On February 11, 1991, the military leadership presented this plan to Jovic, following which they agreed that on the next day he would go to the SSNO and see about it in more detail, and after that it would be “shown” to the Presidency. In addition, at the time, the military top had an intention to approach the SFRY Presidency, SFRY Assembly, and probably, the public, with information on the situation in the country and on the constitutional role of the armed forces in resolving the crisis. The draft of this communiqué was read by Jovic on that day and he provided his suggestions. Namely, he proposed that they should attempt to publicize the **Positions of the Armed Forces of the SFRY on the resolution of the crisis in the country** as the positions of the Supreme Command, because then “**it would all be better and stronger**”, and Kadijevic immediately agreed, if this was to be accepted by the Presidency (For more details on this: B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 266-268).

The execution of the Order for disarmament, where “**the one still unarrested was Spegelj**”, and, in relation to this, the drafting and realization of the military action plan, then presented by Kadijevic, was commented by Jovic as follows: “**My assessment is that we are already late and that we are under strong and justified criticism of the public. The Army has been constantly announcing some fierce action in various variants, but nothing is actually being undertaken whatsoever, nor is the Presidency demanded to provide any decision for them to do so**” (Ibid., p. 268).

the Serb members of the Presidency, and with Slobodan Milosevic and Momir Bulatovic,¹⁸⁸ that is to say, with the Informal Group, which had already been making decisions and practically functioning as the SFRY Presidency.

In these plans, the basic concept of the army consisted of the following: firstly, **“to combine political and military measures in order to overthrow the government first in Croatia, and then in Slovenia”**, and secondly, **“in the undecided republics (Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina), combine political measures – demonstrations and surges – to overthrow the leaderships or to turn them around in another direction”**, at which these activities were to be **“combined with some military actions, too”**.¹⁸⁹

The execution of this plan would be directed by **“those members of the SFRY Presidency who opt for this course”**, and the action would be conducted with strong **“reliance on the army”** and **“on the forces in favour of Yugoslavia”**. All the federal institutions that accept this course **“shall be included in the action”**, and those which fail to join (the SIV, for instance) were to be overthrown from power.¹⁹⁰ **Even the state of emergency** was to be introduced **“where necessary”**.¹⁹¹

For the realization of the aforementioned plans, the military leadership proposed to undertake two groups of measures and actions: **in the civilian and military sectors**, at which, among other things, the manner of

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., pp. 265-281. In late February 1991, general Spegelj learned that there is a developed plan of intervention in Slovenia and Croatia. This, plan, according to him, fit into the so-called *Sutjeska 2* plan, according to which certain forces were moving from the East of Yugoslavia into Slavonia and West Bosnia, in order to take a certain line in defence against the NATO attack. This option, according to Spegelj, with some modifications and changes, was suitable for the intervention against Slovenia and Croatia (M. Spegelj, the aforementioned work, pp. 50-51).

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., pp. 276-277.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 277. Kadjevic’s proposal to overthrow the federal institutions which fail to join the action was commented by Jovic in stating that the General **“does not explain how he means to accomplish this”**.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

carrying out the political and military actions (particularly the political ones) had not been announced.¹⁹²

After the action in Croatia, the plan foresaw to move on to Slovenia. In both of those republics (first in Croatia, and later in Slovenia, too), **“as the first variant, there could be military administration, and then formation of institutions from among the non-compromised persons”**.¹⁹³

¹⁹² Ibid. **“In the civilian sector, we needed to prepare:**

1) The paper for March 1, for the session of the Presidency to take the political decision on the resolution of the crisis.

2) In Croatia, politically and institutionally strengthen the Serb Krajina and support its secession from Croatia (rather factually than publicly).

3) Organize mass rallies in Croatia against the HDZ, raise Bosnia and Herzegovina up on their feet ‘for Yugoslavia’, and in Macedonia, seek the concept of the Rally to overthrow the pro-Bulgarian leadership. Seek mass rallies of support in Serbia and Montenegro. Forbid gathering in Kosovo” (Ibid.).

Among **military measures**, Kadijevic included the following:

“1. File the indictments tomorrow, including the one against Spegelj, and make them public the day after.

2. Since it is probable that on March 1, 1991, the Presidency will not make any progress in negotiations on the political future of the country, immediately after that, upon the request of the military top, hold a session of the SFRY Presidency in the function of the supreme command of the armed forces at the command place, increase the combat preparedness of the army, conduct mobilization and prepare for decisive action in Croatia. (Veljko does not state anything about how he thinks that the same Presidency which is not able to make any decisions on March 1, 1991, can or will make an even fiercer decision right after that).

3. Immediately after that, request that Spegelj turn himself in, that the arms be returned, and the reserve police forces disarmed, and give an ultimatum.

Two options are possible here: to first seek Spegelj and the arms, so if their forced taking is not successful, let the army, immediately after the PSFRY decision, be brought into combat preparedness and immediately use force to take both Spegelj and the arms (because the assessment is that they will not give these away voluntarily)” – Ibid., pp. 277-278.

¹⁹³ Ibid., p. 278. The program also foresaw the opening of an information system which then, according to the assessment of the military top, was **“completely closed”**. In addition, **“the further procedure (election of the bodies, referendum on staying in Yugoslavia or leaving it, etc.) would be conducted pursuant to the decision of the SFRY Presidency”**.

Jovic did not comment on the aforementioned plans and the manner of their implementation. Given all the complexity of this problem, he was aware that it requires the decision of the Presidency. Therefore he was **“concerned [...] by the indecisive behaviour of the Presidency – whether we are going to be able to secure the majority for the decision on mobilization and on raising combat preparedness, as well as for the other decisions”**. At this, he was afraid of the SIV, because he believed that it would be against, which could interfere with their action.¹⁹⁴

On February 26, Jovic talked with Bucin and Bogicevic, aiming to **“mentally”** prepare them for the positions and decisions that were needed for the holders of the Greater Serbia movement. Bucin believed that **“consistent execution (implementation) of the Order for disarmament”** is the issue of their survival in the Presidency, which was, according to Jovic, also thought by Bogicevic, but he was **“against the use of force and bloodshed”**.¹⁹⁵

Nevertheless, the military top could at that time not have foreseen all the details. However, its goals were clear, **“and they would be implemented depending on the situation”**. In relation to this, Kadijevic stated: **“Once the military actions begin, they must be quick and energetic. We have thus been tricked twice (about the Order). We shall not allow this to happen for the third time”** (Ibid.).

¹⁹⁴ Ibid. In his memoirs, Jovic noted down about this: **“I have not commented on anything. I listened and thought it over. It is too complex to take a rush position. Of course, only my position is not enough, what is required is a decision by the Presidency. I am concerned about the indecisive behavior of the Presidency – whether we shall be able to secure the majority for the decision on mobilization and raising of combat preparedness, as well as for the other decisions. As for the SIV, I believe they will be against, which can disrupt our action. I will try to discuss it with some members of the Presidency, with Slobodan Milosevic and Momir Bulatovic. Nevertheless, everything needs to be carefully thought about. It is true that there has been a lot of plight. The danger is threatening us from losing credibility among the people, which we had acquired in a very difficult way, although it is yet more of a problem if we lose the state, and this is primarily what the case here is all about”** (Ibid.).

¹⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 278. Such a position by Bogicevic was commented by Jovic in the following way: **“A strange mixture of goals and methods: we can be subjected to both arms and force, and we are supposed to handle them with mercy.”** Jovic wrote that they tried to dissuade Bogicevic from such a position. However, when Bogicevic was in question, according to Jovic, **“nothing is ever certain”** (Ibid.).

Jovic was intensively thinking about the plan of the military presented to him by Kadijevec on February 25. He was concerned by the belief **“that the Presidency will not have the majority for the decisions proposed by the army”**.¹⁹⁶

On February 28, Jovic consulted Milosevic to that effect. He read to him **“all his notes, word by word”**. Milosevic believed **“that this is all good, except that Slovenia needs to be left at peace. Only Croatia needs to be treated”**. According to him, the Slovenes **“have not violated the (military) laws to that extent, and there are no formal justifications, and politically all would boil down to overthrowing the elected bodies”**.¹⁹⁷

When asked by Jovic, **“what do we do if we fail to reach the majority needed in the Presidency for the required decisions”**, Milosevic believed that decisions need to be made **“with as many members as are ‘in favour of’ and that the army ‘will listen’”**. In addition, he believed it logical **“to ‘remove’ anyone who will resist such an action by the Presidency”**.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 281. This, according to him, is **“very probable [...] after the information on the evolution of the positions by Gligorov and Izetbegovic”**. Namely, when mentioning Gligorov and Izetbegovic, Jovic has in mind the talks of the Yugoslav presidents in Sarajevo, on February 22, 1991, where no agreement was reached about the concept for resolution of the constitutional crisis in Yugoslavia (Ibid., p. 275).

A day before this meeting in Sarajevo, Jovic and Kadijevec had talked about the situation in relation to this discussion. Their joint assessment was that **“Sarajevo needs to be subjected to an overturn”**. If this fails (**“if it does not happen”**), the Presidency of the SFRY, as the Supreme Command, should **“take a move that will extort the overturn”**. Therefore they concluded: **“We need to nail them against the wall – either the referendum or the implementation of the constitution and the laws – or the force”** (Ibid.).

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid. However, for Jovic, there was **“a very suspicious violation of the laws between Slovenia and Croatia, and that is a very dodgy idea that the minority at the Presidency take binding decisions. This is then a state in which the army decides, and this can not be concealed. And no one is even thinking about that the army too is multiethnic and that by that very fact, without the decision of the political body, it is hard for it to remain monolith”** (Ibid.).

At the time, the Army was **“in big trouble”**, because it did not have the political **“coverage”** for what it was supposed to do. It was afraid of the **“action without coverage”**. However, a decision by the SFRY Presidency without sufficient votes was neither constitutional nor **“cover”** enough. In the opinion of Jovic, it was better **“to create a vacuum for the army to make its own decisions, rather than have a ‘half fish, half girl’ option”**.¹⁹⁹

In early March 1991, Milosevic initiated the Pakrac incident, in order to disrupt the opposition rally in Belgrade, announced for March 9.²⁰⁰ To these aims, Jovic, in the capacity of the president of the SFRY Presidency, without even summoning the Presidency, ordered the deployment of the Army in Croatia.²⁰¹ JNA units were sent to Pakrac from Bjelovar,

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰⁰ M. Vasic – F. Schwarm, the aforementioned work, p. 240. As M. Vasic and F. Schwarm wrote, he was not successful at this, although he had risen **“the interethnic tensions in Croatia, and to a certain extent in Serbia, too”** (Ibid.).

²⁰¹ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 281-282. This order was made by Jovic without the session of the Presidency, as he wrote in his memoirs, **“since it was a Sunday. The members of the Presidency were not in Belgrade. Janez and Vasil were grumbling a little bit, but the decision was nevertheless confirmed”** (Ibid., pp. 281-287).

Without the decision of the SFRY Presidency, Jovic was not supposed to send troops into Pakrac. He did it upon the request of the military leadership, with the telltales by admiral Brovet about how **“the SSNO proposal for the JNA involvement in Pakrac was starting from the constitutional role of the JNA – prevention of breakout of an armed conflict, particularly the inter-ethnic one”** (S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. 23).

When the SFRY Presidency was assessing the situation in Pakrac, on March 5, 1991, as Jovic did not want to invite the representatives of the Republic of Croatia, Mesic left the session. Jovic requested that the Army be granted all the powers, which was fiercely reacted upon by Drnovsek, and Kadujevic announced that “in a couple of days” a military “assessment” and a “proposal for measures” would be ready (Ibid., pp. 23-24).

On March 6, 1991, General Kadujevic announced to Jovic **“certain new tactics or action. He has the intention to arrest some twenty HDZ activists who have received arms, one of these days”**. In relation to this, Jovic wrote: **“Let us see that. For that, they do not need a Presidency decision. Anything they have promised so far, they have not done. The people have started losing confidence in the Army and in us. It is high time something practical were done”** (B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 282).

Virovitica, and Zagreb, and the Command of the Varazdin (32nd) Corps set its front line command place in the city itself.²⁰² Several days later (on March 9, 1991), in a fierce conflict between the power and opposition,²⁰³ upon the telephone requests by Slobodan Milosevic, Jovic ordered General Kadijevic to take the army out to the streets (in Belgrade) and **“repossess the areas in front of the targeted state institutions”**.²⁰⁴

²⁰² D. Marijan, the aforementioned work, p. 297; Ibid., **ORUZANE SNAGE...**, pp. 371-372. On March 1, 1991, according to D. Marijan, an attack by insurgent Serbs on the Police Precinct in Pakrac and disarmament of policemen of Croat ethnicity constituted a new attempt to destabilize Croatia. The insurgency was extinguished a day later (on March 2), by the intervention of the special unit of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Croatia (Ibid.).

General Dobrasin Prasevic, Chief of Staff of the Headquarters of the 5th Military District, stated in Pakrac that they had come to prevent **“an interethnic clash, by acting preventively: so that we show to the people and convince them that they will not be left to the mercy of the special forces, and for them to be able to see ‘on site’ how committed we were in not permitting violence and bloodshed”** (D. Marijan, **JUGOSLAVENSKA NARODNA ARMIJA ...**, PP. 297-298).

²⁰³ B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, p. 219. Then, according to B. Mamula, both the power and opposition in Belgrade were on the side of Greater Serbia. In relation to this, he wrote: **“All of us in their respective ways and their respective forces and means, or together, would defend the idea of ‘Greater Serbia’, when they would assess that the Army had started its own way in the defence of Yugoslavia and Socialism. Not for a moment could one neglect the influence and linkages of Belgrade with the Serbs in Bosnia and Croatia. On the other hand, the army in Serbia was traditionally respected; its message and action were appreciated. The majority of JNA staff were Serbs, disgraced after the numerous attacks against the Army, without having to forcefully revert in a single case, Slovenia had exceeded the brim and the nationalists were publicly calling upon them these days, labeling and spitting on them in Belgrade and in Serbia. It is needless to say that they were among the first who wanted to clear their honour and raise their heads. Finally, it is only through the defence of Yugoslavia that the old Serbian axiom was resolved, that all the Serbs need to live in the same state, so the logical conclusion ought to be that the defence of Yugoslavia would have the support by the majority of Serbs”** (Ibid.).

²⁰⁴ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 283. In his memoirs, Jovic wrote: **“... Slobodan will send an official written request that we shall approve tomorrow at the session of the Presidency”** (Ibid.).

About this decision on the deployment of the JNA in extinguishing the insurgency in Serbia, for the sake of protecting the government, Jovic was discussing more broadly in his book titled **KNJIGA O MILOSEVICU** (Belgrade 2001).

In assessing the “**overall situation in the country**” in early March 1991 “**as the beginning of civil war**”, the military leadership (the

“... I was spending the weekend in my resting house in Niksic, near Kragujevac. As the president of the SFRY Presidency, I was constantly informed about the events. A number of times I was phoned by Slobodan Milosevic, President of the Republic of Serbia, and Veljko Kadijevic, Federal Secretary for National Defence. Milosevic was obviously much better informed. He had probably been closely monitoring everything that was happening, and possibly he was even directly consulted as to what needs to be undertaken. This could be concluded by the fact that, whenever he called me, he spoke about new moments that were currently happening on the field, and he was describing the situation as dramatic each time, and ever more and more so. Even with the first call, he was anticipating the probable need for assistance by the army. He was obviously aware that the available police forces would not suffice. I was suggesting this to Kadijevic, so that the army would be ready if necessary. Kadijevic acted in a rather reserved manner, pointing out that this is the job of the police and that in case that he is demanded such a thing, a decision by the Presidency needs to be obtained.

The situation and the relations at the SFRY Presidency did not provide secure prospects that such a decision could be passed. The Presidency members from the other republics, except from Serbia and Montenegro, were not inclined to protect the power in Serbia. They would rather have overthrown it they could. Nevertheless, I started the first circle of consultations with the members of the SFRY Presidency. I called one by one on the telephone to report to them about the situation and to suggest that we may have to state our positions about the use of the JNA in order to extinguish the uprising in Serbia. This involves the protection of the legally elected government, which by the Constitution of the SFRY falls in the jurisdiction of the JNA, but this requires an assessment and decision by the SFRY Presidency.

Such a possibility affected the Presidency members as a shock. More or less, all of them expressed the desire to avoid this, if at all possible. Even the members of the Presidency who would in any way want to protect the power in Serbia were confused at the fact that we have to use the Army against the insurgency in Serbia, now when we need it to fight the separatism and forced secession of the western republics. I avoided contacting Drnovsek and Mesic all the time until the final decision, lest they would influence Bogicevic, Tupurkovski and Sapunxiu, who were indecisive and could easily refuse the use of the Army, by the very fact that all the three were expressing a large reserve against any sort of such a move by the Presidency. They believed that this would not be good.

Milosevic called in for the umpteenth time asking me directly whether I would assist or not, as the situation was beyond control. I told him that I have already announced to Kadijevic and the members of the Presidency the possibility of deploying the Army and that, regardless of any protest, I will demand that a decision on the deployment of the army be passed, aimed at extinguishing the insurgency and vandalism which have

Headquarters of the Supreme Command), seemingly in the function of the 1974 SFRY Constitution, and in fact **“strained in the rains of**

really taken on a large scope. The demonstrators had pushed through into the Serbia Assembly and Government Buildings, and there is also the danger that they would take up the Television. I promised him that I would immediately repeat the cycle of consultations in order to pass the decision.

I first called Kadijevic and told him that I would seek consent by phone from the Presidency members to pass the decision on the JNA intervention in Belgrade, to extinguish the violence and assist in introducing order. The Army needs to prevent the protesters from taking over state institutions, by placing its forces in front of those buildings, and by demonstrating its military power, in order to warn the protesters against ‘playing with the state’. We did not talk about the use of force or arms, that is, fire, in extinguishing the insurgency. However, the army was not explicitly forbidden from doing that. It all depended on the course of events and on the situation in the field.

Kadijevic told me that in that case, he needs not only a decision by the Presidency, but also a written request by the Republic of Serbia. I did not dispute him. The written request can be sought by the Presidency, if it believes it necessary, and the Army must proceed according to the decision by the Presidency. I asked Milosevic if he agrees to send a written request to the Presidency for the deployment of the army, so I could operate with it in the negotiations with the members of the Presidency. Milosevic agreed.

As soon as I finished the conversation with Milosevic, Kadijevic called me again. Now he believed that it is necessary to undertake something urgently, because the protesters are threatening to break into the JNA General Headquarters, which is located right across the road from the Government of Serbia building, which they have already broken into.

The discussion with the members of the Presidency was easier than it seemed based on first contacts. This was also much contributed to by the fact that the Army was also at stake, that is, that the General Headquarters was under the attack of the protesters, but also by the information that Serbia was officially and in writing demanding protection of its state institutions and the legally elected government. Tupurkovski, Bogicevic and Sapunxiu expressed certain resistance, each of them in their own way, but they agreed after my warning that the Presidency may not escape its constitutional responsibility to protect the constitutional order, if necessary, even by the use of the JNA. They did not like our using the army to defend the Serb leadership, even less the idea that in a similar way we could use it to destroy those who are not of our liking, of the separatist leaderships.

I was assuring them that for each of us, legally elected government is the same and that the army shall not defend ones and destroy others. It is hard to know who trusted whom at that moment, but they agreed. The votes of Nenad Bucin and Jugoslav Kostic were not disputable from the very beginning. I did not succeed in the attempt to get connection to Drnovsek and Mesic, but this was not even necessary, because six votes were enough for the decision, which I immediately communicated to Kadijevic and Milosevic.

Greater Serbia”, demanded that a session of the Supreme Command (the SFRY Presidency and the Headquarters of the Supreme Command) be held. In fact, the initiated insurgency of the Serbs in Pakrac was the motive for the leadership of the Greater Serbia movement, headed by Milosevic, to try and force the SFRY Presidency to introduce a state of emergency in the country, allowing the JNA to “legally” take over power in all of the republics, that is, legally establish a Serb military dictatorship, and wartime powers for President Jovic, who would in this way extend the presidential mandate over an unlimited period.²⁰⁵

Finally, upon the request by the Headquarters of the Supreme Command, and factually upon Milosevic’s order, the session of the SFRY Presidency was actually held on March 12, 1991, in the function of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of SFRY and at its command place,²⁰⁶ instead at the Palace of the Federation, that is, in an

The tank and motorized units of the JNA appeared on the streets of Belgrade and took positions in front of all the major state institutions. Their appearance had the expected effect. Even without the use of force the demonstrations soon stopped, the people ran away. Chaos was left on the streets, from the unbelievable vandalism never seen before in Belgrade. The demonstrations that were directed towards taking of the television station, and through it of the power too had failed, but this was a lesson from this event left for anyone able to draw conclusions for future behaviour.

The next day, on March 10, 1991, we held a session of the SFRY Presidency, at which we confirmed the decision adopted in telephonic communication. It was also attended by Slobodan Milosevic, who had brought the written request of the Republic of Serbia for military intervention in Belgrade. As the storm had passed and everything ended well without the use of fire by the JNA, there was no discussion either. The decision was simply confirmed in writing, with a little grumbling by Mesic and Drnovsek out of the session, that the army should not only serve us to save Milosevic’s power” (B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 65-69).

²⁰⁵ V. Kadijevic, the aforementioned work, pp. 111-112; B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 286-295; D. Marijan, **JUGOSLAVENSKA NARODNA ARMIJA ...**, p. 298; S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, pp. XI and 23; S. Biserko, the aforementioned work, p. 222. According to Mesic, the application of the emergency measures were to allow the JNA to effect a “legal” aggression against the Republic of Croatia (Ibid.).

²⁰⁶ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 286-295; S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. 23; AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2442, Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence, confidential no. 04/490-1, March 21, 1991, Sarajevo – to the District Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Tuzla, Information on Current Events.

enclosed underground facility of the Supreme Command.²⁰⁷ The agenda was **“the situation in the country and the tasks of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces”**. On behalf of the unconstitutional Headquarters of the Supreme Command, an introductory speech was held by General Veljko Kadijevic, Federal Secretary for National Defence, who was holding the keynote speech, as if he were presiding.²⁰⁸

“Based on the brief presentation of the situation assessment”, Kadijevic brought up a number of requests, concealing the proposals by the leadership of Serbia, mainly Milosevic and Jovic, aimed at making the army a political factor, even an arbitrary in the Yugoslav crisis, which they had brought Yugoslavia into, that is, to have the JNA impose a military rule in Yugoslavia and to dictate the political solution of the leader of the Greater Serbia movement. These requests mainly boiled down to: **introduction of the state of emergency on the whole territory of the SFRY, rising combat preparedness of the armed forces** (preparedness of the army, including the mobilization of a part of units, and **disarmament and dissolution of the illegal armed formations**.²⁰⁹ With the votes of Tupurkovski, Bogicevic, Mesic and Riza Sapunxiu, the proposal was

The session was attended by all the members of the Presidency, except Drnovsek, and in addition to Kadijevic, also attended by generals/admirals Brovet, Adzic, Cusic, Cubra, and Vuk Obradovic (B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 286).

²⁰⁷ Ibid. Insisting that the session be held on the premises of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command, according to General Spegelj, the military top, headed by General Kadijevic counted **“that in those secret underground premises, filled with big maps, drawings, surveys and charts, they would impress the members of the SFRY Presidency, that this setting and the energetic presentation of Kadijevic, Adzic and Brovet with the request for radical measures would frighten them, so they would accept the decision to proclaim a state of emergency so that the armed forces would take over the power and ‘preserve Yugoslavia”** (M. Spegelj, *SJECANJA VOJNIKA*, Zagreb 2001, pp. 187-188).

²⁰⁸ Ibid., pp. 286-295.

²⁰⁹ Ibid; V. Kadijevic, the aforementioned work, p. 113; S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. 24; M. Davor, the aforementioned work, p. 298; S. Biserko, the aforementioned work, p. 222. **“With his hands shaking”**, General Kadijevic was explaining: **“In Yugoslavia there are all possible enemies of socialism and the integral Yugoslavia on the scene. The *Ustasha*, *Chetnik*, *White Guard* and all other elements are more active and raising their heads. We are in the situation to have to fight the same enemy we fought even in 1941”** (S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. 24).

refused. During the break, it was agreed that the Army should reformulate the proposals and reduce them to **taking preparedness measures in the armed forces, including mobilization of a part of the units, but even this was (later) refused.**²¹⁰

²¹⁰ Ibid.; V. Kadijevec, the aforementioned work, p. 113; S. Biserko, the aforementioned work, p. 222; B. Bogicevic, **RAT JE PLANIRAN**, in: F. Ademovic, JNA BEZNADJE ZLA, Sarajevo 1997, pp. 29-30. The proposal of the edited text of the decision – without introduction of the state of emergency, with increased combat preparedness of the army and additional mobilization was voted for by: Borisav Jovic, Nenad Bucin, Jugoslav Kostic, and Riza Sapunxiu. Against were: Bogic Bogicevic, Stjepan Mesic, and Vasil Tupurkovski. Janez Drnovsek did not attend the session.

The decision was not passed, as it required at least five votes (B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 295; B. Bogicevic, the aforementioned work, pp. 29-30).

The course of the “**dramatic session**” of the SFRY Presidency dated March 12, 1991, was reconstructed based on Jovic and Mesic’s memoirs (B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 286-295, and S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, pp. 24-27), a testimony by Bogic Bogicevic (B. Bogicevic, the aforementioned work, pp. 29-35), and Kadijevec’s “views” (V. Kadijevec, the aforementioned work, pp. 112-113).

The military top entered the continuation of the session with a decisive position to play their role until the very end. However, not even at the repeated voting did they receive the fifth vote, expected to come from the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bogic Bogicevic – an ethnic Serb. He “**remained a legalist and a democrat, loyal to his republic and all its citizens, and just like in some other previous and later sessions of the Presidency, he did not accept the proposals which, sometimes more covertly, sometimes more openly, were devised at deploying the JNA**” (M. Spegelj, the aforementioned work, p. 188). In this way, Bogicevic prevented the military top and Milosevic’s part of the Presidency to gain the legal grounds for the coup (B. Bogicevic, the aforementioned work, p. 30-35).

According to Bogicevic, the taking of the decision to introduce the state of emergency on the whole territory of Yugoslavia was supposed to mean the adoption of a decision on starting the war in all the regions of Yugoslavia, and not a peaceful solution to the Yugoslav crisis. In relation to this, he claims that, in spite of the Economic Reform Program which was successful, gaining the support of almost the whole world, the putsch agreed between Jovic, Kadijevec and Milosevic, was planned and due for March 12, 1991, directly after the SFRY Presidency would have accepted the request of the military top. At the same moment, military administration would be introduced: military measures would be used to throw down the leaderships in Croatia and Slovenia, and the military and political measures would be used against the leadership in Bosnia and Herzegovina elected at the multi-party elections, as well as on the “pro-Bulgarian” leadership in Macedonia. At this, at the same time, presidents Tudjman and Kucan would

The members of the Presidency did not know that the Session would not be continued the next day. Milosevic, Jovic and Kadijevic were aware of that they can not carry out the coup without major external support. This is why, upon agreement with Jovic and Milosevic, in the morning of March 13, 1991, Kadijevic secretly flew to Moscow, for consultations with Marshal Dimitri Yazov, minister of defence of the Soviet Union, on the synchronization of the plan for putsch actions in Moscow and Belgrade.²¹¹

be arrested. If this failed, according to Bogicevic, there was **“the other part of the scenario – to block the work of the federal institutions by blocking the Presidency through resignations by President Jovic, Nenad Bucin (Montenegro), and Jugoslav Kostic (Vojvodina), to dismiss the Kosovo representative Riza Sapunxiu. The federal parliament was to be blocked by having the army not allow the arrival of the delegates from the republics and provinces to Belgrade”** (B. Bogicevic, the aforementioned work, pp. 29-34).

According to Bogicevic, the introduction of the state of emergency **“was aimed at definitively producing conflict and chaos in the country, by following the demands and paroles such as: ‘Down with the Constitution!’, ‘Power to the Army!’, ‘We want arms!’.** These were the attempts at creating the conditions for a ‘war of general national defence’ to begin in March 1991. Under these conditions, pursuant to the Constitution, Jovic’s mandate of the President of the SFRY Presidency would be extended, and on behalf on the SFRY Presidency he would execute command over the armed forces. And as the Assembly ‘would not be able to convene’, the Presidency would pass the decrees with force of law, from the powers of the Assembly. It could transfer certain tasks in terms of directing and commanding over the armed forces onto the Federal Secretary for National Defence” (Ibid., pp. 34-35).

²¹¹ *Vreme* (Belgrade), September 23, 1991, pp. 7, and 9; S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, pp. 24-25; B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 295; M. Spegelj, **PRVA FAZA RATA...**, p. 51; b. Mamula, the aforementioned work, p. 33; S. Biserko, the aforementioned work, p. 222.

In his memoirs for March 13, 1991, Jovic wrote down as follows: **“Last night, after the session at the Presidency, Veljko requested my approval to go to Moscow overnight for consultations with Yazov. He wants to ask whether the USSR would protect us against a potential intervention from the West, if we go forward with using the army for the execution of the Presidency’s orders. I agreed. He went off and returned the same night. The Russians said that there is no variant in which the West is counting with military intervention. They avoided speaking about Soviet assistance”** (B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 295).

Given that no official note was made about this discussion, General Vuk Obradovic, who attended this meeting in Moscow on March 13, 1991, with General Kadijevic, made

The majority was also uninformed that an agreement was made with Milosevic on the last day of February 1991 at the latest, how to

“his minutes” (during the discussion he was noting down the basic theses from the presentations by Kadijevic and Yazov) publicly available. They were published in 1998 in the Belgrade magazine *Profil*, no. 16, pp. 105-114, under the title **“RAT I MIR GENERALA VUKA OBRADOVICA”**. A photograph of the meeting between Kadijevic and Yazov was also published in there.

About the preparations for this trip, the number of members of the “delegation”, the time of negotiations and the number of attendees, General Obradovic noted down: **“After the end of the first day of the Presidency’s work, on March 12, 1991, in the evening, in the lobby of the cool conference room of the Supreme Command’s command place, where the session was held, I was invited by Kadijevic, and in the presence of Borisav Jovic, he ordered that I do all the technical preparations for the departure to Moscow, but so that the then commander of RV and PVO, General Anton Tus does not know about the flight. The majority in the military leadership was convinced that Tus had already been in direct contact with Tudjman, but Tus was deftly concealing all the traces that could expose him to any serious risk. Later on, while arranging the flight details, I drew the attention of General Mircetic to that, who was the then Chief of Staff of the headquarters of the command of RV and PVO, but in the morning, after arriving at the Batajnica airport, I realized that Tus had been there before us and easily informed himself about who travels and where!”**

In addition to Kadijevic and myself, several people from his direct security accompanied us on the trip. The discussion between Kadijevic and Yazov was conducted on March 13, 1991, from 14:00 to 16:00 hours. In addition to me, I hope I can remember well, there was only one Yazov associate and their interpreter attending” (*Profil*, no. 16, p. 106).

The goal of Kadijevic’s trip to Moscow was to obtain the answer to the question **what is the USSR position “on the potential military intervention of the West against Yugoslavia?”** Minister Yazov, with whom Kadijevic had already previously been in contact, responded to him in a lengthy discussion that **“no military intervention from the West”** at the time **“is realistic.”** (**“For the time being, the West has no force for quick intervention.... No western forces are threatening the Yugoslav People’s Army or Yugoslavia...”** – B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 49, and 276; *Profil*, no. 16, p. 107).

After their return to Yugoslavia, a number of times, Kadijevic **“repeated that the Russians are in mud up to their knees, and that they are not able to assist even themselves, let alone us”** (*Ibid*).

Mikhail Gorbachev knew about the meeting between Kadijevic and Yazov, but they did not report to him what they had talked about. In relation to this, in an interview for the first issue of the magazine *Profil*, in late 1995, he stated: **“If I had known what they were intriguing, I would have arrested both of them immediately”** (*Profil*, no. 16, pp. 106, and 108).

“create a vacuum for the army to make its own decisions”²¹² and thus fulfil Kadijevec’s threats stated in the conclusion of the Session of March 12, 1991.²¹³

After the return from Moscow, on March 13, 1991, where he had received no support for the coup and where **“the Russians had told him that there is no option in which the West is counting with military intervention”**, and when he ascertained himself **“that the Russians were in mud up to their knees...”**,²¹⁴ on the same day, General Kadijevec called

²¹² B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 281. Among other things, in his memoirs, he wrote: **“... I consult Slobodan Milosevic in terms of the army. I read him all my notes, word by word. He believes that this is all good, except that Slovenia needs to be left at peace. Only Croatia needs to be treated. The Slovenians have not violated the (military) laws to that extent, and there are no formal justifications, and politically all would boil down to overthrowing elected bodies.**

When asked what do we do if we fail to reach the majority needed at the Presidency for the required decisions, he believes that decisions need to be made with as many members as are ‘in favour of’ and that the army ‘will listen’. He believes it logical to ‘remove’ anyone who will resist such an action by the Presidency.

There is a violation of the laws between Slovenia and Croatia, and that is a very dodgy idea that the minority at the Presidency is to take decisions. This is a state in which the army is to decide, and this can not be concealed. And no one is even thinking about that the army too is multiethnic and that by that very fact, without the decision of the political body, it is hard for it to remain monolith...” (Ibid., p. 281).

²¹³ S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. 26.

²¹⁴ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 295; *Profil*, no. 16, p. 107; M. Spigelj, the aforementioned work, p. 51; B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, pp. 24, and 33. According to Mamula, who learned about the trip of General Kadijevec to Moscow in the summer of 1991, from the BBC Balkans correspondent Misha Glenny, which was awkward for him that a foreign journalist would inform him **“about that the trip of the Yugoslav defence minister”** with whom he was directly linked, **“was known about from before, and needed to be expected. Yazov, a man who did not know or find the power to stop the dissolution of his own country, was requested to provide the cover for their own indecisiveness”** (B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, p. 33).

The trip of Kadijevec to Moscow on March 13, 1991, was conducted without the knowledge of the President of the government, Ante Markovic, which was interpreted by many as a definite turnaround of the SSNO against the SIV. The secret trips of the military top to Moscow at the time were frequent (*Vreme*, September 23, 1991, pp. 7, and 9; S. Biserko, the aforementioned work, p. 221).

Borisav Jovic together with Slobodan Milosevic “**for consultations as to what to do, if the Supreme Command again refuses the proposed decision at tomorrow’s session**”. Namely, then, without any consultation, in the presence of General Adzic, he literally said to the invitees: “**Let us go for the putsch!**” Kadijevec said this independently from whether the Presidency will adopt the proposed decision or not. If they adopt it, according to him, this decision “**shall be a cover for mobilization in the first 48 hours only**”, and if it is refused, **they would do the mobilization themselves**. However, in that case, there was “**danger that the Presidency would convene and dismiss the military top**”. Therefore, he insisted on the need to adopt the decision.²¹⁵

Unlike Milosevic, who had “**never asked or commented anything**”, Jovic asked General Kadijevec “**what exactly the ‘putsch’ meant.**” In relation to that, he received the following answer: “**a dismissal of the Government and the Presidency. They will not touch the Assembly, but they will not allow them to convene either. They will not touch the republic authorities, and all the others, as long as they support the coup. On the contrary, they will overthrow them as well. The goal is: to determine a timeframe of 6 months (or shorter) for the agreement on the country’s future, and until then, stop the chaotic dissolution of the state**”.²¹⁶

On that first day of the session of the SFRY Presidency, that is, of the Supreme Command of the armed forces, “**and particularly its outcome**” (the Serbo-Montenegrin request for introduction of the state of emergency and transfer of power to the JNA had not been accepted), allegedly developed an idea within Jovic to resign. Allegedly, he could not allow himself that, as the president of the SFRY Presidency, he executes the decisions of the majority with which he did not agree, and

In August 1987 (upon the invitation of army General Yazov) and in February 1988 (celebration of the 70th Anniversary of formation of the Red Army), Admiral Branko Mamula visited the USSR, from where he had brought “some important information”. He was interested in the issue of behavior of the Soviet military leadership towards the perestroika – the new course of interior and external policy of Gorbachev (B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, pp. 128-129, and 135).

²¹⁵ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 269.

²¹⁶ Ibid.

which, in his opinion, **“are aimed towards the break-up of the country and civil war”**. After he listened to General Kadijevic and his proposal on execution of the coup, Jovic said that tomorrow **“after the session, he would resign”**, because the **“session will most probably not approve the requested measures”**. This was a “strong reason” for him.²¹⁷

Such a position by Jovic was aimed to leave the agreed **“room for action”** for the Army. In relation to this, he also said that he would speak to Nenad Bucin and Yugoslav Kostic **“to do the same”**.²¹⁸

The continuation of the session of the SFRY Presidency in full composition was held on March 14, without any **“tangible”** results. Kadijevic was making new efforts to make the SFRY Presidency pronounce a state of emergency and to grant the war rights in peacetime conditions to the JNA. Drnovsek fiercely opposed this (**“it is peacetime and the place of the Army is in the barracks, the Army can not both run the politics and use force to resolve problems”**).²¹⁹ The Army also agreed that the decision **“does not mention mobilization, but only the increase of combat preparedness”**, **“which did not satisfy the opponents of the decision”**. Only three votes were in favour, and five were against.²²⁰

²¹⁷ Ibid.; S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. X.

²¹⁸ B. Jovic, p. 296. In relation with this, In his memoirs, Jovic wrote: **“No one commented on anything. We parted in silence. Along the way, Sloba told me that he will not go to the Presidency to replace me.”** (Ibid.).

²¹⁹ Ibid.; S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. 25.

²²⁰ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 296. In his memoirs, Jovic wrote down: **“In this part of the work, the Presidency was complete. Janez Drnovsek said that the decisions already brought at the Assembly of Slovenia, particularly those pertaining to the army ‘already mean the de iure exit of Slovenia’ from the federal system. He said that the adoption and execution of the proposed decision in Slovenia would cause a conflict and speedy exit of Slovenia from Yugoslavia. He suggested the appreciation of reality and political negotiations, and refused to pass the decision.**

The novelty in relation to March 12, of that year, was that Riza Sapunxiu had also changed his mind and withdrawn his approval of the decision. So, instead of 4, for the time being, we have 3 in favour, and 5 against the decision. The situation only got worse” (Ibid.).

In a tense atmosphere, the request for introduction of the state of emergency was again refused, although the generals were threatening that it depends on acceptance of their request **“whether the SFRY Presidency will be able to function at all as the collective chief of the state and the supreme commander”**. The more so, because, according to general Adzic, the JNA was **“only one more institution in this country”** that listened to the orders of the Presidency. Stating that **“no one listens to the Presidency any longer”** in this country, he requested their support, because otherwise (**“... if you fail to support us”**), they will find themselves **“in the situation without an exit...”**.²²¹

Upon refusal of his request, Kadijevic reacted with a threatening announcement that **“the Headquarters of the Supreme Command shall convene separately”** and resolve everything at their own discretion or – **“let us once again discuss the problem, and on that occasion we shall also let you know about the decisions of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command”**.²²²

When the stating of positions was over at this session and when it was concluded that the decision had not been passed, Jovic said that, for the sake of opening up the room **“for action”** of the Army, **“he would file the resignation and warned that this same was also announced by Nenad Bucin and Jugoslav Kostic”**. Concluding that some key decisions of the Presidency could not be **“passed without the ‘qualified’ majority of 6 members”**, according to Jovic, the Presidency **“factually ceases to exist for decision making on this issues”**. According to him, this created **“the room for the Headquarters of the Supreme Command to make its own decisions”**.²²³

²²¹ S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. 25.

²²² Ibid.

²²³ Ibid., pp. 296-297. This was an alternative discussed as early as in February, if the Presidency fails to introduce the state of emergency in the country (B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 265-281). At the aforementioned session, Jovic also kept silent about the replacement of Riza Sapunxiu. In relation to this, he wrote that he had had in mind, but he did not say **“that the Assembly of Serbia would replace Riza Sapunxiu because of such behavior and that the Presidency shall not even have simple majority”** (Ibid., p. 297).

This was, as Jovic said, **“met with fierce opposition: How can I dismiss the Presidency, etc.”**, which caused **“a repeated discussion about everything, a whole flurry of polemics of several hours, with attempts to find some kind of a solution after all, but without success”**. The only thing they could agree to was to continue **“the session tomorrow. Let us try again”**.²²⁴

In the beginning of the second continuation of the Session, on March 15, Brovet briefed that **“the Headquarters of the Supreme Command has no new proposals and that the situation in the country is deteriorating”**, and Jovic threatened that, **“if the Army’s hands are tied”**, **“there could be mass demands for arming of the Serb people and for the creation of a Serb army for the purpose of self-defence...”**.²²⁵

²²⁴ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 297.

²²⁵ Ibid. Given that after Brovet’s brief, i.e. **“that the Headquarters of the Supreme Command has no new proposals [...] nobody wanted to take the word”**, and Jovic tried to convince the Presidency (**“...let me once again prompt the members of the Presidency to thoroughly think about what such an approach towards the JNA means...”**), in justification of passing the decisions proposed by the army (Headquarters of the Supreme Command) in order to “preserve” Yugoslavia. In relation to this, he said as follows: **“I would like to inform the members of the Presidency and the Headquarters of the Supreme Command that our analyses in the Republic of Serbia, that (if the hands of the Army are tied preventing it from meeting its constitutional obligations in the prevention of interethnic conflicts and civil war given the position of the Serb people, its distribution in the other republics, lack of organization and weapons), the position of the Serb people is becoming unfavourable and very awkward. Serbia’s orientation is based on the promises of the SFRY Presidency and the armed forces to protect all ethnic groups, all nations and all citizens against the danger of interethnic conflicts, which with such potential position of ours would not be ensured. It is our assessment that, in this situation, there could be some mass demands for armament of the Serb people and for formation of a Serb self-defence army – and we shall not be able to eradicate this.**

We in Serbia, as the leadership in such a situation, would not be able to survive if we were to oppose this, because there are some very strong forces working on this, and with this situation they are receiving some strong arguments to get this realized. The leadership of Serbia cannot stand on anyone else’s side, but the side of its people and it must secure its defence, if the Army is not able to defend it.

What is the perspective of our country, in that situation, and its destiny, it is not hard to anticipate, because any day we can let control slip out of our hands and have bloodshed and civil war.

The proposals and authorities of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command which were leading to the civil war and taking over of power on the part of the Greater Serbia movement were nevertheless refused with five votes to three. Most members of the Presidency believed that **“the Yugoslav crisis”** needs to be resolved through peaceful rather than military means.²²⁶ Jovic and Kadijevic

Therefore, the situation is very difficult, very delicate, and I have the duty to warn you that this is the destiny awaiting us if we are not able to ensure the conditions for the Army to equally defend all the nations and citizens of this Yugoslavia” (Ibid., p. 297).

On the occasion of the repeated gathering of the SFRY Presidency at the office of the General on March 15, 1991, the military leadership was threatening with a civil war and strengthening of the antisocialist forces and stated the Slovenia and Croatia were breaking up Yugoslavia and **“violating the rights of others”**. At this, **“Jovic, who was all red in the face,”** was threatening that **“it is not going to be as you wish it, gentlemen”**, because Serbia **“would impose itself to protect the interests of the Serbs in the other republics [...] in all regions where they live [...] Serbia would form its republic army... in order to protect the barehanded and endangered Serb people living outside the territory of the Republic of Serbia“**. On that occasion, Jovic turned to Mesic, Vice President of the SFRY Presidency, clenching his fists, said: **“OK, now I’m going to tell you something. You in Croatia have been passing laws suspending the federal Constitution and federal legislation. You have been bringing the Serbs into an endangered position; you have been illegally arming against the Serbs in Croatia and breaking up Yugoslavia. You tell me what the anti-constitutional action is. This is what this is all about. The Serbs have the right to live in Yugoslavia, and if someone wants to secede, then the Serbs have the right to live in a single state regardless of how it is called. You’ve got to understand this, you in Croatia!”** (S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, pp. 25-26).

²²⁶ Ibid., pp. 297-304; V. Kadijevic, the aforementioned work, p. 125. Stjepan Mesic immediately reacted against Jovic’s presentation, in which he tried to “explain” to the members of the Presidency what such a position towards the JNA means. Mesic was in favour of resolving the economic and political problems through political negotiations, and against placing the army in a state of higher preparedness. At this, among other things, he rightfully stressed that he does not believe in the piece of information presented by Jovic, that the Serbs are unarmed.

Janez Drnovsek, among other things, could not agree with the proposed measures, because he thought and assessed **“that they too are leading towards civil war”**. He was convinced **“that the Yugoslav problems can not be resolved through force, the army, with any measures, but only politically. Whoever it is – either a nation or a republic in that case, if the JNA begins with application of some military measures**

announced the consequences agreed upon with Milosevic,²²⁷ that is, the paralysis of the Presidency and the agreed putsch.

within Yugoslavia, we are sure that this would be the worst solution and that this would end in the worst possible way”.

Tupurkovski, Bogicevic, and Sapunxiu, also, did not accept the proposed decision submitted by the Headquarters of the Supreme Command (Ibid.). Bogicevic’s vote was decisive at the moment when the Serbo-Montenegrin part of the SFRY Presidency was making efforts to introduce the state of emergency in the country.

General Kadijevec too, recognized that with the disarmament of the **“paramilitary”** formations and introduction of the state of emergency in Yugoslavia the breakup of Yugoslavia would not be prevented, that that this would cause **“even civil war”** in the country. Having this in mind, in an “effort” to offer the answer to the question **“what a military putsch would mean for Yugoslavia”**, he brought up the question, **“what would the Headquarters of the Supreme Command wish with the proposal for introducing of the state of emergency in the country and for disarming of the paramilitary formations in Yugoslavia with which it went before the SFRY Presidency on March 12, 1991, and which was refused by the Presidency, if this would not prevent the break-up of Yugoslavia?!”**. In relation to this, he “specified” his response in the way that the acceptance of this proposal and **“its execution”** would allow for the **“solution of the Yugoslav crisis to be significantly more legal, thus also significantly more peaceful...”**, that it was. According to him, this would **“be very much for Yugoslavia”** (V. Kadijevec, the aforementioned work, pp. 149-150).

Speaking about this, Kadijevec nevertheless **“noted [...] that the acceptance of the proposal from the Headquarters of the Supreme Command and its implementation would also cause a civil war in Yugoslavia, particularly because the foreign factor would also be working on it”**. Although he could not deny it, a **“legitimate order”** was much more important to Kadijevec, that the JNA would introduce the state of emergency in the country, because **“at the time and with the arms that were available then in Yugoslavia, the interethnic and religious conflicts would be much easier to place under control if the JNA had a legitimate order to do so”** (Ibid.). Obviously, the goal was to take over the power in Yugoslavia.

²²⁷ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 297-304.

Before he concluded the session, Jovic gave the word to General Kadijevec, who was again making efforts to explain the proposals of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command, which have, according to him, **“seen the light of the day at a fatal moment”** for Yugoslavia. In relation to this, Kadijevec at the time said the following:

“Because the decision was passed, the proposal was given by the Headquarters of the Supreme Command, and it was given on the basis, as I said in the beginning of the presentation, not of the momentary situation, or some momentary and partial assessments, but on assessments spanning several years which, unfortunately, tended to realize in our anticipations exactly as we had said, only with one correction,

Veljko Kadijevic had intimately abandoned the putsch as early as in the discussion with Yazov in Moscow, and he communicated this upon return to Belgrade to Milosevic and Jovic.²²⁸ If Yazov had encouraged him, the vain discussions on March 14 and 15 would never have happened. The extortion of a decision by instigating tensions was their goal.

The military coup that was constantly hanging in the air and was in option, particularly in March 1991, could not be carried out for a number of reasons. First of all, almost in all communities, the JNA was viewed as the Serb army, because for over one decade, it had already lost the legitimacy of the guarantor of Yugoslavia. Kadijevic did not dare to take up this step in spite of the pressures by Milosevic and Jovic.²²⁹

“The classical military putsch that would be aimed at applying military force in order to keep Yugoslavia together, under the Yugoslav circumstances such as remained after Tito’s death”, according to Kadijevic, “had never had any prospects for success, particularly if one is referring to permanent success”. Such a putsch, according to him, “could have been carried out most easily after Tito’s death”, because “there were abundant reasons for that if the disintegration processes that were breaking up Yugoslavia were in question”, and at

they were somewhat quicker in time than we had said they would be. Our proposals come at a fatal moment for this country. In spite of that, they have already seen the light of the day, although – that fact shall have no significant effect, but they have seen the light of the day, which is only one of the proves as to where we are, even here, in the enclosed facility of the Supreme Command. We as the army shall draw some lessons from that. The Headquarters of the Supreme Command – and I inform you – is taking onto itself the right and obligation to make the situation assessment immediately after this decision and draw certain consequences that arise from it” (Ibid., pp. 303-304).

According to Mesic, the session of the SFRY Presidency was completed by Kadijevic instead of by Jovic, with the following statement: **“You have passed the decision such as you have, and you will bear its consequences. We as the Headquarters of the Supreme Command shall thoroughly review it, study all the consequences and as the Army we shall draw certain conclusions from that based on which we shall act”** (S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. 26).

²²⁸ Ibid., pp. 295-296.

²²⁹ S. Biserko, the aforementioned work, pp. 225-226.

the time, the Army “**could also take over power with relative ease...**”²³⁰

In March 1991, the military leadership had “**prepared complete documentation, people and all the rest**” for the introduction of a military coup. However, once they did not obtain constitutional cover, or Russian support, they created the idea “**that the army should take over power by itself**”, and, in “weighing” the reasons *pro et contra*, they gave up on that.²³¹

Admiral Mamula also believed that a military putsch was to be carried out in Yugoslavia, and he thought that the ideal date was the time of one month later, during one in the row of meetings of the republic leaders. In relation to this, he states that it was even suggested to him from abroad that on April 18, 1991, “**the JNA needs to arrest the six in Ohrid and take over the power in the country**”, and thus allegedly stop the break-up of Yugoslavia. This corresponded to his concept “**that he was advocating in favour all of the time**”. However, the “**scepticism**” of General Kadijevic towards such steps by the JNA was “**well known**”, according to Mamula.²³²

The arresting of the political republic leaders and their departure from power, including Milosevic, was also advocated by Admiral Mamula in August 1991. Namely, when after the breakdown of the JNA in Slovenia discussions were conducted about the dismissal of Kadijevic, Admiral Mamula met “**eye to eye**” with Milosevic, and telling him that it is not

²³⁰ V. Kadijevic, the aforementioned work, pp. 114-115.

²³¹ M. Spegelj, **SJECANJA VOJNIKA**, pp. 188-189.

²³² B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, pp. 188-189; M. Spegelj, the aforementioned work, p. 189. Admiral Branko Mamula was all in favour and supportive of the military coup, as the (ultimate) opportunity for the preservation of Yugoslavia. However, according to him, the JNA leadership was unprepared to take into its own hands the responsibility in the whole country, which, according to Mamula, was “**a clear indicator that the battle for Yugoslavia was irreversibly lost**” (B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, p. 194). In relation to this, he believes that the military leadership of the JNA “**bears the responsibility for not having carried out the coup. Instead, it allowed that the nationalist leaders and the separatist behavior of the two western republics to push the JNA into the arms of the Greater Serbia nationalism, which unscrupulously abused the Army in an interethnic war, and finally discarded it**” (B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, p. 9).

a problem to find a replacement for Kadijevic, presented the position that the **“actual task of the Army is to take on full responsibility for the solution of the crisis from Slovenia to Macedonia, and that all of them – the presidents of the republics, including himself – Milosevic, have to go from power”**. According to him, this was **“the only solution in the attempt to save Yugoslavia, although it may even be all too late for such an attempt”**.²³³

Such a plan of Mamula’s envisaged military administration in the whole of Yugoslavia, because, after the arrest and removals of the presidents of all the republics, the army would possess all the state and political institutions in the republics and in the Federation. Such a move was expected by Mamula to come from Kadijevic and the whole military top. However, Kadijevic did not wish to act like that. He assessed correctly that, in case of military defeats in Slovenia and Croatia, his last resort is Slobodan Milosevic and that the JNA must remain by no means without an ally, even if it was to be only one republic – Serbia.²³⁴

Immediately after the session of the Supreme Command dated March 15, 1991, Borisav Jovic made a public presentation through Television Belgrade (for the citizens of Yugoslavia), informing them that the presidency of SFRY, in the function of the Supreme Commander of the armed forces, **“did not accept the country situation assessments or the decisions proposed by the Supreme Headquarters of the Armed Forces”**. While doing so, he did not fail to point out that Yugoslavia **“is in the critical stage of break-up through a *fait accompli* policy”**, which, according to him, **“is being systematically conducted by the separatist forces, in failure to appreciate either the constitutional system of the country or the ethnic or civic rights of the others”**. According to Jovic, this threatened to **“take us into direct interethnic conflicts and into civil war”**.²³⁵

²³³ B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, p. 227; M. Spegelj, the aforementioned work, pp. 190-191.

²³⁴ M. Spegelj, the aforementioned work, p. 191.

²³⁵ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 304.

In assessing that the past political negotiations on the future of Yugoslavia “**have yielded no tangible results**”, Jovic deluded the public, transferring the guilt related to the break-up of Yugoslavia on others, primarily onto the republic leaderships of Slovenia and Croatia. Among other things, he also spoke about the role of the army in the political life of Yugoslavia, justifying the proposals of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, which, according to him, were well argued.²³⁶

In an effort to leave “**room for the action by the army**”, that is, for “**taking over of power and disarmament of the paramilitary units**”, Jovic informed the public that he is **resigning from the office of the President of the SFRY Presidency**.²³⁷

²³⁶ Ibid., pp. 304-306. Jovic saw the failure to accept the “well argued” proposals from the Headquarters of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces by the majority of the SFRY Presidency members in the following “reasons”: “**The reason for opposing these decisions, in my opinion, is that there is a prevalent position with the majority of the SFRY Presidency members that the further course of events in the country needs to be surrendered to the *fait accompli* policy, in spite of the fact that it is clear that this is leading into a civil war. Also, I believe that, as the members of the Supreme Command, by refusing the proposals of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command in that way, they have shown obvious mistrust in the Armed Forces of the country**” (Ibid., p. 306).

²³⁷ Ibid., pp. 296-311. However, Borisav Jovic “explained” the filing of the resignation, in a public address through Television Belgrade on March 15, 1991, in the following way:

“Faced with the fact that, in the SFRY Presidency, a relation of forces has prevailed which does not take into account the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the country, oriented on supporting of the dissolution of the country in an unconstitutional and non-democratic manner, making efforts to tie the arms of the Yugoslav National Army as the last Yugoslav institution which could provide the conditions for peaceful and democratic disentanglement of the crisis, having in mind the oath that I made when taking over the office, I hereby inform the public that I am not able to be an accomplice in such decisions contributing to the dissolution of the country, with possible catastrophic consequences to our citizens and peoples.

Therefore I have decided to resign from the office, believing it to be the most honest act and in accordance with my conscience” (Ibid., p. 306).

With the resignations of Jovic from the office of the President, and of the “satellites” (Bucin and Kostic) from the membership in the SFRY Presidency (on March 16, 1991), as well as the statement by Slobodan Milosevic (on March 16, 1991), that under such circumstances **“he no longer recognizes the decisions of the SFRY Presidency and that he shall not participate in its work (as a replacement for the member of the Presidency from Serbia)”**,²³⁸ the SFRY Presidency was paralyzed, with room freed for a military coup, due to **“confusions and indecisiveness in the military top”**, was not utilized.²³⁹ On March 17, the military

²³⁸ Ibid. Believing that the Army would execute the task, during March 16, 1991, Milosevic convened the meeting of all the 2000 presidents of the municipalities of Serbia, and at that meeting he **explicitly announced a war and change of borders**, so that **“all the Serbs should live in a single state”**, and two days later, although he already knew that there will be no agreed autonomous action by the Headquarters of the Supreme Command, he literally repeated this before 200 students and professors of Belgrade University. Other options had also been developed for the realization of the Greater Serbia goals.

The statement by Slobodan Milosevic about how **“he no longer recognizes the decisions of the SFRY Presidency and that he shall not participate in its work”** really was in **“the function of breaking up Yugoslavia”**, which was negated by Jovic. Namely, he claimed that this was not **“in the function of breaking up Yugoslavia, such as was immediately prescribed to him even by the Serb opposition, but in the function of protecting the army from potential decision of the rest of the Presidency to dismiss the military top and prevent in its action”** (Ibid., p. 306).

²³⁹ Ibid., p. 306-311. The army did not take over the power. Kadijevic did not dare to conduct the agreed putsch.

Although at the three-day session of the SFRY Presidency the military leadership was threatening to conduct an autonomous coup unless it receives constitutional coverage for that, according to general Spigelj, this was **“transparent bluffing, because they knew that without the direct support and assistance from the USSR and maybe similar actions in the neighbouring countries – Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria, they did not stand a chance. And they had already realized the fact that the army does not even closely fit the task of conducting the coup, just like that Croatia and Slovenia are armed enough for their defence. Everything said and done by the administrative top of the JNA then and later on was a game, in order to conceal its own lack of power before the Presidency, and to preserve at least some authority in the public.**

And this could only be preserved by constant postponements in the use of the army...” (M. Spigelj, the aforementioned work, p. 188).

leadership (Kadijevic, Adzic, and Brovet), reported to Jovic and Milosevic to that effect in a completely illegal manner. This was only two days after Jovic had resigned and four days since the military top communicated to them **“that they had opted for a military coup”**. The explanation for abandoning the military coup (on March 17, 1991), was based on a contrary assessment of the consequences of the threat for autonomous decision-making by the Headquarters of the Supreme Command. Among other things, the military leadership concluded **“that the military action in Croatia and Slovenia is not a good solution”**.²⁴⁰

The fake exit by Jovic, Bucin and Kostic from the SFRY Presidency did not place the JNA into the function of **“taking over the power”**, and thus, due to a **“very delicate situation”**, according to Jovic, the danger was created, according to him, that the SFRY becomes **“commanded by separatists and breakers of Yugoslavia”**. Due to this, it was decided that Jovic should return to the Presidency.²⁴¹

²⁴⁰ Ibid. According to Jovic, the military top was bound to know that before. Thus, as Jovic wrote, the army made a **“salto mortale”** overnight. According to him, the military top turned out to be quite queer. **“If they had all the analyses in mind, even then when they told us that they have opted for a military coup, it is not clear how they opted for it. If they had not had all of that in mind, then they were not being serious...”** (Ibid., p. 310).

Jovic writes that for a long time he was **“troubling”** himself to understand **“why the army had made such a salto mortale overnight”**. In response to this question, he concluded that **“it was possible that they had not sufficiently analyzed the difference between acting based on the legal decision of the Presidency and introduction of the state of emergency and forced confiscation of the arms and the military coup with the same goal. The former case would mean a reduction to the minimum, and the latter a drastic increase of the repercussions of domestic and external resistance, political and economic isolation, which they had probably realized only once they were faced with the critical moment”** (Ibid., p. 311).

²⁴¹ Ibid., p. 311. According to Jovic, this **“was not difficult, because we had an absolute majority and huge support in the Assembly of Serbia. The Assembly took the position that I need to continue performing the office assigned to me at the SFRY Presidency, although it had adopted all my assessments about the situation in the country and the Presidency that I had addressed in the subject report. The whole event related to my resignation had a strong echo and influence on the republic leadership, the whole of Serbia and the Serb people in becoming sober about the actual situation of facts in the Yugoslav leadership and the position of the Serb nation in Yugoslavia”** (Ibid., p. 311).

The full debacle made Milosevic order Jovic to withdraw the resignation and the replacement, which was executed by the Assembly of Serbia as early as on March 20, a day before the meeting of the Presidency with the presidents of the republics. Sapunxiu and Bucin were replaced by the pensioned Ensign and lottery vendor Sejdo Bajramovic, and Dr. Branko Kostic, and all was returned to the beginning. Thus, on March 21, 1991, the damage caused by some clumsy moves were corrected.²⁴²

In accordance with his assessment on “**leaving**” Yugoslavia, presented on May 16, 1990, on the occasion of taking on the office of the president of the SFRY Presidency,²⁴³ on March 22, 1991, Jovic definitely reached the “**position**” that “**all options for the defence of Yugoslavia had been lost**”.²⁴⁴

After the majority of votes at the SFRY Presidency did not accept the proposals of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command, this body continued “**further work and assessments, monitoring the situation and events, and determining the measures as to how further and most fully realize the constitutional role and what to propose further to the Supreme Command**”. In relation to this, on March 19, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command issued a communiqué which was contrary to the actual status and activities of the military leadership, such as for instance, the statement that the JNA, “**just like before, shall not interfere with the political negotiations about the future of the country**”, and that “**in resolution of the**

²⁴² Ibid. On March 20, 1991, at the Assembly of Serbia, Jovic submitted an exposé, in which he repeated and further intensified the accusations on the alleged support by the majority of the SFRY Presidency members “**to unconstitutional and illegal actions leading to the dissolution of the country**”. At this session of the Serb Assembly, contrary to the SFRY Constitution and Serbia Constitution, the Presidency member from SAP Kosovo was dismissed (Riza Sapunxiu), which meant a serious violation of the SFRY Constitution (K. Rotim, **ODBRANA HERCEG-BOSNE**, volume I, Siroki Brijeg 1997, pp. 82-84).

On March 20, 1991, the Council for National Defence and Protection of the Constitutional Order of the Republic of Croatia, at its fourteenth session, chaired by Franjo Tudjman, reviewed the aforementioned presentation by B. Jovic, and assessed it as unacceptable, as well as the dismissal of Riza Sapunxiu (Ibid.).

²⁴³ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 145.

²⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 311.

interethnic, inter-republic and inter-party disputes, it shall not allow violence from any side”, and “that under no conditions shall it allow interethnic armed conflicts or civil war to happen in Yugoslavia”.²⁴⁵ The engagement of the armed units from the 1st and 5th Military Districts in Plitvice in late March, where the Serb militia had set up a barricade, on the Slunj-Titova Korenica road, was contrary to the alleged declarative communiqué of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command.²⁴⁶

²⁴⁵ AIZ, inv. No. 2-2442, Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of Territorial Defence, confidential, no. 04/490-1, March 21, 1991, Sarajevo – to the District Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Tuzla, Information on Current Events. This communiqué stated as follows:

“1. The JNA shall reliably secure the SFRY borders against any form of violation and shall not allow their change until the potential agreement to that effect is passed and comes in effect, as pursuant to the SFRY Constitution;

2. Under no conditions shall the SFRY allow for interethnic armed conflicts or civil war to happen in Yugoslavia;

3. In resolution of the interethnic, inter-republic and inter-party disputes, violence shall not be allowed on the part of any of the sides;

4. Normal conditions for life and work of the armed forces must be ensured. This primarily includes: respecting of the recruiting and other forms of the military obligation, pursuant to the SFRY Constitution and federal regulations; return of the territorial defence into the system of directing and commanding as determined in the SFRY Constitution and enactments of the SFRY Presidency, regular financing of the JNA in compliance with the already taken social obligations;

5. As the SFRY Presidency did not accept the proposal for necessary measures for full execution of its own Order dated January 9, 1991, the JNA can not bear the responsibility for any further illegal arming of the citizens and their military organizing on any part of the Yugoslav territory;

6. Just like in the past, the JNA shall not interfere with the political negotiations on the future of the country” (Ibid.).

On March 20, 1991, the Council for National Defence and Protection of the Constitutional Order of the Republic of Croatia, at its fourteenth session, chaired by Franjo Tuđman, reviewed the aforementioned communiqué by the Headquarters of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of SFRY, and assessed it as unacceptable (K. Rotim, the aforementioned work, pp. 82-84).

²⁴⁶ D. Marijan, **JUGOSLAVENSKA NARODNA ARMIJA ...**, pp. 298-299. The units of the 5th Military District set up a buffer zone in the area of Plitvice, between the “conflicting parties”, whereby the whole Knin Krajina or the area of Lika with the

The failure of the Serb leadership and the lack of preparedness of the indecisive military leadership to take on the responsibility for the agreed military putsch and the forced overthrowing of the governments of the republics of Croatia and Slovenia, without Russian support²⁴⁷, made Milosevic accept Mesic's suggestion to try and reach an agreement with Tudjman in order to attempt to resolve the created dispute. In the utmost secrecy, in only several days, a meeting was organized.²⁴⁸

The agreement was reached in big secrecy on March 26, 1991, in Karadjordjevo, but without Mesic and Jovic. Tudjman was caught in the trap of the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina and thickening the pretzel of his own state. Some fifteen pre-war Bosnia-Herzegovina districts were enough for that, and in addition there was also a prospect for the division of the remaining part of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the basis of the Serb or Croat majority.²⁴⁹

majority Serb population received a "guardian", preventing the action of the units of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Croatia, and allowing for establishment of the illegal authorities of the insurgent Serbs (Ibid., p. 299).

²⁴⁷ Ibid., pp. 265-281. Due to this failure, according to Spegelj, Kadijevic began thinking about an attack on Slovenia, at which he needed to ensure that Croatia should not intervene. He received such a promise from Tudjman, who told him: **"We shall not meddle into your dispute with Slovenia"**. This, according to Spegelj, **"was a test, and if the action develops well, following Kadijevic, with 2,000 special forces and a group of Slovenes to take over the power, General Gracanin was to arrive in Slovenia, too, the then Federal Secretary of Interior"**. He had, claims Spegelj, **"already arrived with the aircraft into a JNA base near Ljubljana, and there he was waiting for the results of Kadijevic's action, however, as in ten day's time Kadijevic suffered a catastrophic defeat, Gracanin – the great general – sat on an airplane again, and ran off to Belgrade. This is how the plan failed"** (M. Spegelj, the aforementioned work, p. 51).

²⁴⁸ For more details on this, pls see: M. Minic, **DOGOVORI U KARADJORDJEVU O PODELI BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE**, Sarajevo 1998, pp. 21-104; H. Sarinic, **SVI MOJI TAJNI PREGOVORI SA SLOBODANOM MILOSEVICEM**, Zagreb 1999. For this, see: pp. 1052-1054 of this work. According to Mamula, Kadijevic knew about the contents of the negotiations in Karadjordjevo (they were held at the military economy building) – Slobodna Bosna, no. 186, June 8, 2000, p. 25.

²⁴⁹ Ibid. Testifying in The Hague (in September of 2002) in the process against Milosevic, Mesic clearly confirmed all of this once again.

According to Mesic the agreement in Karadjordjevo was reached so that Croatia receives thirteen of the pre-war Bosnia-Herzegovina districts, that is, the borders of the Duchy (*Banovina*) of Croatia from August 1939, and the Bosnian Prekounje area (Bihac, Cazin, Velika Kladusa, and Buzim), because this, as “**Turkish Croatia**”, that is, a territory populated by a huge majority of the Muslims, allegedly was not needed by Milosevic.²⁵⁰

The promised 33 municipalities (with a population of 1,166,577, of which: 473,789 Bosniaks, 460,462 Croats, 164,549 Serbs, and 67,777 others, and with an area of 13,974 km²)²⁵¹, obviously did not meet Tudjman’s aspirations. Milosevic’s offer, on the other hand, was just a bait and a trap to open up the issue of border change, in order to definitively opt for the war variant of solving the Serb national issue. Quite probably, both were hoping in the subsequent Serbo-Croat division of borders and **exchange of population**, that is, “**humane resettlement**”, or “**humanitarian moving**”, that is, “**deportation of population**”,²⁵² in order to reach a definitive solution of the Serb and Croatian ethnic issue by using the war option and the “**final settlement**” of the Muslim issue, that is, of the issue of the Bosniaks, by their liquidation or resettlement out of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It seemed that this compromise could avoid the virtually started Serbo-Croat war, and under the given circumstances, both “greater” states would be realized within their currently possible scopes.

The dissolution of Yugoslavia was at its end. In addition to Serbia, Slovenia and Croatia too were already acting as independent states. The summits of the chiefs of republics yielded no results. It was only Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia that still believed in the possibility of its survival. Disappointed at Kadijevic's indecisiveness and mistrusting the loyalty of the military leadership, for the moment, Milosevic was even ready to compromise with Tudjman, drawing him into the destruction and mutual division of the neighbouring Bosnia and Herzegovina.

²⁵⁰ M. Minic, the aforementioned work, pp. 77-90.

²⁵¹ **GEOGRAFSKI ATLAS BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE**, Survey Institute of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo 1998, p. 39.

²⁵² **INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR FORMER YUGOSLAVIA**, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, PROSECUTOR AGAINST SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC, The Hague 2000, paragraph 59; S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. 174; Z. Pasic, **BOSNA I BALKAN**, Sarajevo 2002, p. 134. About this, cf. p. 366.

IV

**DEFINING THE BORDERS
OF GREATER SERBIA**

1. The War Plan “RAM”*

After the meetings of the Presidency of the SFRY held on March 12, 14, and 15, 1991, when the Greater Serbia forces did not manage to legally succeed in taking over the power in the country, the military leadership assessed that there are two options for further action:

* In the practice of the Greater Serbia movement, and in order to form Greater Serbia, the idea of a “homogeneous Serbia” was revived, as well as of “ethnic cleansing“, that is, genocide, forced resettlements and other forms of crime. This scenario, a criminal plan, was **publicly and secretly** referred to as “**plan RAM**”, meaning “FRAME”. In the mid-nineties, **with the new deployment of the Army and the formation of special motorized units (in early June), and with the “idea” for the “expulsion” of Slovenia and Croatia out of Yugoslavia** (June 27 and 28), the leadership of Greater Serbia **adopted plan RAM** (B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 152, and 159-162; cf. *infra*, pp. 278-281).

The existence of plan RAM was revealed in a closed session of the SIV on September 18, 1991, when President Ante Markovic informed of its existence. The SIV departments disposed of recordings of telephonic conversations between Slobodan Milosevic and Radovan Karadzic, which showed, as was established by *Time* (Belgrade) that “**RAM is not fiction, at all**”, but “**the delimitation of the Western borders of Serbia, the creation of a framework** [*cf.* meaning of the word; note by the author] **for a new Yugoslavia, in which all the Serbs, with their territories, would live in the same state**”. In relation to this, Ante Markovic stated at that session, among other things, “**that there is a clear connection... whereby Slobodan Milosevic gives orders to Radovan Karadzic, to get in touch with Uzelac** (General Uzelac was the commander of the Fifth Corps of the JNA; note by the author) **and says – based on the agreement at the highest military level – that the arms be surrendered, that the Territorial Defence Corps of Bosanska Krajina be armed, and that this be used in the realization of the RAM program**”, “**what the RAM program means – so they say, I do not know, ‘this is the implementation of the RAM program’ – used by a man who participated in this conversation; they say it is the Greater**

- **the first one, that the Headquarters of Supreme Command or only General Kadijevic, as Chief of Staff of the Headquarters, resign¹ and**

- **the second one, “that the Army relies on political forces in the Federation and the republics representing all those nations who wish to live in Yugoslavia, with a peaceful departure from those who wish to leave it, and continues to securing such a policy”. This, “translated into the practical language of the then current situation, meant, among other things, the protection and defence of the Serbian nation**

Serbia program“ (*Vreme*, September 23, 1991, pp. 7 and 9, and September 30, 1991, pp. 4 and 5; S. Mesic, **KAKO JE SRUSENA JUGOSLAVIJA – politicki memoari**, Zagreb 1994, p. 236; S. Djukic, **ON, ONA I MI**, Belgrade 1997, pp. 252-253; S. Biserko, **OD JUGOSLOVENSKE NARODNE ARMIJE DO SRPSKE VOJSKE**, in: **RATOVI U JUGOSLAVIJI 1991.-1999.**, Compilation of Communiqués and Discussions from the Round Table, Belgrade, November 7-9, 2001, Belgrade 2002, p. 224).

According to the statements of a high-ranking military analyst (a Ph.D. holder) at the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, published by Zoran Odic on October 2, 1991 in the daily *Oslobodjenje*, in Sarajevo, plan RAM was drafted in February 1991, with the ultimate goal of forming Greater Serbia and **the Union of Serb States**. According to that military expert, this plan represents **“the expansion and cleansing”** of the territories of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia **“from the inside, and the integration of the Serbian enclaves within this territory”** (*Oslobodjenje*, October 2, 1991, p. 2).

General Ilija Radakovic claims that the preparations and the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina were conducted under the code “RAM“ (I. Radakovic, **BESMISLENA YU RATOVANJA**, Belgrade 1997, p. 7).

According to Stjepan Mesic, with the use of the JNA, Slobodan Milosevic had implemented plan RAM through the installation of the “governments” with **“obedient chauvinists, petty hillbilly politicians, dentists and warehouse attendants, and in Bosnia, and again with a view to a part of Croatia, where ‘cleansing, i.e. resettling’ was planned, he had done it through Karadzic’s nationalist organization, relying on the troops of the Banja Luka and Knin corps”** (S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. 236).

¹ V. Kadijevic, **MOJE VIDJENJE RASPADA - VOJSKA BEZ DRZAVE**, Belgrade 1993, pp. 113-114. Kadijevic states that **“in a normal state, this would also have been the only option”**. However, as **“we already [then] practically had no common Yugoslav state, but a conglomerate of all sorts of things, it was concluded that this option would be more to the benefit of the breakers of Yugoslavia, and that this would be a coup within the Army, which now has other tasks. This is why such an option was refused”** (Ibid.).

outside Serbia, and the gathering of the JNA within the borders of the future Yugoslavia, however, the second part of the task – the gathering of the JNA – had to, operationally and time-wise, be coordinated with the first part of the task”.²

The leadership of the Greater Serbia movement, **“without a single exception”**, accepted the second option.³

By opting for the leadership of the Greater Serbia movement (**“without a single exception”**), and in favour of the concept of **“protection and defence”** of the Serb people outside Serbia and gathering of the JNA within the borders of the future Yugoslavia, the JNA placed itself into the function of the implementation of the Greater Serbia project and Serbia’s war-waging policy. From then on, the military leadership began communicating only with the part of the Presidency who had accepted such a political course for the **“disentanglement of the political crisis”** in Yugoslavia. Thus, the JNA distanced itself from its constitutionally determined obligation and became the armed force of the ruling regime in Serbia and Montenegro.⁴

The agreement in Karadjordjevo, as incomplete as it may have been, significantly changed the situation. **Milosevic was no longer on**

² Ibid., p. 114.

³ Ibid. This option, according to General Kadijevic, **“with the participation of the appropriate political personae who were on such a political course of disentanglement of the political crisis, was accepted by all, without a single exception”** (Ibid.).

⁴ S. Biserko, the aforementioned work, p. 222; V. Kadijevic, the aforementioned work, p. 114; D. Domazet-Loso, **KAKO JE PRIPREMANA AGRESIJA NA HRVATSKU ILI PREOBLIKOVANJE JNA U SRPSKU IMPERIJALNU SILU**, *Hrvatski vojnik (Croatian Soldier)*, August 1997, p. 15; D. Marijan, **JUGOSLOVENSKA NARODNA ARMIJA U AGRESIJI NA REPUBLIKU HRVATSKU 1990.-1992. GODINE**, (hereinafter referred to as: **JUGOSLOVENSKA NARODNA ARMIJA...**), *Casopis za suvremenu povijest*, no. 2, Croatian Institute for History, Zagreb 2001, p. 298. Such a position on the role of the JNA, as claimed by D. Marijan, entailed its involvement in the armament, training and accoutrement of the Serbs in Croatia. Thus, for instance, the assistant for security of the commander of the 10th Corps, from late April to early July 1991, organized the withdrawal of large quantities of arms, weapons and ammunition from the military warehouses in Lika, for the needs of the Serbian Democratic Party (D. Marijan, the aforementioned work, p. 298).

his own. In exchange for the survival and a “so-called *banovina*” [duchy; note by the translator] he was promised, **Tudjman had agreed to take on the role of the collaborator.** Regardless of the honesty of that agreement,⁵ the precarious conquest of Croatia was off the agenda. The dispute was mainly reduced to the division and destruction of Bosnia.

⁵ It is really hard to believe that this was honest, given the “maximalist” plans of both sides. For the one side, the maximum (**territorial**) reach was the line of Virovitica-Karlovac-Karlobag, and for the other, the Drina River. Realistic options and suggestions of “**humane resettlement**” and exchange of population after agreement on territorial division had been proposed, and this was a concept already tried in WWII. The project of “*Grossraumordnung*” (arrangement of the greater German territory) foresaw the displacement of millions of people, in order to create Greater Germany (*Grossdeutschland*), which would encompass vast areas in the East and Southeast of Europe. In Pannonia, for instance, there was a plan for the formation of a Danubian Swabia (*Donauschwabenland*), as well as for the opening of the access to the warm seas, from Rjecina to Tagliamento (*Adriatisches Kuestenland*), the Croats were to be resettled to the East of Romania, the resettlement of some 300,000 Slovenians into Serbia had already begun, and then they were diverted into Fascist Croatia, from where so many Serbs were to be resettled to Serbia, and so on.

Through the leadership of the fifth columnist Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slobodan Milosevic was “testing” the possibility for the realization of population resettlement through negotiations. With that aim, on January 1, 1991, Nikola Koljevic met Franjo Tudjman to discuss the “**homogenisation of certain territories**”. He suggested Tudjman to form an agency that could regulate the necessary demographic solutions addressing this process “**at the civilization level**” (**THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR FORMER YUGOSLAVIA**, Case: No. IT-02-T, PROSECUTOR AGAINST SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC, The Hague 2000, hereinafter referred to as: **ICTY**, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraph 59). The collaborationist leadership of the SDS of Bosnia and Herzegovina had planned to accomplish this goal through the use of force (Ibid., paragraph 61).

At a session of the Presidency of the SFRY held on August 20, 1991, Dr. Branko Kostic presented the concept of “**exchange of population**” (S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. 174).

In September 1992, as the failure of the RAM operation became obvious and The Hague Conference began (September 7, 1992), negotiations were held between Franjo Tudjman and Dobrica Cosic, chiefs of states of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Tudjman offered Cosic the exchange of the population of Western Slavonia, for the population of Bosnian region of Posavina. Cosic accepted, Karadzic agreed, and Cyrus Vance approved that this be called “**humane resettlement**” (Z. Papic, **BOSNA I BALKAN**, Sarajevo 2002, p. 134).

The summits of the republic presidents yielded no results. As the SSNO had threatened to raise combat preparedness and conduct mobilization, the Greater Serbia movement was counting on that Tudjman too would agree to the offer.

Publicly declaring itself as in favour of the survival of the SFRY and the “actual” democratic transformation of society⁶ - in the meeting “of the four” (Milosevic, Jovic, Kadijevic and Adzic) on **April 5, 1991**, the leadership of the Greater Serbia movement **opted for war**. In relation to this, the heads of the Greater Serbia movement assessed that “Rubicon had been crossed” – **an agreement was reached that the army, without a decision and approval of the Presidency of the SFRY (“We shall not seek any decision or approval”; “we shall seek no decisions from anyone any longer”), shall proceed with armed action for the sake of protection and defence of the Serb nation in Krajina, that is, the defence of what had already been conquered in Croatia (“Serb towns that were then under Serb rule”).**⁷

⁶ At the session of the Presidency of the SFRY, held on April 3, 1990, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command “**presented the assessment of the situation and proposed measures**”, in which, among other things, it deemed that the Presidency of the SFRY, the Assembly of the SFRY, and the SIV, “**must undertake all the necessary measures in order to preclude direct threats to the survival of the SFRY as a state, and prevent [sic] the actual democratic transformation of the society that will be based on the constitution and the laws...**”. The assessment of the situation presented by General Kadijevic and the proposed measures which were, on behalf of the Headquarters of Supreme Command, advocating “**consistent**” securing of the constitutional order, in order to avoid “**chaos and civil war**”, were accepted with a majority of votes at the Presidency (V. Kadijevic, the aforementioned work, pp. 107-108; B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 133-134).

⁷ B. Jovic, **POSLEDNJI DANI SFRJ**, second amended issue, Kragujevac 1996, p. 317. In his memoirs, presenting various falsities and pro-Greater Serbia assessments, Borisav Jovic wrote about this meeting as follows:

“**April 5, 1991** –

In agreement with Slobodan Milosevic, I invited himself, Kadijevic and Adzic for a discussion in the group of four.

We talked about the situation in which the Presidency of the SFRY had found itself, not having the required majority any longer, and not being able to pass the deployment of the Army as an armed force. All the decisions for the use of army

In early April 1991, the military leadership adopted the decision to deploy a portion of the JNA units westwards. A part of the elite 63rd Parachute Brigade was sent from Nis to Zagreb. From the 51st Motorized Brigade from Pancevo, the First Armoured Battalion was deployed to Petrinja (into the composition of the 622nd Motorized Brigade). The Second Motorized Battalion of the 36th Motorized Brigade from Subotica, and the First Motorized Battalion of the 453rd Motorized Brigade from Sremska Mitrovica were deployed into Eastern Slavonia, onto the territory of Vukovar and Vinkovci, and were subjected to the Command of the 17th Corps. The armoured motorized parts of the 10th motorized brigade from Mostar were stationed in May at Kupres Plateau.⁸

On May 6, General Kadijevic seemed to have gained back his self-reliance and desire for independent action. Starting from the assessment

from now on can only be taken if it is not ordered to act. This is the only thing that we can obtain the sufficient number of the members of [the] P[residency of the] SFRY. It is clear that the respect of the position that the army must not use arms would be catastrophic for the Serb nation in Croatia, which had not armed itself because it had been counting on the protection of the JNA, whereas Croatia had armed its pro-Ustasha secessionist units.

We wonder whether the army will allow that Croatian police take Knin and other Serb towns, which are now under Serb rule?

The answer is very clear: it will not. It will proceed in the following manner: in case the Croats attack them, they will offer armed action and inform me, and then I will just summon the Presidency and only inform them of the fact. We will be looking for no decision or approval.

We drew their attention to the fact that proceeding otherwise would be treason, and that treason in this case would mean the fall of the Serb leadership and the failure of the JNA. They have agreed and given some solid promises.

Let us see how it goes. I guess they have had enough too. In any case, we have “crossed the Rubicon”. We will be seeking no decisions from anyone any longer, we will be acting as needed to protect the Serb nation, we will keep informing the Presidency on the developments, and whoever may not like it can go home. It is even stupid that they sit in the leadership of the state with which they have waged war. The army will attack no one, but it will protect itself and the Serb nation in Krajina” (Ibid.).

⁸ D. Marijan, the aforementioned work, p. 299; A. Tus, **RAT U SLOVENIJI I HRVATSKOJ DO SARAJEVSKOG PRIMIRJA**, in: **RAT U HRVATSKOJ I BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI 1991.-1995.**, ed. B. Magas and I. Zanic, Zagreb-Sarajevo 1999, pp. 68-69.

that, due to the exasperation of the situation in the country (i.e. the beginnings of the armed insurrection by Serbs in the area of Vukovar municipality, then also around Vinkovci and Osijek), **“a large-scope civil war [had] begun in the country“, he ordered the raising of combat preparedness of the JNA and [was about to order] the mobilization of appropriate units and threatened that”**, unless this were done by the appropriate institutions of the Federation, **“the JNA would ‘secure’ peace”**.⁹ The session of the Presidency, where the President of the Assembly of the SFRY, the president of the SIV, the presidents of the republics of Serbia and Macedonia, the presidents of

⁹ Ibid., pp. 299-300. B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 319. This was an excuse for the first of the several rounds of mobilization of the reserve composition, which continued until the end of the year. **“Only selected officers”** were informed of this order (D. Marijan, the aforementioned work, p. 300).

On May 6, 1991, General Kadijevic, who was on medical treatment in Karadjordjevo, sought from Jovic to communicate to the Presidency **“the official positions of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command and the Federal Secretariat for National Defence:**

Because the proposals of the Federal Secretariat for National Defence were not recognized, a large-scale civil war has broken out in the country.

The army, which had attempted to stop this process in this way, did not succeed. If it continued like this, it would itself be broken up.

Pursuant to the constitutional role of the Yugoslav People’s Army, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command demands that the Presidency and all the federal bodies secure peace in the country.

In the meantime, orders will be given, that anyone who attacks the army, so as they have done so far, and at which the army suffered first casualties, be faced following the rules on the combat use of units, meaning including the use of fire.

The Headquarters of the Supreme Command has already ordered the raise in the combat preparedness of the Yugoslav People’s Army, and it will order mobilization of the appropriate units so that, unless the appropriate bodies of the Federation fail to secure peace, the Yugoslav People’s Army can do this.

Please inform to this effect all the factors influencing the situation in the country, in the Federation and in all of the republics” (B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 319).

Jovic informed all the members of the Presidency about the aforementioned positions of the military leadership, and they concluded that he should immediately convene a session of this highest body of the country, with the presidents of the republics, the SIV and the Assembly, for the following day, May 7, 1991 (Ibid.).

presidencies of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Slovenia, and the president of the Government of the Republic of Croatia, discussing the current political and security situation in the country, convened for May 7, only to end in the wee hours on May 9,¹⁰ when, under pressure of **“the imminent”** military option (i.e. from fear of a possible military coup), they unanimously adopted the decisions, measures and activities,¹¹ the implementation of which would secure peace in the country, **“thereby**

¹⁰ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 320-321. This session, with pressure of the military option, lasted for two days and two nights, that is, on May 7 and 8 (it ended on May 8, **“after midnight, that is, on May 9, at 3 AM”**) and, according to Jovic, it was **“an exceptionally difficult and dramatic one. The division was complete, the disagreement a big one, but also the pressure was big in terms of the military option being imminent unless a political agreement was reached”** (Ibid., p. 320).

¹¹ Ibid. **“Pursuant to its own, and the constitutional responsibility of the federal and republic bodies for the situation in the country, and to the necessary need to secure peace and normal conditions for the resolution of the Yugoslav crisis, the Presidency of the SFRY decided upon a specific program of measures and activities for a permanent solution to the interethnic and inter-republic conflicts, on the principles of full respect for the territorial integrity of the SFRY and the republics, that is, legality and legitimacy of the governments in them, the civic, individual and ethnic rights, as well as the rule of law.**

In order to resolve the interethnic conflicts in the Republic of Croatia, conditions need to be created for:

- a) prevention of armed conflicts;**
- b) identification of the disputed issues causing the interethnic problems;**
- c) securing democratic dialogue for their resolution.**

In order to accomplish this, the following needs to be done:

Guarantee and provide public order and safety, as well as ethnic and civic rights of all citizens in compliance with the constitutional legal system of the Federation and the Republic of Croatia. All the disputed issues are to be resolved with the involvement of the appropriate bodies of the federation.

Immediately ensure cessation of all violence, and secure peace. To this end, immediately stop the movement of the armed formations and armed citizens at critical points, except for legitimate local law enforcement bodies, and in between the area with predominantly Serb population and the other parts of Croatia, stop the movement of all armed formations and groups in both directions, except for the JNA and SSUP (Federal Police) forces.

This restriction measure shall be implemented during the month following the day this Decision was taken on.

also ensuring conditions for the return of the combat preparedness of JNA units back to normal level”.¹²

This decision gave broad powers to the JNA **“at critical points”** – in the area of Croatia **“with a predominantly Serb population”**, where its units, as well as the units of the Federal Secretariat for the Interior, had already been deployed. Thus, the leadership of the Greater Serbia movement accomplished a **“major advance”**, particularly **“in view of the powers given to the army”**, because this decision of the Presidency of the SFRY constituted, in essence, **the military option**.¹³ It was in

The Yugoslav People’s Army, which, in concordance with its constitutional role and orders of the Presidency of the SFRY, is already involved in ‘critical points’, shall be responsible in terms of ensuring the efficient execution of this decision of the Presidency of the SFRY.

Immediately demobilize the reserve compositions of police or police forces, organize the withdrawal of weapons from citizens and their storage into appropriate warehouses controlled by the competent bodies, in compliance with the Law.

Immediately conduct a detailed investigation by the appropriate federal and republic bodies in connection with the armed conflicts, human casualties and material destruction, and inform the public to that effect.

Immediately stop the attacks against the Yugoslav People’s Army, its members, facilities and resources of the JNA.

The Presidency of the SFRY assesses that the Yugoslav People’s Army is exercising its function in compliance with the Constitution of the SFRY and federal laws, and that it is capable to successfully protect the borders of the country and prevent inter-republic and interethnic conflicts as the joint armed force of all our nations.

Immediately form a peer group consisting of the representatives of the Republic of Croatia and the legitimate representatives of the Serb nation from Croatia, in order to begin negotiations on any disputed political issues deemed to be causing the crisis, such as: the constitutional equality of the Croatian and Serbian nations, the language, the alphabet, ethnic and state symbols, the right of the nation to self-determination, up to secession, the manner of declaration at referenda, and the like...” (Ibid. pp. 320-321).

¹² Ibid. The part of the Presidency of the SFRY that was committed to Greater Serbia, while reviewing the program of actions and measures of May 9, 1991, in connection with the situation in Croatia tried to establish the political decisions for, according to Mesic, stronger military pressure against Croatia (S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. 136).

¹³ Ibid., pp. 320-321, and 323. Jovic evaluated this session in the following way: **“Having in mind the unseen political outwitting and arguing that lasted for two**

concordance **with the war option** of the leadership of the Greater Serbia movement **as accepted on April 5, 1991.**

On May 9, 1991, a meeting was held in the office of General Kadijevic, who had returned from treatment in Karadjordjevo, attended, in addition to him, by Slobodan Milosevic and Borisav Jovic. The discussion was **“about the intentions and position of the army”** after the decision of the Presidency of the SFRY dated May 8 **“to establishment peace and undertake steps for the further resolution of the crisis”**. Surprised at the agreement **“for such radical and far-reaching measures”**, Kadijevic communicated to them the assessments and intentions of the army, with an assumption that the aforementioned decision of the Presidency **“was not taken”**. In relation to this, he presented the elements and goals of the assessment, the method of implementation, the institutions of power for implementation of the option, the start time, the duration and the order of sequence, in which he again proposed the **introduction of a state of emergency**.¹⁴

In the brief discussion that was conducted, in order to break down Croatia more easily, Milosevic **“believed it would be good to narrow down the front of resistance by letting the Slovenians go. If the republics do not object against that, we need to allow the Slovenians to secede legally”**. Jovic thought **“that everything that Veljko said was some kind of reprise of what they had intended after the session of the Supreme Command, which they themselves had abandoned”**. Therefore he was not clear about **“what this concept was supposed to mean, now when they had themselves recently fully discredited and eliminated it”**. In further presentation, Jovic indicated the importance of enforcement of the decision of the Presidency of the SFRY, of May 7 and 8, 1991, **“which is the legal basis for the activity of the JNA and all the others in order to resolve**

days and two nights, one has to have in mind that these conclusions may be the tactical compromise of Croatia, which was ultimately ‘cornered’. In any case, the conclusions constitute a major advance in terms of the powers granted to the army, but also in terms of the recognition by Croatia as to what the causes of the inter-ethnic conflicts are, regardless of the fact that there is little hope that it will also accept having these causes removed in practice” (Ibid., p. 321).

¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 322-323.

problems". He believed that **"it was necessary to do a new version based on the obligation to enforce the decision of the Presidency"**, which would also contain **"the options for proceeding, in case someone offers resistance to the enforcement of the decisions of the Federal Presidency"**, which, in his opinion, was **"quite probable"**. Such an option provided them with the possibility to remove **"only the ones that needed to be removed"**, for which, according to him, they had a legal basis. In case **"that the decision is brought into question in general, and by the majority of the republics"**, they could – according to Jovic – return to the version proposed by General Kadijevic. The more so, because he believed that **"in essence, the Presidency of the SFRY had opted for the military option (because it granted huge powers to the Army), although it does not bear such a name"**.¹⁵

In the end, Jovic presented the position that **"the Army needs to understand and accept"**, that for the holders of the Greater Serbia movement, it is crucial to defend **"the territories of the peoples who wish to stay in Yugoslavia"** and that they find it **"far more suitable"** to do this **"based on the preservation of legality of federal power, and significantly less through a military coup"**.¹⁶ Milosevic and Kadijevic accepted such a position.¹⁷

In the days of **"arguing"** about the election of Mesic for President of the Presidency of the SFRY (from May 10, 1991, and later on), a number of meetings were held, at which discussions and negotiations were held between the Serbian and Montenegrin political and military leaderships – Milosevic, Jovic, Bulatovic, Kostic, Jokanovic, and generals Kadijevic and Adzic. These meetings, in addition to the issue of election of Mesic for president, also discussed the Serbs in Croatia. Thus, in the

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 323.

¹⁶ Ibid. In this, Jovic also emphasized as follows: **"The Army itself, in its analysis after the session of the Supreme command of March 12 to 15, [1991], showed exceptional risks arising from such a problem resolution path, because it would also lead to the loss of legitimacy and power in Serbia, if it keeps supporting the military option. Anyway, the army itself then abandoned a similar solution"** (Ibid., pp. 323-324).

¹⁷ Ibid.

discussion between Jovic, Milosevic and Kadijevic, on May 10, it was agreed **to continue with the defence of the Serbian nation in Croatia**.¹⁸ At the meeting of May 13, the leadership of the Greater Serbia movement (Milosevic, Jovic, Bulatovic, J. Kostic, Jokanovic, and General Kadijevic) discussed the position (for three full hours) in relation to the election of Mesic for President of the Presidency of the SFRY. In relation to this, according to Jovic, two basic theses were in option.¹⁹ Unlike the others, the military leadership believed that Mesic needs to be elected. However, this position was not accepted.²⁰

After the session of the Presidency of the SFRY on May 15, 1991, at which Mesic was not elected for president, because he did not receive the required majority of votes (the transfer of the post was prevented by Milosevic's group in the Presidency of the SFRY),²¹ thus opening

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 324. This agreement, according to Jovic, was based on the Decision of the Presidency of May 7 and 8, because, in his opinion, it gave them **“enough options, at least for the time being”**.

¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 324-325. About this, Jovic wrote as follows:

“- Veljko Kadijevic believes that he [Mesic] needs to be selected, because an opposite action would cause a crisis with serious political consequences and stop the processes of negotiation about the country's future.

- The others believe that he should not be elected, because this would finally ‘give wings’ to the breakers of Yugoslavia, and they themselves would feel embarrassed in front of their own nation” (Ibid.).

²⁰ Ibid. Nevertheless, **“after an argument”**, Kadijevic expressed understanding for the adopted position, because **“it is not the matter in that he supports Mesic, but that he is burdened with an illusion that there is a way of keeping Croatia and Slovenia within Yugoslavia, when they have virtually opted for separation”** (Ibid.).

²¹ S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. XI; ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-T, paragraph 94. Milosevic's group in the Presidency of the SFRY did not allow the constitutional President Mesic to take on the presidential office at the time. Thus, among other things, the JNA was allowed, as it had no supreme commander, after Slovenia and Croatia had declared independence and sovereignty, to make an aggression against Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina (S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. XI).

According to the Constitution of the SFRY, Stipe Mesic was to be automatically elected, that is, pronounced, President of the Presidency of the SFRY, just like all the previous presidents were elected. However, Borisav Jovic used a trick and placed the election of Stipe Mesic up for voting, and Republic of Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, and Bosnia

up a crisis within the Presidency, Milosevic and generals Kadijevic and Adzic “dropped by“ to Jovic’s. The generals were “**dissatisfied**,

and Herzegovina voted for him, and Serbia, Vojvodina, and Kosovo were against, whereas Montenegro refrained from voting, so the session was recessed and postponed for the following day (K. Rotim, **ODBRANA HERCEG-BOSNE**, Siroki Brijeg 1997, pp. 99-100).

Then, the members of the Presidency, as the representatives of the republics, were as follows: Dr. Borisav Jovic (President at the time), representing Serbia; Dr. Janez Drnovsek (the previous President) representing Slovenia; Bogic Bogicevic representing Bosnia and Herzegovina; Nenad Bucin representing Montenegro; Dr. Vasil Tupurkovski representing Macedonia; Dragutin Zelenovic representing Vojvodina and Riza Sapunxiu representing Kosovo. The Assembly of Serbia had suspended the autonomous institutions of Kosovo, dismissed its Presidency of Kosovo, and delegated Vukasin Jokanovic, the Vice President of the Assembly of Serbia into the Presidency of the SFRY, while in March, it unconstitutionally dismissed Sapunxiu, delegating to his office the Vice President of the Serbian Assembly. The representative of Vojvodina had also left (Dragutin Zelenovic, candidate for the composition of the Serbian government), so Jugoslav Kostic, the president of the Vojvodina Presidency, was appointed (S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. X; K. Rotim, the aforementioned work, p. 95).

On May 16, “**Jovic’s burlesque**” was transferred from the Presidency of the SFRY onto the Federal Assembly, which for the second time (the first time was on May 10), was “deciding” on the confirmation of Branko Kostic, Sejdo Bajramovic (Reserve Ensign, and pensioner), and Jugoslav Kostic (a Vojvodina Montenegrin and Serb). Somehow, they were “pushed through”, with elementary violations of the Constitution of the SFRY (S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. 11). In relation to this, Mesic wrote that Serbia, given that it did not recognize the Assembly or the Presidency of Kosovo, having constitutionally revoked the autonomy of Kosovo, could not send anyone from Kosovo to the Presidency “**on behalf of Kosovo**”. As the Assembly of Vojvodina, whatever it was like at the time, survived, and it was formally and factually subjected to the Assembly of Serbia, the autonomous right of Vojvodina was expressed by the representative of Serbia in the Presidency (Ibid.).

At this session, during declarations, together with the Slovenians and Albanians, the Croatian delegation also left the Assembly (Ibid.).

It was in vain to try and prove at the session of the Federal Assembly that the decision of the Serbian Parliament to suspend the autonomous authorities Kosovo and dismiss R. Sapunxiu was a most blatant violation of the Constitution. However, it was just the way Assembly Chairman Slobodan Gligorijevic-Ajga agreed with Milosevic. When the large assembly hall of the Federal Assembly was left by the delegations of Slovenia and Croatia, together with the Albanians from Kosovo and a part of the Bosnia-Herzegovina delegation, Gligorijevic informed the attending MPs that both Kostic and Sejdo Bajramovic were “confirmed in package”. Irfan Ajanovic, Vice President of the Assembly of the SFRY, protested this against but Gligorijevic did not respond to that (Ibid., p. 13).

afraid and annoyed”, and Milosevic and Jovic were “**disappointed at the position of the army**”,²² whose military leadership took the option that Mesic needs to be elected.²³

Slobodan Milosevic’s group of four in the Presidency of the SFRY did not allow Mesic to perform constitutional functions. In the desire

²² B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 325. In relation to this, Jovic wrote: “**Veljko says that what we have done** [i.e. not support Mesic’s election; note by the author] **is a mistake. Blagoje says that he would be glad to arrest us. Slobodan tells him that he can feel free to arrest us if he wants to. The Serbian opposition was altogether for Mesic and against us. Sloba and I are convinced that we are doing well, but we are very disappointed at the position of the army**” (Ibid.).

²³ Ibid., pp. 324-325. General Adzic commented the failure to elect Mesic: “**This is a burlesque. The Constitution requires ...**”. Some Western agencies commented the statement by the general as “**anger at Serbia, claiming that with the failure to elect Mesic it further weakened the authority of the federal institutions, and of the Army itself**” (S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. 8).

Admiral Mamula was against electing Mesic for President of the Presidency of the SFRY. He believed this to be a “**crazy idea**”, because Mesic’s alleged “**efforts to break Yugoslavia up made up his basic political image**”. Mamula did not agree with Kadijevic and Adzic; “**to take such a decision in order to ensure peace in the house and avoid the pressure of the international community...**” (B. Mamula, *SLUCAJ JUGOSLAVIJA*, Podgorica 2000, p. 186).

By obstructing and failing to recognize the constitutional president, the Republic of Serbia (the Serb block), according to Mesic, “**was breaking up Yugoslavia**”, showing the world “**who is undermining Yugoslavia and the Constitution**” (S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, pp. 10, and 17).

President George H. W. Bush, in a telephone conversation with A. Markovic (on May 20, 1991) stated that he supports the federal Government and in particular the President, believing that he would be in favour of the further democratic transformation of the country. The USA then assessed that the election of S. Mesic “**is the reflection of democratic changes in Yugoslavia**”, and that the “**prevention of that is a sign of the stopping of democratic development in Yugoslavia**” (Ibid., p. 19).

Due to “**the conduct of the leadership of the Republic of Serbia, and its treading on human rights and current destabilization of the Yugoslav Presidency**”, assistance for Yugoslavia equalling half a million dollars (the so-called Don Nickels Amendment) was cancelled. Bush and Baker conditioned “**the freezing of the Nickels amendment**” with the election of Mesic (the amendment was suspended on May 25, although even then and later “**the Serbian four**” claimed that at no price will they “**have a Croat fascist heading the supreme command**” (Ibid.).

to assist in resolving the stalemate position, on May 29, the European community delegation was visiting Belgrade. In the discussion with them, Mesic indicated that the blockade of the Presidency was just one of the elements of the Greater Serbia scenario, just as were the **“invasion of the payment system of Yugoslavia, the blockade of the Slovenian market, creation of the crisis points in the parts of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina”**. Among other things, Mesic stated that the goal is to block the overall system and to grant the Army **“the right of arbitration”**.²⁴

The next day, the European community delegation also talked to the representatives of the republics, advocating for the preservation of Yugoslavia within its then framework, internal and external borders.²⁵

Borisav Jovic and both Kostics proposed the change of order of sequence at the head of the Presidency of the SFRY, thus blocking the Presidency, in order to skip Croatia in its right to preside the Presidency, at which they offered the presidential office to Bogicevic, and the Vice Presidential one to Tupurkovski. They believed that this was **“the best way to overcome the crisis”**.²⁶

For six weeks, Jovic and Dr. Kostic were convincing **“the crazed people that they ‘simply can not accept Mesic’, in which Dr. Jovic allowed Croatia to elect ‘someone else’, and Dr. Kostic precluded any possibility that Croatia can be represented by any members of the HDZ.”** In spite of its Greater Serbia commitment, the Serbian opposition was on the side of Mesic, as was the whole political world.²⁷

At the request of the general, on May 31, 1991, at Milosevic’s, Kadijevic and Jovic talked **“about the intentions of the army in relation to Slovenia refusing to send recruits and to surrender the recruit records to the Army”**. Among other things, Kadijevic asked for their opinion on that **“if the army throws over the Slovenian**

²⁴ S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, pp. 29-30, and 38.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 31.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 37.

government because it is not enforcing the military laws, etc.”. However, these were, according to Jovic, empty military stories, which he believed no longer.²⁸

On June 7, discussing in Kadijevic’s office, Milosevic and Jovic were seeking the answer **“to the question whether the army would intervene if it comes to a tussle at the rally”** on June 9, which was announced by the opposition. The general answered in the affirmative, but he insisted that Milosevic and Jovic (the Serb leadership) first do whatever they can, in order not to leave everything to the army.²⁹

A day before the meeting in Split between Tudjman, Milosevic and Izetbegovic, the goal of which was **“to seek a way to resolve the Yugoslav crisis”**, where, according to Jovic, many had expected **“to talk about the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina and creation of a Muslim mini-state”**, on June 11, the following persons met at Milosevic’s: Milosevic, Jovic, Dobrica Cosic, and Radovan Karadzic. The goal of this meeting was to agree about the tactics **“to be applied by Milosevic”**. It was assessed that they need to strictly stick with their principal, or rather, declarative positions: **“we wish to preserve Yugoslavia, and within it Bosnia and Herzegovina too, we are not seeking the division of anything, or a Greater Serbia, but we shall not allow that the Serb nation be forced out of Yugoslavia”**.³⁰

Starting from such viewpoints, the leadership of the Greater Serbia movement and their collaborators also assessed that, allegedly, **“by working on the break-up and dissolution of Yugoslavia”**, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina **“were also working on the creation of Greater**

²⁸ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 337. Jovic wrote that at the time Kadijevic was asking **“a thousand questions. He was beating around the topic of what we think about the army overthrowing the Slovene government, because it is not enforcing military laws, and so on... Honestly, I was sick and tired of these military empty stories. I do not believe them any more at all. They are not going to do or undertake anything, this is clear. And we have already told him a hundred times what we think.”** (Ibid.).

²⁹ Ibid., p. 338.

³⁰ Ibid.

Serbia”, which was in their favour, because, as they thought, the time was also on their side (i.e. on the side of the Greater Serbia movement).³¹

On June 20, as the session of the Presidency of the SFRY was not held,³² Milosevic, Jovic, Bulatovic, Branko Kostic and Jugoslav Kostic assessed the situation and agreed on further moves. In assessing that, within a month, Slovenia and Croatia would become independent, they concluded that it is necessary to undertake certain measures of protection against “separatism”. To this aim, in addition to the proposal for **“financial and economic defence”**, it was agreed that on June 24 they would meet generals Kadijevic and Adzic and demand a precise answer to the question **“whether they would deploy the army on the new (Serb) borders of Yugoslavia”**, in order to allegedly **“prevent higher casualties among the Serb people and defend the territories”**. They concluded that, **unless they received confident guarantees, they would organize the defence themselves and give up on the army.**³³

In accordance with the aforementioned conclusions, and based on the arrangement and objectives determined four days before, on June 24, a meeting was held at Milosevic’s, attended by: Veljko Kadijevic, Blagoje Adzic, Borisav Jovic, Momir Bulatovic, Branko Kostic, Jugoslav Kostic, and Slobodan Milosevic. Milosevic spoke first,³⁴ and, according to

³¹ Ibid. p. 339. In relation to this, they assessed that **“the time is working for us, and their, particularly Croatian, politics is becoming nervous. Each move it makes may be wrong and beneficial to us”**.

³² Ibid. Jovic wrote that the (expanded) session of the Presidency of the SFRY was not even held on June 20, 1991, because **“the Croat and the Slovene did not want to come until we change the decision about the (non-)election of Mesic for president. We decided that there is no more possibility of discussing that any longer”**.

³³ Ibid. At that meeting, it was agreed that they would also develop the procedures to push the Croats and Slovenians out of the federal institutions too – **“so that they do not get to decide about us, if they have already separated out”**, and to oppose **“any kind of policy of forced retaining of the Croats and Slovenians within Yugoslavia, as well as forcing the Serbs out of it”** (Ibid.).

³⁴ Ibid., p. 340. Jovic wrote how Milosevic communicated his assessments **“on the international environment: Germany supports the break-up of Yugoslavia, that is, the separation of Croatia and Slovenia. At the CSCE session in Berlin, it had coordinated in those terms with Austria and Hungary. It is trying to draw Japan into the CSCE, and establish an axis between Berlin and Tokyo.**

Jovic, did not even mention the reasons they met for. He was followed by General Kadijevic,³⁵ and then Jovic, who, among other things, in pointing out the goals of the holders of the Greater Serbia movement to allow “secession” to Slovenia and Croatia (“**but in a legal manner, and not through a fait accompli policy**”), indicated that Serbia and Montenegro immediately need to review the measures of self-defence in economic and financial terms. However, the problem was in that the leadership of the Greater Serbia movement **could not legally ‘leave the Serbs in Yugoslavia’**, and so the last pressure was made on the JNA, which should solve this itself. Therefore, “**the security side**”, according to Jovic, depended “**on the response we will get today from the Army: will the JNA defend the Serbs in Croatia after the decision for secession, and how?**”³⁶

General Adzic assessed Jovic’s position on Mesic “**as a stubborn one, and the position on the defence of the Serbs in Croatia as an**

The USA wants Yugoslavia to stay, but be pro-American.

Slovenia and Croatia do not find the USA policy suitable to them, but German policy fits them.

The USA has no other option but Yugoslavia with Ante Markovic. The election of Mesic is in the function of this interest.

He explains this by Baker’s statement that, by not electing Mesic, we have drawn criticism upon us and weakened our position” (Ibid.).

³⁵ Ibid. He developed the thesis “**that the Russians can not help us [either], that America has realized that Yugoslavia is dominated by secessionist policy and that this is not in their interest, but in the interest of Germany. They would like to preserve Yugoslavia and they are seeking allies. Their ally in Yugoslavia is Ante Markovic and we could use his assistance to preserve Yugoslavia!**

The only reason that the external factor has turned against us is the non-election of Mesic, so we need to correct it immediately, tomorrow, and elect Mesic!

This would allow us to connect Ante Markovic to us and place the SIV in the function of fighting against secessionism, and retrieve the discussion about the future of the country back to the Presidency of the SFRY” (Ibid.).

³⁶ Ibid. On this occasion, Jovic stated that he would not vote for Mesic, “**regardless of the pressures**”. In relation to this, in his memoirs, he wrote: “**Croatia and Slovenia want to stay in the bodies of the federation so they can take decisions about us, and that we can not take decisions about them. They still want to preside over us. If someone has lost his or her political reason, I haven’t. I can resign if this is required, I can be dismissed, but vote for him – that I can’t**” (Ibid.).

unreasonable one, because the JNA is there to defend all the Yugoslav nations”. Jovic reacted, without well-founded arguments, “that only the Serbs are endangered, just in case he had forgotten”.³⁷

Branko and Jugoslav Kostic, as well as Momir Bulatovic, were categorical just like Jovic. However, according to Jovic, Milosevic swayed, seeking a solution whereby Mesic could be elected, **“but so that we can still outwit them”**.³⁸

At this meeting, everyone besides Jovic, according to whom this was unbelievable, **“abandoned the discussion with the army about the defence of Serbs and Serbia, while diverting the discussion into the pressure upon us to elect Mesic.”**³⁹ He was disappointed with this meeting and at the same time angry with Milosevic, because **“he did not proceed as agreed”**.⁴⁰

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid. In this way, according to Jovic, Milosevic wanted to calm down Adzic. Jovic asked him:

“- do you have a specific proposal?

He doesn’t.

I present a specific proposal to him! So that I get sick, go for medical treatment, and they have him replacing me, so let him vote all he wants.

Slobodan adds:

- and after the voting I can come over and resign.

Thus – the same like me. He can’t do it either!” (Ibid., p. 341).

³⁹ Ibid., p. 341. Due to this, Jovic decided to think over whether in the future he will participate in such meetings.

In evaluating the **“results”** from this meeting, Jovic wrote that **“some stupid position arose that we try to send a letter to the Federal Council of the Assembly of the SFRY, so that it can itself interpret the Constitution and inaugurate him without elections. Should they wish so and have the right to do so”** (Ibid.).

⁴⁰ Ibid. In his memoirs for June 25, Jovic wrote as follows: **“I say to Slobodan Milosevic that I am disappointed with yesterday’s meeting and that I am cross with him. He is also disappointed, but he does not get it why I am cross with him. I explain to him that he did not act as had been agreed. He justifies himself that ‘he had said in general terms that we expect to hear what the position of the JNA would be’.**

Milosevic “the Boss” gave up on the discussion of the use of the JNA. He obviously did it because he “was disappointed”, because he got afraid, as the Russians could not help them, and also due to the pressure of the international community.

Slobodan Milosevic, after having talked to Ambassador Zimmermann on June 26, who inquired what was the condition of the Serb leadership in order to have Mesic elected, and in relation to this, he requested Jovic to provide an “answer” that he then communicated to the Ambassador,⁴¹ and as Jovic informed him about the assessments and positions of NATO towards Yugoslavia,⁴² as well as after Slovenia and Croatia had decided to opt for “secession”,⁴³ together with Jovic,

I told him that I will attend such meetings no longer if the situation is repeated only once more, where he acts contrary to what has been agreed, and that I will not accept pressure. I do not intend to participate in any letter writing to the Assembly of Yugoslavia. For me, Mesic is already a closed book” (Ibid.).

⁴¹ Ibid. About this, Jovic wrote: “Slobodan calls me at home. Zimmermann asks what our condition is to elect Mesic. I tell him: the condition is humiliating and probably unacceptable for Croatia: that it publicly abandons the *fait accompli* policy and annuls all the laws it has passed, which are contrary to the Constitution of the SFRY, and that Mesic publicly announces that he denies them himself, that is, that it is not his goal to dissolve but to preserve Yugoslavia.

Slobodan communicated this to Zimmermann” (Ibid.).

⁴² Ibid., pp. 342-343. According to Jovic’s interpretation of the NATO positions towards Yugoslavia, “**firstly, we are not the problem of the Balkans, but of Europe.**

Secondly, there is no collective security in Europe if there is disagreement and conflict in Yugoslavia.

Thirdly, NATO must act decisively, because it should not allow the escalation of conflict and loss of control over the course of events.

Fourthly, the assessment for the time being is that our crisis can be *mitigated* through political and economic measures, and this is the direction of activity for the time being.

Fifthly, it is unacceptable for NATO to have any involvement of the Army (JNA) on the side of one of the conflicting options, and it (NATO) would react upon it in a decisive and strong manner!” (Ibid., p. 342).

⁴³ On June 25, 1991, the Croatian Assembly unanimously adopted **the Constitutional Decisions on Sovereignty and Independence of the Republic of Croatia, and the Declaration of Independence and Sovereignty of the Republic of Croatia** (S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, pp. 44-47).

he visited Kadijevic. They informed the General about this information from NATO, which, according to Jovic, “**identifies Yugoslavia as its**

On the same day, the Assembly of Slovenia also **declared independence of the Republic of Slovenia**. Slovenia brought the decision to fully take over all the functions of the Federation within the borders of Slovene territory, and to establish a border towards the rest of Yugoslavia. The appropriate Slovenian bodies in charge of law enforcement and customs implemented this decision. (Slovenia established control over its 671 km long border and over all 37 customs crossings from Slovenia into Hungary, Austria and Italy) – S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. 47; V. Kadijevic, the aforementioned work, p. 117.

The Assembly of the SFRY concluded that those Slovenian decisions on taking over the state border of Yugoslavia on the territory of Slovenia are unconstitutional, demanding the appropriate federal bodies to re-establish the status quo ante at the state border. In accordance with this, at the session held on June 25/26, 1991, the Federal Executive Council brought a decision on direct securing of enforcement of the federal regulations pertaining to the crossing of the state border on the territory of Slovenia:

“1. In order to secure the federal regulations on crossing the state border and movement in the border strip in the territory of the Republic of Slovenia, as well as in order to ensure enforcement of the international obligations of the SFRY and smooth international traffic and free movement of people across the state border, the Federal Secretariat for Interior shall directly undertake, that is, ensure performance of the tasks of border control.

2. Directly ensuring the enforcement of federal regulations related to the crossing of the state border, the Federal Secretariat for the Interior shall establish direct cooperation with the Federal Secretariat for National Defence, in order to involve the border units of the JNA to secure the state border both at the border crossings and in the populated settlements in the border strip. The Federal Secretary for the Interior and the Federal Secretary for National Defence shall jointly determine the manner of establishing of cooperation referred to provision 1.

3. Once the federal administrative body, that is, the federal organization, in controlling the circulation of goods and passengers from its competency at the border crossing, comes across physical or other resistance, or when such resistance is to be expected, the employees of the Federal Secretariat shall be obligated to provide assistance to that federal administrative body, that is, the federal organization, upon their request.

4. More detailed provisions for the execution of this decision shall be governed by the Federal Secretary for the Interior.

5. The Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs shall inform the competent bodies of the neighbouring countries on the temporary regime governing the state border crossing in the territory of the Republic of Slovenia, in concordance with this decision...” (V. Kadijevic, the aforementioned work, p. 117; S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, pp. 46-47; B. Mamula, *SLUCAJ JUGOSLAVIJA*, Podgorica 2000, pp. 177-178).

‘test case’ to be used for the verification of its new strategy”.⁴⁴

The aforementioned information, which, according to Jovic, presents the assessments and positions of the Western Alliance towards Yugoslavia, was most probably devised by Milosevic and Jovic, Jovic even more probably, in order to marginalize Ante Markovic and convince the military leadership (Kadijevic and Adzic) that the JNA must be the key factor in “resolving” the Yugoslav crisis. This is confirmed by Jovic’s “random statements” about how it is allegedly clear that NATO wishes to implement the economic and political measures through Ante Markovic, where **“there is no place for the JNA in the resolution of our crisis”**, because **“it may not get involved, because it will always be on someone’s side (for instance, on the side of those who have been attacked)”**.⁴⁵

That **“destiny for the JNA”**, according to Jovic, **“was determined by NATO”**. In presenting such a claim, Jovic even goes further in his thoughts, in which he believes that this is also **“the reliance of the JNA onto Ante Markovic, from whom it expects to save Yugoslavia”**. According to him, this is **“the most miserable role that can give to an army: that it may not defend the endangered in its own country”**.⁴⁶

In order to ensure the implementation of federal regulations on crossing the border on the territory of Slovenia, in accordance with the aforementioned decision of the SIV, certain border JNA units were also engaged (some 1,900 soldiers and officers with appropriate equipment), tasked to implement this decision. Within 48 hours, of the 137 facilities at the border, the JNA took over 133, thus practically executing the task assigned (V. Kadijevic, the aforementioned work, p. 117).

Later on, the Slovenians, Kucan in particular, imputed the key responsibility for what followed onto Ante Markovic, because, according to them, he ordered that the JNA **“use the tanks to bring Slovenia back to reason”**. In relation to this, Mesic states that Ante and all the ministers, even the group of Slovenians in the Government, did not demand the action with tanks and military equipment, **“but the idea was only for involvement of the border units, and at the border only”**. The SIV took the position that the armed forces must not be used except in the case of defence (S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. 47; B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, p. 209).

⁴⁴ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 342-343.

⁴⁵ Ibid. p. 343.

⁴⁶ Ibid. In relation to this, Jovic goes on to say: **“It must not, but the NATO will!”**

At this, Jovic concluded that **“NATO shall not defend the endangered, but help those who are endangering, unless they are strong enough themselves ”**.⁴⁷

After the general had **“carefully”** read the information, he asked when it arrived and started pondering, and in accordance with the aforementioned assessments of his, Jovic **“interpreted for him”** that **“based on that concept, Ante will not save Yugoslavia with the assistance of the JNA”**, as this was, according to Jovic, believed by Kadijevic, **“but with the assistance of NATO forces, and they will put our army into the barracks”**, because **“our army is a Communist one and energetic action would be offered to counteract it”**.⁴⁸

Kadijevic was trying to explain that NATO always said they were against the use of force, and Jovic replicated that over at NATO, they are now **“against use of our force only”**, which was responded by the General by saying that **“that is something we shall not respect”**.⁴⁹

Milosevic had insisted **“on several occasions that the army must defend the future borders of Yugoslavia. ‘What do we have to do in defending Slovenian borders’, this is just temporary. We need to defend the borders which are going to be permanent”**, whereby, according to Jovic, he had corrected **“yesterday’s mistake”**.⁵⁰

At the time, Milosevic **“stubbornly”** mentioned only Slovenia, which was commented by Jovic as that **“this may also have happened out of tactical reasons towards the army, which was intoxicated by the unity of Yugoslavia, which no longer existed”**, because, according to Jovic, **“for us it is clear enough that this also pertains to Croatia without the Serb territories in it”**.⁵¹

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid. Jovic told all of this to Kadijevic **“so he can think it over well, as to who can and who can not be his ally”**.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 344.

On June 27, 1991, Milosevic “**started with open hostilities in Slovenia**” – the JNA was moved ahead to conquer that republic, to possess the borderline with Slovenia and to establish presence by federal police and customs at the border.⁵² In this aggression, the JNA used all the forces available to stomp Slovenia down.⁵³ However, in

⁵² I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, p. 67; O. Backovic – M. Vasic – A. Vasovic, **KO TO RADO IDE U VOJNIKE (MOBILIZACIJSKA KRIZA – ANALITICKI PREGLEDI MEDIJSKOG IZVJESTAVANJA)**, in: RAT U HRVATSKOJ I BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI 1991-1995, edited by B. Magas and I. Zanic, Zagreb-Sarajevo 1999; S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. 48. D. Marijan, the aforementioned work, p. 300. The commander of the Fifth Army District, stationed in Zagreb, general Konrad Kolsek, informed in writing the Slovenian prime minister Peterle that the Fifth Military District has the assignment to take over all the border crossings and secure the state border of the SFRY, and that the task will be executed unconditionally. In relation to this, Kolsek wrote: “**We shall proceed according to the rules of the combat use of units. Any resistance will be broken down, and all the consequences will be borne by those who had ordered such resistance, and those who executed it**” (S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. 49).

During the attack against Slovenia, major personnel changes were made in the Fifth Military District. General Konrad Kolsek, the commander of the Fifth Military District, was dismissed, and he was replaced by General Zivota Avramovic (the then commander of the Third Military District). The command over the Fifth Corps of the Military Air Forces and Anti-Aircraft Defence was taken over by colonel Ljubomir Bajic (the then Chief of Staff of the Headquarters). Thus, the leading positions in the Northwest District were now held by members of the Serb nation, which was largest in number among the officer personnel, and the distrust against the non-Serb personnel was thus apparent (D. Marijan, the aforementioned work, p. 302; S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, pp. 70-71).

In early July, General Avramovic started all the troops available to attack the Republic of Slovenia. The land forces, armoured forces, were coming on particularly strongly towards Ljubljana from the southwest, probably the units of the Rijeka Corps headed by general Cad, and one tank echelon also pushed through which, in the morning of July 2, had come out of Jastrebarsko (S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, pp. 70-71).

⁵³ S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. 49. Although the initial armed combat began in Croatia (through the Serbo-Croat dispute and through the ‘logging revolution’) in 1990, more direct military involvement was launched by the JNA in Slovenia, in June 1991, directly after the Slovenian Declaration of Independence. In this attack, “**on the one side, there were the motorized and mechanized units of the JNA from Croatia, the units of the JNA located in Slovenia, JNA aircraft and the forces of the Ministry of Interior and the Customs from the Federation, and on**

application of the doctrine of armed nation, which had been studied by the JNA for decades, the Slovenians offered adamant resistance, having stopped JNA tanks.⁵⁴

the other side, there were the units of the Slovenian TO, the Slovenian Police Forces and the internal resistance by the Slovenians who were in JNA units” (I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, p. 69).

The first goal of the JNA towards Slovenia, according to general Radakovic, was **“to reach the line of Maribor - Cole - Vrhnika - Susana, and the second goal was to launch a parachute attack on Trojan, Ljubljana valley and the Postpone gate, which will allow the introduction of the second echelon and a parachute attack on the borders”**. In order to realize those goals, the JNA employed forces from Croatia: in the direction of Varazdin-Maribor, parts of the 32nd Varazdin Corps, in the direction of Zagreb-Novo Mesto, and Karlovac-Metljika, parts of the 10th Zagreb Corps, and in the direction of Gorski Kotar-Kocevje and Rijeka, and Ilirska Bistrica-Sezana, parts of the 13th Rijeka Corps. It also envisaged the forces of the Military Naval Sector of Pula in the direction of Kopar, the Second Echelon and the reserve (two battalions of the parachute infantry), and the aircraft forces for support to the land units and for bombing of Nanos, Krvavac, Boc, Kum, Catez, and Dravograd (TV and radio systems) – Ibid.

Mesic was not officially informed of these movements of tanks and armoured vehicles. In vain did he order the army to withdraw. Ante Markovic was also not informed about the movements of troops through Slovenia (S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. 49).

As written by general Radakovic, the JNA crossed the Croato-Slovenian border, in an effort to try and establish control over the borders towards Austria and Italy, cut off Slovenia, take the airports and establish status quo. The TO of Slovenia planned to remain at the border together with the police, blocking the roads leading to the border crossings and cities; prevent oncoming echelons; block JNA units in garrisons within Slovenia; and initiate negotiations for the JNA to leave the territory of Slovenia (I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, p. 69).

⁵⁴ Ibid., pp. 50 and 65; I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, p. 69. In Slovenia, the JNA was literally strategically surprised. The Territorial Defence Corps was defending its own country and independence. When, according to general Radakovic, the JNA **“did not succeed in the implementation of its goal, then two options appeared – negotiations and saving of the units, or extension of the conflict, thus sacrificing the units in the garrisons until reinforcement comes. In fact, what happened was a strategic paralysis in the army top when the General Staff of the JNA changed its initial goals and satisfied its aspirations with what could be preserved at the moment. It seemed that the General Staff was surprised at the resistance and manner of resistance, while it had been convinced that by closing the borders down and demonstrating a bit of military force it would be able to cover up Slovenia”** (I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, p. 69).

During the attack on Slovenia, at the borders between Serbia and Croatia, in accordance with the Instruction for Use of Armoured and Mechanized Units under Emergency Circumstances,⁵⁵ the leadership of the Greater Serbia movement stationed armoured and mechanized units of the First Military District.⁵⁶

The thus **“planned and executed operation, from the standpoint of the technique of implementation, is a major improvisation, and the failure was later justified by their refraining from the use of heavy artillery, by shortage of logistical support, and other attempts to justify their own mistakes”**, claims General Radakovic (Ibid.).

⁵⁵ D. Marijan, the aforementioned work, p. 301, note 58. The administration of the armoured and mechanized units of the SSNO on June 28, 1991, issued **the Instruction for the Use of Armoured and Mechanized Units under Emergency Circumstances**, establishing the tasks of these units under such circumstances: the securing of borders; strengthened securing of military facilities; a share in securing economic, social and other facilities of special importance; patrolling around the areas, setting up barricades and obstacles on the roads and in the streets; patrolling around the areas; demonstrating of force; extinguishing violent demonstrations, identification, breaking up and destruction of commando, banditry, terrorist and other groups; searching the terrain; blocking and destroying violent groups; putting down armed insurrections and preventing civil war (Ibid.).

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 300. The operational development of these units, according to D. Marijan, was **“undoubtedly a demonstration of force which was used to emphasize the disproportion in the quantities and types of armament to the Croatian armed forces. The strong added threat was in taking up bridges across the Danube, the last natural obstacle separating Croatia from Serbia. The commander of the 12th Corps, general major Mladen Bratic stated that in early July, they had a number of announcements by certain extremists that they would pull down the bridge and thus prevent us from executing our tasks in prevention of interethnic conflicts. Therefore, we are holding both sides of all the bridges between Vojvodina and Croatia. Taking the bridges sent a message that the Serbian tanks are no longer separated from Croatia by the Danube River as a large natural obstacle. The army bulletin *Narodna Armija* openly explained that their goal is to prevent the fratricidal war and to protect the borders of Yugoslavia, but also to get involved in the fight against the paramilitary formations that are becoming ever stronger in this territory. Two brigades were deployed at the border near Sid, the First Proletarian Guards Mechanized Brigade from Belgrade, and the 453rd Mechanized Brigade from Sremska Mitrovica. Baranja and the bridge between Bezdan and Batina were taken by the 36th Mechanized Brigade from Subotica, and the bridge with the broader area around Bogojevo, by the 51st Mechanized Brigade from Pancevo. The bridge on the Danube, between Ilok and Backa Palanka, was taken by the unit from the composition of the 12th Corps. In the city of Osijek, the 12th**

On June 27, the Federal Executive Council (SIV) proposed a three-month postponement in the implementation of the Slovenian and Croatian decisions for secession. Given that neither the blocked Presidency nor President Markovic had control over the JNA, the SIV insisted on **“immediate constitution of the Yugoslav community, and unblocking of the Presidency, so it can take over the functions of the supreme command and prevent autonomous conduct by the Army”**.⁵⁷ On the following day, a ceasefire was arranged for with the three-member European Community, providing for the withdrawal of the army into the barracks, a three-month moratorium for the decisions of Slovenia and Croatia for secession and selection of Stipe Mesic for President of the Presidency of the SFRY.⁵⁸

When the putschists understood that the JNA was defeated in Slovenia, they sought new solutions. Jovic’s group showed the signs of giving in. Markovic informed Mesic to this effect on June 29, receiving **“assurances from the most responsible people in Serbia, that they will no longer stand in the way of the inauguration of the constitutional president”**.⁵⁹

Jovic, the two Kostics and Bajramovic, after Milosevic’s discussions with the three ministers of the European Community, on June 29, wrote a joint statement about the **“cease of reasons”** due to which, on May 15, they refused to elect Stjepan Mesic.⁶⁰

Proletarian Mechanized Brigade, with a part of its forces, fortified itself in the barracks, and with the other part it took the ways leading out of the city, under the excuse that this was allegedly an exercise design” (Ibid., pp. 300-301).

⁵⁷ S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. 50.

⁵⁸ K. Rotim, the aforementioned work, p. 103. These conditions were accepted by Slobodan Milosevic, Franjo Tudjman, and Milan Kucan.

The Slovenians negotiated with the SSNO on June 28, 1991, too (Kucan and Brovet), before the arrival of the European negotiation group of three to Zagreb, and Bavcar and Jansa talked to Andrija Raseta on the technical implementation of the truce (I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, p. 74).

⁵⁹ S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, pp. 52-53.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 53. Obviously the European group of three influenced the change of the hard-line Serbian position. At the time, the EC delegation, in addition to the resolution

However, only some forty hours after these negotiations and public statements on the cease of reasons for the non-election of Mesic, Jovic once again disagreed to vote for Mesic. Upset by the new statements of the Belgrade top, on June 30, the ministers of the European Community demanded from Milosevic to instruct Jovic, without delay, to support Mesic's appointment.⁶¹

On June 30, in a closed meeting of the Council for the Protection of the Constitutional Order, speaking about the situation in Yugoslavia, and in relation to this, about **“a very big risk that Yugoslavia”** can allegedly **“become another Lebanon, and even worse than that”**, on

of the crisis at the Presidency, also sought that the army be withdrawn from the barracks, and that Slovenia and Croatia accept the proposals of the SIV for a three-month postponement of the implementation of the decision for secession (Ibid.).

Informed of the changed position of Belgrade in terms of his election, on the same day, Mesic sent the decision and communiqué to the illegal Headquarters of the Supreme Command, as follows:

“As the warfare in Slovenia is still lasting and, in relation to the decision of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command of the SFRY for the mobilization of the reserve composition of the JNA in certain parts of the country, as the constitutional President of Yugoslavia and a member of the Presidency which by the Constitution should perform the function of the supreme commander of the JNA, I hereby decide:

1. That the Headquarters of the Supreme Command of the JNA immediately suspend all military operations in Slovenia, in compliance with the general agreement between the presidents of Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia, and the president of the SIV, and the European Community delegation;

2. That all military units be withdrawn immediately into barracks throughout the country,

3. I hereby order to the Headquarters of the Supreme Command of the JNA to urgently withdraw its order for mobilization;

4. I hereby inform all the federal and republic bodies of authority, and the domestic and international public, that I was forced to make this step due to the persistent prevention on the part of the members of the Presidency of the SFRY from Serbia and Montenegro for the Presidency to be constituted in compliance with the Constitution of the SFRY” (Ibid., p. 54).

This futile order to the army to withdraw was also forwarded by Mesic to the SIV, to the presidents of the republics, to the republic governments, to the EC Council, and to the CSCE (Ibid.).

⁶¹ Ibid., pp. 54-55.

behalf of Milosevic, Jovic “**placed an underline**”, and “**thoroughly reconsidered his position**”, gave up on the “preservation” of the integrity of the SFRY. He brought up a statement about existence of a wrong assessment “**that the integrity of the country can be preserved**”. In his opinion, at the time, “**there were no longer any political conditions for us to be able to preserve the integrity of the country**”.⁶²

Starting from such positions, in this meeting, Jovic announced – the first person to do this at a meeting of an institution of the Presidency of the SFRY – “**that Slovenia should be given up on**” – **immediately proposing the decision on its exclusion from Yugoslavia**,⁶³ which

⁶² B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 344. Then Jovic, hiding the Greater Serbia intentions, cynically said, among other things, as follows: “**Simply, under the contemporary conditions of the European and global developments, it is impossible to force the nations which do not wish so, to live in a country. This is, simply, impossible. This is a fact, this is reality. Those who are pushing us into that, are pushing us into war, for the sake of their interests, claiming that we have such interests too. We do have such an interest, but not everyone has it, and those who do not have it, will not accept it!**” (Ibid.).

B. Jovic did not favour the lack of readiness in the public opinion “**for certain radical moves towards the disentanglement of the crisis through the dissolution of Yugoslavia**”, because it was “**more in favour of the radical measures to force out the survival of the country as a whole**”. However, according to him, allegedly, “**everything**” suggested “**that the best option was a peaceful departure, with the appreciation of the will of each nation**” (Ibid.).

⁶³ Ibid. About this position of his, in his memoirs, Jovic wrote: “**In my opinion, we shall best punish Slovenia if we immediately adopt the decision for its exclusion from Yugoslavia. The session of the Assembly of the SFRY needs to be convened right away; communicate through an Assembly decision that the right of the Slovenian nation to self-determination and secession is respected, that the Assembly of Yugoslavia acknowledges the decision of Slovenia to become an independent and sovereign country, to determine a new border and immediately seek the convention of an urgent session of all the republic bodies so they can confirm this decision.**

In my opinion, we need to immediately seek from the Federal Executive Council to supply the draft Law on delimitation of borders, which would follow right after this decision; to seek a moratorium for foreign debt until the borders with Slovenia are defined, to have the world public support us in going through this situation; to withdraw the JNA towards new borders, because we are not able to otherwise respect the request of the European and world public not to use force. Unfortunately, Europe is such that they do not accept the use of force only on our part. Europe

no one at the meeting itself reacted to, because, according to him, **“they were surprised”**.⁶⁴

In advocating in favour of bringing the decision for **urgent exclusion of Slovenia from Yugoslavia** (“... **Slovenia is to be fully excluded from Yugoslavia in every sense...**”), Jovic also proposed the measures to accomplish that. One of them was the **deployment of the JNA on the new borders**.⁶⁵ Within the borders of Greater Serbia, which in that variant would also include Croatia.

In the desire to paralyse the decisions of the SIV and of president Markovic personally, and to have Milosevic’s group of four at the Presidency taking decisions with force of law, Jovic also brought up the issue and manner of **the use of the Army**. In relation to this, he stated **“that any decision for the use of the Army, any decision for action of any kind should be passed in the Presidency of Yugoslavia, rather than at the Federal Executive Council”**.⁶⁶

did not with a single word say that the force is also that which is being done by the Slovenians, which practically means that Europe supports the secession, too.

We immediately need to exercise the monetary, financial, foreign currency and every other partition, which will completely secede Slovenia from Yugoslavia, and in every respect introduce convertible payments between Slovenia and other parts of the country.

We need to demand from the world not to recognize Slovenia until the complete border is defined based on the laws of Yugoslavia.

In my opinion, without a radical approach to the solution of the Slovenian problem, we are going to enter an endless war. We are entering a war that has no sense at all, and which ultimately we cannot win. We do not have the need or the interest to wage that war” (Ibid., pp. 344-345).

⁶⁴ Ibid. The military, and Jovic **“knew this”** very well, **“does not agree with this. Neither does Croatia agree, because it does not wish to stay alone in the conflict with Yugoslavia. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia are against it, because they apprehend the domination on the part of Serbia and Montenegro in the Presidency, as in that case, out of the seven members of the Presidency they would have four, that is, the majority”** (Ibid.).

⁶⁵ Ibid., pp. 344.345.

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 345. He substantiated such a position by stating that the SIV is not competent for that, and the **“Presidency exists and has existed, regardless of whether it has a president or not”**.

The three ministers of the European Community, on June 30, and July 1, 1991, supervised the constitution of the Presidency of the SFRY and directed its work. After negotiations, assurances and convictions, three decisions were brought: **the truce, the three-month moratorium, the implementation of the Declaration of Independence of Slovenia and Croatia, and (symbolically) establishment of the constitutional order, by electing the president (Mesic) and Vice President (Dr. Branko Kostic) of the Presidency.**⁶⁷ However, the leadership of the

Admiral Branko Mamula also stated that, on the basis of its constitutional powers, the Federal Executive Council could not resolve the problem of the state border, and the JNA could and had to do it. However, according to Mamula, Kadijevic was not ready to take on the responsibility. **An independent and decisive action in Slovenia** called for the resolution of all the other open capital problems of the county in the same way, as well as for equal treatment of each of them. In **June 1991**, according to Mamula, he was far away from that. On the other hand, **“we could not sit with out hands clasped and look at the country being broken up and the borders being changed”**. According to him, the only alternative left was the joint action of the SIV and the JNA. This sole option **“had all the preconditions for success and would be acceptable as a legal one”**. In relation to this, Mamula wrote that Kadijevic had accepted his assurances **“that the risk is lowest if they act jointly in Slovenia”**. In the presence of Mamula, he telephoned Markovic and arranged for a meeting. Mamula commented upon this in the following manner: **“It seemed to me that Kadijevic was also personally relieved through our discussion – he was no longer alone”** (B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, p. 117).

⁶⁷ S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, pp. 58-65; B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 347. On June 30, **“after unseen pressures by foreign factors and domestic opposition”**, Stjepan Mesic was elected President of the Presidency of the SFRY, when, according to Jovic, the **“political torture”** ended, which they had allegedly been undergoing from May 15 until June 30, 1991 (for more details on this, cf. B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 346-347).

Before the election of President Mesic, on June 30, Jovic talked to Slobodan Milosevic, after the discussion of the representatives of the European Community with him (that is, Milosevic), at the Palace of the Federation, and before the meeting of the members of the Presidency with the EC ministerial group of three, which, according to Jovic, had come to **“make pressure to have Mesic elected president at any price”**.

According to Jovic, after that conversation, Milosevic was **“all broken”**, because the EC delegates **“proceeded with such persistence and non-appreciation of any of his arguments, as well as with accusations and threats against Serbia, that there is a question as to whether it is worth to enter such disputes because of Mesic, because another representative of Croatia would probably be the same as him, maybe even**

Greater Serbia movement, particularly General Kadijevic and his closest associates, continued ignoring Mesic's orders to the army, and prevented his influence over the armed forces. They also obstructed Mesic from any participation in the work of the Presidency, preventing him, among other things, from safely travelling to the sessions of this highest state body.⁶⁸

In the late evening of July 1, 1991, after the JNA failure in Slovenia, admiral Mamula **illegally**, but invited by General Kadijevic, arrived to the Ministry of Defence. Kadijevic, **“visibly upset, very tired, broken under the burden of what had happened in Slovenia, was quite incoherently”** presenting the course of the operation and **“its unfortunate end”**.

worse”. Therefore, Milosevic **“had to give in and agree”**, and he recommended to Jovic to torture them as long as he can, and then to accept (Ibid.).

The outcome of Milosevic's discussion with the EC representatives was immediately conveyed by Jovic to the members of the Presidency from Serbia and Montenegro (Jugoslav Kostic, Sejdo Bajramovic, and Branko Kostic).

In the meeting of the Presidency of the SFRY with the EC members, where, under external pressures, a discussion was held about the presidential election, Mesic was finally elected (Ibid). On July 1, chairing the session of the Presidency held on June 30 and July 1, Tupurkovski inaugurated Stipe Mesic as the President, and Dr. Branko Kostic as the Vice President of the Presidency of the SFRY, whereas the Presidency (with Mesic as president) was symbolically renovated (S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, pp. 58-65; B. Mamula, **UZROCI I POSLJEDICE RATOVA U JUGOSLAVIJI 1991.-2001.** -hereinafter referred to as: **UZROCI I POSLJEDICE RATOVA ...-**, in: **RATOVI U JUGOSLAVIJI 1991.-1999.**, Compilation of the Communiqués and Discussions from the Round Table, Belgrade, November 7-9, 2001, Belgrade 2002, p. 213).

⁶⁸ **ICTY**, Case: No. IT-02-T, paragraph 94. Mesic could not exert any personal influence as the President of the Presidency. Through public media, he issued orders to the army, which were ignored by the military leadership (Headquarters of the Supreme Command), **“treating them as if they did not exist”**. These orders to the army issued by Mesic, according to Kadijevic, **“were not actually orders at all”**. The Federal Secretary states that, in the Presidency, Mesic **“could not bring any decision as he wished, because at the time the proportion of power was four to four. From such a proportion of powers, the Presidency, unfortunately, could not take any decisions that were proposed by the Headquarters of the Supreme Command”**, which, according to Kadijevic, **“were in favour of the defence of Yugoslavia”** (V. Kadijevic, the aforementioned work, pp. 37-38).

He used harsh words to insist on the fault of General Adzic, due to poor organization and directing over the operation.⁶⁹ Mamula proposed him **that the JNA should come out onto the state borders in Slovenia and preserve the integrity of the SFRY.**⁷⁰ Kadijevic agreed with this, he organized a meeting to which he invited General Adzic and the appropriate leadership of the General Staff and the Ministry.⁷¹ The

⁶⁹ B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, p. 210. Kadijevic was accusing Adzic **“for having gotten directly involved in details, instead of setting a clear goal for the operation and assigning general Kolsek, commander of the Zagreb Military District, to influence the size and selection of forces, monitor the course and intervene when problems arose. Kadijevic had from before been concerned with the potential conduct of general Kolsek, a Slovene by ethnicity, if a crisis in Slovenia occurs. Now, certain huge things happened, asking for responsibility, and Kadijevic was not clear how much guilt in it was in the confused conduct of Adzic, as he said, and how much was in the conduct of Kolsek, if mistakes or bad faith were in question. He had already been clear about the responsibility of the commander of the Ljubljana and Maribor Corps, generals Popovic and Delic, because they had seriously violated and erred within the framework of their responsibilities, regardless of the poor performance on the part of the Command of the Zagreb District and the General Staff. General Cad, also a Slovenian, the commander of the Rijeka Corps, did his part of the task successfully, handling the southern sections of the Yugoslav-Italian border. He was decisive in work, and he did not wait for Kolsek or Adzic to give out orders to defend him when attacked, or to patrol in front of him, and remove the obstacles imposed ahead of him. Following this, Kadijevic started talking about Adzic’s and his own responsibility. He believed that the least they have to do is resign, although it would be honourable to commit suicide and save the dignity of the Army, he said. He blamed me for Ante Markovic. ‘The son of a gun acted as usual – washing his hands off of everything, he did not know that the Army was going to use force in executing its tasks (!), he should not have been involved at all’, Kadijevic was grumbling”** (Ibid.).

⁷⁰ Ibid. In relation to this, Mamula stated that it was out of question that personnel changes must be completed, that an overall analysis of the failure in Slovenia must be conducted, but nevertheless, the main task remains: going out onto the borders and preserving the integrity of the country. The time was running by and the JNA failure was quickly turning into a fait accompli. Yugoslavia was disappearing, and the direct responsibility for that was now on the Army, not on the leaderships of Slovenia or the Federation any longer” (Ibid.).

⁷¹ Ibid. **“Waiting for their arrival”**, wrote Mamula, **“we were sketching the contents for the meeting: the assessment of past events in Slovenia, and the conclusions**

meeting, which started somewhere “**after midnight**”, and which was opened and chaired by General Kadijevec, was attended by admirals Mamula and Brovet, and generals: Adzic, Negovanovic, Vasiljevic (Chief of Staff of the KOS, the Counter-espionage Service of Yugoslavia) and Vuletic (Chief of Staff of the Cabinet of the Minister). The discussion ran until “**the early morning**”. There was no dilemma that the JNA must disarm the TO of Slovenia and repossess the borders.⁷² However, a number of the attendees advocated the position that, nevertheless, after that (i.e. from 3 to 6 months) the JNA can withdraw from Slovenia and let the federal institutions (Presidency, Assembly, Government) resolve the situation. Mamula did not agree with these positions, because the answer to the basic question was not provided – about the destiny of Yugoslavia. He insisted on the need to undertake a mass military operation, to break up and disarm the TO, to break through onto the borders, and

towards the establishment of a more comprehensive operation in Slovenia – breaking down the resistance of the TO, coming out onto the borders and preventing the Slovenian leadership to execute a forced secession. We agreed that General Kolsek should be replaced by General Zivota Avramovic, commander of the Army District in Skopje. General Kolsek could no longer stay on the post of the commander and face new challenges. We knew Avramovic was a capable officer who had spent several years on the post of the commander in Varazdin and had been successful ever since, and in the early eighties, after an examination I had personally attended, he was produced into a general. He had the knowledge of combat territory, was respected among the military officers and reputable in the Croatian society. We expected a lot from him in the critical moments, which the forces in Slovenia and Croatia were going through, before the eyes of the domestic and world public.

It will turn out, unfortunately, that he was below the requirements of the difficult situation in the summer and fall of 1991 on this part of Yugoslav territory” (Ibid., pp. 210-211).

⁷² Ibid., pp. 210-215. Among other things, Admiral Mamula presented the position that **the operation should immediately be renewed and the task completed – to break through onto the borders of the SFRY in Slovenia**. Among other things, General Adzic pointed out “**that we do not have sufficient forces available for a new, comprehensive operation**”, and he saw no reason “**why we would need it**”. Instead, he suggested “**that the forces in Slovenia need to be strengthened, strongly supported by aircraft forces and continue the activity**”. Vuk Obradovic saw no reason “**why the JNA would fight in Slovenia and force it to remain in Yugoslavia**”, and, among other things, he insisted “**that the JNA should withdraw to the Serb borders in Croatia and defend those instead**” (Ibid., pp. 210-215).

put the leadership of Slovenia up for responsibility due to the armed insurrection and attacks against the JNA. At the same time, he also pointed out the significance of the movement of the JNA units, because, according to him, **“the JNA success in Slovenia”**, of which he was assured, would turn over the whole situation in the country and allow the JNA to reach the ultimate goal: **take over the power and allegedly stop the destruction of Yugoslavia.**⁷³

Kadijevic agreed to undertake a comprehensive military operation of repossession of the borders of the SFRY, and in accordance with this, a start of the preparations was agreed upon, and a four-day time frame was determined for achieving combat preparedness. To this aim, he asked Mamula to take on the activities of planning with General Adzic.⁷⁴

The plan of operations in Slovenia, with the established goals and ideas, forces, manner of their directing and engagement, and all the factors, was made at the General Staff, without knowledge or consultations with Milosevic. At the same time, Admiral Mamula also tried to develop **“the general idea for operations in Croatia, aware that right after the completion of the operation in Slovenia (and maybe even simultaneously), the JNA would have to face the**

⁷³ Ibid., pp. 216, and 222. At this, Mamula was against informing the Presidency about the preparations for the operation in Slovenia **“until the main tasks are completed, and then to put it before a fait accompli and move ahead. We had to be ready in case the preparations are revealed, if the JNA is attacked or there are attempts to stop it”**. He believed **“that the broken Presidency does not have the power to stop us, and Milosevic would not dare proceed in public through the Army. ‘Even if this happened, we had to be ready to remove them quickly and prevent them from obstructing or openly confronting us. The mass media in that case would be placed under the control of the JNA. The General Staff had a plan prepared for such contingency”** (Ibid., pp. 216-217).

⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 217. Admiral Mamula and General Adzic started right away and into the operational room of the General Staff (in early morning of July 2, 1991). Mamula presented the goal and his idea of the operation, **“and then we talked about the forces, the manner of their management and deployment, on the aircraft force support, on the intelligence and security measures, on the tasks of the special forces, and other relevant factors of the operation. It did not exceed the frameworks of the operation in Slovenia. All the rest pertained to the Minister of Defence, General Kadijevic and his role in the disentanglement of the crisis: how, how many and who of the associates and subjects to inform and what tasks to assign them with”** (Ibid.).

resolution of the military and political situation in Croatia”.⁷⁵ However, General Kadijevic, “**unprepared to opt for an independent path of the Army in the resolution of the Yugoslav crisis**”, postponed the operation in Slovenia.⁷⁶ He slipped aside once again – maybe because

⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 220. In relation to this, he came to the following conclusions:

“1. A strong grouping of the JNA after the operation in Slovenia, in order to isolate Croatia from the West;

2. Use of forces brought to the regions of Kordun, Banija, and Bosanska [Bosnian; note by the translator] Krajina, from the line of Karlovac-Sisak-Novska-Nova Gradiska, to approach the release of the garrisons in central Croatia, with Zagreb as the main target, and to break out onto the Drava river, and the border with Hungary in order to prevent the arrival of armament and assistance to the ZNG [Zbor Narodne Garde, Assembly of the People’s Guard, Croatian armed formation; note by the translator] and potential withdrawal of forces across the river;

For each separate area of Croatia, there were forces strong enough to accomplish the general goal: The Military Naval District with the Knin Corps, the forces from Mostar, and as needed, the Corps from Titograd, were able to break the resistance of the ZNG and other paramilitary armies of the HDZ in Dalmatia, and place Western Herzegovina under control; in eastern Slavonia and Baranja, the Tuzla and Novi Sad Corps were able to resolve any organized resistance in this area: in Istria and the area of Rijeka, the situation was boiling and could easily be placed under control using the forces of the Rijeka Corps, mobilized forces in Lika and Gorski Kotar, and the military naval and aircraft forces from Pula;

4. The forces in Bosnia should be strengthened and regrouped after the separation of the military compositions for the operations in Slovenia and Croatia. The Guard Corps in Belgrade (or in the corresponding regions in Srem), the Kragujevac and Uzice Corps were a reserve sufficient to make an intervention as needed. The compositions in Macedonia or Kosovo should not be weakened;

5. The strategic grouping that would derive from such a general concept would also meet the needs of defence from any outside intervention.

The Headquarters of the Supreme Command should go out of Belgrade, to one of the command places in Bosnia. The buildings of the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff in Belgrade downtown no longer provided conditions for safe work, there were not even minimal security conditions” (Ibid.).

⁷⁶ Ibid. According to Mamula, General Kadijevic “**brought himself into a most difficult situation possible. Unprepared to opt for the independent path of the Army in disentangling the Yugoslav crisis, all the time and even right now – in decisive moments, he has been moving along two tracks: trying to cover himself with one – the legitimistic one, and in a given situation, when he assesses that this**

of cowardice or, more probably, because he did not dare go ahead with Mamula, against Milosevic and Jovic.

On July 2, 1991, (at 18:00) movements of the JNA were stopped in all parts of Slovenia. Under pressure by the TO of Slovenia, the SIV and, after July 1, the Presidency of the SFRY, the Army ceased the movement of the troops. The JNA was stopped and blocked in Slovenia with the strength of the unified people. That evening, General Adzic made a public television announcement of a putsch to the “peoples of Yugoslavia”, threatening that the army **“will push things to the very end”**.⁷⁷

On that evening, General Kadijevic did not join the putschists group of the Greater Serbia generals, headed by Adzic, in taking over the power. He accepted the demand that the army, together with the Slovenian armed units, withdraw into barracks. Two days later (on July 4), he spoke using peacetime terminology, ready to accept the Presidency as the Command.⁷⁸

Five days after the election of Mesic as President of the Presidency of the SFRY (July 5, 1991), Milosevic and Jovic arranged a meeting with Kadijevic, which they **deemed to be a decisive one**, due to the allegedly **“almost tragic”** situation in the country, particularly because the army had been **defeated and routed**⁷⁹ in Slovenia. They placed some

is possible and realistic, he would switch to the other one – independent army one, for which he had a prepared plan. General Kadijevic did not take a decision this time, either” (Ibid.).

⁷⁷ S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, pp. 72-73.

⁷⁸ Ibid. pp. 73-80,.

⁷⁹ B. Jovic, p. 349. According to Jovic’s assessment, the situation in Yugoslavia was then **“almost a tragic one. The JNA had been defeated and routed in Slovenia. The moral of the army had hit the bottom. The Serb people were losing trust into the JNA. The opposition sought the formation of a Serb army. It was clear to everybody that the war was not be avoided, and that the JNA had almost fallen apart. The Serbian revival movement directly propagated that reservists don’t respond to calls for service, that they desert the army. Treason is in place! Soldiers’ mothers are demonstrating – they are demanding that ‘the kids be returned from the army’. The Serbian nation is completely confused and largely joining the opposition. Our resignations are being demanded...”** (Ibid.).

categorical demands on the army, requesting from Kadijevic as follows:

“1. The Slovenes need to be fiercely counterattacked using all means available, including aircraft forces”,⁸⁰ and “then, they [i.e. the forces] are to withdraw from Slovenia”;⁸¹

“2. The main JNA forces need to be concentrated on the line: Karlovac-Plitvice to the West, Baranja-Osijek-Vinkovci-Sava to the East, and Neretva to the South”. In this way, they needed to **“cover all the territories populated by Serbs until the full disentanglement, that is, until the final free determination of the peoples in the referenda”**, and,

“3. Fully eliminate the Croats and Slovenes from the army”⁸²

Milosevic and Jovic demanded immediate action in Slovenia, because otherwise they were losing ground in Serbia, **“and then the army would also fall apart”⁸³**

“Without any discussion”, Kadijevic accepted everything that Milosevic told him, including the **“categorical”** demands for the army, and he thought that this would require 6-10 days. However, Milosevic and Jovic did not agree with this – they **demand action in 2 or 3 days**, because, according to them, **“after that, Slovenia and Croatia would be recognized by Austria and Germany, and then their military intervention would also be possible”**. Kadijevic accepted this.⁸⁴

At this meeting, in addition to the aforementioned, it was agreed that General Kadijevic should supply the Presidency of the SFRY with two options: **“either to force the Slovenians to execute the decisions**

⁸⁰ Ibid. In this way **“the Slovenians should absolutely not be allowed to harass the JNA again”**.

⁸¹ Ibid. They will bring **“a timely decision”** for the withdrawal from Slovenia. Counterattacking the Slovenians **“fiercely, with all means, including the air forces”** was meant to **“raise the moral of the army, deter Croatia and pacify the Serb people”**.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

of the Presidency taken yesterday [that is, of July 4; note by the author] for the surrender of the borders to the JNA, and respect of federal laws; or that the Presidency orders the JNA to leave Slovenia”. In this, they assessed that in both cases the Slovenians would cause conflict, since without fight they would not let us **“pull out the heavy weapons”**. And they were not supposed to be spared in the conflict.⁸⁵

The military leadership was more prone to threats and threatening manoeuvres than to democratic dialogue. In the speech to the newly appointed “tested” commanders, on July 5, 1991, General Adzic underlined: **“The units you are going to command need to complete the assignment to the end, and also die to the end, if needed”**. The Commander of the Fifth Air Force Corps, Ljubomir Bajic, **“threatened, unless the Slovenians knelt down, that he would carry out the already prepared order for attack against the Slovenian TO forces, until they are eradicated”**.⁸⁶

The Council of Ministers of the European Community, at a session in The Hague on July 5, 1991, adopted **the position that it shall by no means accept the policy of force**, which was also the assessment of

⁸⁵ Ibid. At the time, General Kadijevic asked Milosevic and Jovic **to encourage the mobilized “who do not wish to respond or have responded, but have been demobilized”, to mobilize the Territorial Defence Corps and to assist in the organization of a rally “for Yugoslavia” in Sarajevo**, in order to help France, which according to Kadijevic, **“is fighting for the survival of our country (!) and which wishes to oppose the Germans who want it to fall apart”**. Jovic then said to Kadijevic **“that we should be realistic, not lie both ourselves and the French. There is no more Yugoslavia within its previous borders. If they care about preventing the war on the Balkans, then we need to explain to them about the Serb issue, rather than the issue of preservation of this Yugoslavia. We are the ones that have to do this. If they understand the Serb issue, and if they appreciate equally with the others in Europe, the war will be avoided. This rally in Sarajevo would be bad and a failure. I tell him that he should have in mind that Germans are more important to the French than the Serbs are, let us have no illusions.**

As for the political work on mobilization, the action of the Army in Slovenia is the response to that, rather than to some political speeches of ours that could even have had a negative effect” (Ibid.).

⁸⁶ S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. 100. Obviously the army, as claimed by Mesic, **“classified itself more and more evidently alongside that policy, that strategic option, as embodied in the Serb leadership”** (Ibid., 104).

the Crisis Committee of the **CSCE**.⁸⁷ Immediately after The Hague session, the ministerial group of three came to visit Yugoslavia formally again, upon invitation by the Federal Government, where (under pressure of the European Community), at the meeting in Brioni on July 7, after the discussion with the representatives of the republics and the SIV, and the plenary meeting, chaired by President Mesic, and attended by Dr. Kostic, Bogicevic, Tupurkovski and Drnovsek from the Presidency of the SFRY; Markovic, Loncar, Brovet, and Gracanin from the SIV; and Kucan, Rupel, Bucar and Peterle, followed by Tudjman and the others, at which **the agreement was reached for peaceful resolution of the Yugoslav crisis**.⁸⁸ On July 10, “**deeply concerned with the violence in Slovenia and other parts of Yugoslavia**”, the European Parliament, among other things, condemned “**the use of force in Slovenia by the federal army**” and “**further interference by the Yugoslav federal army into the political crisis**”, insisting “**that the Yugoslav Army immediately return its units back into the barracks**”.⁸⁹

Right after the “**order**” from the leadership of the Greater Serbia movement (on July 5), when Milosevic and Jovic, among other things,

⁸⁷ Ibid., pp. 85-86.

⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 86-92; I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, p. 71. In this way, according to Mesic, the Yugoslav crisis was institutionalised and internationalised, whereby the European community “**was the most present factor in resolution of the Yugoslav crisis**”.

On July 7, 1991, in Brioni, in the presence of the European group of three, the Presidency of the SFRY adopted **the Brioni Declaration**, accepting the right of the SFRY to establish control over its state border, agreeing upon a ceasefire (that “all parties” refrain “**from unilateral actions, particularly from the use of violence**”) and the decision of Slovenia for secession from the SFRY being postponed by three months (B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, p. 179; V. Kadijevic, the aforementioned work, p. 118; K. Rotim, the aforementioned work, pp. 116-118; B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 350-359).

⁸⁹ S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, pp. 95-96. The resolution of the European Parliament, among other things, included the assessment “that the constituent and autonomous provinces of Yugoslavia shall have the right to decide on their own future, in a peaceful and democratic manner, with an understanding that each republic has the absolute responsibility to use exclusively peaceful and democratic means in exercising the changes of the constitutional order...” (Ibid.)

determined the Neretva river as the Serb border to the South and assigned Kadijevic the task of appropriate deployment of the main JNA forces, in order to cover all the territories **“where Serbs live”**, which was accepted by the General **“without any discussion”**⁹⁰. General Kadijevic tried to ensure or clarify whether he was going to have support from the USSR, that is, of the conspiracy group. He contacted Marshall Yazov. About this contact, on July 9, Kadijevic informed Jovic that **“a few days ago”**, in a telephonic conversation, he had posed two questions: **“whether the USSR can protect us if the West launches a military intervention and whether they want to sell us certain weapons that we do not have in sufficient quantities (particularly bombs and kerosene)”**. The answer to both questions was no.⁹¹

⁹⁰ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 349; B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, p. 232. On that day, the JNA was amassing units **“at the Croatian borders”**. Instead of withdrawing into barracks, the army in Croatia **“was amassing in the crisis zones: the units until now stationed in the other republics, filled in with mobilized reservists from Serbia, are being sent day and night to Croatia, [to fight] against Croatia”**. Starting from this, on July 5, the Croatian Government sent a request consisting of five items to the Presidency of the SFRY:

“firstly, immediate withdrawal into the barracks of all the JA [‘Yugoslav Army’; note by the translator] units on the territory of the Republic of Croatia;

Secondly, reduction of the number of the JA units in the Republic of Croatia;

Thirdly, reporting to the civilian authorities of any movement of units outside the barracks, on which occasion their movement would be escorted;

Fourthly, withdrawal of the JA units from the eastern borders of the Republic of Croatia;

Fifthly, cessation of discrimination and harassment of the non-Serb officers and soldiers, and civilians in the JA” (S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, pp. 83-84.

President Mesic talked to General Kadijevic to this effect a number of times, and General Kadijevic responded: **“that interethnic confrontations on the territory of Croatia were dramatically on the rise, at which he did not take into account that Belgrade is instigating the Serbs in Croatia at a galloping pace to civic disobedience and terrorist revolt, that from Serbia (and Bosnia) armed Chetnik groups are ‘jumping’ into Croatia ...”** (Ibid., p. 84).

⁹¹ Ibid., p. 360. About this, Jovic wrote as follows: **“...More precisely, they could not protect us, and as for the weapons, it could only go through regular channels, via the Government of the SFRY (and we are seeking beyond the Government, because Ante Markovic is obstructing the Government in taking the decision).**

During the day, there were **“a number”** of consultations with General Kadijevic **“about the situation in Slovenia and the action that is to be undertaken”**.⁹² Assessing that the General is **“completely disoriented”**, Jovic and Milosevic concluded that they (**“we”**) have to **“dictate the orientation and direction of the action”**.⁹³

The next day, General Kadijevic informed Jovic about the discussion between Stjepan Mesic and Vuk Draskovic, who, according to him, had **“established common political goals to fight for: the destruction of**

Veljko warned him that the Germans are also threatening them through us, and asked him to convey this to Gorbachev.

Yazov called today and said that Gorbachev had accepted the warning on the common danger, that he has talked to Kohl, Bush, Andreotti, Mitterrand and ‘the English guy’, warning that he will not peacefully look upon the division of Yugoslavia, particularly if it involved an outside interference. He will help us diplomatically, but they cannot guarantee anything, nor can they react with eventual reprisals. They will not give the weapons through any secret channels, regardless of the fact that others may have armed themselves in such a way (And through our government, it would not be possible).

So this is how the Russians are thinking (or what they can do)...” – (Ibid.).

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Ibid. In presenting the assessment that the General is **“completely disoriented”**, Jovic states that Kadijevic **“makes terrible evolutions in only a single day: from saying that decisive action must be made in order to retrieve the moral of the Army, to that all of his generals think that any peaceful way is better, that they accept war by no means and that even ‘the devil himself’, let alone the European Mission, should pacify the situation. Just a few hours before that, he told me that a European (military) Mission does not come into question”** (Ibid.).

This assessment about General Kadijevic and the position of his generals was commented by Admiral Mamula in the following way:

“I do not know what General Kadijevic might have said to Mr. Jovic, but I am fully aware that, except in some rare cases, the mood of his generals was quite opposite. They had been expecting and demanding operations in Slovenia. They were fully aware that a different decision would mean the end of the JNA, and of Yugoslavia.

Rejected by the army officers, ridiculed and humiliated at the Presidency and among the republic leaders, General Kadijevic had no more conditions to command the Army, and it was speedily moving towards its dissolution – the formation of national armies and civil war” (B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, p. 223).

the JNA and the leadership of Serbia” (“propaganda against the JNA, its break-up and eradication”).⁹⁴ Assessing that this is “a sacrifice of the interests of the Serb people in Croatia and outside Serbia in general”, and that this is “the price of the agreement with Mesic; that the consequences can already be felt, because in Belgrade itself, in the units of the First Military District, soldiers are rejecting command en masse, saying that they will not listen to the command of those who had on March 9 prevented the overthrow of the Serbian government”, Kadijevic appealed “that we immediately provide a public political reaction”.⁹⁵

Before the session of the Presidency of the SFRY on July 11, 1991, in agreement with Milosevic, Jovic and Branko Kostic, communicating **“the assessment of the situation related to the conflict in Slovenia and the proposed positions”**,⁹⁶ Kadijevic brought up new proposals of the army on **the defence of the future Yugoslavia**. He proposed two options:

⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 360-361. In this way, **“the Serb population in Croatia will remain unprotected. The Croats will harass it individually and cause the Serb reaction, i.e. intervention. Croatia will then declare the Serbs as aggressors and invite foreign troops, with which the legal Serb power will be overthrown”**. In this, Vuk Draskovic, according to General Kadijevic, **“is also supported by Dragoljub Micunovic of the Democratic Party”** – Ibid., p. 361.

⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 361.

⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 364. Assessing the situation in relation to the conflict in Slovenia and the proposed positions, Kadijevic stated: **“The international factor: the USSR can only help us politically, through international institutions. This is the position of Gorbachev; however, it is the assessment of the Chief of Staff of the General Staff of the Soviet Army that the plan for the dissolution of Yugoslavia was made by the CIA, with the assistance of West Germany a long time ago, with the intention to transfer the experience in its implementation on the dissolution of the USSR afterwards. However, the official policy of the USSR, although it probably knows this, cannot do more than provide verbal support.**

France has understood the German game of dissolution of our country, but it also has a prevailing interest of overthrowing the communists, so it seeks from the JNA to refrain and be patient.

The EC action is a combined interest of the FRG and France, but their real goal is to make the turnover in shorter than 3 months.

“The first option for the defence of the future Yugoslavia [would include] Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbs outside Serbia, and possibly Macedonia.

The second option: Serbia, Montenegro, the Serb people in Yugoslavia, and bits of land here and there”.⁹⁷

Kadijevic even proposed measures for implementation of the aforementioned options, that is, for the formation and defence of the future Greater Serbia: **“The army must regroup quickly”**, and this was already being worked on by the military leadership, **“but with great difficulties”**.⁹⁸

Given that the Serbo-Montenegrin block in the Presidency of the SFRY was aware that the proposal formulated by the leadership of the Greater Serbia movement can not receive the required “fifth vote” at

The foreign factor is, in general, not on our side.

Internal situation: Slovenia is already outside Yugoslavia. Croatia as well, virtually. In BiH, there is a prevailing coalition against the Serbs, and in Serbia, the collaboration of the opposition is growing stronger with Croatia and FR Germany in order to gain power; Macedonia is dominated by the anti-Serb mood; the policy towards the JNA in Montenegro is unstable.

The JNA cannot stay united. Slovenians and Croats at the top of the army, who are in favour of Yugoslavia can be counted using the finger of a sole hand. Unless we make some major moves within 10 days, the dissolution of the JNA is imminent.

The idea: In relation to the foreign factor, rely on the French-Soviet line and the paralysis of the FRG” (Ibid.).

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Ibid. At the time, Kadijevic stated that tomorrow, that is, on July 12, at the session of the Presidency he would propose **“two decisions (options) :**

Firstly, consistent implementation of the Declaration (Concluded with the EC representatives for the actions of Slovenia and Croatia in relation to the disputes arising from their laws, decisions and actions – note by B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 364) (with the use of force against whoever sabotages), which will probably not be accepted by the Presidency.

Secondly, that the army withdraw from Slovenia according to all military rules.

If nothing of the above is adopted, then the dissolution of the Presidency of the SFRY would happen” (Ibid., pp. 364-365).

the Presidency, Milosevic, Jovic, and Kostic opted for a new solution – **“that the army needs to be withdrawn from Slovenia immediately and deployed along the borders of the future Yugoslavia, and urgently dismiss all the Slovenians and Croats from senior military ranks”**.⁹⁹ If the army’s withdrawal from Slovenia is prevented, there was need to **“impose some fierce ultimatums to Slovenia or severely attack it”**, and, **“also, immediately strengthen the Eastern Slavonia front line, attack their police forces and not allow them to molest Serb settlements”**.¹⁰⁰

Kadijevic, **“being very concerned”**, accepted all the aforementioned proposals, however, it was obvious that **“he was not the one pulling the strings”**,¹⁰¹ because he had definitely sided up with Milosevic, as the strongest one.

At the session of the Presidency of the SFRY on July 12, 1991, Jovic and Dr. Kostic, just like the military leadership, claimed that, unless they receive green light for Kadijevic’s proposals, **“the war in Croatia would be imminent”**.¹⁰²

⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 365; S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. 105. They substantiated the urgent dismissal **“of all the Slovenians and Croats from the senior military positions”** with the fact that **“now they have their own states and their own armies which are in conflict with ours”** (B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 365).

According to this proposal, all of the army was to be withdrawn from Slovenia (dislocate the units), concentrated in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, while instigating the Serbs in these republics to riot, sending them **“Serb volunteers”** along with the Army. Slovenia was not interesting for them – **“let it go!”** (S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. 105).

¹⁰⁰ Ibid. Milosevic, Jovic, and Kostic believed that all of this would **“retrieve the reputation of the army”**, and **“if this fails, chances to save it would be small”**.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. 105. This plan – **“the Serb scenario”** was first revealed by Dr. Kostic and Dr. Jovic at this session of the Presidency of the SFRY, when they stated that they do not want a war with Slovenia, but that they do not want Slovenia in Yugoslavia either, demanding that the JNA immediately leave this **“Germanophile people, befuddled with militarism and indoctrinated with anti-Yugoslavism”**. Kostic was advocating in favour of **“the withdrawal of the JNA out of Slovenia and the delimitation of new state borders, while accepting the secession of Slovenia as a fait accompli”**. According to Jovic, it would be **“smart”** for the JNA

Having understood that this was a scenario to push Slovenia out of Yugoslavia as soon as possible, and to divide Croatia, Mesic insisted on the army's withdrawal into the barracks ("**the Army must go into the barracks**"), that the mobilization be stopped and the illegal paramilitary organizations be disarmed.¹⁰³ Jovic claimed that if the Army "**in Croatia withdrew into the barracks**", "**blood would run deep**".¹⁰⁴

At this session of the Presidency of the SFRY, Kadijevic demanded the "**disarmament of paramilitary organizations, sending recruits to the Army, consistent adherence to the Brioni Declaration** (i.e. that the Slovenians surrender the border to the JNA and that everything further be resolved amicably) **and authorizing the army to achieve that**".¹⁰⁵

units to "**be deployed outside the territory of Slovenia...**", because "**what has the Army got to do in Slovenia, when it is not desired there!**" (Ibid., pp. 105-106).

Kostic's proposal for dislocation of the units out of Slovenia was an integral part of the overall strategy, "**a part of the strategy for deployment of the armed forces for a definite period, in order to ensure full safety for the JNA members at new locations and to get rid of the Slovenian people, who live in a complete information isolation and blockade, to offer assurances to both them and the international public that there is no desire to use the JNA units to resolve the problem of territorial integrity, not even to retain Slovenia within the composition of Yugoslavia...**" (Ibid., p. 106).

When Mesic objected against Jovic by saying – "**shall we put the Army up into Croatia**", Dr. Kostic diplomatically answered that he did not say so, and continued by saying: "**let them come over to Montenegro, we shall be all so glad to have them**".

Kostic insisted again on voting to enforce his proposal on the withdrawal of the JNA from Slovenia ("**the JNA must withdraw from Slovenia**") – Ibid., p. 108.

Kadijevic "**acknowledged**" their proposals (i.e. of the military top and of the Serb members of the Presidency) for withdrawal from Slovenia, but "**as an extorted measure...**". Together with Admiral Brovet and Ensign Bajramovic, he was somewhat reserved about leaving Slovenia, or, according to Mesic, "**they were at least leaving such an impression**" (Ibid., pp. 108 and 122).

¹⁰³ Ibid., p. 109.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 109-117. Milosevic's group and the military leadership, as stated by Mesic, sought freedom of action for the JNA (Ibid.).

¹⁰⁵ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 365. According to Jovic, Kadijevic was "**virtually seeking the First Option**" for the defence of the future Yugoslavia ("**Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Serbs outside Serbia, and possibly Macedonia as well**") and a ten-day break.

However, his last demand was not accepted by the Presidency, following which, after a break, he proposed to reformulate this demand, so that **“the Presidency guarantees the implementation of these conclusions!”**¹⁰⁶ which was adopted.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁶ Ibid. In relation to this, Jovic stated that Kadijevec did not explain how the Presidency is supposed to guarantee the execution of those conclusions. According to Jovic, this was **“a purely vacuous slogan”**.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid. The Presidency adopted Kadijevec’s modified proposal, but, according to Jovic, **“the chances were small. A waste of time!”**.

The session of the Presidency of the SFRY of July 12, 1991, according to Mesic, voted in favour of enforcement of **“the somewhat modified proposal of Kadijevec’s decision”**, which was to ensure military autonomy, protected by the authority of all the members of the Presidency (having the right to govern the country). The decision, according to Mesic, comprised, among other things, the **“demobilization of all armed formations on the territory of the SFRY, except for the JNA and the regular peace time composition of he police forces”** and **JNA’s filling in with recruits, “in compliance with the federal Law on obligatory service, and other regulations and enactments enacted for its execution...”** (S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. 116). In relation to this, the time frame of the demobilization was determined (**“by July 18, 1991, until Midnight”**). The non-rationed recruits of the June cycle were to **“be rationed with the July cycle by July 20, 1991. The schedule of execution of point 1 of this decision and the filling of the JNA with recruits will be coordinated by the SSNO with the release of the reserve composition from the mobilized JNA units”** (Ibid.).

The text of the rest of the decision, according to Mesic, read as follows:

“3. Immediately exercise the obligations from the joint declaration of July 7, 1991, pertaining to the establishment of the SFRY border control regime, in its application before June 25, 1991, and no later than July 16, 1991, until Midnight; the creation of conditions for normal living and working of the units and institutions and members of the JNA and their families (complete unblocking of the barracks and other military facilities, removal of all obstacles, smooth supply and free communication, movement, regular training program, and the like) by no later than July 13, 1991, until Midnight; the release of all JNA members from detention and return of confiscated resources, equipment and facilities of the JNA, as well as equipment and resources of the Federal Secretariat for Interior, and no later than by July 15, 1991, until Midnight.

4. At the following session, review the execution of its conclusions of May 9, 1991, in relation to the situation in Croatia, including the involvement of the JNA in accordance with its constitutional and legal role, as the context of the obligations of the Presidency, arising from the agreement with the EC representatives, contained in the Brioni documents of July 7, of this year.

Thus, at the time, due to the lack of decisiveness and orientation of General Kadijevic, the attempts of the Serb leadership to withdraw the army out of Slovenia had failed.¹⁰⁸

The military leadership (i.e. the illegal Headquarters of the Supreme Command), in assessing the situation and facing numerous **“major”** problems, particularly related to mobilization, concluded, **“the only solution is that the JNA leave Slovenia”**. To this goal, the question **“how to do that in the given Yugoslav and international situation”** needed to be answered. In relation to this, three options were **“reconsidered”**:

- 1. **“at first, militarily defeat the armed formations of Slovenia, and then leave Slovenia”**,¹⁰⁹

- 2. **inflict, “without the allocation of new land army forces, by using all the air forces, artillery and manoeuvring potentials available within the land army that was already stationed in Slovenia [...] unacceptable losses to the infrastructure of Slovenia, and thus**

5. Execution of points 1 through 3 shall be controlled by a Commission of the Presidency of the SFRY, which is to start working immediately.

6. The Presidency of the SFRY shall guarantee the execution of this decision” (Ibid., p. 116).

¹⁰⁸ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 365. Jovic concluded that **“the army itself is toddling, it is not altogether ripe within itself”**. During the break, Kadijevic was explaining to Jovic that, without disarmament of paramilitary organizations and the sending of recruits to the Army, **“he is not able to do anything, that this is important for him, etc.”**; and with implementation of those two demands, **“the withdrawal is not even necessary. But how to realize them?”**. In relation to this, Jovic stated that the General was relying on the European Community, which, according to him, would **“save Yugoslavia”**. About this, Jovic wrote: **“Let us see that happen. But what will he do with his ten days he is asking for as a time-out? Until then, the army will fall apart!”** (Ibid.).

¹⁰⁹ V. Kadijevic, the aforementioned work, pp. 119-120. The implementation of this option, **“in addition to the forces the JNA had available in Slovenia and which were already partly involved in the fighting on the border and for the defence against attacks by the Slovenian army [the JNA] required further deployment of two infantry and one parachute units, as well as of much stronger airborne forces, in order to transport troops, for parachute attacks and fire support to the land army forces. The beginning of this operation required two to three days, and its duration six to seven days”** (Ibid., p. 120).

force it to respect the decisions of the federal institutions on the state border”¹¹⁰ and,

- 3. **“Accomplish political goals by a combined use of political means and by threatening to use all JNA resources available, with actual use, dosed according to the conduct of the Slovenian side”**.¹¹¹

“In assessing the good and bad sides of all the three options for further use of the JNA in Slovenia”, ‘the Headquarters of the Supreme Command’ **“opted”** for the first one, and excluded the second option. However, this so-called **first option** did not pass with the Presidency of the SFRY, because, according to Kadijevic, **“certain”** of its members **“would not accept it, with an explanation that there is no mood in the nation from which new troops should go to Slovenia, for them to go there and wage war, in order to use the war to force the Slovenians to remain in Yugoslavia, when they obviously do not wish so”**. In this way, **“they stuck to the third option”**. Therefore, in accomplishing the political goal – **leaving Slovenia** – **“further political and military activities”** of the leadership of the Greater Serbia movement **“were conducted essentially in compliance with such decision”**.¹¹²

Jovic and Dr. Kostic did all to prevent the Presidency of the SFRY from functioning, in particular when discussions about the process of resolution of the Yugoslav crisis were held. Due to this, Milosevic’s

¹¹⁰ Ibid. This option, according to Kadijevic, **“carried in itself a very strong note of retaliation and terror against the civilian population”**. In relation to this, he wrote: **“As the Slovenian Army – with the formations and weapons it had available, the partisan technique of use in predominantly urban environment, where soldiers are often mixed with civilians, the lack of any serious military infrastructure – could not constitute cost-effective targets for artillery attacks, particularly by the air force, and these attacks would have to predominantly target civilian facilities, that is, facilities directly serving war purposes too, such as communications, management and information systems, factories whose products serve for wartime needs, etc. The attacks of that type would most certainly cause much more casualties among the civilian population, among which could also be families of JNA members, more than soldiers”** (Ibid., pp. 120-121).

¹¹¹ Ibid., p. 121.

¹¹² Ibid.

group at the Presidency did not want to go to Brioni, where, according to the July 12 arrangement, Mesic convened a session of the Presidency for July 17, and where everything was prepared for its holding. Dr. Kostic, in the capacity of Vice President, convened a meeting on the same day with the members of the Presidency in Belgrade. Mesic, Drnovsek, Bogicevic and Tupurkovski, with Ante Markovic and Irfan Ajanovic (Vice President of the Assembly of the SFRY) attended the session of the Presidency in Brioni. While they were holding the session, Serb collaborationists from Borovo Selo attacked that village with military mortars, telephone lines with the besieged Vukovar were disconnected, the Zadar power supply line was mined, due to which Zadar was left without power, and Tudjman was trying to convince General Kadijevic in the military airbase of Zemunik (near Zadar), to stop the aggression against the Republic of Croatia.¹¹³

In Brioni, where the European Community had accepted the right of the SFRY to establish control over its state border,¹¹⁴ it was agreed that the next session of the Presidency of the SFRY be held on July 18, in Belgrade, because in Brioni, without the Serbo-Montenegrin “group of four”, nothing could be decided. As Mesic’s proposal was not accepted to discuss Croatia, or the new arrangement of Yugoslavia, the agenda for this session (July 18) **involved Slovenia**. At the time, the Presidency of the SFRY in full composition **took the decision to dislocate commands, units and institutions of the JNA from the territory of Slovenia into Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and Montenegro**.¹¹⁵ Based

¹¹³ S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, pp. 120-121.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 121-123, and 269; V. Kadijevic, the aforementioned work, p. 121; B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 366; B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, p. 223. According to Jovic, this decision **formally** stated “**that the units of the JNA from Slovenia were temporarily deployed onto new positions**”, in order, according to him, to satisfy all those who had still been hoping for “**the preservation of Yugoslavia**” (B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 366). In relation to this, in the first sentence of his diary for July 15 (this is probably a typo), that is, July 18, Jovic wrote: “**We have finally adopted the decision for the withdrawal of the JNA from Slovenia**” (Ibid.).

This decision stated in full as follows:

on this decision, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command prepared

“1. The commands, units and institutions of the JNA shall cease deployment on the territory of the Republic of Slovenia until the final agreement on the future of Yugoslavia has been reached. The personal composition and all mobile assets of the 31st Corps are to be dislocated onto the territory of the Republic of Serbia, and of the 14th Corps, onto the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The dislocation is to be completed within three months from the adoption of this decision.

2. Within three months, the members of the permanent composition of the JNA of Slovenian ethnicity will decide whether they wish to stay or not. The procedure for the termination of service in the JNA shall automatically be instituted for the competent officers, except for those who provide written statements that they wish to stay in service of the JNA. Under the condition referred to in point 1, the JNA service shall also be terminated for members of other nations and nationalities who reside on the territory of the Republic of Slovenia, if they request so in writing.

3. The execution of this decision may not be conditioned with the resolution of any legal property relations between the Republic of Slovenia and the bodies of the Federation, or other republics. These issues shall be resolved on the basis and in compliance with the definite agreement on the future of Yugoslavia.

4. The competent bodies of the Republic of Slovenia shall ensure that all the armed compositions of the republic and the armed civilians withdraw from JNA facilities, and that they in no way obstruct the measures and actions of the units and institutions of the JNA. They will also prevent any gatherings of citizens or other manifestations near to military facilities and commands, units and institutions of the JNA in movement.

5. Until the JNA is transferred out of the territory of the Republic of Slovenia, the members, commands, units and institutions of the JNA shall be ensured normal conditions for living and execution of regular tasks, and all the persons in JNA service and members of their families given free movement on the territory of the Republic of Slovenia.

6. The families of active military members and civilians serving in the JNA who wish to reside in other republics shall be ensured free dislocation, at the cost of the JNA, They are guaranteed the protection of rights to the mobile assets they possess, and other rights that can not be exercised until the date of dislocation.

7. The Headquarters of the Supreme Command shall ensure safe, regular and efficient movements of the units and all other actions contained in this decision...”
(S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, pp. 123-124).

Such a decision was voted for by six members of the Presidency of the SFRY, one was against, and one sustained from voting. This proposal, in addition to the **“group of four from Serbia and Montenegro”** (Jovic, Branko and Jugoslav Kostic, and Bajramovic), was also supported by Drnovsek, and Tupurkovski, Bogicevic was reserved. Mesic was

a dislocation plan.¹¹⁶

The Greater Serbia movement had **“finally”** succeeded in reaching the **“withdrawal of the JNA from Slovenia and its deployment “onto the borders of the future Yugoslavia”**. Together with generals Kadijevic and Adzic, Milosevic and Jovic took the position that the JNA need

“strongly against it”. He was the only one in favour of the position **“that the army cannot withdraw from Slovenia, if it is not also to withdraw from Croatia, too”** (S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, pp. 121-123). In relation to this, Jovic wrote that the four members from Serbia and Montenegro, **“plus Drnovsek”**, prevailed. Tupurkovski **“reluctantly joined them thanks to the ‘statement’ of the Presidency that this is in the function of peace. Bogicevic was reserved, and Mesic was strongly against. He insisted on the ‘preservation’ of Yugoslavia (!), and in fact, he was afraid that all the forces from Slovenia would be dislocated into Croatia and used by us for fighting the HDZ”** (B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 366).

Thus, the five votes **“in favour”** decided that **“we leave the north-western borders of Yugoslavia open, that is, to leave Slovenia without the thing that once used to be called ‘national army’ there”**. Speaking about this, Mesic claimed that this **“was one of the rare decisions which would get implemented”** (S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, pp. 121-123).

At this session, Dr. Kostic and Jovic repeated: **“the Army out of Slovenia!”**. Kadijevic and Brovet were acting as though this had originally been their proposal (Ibid.).

In addition to this decision that was unconstitutional according to Mesic, on July 18, 1991, the Presidency of the SFRY also adopted a public communiqué and decided to meet with the presidents of the republics on July 22, in Ohrid (Ibid., p. 124).

¹¹⁶ V. Kadijevic, the aforementioned work, p. 121. One cannot accept the assessment by Admiral Mamula that the **leadership of the JNA had “quite unexpectedly”** opted for the withdrawal from Slovenia. Probably for him, this decision was unexpected, because he in person learned about it from the radio, and he was at it, because two nights before (that is, on July 16), he was present at General Staff when, in accordance with the prepared counterattack in Slovenia, **“the order was issued to the commanders of joint compositions of the JNA to start the operation to establish the control of state borders of the SFRY in Slovenia. The operation was to begin exactly on morning following the day when the decision for withdrawal was publicized”** (B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, p. 179). This counterattack, according to Mamula, had been abandoned, **“without any international legal, political or military reasons”**. Thus, the military leadership missed **“the last opportunity to take over the destiny of the country into its own hands”**, claimed Mamula (B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, pp. 179, and 224).

not get involved in Slovenia,¹¹⁷ but that it should concentrate on the borders of Greater Serbia.

The leadership of the Greater Serbia movement was not interested in Slovenia, except as a factor, which was to be, excluded from negotiations as soon as possible, **by expelling this republic out of Yugoslavia**. Not in a single historical option was Slovenia within the projected Greater Serbia, nor was this a strategic goal of the Greater Serbia movement. The leadership of this movement assessed (according to Kadijevic – **“the policy was assessed[...]**”) that the JNA in Slovenia **“had nothing to fight for”, unlike in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, where it allegedly fought “for the right of the Serb nation to decide on its own future”,**¹¹⁸ that is, for a fascistic Serb state.

¹¹⁷ B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, p. 215. **“In the armed conflicts in Slovenia”, according to General Kadijevic, “in two days, the JNA completed the assigned task related to the border, and it did not accept the imposed war with Slovenia, but it withdrew”** (V. Kadijevic, the aforementioned work, pp. 162-163).

Milosevic withdrew the JNA out of Slovenia onto the so-called Serb borders in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (B. Mamula, **UZROCI I POSLJEDICE RATOVA ...**, pp. 213-214; I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, p. 70).

The withdrawal of the JNA from Slovenia, as well as the abandoning of the operation and the decision for leaving Slovenia was, according to Mamula, **“a tragic mistake”**. Further, he states that the JNA **“gave in under pressures and missed one more, maybe the last chance, to place the course of the chaotic developments under its control. Nobody can claim with 100% assurance, that in July 1991 the Army would have succeeded. But, this was the last chance when the JNA could still prevent the dissolution of the country and save the nations from the tragic interethnic war and all the direct and long-term consequences for them, for the region and for Europe. It would have been honourable and reasonable that the JNA had even tried, nothing more could be lost than what had already been lost. The mood of the majority of the officers in the Army was in favour of a decisive approach. For them, along with all the state and political reasons, there were their own, direct, intimate reasons – defence of dignity and deepest patriotic feelings, their oath, and the responsibility for the break-up of the country”** (B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, pp. 179, and 228).

¹¹⁸ S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, pp. 127, 135, and 148-149; V. Kadijevic, the aforementioned work, pp. 162-163; I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, p. 70. Politically, **“the ten-day war”** in Slovenia, according to General Radakovic, **“was the continuation of the hard insistence on the expulsion Slovenia from Yugoslavia,**

The withdrawal of the JNA from Slovenia meant the change of the external borders of the SFRY. **Without Slovenia, Yugoslavia existed no more.** The exclusion of Slovenia from Yugoslavia meant an essential change of system in Yugoslavia and an easier realization of the Greater Serbia Nazi ideology and the Greater Serbia program. The leadership of the Greater Serbia movement focused henceforth on the aggressive war in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

counting on that the Slovenians would use it for the ‘secession’. The army top or a part of it were sacrificing a part of the JNA units and a part of the units deployed from Croatia for this goal, in order to discredit the SIV, to overthrow Kucan and the new government, or to create more favourable conditions for continuation of the war in Croatia and Bosnia” (I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, p. 70).

Without knowledge of, or approval by the leader of the Greater Serbia movement, the JNA concluded an agreement with Slovenia, **“that the heavy artillery stays over there, and that the soldiers return with light weapons only”**. In accordance with this, the JNA only took some 70 tanks out from Slovenia, **“whereas some 200 remained over there”**. In addition, Slovenia also **“retained two thirds of the total equipment and weapons”** (B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 403-404).

2. Realization of the “RAM” War Plan

The war against Slovenia, waged simultaneously with the loud, open Serb insurrections at Banija and Kordun, in Lika and Eastern Slavonia, and with the occupation of Baranja, forced the world to directly interfere in Yugoslav relations. The first stage of internationalisation involves the European Community. On July 1, under the pressure of the European Community, the leadership of the Greater Serbia movement “**accepted**” that Mesic should take the office of the President, whereby the Presidency of the SFRY was constituted, while Serbia and Montenegro did all to prevent it in the capacity of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the SFRY. The army did not respect its Supreme Command. The Secretary for Defence could not care less about the Government, in which he was an untouchable member, and a fully autonomous one. A number of times, General Kadijevic let Mesic know that he is not listening the Presidency. He refused to submit the report to the Presidency, because he did not want to talk with the alleged “**secessionists**”. He was adamant in giving the blow to Slovenia and Croatia “**from which they would never recover**”.¹¹⁹

After these negotiations, the Brioni joint statement followed on July 7, 1991, and then on July 22, the Ohrid Statement,¹²⁰ with several

¹¹⁹ S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, pp. XIII-XIV, 76-78, and 249. In the first half of July 1991, Kadijevic stated that his army would “**go through to the end**“, until it destroys the Croatian “**Nazi Ustasha**” leadership. General Adzic too was constantly threatening with the army, in order to coerce the Presidency of the SFRY to enforce the decisions of the military leadership, as otherwise “**[they] would strike with force to the extent as needed, we shall wait no longer, there is no giving up[...]**” - Ibid., pp. 104-105.

¹²⁰ Ibid. At the session of the Presidency of the SFRY in Ohrid on July 22, 1991, attended, in addition to the members of the Presidency and the presidents of the republics, that is, the presidents of the presidencies of republics, also by the highest officials of

more meetings with the presidents of the republics, as well as several brief visits by ministerial groups of three, etc.¹²¹ After the decision for withdrawal of the JNA from Slovenia, the leadership of the Greater Serbia movement started an open aggression against Croatia.

In late August, the European Community, interested in a unified Yugoslavia, established that **Serbia was the aggressor**, thanks to the armed force – the JNA, which had accepted the Greater Serbia aggression policy. Then it was proposed that the “**futile negotiations**” be transferred from Belgrade to The Hague, to the International Peace Conference on Yugoslavia, under the chairmanship of Lord Carrington (David Carrington).¹²²

the Federation (such as Markovic, Gligorijevic, Kadijevec, Brovet, Loncar, Gracanin, Kambovski, Marendic, Zekan, and others), which was held at the time of an ever stronger aggression of Serbia against Croatia, an agreement was supposed to be reached “**for finding the solution for future relations in the Yugoslav community**” and the debate was to be conducted on the Government’s program for a three-month moratorium. Referring to the decision for withdrawal of the army from Slovenia, and in relation to this, to that “**this is the proof that nobody wants to force anyone to stay in Yugoslavia**”, Dr. Kostic did not accept the right of the republics to secession. Jovic demanded the disarmament of the republic forces of Croatia, and only then could “**the JNA go back into the barracks**”. Informing that “**some 310 people have been killed and over 5,000 injured in the interethnic conflicts in Croatia**”, Kadijevec was categorically against the withdrawal of the JNA into the barracks (“**how can the army withdraw into the barracks when it is constantly being attacked...**”). Tudjman presented the data on the war in Croatia, and on the actions of the air force. Milosevic was against the withdrawal of the army into the barracks, because “**there were no peacetime conditions in place**”. Without the army, he said, “**blood would run deep**”. Tudjman indicated the fact that the JNA “**behaved variously in various areas. In Kosovo, it helped Serbia establish the legal order of the state of Serbia, and in Croatia it is waging war against the constitutional order of Croatia**”. Mesic did not accept the Ohrid statement, just like Tudjman, because the withdrawal of the JNA into barracks (“**the army into the barracks**”), which was, according to Mesic, the key issue, was not contained in the statement. Namely, they “**sought the unconditional withdrawal of the Yugoslav People’s Army into the garrisons, which was not accepted by the majority of participants in the meeting, and therefore did not agree with the text of the statement**” (S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, pp. 127-132). The text of the Ohrid statement was publicized by S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, pp. 131-132, and K. Rotim, the aforementioned work, pp. 118-119).

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Ibid. p. XI.

The military leadership was relying on the “group of four” in the Presidency and was constantly referring to the Constitution, while all the war actions of the JNA were contrary to the Constitution. Milosevic’s group in the Presidency of the SFRY, while Mesic was prevented from performing the office of president, had taken a decision, in his absence and in the absence of Drnovsek, by which the JNA was granted the right to move the troops towards the places where “**conflicts**” arise.¹²³ When he took over the office of President, Mesic demanded on several occasions that the JNA be brought back into “**the constitutional order**”, be returned to the barracks,¹²⁴ yet his demands were in vain.

¹²³ Ibid., p. 204. According to Mesic, the military leadership (constantly referring to the Constitution) was behaving in a putschist and ‘Greater Serbia’ way, because it was enforcing the policy of aggression. It established, “**in taking the functions of the Presidency of the SFRY, a ‘Headquarters of Supreme Command’, where Milosevic’s clan has the influence. The Republic of Serbia has three votes in the Presidency, and the fourth one was given to its as a gift in advance (‘second eye’?). Making decisions required a group of five**”. Mesic, in the capacity of president, could never receive the fifth vote for his positions, and sometimes Serbia even received the votes of Tupurkovski and Bogicevic (S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. 204).

¹²⁴ S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. 140. Thus, for instance, at the session of the Presidency on July 26, in Belgrade, Mesic sought that the JNA be brought back into “**the constitutional order**”, to be returned to the barracks. In addition, in referring to the function of the first man in the Supreme Command, he also informed the military leadership of the numerous facts on the strong attacks of the JNA onto Croatian villages and cities, and numerous other crimes, in particularly about the mass murders of the Croats in Banija on July 26 and 27. Based on the data supplied by Dr. Gregoric, Mesic informed Kadijevec and Brovet about that there were:

“**...firstly, heavy attacks with mortars and other heavy artillery from the JA arsenal onto Croatian villages and cities in the areas of Eastern Slavonia, Lika, and Northern Dalmatia;**

secondly, a large number of casualties among the civilian population in Croatian villages and cities, particularly in Banija, where the majority of places have been resettled, which was contributed to by the described heavy attacks, as well as by the activity of the Greater Serbia terrorists in that area;

thirdly, a large number of killed members of the internal law enforcement forces of the Republic of Croatia, as a result of the expansion of the Greater Serbia insurrection, with more or less open support as well as direct involvement by the members of the JA units.

After the defeat in Slovenia, the JNA “**finally**” focused in the direction of the transformation into a Serb army, with the formation of Greater Serbia as goal.¹²⁵ On July 30, on the eve of the session of the Presidency with the presidents of the republics about the future of Yugoslavia, in Jovic’s office, General Kadijevic informed Milosevic and Jovic, “**clearly and definitely, about his position and final orientation: the JNA is transforming into the army of those who wish to remain in Yugoslavia, and at least it is: Serbia, the Serbian nation, plus Montenegro. Based on these principles, it is withdrawing on the territories and changes the leaderships**”.¹²⁶

The culmination of the terrorist vandalism, with open assistance by the JA units, occurred on July 26, and 27, with the mass murder the Croats in the villages of Struga, Mucani, Kuljani, and Kozibrod, in the Banija Region, was carried out.

All of this had occurred in spite of the agreed cease-fire. On the contrary, even after the cease-fire agreement, heavier armed attacks against the members of the law enforcement forces of the Republic of Croatia as well as against civilians continued, with all the features of genocide against the Croats.

Those crimes were occurring in front of the eyes of the Presidency – the head of the SFRY and the supreme commander of the Yugoslav Armed Forces, the aforementioned JA, and the Federal Executive Council, whose Defence Secretary stated, on several occasions that the Army will not interfere with the resolution of the state and political crisis...” (Ibid.).

In Croatia, the JNA went out into certain areas following the decision of the Presidency of the SFRY, and it was given a one-month time frame, which expired in the second week of June 1991. However, the JNA had still remained there (Ibid., pp. 133, and 137).

¹²⁵ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 367. Admiral Mamula claims that the JNA, after the defeat in Slovenia, “**got the concept of the Greater Serbia simply and without resistance imposed on it, as was the doctrine that will realize it**”. The more so, because “**the assessment is that the JNA has no choice anymore**”. Therefore, according to him, “**on July 30, 1991, the army leadership had finally given in**” (B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, p. 230).

Obviously, General Mamula “**forgot**” that, much earlier, before the defeat in Slovenia, the JNA had accepted the Greater Serbia concept (this had been its choice from before), and before July 30, 1991, the military leadership had “**given in**” to the leader of the Greater Serbia movement – Slobodan Milosevic – who imposed the doctrine of realization of the Greater Serbia fascist project on the JNA.

¹²⁶ Ibid. This “**clear and definitive**” position and orientation of Kadijevic was commented by Jovic in the following way: “**He does not believe in any of the options for survival of the integral Yugoslavia.**”

Milosevic warned Kadijevic **“that what he is speaking he is working on slowly. He needs to work on that more quickly”**, which the general resented, **“he is making excuses, he is feeling awkward, and he knows he is to blame”**.¹²⁷

The leadership of the Greater Serbia movement was not satisfied at Kadijevic’s actions. Therefore, in early August, Milosevic tried to dismiss Kadijevic (even through admiral Mamula, who was backing him up), because he was **“incapable of leading the Army in the newly emerged crisis”**.¹²⁸

(Of course, this is what we have been persistently telling him ourselves, but he was swaying.)” – B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 367.

Among other things, the session of the Presidency of the SFRY on July 30 discussed the cease-fire process and its supervision. With the majority of votes, the **State Commission** was formed, headed by Dr. Kostic, upon which Mesic left the session. However, this commission, which was **“along with the Army, along with Serbia”**, abandoned by Bogicevic, Tupurkovski, Ajanovic, and Kambovski, did not stop the aggression, because it was unacceptable that it was headed by Vice President Kostic, who had publicly offered support **“to the terrorists in Slavonia”** (S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, pp. 142, 147, and 204).

At this session, Mesic demanded that Dr. Kostic, because in mid-1991 he had voluntarily been visiting the “Serb autonomous areas” and the insurgent commands in Croatia (in Borovo Selo), and **“encouraging terrorists”** in front of the TV cameras **“to expand anti-Croatian actions”**, be called to responsibility. Jovic **“thought that in such a situation, he could offer a clever repartee: ‘You are suggesting that Branko needs a passport to go to Croatia?’”** (S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, pp. 137, and 141).

¹²⁷ Ibid. In bringing up the aforementioned **“epithets”** and assessments, in particular the one by which Kadijevic is to blame, Jovic further states that the General **“had been indecisive for a long time”**. However, **“Veljko is making an excuse that nobody wants to help us. The Russians are looking onto themselves, and if they would say just one word to the Americans – ‘nyet’ – we would be protected from foreign intervention. This way, if we press more, they will recognize the independence of Croatia, and it will invite foreign troops to come and impose upon us a conflict with Europe. The Russians have even refused to sell us arms, and they owe us almost three billion dollars”** (Ibid.).

¹²⁸ B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, pp. 225-228. In early August 1991, at the meeting at the CK Building at Usce, attended by Dragan Atanasovski (President of the SK-PJ), and Mira Markovic [wife of Slobodan Milosevic; note by the translator], from the senior leadership of SK-PJ, General Ljubicic and Admiral Mamula (the meeting was convened at the request of Ljubicic, to be received by Mamula), Ljubicic

“As with the development of events, the Yugoslav state was

proposed that Kadijevic needs to be dismissed, **“because he is incapable of leading the Army in the newly emerged crisis”** (Ibid., p. 225).

The initiative for the dismissal of General Kadijevic had come from Milosevic, in whose house he and Ljubicic discussed the topic of Kadijevic. Starting from that, Mamula visited Milosevic, who received him immediately. On this occasion, presenting a brief assessment of Kadijevic, Milosevic concluded that he had lost his reputation and support among the Army and that he needs to be dismissed (Ibid., p. 226).

Given that he could not allow **“that the responsibility for the break-up of Yugoslavia be reduced to the Army and Kadijevic in person”**, Mamula presented the way in which the SFRY can be saved from the current disaster. In relation to this, stating that **“it is not at all a problem to dismiss Kadijevic, that there are generals who can lead the Army decisively and successfully”**, he stated that all the presidents of republics, including Milosevic, have to leave power. This, according to Mamula, was **“the only solution in the attempt to save Yugoslavia, although it may even be too late for this attempt too”**. According to Mamula, Milosevic was surprised, **“but he reacted promptly: ‘Why me, the only one who is supporting the army and defending Yugoslavia?’ He stood up in protest and started off towards the door, which was the sign that we had finished the conversation and that I should leave the office. Not that it did not matter to me, but as early as in coming there had I been ready for the worst. Nothing happened, I left the palace peacefully and walked away”** (Ibid., pp. 226-227).

Probably because they were not satisfied with his actions, because he could not meet all of their demands, Milosevic insisted on the dismissal of Kadijevic. Thus, in late September 1991, a group of some forty officers of the guardian brigade arrived at the SSNO at night and took over the command of the Ministry and General Staff buildings, demanding resignation of General Kadijevic, offering General Adzic to take on his duty and overall control over the Army. Although this group was headed by major Sljivancanin (the KOS officer in the brigade), the role of Colonel Vuk Obradovic was more interesting, as he was the key person in that event. When he realized that General Adzic refused to participate in overthrowing Kadijevic, which meant that the mutiny had failed, Obradovic suddenly disappeared (Ibid., p. 228).

In a discussion between General Mamula and General Vasiljevic (the Chief of Staff of the KOS) in the spring of 1991, Vasiljevic warned him **“about the characteristics and ambitions of colonel Vuk Obradovic, and said that he seriously means to become Defence Secretary, and hopes that Serbia would support him in this effort. Vasiljevic knew about my relations with Kadijevic at the time, and he probably wanted me to draw Kadijevic’s attention to Obradovic, because he had trusted him too much and relied on him and his judgments. I am not far from the conclusion that the attempt to overthrow Kadijevic was initiated through Vuk Obradovic. However, he does not have the profile of an officer who would bring the mutiny up to its end with the risk of a bloodshed, which could not be excluded, particularly when General Adzic stood in the way”** (Ibid.).

disappearing more and more”, the military leadership advocated for **“a quick creation of the new Yugoslavia”**. The main motivation for such an approach of theirs **“was not only in the need for the JNA to have its own state, but primarily in the conviction that there are peoples in Yugoslavia who really wish to live in a joint state”**. Starting from such a **“conviction”**, the military leadership stood in favour for the formation of such a state (**“the new Yugoslavia”**), whereby thus it openly revealed its goals.¹²⁹

Milosevic and Jovic were against involvement of the JNA for defence of the state border of the SFRY in the northeast part of the country – in Slovenia and Croatia. They had marked the future borders of Yugoslavia on the western ethnic border of the Serbs in Croatia (the RAM War Plan). Therefore, they sought the JNA **“to withdraw onto those borders, by blackmailing them: unless this is done, Serbia shall form its own armed forces and organize its own defence and leave the JNA to its own destiny.”**¹³⁰

The issue of withdrawal of the JNA from Croatia was on the agenda.¹³¹

¹²⁹ V. Kadijevic, the aforementioned work, p. 90. In relation to this, Kadijevic states: **“..., so this is why such a state needs to be created”**.

¹³⁰ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 343-367, and others; B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, p. 178. Mamula claims that **“this threat with blackmail was not only an empty shotgun”**, because the intentions of Serbia to form its own army as a replacement to the JNA were evidently shown in the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, adopted on September 28, 1990, while the SFRY still existed, as well as its armed forces, and the system of command over them. This Constitution, among other things, established that the president of the Republic **“shall direct the armed forces in peace and war; order general and partial mobilization...”**. The realization of this constitutional provision, according to Mamula, required the removal of a realistic obstacle – **“the existence of the JNA and the precariousness thereof”**. After the JNA failure in Slovenia, as Mamula wrote, conditions were created for the removal of this obstacle. Therefore, both Milosevic and Jovic were increasing their pressure on the military leadership, particularly in the summer of 1991 (B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, pp. 178-179, and 229).

¹³¹ Ibid. p. 230. About this, Mamula wrote as follows: **“It was just a question of time when the JNA will have to withdraw from Croatia. Tudjman had taken a correct strategic approach: on the external plan, to insist on and create any army**

In such a situation, the (reduced) tasks of the JNA (according to Kadijevic – “the armed forces”) consisted, among other things, of: **“1) the defence of the Serb people in Croatia, and of its national interests; 2) the withdrawal of the JNA garrisons from Croatia; 3) full control over Bosnia and Herzegovina** (by increasing the density of presence there; note by the author), **with the ultimate goal to defend the Serb nation and its ethnic rights...”;**”4) **the creation and defence of the new Yugoslav state of those Yugoslav nations which so wish, this currently being the Serb and Montenegrin nations.**¹³²

In accordance with these tasks, the JNA “switched along” with the Serbs on the ethnic Serb borders in Croatia and waged war against Croatia and the Croats.¹³³ In this war for ethnically cleansed territories, the JNA almost came to the line of Gospic, Otocac, Karlovac, Sisak, Nova Gradiska, Zadar, Sibenik, Sinj, and there it stopped. It did not accomplish the political goals (postpone the “**international recognition of the fait accompli**”) or military goals (the liberation of the blocked garrisons on the whole territory of Croatia), that is, “**the strategy of the involvement of the JNA in Croatia in the summer and autumn of 1991**”, which ,after the decision for abandoning Slovenia, was designed and

that could simultaneously resist both the JNA and the Krajina paramilitary, and once Croatia is recognized and the JNA has to withdraw, to defeat the Krajina army and force the Serbs to obedience. Until the assumed conditions are created, the position was taken to stall, to negotiate, not to challenge the JNA for a radical settlement, if it is assessed that it could do it, by seeking cease fires, in a single word – buy time. He was successful in accomplishing all three goals, however, the defeat of the Krajina army had to be postponed until all the necessary international circumstances were created, most directly linked to the war in Bosnia and to the defeat of the Bosnian Serb Army in the spring and summer of 1995. For Tudjman, since the dissolution of Yugoslavia began, this was the sole goal – to create a Greater Croatia. As early as since March 1991, since Karadjordjevo, he had been negotiating with Milosevic about the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina, they were playing with who will get what and finally, he succeeded in expelling the Serbs from Krajina, conquering a large part of Western Bosnia and expelling the Serbs almost as far as Banja Luka” (Ibid.).

¹³² V. Kadijevic, the aforementioned work, p. 93.

¹³³ B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, p. 231. This policy and practice, according to Mamula, was detrimental to the JNA.

proposed by admiral Mamula.¹³⁴ The JNA had sufficient forces available to accomplish the goal before October 1991, when the discussion in The Hague started on the issue of sovereignty and independence of the republics, and their mutual recognition.¹³⁵

¹³⁴ Ibid., p. 230-231. The differences between Mamula's assessments and positions and the ones by General Adzic and other high-ranking military officers did not exist. **"Anyone thinking about Yugoslavia, rather than about Greater Serbia and its devised borders, would come to the same conclusions. However, it was not very much worth it to discuss about the involvement of the JNA with the chief of staff of the General Staff. Actually, it was not himself who commanded over the Army, it was Milosevic".**

"The separation of the enemy and Serb paramilitary forces at the separation line", according to Mamula, "could be a temporary goal until these are disarmed, placed under JNA control or militarily defeated". According to him, **"extended speculation and stalling on the separation [will lead] to the alignment of the JNA with the Serb side".** This trap **"of unilateral conduct was not even avoided by the UN forces, whose political, as well as national distances from the warring parties were incomparable to those of the JNA",** claims Mamula (Ibid.).

¹³⁵ Ibid., p. 231. Speaking about this, Admiral Mamula states that **"many arguments can be sued to claim that the break-up of Yugoslavia would not have been proceeded in October, nor would Slovenia have been recognized, if the JNA had unblocked its garrisons, strengthened its positions with the newly arrived forces and proceeded from the depth with a decisive disarmament of the paramilitary forces in Croatia. The JNA garrisons would not have been disarmed, huge quantities of armament, artillery and lethal devices would not have been confiscated, which allowed that, from the end of summer until the end of the autumn, the proportion of powers had completely changed between the JNA and the ZNG. In late September, Tudjman himself claimed that seventy JNA facilities, ranging from the complete garrisons to he armament and weapon warehouses, had fallen into ZNG hands. The armament, artillery and equipment withdrawn on trains from Slovenia were largely withheld by the ZNG units. Only one composition of 26 wagons 'that disappeared on the way' held equipment equalling 6 artillery divisions.**

On September 19, the Guard Corps left Belgrade and went to Sid and the Croatian border. Together with the brigades from Sremska Mitrovica and Djakovo, it had enough forces to push out onto the territory of Virovitica, Bjelovar, Koprivnica, Varazdin, with one major part, and to strengthen the already present forces on the territory of Karlovac, Sisak, Okucani with its other part, so that together with the armed and artillery forces from Karlovac, Jastrebarsko and Dugo Selo, they can force ahead towards Zagreb, liberate the besieged barracks in Zagreb and Varazdin, and to force the Croatian HDZ government to negotiate. The pockets, such as Vukovar or Osijek, had no military significance in the projected operation.

The leader of the Greater Serbia movement and the actual commander of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, Slobodan Milosevic, in accordance with the formation of an “independent” Serbian state in Krajina, which was the essence of the Greater Serbia strategy in Croatia, decided that the JNA should remain within ethnic Serb boundaries, in order to defend them **“together with the Krajina paramilitary”**. General Kadijevic formally issued such an order to General Panic, the operational commander of the formations located on the eastern borders of Croatia.¹³⁶

On August the 3rd, 1991, the Presidency of SFRY passed a decision to cease-fire **“in the Krajinas between Serbs and Croats, with the consent of Croatia”**.¹³⁷

They would be left deep in the background and share the destiny of whatever would happen in Zagreb and the broader territory surrounding it.

The JNA operation in the central part of Croatia, in my opinion, should have been commanded by the commander of the Zagreb Military District, General Avramovic. He and his command should have been at some of the command points in the central area, and by no means on the periphery, at the Slunj training ground, where he had barricaded himself, and remained immobile for three months” (Ibid., pp. 231-232).

¹³⁶ Ibid., pp. 232 and 239. **“Instead of the projected operation on the whole territory of Croatia, what actually occurred was”,** according to Mamula, **“a senseless and bloody fight in Vukovar and around it, the fight exclusively for territories between Serb and Croat nationalists. The destiny of these territories, as we can see now, was not determined by the victories of one side or the defeats of the other, but by many other circumstances: from the international, to the ethnic and historical ones, which could not be understood by the blinded nationalists”** (Ibid., p. 232).

¹³⁷ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 368. **“The immediate, absolute and unconditional cease fire”** was discussed, as stated by Mesic, on August 2 and 3, at the session of the Presidency of the SFRY. Croatia’s demand for the inclusion of European observers in the monitoring of the truce was refused by the military leadership and the Serbo-Montenegrin clan in the Presidency. Having in mind the location and dislocation, the constant concentration of artillery in the crisis zones, the speedy withdrawal of the corps in the Bosnian territories neighbouring Croatia and other things, the JNA also sought the division of Croatia, in order to conquer the territory of the Greater Serbia, and to overthrow the democratically elected Croatian government. (S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, pp. 146-148).

The ministerial Group of three visited Yugoslavia again on August 3 and 4, mainly due to **“the escalation of the war in Croatia”**. During the visit to Belgrade, the European Community then also proposed the expansion of the observer mission to

Four days later (on August 7), the “SAO Krajina”, the “SAO Slavonia”, and the Republic of Croatia had **“agreed on a ceasefire”**.¹³⁸

On August 8, at a meeting, in addition to him also attended by Slobodan Milosevic, Borisav Jovic, Branko Kostic and general Blagoje Adzic, where they agreed about the **“further political orientation in relation to the decision for ceasefire in Croatia”**, General Kadijevec informed the participants **on the territorial regrouping of the JNA**. In relation to this, he stated that **the army is dislocating from Slovenia into Bosnia and Serbia**.¹³⁹

Milosevic insisted on **“the increase of the combat preparedness of the army, because, according to his assessment, the fight is still to come”**. In addition to that, he asked, almost insisting on **“when and whether the army will for once begin the definite fight”**, because, according to him, the Croats were arming themselves more and more every day.¹⁴⁰

include Croatia, which was fiercely opposed by Jovic and Dr. Kostic. Thus, the European Community mission did not succeed due to the blockage by the Serbian block, for which Hans van den Broek accused Serbia, which, making efforts to hide its aggressor intentions, was persistently opposing the internationalisation of the problem and the presence of objective observers (Ibid., pp. 152-154).

The escalation of the war against Croatia prompted the request for an urgent session of the Security Council. The leadership of Croatia was advocating full internationalisation (Ibid., p. 157).

¹³⁸ Ibid. In presenting this piece of data, Jovic wrote: **“We shall see how long this will last. The Croats are mainly taking advantage of the ceasefire to surprise and kill JNA soldiers. We are constantly cautioning the military leadership to increase their precautionary measures”** (Ibid.).

¹³⁹ Ibid., p. 370.

¹⁴⁰ Jovic presented his assessment **“that the Croats are cornered, that they are facing a dilemma: the escalation of the war means a military defeat for them, while accepting peace brings them defeat at the interior policy level. Their only hope is to internationalise the problem and bring in foreign troops. This can only happen in the option of international recognition of Croatia, which could be caused by some wrong move on our part. One such move could be the attack of the army on the Croatian government. The world would turn against us. The problem is how to disarm them, without overthrowing the government”** (Ibid., pp. 370-371).

Speaking about the situation within the army, General Adzic said **“it was not specially good. Selections are being made, but fairly slowly”**.¹⁴¹

This meeting resulted in an agreement **“that the army should not decrease its combat preparedness, regardless of the truce”**.¹⁴²

At the time, Jovic assessed the significance of **intensive expulsion of Slovenians and Croats from the army, the withdrawal of the army onto the territories it will ultimately defend, and them clean up from the HDZ army**. According to him, this was the only solution, because everything else is **“wandering and waste of time. Step by step, but slowly”**, this was getting realized, according to Jovic.¹⁴³

At a meeting at Kadijevic's, on August 14 which was, in addition to himself, also attended by General Adzic, Milosevic, Jovic, Momir Bulatovic, and Dr. Branko Kostic (**the meeting of the “Group of six”**), the General communicated **“the assessment of the army”** (**“...the Croats have opted for increasing tensions with the JNA”**, disagreement with the Serbs in Krajina and Slavonia, paying much more attention to Bosnia, and the like)¹⁴⁴, and he proposed the formation of a regular coordination

Jovic left this meeting before its end, because of his trip to Vojvodina. General Kadijevic gave him **“the credits”** for the **“reasonable”** position. In relation to this, in his memoirs, Jovic wrote down: **“Veljko is strange, one time he is in favour of the general attack and overthrow of the Croatian government, the other time he is against it”** (Ibid., p. 371).

¹⁴¹ Ibid., p. 371.

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ Ibid. Jovic formulated this assessment of his in the following manner: **“We really have no other solution but to intensively expel Croats and Slovenes from the army, withdraw our army onto the territory that we will ultimately defend, and use all the force available to clean them up from the HDZ army”** (Ibid.).

¹⁴⁴ Ibid. In relation to this, among other things, Kadijevic stated: **“According to the information coming from several sources, and the Greek one is completely reliable, the Croats have opted to increase the tensions with the JNA, in order to use the increased confrontation as a cause for foreign military intervention.**

The current situation does not suit them. They have support from the Vatican and the FRG, as well as the blessing of the USA.

The Romanians are anticipating a similar attack in their country in October, but they are associating it with the developments in Yugoslavia, for fear of the Hungarians.

system in the aforementioned composition. He substantiated this with the fact that **“the others are working much more systematically than we are”**. He admitted that this approach is dangerous for the army, but he pointed out that it is in fact necessary. Therefore he stated it would be good **“to form an expert headquarters of some 5-6 people (Serbia, Montenegro, and the JNA), which would have the task of making assessments and proposing decisions”**.¹⁴⁵

His proposal on the systematic coordination among the **“Group of Six”** was accepted, which, in particular from August 14 onwards, took actual decisions. However, the idea for the formation of the **“expert headquarters”** was not supported, with the explanation that **“it is the army which should be doing analyses”**.¹⁴⁶

Under the influence of the international community, in early August 1991, Serbia accepted the decisions for ceasefire and establishment of a truce, however, it regularly did not abide by them, just as it happened with the decision of August 6. The JNA undertook joint military actions, committing numerous crimes.¹⁴⁷ On August 8, the Government of the

Foreign military powers assess that the next movement in the action to overthrow the leadership of Serbia and the JNA needs to be a division within the SPS, because they have assessed that the opposition forces are weak.

There is a serious problem of disagreement between the Serbs in Krajina and in Slavonia, on political and military terms. There is an urgent need for coordination” (Ibid.).

“About BiH [Bosnia and Herzegovina], he says that Alija and his people will not easily change their positions. Much more attention should be paid to Bosnia” (Ibid.).

¹⁴⁵ Ibid. Jovic commented on this proposal as follows: **“I am afraid that, on the contrary, we could miss out on the main things”**.

Jovic wrote that Kadijevec had presented the example that Branko Kostic **“had stated last night, without prior agreement, that it was better to call in he reservists, than to extend the retaining of recruits, which is not the position and the assessment of the army”** (Ibid.).

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 372.

¹⁴⁷ S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. 159. The aggressor attacks against Croatia in the first half of August, according to Mesic, **“became of devastating intensity. The targets of military cannons have these days been Osijek, Vinkovci, and Saborsko, and the attacks are also beginning on Ceminac and Topusko in Banija. The parachute**

Republic of Slovenia informed the world that Croatia “**is exposed to aggression of the Yugoslav Army**”. Mesic was stating in vain that it is only possible by internationalisation and bringing in of peace forces to prevent “**the transformation of a crisis into a war clash**”. Therefore, just like the leadership of the Republic of Croatia, he persistently insisted on the expansion of the mandate for the observer mission and further involvement of the ministerial group of three in Yugoslavia. Serbia did not respect the truce, and Milosevic was tricking the world, in an effort to conquer as much as possible of the Croatian territory, in order to realize the Greater Serbia dream. The JNA used the truce to raise “**the combat preparedness**” and strengthening of the army, that is, emergency measures, and sought from the Presidency to order “**constitutional recruitment**”, that is, “**enforcement of the law**”, complaining that in July 1991, only 51.6% of the recruits were sent to the Army.¹⁴⁸

units of the JNA have blocked the island of Solta. Zadar with the surrounding settlements is without water supply; near Obrovac, the terrorists have turned down the water pipeline valves. Near Kostajnica, new crimes are in abundance; HTV reporter Goran Lederer was shot dead. In eastern Slavonia and western Srijem, in Baranja, in Banija and Kordun, and in Lika, there are already more than 30,000 expelled Croats, but there are also tens of thousands of Serbs who had also left, and who are still being called upon by the Serb authorities and taken care about in Serbia, by sending buses and lines of private vehicles to pick them up, even to villages where there has been absolutely no intervention by the armed forces of the Republic of Croatia” (Ibid., p. 159).

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., pp. 159-163. The Assembly of the Republic of Croatia brought the Decision for Non-Application of the Law on obligatory military service, so the recruits from Croatia no longer went to the JNA, just like from Macedonia either. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, sending of the recruits during July was postponed, and in August, the recruited young men could only be deployed in the units within Bosnia and Herzegovina. Starting from the assessment that “**Serbia is there, wherever Serbs may live**”, on July 8, Serbia adopted the position “**that the recruits from the Republic of Serbia should be sent to serve the military term only in the JNA units on the territories populated by the nations which have opted to live in Yugoslavia**” (Ibid., p. 161).

Left without recruits, on August 12, “**in compliance with the federal laws**”, the SSNO dictated the following decision to the Presidency:

“1. No later than by the end of August of this year, the military territorial authorities shall take over the military obligation tasks on the whole territory of the SFRY, except for the Republic of Slovenia.”

The truce in Croatia was violated both in the late second and early third week of August, particularly in Banija. The JNA was using artillery to bomb Osijek, Vinkovci, Vukovar, and other places. On August 16, troops and artillery of the Banja Luka Corps of the JNA, commanded by general Uzelac, were thrown into West Slavonia.¹⁴⁹

The aggressor's attacks against Croatia were intensified on August 16 and 17. At the sessions of the Parliament, Mesic was pointing out those crimes and persistently demanding that they be stopped. On August 16, at the session of the Presidency, Dr. Kostic "**soothed**" him by telling him that his Commission will investigate into that. However, the JNA continued attacking with unremitting force. Independently of the diversion of the Fifth Corps of the JNA into West Slavonia, the Serbian Democratic Party (in mid-August) sent a thousand of Serbs to fight against the Republic of Croatia.¹⁵⁰

The failed state coup by Marshall Yazov and Kryuchkov (Vladimir Alexandrovich Kryuchkov, Chairman of the KGB) in Moscow on August 19, 1991, destroyed the last hope for Milosevic and the military leadership that they would receive external support for their own counterrevolution in Yugoslavia. Thus, the somewhat premature joy of the Socialist Party

2. They shall undertake all the necessary measures, including measures of criminal prosecution, against the most responsible individuals sabotaging and not implementing the Law on obligatory military service, and the Decision of the Presidency of the SFRY in terms of the military obligation and of recruits to the JNA.

3. They shall maintain the combat preparedness of the JNA at the required level" (Ibid., p. 161).

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., pp. 164-166.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., pp. 166-170. The armed formations of the Serb insurgents in West Slavonia, on August 1991, attacked a unit of the Croatian police and the ZNG in Okucani. Due to this, the Government of the Republic of Croatia demanded an urgent meeting of the Presidency of the SFRY. On the same day, the Combat Group of the 265th Mechanized Brigade was sent from Bjelovar, and a part of the 329th Armoured Brigade entered Okucani from the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and attacked the Croatian police forces. The military leadership rejected the accusation of the leadership of the Republic of Croatia for an open aggression as ungrounded, believing it "**is logical to involve the forces of the First Military District and the units of the Banja Luka Corps on the prevention of interethnic clashes in their areas of responsibility**" (D. Marijan, the aforementioned work, p. 305).

of Serbia¹⁵¹ died down immediately, and Milosevic had to give up the sheer hope of ruling all of Yugoslavia, with the help of the “reborn” USSR. Milosevic tried to overthrow the federal government¹⁵² and activated the reserve plan: the “antifascist” propaganda and rhetoric of the JNA and the regime started converting into the Greater Serbia rhetoric (“Ustashas” began meaning “Croats” ever more often, and less and less “the HDZ regime”). The JNA units, deployed in July 1991 on the border of Vojvodina and Croatia, went into an conquest for territories, rather than an attack to overthrow the HDZ government in Croatia. The ethnical one was replacing the political platform of the war. The JNA is swiftly becoming the Serb army.¹⁵³

The territorial aspirations of Serbia towards Croatia and some other republics become more expressive in late August 1991. The aggression against Croatia was still escalating. The decision for an immediate and

¹⁵¹ O. Backovic-M. Vasic-A. Vasovic, the aforementioned work, p. 358; M. Vasic-F. Schwarm, **MIRIS ZLOCINA – SRPSKE PARAVOJNE FORMACIJE 1990.-2000.**, in: RATOVI U JUGOSLAVIJI 1991.-1999., Compilation of Communiqués and Discussions from the Round Table, Belgrade, November 7-9, 2001, Belgrade 2002, p. 243. Departure of Mikhail Gorbachev was desirable among the Yugoslav general circles. In addition to the military circles, pleasure was also evident among the Milosevic circle. Professor Mihajlo Markovic, one of Jovic’s head people in the SPS (the ruling party) publicly supported the putschists (S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, pp. 170-171).

¹⁵² Ibid. At the session of the Presidency of the SFRY, with the presidents of the republics, on August 22, Milosevic presented the claim that Markovic’s economic policy was disastrous, about which “**they had nicely warned him**” last year (December 27), which is his fault (“**It’s your fault!**”). This was the way Milosevic used in trying to overthrow the Federal Government, which had before him been initiated by Momir Bulatovic, when he claimed: “**If there is no Assembly, if it is not functioning, then there is no SIV either**”. Markovic patiently responded to such ill-argued accusations: “**Serbia prevented the adoption of the economic program for 1991. Serbia made a diversion into the payment system, Serbia did not adhere to any single agreement, so how can they simply throw the responsibility on someone else’s back**”. Milosevic reacted to this, waving down his hand: “**That was last year**”, and Markovic replied again: “**Last year, you undermined the economic policy, you suspended the commercial and economic relations, you exceeded allowed public wages and expenditure, you made diversions into the payment and monetary system... The production is falling down, and wages are increasing. The two most recent wage rounds were paid in the amount of 41.5 billion dinars...**” (S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. 181).

¹⁵³ Ibid.

unconditional ceasefire in the Republic of Croatia was constantly violated. Even Kostic's "State Commission" could not cover up the increasing casualties and vast material damage.¹⁵⁴

On August 27, the observer mission of the European Community found that the JNA was acting jointly with Serb insurgents against Croatia (i.e. that it had sided with the aggressor option of Serbia). In the "**Declaration about Yugoslavia**", the European Community communicated its commitment that "**it shall never recognize the change of borders**" and "**that it shall not accept the fait accompli policy**", and presented its intention to convene a peace conference and establish an arbitration procedure. This document contains three principles: **the determination of the aggressor** (i.e. Serbia, JNA), **international supervision**, and, a **conference on Yugoslavia**. In this way, "**the door was widely opened for internationalisation of the Yugoslav crisis complex**", that is, particularly the aggression against Croatia was internationalised, an effect Serbia had opposed, particularly the presence of observers of the European Community in Croatia.¹⁵⁵

The persuasion took five days. Only in the continuation of the session with the representatives of the European Community and the presidents of the republics, on September 1, did the Presidency of the SFRY accept the documents of the European Community titled *Declaration on Yugoslavia*,

¹⁵⁴ S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, pp. 187-188. In August 1991, General Spiro Nikovic, the Knin commander, stated that in five days the army can complete a very successful operation, and this has to be done by the Army itself, instead of pretending to be a peacemaker in the so-called buffer zone. General Uzelac, commander of the Banja Luka Corps, instructed the subjected commanders to cross the Sava river with tanks and armoured vehicles, and to push towards the North "**in order to identify the right, correct borders**". For the Serbian government, "**this was not a conquest, this was not the war of Serbia against Croatia, and this was only about saving endangered Serbs and correcting unjust administrative borders**". However, this was the Serbian scenario for a change of the borders, that is, an aggressive war for Greater Serbia (Ibid., pp. 186, 191, and 194).

On August 27, 1991, huge JNA forces started towards Croatia through Bosnia and Herzegovina (Ibid., p. 185).

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., pp. 198-200. Thus, claims Mesic, Europe named the aggressor (Serbia) and did not allow forced change of the borders. In relation to this, he writes: "**The Greater Serbia scenario is failing. Through internationalisation, we are entering the process of prevention of this dirty war imposed on Croatia**" – Ibid., pp. 198-200, and 203-204.

*Memorandum of Understanding for the Expansion of the Monitoring Mission in Yugoslavia, and Ceasefire Agreement.*¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁶ S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, pp. 206-212; B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 380-382. On August 29, these documents were “**studied**” by Slobodan Milosevic and Borisav Jovic. In his diary for August 29, Jovic noted down: “**I give Slobodan my opinion on the essence and course of yesterday’s session of the Presidency. He fully agrees with me. He says he is facing unseen pressure by the EC representatives. The pressure is based on falsities, and they are transformed into accusations. He was thinking about what position we should take. He believes that the Declaration is something they have adopted and something we cannot change, although it is not fair and just. This is not worth discussing. We should concentrate on the documents we are expected to sign, and this is the Agreement for Ceasefire ad the Memorandum of Understanding. Do everything we can to correct in those documents whatever is not acceptable, and then fight further. He believes that it could even be worse for us if they isolated us immediately, instead of going into the further course together, so that we can fight. If they manage to put us aside at this point, they can forever impute on us that we have ourselves chosen such way.**”

I warn him that the Declaration has not only unacceptable assessments, but also demands that we accept a Peace Conference, arbitration, monitoring, and truce, which are based on such unacceptable starting assessments, so hence, it is not possible to ‘become aware of it’ and keep silent. Also, I warn him that ‘Ceasefire Agreement’ demands the disarmament of all paramilitary units except the Croatian police, and it was exactly the Croats who had declared the largest number of illegally armed forces to be police forces, which have grown to 120,000 members. It also envisages the exclusion ‘the regular guard formations’ from the disarmament, which is unacceptable, because the whole Croatian guard is illegal. It turns out that it demands only the disarmament of the Serb units in Krajina, if there are any at all. Further, it demands that the JNA withdraws into barracks, which would be home arrest for the army. Supposedly it involves withdrawal into garrisons rather than barracks. These are all unacceptable positions, aiming to impose an ultimatum upon us to sign, otherwise they shall ‘excommunicate’ us, and continue negotiations with those who accept that, and they shall accuse us of breaking up Yugoslavia.

Slobodan says that we had better entered the further circle of negotiations, rather than being accused of having excluded ourselves. He reminds me that the army is thinking in similar terms. He will still think the whole situation over, but he expects big pressure on the part of the EC against us. He hopes that in the next phase we will nevertheless have space and time to explicate our position and to establish a more equal treatment.

We concluded that, in the meeting of the Presidency, I should try to obtain some corrections to the documents, if possible” (B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 380-381).

Milosevic's group in the Presidency of the SFRY voted "in favour", **"but with the statements that this is an ultimatum intended at the international isolation of Serbia and Montenegro"**, which, according to Jovic, **"will not bring anything good either to Yugoslavia or to those who have opted for such political violence"**.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁷ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 381-382. During the voting about the Memorandum on the Observer Mission, Jovic said: **"It is in vain to speak, there is no possibility for discussion. I have to accept the imposed destiny, too"**(S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. 212).

About this last session of the Presidency in full composition, Jovic wrote down:
"September 1, 1991.

Session of the Presidency. Continued review of the documents (the ultimatum) of the EC.

Mesic demanded that we vote immediately, because the European 'group of three' is waiting for our position (They had come, although we did not invite them).

I present the objections to the Agreement for Ceasefire, and seek that the Presidency takes the position that the Croatian police forces above the normal composition of 20,000 people should be disarmed, as well as the Croatian guard in full, and that the JNA should withdraw into garrisons, rather than into barracks.

Mesic and Drnovsek are insisting on having nothing changed. Loncar is supporting them. They say, those who want to sign will go into further negotiation, and those who don't, may exclude themselves. The only thing left was to vote and there is not much more to discuss or negotiate about.

Upon my strong insistence, they agreed that I call Van den Broek myself and tell him about my objections, which, if removed, provide the opportunity for the documents to be signed.

We stopped the session so I could make that phone call.

Van den Broek was brutally resentful. He told me: 'I have not come here to negotiate with you'. He did not want to even hear about any changes. It was clear that he was eager to see the excommunication of Serbia and its isolation, as well as that there was a clear agreement with Mesic and Drnovsek.

I returned to the session of the Presidency to inform them about the result. The separatists were triumphing. They had expected a triumph – which I and the rest from Serbia and Montenegro, would vote against. We voted in favour, with the statements that this is an ultimatum intended at the international isolation of Serbia and Montenegro, which will not bring anything good either to Yugoslavia, or to those who have opted for such political violence" (B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 381-382).

At the meeting of the Informal Group of Six, on September 5, after the Agreement for Ceasefire had been signed on September 1, with the Memorandum on European Observers, Kadijevic gave **“the assessment of the situation”**,¹⁵⁸ presenting a number of **“thoughts and positions in the army”**,¹⁵⁹ and in particular the cases in which the army must be ready for war,¹⁶⁰ and gave a number of proposals. According to Kadijevic, the war had to be **offensive in nature, and of high intensity, “because otherwise they would be going into a defeat”**. The imposition of the offensive war, according to him, required **mobilization in Serbia and Montenegro, then of Serbs in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and “some Macedonians and Muslims”**.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 382. In relation to this, Kadijevic stated: **“The agreement for ceasefire is a sign of failure of the Croato-German line and the failure of the trap they had set up for Serbia. After the Agreement, they tried to retrieve the conflict line, in order to have Slovenia and Croatia recognized, with potential addition of the ‘Blue Helmets’, or an European army.**

Serbia and the Army find it suitable that the European Conference on Yugoslavia starts soon, on the 7th and 8th of this month. This is good for the army, because its tenacity is very limited.

The goal of Croatia and Germany is to either quickly impose a dictate or extort the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, and this has been avoided.

The French and the English see the German penetration line into the Balkans, and they oppose the disintegration of Yugoslavia and recognition of Croatia” (Ibid.).

Milosevic also stated that the Greek minister of foreign affairs had presented similar assessments to him (Ibid.).

¹⁵⁹ Ibid. According to Jovic, Kadijevic presented **“the following thoughts and positions about the army:**

The Army cannot be the only federal institution for the adoption and implementation of the truce, but part of the overall system of the Federation.

The transformation of the Army has to go just like the transformation of Yugoslavia goes” (Ibid.).

¹⁶⁰ Ibid. According to Kadijevic, the Army had to be ready for war in the following cases:

“1. If Croatia continues with provocations and blockades up to an unbearable extent, and if it proves that this would cause the disintegration of the JNA.

2. If ultimate solutions were to be imposed to introduce solutions unacceptable to the Serbian people” (Ibid.).

¹⁶¹ Ibid., p. 383.

Starting from the position that such decisions require **“coordination between policy and propaganda, particularly in relation to the people who are going to war”**, at this joint meeting, Kadijevec was demanding that such a decision be made.¹⁶²

“The Group of six” received the information about Kadijevec’s assessment and proposals, and they agreed that they would meet soon again and continue **“further review of the situation and directing of the course of developments”**.¹⁶³

In early September 1991, in spite of the Agreement for Ceasefire, the aggression against the Republic of Croatia was continued and intensified (the Agreement **“did not ensure peace. The war escalated”**).¹⁶⁴ On September 3, the Presidency held a futile session in Belgrade. The European Community in The Hague adopted one more declaration on Yugoslavia and brought the decision that on September 7, they convene a Conference

¹⁶² Ibid. Kadijevec then spoke about the material resources, funding, ethnic composition of the JNA, and the like, which was recorded in Jovic’s memoirs as follows:

“The material resources are partially limited. Lethal devices and fuel are limited in the Air Force.

The funding provided should be the one of the wartime. At present, the National Bank of Yugoslavia has 60 billion dinars for war reserves [4.3 billion €; note by the author].

The ethnic composition of the JNA would, in that case, have to change even further. Even without that, clashes happen every day within families and between officers.

Slovenia and Croatia need to be exposed to conflict with Europe, within the EC. Support Europe in whatever it may propose (preservation of Yugoslavia, a new constitutional solution, and the like).

Through the evolution of discussion, we will reach what suits us best, because the Croats and Slovenians will remain stubbornly for the option of secession and thus annoy Europe.

Our concept is: Yugoslavia, a union of equals, and an efficient state, without experiments, self-determination of the peoples.

We should not go into tiny details with minor issues, but we should stick to the principles” (Ibid.).

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, pp. 213-215.

on Yugoslavia, to be chaired by Lord Carrington. General Kadijevec states that **“the regime in Croatia is a fascist one”**, this republic is strewn with **“neo-Nazism, the main threat to the Serbian people”**. **“He trusted”** that **“there is no army in the world, at any moment in history, which had found itself in a more unenviable position than ours, we remained stateless!...”**. The peace conference on Yugoslavia started working on September 7, in The Hague, and was held in prolongations, under the chairmanship of Lord David Carrington.¹⁶⁵

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., pp. 215-232. According to Mesic, Europe understood that the war waged in Croatia was not the war of the Croatian Serbs for their rights, but that it is the occupation of Croatian territories, in order to form Greater Serbia (Ibid., p. 213).

The Hague Peace Conference on Yugoslavia, convened by the EC member countries, was attended by the members of the Presidency of the SFRY, the President of the SIV, the six republic presidents, the Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs, the EC foreign affairs ministers, the representatives of the European Commission, the European Political Cooperation, the CSCE, and Lord Carrington as the chairman.

In the joint communiqué, the participants stated:

“We, the representatives of the European Community and the member countries, as well as of Yugoslavia and its republics, participants at the opening of the Conference on Yugoslavia, have gathered at the Peace Palace in The Hague, on September 7, 1991.

It is our common goal to bring peace to everyone in Yugoslavia and to find durable solutions, only on terms of all their legitimate apprehensions and aspirations. In order to accomplish that, we have decided to establish an Arbitration Commission under this Conference.

The opening of today’s conference marks the beginning of negotiations about the future of Yugoslavia and its peoples, and the result of this negotiation must respect the interest of all parties living there.

We promise that we shall seek a peaceful solution based on the principles and obligations agreed upon under the CSCE process.

We are committed to never accept changes of any borders that would not be conducted in a peaceful and amicable way.

We affirm our commitment to the Paris Charter for the construction of a new Europe, the solidification and strengthening of democracy, as the only system we all need to be guided by.

We solemnly declare our will to do everything that is in our power to make the Conference on Yugoslavia pass peacefully, with supervision of the ceasefire and all elements required for that, and thus to contribute to a peaceful solution”.

In late first and early second week of September, the aggression against the Republic of Croatia was intensified.¹⁶⁶ Europe, not only Croatia, was shocked, and the US was “**deeply disappointed at the degeneration of the political awareness in Yugoslavia and the revival of the primordial passions in the nationalist political circles of Serbia, but also of Croatia and Slovenia**”, and even The Hague Conference “**does not give them any hope of success**”.¹⁶⁷

Unable to contact Kadijevic in direct discussion and at the session of the Presidency, on September 11, Mesic sent a letter from Zagreb to the General, which, among other things, pointed out to “**the extra-institutional action of the JNA**”.¹⁶⁸ According to Mesic, such action of

The adopted joint statement was signed by all the participants. It was agreed that on September 12, the Arbitration Commission should start working (K. Rotim, the aforementioned work, volume I, p. 144).

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 233. After his return from The Hague, Mesic found his desk “**covered with reports on intensification of the aggression: frequent attacks were made on the industrial zone of Sisak, mortars are devastating Novska, Gradiska, Gospic and Otocac, fresh troops, while people forcefully mobilized in the composition of the Banja Luka Crops were concentrating at the frontline near Okucani... Not a mention on implementation of the Agreement for Truce and Withdrawal of the Army into Barracks. The prayers for peace in Croatia and Yugoslavia by the Holy Father were also in vein. There is a terrible echo of the cries from Krusevo and Otocac, from the masses of refugees in Lovincani, Svetorocani and Riciani, from Vrlika, from Vukovar and Sarvas, from Baranja... The Croatian villages in West Srijem are burning, explosions are shaking up Vukovar and Osijek, and from September 10, the Yugo-army also started attacking Karlovac**” (Ibid.).

¹⁶⁷ Ibid. Lawrence Eagleburger stated that “**the leadership of Serbia is going for the creation of Greater Serbia... Milosevic is ready to let Slovenia and a part of Croatia become independent, but under the condition that Greater Serbia include Bosnia and Herzegovina, parts of Croatia and probably Macedonia**” (Ibid., pp. 233-234).

The US leadership, according to Mesic, surely also knew that the leadership of Serbia was “**closely cooperating with the JNA in conquering parts of Croatia**” (Ibid., p. 234).

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 237. Mesic stated several examples of the “**extra-institutional action**” of the JNA:

“- **all the insurgent groups have been armed and given protection by the JNA;**
- **the mobilization of the Serbs in the TO was done by the Army or it tolerated such mobilization, and then the TO units act under the single command of the**

the JNA was the main responsibility of the SSNO and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, that is, General Kadijevec and Adzic, who “had slipped out of control” of the Supreme Command, and acted based on the political instructions of the leadership of Serbia. Given that **the military leadership was persistently obstructing the execution of the orders of the Supreme Command**, on the same day, Mesic issued the Order for the Withdrawal of the Army into the Barracks within 48 hours.¹⁶⁹

JNA or with their knowledge, committing such crimes, even against civilians, as not remembered even from Second World War;

- **the units commanded by General Nikola Uzelac from the First Military District use heavy artillery from the territory of BiH (Bosnia-Herzegovina) to attack Croatian cities and villages, while the very same General tells the president of the Government of BiH that it shall be so until the police forces of the Republic of Croatia surrender themselves (Kostajnica);**

- **the war crimes of the so-called TO in Baranja and Srijem were committed with the active support and assistance of the JNA (the JNA has conquered Baranja and surrendered it to the extremist groups which are now sending ultimatums to the Republic of Croatia, and along with the *Chetniks*, the active JNA Major Borivoje Dobrokesa also places his signature);**

- **Milan Martic, arrested in BiH, against whom a search warrant was issued due to ascertained crimes, was transported to Knin as a national hero by General Major Aleksandar Vasiljevic, in a military helicopter;**

- **From the territories of BiH and Serbia, the JNA is using heavy artillery and tanks to destroy Croatian villages and cities (Kostajnica, Vukovar, etc.);**

- **General Aksentijevic, from the Fifth Military District, with a cynical grin on his face, presented in HTV [Croatian Television] that the withdrawal of the JNA into the barracks is the personal opinion of the President of Presidency of the SFRY, by which he has seriously violated the laws to which himself and other JNA officers like to ‘refer’;**

- **The JNA has taken the HTV [Croatian Television] transmitters to broadcast Belgrade TV propaganda (Slavonia, Dalmatia, Lika)” – Ibid., pp. 237-238.**

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., pp. 238-239; K. Rotim, the aforementioned work, p. 147. This order fully stated: “**that all the units have to withdraw into their barracks within 48 hours, and that the units which, with the help of the insurgent groups, have taken the area of the Beli Manastir municipality should withdraw from that area within 72 hours from the moment of the announcement of this order in public media. All the military commanders who neglect and fail to execute the orders of the Presidency of the SFRY for withdrawal of the Army into the barracks shall be placing themselves beyond the law...**”

The military leadership refused to execute the order of the President of Presidency of the SFRY, ordering the withdrawal of the JNA into barracks. The next day, General Kadijevic replied to Mesic (through fax, with the “urgent delivery” sign, and true, it was addressed to the Presidency). In the letter, broken down in several points, among other things, the General claimed that **“the JNA does not bear the responsibility for human casualties and for the destruction.... Members and units of the JNA had been opening fire only for the sake of their own protection...”**, and that the army **“shall not withdraw into the barracks”**.¹⁷⁰ Thus

By withdrawing the army units of JNA to army barracks, and dissolving the illegally mobilized units of TO, since no such decision was made by the presidency of SFRJ, the conditions for solving the crisis in a peaceful and democratic manner will be created with all the relevant factors. Only by withdrawing the armies, it is possible to secure functioning of a legal state and all of its institutions...The army commanders who disobey and do not act according to the decisions of the presidency of SFRJ about the army withdrawal will automatically place themselves outside the law...” (S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. 238).

Jovic writes that **“it was without a session of the Presidency, and on his own, that Mesic had issued the ‘Order’ for the army to withdraw into the barracks”**. This order by Mesic was, as Jovic claims, assessed by the leadership of the Greater Serbia movement **“as the creation of reasons for attacking the army in Croatia. If the army fails to ‘obey’, they will be pronounce outlaws and occupators in Croatia. The purpose is to more easily explain and justify the aggression of Croatia against the Army. In fact, is preparing a declaration of war against the Army.**

However, the Army does not have the right to obey individual decisions of that kind”, wrote Jovic (B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 385).

Jovic demanded and insisted that Mesic, as the President of the Presidency of the SFRY, **“convenes an urgent session of the Presidency of the SFRY, in order to review the action of the President of the Presidency of the SFRY – issuance of the order that the JNA units withdraw to the barracks without prior decision of the Presidency of the SFRY”** (S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. 241).

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 239-241. Such a response by Kadijevic was published in: K. Rotim, the aforementioned work, pp. 144-147.

On August 3, the Assembly of the Republic of Croatia adopted Conclusions in which it brought up the demand that the JNA withdraw from the territory of the Republic of Croatia without delay. As the JNA neglected these conclusions and continued with the aggression, in early September, Croatian forces began making pressure on the barracks. The **order** by the President of the Presidency of the SFRY Stipe Mesic dated September 11, for withdrawal of the JNA units into barracks within 48 hours was rejected by the military leadership as unlawful (D. Marijan, **JUGOSLOVENSKA NARODNA ARMIIJA...**, p. 306).

the JNA acted extra-institutionally and virtually committed a military coup.¹⁷¹

On September 12th, the meeting of “**the Group of six**” was held (“**a continuation of the meeting in the same composition**” like the one on September 5). Starting from the statements made at the previous meeting, “**the Group of six**” decided that the Peace Conference is for them “**a desirable and correct way, and that the war is imminent if the conditions [for it] are in place**”, i.e. those that they discussed the previous time. It was assessed that the Croats “**will more probably force the war onwards, rather than the Conference achieving success**”.¹⁷²

On the same day, General Kadijevic and Admiral Brovet talked to Sir Fitzroy McLean – (Envoy of Great Britain to the Supreme Headquarters of the NOV and POJ in WWII), who was sent to Yugoslavia by Lord Carrington, Chairman of the European Conference on Yugoslavia, and to the Ambassador of the Great Britain. Speaking about a potential solution to the Yugoslav issue, Kadijevic declaratively stated that it is best to have **an integral Yugoslavia**, and he did not fail to note that, if allegedly this were not possible, than “**a narrowed Yugoslavia**” would be an option: “**Serbia and Montenegro, and whoever else wants it**”.¹⁷³ At this, he intentionally “**forgot**” to clarify what he meant and which nation he was referring to under the formulation “**and whoever else wants it**”.

Stating the fact that “**a quick decision must be made about the future of Yugoslavia**”, in addition to the message that “**it will not be so easy to reach the ceasefire in Yugoslavia...**”, the military leadership also indicated upon the existence of risk from “**expansion of the conflict to BiH**”, after which it would allegedly “**be much harder to come out of the chaos**”.¹⁷⁴ This was a public announcement of their planned aggression on Bosnia, which followed soon after.

¹⁷¹ K. Rotim, the aforementioned work, p. 147; B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, pp. 186-187.

¹⁷² B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 383.

¹⁷³ Ibid., p. 384.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid. According to Jovic, the main messages of General Kadijevic and Admiral Brovet were:

On September 12, upon the invitation of Francois Mitterrand, Milosevic visited Paris,¹⁷⁵ where the French president persuaded him to accept the creation of the European Arbitration, whereas Ante Markovic tried to perform a reconstruction in the Government.¹⁷⁶

For the leadership of the Greater Serbia movement (“**both for the political leadership of Serbia and for the JNA**”), the “**status, tenacity of the Army and the ultimate political solution of the issue of Serbs in Croatia were the key issues**”.¹⁷⁷ Following an assessment of the military leadership, their realization required a sufficient amount of manpower at their disposal. However, General Kadijevic then claimed that with their available manpower, they are not ready for the war with Croatia. Therefore, according to him, mobilization was necessary, because, if the war “**begins, it will very probably develop into a general conflict**”. He insisted on two parallel processes – **negotiations for peace and**

“They were made aware of the fact that it will not be so easy to reach ceasefire in Yugoslavia, unless they stop the Germans, who influence the Croats, encouraging and assisting them. This is the key to their power, if they have any.

A quick decision should be made about the future of Yugoslavia, because there is danger from expansion of the conflict into BiH, after which it would be much harder to come out of the chaos” (Ibid.).

Kadijevic and Brovet were satisfied at having deluded McLaine and the British Ambassador (Ibid.).

¹⁷⁵ Ibid. According to Jovic, Milosevic “**was visiting Paris upon Mitterrand’s invitation.**

Mitterrand’s evolution from clear support to Serbia, to siding up with the other options, as explained to Milosevic, is in the function of interior political needs.

Probably so, but why are they settling their interior political needs at our expense?

Mitterrand persuaded Milosevic that he should accept the formation of a European arbitration, which would ‘fairly’ assess what is actually happening in Yugoslavia and what needs to be done” (Ibid., pp. 384-385).

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 385. The attempt by Ante Markovic to reconstruct the Government was evaluated by the “**Group of Six**” as “**a manoeuvre for his own rehabilitation and strengthening of his own position, as well as the desire to dispose of those whom he does not like, Veljko Kadijevic above all. We shall not support that**” (Ibid.).

¹⁷⁷ Ibid. Indicating upon those “**key issues**”, Jovic states that the European Community “**has persistently recommended them to refrain from them, but there is a limit to that as well**”.

preparation for war. At the same time, his assessment was that “**for both of these, mobilization is the key point**”, which, according to him, “**began with some 5,000 people**”, at which the response was crushing – 25%.¹⁷⁸

According to the RAM plan, the mobilization of new units was to be used to “**cut up**” Croatia and force it to capitulate:

“1. Cut up Slavonia along the line of Okucani – Pakrac – Daruvar.

Push out onto the line of Vinkovci – Osijek and go along the Drava valley to merge with the army coming from Daruvar.

Push through along the line of Petrovac – Karlovac and merge with the units from this region, joined by the units coming from Slovenia. Cut away Zagreb from the South.

Push through to the Adriatic, along the line of Zadar – Sibenik – Split.

Cut up Herzegovina and Croatia along the line of Mostar – Ploce”.¹⁷⁹

In mid-September 1991, the commands, units and institutions of the JNA in Croatia, had found themselves in an exceptionally hard situation, only due to failed mobilization. All the smaller and a number of larger garrisons and warehouses were taken by Croatian forces; in Gospic, the barracks were surrendered, and the Territorial Defence left the area it was holding; Korenica too was threatened; the garrison in Virovitica (with 200 people) also fell; the garrison of Djakovo surrendered without fight; some 60 smaller facilities with some 10-20 people were also taken; the forces in Varazdin and Bjelovar were almost exhausted, and Zagreb, Jastrebarsko, and some other places were surrounded; from Rijeka down to Split, all the garrisons were threatened; the whole of Dalmatia was cut off (militarily); the Ploce garrison was taken; Vinkovci and Nasice were besieged; the garrison of Vukovar

¹⁷⁸ Ibid. According to Kadijevec, this was “**very concerning**”, and he was not sure “**if it would be different even if the war began**”.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 386. This mobilization did not succeed.

was unblocked, “but the city was not taken”; the garrison in Slavonski Brod was taken. The JNA was holding the region of Okucani, and the Ninth Corps accomplished “some good results”. As a whole, the situation for the JNA was favourable for offensive actions through Okucani and Pakrac, where Slavonia was to be cut in half, but **“there was no moral among the army”**. In eastern Slavonia, the brigades from Vojvodina had scattered themselves around. In mid- and second half of September (more exactly, on September 20), the most critical situation was in Gracac and Knin, via which the Croats could penetrate towards Knin. Therefore the front line was to be strengthened with manpower, which was lacking at the time because the mobilization had not succeeded.¹⁸⁰

In the discussion with the leadership of the Greater Serbia movement, Jovic repeated the **“question which according to him was the key one, for a million times”**, the question that occupied him all of the time: **“is it in their goal to use the army ‘to defend the new borders of the people who wish to stay in Yugoslavia’, or to overthrow the Croatian government?”** In addition, he also wondered **“why we need the general conflict along the depth of the Croatian territory?”**¹⁸¹

In response to this and similar questions, Jovic claims **“that there was not much sense to it”**, because the army was **“still intoxicated with Yugoslavia, although we had talked many times and said this was not realistic anymore”**. He believed that **“we have quite enough manpower if we withdraw all the forces from Slovenia and Croatia onto the future borders”**¹⁸² – borders of Greater Serbia. At this, he was afraid **“that due to this there will be more misunderstandings and difficulties to come”**. **“Spreading the army across Croatia”** represented for him **“a nonsense, and it was even less reasonable for us to overthrow the government”**, because they had elected it themselves, so - **let them have it”**.¹⁸³

180 Ibid.

181 Ibid., p. 385.

182 Ibid.

183 Ibid. Finally, Jovic concluded that the lack of decisiveness with the army may cost them dearly.

On September 17, 1991, in Igalo, Carrington forced Milosevic and Kadijevic on the one hand, and Tudjman, on the other hand, to sign an agreement on full ceasefire. The next day, Markovic demanded the dismissal of Veljko Kadijevic and Stane Brovet, because Kadijevic had secretly gone to Moscow for a meeting with defence minister Yazov, and had ordered a large number of helicopters, aircraft and rocket systems. On the same day, at the session of the SIV, Markovic informed about the conversation between Milosevic and Karadzic, in which he ordered the leader of the SDS of Bosnia and Herzegovina (by phone) to contact general Uzelac in Banja Luka, for the purpose of implementation of the war plan coded “RAM”.¹⁸⁴

The Greater Serbia movement insisted on the implementation of the planned high intensity “RAM” operations, with the purpose of defeating Croatia and pushing through onto the borders of the projected Greater Serbia. The contribution of the Navy and of the majority of the Air Force consisted in blocking Croatia from the air and from the sea, and the use of new motorized, armoured, and mechanized brigades of land army in a number of directions was to cut up Tudjman’s “pretzel” and force him into capitulation.

On September 17, 1991, the Navy of the Armed Forces of the SFRY begun with a naval blockade of the Adriatic ports, and offered fire support to the action of the Marine and Land Army sector forces, focused in the areas of the cities of Dubrovnik, Split, Zadar, Sibenik, and Ploce.¹⁸⁵

In addition to the Navy, there were also two other operational groups of the JNA active in the South of Croatia. On the section between Mostar and Split, the **37th (Uzice) Corps** from Serbia was active, which, in cooperation with the **2nd (Podgorica) Corps**, as of the second half of September 1991, occupied all of eastern and central Herzegovina, which constituted the beginning of the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina.

However, due to the poor response of the reservists, the assignment of the 37th Corps was reduced to securing the airport in Mostar, and

¹⁸⁴ S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, pp. 236-247; K. Rotim, the aforementioned work, p. 142. See: pp. 494-495, and 578-581.

¹⁸⁵ D. Marijan, the aforementioned work, p. 313.

intimidating the non-Serb population. To the East of the 37th Corps, the forces of the **2nd (Podgorica) Corps and the 9th Marine Sector of Boka** were active. The Operational Group for South Herzegovina and Dalmatia, that is, the 2nd Operational Group, coordinated their actions towards Dubrovnik.¹⁸⁶

On September 20, “**the Group of six**” continued the discussion in the same composition. General Adzic informed about the “**occupation all the smaller and some larger garrisons and warehouses on the territory of Croatia**”, that is, on the defeats of the JNA in Croatia, primarily due to the failure of the mobilization, due to which a “**reduced plan**” needed to be made.¹⁸⁷

Jovic explained the “**nice**” information on how, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, “**resistance had occurred by Muslims against the army which had started from Serbia towards Krajina and Okucani as well as from Montenegro towards Mostar,**” as a result “**of the hesitation on the part of the army to withdraw onto the future borders**”. Having this in mind, he assessed that “**it will be much harder for us to now conduct further action, due to the such stupid defeats**”, which, according to him, were “**absolutely unnecessary**”.¹⁸⁸

At the meeting of “**the Group of six**” in rump composition (Kadijevic had not brought Adzic, and Kostic had not brought Bulatovic), on September 24, afraid at the prospects of defeat, and behaving “**in a very confused way, almost as though he had lost it**”, Kadijevic was speaking about the defeat of the army, about desertion, lack of motivation, risk of treason “**by the still high number of Croats in the army, about the large mistrust by the Serbs even against the loyal non-Serb officers, about the human and family dramas**”. In order to “**avoid the worst**”, he stated that “**he would immediately have to dismiss 2,000 officers**”, which was “**very difficult**”. Milosevic replied to him that he

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.

¹⁸⁷ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 386.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., pp. 386-387. In relation to this, he asked the question: “**What for do we need this lining up and down Croatia? Why do we need its capitulation?**”. According to him, “**the thing boils down to rescuing the blocked soldiers in the barracks**” (Ibid.).

should dismiss them, that he “**should have done it even earlier**”, which was responded by the General, hardly bearing to hear this, as to that “**it was easier said than done**”.¹⁸⁹

Kadijevic then concluded that the army “**shall lose the war against Croatia unless motivation and success of mobilization are ensured**”. However, according to him, this could not be accomplished “**with the semi-legality of Yugoslavia**”. Therefore, he insisted that **Serbia and Montenegro need to pronounce that the army is theirs, and to take over the command, funding, war and everything else**. He stated that all the generals in the General Staff who are Serbs, except for one, “**desire this and are thinking like this**”.¹⁹⁰

The discussion between Milosevic, Jovic and Kadijevic took long. They did not agree with the general’s assessment that **the army is about to face a defeat, nor that the mobilization has been such a failure**, because Kadijevic had received manpower of 50,000. Milosevic and Jovic could not accept **the demand that the army be deprived of the Yugoslav name and heritage of the joint state**, because thus Serbia and Montenegro “**would fully lose all the advantages, both political and military, in the existing conflict and disputing**”. At this, they asked a question “**what they [i.e. the military leadership; note by the author] mean by saying that the Serbo-Montenegrin army wages war with Croatia and should defeat it?**”¹⁹¹

In the end they split, “**with a repeated request to honour the agreement that the army leaves the territories where there are no Serbs and to defend the ones where the citizens declare that they wish to remain in Yugoslavia**”. However, Kadijevic stuck to his position, “**not disputing that he will continue the fight**”.¹⁹²

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 387.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² After the departure of Kadijevic and Branko Kostic, Milosevic and Jovic assessed that “**Veljko has lost it and would very gladly slip away in a cowardly way**”, and that his “**moral is down to zero**”.

In September 1991, there was also a lot of arguing about formulation of goals of the future involvement of the JNA. Some individuals were in favour of declaration of general mobilization, and for initiation of a military offensive which would break down

Four days later (on September 28, Sunday), “**the Group of six**” reconvened in full composition, upon the request of Kadijevic.¹⁹³ The General presented “**the assessment of the situation**”. He spoke about the situation on the frontline, where “**all the Serb areas in Croatia have been liberated**”.¹⁹⁴ He reported on the situation in the

the resistance of the Croatian regime on the whole territory of the Republic of Croatia. However, the largest number of generals was against this, at which they openly favoured the withdrawal of the JNA “**onto the ethnic borders of the Serb people**”. These borders were to be the northwestern borders of new Yugoslavia (*Profil*, no. 16, p. 108).

A number of generals, presenting their positions and commitments for the new system of the JNA, were in favour of having the JNA “**strongly and clearly**” rely on the nations accepting it as its own. According to them, these are the Serb and Montenegrin peoples, and “also partially the Muslim and Macedonian ones”. The ethnic borders of those nations, at the stage of disentanglement of the Yugoslav crisis (September 1991), were to also become the borders that the JNA can and must defend. According to them, Yugoslavia within such borders is “**the actual homeland of the JNA members**”, and they also claimed that they cannot and must not stay without their homeland. For the champions of such perceptions, in September 1991, SFRY did not exist any longer, whereas the JNA “**remained without its own state and had found itself in an airless space**” (Ibid. Pp. 108-109).

In the major part of the army personnel, in September 1991, the goals they fought for at the time were not clear, which caused major consequences. Due to this, a number of this personnel, including a number of generals, among which was even Vuk Obradovic (cf. infra), believed that the goals for which the JNA then fought “**should remain within the limits of protection of the ethnic borders of the people**” to which they belonged, and saving the JNA members “**outside those ethnic borders by combining political, international, military, and all other possible activities**”. According to them, the JNA should “**firmly stick together with the people of Krajina, the people of Baranja, Slavonia, and West Srem...**” (Ibid., p. 109).

¹⁹³ Ibid. Jovic had come from his native Niksic, where he had been spending the weekend.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid., pp. 387-388. In relation to this, Kadijevic stated:

“- **All the Serb areas in Croatia are liberated. There is still a small number of mixed settlements, which will be liberated soon.**

- **Parts of the garrisons behind the front line are in a very difficult situation. They get out one by one.**

The idea is to use the forces from the depth, mobilized and active, to strengthen the taken territory and secure normal communication with the garrisons, or for them to withdraw from the present locations.

army¹⁹⁵ and assessed that the negotiations about a peaceful solution of the crisis **“were without prospects for success, if the military option fails”**.¹⁹⁶ At this, Kadijevic, in evaluating the involvement of the JNA on Yugoslav territory thus far, concluded that its combat involvement **“is practically reduced to the protection of the Serb people and those who wish to remain with it in a joint state”**.¹⁹⁷

No single garrison would have fallen if the mobilization had been successful” (Ibid., pp. 388).

In his memoirs, Jovic noted down as follows about the issue of withdrawal of the garrisons from the then locations, about which Kadijevic was talking: “[Kadijevic] **does not explain, why he did not withdraw them when we said so, onto the new borders, and he could have done that”**.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid. When reporting on the situation in the army, Kadijevic brought up as follows:

“There is organized work aimed at breaking of the army. Now the attack by the Serb opposition forces is the most active one. Over the last three days, three putsches were attempted: in the Military Air Forces, in the VMA Military Hospital and in the Guard Brigade.

Everywhere, the same paroles and the same demands. They demand that the Presidency of the SFRY, the Supreme Command and the Army be cleansed off of traitors and that only Serbs and Montenegrins remain. There is no trust in Kadijevic and Brovet. They demand people who will ‘cleanse all, pull down everything, and kill everyone...’. No arguments are being taken into account” (Ibid.).

¹⁹⁶ Ibid. According to him, the tactics of the USA, Germany and Croatia is **“to conduct negotiations and to go for disarmament of the JNA on all bases available”**.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid. About the discussions lead by Kadijevic within the framework of the JNA, Jovic wrote: **“He quickly dissuades the people who think differently, but also, mistrust against him and Brovet is expanding quickly. They think that they could have settled all of that sooner. They do not mind the circumstances. This is a typical example of the special war. The security service could not catch all the ends where this is all coming from. Probably from one centre. Mihály Kertesz [national delegate at the Assembly of Serbia; note by the author] is frequently in contacts with certain people from the JNA through which this wave gets intensified. He is factually suspecting Kertesz.**

The readiness of the Serbs in Serbia to get involved in fights in Croatia is dissatisfactory. They are demanding action, while they do not wish to participate in it, so they criticize because there is no action! He states numerous brigades refusing to go into battle” (Ibid.).

At this meeting, Kadijevic brought up the issue of the state again. He insisted again on the offer he had also presented at the previous meeting, that the **JNA be transferred to Serbia and Montenegro**. Because, according to him, Serbia and Montenegro “**have no army of their own**”, he proposed finding a formula “**that the JNA be transferred into the hands of those people who wish to stay in Yugoslavia**”.¹⁹⁸

The assessment was made that, from the international viewpoint, this is bad. However, “**from the viewpoint of the will of the Serb nation to get involved in their own army**”, in Kadijevic’s opinion, this may even be better.¹⁹⁹

The leadership of the Greater Serbia movement was not allowed to “**walk out on**” Yugoslavia due to political reasons, or the reasons of “operational disguise” for conducting operations in this unusual war, because “**for the future disentanglement of the Yugoslav crisis, this would lead Serbia and Montenegro into unfavourable circumstances, and would lead this Serbo-Montenegrin army into the position of the ‘aggressor’ on Serbian territories outside Serbia**”.²⁰⁰

In order to strengthen the JNA, Kadijevic presented a number of proposals,²⁰¹ and asked Milosevic “**why he had never publicly acted**

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid., pp. 388-389.

²⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 389. Jovic was “**wondering**” how come that Kadijevic did not appreciate that.

Kadijevic’s conclusion that they had agreed for permanent coordination, which, according to him, “**was in place anyhow, but everyone was doing their respective jobs, so the coordination was not fitted to the needs**”, Jovic commented as how “**it is visible that he is depressed. He says, in the past he had the custom to propose what needs to be done, but now he can just as well skip that too**”.

²⁰¹ Ibid. In relation to this, he said:

“- **Everything must be done in order to stabilize and strengthen the army, in order to succeed in negotiations later on;**

- **A way needs to be found that a part of the Presidency of the SFRY [the one loyal to Milosevic; note by the author] both formally and factually takes over management and command over the armed forces of the country;**

in behalf of the army and mobilization", he spoke about **"numerous psychological traumas and problems of the officers and generals coming from mixed families and marriages"**, and he also expressed his personal readiness to **"make moves aiming at the general goal"**²⁰², and provided the assessment of the situation on the front line.²⁰³

In reviewing the staffing changes in the JNA, which were requested by Jovic and Milosevic, as they had agreed upon, a very rough discussion was lead, particularly as to the issue of the defeat in Slovenia.²⁰⁴ General

- that this part of the Presidency of the SFRY reveal its position towards the JNA and bring the necessary decisions;

- It must be ensured that the military conscripts be the army, rather than being the political problem of the army;

- Further staffing changes need to be made at the army" (Ibid.).

²⁰² Ibid. This, according to Jovic, meant that Kadujevic was ready even to resign **"if we demand it"**.

²⁰³ Ibid. Kadujevic assessed at the time that the situation on the frontline is a favourable one, expressly claiming that **"this army with maybe two brigades left is quite sufficient to complete the whole task"**. This assessment of his was commented by Jovic by stating that the General had been saying up to then **"that he needed a general mobilization. I guess he has returned to the Serb borders in his mind"** (Ibid.).

The situation on the frontline was presented by Kadujevic in the following way:

"The Knin Corps has been strengthened and the situation over there is good.

The penetration towards Pakrac is a "bone in Croatia's throat". Even there, the situation is stable.

Two more brigades have been sent to Banija and Kordun, one towards Petrinja, and the other towards Karlovac. If we sent two more brigades (one towards Knin, and the other towards Okucani), everything would be alright.

The situation in the Dubrovnik sector is solid. The Valjevo forces have fled from this sector too (resp. from the border of Montenegro and Herzegovina). The HDZ forces there can easily be eradicated.

Slovenia is pulling itself back together. We do not have enough infantry, and one cannot do without it. The Kragujevac forces have fled, as well as the Vojvodina ones. Now another brigade is getting ready in Novi Sad. It will go out to the line of Osijek – Vinkovci, and take up Vukovar, but the infantry is necessary" (Ibid., pp. 389-390).

²⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 390. In his memoirs, Jovic wrote about this as follows: **"I demand Veljko to inform us whether the staffing changes are being made in the army that we had agreed upon.**

He answers to me angrily: 'This is what the putschists also want'.

Adzic was speaking about the situation on the frontline, also indicating crimes,²⁰⁵ and providing a conclusion with a number of proposals, which

He has lost his nerve.

I reply: ‘Last time you told me that 2,000 people need to be dismissed. You should not be discussing that way, you should be reporting as to what has been done’.

He apologizes. He says that much has been done, but they were prevented by ‘the rabble-rousers’.

Slobodan jumps in: ‘The staffing changes are a first priority issue’.

Veljko interrupts him: ‘Why did we then lose in Slovenia? The Serbs did not want to go to Slovenia’-

I tell him that this cannot be rue. He allegedly needed a manpower of 5,000 for Slovenia. Could he not simply strengthen the Slovenia manpower as much as he needed, from the 150,000 permanent composition of the JNA?! This really sounds not just like an excuse, but also like an unjustified attribution of the fault onto Serbia” (Ibid.).

In Milosevic’s attempt to avoid confrontation, it was discussed **“about consolidation among the JNA, about staffing changes”**. However, according to Jovic, it was clear **“that the army is trying to attribute to us the responsibility for its own mistakes and defeats” (Ibid.).**

²⁰⁵ Ibid. General Adzic reported **“about the ‘slackness’ of the Krajina army. There is a large number of them eating JNA food, but not on the battlefield. There is an urgent need to form a headquarters, which will place them all under control. There are cases of plundering out of Serb villages, which must be prevented immediately.**

The situation in Lika is bad. They are constantly fighting. No one knows how many insurgents there are and whom they can count on.

In Banija, the situation on the front line is even the best, but there is much swaying among the reservists. 400 people have fled from the Loznica brigade. He claims that there is organized activity towards the disintegration of the Serb units. Similar dissipation of the Serb reserve units is going on everywhere. One elite unit of the Guardian division has fallen completely apart – it remained without soldiers once the recruits had left after having served their military term, and the filling in with reservists did not succeed. Only the 3rd Brigade from Pozarevac has been successfully mobilized. It unblocked the Vinkovci unit from the siege.

The 2nd Mechanized Brigade (Valjevo forces) has completely fled. These are Orthodox Serb nationalists. Now the complete artillery of the 2nd Motorized Brigade is standing there in Sid without manpower.

Slavonia required a lot of army, they do not have infantry. He wanders where the Slavonian Serbs are, do they perhaps think that others will defend their country?” (Ibid.).

were aimed at establishing and controlling the taken positions in Croatia.²⁰⁶

In late September and early October 1991, the Greater Serbia leadership started with the plan of attack against Croatia, with an aim, in compliance with the main ideas from the basic concept on which the plans for deployment of the JNA on overall Yugoslav territory were created, to defeat **“the Croatian army fully, if the situation allows so, ...”** and to realize **“full cooperation with the Serb insurgents in Serb Krajina”**; to allow **“the completion of the withdrawal of the remaining parts of the JNA out of Slovenia”**, in particular taking into account **“that the role of the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be the key one for the future of the Serb nation as a whole”**.²⁰⁷

²⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 391. General Adzic demanded:

“1) Strengthening of the reached line must be ensured;

2) Units should be filled in with volunteers;

3) Serb insurgent units must be classified and the positions for defence of the reached lines must be solidified;

4) Slavonia must have infantry, in order to control liberated territory” (Ibid., pp. 390-391).

²⁰⁷ V. Kadijevec, the aforementioned work, p. 134; D. Marijan, the aforementioned work, pp. 307-313, and 318-319. According to Kadijevec, the aforementioned tasks were to be executed in two stages: **“the first one consisted predominantly of counterattacks of tactical relevance, until the Croat aggression is fully developed, with intensive organization and preparation of the Serb insurgents in Croatia; and the second one, with joint operational and strategic attack operation, defeat Croatia and complete the tasks assigned”**. However, in addition to the already assigned JNA forces, this operation also required 15-18 more brigades of land army – armoured, mechanized, and infantry ones (V. Kadijevec, the aforementioned work, pp. 134-135).

The idea of the manoeuvres contained the following basic elements:

“- fully block Croatia from the air, and from the sea;

- link as directly as possible the directions of attack of the main JNA forces to the liberation of the Serb regions in Croatia, and of the JNA garrisons in the depth of Croatian territory. To this goal, slice up Croatia along the lines of Gradiska – Virovitica; Bihac – Karlovac – Zagreb; Knin – Zadar; Mostar – Split. Use the strongest group of the armed and mechanized forces to liberate East Slavonia, and then quickly continue action towards the West, merge with the forces in West Slavonia and continue towards Zagreb and Varazdin, that is, towards the Slovenian border. At the same time, use strong forces from the region of Herceg Novi – Trebinje,

Therefore, the Greater Serbia movement had particularly focused **on the activation of the (Serb) fifth column (“for concrete cooperation with the representatives of the Serb nation”)** in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and for cooperation **“with the Serb nation as a whole”**.²⁰⁸ This way they secured that, during the aggression against the Republic of Croatia, they can do **“manoeuvring and movements of the JNA forces across Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was of vital importance to the JNA”**.²⁰⁹

After the defeat in Slovenia and in the initial period of the armed aggression against the Republic of Croatia, the Greater Serbia movement was narrowing its goals – down to the **protection of the Serb people**

block Dubrovnik from the land and push through into the valley of Neretva and thus merge activity with the forces moving towards Mostar – Split;

- after reaching certain facilities, secure and hold the border of the Serb Krajina in Croatia, pull out the remaining parts of the JNA from Slovenia and after that withdraw the JNA from Croatia;

- the mobilization, preparation of mobilized or demobilized units, as well as their bringing onto the planned direction of use, will require 10-15 days, depending on the degree of combat preparedness of these units and their distance from the direction of use” (Ibid., pp. 135-136).

The aggressive attacks against Dubrovnik began on October 1, 1991. By October 5, Prevlaka was “cleansed”, and then the pressure on Dubrovnik followed, as it was besieged and completely cut off from Croatia (D. Marijan, the aforementioned work, pp. 313-314).

In the initial days of the operation, General Kadijevic stated (on October 5, 1991), that “the army at this time wishes nothing more than to establish control in the crisis regions, to protect the Serb population from persecution and destruction, and to liberate the JNA members and their families”, and that “the condition for this is to defeat the Ustasha forces” (Ibid., p. 307).

²⁰⁸ V. Kadijevic, the aforementioned work, p. 147. The leadership of this movement **“had to”** do this, because, allegedly, according to Kadijevic, **“the JNA efforts to orient the Muslim part of the leadership of Bosnia and Herzegovina as well towards the new Yugoslav state of those Yugoslav nations which really wish so, had not been fruitful”** (Ibid). In addition, according to Kadijevic, they were very “generous”, because they never closed the **“door for cooperation with the others, at least individuals, who were in favour of the new Yugoslavia”** (Ibid).

²⁰⁹ Ibid. These manoeuvres and movements, according to Kadijevic, **“were made with difficulties, somewhere they were obstructed, but nowhere were they stopped”**. This, among other things, allowed that the mobilization **“in the Serb parts”** of Bosnia and Herzegovina **“be very successful”** (Ibid.).

and the establishment of the borders of the future Yugoslavia. Thus, the goal of the JNA **“in the first stage of the armed conflict”** in Croatia was allegedly **“to protect the Serb people in Croatia against the attacks of the Croatian armed formations, and allow it to consolidate its military self-organization for defence”**, and **“at the same time prepare the JNA for war against Croatia once Croatia begins it against the JNA”**.²¹⁰ This task of **“defence”** of the Serb people in Croatia was initially conducted by the JNA under the form of **“prevention of interethnic conflicts”**,²¹¹ which was of extreme importance for the Greater Serbia movement.

The JNA could no longer conduct the **“defence”** of the Serb people in Croatia in this way, having in mind the JNA’s goal, general concept and plan of deployment. However, before it started **open combat activity against the Republic of Croatia**, the JNA **“had to first wait for an open attack, so that it can be visible for anyone, and it is unambiguously clear as to who is the attacker, who is the defender, who is imposing the war, and only then could they return the attack”**.²¹² In their assessment, this was **“very important, not only politically, but also in terms of military strategy”**.²¹³

The task of use of the JNA in the next phase of the war in Croatia, starting from the **“changed general political goal: the creation of the new Yugoslavia consisting of the people who wish so”**, and allegedly **“peaceful and just parting with those peoples who do not wish to remain in Yugoslavia... was [now] to protect the Serb people in Croatia in a way that all the areas with a Serb majority will be liberated in all terms from the presence of the Croatian army and**

²¹⁰ Ibid., p. 127. In order to realize this assigned task, the JNA units were strengthened **“in and around Croatia. To have two types of formations. A larger number of armoured mechanized formations ranging from one platoon to one battalion to be deployed as close as possible to the potential places of conflict, so that they can offer quick intervention. An appropriate number of the armoured mechanized units such as brigades or stronger, should be set on the appropriate points in Croatia and around Croatia, so that they can be employed for major interventions”** (Ibid.).

²¹¹ Ibid., pp. 127 and 133.

²¹² Ibid., p. 133.

²¹³ Ibid., p. 134.

Croatian government; to withdraw the JNA from Croatia, but so that completion of the first task is ensured prior to that; on the whole Yugoslav territory perform further transformation of the JNA into the army of future Yugoslavia, both by the internal ethnic and organizational structure, and by the territorial location”.²¹⁴

The operational and strategic operation (the modified “RAM”) against Croatia, which envisaged that the Croatian army be defeated, was executed by the JNA, but **“in a rather modified manner in relation to the initial plan”**. The reason (**“only and exclusive”**) for the modification of the initial plan of this operation lies in **“the semi-successful mobilization and organized desertion of the reserve composition of the JNA”**. In addition to the poor response, thus reduced units **“could not be moved ahead towards the directions and places of use, that is, some that had even been moved, upon their arrival to the front line, abandoned it”**.²¹⁵ Due to the shortage of the planned forces **“it was not possible**

²¹⁴ Ibid. The aforementioned tasks were to be executed in two stages: **“in the first one, predominantly with counterattacks of tactical relevance, until the aggression of the Croats is fully developed, with intensive organization and preparation of the Serb insurgents in Croatia; and the second one, with joint operational and strategic attack operation, defeat Croatia and complete the tasks assigned”** (Ibid.).

The joint operational and strategic attack operation and defeat of the Croatian army, in addition to the JNA forces employed in the first stage, according to General Kadijevic, **“also required 15-18 more brigades of land army – armoured, mechanized, and infantry ones”** (Ibid., p. 135).

Grouping of the JNA forces and their use in the first stage was envisaged **“to be conducted so that they be in concordance with the plan of the operational and strategic attack operation planned for the second stage”** (Ibid.).

²¹⁵ Ibid., p. 136. About the failure of mobilization and about defection, Kadijevic wrote: **“All the problems of strategic and operational nature in carrying out the operation, particularly the problems related to the time of arrival of the necessary or fresh forces in certain directions, are exclusively conditioned by the failure of mobilization and by defection, in particular in some parts of the country. The solution to this problem has always been and shall always be in the hands of the state which, unfortunately, was at the time not there to the extend demanded by the war state. This was known by enemies of all colours, both external and internal ones. Moreover, they knew that this was in fact the only way to prevent the JNA in execution of its tasks, and this is why they concentrated all their efforts and coordinated them jointly. This is why various actions were run by ‘parents, mothers, sisters, peacemakers, pacifists, etc.’ across Yugoslavia against the JNA, whereas**

to perform the operation in one move and thus quickly defeat the majority of the Croatian army, which was otherwise also considerably more numerous than the employed JNA units, but this had to be performed gradually and over an extended period”.²¹⁶

On October 1, having convened the session illegally, at the Palace of the Federation, Dr. Kostic gathered a large number of the members of the Presidency (Tupurkovski and Bogicevic attended too), in order to **legalize the counter-constitutional action of the military leadership, that is, to legalize the military putsch.**²¹⁷ This illegally convened session was preceded by public declaration of the SSNO that the JNA is in war

there were no such actions in Croatia against the Croatian army, although it had enforced general mobilization. However, in spite of this huge handicap, shortage of forces that were counted on and which objectively were not large, both in comparison with the total mobilization potentials of the country, and in comparison with the size of the Croatian army, the operation /RAM; note by the author/ was effected with reduced demands and with incomparably more difficulties and losses that would have otherwise been the case” (Ibid., pp. 136-137).

²¹⁶ Ibid., p. 137.

²¹⁷ S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. 262. Mesic accused Tupurkovski and Bogicevic for having attended that session of the Presidency. In his letter to Gligorov, he protested by pointing out, among other things, that Tupurkovski **“by his presence in the illegally convened meeting of the Presidency is legalizing the military putsch and is allowing Serbia and the JNA to effect aggression and devastation, with all the so far committed crimes on the territory of the Republic of Croatia. Do the friendly Macedonian people know about that?”** (Ibid.).

Speaking about the reasons for presence of Tupurkovski and Bogicevic at this session, Mesic assumes, among other things, that this was **“decisively influenced by the army’s occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina...”**. In his letter to Izetbegovic, among other things, Mesic also stated that by his presence at the session of the Presidency on October 1, Bogicevic **“was enabling the legalization of the military putsch”** (Ibid.).

The presence of Tupurkovski and Bogicevic at that session, in spite of the fact that **“not did Tupurkovski allow once more to be persuaded to come to these illegal meetings of the Kostics”**, and Bogicevic appeared once more **“in an attempt to present the whole of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian problem caused by the military pressure on his republic, and then, he also left Belgrade for good”**, had, according to Mesic, overwhelming consequences to it. **“Namely, not due to their positions, but due to their sheer presence at the session of October 1, they will be attributed with the approval of the most recent decision of the Kostics – Jovic – Bajramovic group, proclaiming the state of war in Yugoslavia”** (Ibid., pp. 262-263).

against Croatia. Namely, in the night of September 30/October 1, 1991, the illegal Headquarters of Supreme Command of the OS SFRY, fearing that Croatia would block the barracks and thus reach the heavier weapons and modern equipment, sent an ultimatum to the Croatian political and military leadership (“**the last warning**”) that “**for every attacked and conquered facility of the Yugoslav National Army, there will immediately be one facility destroyed which is of vital importance to the Republic of Croatia**” and that “**for each facility attacked or garrison taken, the vital facilities of the city where the garrison is located will be destroyed**”.²¹⁸

At that session, the Presidency of the SFRY (without Mesic and Drnovsek) assessed “**that it is absolutely unacceptable to withdraw the JNA from the territories populated by Serbs in Croatia, because this would expose them to physical eradication**”. Therefore, it believed “**that all the military forces, until a political solution to the Yugoslav crisis is reached, need to remain on the territories where they are found now, while respecting the truce, and then, once reached, the political decisions and agreements.**”²¹⁹

²¹⁸ Ibid., p. 263; K. Rotim, the aforementioned work, pp. 162-163; D. Marijan, the aforementioned work, p. 306. The session of October 1, was completed in the late afternoon hours, following which Mesic received the “communiqué”, together with the invitation for tomorrow’s session, with “**an ominous and unusual announcement: ‘The representatives of the Headquarters of Supreme Command shall also participate in the work of the session’, without a single word on the usually invited representatives of the Federal Assembly and the SIV**”. Mesic reacted upon this by sending a letter of protest to all the members of the Presidency through the Secretary General: “... **The session was illegally convened by the Vice President... Namely, the Vice President of the Presidency, together with some members of the Serb block, is participating in the military putsch and is intentionally attempting to use illegal manipulation to reach decisions in the Presidency, in order to legalize the illegal and non-constitutional decisions of the Army. The positions of the Serb block in the Presidency are not strange to me, but I am surprised at the accession to the military putsch by Messrs. Bogic Bogicevic and Vasil Tupurkovski. I have to emphasize once again that the same JNA, which demands that its funding be placed on the agenda, is using tanks on motor roads and is blocking the air traffic in order to prevent arrival to the session of the legal and legitimate President of the Presidency of the SFRY. Everyone shall carry their respective shares of responsibility for illegal action**” (S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. 263).

²¹⁹ S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. 283.

The leadership of Montenegro, headed by Momir Bulatovic, on October 1, 1991, brought the decision to use all the “**republic resources**” for the “**liberation**” of Dubrovnik. To this goal, in addition to ensuring of the forces (manpower – units of the Territorial Defence and the JNA reservists) and logistical support, on the same day, Bulatovic also issued the order for mobilization of special units, with the task to act jointly with the forces of JNA and Territorial Defence, and participate in the aggressive combat operations in Dubrovnik and East Herzegovina.²²⁰

On October 2, only Serbs and generals were at Kostic’s cabinet (without president Mesic, and without Bogicevic, Tupurkovski, and Drnovsek). That morning, the following statement of Dr. Kostic was broadcast (Channel 2 of Radio Belgrade, given on October 1, to the British TV network “Sky News”): “**If the leadership of Croatia fails to accept the ultimatum of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of Yugoslavia, the Presidency of the SFRY will be forced to order a general attack against Croatia...**”²²¹

²²⁰ ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraphs 82-83, and 959. At this meeting with Prime Minister Djukanovic and several senior officers of the JNA, Bulatovic claimed that thirty thousand “Ustashes” had attacked Montenegro, which was a lie. At the next meeting, Bulatovic and other top Montenegrin politicians discussed the creation of the (historic) “**Republic of Ragusa** [i.e. Dubrovnik]”, and its accession to the expanded Serb state (Ibid.).

²²¹ Ibid., p. 264. In his interview, Dr. Kostic said:

“...

JOURNALIST: Has not thus the Headquarters of the Supreme Command taken over the competencies of the Presidency?

KOSTIC: No, because in the previous decisions of the Presidency the Headquarters of the Supreme Command had such powers, including saving of the army endangered in the barracks, and employing the necessary forces in crisis areas, where they need to serve in separation of the interethnically conflicting sides. The Headquarters has brought such a decision as it can make.

JOURNALIST: Today, while you were at the session, a piece of news has passed around that Mesic has resigned, which he has denied, and that Kadijevec has been arrested.

KOSTIC: This piece of news has not reached me...

JOURNALIST: Judging by the conduct of the head people of BiH, there were three that were expected to show up, but they did not come, because Mesic

Several weeks later, Kostic, together with the rest three members of the rump Presidency, at a meeting of theirs, in presence of Mesic's advisor, stated that the Presidency shall order "**a general attack against Croatia**". From the military leadership (generals Kadijevic and Brovet) he demanded that the JNA "**must strike frontally, with all forces, as a thunderbolt, penetrate inside and even into Zagreb!**"²²²

is not presiding, there is resistance against your method of work. And you did not say, has Kadijevic been arrested?

KOSTIC: He has not been arrested, what do you mean arrested?

JOURNALIST: Honoured Vice President of Yugoslavia, the richest parts of Croatia have been devastated, destroyed. Now the fire is coming near Dubrovnik, three cassette bombs have been thrown onto it today. Has the Presidency discussed this today? I suppose the Presidency shall not allow Dubrovnik to be devastated!

KOSTIC: There has been no discussion of that. And as for the cassette bombs, I have not heard about them, I have just heard that Dubrovnik has been bombed.

JOURNALIST: Honoured Vice President, according to this ultimatum, or – as you say – the ultimate warning of the Headquarters of Supreme Command to the Republic of Croatia, it turns out – if the blockade of barracks is continued – that the JNA would pull down the major facilities of Croatia. Dubrovnik is such a place. Is it possible that someone shall have the imprudence to strike Dubrovnik?

KOSTIC: I suppose that it will not occur to anyone among the Croatian formations to use the Fortress of Dubrovnik or some other place to set artillery, mortars, or other weapons, to be used to endanger or fight the other side in the conflict. But, if the Croatian armed formations happen to use the buildings of Dubrovnik, thinking they are protected there, to strike the other side, then this realistically poses a threat to Dubrovnik.

JOURNALIST: Glory is transient, humans are mortal, and Dubrovnik should be immortal, at least this is what we have believed. I think, honoured Vice President, that the eight of you at the Presidency are not so important as Dubrovnik, do you agree?

KOSTIC: Do not refer only to the eight of us, please.

JOURNALIST: I have asked about the Presidency, because you have said that, of the Federal institutions only the Presidency is functioning, that the Assembly is blocked, that the SIV has been decimated...

KOSTIC: It could occur to no one to strike a church tower, but, if someone over there places a machine gun nest into it, then this machine gun indeed needs to be neutralized. So, now you tell me who is to blame. This also pertains to Dubrovnik" (S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. 264).

²²² Ibid., p. 265. In relation to this, the Belgrade commentator stated that "**the general attack against Croatia**" should have been ordered as early as in mid-March

The rump Presidency of the SFRY (four members, only from two republics – from Serbia and Montenegro), in cooperation with the military leadership (Kadijevic, Adzic and Brovet), at the illegally convened session of October 3, decided that as of that date, that is, October 3, **“the Presidency shall make decisions by the majority of votes of members present”**, and, referring to the Constitution, openly violating it, **they declared the immediate threat of war**,²²³ that is, performed the putsch,

1991, when **“the demand of the Army for full raising of combat preparedness was correctly understood and supported only by Borisav Jovic, whereas Mesic and Drnovsek were repeating their well-known positions, Riza Sapunxiu was lost, Bogic Bogicevic kept repeating that this will not provide salaries for the 23,000 workers in Zenica, and Vasil Tupurkovski, as usual, was performing his ivory-tower shows”** (Ibid., p. 265).

Such tactics for the conquest and destruction of Croatia was not accepted by Kadijevic at that meeting, **“but not for reasons of humaneness, instead, out of the difficulty!**

- Branko, we don't have enough force to do that, we have no manpower!” (Ibid.).

²²³ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 392-393; O. Backovic –M. Vasic – A. Vasovic, the aforementioned work, p. 360; S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. 268; B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, pp. 240-242; D. Marijan, the aforementioned work, p. 306. Kostic's public communiqué states that this **“was unanimously assessed by the Presidency of the SFRY”**. He was referring to the decision of the October 1 session, when Tupurkovski and Bogicevic attended, when with the majority of the present members the Presidency **“unanimously assessed that we are facing the danger of the general civil war and that the country is in the state of immediate threat of war, of which the local and international public has been already notified in the official communiqué from that session”** (S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, pp. 268-269).

At the session of the Presidency of October 1, the status of immediate threat of war had never been mentioned, but, as the **“communiqué”** states, **“the Presidency of the SFRY was informed by the competent federal bodies that the political and security situation in the country is ultimately difficult and dramatic, and that the general civil war is threatening”**. This formulation was not included in the **“communiqué”**, or in the record from this session, nor in the invitation for the October 3 session. There was only one agreed point on the agenda: **“Some current issues from the general national defence domain”**. Only at the meeting **“of the group of four”** was it decided that the first point of the agenda be **“the agreement for ensuring continuity of the work of the Presidency of the SFRY based on the assessment of the Presidency from the 143rd Session of the Presidency held on October 1, 1991, about existence of the immediate threat of war and the transition of the work of the Presidency of the SFRY under the conditions of existence of the immediate threat of war”** (Ibid.).

by taking over – formally and factually – the management and command over the Armed Forces of the SFRY. The Vice President of the Presidency, Dr. Branko Kostic, made this. From the right to direct and command the OS SFRY, they had **“unanimously”** excluded Dr. Drnovsek, the representative of Slovenia,²²⁴ and offered support to the

According to Mesic, reference to the October 1, 1991 session of the Presidency of the SFRY is a **“sheer falsification”**. In order for the October 3 session to have the aforementioned agenda, according to him, **“prior to that, two things had to be decided, that: (1) immediate threat of war exists, and (2) the Presidency of the SFRY transfers to work under conditions of immediate threat of war. Had there not been such decisions, how could then such an agenda ever have been announced!”** (Ibid.).

Jovic substantiated the decision of the Presidency to transfer to work under conditions of immediate threat of war in the following way: **“Two days ago, we took the decision that the Presidency of the SFRY should come out of the paralysis imposed on it by boycotting work on the part of some Presidency members. For a long time, Drnovsek has not been coming to the meetings, and recently Stipe Mesic either. Tupurkovski and Bogicevic do not accept the holding of sessions without Mesic as the president, and every attempt on our part to make any serious decisions is brought into question.**

Mesic is in Zagreb. On our insistence to come to Belgrade so we could perform our function, he convenes the session in Brioni, which we rejected. The Rules of Procedure envisage that the Presidency works in Belgrade. The change could only occur upon the decision of the Presidency, but not upon the decision of the President only. Mesic says that due to traffic obstacles on the highway, he cannot come! This was a good excuse for us to use the constitutional option and transfer to work with that number of the Presidency members as can come to the session. The Presidency brought the decision to transfer to work under the conditions of immediate threat of war, and then it works in any composition that is viable. This decision was brought with the participation of six members of the Presidency, including Bogicevic and Tupurkovski. They had agreed for us to bring the decision on work under conditions of immediate threat of war, and once we started implementing it, they withdrew and refused to participate in further work of the Presidency. Probably they have been influenced from aside” (B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 392-393).

Jovic openly lies, particularly when he claims that the decision for transfer of the Presidency of the SFRY to work under conditions of immediate threat of war was made with participation of **“six members of the Presidency, including Bogicevic and Tupurkovski”**, who, according to him, had agreed upon the aforementioned decision to be made (Ibid., p. 393).

²²⁴ S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. 269. This is the right that was denied to Dr. Drnovsek by the rump Presidency, **“because, with the consent of the Republic of Slovenia, on July 18, 1991, the Presidency of the SFRY brought a decision to dislocate all commands, units and institutions of the JNA out of the territory of**

aggressive measures and activities of the JNA, approving, among other things, **“the work of the Headquarters of Supreme Command of the armed forces in execution of the decisions of the Presidency of the SFRY in relation to the mobilization”**, whereby they legalized the conducted mobilization, for which no legitimate decision had ever been made.²²⁵ In this way, the leadership of the Greater Serbia movement (the army together with the Serb leadership, and the Serbo-Montenegrin Group of Four – the rump Presidency with the Army top), headed by Milosevic, took over power in the country and thus legalized the aggression against Croatia. Along with the licentious retaining of the title and name of the already serbianized JNA,²²⁶ this constituted **the putsch and a definitive disappearance of the SFRY**. The Presidency **“transferred to the conditions of work under immediate threat of war”**, thus taking over certain competencies of the Assembly of the SFRY, which, in such a situation, could not convene. At the same time, it meant that it can work **“in any composition that is viable”**.²²⁷

the Republic of Slovenia”. In citing this decision, Mesic concluded: **“On July 12 and 18, they had a completely different story, when Kostic and Jovic brought up the request for withdrawal of the army from Slovenia”** (Ibid.).

²²⁵ Ibid., pp. 272, 274, 275, and 277. About this, the Presidency of the SFRY had never brought any decisions.

The rump Presidency then **“agreed that the Federal Secretary for National Defence, Army General Veljko Kadijevic participates at the meeting in The Hague on October 4... and it established the positions for his presentation at this meeting”** (Ibid.).

²²⁶ Milosevic insisted on the name of Yugoslavia (both for the state and the army), in order to maintain his **“thesis”**, thus deluding the public that Yugoslavia had been broken up by the **“secessionists”** (Slovenia and Croatia), with important support from Germany, Austria, and the Vatican. For Milosevic, this was of **supreme importance**, because he was counting on that the future Yugoslavia (of 17 million) would be **continuous in legal personality with the SFRY**. Upon insistence of General Tomislav Simovic (defence minister of the Republic of Serbia), Milosevic refused to conduct general mobilization, because allegedly, **“the conditions for that have not yet come into place”**, as **“Serbia is not at war”**. Instead of the general mobilization, Milosevic was in favour of the partial one, and for disciplining of defectors, at which he sought to be given the lists **“of incompetent generals and colonels for urgent retirement”** (S. Biserko, the aforementioned work, p. 227).

²²⁷ Ibid., pp. 272-274, and 277; B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 392-393; O. Backovic - M. Vasic - A. Vasovic, the aforementioned work, p. 360; B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, pp. 187-188, and 240-241; D. Marijan, the aforementioned work, p. 306.

With the decision “**to transfer to work under the conditions of immediate threat of war**”, the Presidency of the SFRY was deciding with the majority of votes of the members who were present. Dr. Branko Kostic, Vice President of the Presidency, who had usurped the post of President, declaratively stated after that decision that “**the Presidency of the SFRY will not be using military force in order to impose its own will to any nation in Yugoslavia**”.²²⁸

The foreign ministers of the EC countries characterized the decision of the Presidency to work in rump composition as unacceptable. Namely, they did not wish to recognize, as they said, “**the rump, or the ‘Serb’ Presidency**”²²⁹, because its decisions were not constitutional, and the work of this body in its rump composition was unacceptable. Jovic commented upon this assessment that “**this means that they will ignore our decisions and deem us as non-existent**”.²³⁰ **At the conference in The Hague, where, within the UN framework, a discussion was held about Yugoslavia, on October 4, it was concluded that the decisions of the Presidency to transfer to work under the conditions of immediate threat of war were unconstitutional.**²³¹

²²⁸ D. Marijan, the aforementioned work, p. 306. However, the situation was quite the contrary one, because “**it was exactly then that the majority of the military potentials of the JNA was in function of imposing the will of the political and military top of the most numerous people in the SFRY (the Serbs), to the second people by size (the Croats)**”, as correctly pointed out by D. Marijan (Ibid.).

²²⁹ S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. 313; V. Kadijevec, the aforementioned work, p. 38; B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 393. Because of this, Kadijevec “**concluded**” that “**thus the time has come when the West was pushing the JNA to act independently**” (V. Kadijevec, the aforementioned work, p. 38).

²³⁰ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 393. A number of members of the Presidency of the SFRY, since late August or early September 1991 (according to Jovic, the last session of the Presidency of the SFRY in full composition was held on September 1, 1991), had not been coming to sessions, such as: Janez Drnovsek, and Stipe Mesic. **Tupurkovski and Bogicevic did not accept the holding of sessions without Mesic as the president** (B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 381-382, and 392). Instead, illegal meetings of the “**Group of Six**” had been constantly and in continuity held just as before.

²³¹ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 393-394. This conference was on behalf of the SFRY also attended by Budimir Loncar, Federal Secretary for Foreign

In cooperation with the military leadership, the rump Presidency of the SFRY consisting of four members (representative of Serbia – Jovic, as Milosevic’s exponent, and the representatives of Montenegro – Dr. Branko Kostic, Vojvodina – Jugoslav Kostic, and Kosovo – Sejdo Bajramovic), as completely insignificant political personalities and marionettes of Milosevic from the very beginning, attempted to retain the legitimacy of the chief of state which then had no longer existed. Having the control and decisive influence over the Rump Presidency and the Headquarters of Supreme Command, Milosevic manipulated this usurped body in order to provide legality to the moves made by the JNA and retain the seemingly existing international legal subjectivity of the SFRY, primarily in the view of foreign policy.²³²

Outside Serbia and Montenegro, no one in Yugoslavia “listened” to a Serbo-Montenegrin Presidency. Milosevic and Bulatovic, whereby Milosevic was the leader, represented Serbia and Montenegro and “**the Presidency was his cabinet for directing and commanding the Army, which was still obeying them blindly**”.²³³ The other members of the Presidency (4), including the President himself, were prevented from performing their functions. All the other federal bodies were also blocked by the conduct of Serbia and Montenegro, thanks primarily to their location and staffing mostly with Serb personnel, in the function of the achievement of Greater Serbia.²³⁴

Affairs, who declared solidarity with such a conclusion, which was enough for Jovic to conclude that “**we must dismiss him. There is no other option**” (Ibid., p. 393).

On October 26, 1991, as agreed, Branko Kostic talked to Loncar and suggested him to resign by himself, which he refused. Because he was an obstacle for the Serb leadership, Jovic demanded “**an analysis from the services, to tell him what we could do**” (Ibid., p. 404).

²³² O. Backovic - M. Vasic - A. Vasovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 360-361; B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, p. 241; S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, pp. 47-48, and 313; **ICTY**, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraphs 99 and 956. In addition to the control over the rump Presidency, Milosevic **was also exerting direct or indirect control over the police and military forces in the Republic of Serbia and SFRY (ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraph 99).**

²³³ B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, p. 246.

²³⁴ S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. 313; B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 393.

The Greater Serbia aggressor was also attacking Dubrovnik. On October 3, the JNA (JRM; Yugoslav Navy) also introduced the overall blockade of all the Adriatic ports. Thus Croatia was blocked at sea. **“The airports are closed, the roads are cut, and the ships are prevented from sailing off.** Not even fishermen could not make it out to the sea”.²³⁵

“The Four-Member Gang”, as the journalists began to call the putschist Belgrade clan, on October 4, after the transfer onto the new conditions of work during the immediate threat of war, and after taking on certain competencies of the Assembly of the SFRY, passed **“the Order for partial mobilization, up to the level required to fill in the commands, headquarters, units and institutions of the armed forces which ensure their combat preparedness”**. On the same day, Dr. Kostic signed off the Order **“on degrading the ranks of the active military personnel because of desertion or transfer from the JNA into paramilitary units”**.²³⁶

On that day, starting from his conceptions that the JNA had remained stateless, General Kadijevic stated that he would do all to throw Croatia down on its knees and defeat the **“Ustasha forces”**.²³⁷

On October 4, 1991, one more truce agreement was signed in The Hague (Tudjman, Milosevic, and Kadijevic). Milosevic and Kadijevic declaratively approved of **“the loose union of sovereign republics”**, the respect for established borders, and the dislocation and regroupment of the JNA, with control by international observers.²³⁸ However, they denied The Hague agreement for ceasefire. Although they allowed the option that The Hague conference did discuss withdrawal of the army from Croatia, both Milosevic and Kadijevic insisted on retaining the JNA in parts of Croatia, although this, according to Mesic, **“was not even mentioned by The Hague agreement”**, claiming that **“there was no mention about abandoning the areas populated by Serbs”**. In accordance with this, they stated that the JNA **“would remain where the Army is**

²³⁵ S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. 268.

²³⁶ Ibid., p. 277.

²³⁷ Ibid., pp. 273-274.

²³⁸ Ibid., pp. 272-273.

desirable, and it is desirable in all the Serb areas in Croatia”.²³⁹

“**The two eyes in one head**” were looking at the survival of Yugoslavia differently. In The Hague, Momir Bulatovic (President of Montenegro) proposed to equally discuss the survival of Yugoslavia and its international legal cessation. In the capacity of the president of Serbia, Milosevic refused the positions from the Declaration on Yugoslavia.²⁴⁰

On October 5, after the discussion urgently requested by Jovic, among himself, Kadijevic and Milosevic, held October 2,²⁴¹ the meeting

²³⁹ Ibid., p. 283. Upon such interpretation of the agreement, there was a public reaction by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs on behalf of the Ministerial Council of the European Community, claiming that **“indeed, nothing was signed, but the verbal agreement is also deemed binding, and the statement of General Kadijevic and the communiqué of the SSNO are unacceptable... No document has been signed, but all sides have agreed that the federal forces would withdraw from Croatia within one month”** (Ibid.).

²⁴⁰ B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, p. 240.

²⁴¹ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 391. The reason for this **“urgent discussion”** was the information that Jovic **“urgently”** received from Vlado Kovacevic, member of the Main Board of the SPS, that at the meeting of the soldiers of the First Proletarian Brigade, the retired General Eugen Lebaric had asked General Marko Negovanovic (member of the Headquarters of Supreme Command in charge of ideology affairs) **“how come, that there is such rate of desertion in the army and resistance to mobilization?”** At that, the general responded to him as follows:

“- You had better ask the president of the Republic of Serbia and the state and political leadership of Serbia.

- The SPS and the leadership of Serbia are to blame for the defeatism, having allowed something like that to take place.

- They had initiated the fight of the Serb nation in Croatia, and now they are leaving them on thin ice.

- The main culprit is the Serbian state and the SPS, because they are not fighting against the enemy of the JNA and the defection within it” (Ibid.).

After that, Jovic called Kadijevic and Milosevic, asking for an urgent meeting. Milosevic sought from Kadijevic to immediately dismiss general Negovanovic, and Jovic said: **“that it was not Negovanovic who made it up, that he had only presented the position of the military top, and that I want to make this clear: how can something like this be revealed in public. The army cannot do without us. We could perhaps do without [the Army] – we would form our own, anyway – and how would they devise their own state – is not clear.**

of **“the Group of six”** was held (without Bulatovic, who was absent), at which Kadijevic again demanded **general mobilization “as a condition for victory!”** A long discussion was held, at which they **“almost quarrelled with each other”**.²⁴²

Jovic was energetically against this proposal. Instead, after **“the Serb”** territories in Croatia **“had been liberated”** by the JNA that is, taken one third of the Republic of Croatia, he proposed a new tactics – **switching to a political solution**. At this, he sought the development **“of the concept of a peace making initiative combined with the concept of force, in order to deter from war and shift towards a political solution”**. Milosevic agreed with this, too. However, generals Kadijevic and Adzic were desperate, accusing Jovic and Milosevic of leaving the Serb nation on **“thin ice”**. Branko Kostic expressed solidarity with the generals, **“in casual and general terms, not taking into account the actual situation in Europe and in Serbia”**.²⁴³

Milosevic and Jovic denied the accusations of the military top on leaving of the Serb nation **“on thin ice”**, claiming that **“all the Serb territories have been liberated”**.²⁴⁴

The discussion was stopped, to be continued **“on some other occasion in full composition”**.²⁴⁵

Veljko promised he would check up on that.

He has checked it up and he says that Lebaric was not telling the truth.

Maybe Kadijevic is being lied to. Maybe we are all being lied and all of them think so about us. We have come over that. Dog eat dog...” (Ibid.).

²⁴² Ibid. In relation to this, Jovic was wondering, because the military leadership spoke **“a couple of days ago”**, **“that 6 brigades (30,000 manpower) was enough for final success”**, and **“now they are demanding general mobilization. Serbia and Montenegro have 1,500,000 military conscripts! Are we supposed to mobilize all!? And Croatia has 200,000 soldiers. Why do we need such a large army?”**, rightfully wondered Jovic (Ibid., pp. 391-392).

²⁴³ Ibid., p. 392.

²⁴⁴ Ibid. In relation to this, Jovic wrote: **“I guess at one point we must switch to a political solution”**.

²⁴⁵ Ibid. On October 5, the **“the Gang of Four”** was distributing general’s epaulettes. Namely, a list was prepared at the Presidency of the SFRY with several thousand names

On the next day (October 6), Jovic wanted an urgent discussion with Milosevic, so that they can agree in private. The more so, because they are not **“a self-service shop”**, in terms that they supposedly need to meet the needs of the generals, because the politics must start from them, rather than from the generals, with which Milosevic agreed. Starting from the assessment that Europe is eager to economically destroy and block them, they concluded that **“they must switch to a peace-making offensive, and prepare for warfare, unless there is another solution”**. They could not accept the war option **“to the extent in which it was not necessary”** and get killed for what they can obtain through negotiations. They decided that, **“regardless of what the army thinks”**, they should accept the demand of the European Community ministers for ceasefire, with the goal of liberating and unblocking the barracks in Croatia without casualties, and instruct the army **“to defend the territory already liberated”**.²⁴⁶

In the afternoon hours of the same day, the rump (four-member) Presidency of the SFRY took such a decision and authorized the army to conduct negotiations about its implementation.²⁴⁷

In concordance with the mentioned decision, **on October 8, 1991 in Zagreb, a general ceasefire was signed on the territory of the Republic of Croatia (the eighth truce!)** between the SSNO and the Republic of Croatia. On the same day, the Assembly of Croatia brought

– proposals for decorations for **“the active military personnel and soldiers for the courage shown and for conscientious fulfilling of tasks”**. From August, this list had been waiting for the signature by President of the Presidency of the SFRY. By the **“unanimous decision”** of his group of four, which was making decisions **“by the majority present at the session”**, Kostic was authorized on October 7 to sign off the decree on decorations **“for exceptional sacrifice and execution of combat tasks, but also for promotions into higher ranks”**. Thus, **“for exceptional contribution in execution of combat tasks”**, the then colonels, blatant criminals, received extraordinary ranks of General – Ljubomir Gajic and Ratko Mladic (S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, pp. 275-276).

On October 5, **“upon the proposal of the SSNO, without a session, in consultations with the members of the Presidency”**, the rump Presidency of the SFRY passed **“the Order for Determining of Territories of Jurisdiction for Martial Courts of First Instance”** (Ibid., p. 277).

²⁴⁶ Ibid.

²⁴⁷ Ibid.

an unanimous decision confirming the decisions brought 3 months before – **Croatia has terminated all the connections with Yugoslavia and become a free, independent and sovereign republic.**²⁴⁸

On October 9, the meeting of the “**Group of Six**” was held (in the full composition: Milosevic, Jovic, Dr. Branko Kostic, Bulatovic, and generals Kadujevic and Adzic). Kadujevic presented “**the assessment of the situation and new proposals for further action**”. He indicated their goals (“**our goals**”) – “**the protection of the endangered Serb people in Croatia, and pulling out of the Army from the blocked barracks**”,²⁴⁹ the situation in the Croatian army,²⁵⁰ the situation in the JNA,²⁵¹ and

²⁴⁸ S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. 280; K. Rotim, the aforementioned work, pp. 169-170. Under the auspices of the European Community, represented by Ambassador D. J. van Houten, the agreement was signed by: general Andrija Raseta (representative of the SSNO), Stjepan Adamic (deputy defence minister of the Government of the Republic of Croatia), colonel Imre Agotic (member of the Main Headquarters of the Croatian Armed Forces), and Ambassador Dirk-Jan van Houten (Ibid.).

²⁴⁹ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 394. At the time, Kadujevic replaced “**the overthrow of the Croatian leadership, which he had long demanded**”, with “**pulling the army out**”.

²⁵⁰ Ibid. About the situation in Croatia, Kadujevic stated: “**They have 200,000 armed soldiers. They have new forces coming in. They are receiving arms from abroad. They are seriously shaken by our offensive. They have strong international support. If they assess that they would lose in political negotiations, and gain on military ground, they will opt for the military action, regardless of the current situation. There is no doubt that they will stick to the military option**” (Ibid.).

²⁵¹ Ibid. About “**the condition in the JNA**”, Kadujevic pointed out:

“**The main weaknesses are the besieged garrisons and the lack of reserve soldiers.**

Part of the reserves on the front line could easily be defeated in case of extended waiting.

The JNA does not possess sufficient power to completely defeat the Croatian army, although they may even fall in 10 days if there was not for the problem of the besieged garrisons (I wonder why they had not done this while the garrisons were still not besieged and why is he still shuffling the idea of completely defeating the Croatian army if he has accepted the new goals).

For realization of the goals, which can also be accomplished without defeating the Croatian army, but only threatening them with force, with a peace making initiative, the army requires forces larger than the available ones” (Ibid.).

the political and psychological assessment.²⁵² Among the new proposals, in addition to the readiness for the military option **“for the realization of the objectives and political disentanglement”**, the General insisted once again on **comprehensive mobilization**.²⁵³

The aforementioned assessments and proposals of the general were not specifically commented on, whereas **“in general, there was**

²⁵² Ibid. About this, Kadijevec said as follows:

“The axis of the activities of the JNA compositions are Serbs and they are excellent everywhere, both as officers and as soldiers.

However, the Serb and Vojvodina reservists have offered major resistance against coming to the army. There where the reservists were in minority in relation to the active composition, they were fighting well. The main problem is where they were either the majority or fully reservists. The fleeing from the frontline continues.

The Montenegrins and the Herzegovinians are excellent. The Bosnians and the Krajina forces are rather mediocre” (Ibid.).

²⁵³ Ibid. In relation to this, General Kadijevec concluded:

“1) We have to get ready for the military option of the realization of the objectives and political disentanglement. Unless we are militarily ready to defend our goals, we will suffer a defeat.

2) It is certain that the military option of defence in long-term on the reached frontline, only with forces we have available can not be accomplished, we shall not hold on.

The solution is to be sought in a quick political disentanglement or a military action. On a long-term basis, we will lose. Therefore we should seek intensification of the military and political measures, combined.

Intensify political negotiations both through the EC and directly.

Try to use the EC peace-making initiative to find a peaceful solution as soon as possible and thus accomplish our goals.

We need to let them know that, if there are tricks in this peace making initiative, Serbia and Montenegro will propose general mobilization and that the Army will be capable to prevent any solution unacceptable for us. This needs to be stated very clearly.

As early as now, prepare everything for general mobilization that may or may not happen.

Meanwhile continue with maximum use of the partial mobilization.

The Army shall continue with the pulling out of the units from the besieged garrisons based on agreements or by force, as well as by transformation within the JNA” (Ibid., pp. 394-395).

no disputing them, except for the always disputable general mobilization”.²⁵⁴

In Croatia, particularly as of October 1991, the JNA found itself in an exceptionally hard position, facing **“a dilemma and lacking a decision on either decisive general military operation, or withdrawal from Croatia”**.²⁵⁵ In order to **“fully”** defeat the Croatian army, the JNA at the time did not have **“enough power”**, because it lacked a reserve army. Namely, the JNA needed **“forces larger than those available”**.²⁵⁶

The other **“main”** weakness of the JNA, in addition to the shortage of the reserve army, was its besieged garrisons. Due to blocked garrisons, the JNA could not withdraw from Croatia, where, among other things, it also lost huge quantities of weapons and ammunition.²⁵⁷ In such a situation, the JNA made efforts, **“based on agreements or by force”**, to pull out units from the besieged garrisons, **“as well as by transformation within the JNA”**.²⁵⁸

On October 1991, in The Hague, Van den Broek again gathered presidents Tudjman and Milosevic with General Kadijevic, where **a new (already the tenth) ceasefire was concluded**. Milosevic and Kadijevic accepted the decision that **within thirty days, the JNA must withdraw from Croatia**. However, Milosevic and Kadijevic denied this. They claimed that they had not signed anything, and that, if there was any discussion about the withdrawal of the Army from Croatia, **“there was no discussion about abandoning the places populated by Serbs”**, and that the JNA **“shall remain where the Army is desired, and it is desired in two Serb areas in Croatia”**.²⁵⁹

²⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 395.

²⁵⁵ B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, p. 187.

²⁵⁶ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 394.

²⁵⁷ Ibid.; B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, p. 228. According to Jovic’s notes dated October 27, 1991, in which he speaks about the meeting of the Rump Presidency of the SFRY at the Headquarters of Supreme Command, **“three trains, some 100 wagons of armament and ammunition (cannons, howitzers, etc.) were seized”** from the Yugoslav People’s Army. – B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 404.

²⁵⁸ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 394.

²⁵⁹ S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, pp. 281, and 283.

Having in mind such positions of the Greater Serbia political and military leadership, Van den Broek sent proposals to Kadijevec **“about a balanced plan for the withdrawal of the federal army from Croatia during the transitional period”**. Upon this, the military leadership agreed that, within the next three months the JNA would withdraw from Istria. However, in other areas of Croatia (in war zones), the JNA was concentrating new troops brought from Macedonia, filled in with Serbo-Montenegrin reservists, attacking Croatia, in which numerous crimes were committed.²⁶⁰

The Rump Presidency was having continuous sessions (either at the round table or **“in telephonic consultations”**), fully bereft of interest for the absence of the representatives from other republics and at the same time, ignored by the European Community, in the function of the Supreme Command too (the decisions about this function were discussed and taken by the **“Group of Six”**, as well as earlier). All the moves of the European Community, according to them, were destructive. On the eves of the Second Plenary Session of the Conference on Yugoslavia in The Hague, **“the group of four”** had a number of sessions over only two days (October 16, and 17), finding that **“the EC is audaciously”** refusing to recognize their decisions, and they wrote letters to Van den Broek and Lord Carrington, and to others, stating that they are **“the supreme command”** and that their positions are the only ones that are competent, etc.²⁶¹

²⁶⁰ Ibid. p. 284.

²⁶¹ Ibid., pp. 284-285; B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 400. At the session of October 17, the Rump Presidency decided to go to The Hague, but, as written by Jovic, **“they had planned the decision making about the position for the evening, at 9 PM, until the text of Carrington’s plan had been translated. Otherwise, as early as from the untranslated text, it was clear that the proposal is unacceptable, that it needs to be refused: it sets Yugoslavia apart, breaks up the Serb nation into several states, leaving Serbs in Croatia, etc.”** (B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 400).

Then Dr. Kostic stated that Montenegro would support the proposal of Lord Carrington, which caused a real shock with Jovic and Milosevic. About this, Jovic wrote as follows: **“At the office of Branko Kostic – he was just about to leave for Titograd, to the session of the Assembly of Montenegro, on the same issue; suddenly, Branko told me, in front of Jugoslav Kostic and Sejdo Bajramovic, as follows:**

“Montenegro will support the proposal of Lord Carrington!”

I looked at him, unbelievably, as is he was joking. I warn him not to tell such jokes. Very seriously, he confirms the same once again.

In the presence of **all the members of the Presidency of the SFRY and the presidents of the republics**, that is, the presidencies,

I told him that this would be the most treacherous knife into the back of Serbia and its leadership. Let them think well over about what they are doing. Annoyed, I left his office, simply not believing.

In several minutes, Yugoslav Kostic comes to me, he says that Branko has repeated the same again and even said that he will probably resign from the office of the member of Presidency of the SFRY, because Yugoslavia exists no more!!

Nice, by Jove!

I go to Slobodan Milosevic so we can prepare the positions for The Hague. Immediately I told him this nonsense. He does not believe. He thinks they can't be serious.

In several attempts to reach Momir Bulatovic on the phone, Slobodan is not successful. "He does not have a phone with him, he is in the conference room!" Imagine that! (while he does not want to answer).

We receive the fax with the positions of Montenegro. Black positions. Only then Momir Bulatovic calls. He is persistent, nothing can be changed. We are shocked.

Around 8 PM I receive Cyrus Vance, envoy of the UN Secretary General. I make efforts to talk to the man in a normal way, although he himself was rather "stiff".

At 9:30 PM, the session of the Presidency of the SFRY about Carrington's document. I take the word and start telling Branko: "Although you in Montenegro have declared yourselves positively, we shall overpower your vote here..." However, Branko had the same opinion as me. Meaning, the conflict is within the Montenegrin leadership.

I try to learn from Branko what the matter is about, how this turnaround had come about. He links everything to the meeting held several days earlier between the Serb and Montenegrin leaderships.

And what happened at that meeting? I participated in it.

It discussed mainly the directions for solution of the crisis and the actual difficulties in which we are.

The Montenegrins were exceptionally aggressive. They proposed general mobilization. They criticized the dissipation of the units in Serbia, they believed that this may be eliminated by one single speech by Slobodan Milosevic, that we had given too much clearance to the opposition, that we are not holding the press, radio and television under control, [and] that they do not trust in the political solution unless we overthrow Tudjman's army and government.

on October 18, in The Hague, the Second Plenary Session of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia was held, dedicated to reaching an agreement among the six republics. The proposed documents for the future system of the Yugoslav states were read by Lord Carrington, demanding, without explanation, their declaration on the three points of their proposal: **unconditional ceasefire, urgent unblocking of all the barracks and military facilities in Croatia, and evacuation of the blocked barracks and facilities as soon as possible out of Croatia**; however, the precise time frame is to be determined by the tripartite group in Zagreb. Among other things, Bulatovic and Milosevic sought special status for the Serb people in Croatia, to be guaranteed by the international community, together with demilitarisation. Carrington interrupted Dr. Kostic in speaking

We could not agree about that. We presented the objective situation in Serbia, which cannot be easily turned around with a single speech. The people are not so much in the mood for war, as they may think, nor can we move them ahead overnight. They have to have this fact in mind. Furthermore, the orientation for the military option has to have in mind that on the other side we have not only Croatia, but also Germany, and probably Europe and the US. Even the USSR is not on our side, they have been weakened, and Gorbachev did not even want to promise that he will place a veto at the Security Council if they want to introduce economic embargo or military measures. Our opinion is that we have militarily protected the territories of the Serb people, that we should not go and conquer what is not ours, that we need to keep balance on the field and conduct political negotiations. For us it is important to accomplish freedom and independence from the Croats for the Serb people in Croatia. It is not our goal to overthrow the Croatian government, or to conquer the Croatian territories.

Seemingly, at least in their interpretation, the Montenegrins were shocked that we are not seeking general mobilization but negotiations.

I shall never understand how come that our position to accept political negotiations served them as a reason to accept the EC ultimatum. They will never be able to justify that.

People are confused at the Montenegrin acceptance of disintegration of Yugoslavia. We are not dramatizing the events, hoping for a positive evolution. Maybe the Assembly of Montenegro, or the people of Montenegro, will deny such a position of Bulatovic.

He is in person also trying to cover this up in public..." (B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 400-401).

“on behalf of the Presidency of the SFRY”, because he knew **“that the Presidency as such” did not exist at the time**. After he had **“clarified”** that he was speaking **“on behalf of four members of the Presidency...”**, Carrington took the word away from Dr. Kostic, and the Kostics, Jovic and Bajramovic left the Conference. Carrington concluded the session with a conviction that nevertheless, some progress had been made, and with the proposal **“to request from the working groups to further develop what we have agreed about”**, announcing that they would convene again to do what they could.²⁶²

Five republics accepted the document offered,²⁶³ except for Serbia, which was the only one against it. At the plenary session, Milosevic (the president of Serbia) did not accept this document and proposed amendments to the principles for a general solution of the Yugoslav crisis.²⁶⁴

²⁶² S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, pp. 286-289.

²⁶³ K. Begic, **BOSNA I HERCEGOVINA OD VANCEOVE MISIJE DO DAYTONSKOG SPORAZUMA (1991. – 1996.)**, Sarajevo 1997, pp. 24-26. This is the document under the title **“Frameworks for general solution of the Yugoslav crisis”**, which, after a previously signed order for urgent and unconditional ceasefire, was distributed to the participants of the Conference. According to this document, overcoming the Yugoslav crisis included the following components:

“a) Sovereign and independent republics with international subjectivity for those republics that so desire.

b) Freedom of association for the republics with international subjectivity, as foreseen in this agreement.

c) A comprehensive agreement, including the control mechanisms for protection of human rights and the special status for individual groups and areas.

d) European involvement, in cases where needed.

e) Under the global solution, recognition of independence of those republics which so desire, within their existing borders, unless a different agreement is reached” (Ibid., p. 24).

²⁶⁴ Ibid. S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. 293. In the subsequent substantiation of his position, Milosevic pointed out that the principles of the agreement for a general solution of the Yugoslav crisis mean the termination of Yugoslavia. In spite of that, he advocated in favour of continued work of the Conference and in particular of the involvement of the Arbitration Commission. The other five republic leaders had in principle accepted **the Framework for the General Solution of the Crisis** (K. Begic, the aforementioned work, pp. 24-26, and 31).

In addition to being cross with the insufficiently loyal Bulatovic, who, unlike Milosevic, had accepted The Hague documents **“and left Serbia on the thin ice, which caused numerous dilemmas, surprising Europe itself”**, in speaking about The Hague Conference, the leadership of the Greater Serbia movement claimed that **“The EC Peace Plan for Yugoslavia means a catastrophe and bloodshed”**. Kadijevic’s threat was published that the army **“would undertake decisive action with all the resources available”** against Croatia, and that, in its transformation **“from the army of a Yugoslavia which is disappearing, into the army of a Yugoslavia which is emerging”** it will gather the power **“to defeat Croatia”**, because allegedly **“the government over there is using the revived, and even more horrid genocidal methods than those from WWII”**, relying on Germany, which **“for the third time in this century is attacking our country”**, and **“methods are also in place, as were used by the Fascists in WWII”**.²⁶⁵

Adamant to defeat **“the Fascist Croatia”** in the war against it, in late October and later on, the JNA had devastated whatever was accessible to it in Croatia, including Vukovar and Dubrovnik.²⁶⁶

On October 19, in compliance with the decision of The Hague Conference dated October 18, 1991, Franjo Tudjman and General Kadijevic **issued the Order for ceasefire on the territory of the Republic of Croatia**, and for the unblocking of all the barracks and facilities controlled by the JNA on the territory of the Republic of Croatia.²⁶⁷ However, in spite of that, the leadership of the Greater Serbia movement undertook measures to secure combat preparedness of the units and to increase the size of armed manpower – through the mobilization of military conscripts and units.

In a closed session (between October 18 and 19, 1991), the Assembly of Serbia gave support to Slobodan Milosevic and demonstratively refused **“The Hague materials”** (Ibid., p. 26. note 2).

²⁶⁵ S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, pp. 289-290; B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 400.

²⁶⁶ S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. 290.

²⁶⁷ K. Rotim, the aforementioned work, pp. 170-171.

In order to undertake **decisive action against Croatia**, on October 22, upon the proposal and influence of the military leadership, the Rump Presidency declared “**urgent mobilization of military conscripts and units, in accordance with the operational needs of the JNA**”, only “**in such parts of the country, which wish to stay in Yugoslavia**”.²⁶⁸ Based on the Order of the “Presidency” of the SFRY dated October 4, 1991, and the Order of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, marked strictly confidential no. 2732/1 and dated October 21, 1991, “**for the purpose of timely undertaking of security measures in terms of the required level of combat preparedness of commands, headquarters and units of the First VO [Military District; note by the author], on October 22, 1991, the commander of the First Military District (General Zivota Panic) issued the Order for Execution of all the Necessary Preparations “(strategic, staffing, organizational, and other) for the implementation of mobilization of all the war units in the JNA, in the area of responsibility**”. In addition to the other measures, the competent commands and officers were obligated to **urgently** undertake the general and specific measures on the organization and preparation of mobilization.²⁶⁹

²⁶⁸ S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. 289; K. Rotim, the aforementioned work, p. 161. This order for mobilization was dictated by Kadijevic. In this, he fiercely attacked the European Community and in particular Germany, at which, according to *Borba*, “**the tone of his General [sic] was exceptionally aggressive**”. He then also announced the transformation of the JNA “**into the armed force of Yugoslavia such as it will be preserved**” (S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. 289).

²⁶⁹ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2814, Command of the First Military District, strictly confidential no. 12/73-173, October 22, 1991 – to the commands: of the Fourth Corps and others.

All the commands and officers, among other things, were obligated, in a timely manner, to prepare and ensure “**the complete military equipment (including helmets, protective masks, pioneering tools, emergency bandages, and the like), the formation armament and the accompanying quantities of ammunition for the whole manpower (as per the peacetime and wartime formation of the respective unit)**”. What was to be done immediately was “**to carry out invitation to the training into the war-time units of the AVL [Active Military Personnel; note by the author] and the reserve military officers deployed in such units, for their training in carrying out of mobilization and commanding over the units in execution of the basic combat tasks. All the reserve**

After his return from The Hague, where at the conference he had accepted the proposal by Lord Carrington, Momir Bulatovic gave an ultimatum to the army, demanding from General Kadijevic **“to immediately return from the front line in Krajina the Montenegrin Brigade, or [Bulatovic] shall give his support to the public request that the Montenegrins leave the front line”**. In relation to this, on October 22, **“all shocked”**, Kadijevic called Jovic and read him the ultimatum. This, according to Jovic, was **“nothing else but treason”**.²⁷⁰

Probably under pressure from abroad, and, primarily, of the announced third Hague session, Bulatovic announced and demanded the withdrawal of the Montenegrin reservists from the surroundings of Dubrovnik, because **“Montenegro has no aspirations towards Dubrovnik”**. Plundering and burning, on October 24, the JNA conducted a parachute attack on Kupari and pushed through the Croatian defence positions near Dubac.²⁷¹

On October 24, the Presidency of Montenegro demanded from Kadijevic and his war headquarters to have the units filled in with Montenegrin reservists returned from the front line in Croatia. However, Kadijevic did not respond to that, because the rump (war) Presidency was backing him up, particularly Dr. Kostic.²⁷²

military officers at the levels of commanders of regiments or brigades, battalions or divisions, commanders of companies – batteries and independent platoons, as well as officers at other key duties in the units for which the competent commands deem necessary”.

The inviting was to be done on October 23, 1991, **“and the training of the reserve composition was to be conducted over 12 hours a day (with officers and mobilized reserve units)”**.

The mobilization was to be done selectively, in order to avoid the weaknesses, which had thus far been present in mobilization of war units.

Under this order, there was also the need to undertake **“special measures for institution of criminal and minor offence procedures against the responsible persons for failing to fulfil their military obligation”** (Ibid.).

²⁷⁰ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 401-402.

²⁷¹ S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. 291.

²⁷² Ibid., p. 292.

After the return from The Hague (between October 22 and 25), a meeting of **“the Group of six”** was held at Milosevic’s, also attended by Momir Bulatovic, who had, on October 18 in The Hague, accepted the proposal of Lord Carrington, which was also supported by Dr. Branko Kostic.²⁷³ At this meeting, Bulatovic stuck **“to his option”** and **“none common language”** was found.²⁷⁴

Between Slobodan Milosevic and the Army, primarily General Kadijevic, over the recent and not so short period of **“our drama”**, as written by Jovic in his memoirs for October 25, 1991, there was air of latent mistrust and even almost of conflict. Their conflict and mistrust were felt less at the meetings of **“the Group of six”**, and much more when one of them was alone with Jovic.²⁷⁵

Kadijevic was in a very bad mood because Serbia did not give enough **reservists for the war** and because Milosevic and Jovic did not do more (politically) against desertion. At each meeting, he was trying to point out that they can win the war easily only if Milosevic and Jovic so wish.²⁷⁶

Milosevic, upon Jovic’s agreement, had a serious objection against the Army for having brought them into such a situation, stalling action

²⁷³ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 400-402.

²⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 402. About this meeting, Jovic noted down in his memoirs as follows: **“... There was Momir Bulatovic, too. We did not attack him. We were trying to ‘look the other way’, to pretend that we do not see anything. But we could not find the same language when we were coming from different standpoints. Towards the end of the meeting, I said that it is in vain to continue our work now unless Momir changes his position. His response was that the problem is not in Momir but in us. ‘They do not want to fight in the war for us’, ‘they are running Montenegro, not us’, and so on. There is not even tolerance left, let alone trust!”** (Ibid.).

After the meeting, Jovic invited Milosevic at home and **“said that such meetings have no more sense if Momir sticks with his opinion”**.

²⁷⁵ Ibid.

²⁷⁶ Ibid. Jovic claims that this was factually accusing Milosevic and Jovic when saying this.

all the time. Jovic had even resigned in the first place to give the army the room for action, and it had even missed that opportunity.²⁷⁷

Milosevic had a little of an aversion towards Kadijevic, who was meddling into political issues a lot, without having resolved the military ones. Therefore, he ignored any initiative by the General, which had a political character and told Jovic: **“Let him mind his own business. Let him do what he is in charge of”**.²⁷⁸

At the last meeting of **“the Group of six”** at Milosevic’s,²⁷⁹ generals Kadijevic and Adzic again directly accused Milosevic and Jovic of leaving the Serbs in Croatia **“on thin ice”**. Milosevic responded to them on how they **“had been helping them generously”** and that they would **“do it until the end”**. General Adzic, who, according to Jovic, had a position similar to Kadijevic’s, demanded a larger number of reservists, and said unless he is given **“some more reservists, he will be left with nothing else but to take a gun and go and fight them himself”**.²⁸⁰

Speaking about this mistrust between the political and military leaderships, mainly between Milosevic and General Kadijevic, on October 25, 1991, Jovic claimed that there was a big question **“as to whether trust could be established”**. The more so, because from the newspapers they learned **“how many tanks and other equipment, and where, had been seized. It is from the newspapers that we learn that the JNA has made an agreement with Slovenia to leave the artillery there, and that the soldiers come back only with light armament. They have started working the wrong way, and hiding their nonsense from the leadership”**.²⁸¹

²⁷⁷ Ibid. In relation to this, on October 25, 1991, Jovic concluded: **“It is hard now to ‘accommodate’ it all the time, while it is doing nothing”**.

²⁷⁸ Ibid.

²⁷⁹ Ibid. About this meeting, On October 1991, Milosevic stated: **“maybe it will be the last one, and that’s it”**.

²⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 403. Jovic reacted to such information by saying: **“This is really insolent”**.

²⁸¹ Ibid.

At a meeting with Milosevic, Kadijevic became **“so annoyed that he said: ‘If you do not accept what I propose, I will dismiss the army’,** upon which Jovic fiercely responded to him: **‘You can only resign, and you are not in charge of dismissing the army’**”.²⁸²

On October 25, Kadijevic informed Jovic about his discussion with the representatives of western Slavonia, who had allegedly told him that, if they are **“left on thin ice”**, they will fight over there no more, but instead they would come directly to Belgrade with all of their arms to settle accounts **“with those who are responsible for that”**, and that he told them **“that he would also join them with a gun in his hand”**.²⁸³

Jovic (**“coldly, and without frustration”**) responded that he should send a message to the Serbs in western Slavonia **“that we shall under no circumstances leave them on thin ice”**.²⁸⁴ In relation to this, Jovic presented some exceptionally significant data on the number and ethnic composition of the JNA reservists.²⁸⁵

On October 25, in The Hague, the Third Session of the Conference on Yugoslavia was held. Just like on October 18, Milosevic, adamant in his position to resolve the Yugoslav issue using the army, applying all the means, including force, refused Carrington’s proposal for agreement on the new system of the Yugoslav countries. Carrington was dissatisfied at the actions of Serbia and the JNA (**“Truce agreements are getting signed, while Kadijevic is mobilizing new forces”**). Stating that he is sorry that he had not responded to the invitation to come to The Hague,

²⁸² Ibid. Stating that Kadijevic had apologized, Jovic concluded: **“... one can see what he thinks in himself. And what he thinks about himself”**.

²⁸³ Ibid., p. 403.

²⁸⁴ Ibid.

²⁸⁵ Ibid. About this, in his memoirs, Jovic wrote: **“Of the 200,000 soldiers that JNA has today [that is, in late October; note by the author], 70% are Serbs. Of the 100,000 reservists, 75% are Serbs. Who is holding all these frontlines across Croatia, if not Serbs?”**

Ten days before he asked for 30,000 reservists to finish off the war in 15 days (6 brigades, of which 3 brigades from Serbia, two from Bosnia, and one from Montenegro). He has already received half of that.

Carrington stated that the General always said **“that he would accept and honour any agreed political solution”**. In relation to this, he stated that Kadijevic’s statements **“and his actions clearly show that he had sided up with one party”**. Therefore he pointed out in particular that **“the statements by General Kadijevic are unsustainable when he says he is acting in accordance with the authority given by those who had grabbed the federal Presidency on October 3, which was condemned by the international community...”**²⁸⁶

On October 27, the four members of the rump Presidency (Borisav Jovic, Dr. Branko Kostic, Jugoslav Kostic, and Sejdo Bajramovic) led a discussion at the Headquarters of the Supreme Command, where there were at least twenty generals and about six **“huge maps of Yugoslavia with the deployment of forces, tactical ideas”**. In this, six generals reported about the situation at the front line, the plans, the tactics, the recruits, the withdrawal of army from Slovenia, the personnel changes, the mobilization, etc. The discussion lasted for four hours (from 12 to 4 PM).²⁸⁷

The generals again demanded the **supplementary mobilization of 250,000 people**.²⁸⁸ Jovic presented his assessments that the army has made **“serious mistakes, firstly, because the order of withdrawal was wrong (first the movable property, and the like, and only in the end, the heavy artillery!), and secondly, because they had not done anything to prevent Croatia from grasping these weapons from the**

Today [October 25; note by the author] **he wants** [General Kadijevic; note by the author] **250,000: How come, when nothing significant has changed on the front line?”** (Ibid.).

²⁸⁶ S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. 293.

²⁸⁷ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 404. In relation to this, Jovic wrote: **“They did not feel either comfortable or easy. For years, they learned not having a tutor, and having everything adopted as they said, and now it is a little harder to have that”**.

²⁸⁸ Ibid. Stating this demand of the military leadership, Jovic wrote:

“They are again asking for the supplementary mobilization of 250,000 people. Now the army has some 100,000 soldiers in its active composition, and recruits, and 100,000 reservists. Allegedly, the Croats have 160,000 mobilized and equally as many more (160,000) armed people...” (Ibid.).

trains". Upon this, some generals began defending themselves, but Kadijevic hushed them up and admitted that there had been mistakes.²⁸⁹

As for the issue of mobilization, it was agreed that (on Monday) discussions should be held in the republics, given that **"such a large mobilization can not be realized without their decision and support"**.²⁹⁰

On the same day, Jovic informed Milosevic about this discussion and asked him whether he agrees that on the next day they meet **"the Army and the Montenegrins"**. Milosevic said that they should first talk between themselves, and see about it, and **"keep the Montenegrins on ice. Let them see for themselves what they're going to do"**.²⁹¹

On the next day (October 28), Jovic talked to Milosevic about the position of Montenegro at The Hague Conference, which was of **"crucial importance"** to the Serb leadership, because, among other things, this brought into question their whole policy **"based on the concept that Yugoslavia exists until such time as at least two republics wish to preserve it"**. Due to this, it was agreed that they should talk to the Montenegrins one more time.²⁹²

On October 28, in Brussels, the Council of Ministers of the European Community adopted a new declaration on the five republics which **"have repeated their readiness to cooperate, based on the draft agreement"** and on **"the one republic which is still expressing reservations"**.

²⁸⁹ Ibid.

²⁹⁰ Ibid. Jovic personally did not believe that they can receive such support, but he promised that he would present the army demands to them.

²⁹¹ Ibid., pp. 404-405. Such a position of Milosevic was assessed by Jovic as **"probably a smart move"**, and he continued to say that the Montenegrins have made him very concerned at their conduct. He could never **"even think that they could turn their backs on us so easily"**.

²⁹² Ibid., p. 405. About this conversation, Jovic continues to say: **"Unless they change their statement, we are going public with the right assessments about what their position means, and this would mean their devastation. This is what we are left with as the only way out. We believe that we would find it easier to overthrow them then to build a new, good political platform for further independent action. This is what suits us the least, but we have no other option"** (Ibid.).

Restrictive measures were announced against this republic (i.e. Serbia). Having such a conduct by Serbia, as well as of the JNA in mind, the European Community countries indicated **“the Serbian position at the Conference, the state coup by the four members of the federal Presidency, and their announced plan, aimed at the creation of Greater Serbia”**.²⁹³

The discussion with the Montenegrins, in relation to their, as opposed to Serbia's, acceptance of the proposal by Lord Carrington in The Hague and the call for their army to return from the front line in Krajina, was held on October 29. It was attended by: Milosevic, Jovic, and Aleksandar Bakocevic (member of the Presidency of SR Serbia), and Momir Bulatovic, Milo Djukanovic, Branko Kostic, and Risto Vukcevic (president of the Assembly of Montenegro). Generals Kadijevec and Adzic were not summoned, as Milosevic and Jovic had done so intentionally, so that without them (by themselves) they could clarify the political issues, but they did invite the generals to join them later (for lunch), where the negotiations would continue.²⁹⁴

The discussion was started by Branko Kostic, insisting, among other things, on clarifying the issue **“where we are after the position of Montenegro in The Hague and after its position towards the army”**.²⁹⁵

Milosevic brought up two issues, on which all depended: the attitude of Montenegro towards the army,²⁹⁶ and the negotiations in The Hague. The second issue, according to him, was **a simple one: “The Montenegrins need to provide the amendment to point 1 of the Agreement, so that it retains the wording of that those republics which so desire can become independent and sovereign states, but that it should be**

²⁹³ S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. 294.

²⁹⁴ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 405.

²⁹⁵ Ibid. Kostic stated that they need to know **“whether we have the state, the Presidency, the JNA, or we have come apart”**, because this is what their work in the Presidency depended upon.

²⁹⁶ Ibid. In relation to this, he stated if the Montenegrins **“continue to attack the army and to confront it, the concept of existence of Yugoslavia and our whole policy has fallen down”**.

added that the republics and peoples who so desire can continue to live in the federative state. This would mean the necessary correction in The Hague and in the public. He repeated several times that we are not making the pressure, but we are kindly asking them to clearly tell us: yes or no, so we know how to get about it”.²⁹⁷

Jovic spoke about the threat from the break-up of the concept that was based on that Yugoslavia still exists, what would, according to him, happen **“unless Montenegro changes its mind...”**²⁹⁸ Those of Vukcevic, Djukanovic, Bulatovic and Bakocevic followed his speech.²⁹⁹ After the

²⁹⁷ Ibid.

²⁹⁸ Ibid., pp. 405-406. This would, according to him, bring to some **“major detriment, because we will lose even what we would have certainly gained politically, based on the past strife for the rights and position of the Serb people in Croatia. This would be an unforgivable mistake. Regardless of the outcome of the negotiations in The Hague, we must stick together. There is simply this question: are we together or not? The public can not be held in delusion”** (Ibid., p. 406).

²⁹⁹ Ibid. About this, Jovic wrote:

“Risto, Milo, and Momir spoke. Each of them in the same direction: the problem is not in them. We should not doubt that the people of Montenegro want to be with the people of Serbia, they will prove this at the referendum, as well. They have huge support in the parliament and among people. It is unacceptable that they be called traitors. The problem is that Serbia does not want to make war. They were in favour of the war, but if Serbia is not, then there is no other option than to accept the peace proposals. They dispute by saying that these proposals are no good, although they include full dissolution and eradication of Yugoslavia. They believe they can be improved, but they are essentially acceptable. They attack the army. The army is doing what they want, they do not ask them where to send their reservists, now it is mining the barracks in Montenegro! And so on...

We argued for a long time. We let them know sufficiently clearly how much guilty they would be for the situation that may occur.

Bakocevic posed them an open question: you have talked to the Croatians, Italians, and Austrians... May we know what they offered to you?

Bulatovic said as follows:

- We've got nothing to hide. They told us we would benefit personally, that our party would be treated as a democratic one, that we will receive money for the development of Montenegro, that we will gain Prevlaka in a peaceful way, and that Montenegro shall not suffer from the embargo, if it is imposed against Serbia.

arrival of Kadijevic and Adzic, **“a new dimension was introduced, which even deteriorated the situation”**. Namely, **“the two of them were about to start crying: Unless we give them 250,000 soldiers, everything will fall down. The army would be dissolved, we would lose the war...”**³⁰⁰

The meeting ended **“in complete uncertainty”**. **“Some kind of agreement was reached that the Montenegrins would decide and state their final option, and that the army should wait for that”**.³⁰¹

On October 30, Milosevic drafted the text of the amendments that Montenegro was to send to The Hague, the essence of which was in a peaceful exit, or stay in Yugoslavia. After the whole day of arguing with Bulatovic (**“not about the contents any more, but about the procedure”**), Milosevic **“convinced”** him to send the text out.³⁰²

On behalf of Serbia, and later of Montenegro too, Milosevic drafted the text of the amendment submitted by Serbia and Montenegro to the

Of course, Bulatovic said, we have not accepted the plan of the European Community (Carrington plan) because of that, but because of our personal conviction” (Ibid.).

³⁰⁰ Ibid. According to Jovic, this had come in well for the Montenegrins **“so they can intensify their attacks against us”**.

³⁰¹ Ibid.

³⁰² Ibid. Jovic wrote about this as follows: **“Slobodan has drafted the text of the amendment that Montenegro should send to The Hague. The essence is that those who wish to leave Yugoslavia may do that, and those who wish to stay in Yugoslavia also may do that. So the dissolution is not inevitable. Momir and Slobodan were arguing all day long, not on the contents any longer, but on the procedure. Sloba seeks that Momir should present this to The Hague, and Momir wants Sloba to do it, and that he agrees at the Conference. Finally, Sloba ‘persuaded’ him. Bulatovic finally accepted and promised to forward it. I guess things are going for the better”** (Ibid. pp. 406-407).

Under intensive pressure of Slobodan Milosevic, Borisav Jovic, Dr. Branko Kostic, and the others, Momir Bulatovic changed his position and rejected Carrington’s plan. He was threatened by both Borisav Jovic and Dr. Branko Kostic: unless he reviews his position he shall be dismissed, and possibly also arrested (ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraph 84, inst. 165, and 959).

commissions of The Hague Conference on Yugoslavia, the essence of which was to have the document also include the option by which the future relations among the republics will also be based on **the joint state of equal republics and Yugoslav peoples which, based on their right to self-determination, wish to stay in the joint state.**³⁰³

These “amendments” by the leader of the Greater Serbia movement, in addition to the legal and economic continuity of “**the future Yugoslavia**”, were aimed at the creation of the legal basis for the formation of the “Greater Serbia”, under the name of Yugoslavia,³⁰⁴ using the right of the nations for self-determination under the Greater Serbia agenda.

On October 30, Kadijevic informed Milosevic that on the next day, before the session of the Headquarters of Supreme Command, “**he has the intention to take the decision to use all available forces to go ahead and liberate all the barracks in Croatia and destroy cities**”, which, according to Milosevic, was not smart.³⁰⁵ Jovic asked Milosevic whether they are to give Kadijevic “**some more reservists**”, and he was answered that “**we are not preventing them, mobilization is in their hands, they have the decisions, but we can not expose ourselves forward, to agitate for people to lose their lives for the barracks they have left behind the front line**”.³⁰⁶

³⁰³ K. Begic, the aforementioned work, p. 26.

³⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 27.

³⁰⁵ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 407. According to Jovic, Kadijevic responded to Milosevic: “**You are just like Bora Jovic**”.

In order to boost the severely declined morale, the units of the First Military District, on October 31 and November 1, 1991, during the battle for Vukovar, were visited by the Chief of Staff of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, General Blagoje Adzic (D. Marijan, the aforementioned work, pp. 308-309).

³⁰⁶ Ibid. Jovic then informed Milosevic that he had asked the military leadership at the General Staff “**how much army there is at those barracks, and they responded to me: 13,000. They got angry when I wondered in front of them if it is justified to mobilize 250,000 people, of which at least 10% will be killed for forced conquest of these barracks in the cities? And the question is how much success they will have in the first place. I told them openly that we cannot succeed with such large mobilization and that mass protests may occur, and the political defeat, if we insist on that to the end.**”

In early November 1991, in order to strengthen the military conquests in Croatia, Jovic and Milosevic decided to submit a proposal to invite UN forces into Yugoslavia. At the time, **when the Serb nation had power on those territories**, according to them, there were reasons that they demand the United Nations to protect them with their peace-making forces **“until the political solution of the Yugoslav crisis is reached”**. Milosevic and Jovic had talked about this first on November 2, when Jovic presented the assessment that **“the situation of the Serbo-Croatian conflicts in Krajina has come to the stage”** when they must **“be thinking about a radical move. The prevalent part of the territory populated by a Serb majority is under Serb power. This is only not the case with Central Slavonia, but the Serbs had en masse fled from there, so there is no one left to fight or hold power. Croatia is arming itself more and more, leading to an increased involvement of the JNA, seeking an ever increasing mobilization here in Serbia, and this is totally counterproductive to our policy”**.³⁰⁷

Milosevic agreed to with this very sly move, at which he believed that **“they need to take some more thought”** on how to carry this out.³⁰⁸

Under the chairmanship of Lord Carrington, on November 5, 1991, the Fourth Plenary Session of the Conference on Yugoslavia was held in The Hague.³⁰⁹ Carrington first sought consent about Chapter 1 (“General Provisions”), where Article 1, point C, in accordance with the “Serb objections”, includes the position that, in addition to **the loose association**

They do not care about this. They think it is enough that the two of us hold one speech each, and that everybody will go to war and correct their mistakes” (Ibid.).

³⁰⁷ Ibid.

³⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 408. At this, according to Jovic, Milosevic was thinking about **“how to do this without having them refuse us, and there is also the danger of lack of understanding with the Serbs in Krajina”**. In relation to this, Jovic noted down: **“We will talk about it some more”**.

³⁰⁹ S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. 306. The Conference was attended by: members of the Presidency of the SFRY (except for Dr. Drnovsek), then Markovic and Loncar, the republic presidents (Tudjman, Milosevic, and Gligorov), presidents of the republic presidencies (Izetbegovic, Kucan, and Bulatovic), and the republic ministers of foreign affairs (Silajdzic, Samardzic, Separovic, Meleski, Rupel, and Jovanovic) – Ibid.

of sovereign republics with international identity”, there is also an option of **“the common state of equal republics, made up of such republics as wish to stay within it”**. Four republics were in agreement (**“everyone can go their own ways as they wish”**), and two not (Serbia and Montenegro).³¹⁰

Carrington also proposed another position, supplied by Milosevic and Bulatovic (the author of which was Milosevic), under their amendments to the previous Hague document on the sovereign republics, which may form a joint union. The amendment proposes that the right to form a **“joint state”** is not only granted **“to the republics that so wish”** but also to the **“nations”**, and that the joint state be **“an international entity”** and a **“continuity”** of the existing Yugoslavia.³¹¹

The presidents of the other four republics did not accept the aforementioned proposal. Namely, the leadership of the Greater Serbia movement, primarily its leader – Milosevic, was trying to use the introduction of **nations** in order to secede the collaborationist creations from their mother states and join them to Yugoslavia as their common state. Insisting on the **continuity**, they showed the ambition that such a **“Yugoslavia, as a joint state of the republics and nations”**, remains the only aspirant not only to the continuity and succession of the international personality of the former Yugoslavia, but its successor as well.³¹²

³¹⁰ Ibid.; K. Begic, the aforementioned work, p. 27. Thus, Milosevic, the president of Serbia, denied his signature on the “European plan” for the second time (K. Begic, the aforementioned work, p. 31).

³¹¹ Ibid.; K. Rotim, the aforementioned work, p. 177. In order to accept Chapter I, Milosevic and Bulatovic insisted on making the following changes:

- firstly, that point C, Article 1, states as follows: **“the joint state of equal republics and nations that wish to stay in Yugoslavia as their common state”**; and,

- secondly, that point G also be included, stating as follows: **“Under the framework of the general solution, the continuity and international subjectivity of Yugoslavia as a joint state of the republics that so wish”** (S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. 306).

³¹² S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. 306. Dr. Kostic was prevented from talking once again. After everyone declared in the proportion of 4:2, Dr. Kostic applied to speak. Lord Carrington told him: **“You can not speak, Sir, because it is an illegitimate body that you want to represent”** (Ibid., pp. 306-307).

Given that no agreement was reached on Chapter I, there was no need to discuss the whole document, and Carrington concluded the session, whereby the new Hague agreement suffered the destiny of the previous ones. Instead of a truce and appeasement on the frontline, the JNA launched a new anti-Croatian offensive.³¹³

In the period of November 2-9, Milosevic and Jovic completed numerous preparations for deciding on their proposal to invite the peacekeeping forces of the United Nations, **in order to protect the Serbs in Krajina**³¹⁴ (the discussion with Milivoj Maksic, Deputy Secretary for Foreign Affairs,³¹⁵ made and coordinated the draft of the letter to the Security Council,³¹⁶ and informed Dr. Branko Kostic and Prof. Dr. Gavro Perazic, who was legal advisor to B. Kostic).³¹⁷

³¹³ Ibid., p. 308.

³¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 407-411. According to Jovic, Milosevic agreed with that **“radical move, but he believes that we need to take some more time in order to think about how to carry that out, without being refused, and there is also the risk of lack of understanding with the Serbs in Krajina”** (Ibid., p. 408).

The unsuccessful military mobilization convinced the leadership of the Greater Serbia movement that the formation of the Republic of Serbian Krajina is their optimum goal in Croatia. Given that the Serb people in this area had the power, this leadership very slyly opted for requesting the United Nations to use their peace keeping forces to protect the Serb nation **“until the political resolution to the Yugoslav crisis”** (Ibid., p. 407; S. Biserko, the aforementioned work, p. 226).

³¹⁵ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 408. Jovic talked to Maksic. He asked him for his opinion on the idea to invite the peacekeeping forces of the UN to protect the Serbs in Krajina. Maksic believed that **“this was not realistic. The West does not recognize our four-member presidency, and they will simply just ignore our request. We will just come into an awkward situation”**. Jovic did not agree with this, he thought Maksic was exaggerating, and that he was being too cautious.

³¹⁶ Ibid. The first draft of the letter to the Security Council was made by Jovic on November 7, and then he went to Milosevic to review it together, where, **“with some minor corrections”**, they coordinated the text.

³¹⁷ Ibid. After they had coordinated the text, on October 7, they informed Dr. Branko Kostic about it. He agreed with the idea and the draft letter, and invited Gavro Perazic **“to have a look at the text of the letter”** and give them suggestions. During the same day, he did **“some major corrections to the text”**, which, according to Jovic, then sounded **“very convincing”**.

After that, Milosevic and Jovic decided to go further. They convened the session of the rump Presidency of the SFRY and presented the proposal that the UN Peacekeeping Forces be invited, in order to “protect” the Serbs in Krajina,³¹⁸ that is, in order to legalize the conquered territories in Croatia.

The session of the Presidency was held on November 9. No one had been informed of the aforementioned proposal, presented at the very session, except for Milosevic, Jovic, and Dr. Kostic. **“The Army, the Government, the Foreign office (SSIP), the leadership of Montenegro, or Krajina – no one knew. Even Yugoslav Kostic and Sejdo Bajramovic, the members of the Presidency, were not informed”**, although at the time, Milosevic and Jovic had **“full trust”** in them.³¹⁹

According to Jovic, everyone was surprised and silent, including the JNA and the SSIP. Only Milan Veres from the SSIP, assistant federal secretary, surprised and confused, proposed **“that we take some time to think about it”**. However, Jovic and Dr. Kostic were being categorical and said that **“they had thought about it all and that there can be no postponement”**.³²⁰

After the discussion about the procedural issues as to how and to whom to send the proposal, the text of the letter was adopted to invite UN Peacekeepers for the purpose of “protecting” the Serbs in Krajina.³²¹ The essence of this invitation was in that the Greater Serbia aggressor

³¹⁸ Ibid.

³¹⁹ Ibid.

³²⁰ Ibid. Jovic wrote **“that a discussion arose about the procedural issues as to whom to send it to. If we send it to Darko Silovic, the Ambassador at the UN, who is a Croat, he could even ‘retain’ it for the sake of obstruction, and not deliver it to the Security Council. Direct mailing to the Security Council is not usual when we have an ambassador there. We could equally throw it into the dustbin. We found a ‘solomonic’ solution: to send it personally to the Chairman of the Security Council, the Romanian Ambassador at the UN, and inform the Romanian government of this, so that it would influence that our request be placed on the agenda”** (Ibid., pp. 408-409).

³²¹ Ibid., pp. 409-410. The letter states many facts, which really do not stand, and indicates the danger and fear of genocide against the Serb nation in Croatia, which **“is happening again and threatens to have broader tragic consequences, not only in Yugoslavia, but also in the Balkans and in Europe”** (Ibid.).

under the surveillance of the UN Peacekeepers holds the occupied areas in Croatia, and that the aggression be legalized.³²²

On November 15, the Security Council began having discussions about the idea to send the “**blue helmets**” into the Croatian Krajina. At this, they avoided mentioning of the request by the rump, unrecognised Presidency of the SFRY. Formally, this was “**requested**” by Great Britain and by France.³²³ Thereby Milosevic and Jovic, in cooperation with their

“The UN Peacekeeping forces”, says the letter, “would create a buffer zone and separate the conflicting parties, until the Yugoslav crisis is resolved in a peaceful, fair way, based on the international law, and backed up by the UN. This would create the necessary conditions for the Presidency of the SFRY, as the supreme commander of the armed forces of the SFRY, to bring the decision in non-involvement of the JNA in reduction of interethnic conflicts on the territory of the Republic of Croatia.

In the opinion of the Presidency of the SFRY, the political solution of the Yugoslav crisis that needs to provide a permanent peace, under the present circumstances, and this further assumes involvement of the UN Peacekeeping forces, as a guarantor to the Serbian people in Croatia that they shall not re-suffer their tragic destiny from WWII. The Presidency of the SFRY is convinced that the proposed involvement of the UN Peacekeeping forces would bring to cessation of the armed conflicts. This would also create the conditions for quicker peaceful and democratic solving of the Yugoslav crisis which is now, even with involvement of the European Community, facing major obstacles” (Ibid., p. 410).

³²² S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, pp. 308-310. About the reasons for such invitation, see: S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, pp. 309-310.

³²³ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 411. In this way, according to Jovic, **“the action has been successful”**. According to him, the Security Council had itself found a “solomonic” solution. **“Formally, this was sought by the Great Britain and by France. So that the enemies do not ‘dig it’. They do not wish to mention our ‘rump’ Presidency”** (Ibid.).

On December 31, the ‘rump’ Presidency adopted the Concept for the Involvement of the UN Peacekeeping Forces in Yugoslavia, proposed by the personal envoy of the UN Secretary General, Cyrus Vance), after whom it was later called Vance’s plan. The drafting and coordination of this concept on the Serbian side was participated by Milosevic and Kadujevic. The rump Presidency was excluded, because the UN did not recognize it. In all the stages of negotiations, Milosevic informed and consulted him, as well as Kadujevic (B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 421).

On January 20, 1992, Jovic talked to Marrack Golding – Undersecretary General of the UN, and informed him about the acceptance of Vance’s plan by the (rump) Presidency of the SFRY (Ibid., pp. 422-423).

western allies, deluded the Security Council and the whole world.³²⁴

The major operation designed by the military leadership against Croatia did not yield the expected success. In November, the land forces of the JNA were stopped. After a partial execution of the tasks, including the occupation of Vukovar (on November 18, 1991),³²⁵ a stalemate position was created which over a long-term haul was against the Greater Serbia interests. Its aggressive forces found themselves at the hand of the projected objectives, but without the power to continue their further realization. The other smaller part of the forces that was to contribute to the first group was small in size and surrounded in the Croatian cities... **The JNA had to be contented at the limited success,**³²⁶ hoping that **the**

Golding also met the representatives of the JNA, generals Adzic, Mladic, and Vukovic, who expressed their support to the UN Peace Making Operations Plan (Ibid., p. 423).

On February 2, 1992, the leadership of the collaborationist Republic of Serbian Krajina accepted Vance's plan. The general activities about drafting the plan in the name of the Serbian side were led by Slobodan Milosevic (for more details on this: B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 430-436). Franjo Tudjman too fully and unconditionally accepted the concept and plan of the UN Secretary General, defining the conditions and areas where the UN forces would be deployed (Ibid., p. 435).

³²⁴ On November 27, 1991, the Security Council voted for Resolution no. 721, thus opening the door for the arrival of the blue helmets (S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. 318).

³²⁵ D. Marijan, the aforementioned work, pp. 308-315. Vukovar was taken by the forces of the "North Operational Group", commanded by General Major Andrija Biorcevic and the "South Operational Group", commanded by colonel Mile Mrksic, with the air support of the 1st Air Force Corps, commanded by Branislav Petrovic. Otherwise, this operation was completed under the command of General Zivota Panic, commander of the First Military District (D. Marijan, the aforementioned work, pp. 308-309).

³²⁶ Ibid. the main group of the land army of the JNA, predominantly the armoured and mechanized compositions in **eastern Slavonia**, according to General Kadijevic, had two tasks: **"to liberate the Serb areas in eastern Slavonia"** and **"to be the main manoeuvre force of the Supreme Command for penetration towards Zagreb and Varazdin"**. The first task was completed by the JNA, however, **"it had wasted a lot of time, primarily because it lacked the planned infantry forces to accompany the tanks, which was to be gained through mobilization"**. The JNA group in East Slavonia won **"the so-called battle for Vukovar"**, **"defeated the main group of the Croatian army"**, and after it took Vukovar, it was **"ready to extend the activities westwards"**.

UN Peacekeeping forces that were arriving to the war areas would secure its territorial conquests. Under the pressure of the international

However, due to the lack of sufficient forces, the penetration towards Zagreb was not launched (V. Kadijevic, the aforementioned work, p. 137. The success and the danger of the penetration of this JNA group towards Zagreb had a relevant influence, according to Kadijevic, **“on Croatia’s acceptance of the Vance plan”**).

The JNA activities in **West Slavonia** in the direction of Gradiska-Pakrac-Virovitica **“initially yielded some good results”**, in which **“the mass insurrection of the Serb people in Slavonia contributed significantly”**. However, this group **“had completed its task only partially”**. The main reason for this, according to Kadijevic, was **“that due to the unsuccessful mobilization the group did not receive the planned five brigades, but only an equivalent of one and a half brigades, and those who reached the frontline even abandoned it during the battle...”**. Nowhere did the failure of mobilization **“reflect so negatively on our situation as in West Slavonia...”**, claims General Kadijevic (Ibid., p. 138).

The JNA group in the areas of **Banija, Kordun and Lika**, with certain problems and losses (the lack of forces), nevertheless, executed **“its reduced tasks”** (Ibid., p. 139).

The Knin group “executed all of its tasks in an extraordinary manner”: it fully **“‘liberated’ all the Serb areas in its zone of activity, it cut up Croatia near Zadar, unblocked the Sinj, Drnis, and Zadar garrisons, helped the Military Navy District in unblocking of Sibenik, threatened Split and helped very much with the situation in Lika”** (Ibid.).

Due to the lack of the operationally planned forces, **the Mostar group** executed **“the limited task only – securing Mostar airport, and relying on East Herzegovina to create the operational background for potential activity towards Split in cooperation with the forces of the Knin group and the War Navy”** (Ibid., pp. 139-140).

“In the changed operation plan”, the Trebinje-Herzegovina group was assigned the task to “liberate”, that is, take Prevlaka, “block the broader region of Dubrovnik from the land and be prepared for the activity towards the Neretva delta”. For the execution of this task, which was executed **“efficiently and quickly”**, the group received the planned forces **“thanks to the successful mobilization in East Herzegovina and Montenegro”** (Ibid., p. 140).

The Military Navy **“successfully executed two main tasks – fully efficiently executed and secured the naval blockade of Croatia and preserved the whole Navy fleet for the JNA, that is, the army of future Yugoslavia”**. The Military Air Forces also **“executed all of its tasks with the minimum losses – support to the forces of land army, independent activity, patrolling tasks, transport and parachute attacks”**, as well as **“dislocation of its units and institutions”** (Ibid., p. 141).

The main tasks of the modified plan of operations for the JNA in Croatia were executed as follows:

community, the compromise was resolved through agreement dated **November 22, 1991, on the dislocation of the remaining forces of the Fifth Military District of the JNA out of the territory of Croatia** and leaving the weapons of the Territorial Defence to Croatia. This process of dislocation was completed by **December 30, 1991**.³²⁷

On November 22, 1991, Lord Carrington sent “**the questions he had submitted to the Arbitration Commission**” of Robert Badenteur to Stjepan Mesic.³²⁸ These were the questions of Serbia sent on November

“- **all the Serb areas in Croatia, except a part in West Slavonia, in close cooperation with the Serb insurgents, were liberated**”, that is, taken (Ibid. According to Kadijevec, this accounted for “**about one third of the territory of the former Republic of Croatia**”);

- **through combat, the future army of Serbian Krajina was virtually built, which was equipped by the JNA with appropriate armament and artillery;**

- **the JNA withdrew all of its main combat resources out of Croatia and deployed them so that they correspond with the future tasks. The largest number of the JNA garrisons were unblocked in combat, and only a minor part based on Vance’s plan**” (Ibid. In relation to this, Kadijevec states “**that only a minor number of the garrisons and warehouses were taken by the enemy. The majority of thus lost artillery had been broken or destroyed through subsequent air force actions and in other ways**” – Ibid., pp. 141-142);

- **very high losses were inflicted to the Croatian army, so that it was no longer capable of any serious activity, including defence actions...**” (Ibid., pp. 142-143). These conclusions of Kadijevec, as well as the claims that Croatia has lost the war, are just empty babble of the defeated general).

Speaking about the “**results**” of the war in Croatia, according to Kadijevec, the JNA “**had fully, under the conditions unprecedented in history, executed the first part of their newly established assignment – to militarily defend the right of the Serb and Montenegrin people to have a joint state**”.

However, the second part of this task – “**to secure peaceful separation from other nations who did not wish to remain in Yugoslavia**”, according to him, “**could not be executed by the JNA, because it had not depended on it in the first place**” (Ibid., p. 144). In relation to this, Kadijevec comforts himself with the false statement: “**As it is known, the war was imposed first by the Slovenians, then by the Croats and Muslims, under the dictation of the Germans, and with the support of the pro-German policy in the US, so the peace or war depended upon them**” (Ibid.).

³²⁷ Ibid., pp. 314-315.

³²⁸ S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. 314. For Arbitration (Badenteur’s) Commission, see: K. Begic, the aforementioned work, pp. 31-44).

4 to Carrington, which, according to him, were “**major legal issues**”. In addition to Mesic, Carrington also sent them out to the six republic presidents, that is, republic presidencies, requesting their “**observations without delay**”.³²⁹

The next day (**November 23, 1991**), in Geneva, Tudjman and Milosevic, and General Kadijevic, in front of Cyrus Vance and Lord Carrington, **signed the fourteenth truce**, under the impression of the position of the special envoy of Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, that “**the helmets would come only under the condition that a permanent truce is ensured**”. However, Milosevic’s military forces launched new aggressive offensives (East Slavonia, the Zadar area, and the like). Although it had sought after the blue helmets, the rump Presidency was not in a rush about their arrival, because they had not occupied everything that had been planned. According to them, these forces were to be deployed “**only on the interposition line, in between the warring parties**”, whereby they would geographically round up the Greater Serbia under the name of Yugoslavia.³³⁰

Right before the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia by the European Community, and the invitation to all the republics to become independent, Milosevic and Jovic were “**assessing**” the situation. On December 5, 1991, assessing that “**recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia would follow soon after**”, they were evaluating their position under such circumstances.³³¹

The Serbian leadership assessed that, unlike Macedonia, with which the “**the thing is simple**”,³³² it was going to be “**very difficult**” with Bosnia and Herzegovina. Reviewing the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where, according to them, “**interethnic conflicts had**

³²⁹ Ibid., p. 314.

³³⁰ S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, pp. 315-316.

³³¹ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 420.

³³² Ibid. In Macedonia, according to Milosevic and Jovic, “**interethnic conflicts are not a risk. The Serbs are not endangered. If Macedonia wants to secede, we need to make an arrangement with it about the withdrawal of the army and the division of military property**”.

already begun”, Milosevic and Jovic were intentionally starting from completely wrong facts, such as for instance, endangerment of the Serb population, which, unlike the Bosniaks and Croats, allegedly had not formed **“their paramilitary units”**.³³³ In this way, they made an attempt to **“design”** the military tactics for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In expectance of the international recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the JNA would be declared **“a foreign army”**, and Serbia and Montenegro aggressors, and to cover up his participation in the aggression, Milosevic thought that **all the citizens of Serbia and Montenegro should be timely withdrawn from the JNA in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and redeploy all the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the JNA into Bosnia and Herzegovina, “so that at the time of international recognition they would avoid the general military chaos by having the army walk in an out across the country”**. According to him, this was also to create **“the possibilities for the Serb leadership in Bosnia and Herzegovina to take over the command over the Serb part of the JNA”**.³³⁴

After they had coordinated positions about the **“military tactics”** towards Bosnia and Herzegovina, Milosevic and Jovic invited Kadijevic to join in the discussion and gave him **“homework”** to do. Milosevic told the General in simple terms that **“he needs to do the redeployment of the army: everything coming from BiH into Bosnia and Herzegovina, and vice versa”**, and he explained to him that this is **“strategically**

³³³ Ibid. Milosevic and Jovic **“assessed”** that **“the Muslims and the Croats had abandoned the JNA and formed paramilitary units. Those who have remained in the JNA are virtually the Serbs and Montenegrins, but coming from all the Serb lands. Once Bosnia and Herzegovina is internationally recognized, the JNA shall be declared a foreign army and its withdrawal shall be demanded, which is impossible to avoid. In this situation, the Serb population in BiH, which has not created its paramilitary units, will remain unprotected and endangered”** (Ibid.).

The resources available, including the documents of military origin of the highest degree of secrecy, cannot confirm the alleged **“assessments”** by the leaders of the Greater Serbia movement, that is, they are categorically denying them.

³³⁴ Ibid. In stating this, Milosevic said that **“this had already been done by the Muslims and Croats”**, which, as far as the Bosniaks were concerned, he had made up.

and politically necessary”.³³⁵ Thus the leader of the Greater Serbia movement, “**assessing the further development of events”**, believed that, “**after leaving Croatia, we should have strong JNA forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina”**.”³³⁶

Twenty days later (December 25), Kadijevec, claims Jovic, informed himself and Milosevic that by then allegedly “**90% of the army had been dislocated”**, in accordance with their discussion of December 5, whereby at the time in Bosnia and Herzegovina there was “**10-15% of the army not coming from that Republic”**.”³³⁷

³³⁵ Ibid. Kadijevec claimed “**that this is not in compliance with the policy and practice of the JNA and that it would be very hard to accept for the military leadership”** and said that he would “**see what he can do about it”**.”

Jovic claims that Milosevic was trying to cover up the involvement and participation of Serbia and Montenegro in the aggression and genocide against Bosnia and Herzegovina at any price. In relation to this, Jovic wrote the Milosevic proposed in person, and the rump Presidency of the SFRY accepted and “implemented” the decision that “**immediately all the citizens of Serbia and Montenegro in service at the Yugoslav People’s Army should be withdrawn from Bosnia and Herzegovina”** (B. Jovic, *KNJIGA O MILOSEVICU*, Belgrade 2001, p. 73).

³³⁶ V. Kadijevec, the aforementioned work, p. 147. Kadijevec claims that the Rump Presidency of the SFRY agreed with such an assessment and adopted the proposal (according to him, this was allegedly the assessment of the military leadership). This, he wrote, “**fit in with every realistic political option for the development of the events in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as with the need for existence of ready and strong forces on the border towards Serb Krajina, in order to provide the guarantee that Croatia too would honour Vance’s plan”** (Ibid., pp. 147-148).

The subsequent “**development of events virtually confirmed the correctness of this assessment and decision”**, wrote Kadijevec (Ibid., p. 148).

³³⁷ Ibid., p. 421. About this report of Kadijevec, Jovic wrote: “**In spite of resistance and dramatization, the dislocation was conducted timely and without any noise”**.”

After the session of the Rump Presidency of the SFRY, on December 31, 1991, which adopted the Concept for Involvement of the UN Peacekeeping forces in Yugoslavia (B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 421), at the office of Branko Kostic, where the following sat: Jovic, Branko and Jugoslav Kostic, Sejdo Bajramovic and Kadijevec (so they can have a drink and wish each other a Happy New Year), General Kadijevec informed the attendees that he has decided to resign for health reasons, and that “**this is his final decision”**, and that after New Year he would also confirm it in

The alleged claims by Jovic are false. The original JNA documents available at the highest level of secrecy from this period, and later, cannot confirm this. That is, they confirm differently.

After the signing of the agreement for unconditional ceasefire in Sarajevo on January 2, 1992, between the representatives of the Republic of Croatia and the JNA, the combat activity significantly abated. Parts of the UN Peacekeeping forces started coming and deploying along the separation line,³³⁸ whereby the leadership of the Greater Serbia movement realized its goal.³³⁹

writing (Ibid., pp. 421-422). In relation to this, Jovic stated: **“We did not become much upset about this. No one insisted that he take a second thought on this. We asked him about his health, and he said that ‘there were various things’ the treatment of which he can no longer postpone.**

I am personally in a dilemma whether to believe the health reasons, although it is not excluded that he has them, too. I believe that there are other reasons that he does not want to mention. After all, the drama we are going through is reason enough to topple anyone” (Ibid., p. 422).

³³⁸ D. Marijan, the aforementioned work, pp. 314-315. Parallel with **“the development of war activity in Croatia, there were also”**, according to Kadijevec, **“peace negotiations underway run by the personal envoy of the UN Secretary General, Mr. Cyrus Vance. The modified JNA operation in Croatia was coming to an end when the initial document of Vance’s peace plan was accepted and signed. Then the war activities in Croatia virtually stopped, although the total peace occurred after the Sarajevo agreement of January 2, 1992, between the representatives of the JNA and the Croatian army”** (V. Kadijevec, the aforementioned work, p. 142).

The system of directing and commanding over the JNA was adjusted from Slovenia, via Croatia and up to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Under the conditions when the Commands of the Fifth Military District in Zagreb and the Military Naval District in Split were not able to perform the commanding function, this was taken over and conducted by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY. Thus, the General Staff was directly commanding over the parts of the First Military District, that is, the Novi Sad, Tuzla, and Banja Luka Corps, and over the special interim compositions of OG-1 and OG-2, which had participated in the aggression against Croatia (Ibid.).

³³⁹ After the entry of the international troops into Croatia, the leadership of the Greater Serbia movement realized its goal – it had defined the western borders of the Greater Serbia (by forming of the collaborationist Republic of Serb Krajina and by placing it under the protection of the United Nations) – S. Biserko, the aforementioned work, p. 226.

With the cessation of the war activities in Croatia, the RAM operation was also finished for the most part. The operation was mainly terminated with the agreed fall of Vukovar. The JNA did not defeat Croatia, but it took one part of its state territory, thus framing the borders of Greater Serbia, withdrawing the main combat resources from the rest of Croatia and deploying them along the borders of the future Yugoslavia, and “defending” the right of the Serb and Montenegrin peoples to their joint state. In compliance with the Declaration of the European Community from Brussels, issued on December 17, 1991, Croatia declared its independence and became an internationally recognized state. With the deployment of the UN Peacekeeping forces on one third of Croatian territory, the leadership of the Greater Serbia movement believed that it had secured the preservation of this territory and the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina within the projected grand Serbian state.

3. Failure of Mobilization and Its Supplement

The halved filling in of recruits, and then the cessation of the filling in (coming from Croatia and Slovenia, and in part also from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia), brought the JNA in Slovenia and Croatia into a hard position. The system of regular military obligation in the western part of Yugoslavia had ceased to exist and the JNA began suffering from soldier insufficiency.³⁴⁰

The combat resources of the permanent composition of the JNA were increasingly reducing **“due to the dissipation on ethnic basis, in particular the soldiers serving the obligatory military term”**, which **“the secessionist republics”**, one by one, **“had stopped sending to the JNA”**. This **“serious problem”** could be resolved **“only by inviting military conscripts into reserve compositions, that is, through mobilization”**.³⁴¹

In the beginning of May 1991, (from May 3rd to 7th), partial mobilization was completed of the JNA units on the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Then, two units were mobilized from the composition of the 5th Corps (some 500 people).³⁴²

In late June 1991, the military leadership faced **“several huge problems”**, among which was mobilization as well, which **“in the current developments in Slovenia and Croatia”** proved **“the main restrictive factor for the implementation of all the ideas and plans for deployment of the JNA”**. Given the places of use of the JNA units,

³⁴⁰ D. Marijan, *JUGOSLOVENSKA NARODNA ARMIIJA...*, pp. 305-306, and 318.

³⁴¹ V. Kadjevic, the aforementioned work, pp. 96-97.

³⁴² *ICTY*, Case No. IT-94-I-T, Evidence of the Testimony of the JNA Colonel O.S., June 5, 1996, p. 18; testimony of the JNA Colonel (O.S.) given to the author.

the space of Yugoslavia where the mobilization was still possible was progressively narrowed down. **“The needs for units were permanent, and the time of waiting of the reservists drafted was legally limited”**.³⁴³

In the period from June 29 to August 10, 1991, in compliance with the orders of the Command of the First Military District, in order to be included and sent to the frontline, into aggression against the Republic of Croatia, the 216th Mountain Brigade (former joint tactical unit “R”), and the 1st Company of the 6th Infantry Motorized Battalion (the basic joint tactical unit “R”), from the composition of the 4th Corps of the JNA, were mobilized.³⁴⁴

The mobilization of the 216th Mountain Brigade from Han Pijesak was completed **“immediately after the outbreak of the armed conflict in Slovenia between the units of the JNA and the forces of the TO of Slovenia”**. This brigade was filled in to some 72% manpower level with the people from four municipalities (Rogatica, Sokolac, Olovo, and Han Pijesak), which were populated by some 54% Muslims and some 43% Serbs. As for the remainder (some 28%), the brigade was filled in from the municipalities of the Sarajevo City.³⁴⁵

The mobilization of the 1st Company of the 6th Infantry Motorized Battalion of the 6th Motorized Regiment from Doboј was carried out in **“significantly more peaceful socio-political conditions”**. The

³⁴³ V. Kadijevic, the aforementioned work, p. 119.

³⁴⁴ AIIZ, inv. No. 7-503, Command of the 4th Corps, Strictly Confidential, no. 09/31-127, August 21, 1991 – Command of the First Military District.

³⁴⁵ Ibid. The ethnic structure of the reserve composition of the brigade fit with the ethnic structure of the population. In the assessment of the Command of the 4th Corps, the mobilization of the brigade was done **“under the conditions of strengthened activity of the parties in power (SDA and SDS), which made efforts to offer maximum boycott to the mobilization activities and this was done so that they do not come into conflict with the law. The drafting system was functioning relatively well, the invitations were delivered, but the military conscripts were advised not to respond”**. In favour of this claim speaks the fact that there was a large number of sent invitations, but with the military conscripts not reporting in (Ibid.).

The organizational and formational changes, which were virtually at their end at the time, partially influenced the course of the mobilization, which pertained to **“redeployment of a number of military conscripts and a number (some 400 military conscripts) were not assigned with personal equipment (Ibid.)**.

filling in of the Battalion was executed from only one municipality—Doboj. The ethnic structure was as follows: some 42% Muslims, some 38% Serbs, some 16% were Croats, and 4% were the ‘Others’.³⁴⁶

In the 216th Brigade, the mobilization was done without limitations, except that no mines and explosive devices were issued. In the 1st Company of the 6th Infantry Motorized Battalion, only the manpower was mobilized. The weapons and equipment were issued only in order to conduct the training.³⁴⁷

The response of the military conscripts was the following:

a) **in the 216th Mountain Brigade** (from the time of initial mobilization, within 24 hours, the following responded:

- officers	154	or 78%
- junior officers	53	or 40%
- soldiers	1,079	or 33%
Total:	1,286	or 36%
- motor vehicles	108	or 56%
- transport cattle	26	or 22%

After the expiry of the mobilization period, an additional quota equalled the following data:

- officers	38	or 20%
- junior officers	59	or 46%
- soldiers	954	or 31%

Total: 1,051 military conscripts.³⁴⁸

³⁴⁶ Ibid. The ethnic structure of the battalion fit with the ethnic structure of the population.

³⁴⁷ Ibid. Numerous weaknesses emerged during the mobilization in the functioning of the drafting system, in directing and commanding, in the organization of admittance and formation of units when the response of the military conscripts was very low, “**so no lower-level formational units could be formed,**” in the delivery of invitations, and the like.

³⁴⁸ Ibid. The motor vehicles and transport cattle were released and the Command did not insist upon their subsequent summoning or confiscation.

The total response of the military conscripts in the 216th Mountain Brigade – after all pressures and interventions, was as follows:

- officers	192	or 97%
- junior officers	112	or 84%
- soldiers	2,033	or 63%
Total:	2,337	or 65%

b) in the 1st Company of the 6th Infantry Motorized Battalion
 (from the time of initial mobilization, within 24 hours, the following responded:

- officers	27	or 84%
- junior officers	15	or 80%
- soldiers	431	or 65%
Total:	473	or 66%

After the expiry of the mobilization period, an additional quota corresponded to:

- officers	3
- junior officers	1
- soldiers	77

The total response of the military conscripts was:

- officers	30	or 91%
- junior officers	16	or 84%
- soldiers	508	or 76%
Total:	544	or 77%. ³⁴⁹

³⁴⁹ Ibid. Motor vehicles were not drafted.

A number of conscripts did not respond:

a) In the 216th Mountain Brigade:

- officers	5	or 3%
- junior officers	22	or 16%
- soldiers	1,218	or 37%
- motor vehicles	86	or 44%
- transport cattle providers	96	or 78%. ³⁵⁰

b) In the 1st Company of the 6th Infantry Motorized Battalion

- officers	2
- junior officers	3
- soldiers	162. ³⁵¹

The mobilization of the 216th Mountain Brigade and the 1st Company of the 6th Infantry Motorized Battalion was not successful. During the mobilization, 447 military conscripts deserted, due to which charges were filed against each of them.

In the 216th Mountain Brigade, due to inadequate qualities and old age, 17 reserve officers and 63 reserve soldiers were returned from the military exercise, and excluded from the wartime deployment plan.

In the 1st Company of the 6th Infantry Motorized Battalion, during the mobilization 26 military conscripts were returned from the military exercise (15 because of illness, due to employment in Slovenia or Croatia, and so they do not lose their jobs, 7, due to death in family, 2, and due to wedding, 2).³⁵²

The poor response of the military conscripts, particularly in the initial period of mobilization, had fully disrupted the planned system of combat security of the mobilization, starting from securing of material

³⁵⁰ Ibid.

³⁵¹ Ibid.

³⁵² Ibid.

equipment during their bringing to the mobilization site, to the securing of units and the mobilization site itself. The planned cooperation with the units and bodies of the socio-political communities, established in the plan for coordination of tasks and obligations, was questioned during the mobilization, due to several instances of improper conduct by certain bodies, and prevention of mobilization, which, among other things, also disrupted the integrity of the system of combat safekeeping of the mobilization. The poor response, the destructive conduct by some official instances and party leaders created with the manpower that had responded the feeling of chaos and insecurity, which caused unacceptable reactions and conduct with themselves, causing the mobilization enforcement bodies indecisiveness in issuing of arms and material equipment to the military conscripts, due to suspicion of potential mutual conflicts and flights from the units under arms. Due to the lack of an established system of combat safekeeping as determined in the mobilization plan, as well as due to specific unfavourable circumstances, that were never shown nor were they expected, uncontrolled movement of manpower happened throughout the areas of mobilization. With the majority of the military conscripts, inadequate approach to the execution of duty was shown in terms of interior services and security services, which reflected in the open rejection or failure to accept duties, abandoning duty or even abandoning duty and leaving the units.³⁵³

³⁵³ Ibid., AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2809, Statement of the Chief of Staff of the 216th Mountain Brigade, Sergeant Major of the JNA, Asim Dzambasovic.

The directing and commanding system in the 216th Mountain Brigade, in the assessment of the chief of staff of that unit, Lieutenant-Colonel Asim Dzambasovic, was disrupted, which was, according to him, particularly reflected “**through:**

- 1. Poor response of military conscripts, both Serbs and Bosniaks.**
- 2. Major lack of discipline, both with individuals and with groups, even whole units.**
- 3. Refusal to obey the order that the unit becomes dislocated into the broader Banja Luka area (Zaluzani). Of the whole wartime formation of the brigade, only one unit equalling a battalion was ‘gathered’ and transferred to the Zaluzani area near Banja Luka.**

Explanation:

- The probable goal the senior command is to hold the unit in the area of Banja Luka in preparedness, and from then to get it successively involved and sent out to the open frontlines in Croatia.

The partial mobilization of reservists, which was started on June 30, 1991 in Bosnia and Herzegovina by the First Military District, was met with political resistance. On July 2, the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina passed a decision to suspend sending recruits to the units and institutions of the JNA outside the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,³⁵⁴ in reference to the constitutional provision by which only the Presidency of the SFRY may order mobilization.³⁵⁵

- **Given the disrupted formational composition and the system of RIK (directing and commanding; note by the author), the unit was sent nowhere, and after 20 days of training the rest was returned to the mother unit in Han Pijesak.**

- **The mobilized Bosniaks of the 2nd Mountain Brigade from the area of Olovo refused to obey altogether and nobody went to Banja Luka.**

- **The mobilized Bosniaks from the other units, which were in Banja Luka, were returned after some ten days by party leaders and parents.**

- **the demobilization was done in late July 1991.**

4. The emergence of wearing emblems with nationalists signs on the uniforms.

5. Singing of nationalist songs and other insulting contents in front of the people of non-Serb ethnicity” (Ibid.).

³⁵⁴ O. Backovic - M. Vasic - A. Vasovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 353-355; IIZ, inv. No. 2-1372, Federal Secretariat for National Defence, No. 694-1, Belgrade, July 29, 1991 – to the President of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Such a decision of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was strongly reacted upon by the General of army, Veljko Kadijevic, the Federal Secretary for National Defence, by sending a letter on July 29, 1991, to the President of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Such a decision, according to Kadijevic, **“had a most direct”** influence on **“the filling in of the JNA with soldiers”**, and prevented **“the execution of its tasks on the territory of the SFRY”**. This, according to him, was **“a dangerous step which the JNA can not tolerate, because in this way, the Presidency of the SFRY is effecting an unauthorized interference with the tasks that are not in its jurisdiction”** (Ibid.).

“Due to the serious consequences” caused by such conduct, **“the competent JNA bodies were ordered to immediately and energetically undertake all measures against those who disrupt or prevent regular execution of the military obligation”**. Therefore, General Kadijevic insisted **“that the Decision for Suspension [of sending of recruits] be revoked immediately, and that it should be ensured that all the tasks related to obligatory service and military obligations on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina be executed regularly and in compliance with the federal laws and other federal regulations”** (Ibid.).

³⁵⁵ O. Backovic - M. Vasic - A. Vasovic, the aforementioned work, p. 355.

In early July 1991, partial mobilization met with resistance. The Valjevo reservists did not arrive any further than Sabac, where the whole armoured and mechanized battalion stopped. In Montenegro, the response to mobilization was “**unexpectedly scarce**”. Montenegrins, Albanians, and Muslims abandoned units.³⁵⁶

In early July 1991 (July 5), the military leadership mobilized one segment of the units of the 5th (Banja Luka), 12th (Novi Sad), and 2nd Corps (in Montenegro), and the war units of the 52nd Corps in Kosovo were demobilized, which had been filled in at a level of 100%.³⁵⁷

Upon the order of the First VO (Military District), and with the consent of the commander of the TO of SR Bosnia and Herzegovina, on July 9, 1991, the mobilization of a number of compositions of the TO in the municipalities of Banja Luka, Prijedor, Bosanska Gradiska, Bosanski Novi, Laktasi, Srbac, Mrkonjic Grad, Sanski Most, Sipovo, and of 2 partisan brigades of the TO was executed. The response to this mobilization assessment, both for the military conscripts and the reserve officers, was 73%. The mobilization was successful, whereby the best response was at the TO of the Srbac municipality (100%), and the poorest one was at the TO of the Sipovo municipality (41%), where mobilization was practically not conducted at all.³⁵⁸

³⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 356-357.

³⁵⁷ D. Marijan, the aforementioned work, pp. 302-303. Davor Marijan claims that “**the war in Slovenia was an excuse**” for mobilization and demobilization of the aforementioned units.

³⁵⁸ AIIZ, inv. No. 2.2452. In the public, there were a number of various interpretations and reactions due to this unannounced mobilization alert. In the majority of cases, strong reactions by the military conscripts of Bosniak and Croatian ethnicity emerged: “why was the mobilization done, who ordered it, who will they shoot, why was combat ammunition distributed, how long this will last, the mobilization is illegal”, etc. Thus, for instance, after the completed mobilization in the 2nd partisan brigade of the TO, before the departure to the field camping site, there was “**an exceptionally awkward situation – the division of the composition on ethnic basis was carried out.**”

Serious insults, accusations, provocations, throwing away of arms, bringing of crying children and women happened, and the like. Some 50 members of this composition refused to depart to the camping site. Reserve Captain Zlatko Halilovic was the one who offered the strongest negative reaction, and with a number of other

In the first half of July 1991, even after the attack against Slovenia, the Illegal Headquarters of the Supreme Command kept issuing orders for mobilization of units on several occasions. In Serbia and some

officers, he was persuading the military conscripts from the patrolling platoon to refuse to obey. Due to this, a procedure of criminal liability was instituted against 42 members of the TO, whereas custody was ordered against the organizers (1 officer, 1 junior officer, and 2 soldiers) at the investigative martial court in Sarajevo. The Reserve Sergeant Boris Bunisic fled to Germany.

In Prijedor too, there was a pretty heavy situation, where the president of the Municipality and other SDA leaders did not allow the execution of mobilization, and they did not want to give a dime for the food supplies for the manpower, and therefore the unit was dismissed. The president of the SO on this occasion sent a number of insults on the account of the 'disobedient' Municipal HQ, and said that it no longer exists and that they will receive no salaries.

However, the hardest situation was in the municipality of Sipovo. Namely, two mobilizations were conducted there, one legal and military, and the other one party-led and civilian. The mobilization of civilians, as reported, had started much earlier, and without orders. The official authorities had created a war psychosis among the population. The extraordinary session of the Municipality declared a status of emergency, and the need for defence of some units of the JNA at Kupres. The TO Headquarters was isolated and completely excluded from mobilization. The teams for the confiscation of arms, ammunition and vehicles were party-organized, and not those regulated by the mobilization plan. The team also included the president of the Municipal Executive Board, whereas the president of the SO and the SDS was practically directing all the activities. Upon the arrival of the armament, 200-300 civilians had already been gathered. The weapons for the TO were unloaded into the partition warehouse, and the 'surplus' into another part of the warehouse. The military and technical asset operator was ordered under threats, to execute the distribution of arms according to the afore prepared lists. The calling was done by the former commander of the TO unit, Reserve Captain Nedjo Gvozden. As it was assessed that the 'surplus' armament would not be enough, the other part of the warehouse was also broken into, and a real chaos and plundering ensued.

In this general mess, some 20 barrels and 1 casket of hand grenades were stolen, whereas the rest (576 barrels) were issued upon receipt. The regular compositions of the TO in this way remained without their formational arms and were released to go homes. Luckily, except for the hand grenades (the first casket) the arms (8 tons) was returned to the JNA warehouse, so the potential catastrophe was prevented, because the explosive devices had been lying for several hours in the trucks in the sun.

The distributed arms and major quantities of ammunition were carried around by civilians through the city, and there were some individual shootouts and provocations, which repeated each night. This upset the citizens and set fear into their homes.

other republics, mobilization of reservists was intensified as well. The mobilization in Bosnia and Herzegovina also included the units of the Territorial Defence. In this way, from June 29, until July 7, 17 full war units and 5 partial ones were mobilized.³⁵⁹

At the time, the military leadership was speedily gathering “manpower” across Serbia, in the villages of Vojvodina, then in Bosnia and Herzegovina

With maximum involvement of the officers of the OkSTO (District HQ of the Territorial Defence; note by the author), the official authorities, the SNO (Secretariat for National Defence; note by the author), and of the OpSTO (Municipal HQ of the Territorial Defence; note by the author) of Sipovo, and thanks to the understanding of the people to whom the weapons were distributed by July 21, 1991, 403, or 77% barrels and some 50% of the ammunition were returned. The other armament is also expected to be returned” (Ibid.).

³⁵⁹ S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, pp. 54, and 98-99. On the eve of the Session of the Presidency of the SFRY on July 12, 1991, Mesic received the letter from the US Ambassador Warren Zimmermann, who had been ordered by the US Government to convey to the President of the Presidency “**the serious concern of the US in relation to the current mobilization of the JNA. Certain aspects of this mobilization are of particular concern, and they can contribute to creation of the impression in Washington that a military intervention could be planned in Croatia. We are aware that the JNA is gathering powerful forces – two mechanized divisions with some 20,000 manpower in its tiers – on the rim of East Slavonia, in West Vojvodina, and North Bosnia. There are reports that the JNA is coordinating operations in Vojvodina with the units of the Serb TO. Such an action, together with installation of the Serb reserve troops, filling in of gaps left after defectors of other ethnicities and the reports on exchange of the non-Serb officers and Serbs in the Military District, cautions us of the growing Serb orientation within the JNA. If one takes into account the explosive nature of the current Serbo-Croatian relations in Yugoslavia, then such developments cause serious concern. Faced with such situation, I must point out that the position of my government is: resorting to the military intervention in Croatia or elsewhere in Yugoslavia, if it is used against Croatian authorities or in the interest of a single nation, would be ultimately dangerous and would have a catastrophic outcome, both to our bilateral relations and to the position of Yugoslavia within the international community. Therefore my Government has ordered me to urge again upon all sides in Yugoslavia to respect the constitutional civilian government over the JNA. The position of the United States is that full implementation of the Brioni Agreement, including the relevant arrival of the EC observers, offers the best of hope for a peaceful solution of the Yugoslav crisis. In those terms, we demand that both civilian and military authorities in Yugoslavia cooperate with the EC observers to the maximum extent...**” (Ibid., p. 99).

and Montenegro, in which numerous deserters emerged, who fled the army, because they did not want to go to war.³⁶⁰

In Montenegro, Bulatovic was visiting the mobilized units, telling them that they are going to defend Montenegro and the parts of people who wish to remain in Yugoslavia,³⁶¹ in fact, that they are supposed to conquer other's territories.

After taking the decision on the withdrawal of the JNA from Slovenia, the mobilization was continued, as well as fleeing the army. In mid-July, in Pancevo, the reservists released for leave were demonstrating.³⁶²

From early August 1991, on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, certain military JNA unit commanders were conducting mobilization without the prescribed procedure or orders issued by the competent bodies, which was particularly dominant in Han Pijesak. On August 16, 1991, following a demand by the 5th Corps, mobilization of a part of the territorial defence was done in Bosanska Gradiska (the response was 100%). On the same day, the whole composition of the war police forces was mobilized on the territory of this municipality.³⁶³

In early September 1991, a new mobilization wave started, accompanied with new evasion of invitations, protests and mutinies. The response of the reservists in Serbia was 50%, while in Belgrade 15% only.³⁶⁴ In many places, the mutinies by reserve formation soldiers were continued.³⁶⁵

³⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 101.

³⁶¹ Ibid., p. 106.

³⁶² O. Backovic - M. Vasic - A. Vasovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 357-358.

³⁶³ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2819, S/ocialist R/epublic of BiH, OKSTO (District Headquarters of the TO/ Banja Luka, strictly confidential no. 12/2-64, August 18, 1991 – to the Republic Headquarters of the TO of SR BiH, Sarajevo, Report on the Combats in Bosanska Gradiska, August 16-18, 1991.

Mesic states that General Uzelac had proclaimed general mobilization in Banja Luka. Even Milosevic, according to Mesic, after several months of illegal and forced mobilization, declared 'only' partial mobilization, and he never responded to the objections of the SIV president (S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. 262).

³⁶⁴ O. Backovic - M. Vasic - A. Vasovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 358-360.

³⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 361-365.

In September 1991, the mobilization was completed of the units of the 5th Corps and its bases. In mid-September, the filling in ('general mobilization') was completed for this Corps, which had also previously been engaged in the aggression against Croatia (West Slavonia, Dubica, Jasenovac). The goal of this mobilization was participation in the aggression against Croatia (in the initial mobilization days, the Corps increased from 4,500 to over 15,000 people).³⁶⁶

Following this, in compliance with the decisions of the military leadership and General Adzic in person, it was proceeded with the formation of light brigades (compositions of 800-1,000 people). Each municipality with a population of about 10,000 formed one such brigade, while Banja Luka formed 4, Prijedor 2, and Sanski Most 2. All were under the command of the 5th Corps.³⁶⁷

Under an excuse of securing smooth passage for the units of the Uzice Corps into Herzegovina, on September 17, 1991, the 216th Brigade (in the direction of Visegrad – Ustipraca – Gorazde – Foca – Gacko – Nevesinje – the Neretva valley) was assigned to do a repeated mobilization. The securing of the passage through Ustipraca lasted for two days only, and the units was stopped (the major part of the brigade) in the direction of the village of Stjenice – Rogatica – Mesici, from where it patrolled the field and prepared and strengthened the facilities for fire attacks on the settlements with the majority Bosniak population on the territory of Rogatica. This was the actual goal of the mobilization,

³⁶⁶ ICTY, Case No. IT-94-I-T, Evidence of the Testimony of the JNA Colonel O.S., June 5, 1996, p. 19; testimony of the JNA Colonel O.S. given to the author; *Oslobodjenje*, September 30, 1991; M. Kreso, **CINJENICE KOJE UKAZUJU NA AGRESIJU NA REPUBLIKU BOSNU I HERCEGOVINU OD STRANE SAVEZNE REPUBLIKE JUGOSLAVIJE I NJENIH POMAGACA** (manuscript), Sarajevo, 1993, p. 6. On September 20, General Uzelac, commander of the 5th Corps of the JNA, declared general mobilization in the area of Bosanska Krajina. On this occasion, Alija Izetbegovic, President of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, stated that the invitation for mobilization issued by general Uzelac involves a private war and that the invitation is without legal authority (*Oslobodjenje*, December 31, 1991 – January 1 and 2, 1992).

In relation to the aggression of Serbia and Montenegro against Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina refused sending the recruits to the JNA outside Bosnia and Herzegovina.


³⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 20-21.

rather than securing of passage for the units of the Uzice Corps to Herzegovina.³⁶⁸ In this way, the planned activity was conducted, strictly prepared in secrecy, with clearly set goals.³⁶⁹

On September 19, 1991, General Nikola Uzelac (commander of the 5th Corps) issued the Order (marked strictly confidential, no. 12-456) for the mobilization of the 30th Partisan Division. This mobilization was to be executed **“by inviting the volunteers and volunteer providers of material resources and cattle, through publishing public announcements in media, from the territories of the municipalities from which the war**

³⁶⁸ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2809, Statement of the Chief of Staff of the Headquarters of the 216th Mountain Brigade, Lieutenant-Colonel of JNA Asim Dzambasovic. According to Ltentenant Dzambasovic, this mobilization was also connected with numerous problems, such as:

- **stealing of ammunition and armament from the units;**
- **breaking into warehouses with lethal devices;**
- **secret arming of Serbs through the JNA representatives with the JNA armament and ammunition;**
- **forming of volunteer groups and platoon companies (up to 100 volunteers) and sending them to the front line in Vukovar (this activity was done three times in late 1991 and early 1992);**
- **defection of the JNA by the non-Serb soldiers;**
- **increased cooperation of the JNA (command officers) with the leaders of the SDS;**
- **exalting Serbianity through ceremonies and increased wearing of nationalist emblems on uniforms;**
- **reading of religious books and emphasizing the greatness of the Serbs.**
- **Once a day, the military police patrols patrolled the following direction:**



- **The direction of Han Pijesak – Vlasenica – Zvornik did not require any patrolling, because there them manpower of the 3rd Mountain Battalion was already located in the region of the village of Milici...”** (Ibid.).

³⁶⁹ Ibid. In this mobilization there were no military conscripts who were Bosniaks, except for individual officers and junior officers.

units of the division are filled in” (Mrkonjic Grad, Bosanski Petrovac, and Titov Drvar).³⁷⁰

This mobilization, due to failure to respond on the part of the military conscripts to the mobilization invitations, defecting from units and positions, refusal to take arms and the like, was not successful.³⁷¹

After in the early fall of 1991, the aggression against Croatia had reached full scale, without the approval of the legal authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the JNA units were also using its proper territory to conduct operations against Croatia.³⁷²

In October 1991 (in the beginning of the month), Radovan Karadzic was involved in the mobilization of the recruits from Doboje for the aggression against Croatia. The next month, he was again working on the issues related to mobilization.³⁷³

On October 22, 1991, based on the Order of the Rump Presidency of the SFRY dated October 4, 1991, and the Order of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, strictly confidential no. 2732/1, dated October 21, 1991, **“in order to secure timely undertaking of measures for ensuring the required level of combat preparedness of the commands, headquarters and units of the 1st Military District”**, General Zivota Panic, commander of the 1st Military District, issued the

³⁷⁰ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2577, Command of the 5th Corps, strictly confidential no. 12-456, September 19, 1991 – to the Command of the 30th Partisan Division. This order, among other things, set forth formation of units and their securing with armament, ammunition and military equipment, and undertaking energetic measures **“to prevent unforeseen events”** (Ibid.).

³⁷¹ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2579, Command of the 30th Partisan Division, inv. No. 4-1, January 6, 1992 – to the command of the 30th Partisan Division; Ibid., inv. No. 2-2580, Command of the 5th Corps, strictly confidential no. 1-10, January 10, 1992 – to the Command of the 30th Partisan Division.

³⁷² AIIZ, inv. Nos. 2-175 and 2-176; *Oslobodjenje*, September 30, 1991; M. Kreso, the aforementioned work, p. 6.

³⁷³ ICTY, Case No. IT-02-54-T, paragraph 810. The non-Serb reserve officers who did not respond to invitations for participation in the aggression against Croatia received written orders (through special couriers) to surrender their uniforms.

Order, strictly confidential no. 12/73-173, about the urgent (“**immediately**”) execution of all the required preparations “(**expert military, staffing, organizational, material, security and other ones**)” for execution of mobilization of all the war units of the JNA in the area of responsibility of this District.³⁷⁴

In the period from December 11 through 16, 1991, based on the Order of the Command of the 5th Corps, marked strictly confidential no. 12-809, from December 10, 1991, the command of the 30th Partisan Division mobilized the 13th Partisan Brigade and at the time it equipped

³⁷⁴ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2814, Command of the 1st Military District, strictly confidential no. 12/73-173, October 22, 1991 – to the Command of the 4th Corps and to the others. Thus, among others, the following measures were to be urgently taken:

“4. – for the whole manpower (i.e. in the peacetime and wartime formation), prepare and secure complete military equipment on time (including helmets, pioneer tools, bandages, and the like), formational weapons and accompanying quantities of ammunition. For everything that the commands of war units can not secure immediately, submit requests to the superior commands, up until the competent organizational units, which have the duty to supply all the missing armament and military equipment to the units as soon as possible.

5. – Under the general and specific measures in organization and preparation of mobilization, immediately fill in the command and other key formational positions in the war units with active military personnel from its compositions (commanders of regiments and brigades, chiefs of staff of headquarters, assistant commanders and commanders of battalions – divisions), and if there is an option, fill in with active military personnel for other formational positions from its composition, too.

Any needs to fill in the missing personnel for these duties (by stating the unit, formational position, rank, arm, and the like), to be submitted to the personnel administration of the SSNO, as follows: Corps for their units, commands of Air Forces and Anti-Aircraft Defence for their directly subjected units, and the organizational units of the SSNO for their directly subjected compositions. The priority in filling in is to be given to the combat units.

6. – The SSNO Personnel Administration shall issue orders to directly send the active military personnel into units on temporary assignments of three months. The active military personnel are to be primarily used to fill in command duties in the “R” compositions, in particular in the units for combat activities and backup. In deploying of the active military personnel into these and other units, they can be also assigned to the formational position for which a lower rank has been formationally provided.

and sent out to the front 100 people into the composition of the 5th Kozaracka Brigade.³⁷⁵

The Sipovo municipality was to be used as the basis for formation of the 3rd Battalion of the 13th Partisan Brigade. Of 424 military conscripts, on December 13, 1991, 87 or 20% arrived, of which 16 were sick. All of them fled to their homes on the next morning (that is, on December 14).³⁷⁶

7. – Immediately invite for training into war units the active military personnel and reserve military officers deployed into these units, in order to train them in execution of mobilization and commanding over the units in execution of the basic combat tasks. Mobilize all the reserve military officers at the level of commanders of regiments and brigades, battalions and divisions, commanders of companies – batteries and independent platoons, as well as the officers at other key duties in the units for which the competent commands assess is necessary” (Ibid.).

The invitations were to be completed on October 23, 1991. The training of the reserve composition was to be conducted for 12 hours a day (with officers and mobilized war units).

The mobilization of the war units was to be done selectively, **in order to avoid the weaknesses up to then present in the mobilization of war units.**

All the reserve military officers that were not **“up to their task”, and which did not “respond to the invitation for mobilization”** were to be immediately **“replaced with other persons from the reserve composition who by their patriotic, moral and other qualities can successfully meet the obligations. Legal responsibility measures should be undertaken immediately against those who fail to respond to the invitation without justification, and these measures are to be strictly abided by”.**

Against the persons responsible for failing to meet their military obligation, undertaking of required measures was set forth in the form of instituting criminal or minor offence procedures **“as follows: against military conscripts who refused to receive the invitation or did not respond to mobilization, against defectors from the war units and from the front line, and against those who act destructively and spread defeatism during mobilization and combat. Against persons who did not respond to the invitations of the competent military territorial bodies, the warrant shall be issued for their forced bringing, pursuant to Art. 65 of the Law on Military Obligation”.** To this aim, it was supposed to **“immediately do the preparations of the military bodies within commands of military districts and commands of military units for timely institution of such procedures” (Ibid.).**

³⁷⁵ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2583, Command of the 30th Partisan Division, strictly confidential no. 108-1, January 17, 1992 – to the Command of the 5th Corps.

³⁷⁶ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2581, Command of the 30th Partisan Division, inv. No. 52-1, January 10, 1992 – to the 1st Partisan Brigade.

In Kljuc, of a total of 573, 234 or 40% responded (there were 269 delivered invitations, at which the Bosniaks and Croats refused to receive invitations – 252).³⁷⁷ The aforementioned military conscripts were supposed to go for training to Rakovacke Bare on December 18, following which they should go to the frontline. However, two days earlier (on December 16), at Sitnica, the whole composition (some 182 men) refused to execute the task.³⁷⁸

The Military Department in Titov Drvar, at the request of the Command of the 30th Partisan Division, in order to execute preparations for implementation of mobilization in the 1st Partisan brigade, on December 27, 1991, invited all the officers of the Command of the 19th Partisan Brigade for the preparations for training on January 6, 1992. Of the total 31 invitees from Titov Drvar, 20 officers or 64.5% responded; of 23 from Glamoc, 15 or 65.2% responded, from Bosansko Grahovo, of the 5 invitees only 1 officer or 20% responded. Of the total 59 invited officers, 36 or 61% responded. The ethnic structure of those who did not respond was: 1 Croat, 4 Bosniaks, and 18 Serbs.³⁷⁹

During the mobilization of the 13th Partisan Brigade (it should have been formed in Bosanski Petrovac from the municipalities of Sipovo, Kljuc, and Mrkonjic Grad), 63% of the invitations were sent of the total number of the planned ones, and the response to this number was some 50%, or 34% of the total number. This mobilization (for the 3rd battalion of this brigade), was not successful “due to the influence of various factors”.³⁸⁰

³⁷⁷ Ibid.

³⁷⁸ Ibid.

³⁷⁹ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2582, Command of the 30th Partisan Division, confidential, no. 53-1, January 10, 1991 – to the command of the 30th Partisan Division, Aide to the Chief of Staff of the Headquarters for the ONP.

³⁸⁰ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2584, Command of the 30th Partisan Division, strictly confidential, no. 151-1, January 28, 1992; Ibid., inv. No. 2-2587, Command of the 30th Partisan Division, inv. No. 158-1, January 30, 1992; Ibid., inv. No. 2-2591, Command of the 30th Partisan Division, confidential, inv. No. 182-1, February 03, 1992 – to the Command, Aide to the Chief of Staff of the Headquarters for the PPP; Ibid., inv. No. 2-2592, Command of the 30th Partisan Division, strictly confidential, inv. No. 241-1, February 13, 1992 – to the Command of the 1st Partisan Brigade.

Mobilization did not succeed due to the poor response from the areas of three municipalities – Mrkonjic Grad, Sipovo, and Kljuc – only 487 or 32.7%, and 102 men were sent to the front line from the whole brigade (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2593, Command

A large number of Serbians and Montenegrins refused to participate in the aggressive war of the Greater Serbia regime. The Serbs from Serbia did not show satisfactory readiness **“to get involved in the combats in Croatia”**. They, just like the Vojvodina reservists, offered a big resistance to going to the army. From the second half of 1991 onwards, numerous brigades refused **“to go into combat”**. This caused a mobilization crisis.³⁸¹

“Dissipation of the Serb reserve units”, and **“fleeing from the frontline”** was happening everywhere. 400 people fled from the Loznica Brigade. An elite units of the Guardian Division suffered **“dissipation”**. The Second Mechanized Brigade (from Valjevo) fled altogether. The filling in using reservists **“did not succeed”**.³⁸²

On February 13, 1992, the Command of the 30th Partisan Division issued the Order for Remobilisation of the 13th Partisan Brigade, **“for the purpose of its formation and bringing into full combat preparedness”**. This order was to extend the mobilization of the overall war unit to include February 14 and 15, and 21 and 22, and 28 and 29 (!), 1992.³⁸³

The 2nd Battalion of the 13th Partisan Brigade was formed in Rakovacke Bare and the mobilization was conducted on February 13 and 14, 1992. (**“...without any problems”**. 546 were invited, and 228 or 41.7% responded (there were 265 delivered invitations. Of this number, the response was 86%). No members of the Bosniak or Croat ethnic groups responded.³⁸⁴

of the 30th Partisan Division, strictly confidential, inv. No. 264-1, February 18, 1992 – to the Command of the 5th Corps).

In the period from September 23, 1991 through February 2, 1992, Sergeant Major Ljubisa Markovic was on the temporary assignment at the 30th Partisan Division (garrison of Mrkonjic Grad), where he performed the duty of the commander of the 13th Partisan Brigade (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2589, Military Post Office no. 3326, inv. No. 173. February 1, 1992, Mrkonjic Grad, CERTIFICATE).

³⁸¹ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 388, and 394; O. Backovic - M. Vasic - A. Vasovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 353-355.

³⁸² B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 388-390.

³⁸³ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2592, Command of the 30th Partisan Division, strictly confidential, inv. no. 241-1, February 13, 1992 – to the Command of the 1st Partisan Brigade; Ibid., inv. No. 2-2593, Command of the 30th Partisan Division, strictly confidential, inv. No. 264-1, February 18, 1992 – to the Command of the 5th Corps.

³⁸⁴ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2593, Command of the 30th Partisan Division, strictly confidential, inv. No. 264-1, February 18, 1992 – to the Command of the 5th Corps.

On February 17, 1992, the 405th Backup Base (Knin) mobilized 605 people, and the 993rd one (Banja Luka) mobilized 1,456.³⁸⁵

The mobilization of the Command of the 13th Partisan Brigade with Headquarters- related and independent units of the brigade was conducted on February 22-23, 1992. 370 people were invited (27 officers, 15 junior officers, and 328 military conscripts). In addition to this the SO Kljuc issued a public invitation for 147 more military conscripts, as a supplement to the 2nd Partisan Battalion. The total number of invitations delivered was 292, with 225 undelivered. 189 people responded from various categories, which accounted for 36.5%. The following units were formed: the command of the brigade, the command of the base (courier department), the communications platoon (two departments), the 120 mm mortar company, the mixed anti-armour platoon (one department of recoilless guns), and one department of anti-armour launcher weapons (9 K 11), light artillery rocket platoon of the Anti-Aircraft Defence (one department of the 20/1 anti-aircraft guns), a pioneer platoon (one department of pioneers), and the backup company (incomplete cooking department), a part of the first aid platoon (department of medical aid and part of the department for evacuation).³⁸⁶

The mobilization of the 13th Partisan Brigade was done in three parts:

- 2nd Partisan Battalion on February 14 and 15;
- Command of the Brigade with headquarters-related and independent units on February 22, and
- 1st and 3rd Partisan Battalion on March 2 and 3, 1992.³⁸⁷

³⁸⁵ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-1965, Command of the 2nd Military District /February 17, 1992/, BREAKDOWN OF DATA ON DEPLOYMENT AND CAPACITIES OF THE BACKUP UNITS AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE 2ND MILITARY DISTRICT.

³⁸⁶ Ibid., inv. No. 2-2594, Command of the 30th Partisan Division, confidential, inv. No. 316-2, February 26, 1992 – to the Command of the 5th Corps. The Command of the 30th Partisan Brigade with headquarters-related units in early March 1992 located at the Babanovac Hotel on Mt. Vlasic (Ibid., inv. No. 2-2596, Command of the 30th Partisan Division, strictly confidential, inv. No. 402-1, March 7, 1992 – to the Command of the 5th Corps).

³⁸⁷ Ibid., inv. No. 2-2598, Command of the 30th Partisan Division, strictly confidential, inv. No. 420-1, March 10, 1992 – to the Command of the 5th Corps.

During mobilization, 1,740 people were invited, of which 96 reserve officers, 66 reserve junior officers, and 1,578 military conscripts.³⁸⁸

The command of the 13th Partisan Brigade with headquarters-related units was transferred in mid-March 1992 from the region of Vlasic into the area of the village of Baraci. The Battalions were deployed in the following way: the 1st in the area of Rodusa, the 2nd in the village of Laniste, and the 3rd in the village of Todorici.³⁸⁹

The 2nd Battalion of the 13 Partisan Brigade was deployed in the area of Laniste. A major number of soldiers and officers were found on shooting on training ground of *Manjaca*, headed by the commander of the battalion, where shooting was conducted using the MB 82 and 60 mm hand grenade launchers, 82 mm recoilless guns and *Osa* bazookas.³⁹⁰

On March 25, 1992, in the capacity of representative of the federal secretary for national defence, at the meeting in relation to the information from the Command of the 2nd Military District on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, general Blagoje Adzic imposed, among others, the task to conduct mobilization of the Serb population. In relation to this, at the time he assigned the following task: “**plan and secure mobilization in the areas with a Serb majority**”, and “**in the other areas, ensure a high level of combat preparedness for the JNA units**”. At this, General Adzic also determined the end date for completion of this task (April 10), as well as its holders (deputy chief of staff of the General Staff for the Land Army and the III Administration of the General Staff, in cooperation with the commands of the 2nd and 4th Military Districts.³⁹¹

³⁸⁸ Ibid. The ethnic structure was predominantly Serb. Of the others, 6 Bosniaks responded (among whom 2 officers), and 1 Croat. 5 Bosniaks were left in the unit (1 reserve officer).

³⁸⁹ Ibid., inv. No. 2-2602, Command of the 5th Corps, strictly confidential no. 33-39, March 16, 1992 – to the Command of the 30th Partisan Division

³⁹⁰ Ibid. The numeral size of the 2nd Battalion on April 1, 1992, was 224 men. At the time, two new units were being deployed in the area of Laniste (an engineering regiment and a PO regiment), possessing some facilities (Ibid., inv. No. 2-2617, Command of the 30th Partisan Division, confidential, inv. No. 605-1, April 1, 1992 – to the Command, Elaboration.

³⁹¹ AIIZ, inv. Nos. 2-769, and 2-1238, Federal Secretariat for National Defence, Chief of Staff of the GS OS /General Staff of the Armed Forces/ of the SFRY, general

On May 12, 1992, based on the Order of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential no. 12-81-433, dated May 11, 1992, “in order to protect the Serb people and the honest members of the other peoples in SR BiH, as well as in order to strengthen the operational and tactical position of the units of the 5th Corps”, the Command of the 5th Corps issued an Order for the mobilization of war units. The composition of all the war units of the organizational composition of the 5th Corps was to include “the armed Serb people, the TO units formed so far, and the volunteer units”, the manpower of which was to be included in the formational units and ensure single directing and commanding over those compositions. The mobilized units were to be organizationally strengthened, trained, armed and prepared for combat as soon as possible.³⁹²

The mobilizations, desertions and organized sabotage, “**in critical periods of war operations**”, according to Kadijevec, were constituting “**a bigger problem than the actual value of the enemy army**”.³⁹³

“**With opening up of new crisis points, particularly in Croatia**”, mobilization had become “**a key limiting factor to the implementation of all the JNA plans**”. The failure of mobilization and the desertion (lack of manpower) required “**the modification of the tasks and the ideas for manoeuvring the final operation of the JNA in Croatia**”. This unique operation prepared by the military leadership, “with the goal to execute all the tasks that the JNA had in Croatia and at the same time to allow for further smooth and full realization of the plan for dislocation of the JNA out of Slovenia”, was not fully realized “just for a single reason – failed mobilization and the desertion of the already mobilized military conscripts”.³⁹⁴

Blagoje Adzic, NOTE from the meeting of the representative of the federal secretary for national defence related to the information of the Command of the 2nd Military District on the Situation in BiH and the proposal for deployment of the units of JNA and War Material Reserves – Excerpt.

³⁹² AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2653, Command of the 5th Corps, strictly confidential no. 434-4, May 12, 1992 – to the Command of the 30th Partisan Division.

³⁹³ V. Kadijevec, the aforementioned work, p. 165.

³⁹⁴ Ibid., pp. 96-97, 119, 121-122, 125, and 133-142; I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, p. 71.

Mobilization “**in the Serb parts**” of Bosnia and Herzegovina, thanks to the manoeuvres and movements of the JNA across Bosnia and Herzegovina during the aggression against the Republic of Croatia, was “**very successful**”.³⁹⁵

From mid-1991, the JNA was disastrously poorly filled in, because the military conscripts from Serbia no longer responded either, and thus the units could not be filled in from that republic through regular mobilization. The solution for mobilization of reservists had been a failure. Due to this, the leadership of the Greater Serbia movement made efforts to make up the poor response of reservists in the JNA and the desertion by admission of volunteers. To this aim, a number of documents were enacted about admission and involvement of volunteers and volunteer units of the JNA. These are: **the Decree of the Government of Serbia on Registration of Volunteers for the TO** (August 14, 1991); **Instruction for Admission of Volunteers into the JNA** (September 13, 1991), and **Order no. 73** of the Rump Presidency of the SFRY for **Involvement of Volunteers into the Armed Forces of the SFRY During Direct War Danger** (December 10, 1991).³⁹⁶

The Federal Secretary for National Defence (general Veljko Kadijevic) on September 13, 1991, enforced the **Instruction for Admission of Volunteers into the JNA**, which came into effect “as of the date of its signing”. This document regulates admission of volunteers into the units and institutions of the JNA, determines the notion of volunteer,³⁹⁷ the

³⁹⁵ V. Kadijevic, the aforementioned work, p. 147. In relation to this, General Kadijevic wrote: “**In this way, at least to some extent, we mitigated the problems in the JNA caused by the failure of mobilization in the other parts of the country**” (Ibid.). According to him, the Montenegrins and Herzegovinians were **excellent, while “the Bosnians and Krajina guys were mediocre”** (B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 394).

³⁹⁶ ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-52-T, paragraphs 317-320; AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2280, Federal Secretariat for National Defence, General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, III Administration, confidential, no. 2391-1, September 13, 1991, INSTRUCTION FOR ADMISSION OF VOLUNTEERS INTO THE YUGOSLAV PEOPLE’S ARMY.

³⁹⁷ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2280, Federal Secretariat for National Defence, General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, III Administration, confidential, no. 2391-1, September 13, 1991, **Instruction for admission of volunteers into the Yugoslav People’s Army**; Ibid., inv. No. 5352, Record, Supplement to Statement by Dj. Dj. In terms of this Instruction, the notion of volunteer included “**a person who submits a written request to be**

manner of admission and deployment,³⁹⁸ registration with the JNA,³⁹⁹ manner and procedure for admission to duties and formational positions “which they are skilled for”,⁴⁰⁰ organization, manner and duration of

admitted into the unit – institution of the JNA, if they are capable of performing appropriate military service”.

The volunteer could be **“a person (a male from any part of the SFRY, not younger than 18 and not older than 60. The person from paragraph 1 of this point younger than 27 who has not served the military term yet shall be referred to serve a military term, if they capable for military service”** (Ibid).

³⁹⁸ Ibid. The commands and officers of the units and institutions of the JNA admitted the volunteers from point 2 of this instruction and deployed them into their units – institutions based on peacetime or wartime formation, depending on the level of staffing, the situation in the area of responsibility, and the task of the unit or institution.

The persons from reserve composition – volunteers who had military deployment in their mother units were redeployed to the duties and formational positions assigned to them on the occasion of formation of the war unit. The volunteers who had war deployment in other war units, when the situation so allowed, were sent to the mother war units, and if this was not possible, they were deployed on the vacant duties, that is, formational positions within their units based on peacetime or wartime formation, depending on their military records specialty.

The persons from reserve composition who did not have war deployment in the JNA, as well as the persons from point 2 of the Instruction who did not have the military obligation, were admitted by the commands and officers of units and institutions of the JNA and were deployed on the vacant formational positions of peacetime or wartime formation of their units, depending on their military records specialties, that is, their expert qualifications, knowledge and skills acquired in civilian (Ibid.).

³⁹⁹ Ibid. Registration of volunteers into the JNA was done by the JNA units based on applications filled in by the volunteers in units. The application form is prescribed in this Instruction as its integral part. The application once submitted was irrevocable (Ibid.).

⁴⁰⁰ Ibid. Volunteers were admitted to duties and formational positions for which they were capacitated, and if this was not possible, they were deployed to vacant formational positions with prior basic training for the jobs and duties of the given formational position.

The volunteers were admitted upon determination of their identity and other required data of interest to the Yugoslav People’s Army. The identity was made based on the personal ID card, data in the application, unit card, military card, through competent bodies of socio-political communities where possible, etc. Based on the determined identities, appropriate military records documents were established for each volunteer admitted into the unit.

In the procedure of admission into the units of the Yugoslav People’s Army, health capacity was determined of the volunteers for the duties from point 5 of this Instruction,

the military expert training, supplementary training or retraining,⁴⁰¹ rights and obligations,⁴⁰² decision on admission into the units of the JNA,⁴⁰³ cessation of military service,⁴⁰⁴ and manner of referring “for any unclear questions”.⁴⁰⁵

Upon admission into the JNA, each volunteer signed the Application Form in person, stating that “**he shall perform the assigned tasks in**

The health capacity, whenever possible, was determined by the nearest military medical institution, and when this was not possible, the health capacity was determined by the troop physician based on examination, and as needed, consulting specialists from military or civilian health institutions.

The security check in the procedure of admission and monitoring of volunteers was made based on security service regulations (Ibid.).

⁴⁰¹ Ibid. The volunteers were subjected to organized expert military training, supplementary training or retraining, in order to capacitate them for certain duties in the unit or institution. The manner and duration of training depended on the previously acquired knowledge of the volunteer. The training was in principle organized on the job in the basic unit or institution (Ibid).

⁴⁰² Ibid. In terms of rights and obligations, volunteers were equal with military personnel, that is, military conscripts, and during military service they were entitled to appropriate wages in compliance with the law (Ibid.).

⁴⁰³ Ibid. The decision for admission of volunteers into the JNA units was enacted by the officer of the unit or institution at the level of brigade, regiment, independent battalion, or their equal units. The report on admission of volunteers was regularly submitted to the superior command (Ibid.).

⁴⁰⁴ Ibid. The volunteer’s “military service could be terminated if the need ceased for his involvement in the unit or upon his request: in case of justified legal reasons foreseen in Arts. 32, and 33, of the Law on Military Obligation, or if he has spent the maximum prescribed time in the unit as foreseen in Art. 52. of the cited law” (Ibid.).

⁴⁰⁵ Ibid. For “any unclear questions” it was foreseen to approach the superior commands and competent organizational units of the Federal Secretariat of the National Defence (Ibid.). **All volunteer units were under the single command of the JNA, that is, they were within the single system of directing and commanding of the JNA** (AIIZ, inv. No. 7-50, APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF VOLUNTEERS INTO THE YUGOSLAV NATIONAL ARMY; Ibid., inv. No. 7-49, Federal Secretariat of the National Defence, General Headquarter of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, III Administration, confidential, no. 2382-2, September 24, 1991 – to the Command of the Military Engineering Institution of Hadzici.

a responsible and disciplined manner”, and “that he will abide by the federal laws and other enactments and orders regulating relations and life and work in the Yugoslav National Army”.⁴⁰⁶

Based on the aforementioned instruction for admission of volunteers into the Yugoslav National Army, the SSNO also regulate the right to wages for the volunteers.⁴⁰⁷

The aforementioned documents legalized the participation of volunteers (groups and individuals), that is, armed units, from Serbia and Montenegro, in the combat operations in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, under the single command of the JNA.⁴⁰⁸

In the wars of aggression aimed at forming Greater Serbia, the JNA also placed **volunteers** under its command, including them in the war units of the JNA, and they took part in the aggression and other forms of crimes committed in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

⁴⁰⁶ AIIZ, inv. No. 7-50, APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF VOLUNTEERS INTO THE YUGOSLAV NATIONAL ARMY.

⁴⁰⁷ AIIZ, inv. No. 7-49 and 2-2813, Federal Secretariat of the National Defence, General Headquarter of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, III Administration, confidential, no. 2382-2, September 24, 1991 – to the Command of the Military Engineering Institution of Hadzici. Pursuant to the provisions of Article 119 of the Law on General National Defence (*Sluzbeni list SFRJ*), nos. 21/82, and 35/91, in terms of rights and obligations, volunteers were equal with military conscripts. During military service, the volunteers from point 1 of the Instruction were entitled to wages determined in the Instruction on the Method of Payment of Wages to the Military Conscripts Invited for Military Service in the Yugoslav People’s Army (*Sluzbeni vojni list*, nos. 20/86, 34/89, and 16/91). In payments of wages to volunteers, the then applicable regulations were to be adhered: “The instruction referred to in point 2 of this explanation, the SIV decision on determination of the amount of wages for recruits and personnel in the reserve composition who are not employed during their military service (*Sluzbeni vojni list*, no. 10/81), and The Book of Rules on Compensations for Travel and Other Costs in the JNA (*Sluzbeni vojni list*, no. 13/91).

The explanations in relation to the per diems were directly given by the Personnel Administration of the SSNO, because this involved application of the Book of Rules on Compensations for Travel and Other Costs in the JNA, which this Administration was in charge of (*Ibid.*).

⁴⁰⁸ ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraph 321.

Thus, the JNA units on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina were additionally filled in with volunteers and volunteer groups “**from among the Serb people**”.⁴⁰⁹

⁴⁰⁹ AIIZ, inv. No. 7-50, **Application for registration of volunteers into the Yugoslav People’s Army**; Ibid., inv. No. 7-49 and 2-2813, Federal Secretariat of the National Defence, General Headquarter of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, III Administration, confidential, no. 2382-2, September 24, 1991 – to the Command of the Military Engineering Institution of Hadzici; D. Marijan, the aforementioned work, pp. 307-308; B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, p. 229; AIIZ, inv. No. 5352, Record, Supplement to Statement by Dj. Dj.

In accepting the participation and collaboration of the so-called volunteers in the realization of the Greater Serbia agenda, the JNA also officially legalized the so-called TO of the “**SAO Krajina**”, which, as written by D. Marijan, “**became its combating part**” (D. Marijan, the aforementioned work, pp. 307-308). According to I. Radakovic, the so-called volunteers were in essence “**the sledgehammer of Nazi-Fascism**” (I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, p. 221).

Even at the meeting of the “**Group of six**” (Slobodan Milosevic, Borisav Jovic, Dr. Branko Kostic, Momir Bulatovic, and generals Veljko Kadijevec and Blagoje Adzic), on September 28, 1991, general Blagoje Adzic demanded, among other things, “**that units be filled in with volunteers**” (B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 391).

V

**CONSTITUTION OF THE GREATER
SERBIA FIFTH COLUMN IN
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA**

1. The Fifth Column Activity and Organized Destruction of Government Structures in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The basic goal of the Greater Serbia movement, set forth in the Memorandum of SANU and defined by a request of the already affirmed *Vozd** that “**all Serbs should live in one State**” under the given circumstances, in the early nineties, could impossibly be accomplished exclusively through the forced change of borders of the existing sovereign republics.

The application of political violence in the late eighties yielded only partial results. The bureaucratic anti-revolution and the “happening of the people” (in October and November 1988) only revoked the autonomies of the provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina. The export of the bureaucratic ‘anti-revolution’ was completed in January 1989, with the third “people’s happening” in Podgorica. Futile attempts to export the bureaucratic anti-revolution into Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina during 1989 were terminated with a desperate effort to hold a “**rally of truth**” on December 1, 1989, in Ljubljana, and then attempt to continue the coerced 14th (Extraordinary) Congress of the SKJ (in January 1990), without the Slovenian delegation.¹

From March 1989, the Greater Serbia movement also began applying armed violence, primarily in combating Albanian strikes and

* Note by translator: *Vozd* in Serbian means “Leader, Prince, King” and was normally attributed to Slobodan Milosevic

¹ V. Zarkovic, **SAVEZ KOMUNISTA U VRTLOGU KRIZE**, in: RATOVI U JUGOSLAVIJI 1991.-1999., Compilation of Communiqués and Discussions from the Round Table, Belgrade, November 7-9, 2001, Belgrade 2002, pp. 28-34; N. Major, **RASPAD DRUGE JUGOSLAVIJE**, in: RATOVI U JUGOSLAVIJI..., pp. 43-47.

demonstrations in defence of the autonomy in Kosovo. In this framework, tenths of Albanians were killed, and several hundreds of their intellectuals arrested.²

As soon as during 1988, it was quite obvious that the leadership of the SK of Serbia “**had fully accepted the Greater Serbia nationalist positions on the relations in Yugoslavia and accepted the role of the implementer of the Greater Serbia nationalist agenda and the rearrangement of the SFRY, in order for the ‘the Serb issue’ to be solved**”.³ That year, following the pensioning of Admiral Mamula, the military leadership, headed by the new defence minister (General Veljko Kadijevic), definitely sided up with Milosevic’s Greater Serbia policy of resolution of the Yugoslav crisis. One of the relevant integrative factors (the Armed Forces – the JNA) was placed in the service of its disintegration. Upon the dissolution of the SKJ (January 1990), as the main integrative factor of the joint state, and after the election of Borisav Jovic into the Presidency of the SFRY on May 15, 1989, in which he immediately took the office of Vice President, and soon after the function of the president of the *Council for the Protection of Constitutional Order*, the leadership of the Greater Serbia movement (Milosevic, Jovic, Kadijevic, Gracanin), having understood the inability for Serb domination in the SFRY, abandoned the idea for rearrangement of the SFRY. This resulted in the decision on the creation of the Socialist Party of Serbia, and then in the proposal to have Croatia and Slovenia “forcefully” expelled from Yugoslavia.⁴

A radical turnover in the practical policy of the Greater Serbia movement in the spring of 1990 was also characterized by the illegal disarmament of the Territorial Defence of the non-Serb republics; by the formation of special motorized compositions in the regions of Zagreb, Knin, Banja Luka, and Herzegovina, in the function of combating the “internal” enemy (“**just like in Kosovo**”); to a certain extent, the sovereignty of the other republics had also been acknowledged, so the discussions

² N. Major, the aforementioned work, p. 44.

³ V. Zarkovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 28-34.

⁴ B. Jovic, **POSLEDNJI DANI SFRJ**, second edition, Kragujevac, 1996, pp. 160-161.

on the destiny of Yugoslavia also included their presidents; on May 1990, in Knin, the Serbian community of municipalities was formed, and in June 1990, the Serb Assembly was held in Srb, following which on August 17, 1990, the insurrection in Knin and the surroundings was set up.

Intensive destruction of the government structures of Bosnia and Herzegovina had begun as early as in 1990, immediately after formation of the fifth columnist **Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina** (on July 12, 1990), that is, during its pre-election campaign, and preparations for multi-party elections. During the preparations of those elections, a number of fifth columnist organizations were established. The Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina had the most favourable conditions for operation, formed upon suggestion and initiative of the leading personae of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences (Dobrica Cosic, Matija Beckovic, Milorad Ekmečić), and modelled after the previously formed fifth columnist Serbian Democratic Party in Croatia (headed by the psychiatrist and Academician Jovan Rasković), with the basic intention of being the mother of the Greater Serbia movement in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The party was formed by a core of dissatisfied persons, the so-called dissidents, writers committed to the Greater Serbia ideas (Djogo, Lubarda, Nogo), and was headed by the poet and psychiatrist Radovan Karadžić, with Momčilo Krajišnik, who had been tried at court for economic crime charges immediately prior to that. The ideas from the memorandum of the SANU and Milošević's state in which all the Serbs will live were the basis of the political practice of the Party.⁵

⁵ In mid-1990, in the area of Bosnia and Herzegovina, “**due to ethnic polarization and homogenisation on ethnic grounds**”, there was noticeable activity of the Serbian Democratic Party and by Dr. Jovan Rasković from Knin (ARCHIVE OF THE INSTITUTE FOR INVESTIGATION OF THE CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN SARAJEVO – hereinafter referred to as AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2421, Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of Territorial Defence, marked confidential, no. 04/154-7, August 6, 1990, Sarajevo, Information on Significant Factors and Manifestations for MPS in the TO of SR BiH, in July 1990).

The constituent assembly of the SDS in Banja Luka (August 1990), held before some 15,000 people, was attended by Jovan Rasković, Jovan Opacic, Radovan Karadžić, and Dusan Zelenbaba. In his speech to the citizens attending, Rasković accused the president of the SIV (Ante Marković) for the formation of the Union of Reform Forces

With significant support by Milosevic's **Socialist Party of Serbia**, winner at the premature single-party elections in 1989, and the Belgrade electronic and printed media, the Serbian Democratic Party won 72, or 30% of mandates in the elections for the Assembly of SR Bosnia and Herzegovina in November 1990.

A significant number of the mandates and the other two parties (SDA = 35.8% or 86 mandates, HDZ = 18.35% or 44 mandates)⁶ allowed that they (jointly with the SDA and the HDZ) form the ruling coalition, which brought the already exposed fifth columnist party into power. This – as it was proven in the coming years – was **tragic to the multi-ethnic Bosnia and Herzegovina**.

The basic, essential goal of the Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in compliance with the Greater Serbia movement, had been from its beginning **the formation of the Serbian state, and unification of all the Serbs (“Serb unity”)**, the realization of which gathered Serb nationalist leaders around Slobodan Milosevic, including, among others, Radovan Karadzic. In the implementation of this criminal project, the Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina threatened that it would even use force to accomplish these goals (i.e. through military means), for which it had thoroughly prepared itself. Thus, starting from the assessment **that the Serbs in Bosnia and**

of Yugoslavia (SRSJ) and the dissolution of the Serbian constituency. Particularly aggressive was Dusan Zelenbaba, who spoke about **“the already declared war of Ustashas and the formation of the Serb Dinara Corps”** (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2425, Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of Territorial Defence, confidential, no. 04/154-8, September 4, 1990, Sarajevo, Information on Significant Factors and Manifestations for MPS and combat preparedness in the TO of SR BiH, in August 1990).

Jovan Raskovic, leader of the Serbian Democratic Party in Croatia, wrote an Open Letter to Slobodan Milosevic in September 1990, greeting the Serbian president as the **“most important personality in the modern history of the Serb people”**, and the **“physical protector”** of the Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina in its strife to **“consummate the Serbian ethnic entity”** (INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, Case: No. IT-02-54-T. PROSECUTOR AGAINST SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC, hereinafter referred to as: ICTY, Case no. IT-02-54-T), the Hague, May 31, 2002, paragraph 8).

⁶ S. Arnautovic, **IZBORI U BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI '90 – ANALIZA IZBORNOG PROCESA**, Sarajevo 1996, p. 108.

Herzegovina had linked all of their hopes to their mother country of Serbia and that they would never allow themselves to be separated from Serbia with a state border, in the first half of November 1990, Radovan Karadzic warned that the Bosnian Serbs are prepared for war and **“that they are no longer helpless, but very powerful and unified”**.⁷ To this goal, and then as a result of the devised political decision, numerous crimes were committed, including the genocide against the Bosniaks.⁸

At the press conference held after the meeting with Milosevic, who visited the seat of the Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Sarajevo in late February 1991 and met the leadership of this party, Radovan Karadzic state: **“It is quite natural for the Serbs to live in one country”**.⁹

The Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina was lead by Radovan Karadzic, Momcilo Krajisnik, Biljana Plavsic and Nikola Koljevic (they made up the collective leadership of this party). Karadzic was the president of the Party. Krajisnik was his closest associate, and one of the creators of the party policy. Plavsic and Koljevic (University professors in Sarajevo) were also members of the collective Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and adhered to the party discipline and

⁷ ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraphs 8, 12, 16, 38, and 199; *M/N*, November 9, 1990, pp. 10-13, Interview with Radovan Karadzic, SRBI IZVAN BOSANSKOG LONCA. For Karadzic, this was not only **“a civil war”**, but allegedly also **“a war between ethnic groups and a war between religions”** (Ibid., paragraph 12). Hence, he made efforts to conceal his criminal policy and practice.

⁸ Ibid., paragraph 195. In accomplishing criminal goals, the Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina **“had politically woken up and homogenized the Serb nation”** (ICTY, paragraphs 13. and 14). According to Radovan Karadzic, it was the task of the Serb collaborationists in Bosnia and Herzegovina to stop **“the deterioration of the Serb ethnic issue over several centuries. All that our predecessors failed to do or complete – we must complete it, in this tragic and martyr-like, but also celebrated generation”**. According to Karadzic, they did not **“defend themselves only”**, but allegedly **“the whole Serbian nation and the whole Orthodox religion”** (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-140, Main Headquarters of the Armed Forces of Republika Srpska, Sector for Moral, Religious and Legal Affairs, int. no. 10/24-291, November 7, 1994, Message of the President of Republika Srpska).

⁹ Ibid., paragraph 39.

obedience, as well as to the policy and practice of the Greater Serbia nationalist agenda.¹⁰

Radovan Karadzic performed his leading role exclusively through his position as the chief of the SDS (until the spring of 1992). His supremacy in the leadership of the Serb collaborationists in Bosnia and Herzegovina was strengthened through his close relations with Slobodan Milosevic, who, in the capacity of president of another state, also presented the interests of Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and had regular contacts with Karadzic. In the determination of the party policy and decision-making, in executing the intentions, goals, objectives and the will of the leadership of the Greater Serbia movement and Slobodan Milosevic in person, Karadzic acted in close and constant cooperation with the other leading personnel of the SDS.¹¹

Between Slobodan Milosevic and the leadership of the “Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, in particular Radovan Karadzic, there was a well-developed tactics of their appearance before international players, too. The goal was to prove that this involves the political and military leaderships of two different states, instead of one (the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) and its collaborationist creation (the “Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina”), in which this collaborationist leadership constituted an allegedly independent political and military factor. Well-developed “**combinations**” on how to present this on the international scene were devised. Milosevic, the leader of the Greater Serbia movement, “**worked at his discretion**”, and was turning his head around “**as if he did not know how the leadership of Republika Srpska will proceed**”.¹² Therefore, Milosevic proceeded completely

¹⁰ Ibid., paragraphs 36-37, and 196.

¹¹ Ibid., paragraphs 39, and 196. In late February 1991 (three days after Milosevic’s visit to the seat of the SDS of Bosnia and Herzegovina), the Serb fifth columnists, and then collaborationists, headed by Karadzic, had authorized the leader of the Greater Serbia movement to represent the interests of the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Ibid., paragraph 39).

¹² AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2889, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Supreme Defence Council, DT No. 12-4, August 26, 1995, Belgrade, NOTE from the meeting of the representatives of the highest political and military leadership of the Federal Republic

autonomously, and his collaborationists from Bosnia and Herzegovina were allegedly **“the unforeseeable, crazy Serbs”**.¹³

The Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina formed in July 1990, in compliance with the adopted program and with full reliance onto the party organizations in the municipalities and local communities, which were very organized, quickly set up an effective structure of communications and command. In November 1990, information from faraway villages reached the Main Board of the SDS in Sarajevo in two hours, and Milosevic’s cabinet in even less, if needed. The party infrastructure, created in 1990 and 1991, included technical and organizational capacities for command, control and communication from the senior top of the Party down to the lowest ranks. The SDS

of Yugoslavia and Republika Srpska, held on August 25, 1995, in the residential facility of the Army of Yugoslavia in Dobanovci, pp. 8-9.

At this meeting, on the occasion of discussion on the offered peace solution of the Contact Group, Karadzic proposed to Milosevic **“... that he works at his discretion, but turning his head around as if he did not know how the leadership of Republika Srpska will proceed”**. Upon that, Milosevic **“warned that there is no more time for such ‘combinations’”**. Karadzic responded: **“We can then negotiate for quick peace, but without our enemy knowing it; so that we evade making any tactical mistakes”** (Ibid.).

¹³ Ibid. In the discussion about the peace solution of the Contact Group between the political and military leaderships of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and “the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, at the aforementioned meeting in Dobanovci, Karadzic **“recommended”** that **“it is better that the Yugoslav side, president Milosevic in particular, ‘fight like in the past’, and that they remain ‘the unforeseeable, crazy Serbs’”**. Upon that, Milosevic used the following words to remind Karadzic: **“This is how we negotiated last year..., and after our refusal of the plan, part of the territory was lost and there were many casualties”**. Karadzic then asked: **“What about the history?”**, and Milosevic returned that **“we need living people, not history”** (Ibid., p. 9).

In the continuation of the discussion, Karadzic proposed, among other things: **“Let Slobodan Milosevic go and make pressure on the Serbs from Republika Srpska, just like in the past, but it is also good that we preserve the status of a negotiating party too”**. According to Karadzic’s opinion, **it was also easier for Milosevic “to state that he can influence to a certain extent, but we also have to hear their voice (the Serbs from Republika Srpska)”** (Ibid., pp. 14-15).

members were obligated to implement and adhere to the party policy and decisions of the party bodies.¹⁴

The organization and functioning of the “**security system**” of the SDS was a strict secret and was organized by hierarchy. Communication codes were developed through public telephone lines (a number for specific persons: Karadzic was “01”, Krajisnik “02”, Koljevic “03”, and Plavsic “04”). In August 1991, Karadzic issued the order to all the municipal and regional boards of the SDS in Bosnia and Herzegovina that, in order to protect the secrecy of communications in signatures, written reports, orders and other documents, there will be changes made, and that the “**SDS leaders in Bosnia and Herzegovina need to start using secret identification numbers**”. Thus, the leadership of the SDS of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in September 1991, established a separate conspirative system of command, control, communications and information.¹⁵

At the same time, the Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina worked **in two directions**: firstly, it **declaratively** supported tolerance, democratic dialogue, and protection of Serb interests within Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as of the Republic within Yugoslavia through peaceful negotiations, stressing, just like the leader of the Greater Serbia movement, their goals to allegedly be the preservation of Yugoslavia (while actually they were undertaking actions to bury it down as soon as possible), and secondly, upon the order by the leadership of the Greater Serbia movement, it was **secretly** and conspiratively undermining the unity of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, destroying the state, in cooperation with the institutions in Belgrade and with Serbs in the Republic of Croatia, as well as preparing the creation of “Serb Bosnia and Herzegovina”, and crimes to be committed.¹⁶

¹⁴ *NIN* (Belgrade), November 9, 1990, p. 10; **ICTY**, Case: No. It-02-54-T, paragraphs 37 and 197. “**Whatever may be beyond adopted policy**”, according to Karadzic, constituted treason (Ibid., paragraph 37, inst. 391). In relation to this, Krajisnik claimed that “**the traitors and renegades are the hardest enemies. We would like to send out the following message to those who have fallen down or are neutral, weak or disoriented, and to those who do not feel like traitors: today you still have the time, but tomorrow, it is going to be too late**” (Ibid., paragraph 197).

¹⁵ Ibid., paragraph 198.

¹⁶ Ibid., paragraphs 15, and 199.

In the second half of 1990, there were a number of phenomena **“of serious violation of the constitutional order and territorial integrity of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and violation of the personal and property security of its citizens”**. In relation to this, while monitoring **“phenomena related to the exercise of constitutionality and legality”**, on November 6, 1990, the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina sent a “notice” to the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, indicating their existence. However, even after that, the process of destruction of the constitutional order was continued **“in a sequence of unconstitutional and unlawful actions and enactments”**.¹⁷

Through the leadership of the fifth columnist Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Serb nationalist movement was intensively working on the destruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is, on preparations for the crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, by first forming the **organs of the Serb para-state**. The first such para-statal body was formed in Banja Luka on October 13, 1990, at the **All-Serbian Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina**, named **“Serb National Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina”**, accompanied by a network of such regional councils, whose physiognomy clearly indicated the intention to disrupt the unity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The core of the Serb National Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina was made up by the leading people of the SDS, but it also included other **“Serb parties”**, **“non-party personalities”**, and some **“Serb associations”** (e.g. *Prosvjeta*).¹⁸

¹⁷ I. Dautbasic, **AGRESORSKO FORMIRANJE KOLABORACIONISTICKIH TVOREVINA I DJELOVANJE USTAVNOG SUDA BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE NA NJIHOVOM UKIDANJU**, in: *AGRESIJA NA BOSNU I BORBA ZA NJEN OPSTANAK 1992. – 1995.*, Sarajevo 1996; p. 184.

¹⁸ *Javnost*, October 19, 1990, pp. 10, and November 10, 1990, p. 2; AIIZ, pp. 2-2436; *NIN*, November 9, 1990, p. 11, Interview with Radovan Karadzic, SRBI IZVAN BOSANSKOG LONCA.

The Decision on establishment states that the “Serb National Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina” shall work on “securing and strengthening civic and national equality and freedom of the citizens of Serbian ethnicity and the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole” and “also conduct other national affairs of the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina” (Ibid.).

The self-proclaimed Serb National Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina **“was only responsible to the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, its assemblies and large reunions”** and **“could only be dismissed by the Serb people”**. The first president, Radovan Karadzic, expressing his **“concern”** for the position of the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, presented the actual reasons for the formation of the **“Serb National Council”** – that **“the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina shall not abandon their requests for living in a single state, in which their mother Serbia is too”**, and **“this is why we are today forming our Serb National Council, thereby taking our destiny into our own hands...”**¹⁹

At the constituent assembly in Banja Luka, “the Serb National Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina” also adopted its **“first decision”**, indicating the essence of the change of **“the state character of Bosnia and Herzegovina”**, according to which **“the state position of the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina can not be changed by any assembly decisions, but exclusively by a national referendum”**, that is, **“at the referendum of the Serb people”**.²⁰

The main task of the “Serb National Council” was to care “about the current and future life of the Serb people” on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina (*Javnost*, October 27, 1990, p. 3).

The “Serb National Council” was formed from a part of the Main Board of the SDS of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a part of the Political Council of the SDS of Bosnia and Herzegovina, representatives of the Serb educational and cultural association *“Prosvjeta”*, representatives of other parties, and “prominent non-party personalities”. The Council for Interparty Cooperation at the SDS of Bosnia and Herzegovina also gave its vote for formation of the “Serb National Council”, emphasizing that this involves “a democratic right of the Serb people” and “a form of defence of the sovereign rights of the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, which would gather “all the political parties representing the interests of the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina” (*Javnost*, October 27, 1990, p. 2, Text by Vojislav Maksimovic “IZNUDJENA ODLUKA SRPSKOG NARODA”, *Javnost*, October 27, 1990, p. 3).

The **“All-Serb Assembly”** in Banja Luka was attended by **“all the political organizations of the Serb people from throughout Yugoslavia”** (Ibid.). However, in order to trick the public, only the Serb National Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina was formed on that occasion.

¹⁹ Ibid., October 19, 1990, p. 1.

²⁰ Ibid. This “First Decision of the Serb National Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina” was signed by Radovan Karadzic, in the capacity of president of the Council.

The formation and activity of the separate Serb state and institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, **“the Serb National Council”**, were **“in breach of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, its legal order and general socio-political system”**. This was a non-constitutional body **“with illegal and illegitimate pretensions to represent all the members of the Serb nation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to contest the right of the Assembly of SR Bosnia and Herzegovina to gradually and fully exercise its constitutional functions”**.²¹ This was obviously a directed insurgency, just like the one in Knin.

In late 1990, in compliance with the “Decision” of the **“All-Serb Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina”**, in Banja Luka, the regional Serb national councils were also formed. Thus, in the second half of October 1990, at the first assembly of the Serb people of Herzegovina in Trebinje, in attendance of **“some six thousand Serbs from Herzegovina and neighbouring Montenegro”**, the **“Serb National Council for Herzegovina”** was formed, consisting of elected representatives from

²¹ I. Dautbasic, the aforementioned work, p. 184. In the assessment of the Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, dated October 18, 1990, the Serb National Council was constituted in order to be “a parallel power along with the legitimate power of the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is a negation of the constitutional orders of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Yugoslavia. This [doubtlessly] leads to the formation of ethnic councils for other peoples too, to the dissolution of the sovereignty and integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, leads into new international strife and further conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina”. This is “an attack against the Republic and the desire to postpone the elections, which can not be allowed to happen”. The formation of the Serb National Council is “the hardest shock for Bosnia and Herzegovina as a sovereign society, and needs to be connected to and understood in the closest correlation with the ethnic council in Knin”. With “this action, some leaders and other decision-makers of the national parties are afraid of the elections, so they are advocating for wars of everyone versus everyone, and in fact nobody cares about democracy, but they do care about the introduction of the state of emergency and deepening of the constitutional crisis”. Formation of this council “can even be treated as a coup, as an attempt for secession...”, which “leads to the devastation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to its confederation, and prevents all democratic processes in its own nation and any agreements among the ethnicities, and in particular prevents the official state authorities from functioning” (AIIZ, 2-2341, Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of Territorial Defence, confidential, no. 04/164-10, October 18, 1990 – to the District Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Tuzla).

all Serb political parties “**active in this area: SDS, SPO and SNO, as well as the sister party from Montenegro, the People’s Party**”. At this meeting, speeches were held by Bozidar Vucurovic, President of the Regional Board of the SDS of Bosnia and Herzegovina for Herzegovina, Radovan Karadzic, Prof. Dr. Budimir Kosutic, Prof. Dr. Nikola Koljevic, Prof. Dr. Novak Kilibarda, Vladimir Srebrov, and others. In accordance with his perceptions about the impossibility of joint living, Vucurovic emphasized the need for self-organization of the Serb nation. Speaking about significance of formation of the “Serb National Council”, whereby they had taken “**their destiny into their own hands**”, Karadzic presented a false assessment about that “**the constitutional election laws are tailored at the detriment of the Serbian people, so that after the elections they almost totally destroy the Serb people**”. In relation to this, he emphasized that “**the Constitution is not constitutional, while the Serb National Council is constitutional**”. Prof. Kosutic denied the possibility of accepting “**six states in which the Serb nation would be a minority**”, because, as he said, he had never believed that “**there have been any borders among the Serbian people after 1918**”. Dr. Kilibarda proved that the Montenegrins are Serbs, maybe even “**the most prominent of the Serbs!**”²²

By the first half of November 1990, “Serb national councils” were also formed for Bosanska Krajina (in Banja Luka), for Old Herzegovina (in Foca), and for Ozren (in Bosansko Petrovo Selo).²³

“The Serb National Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, “**as the legitimate representative of the part of the Serb nation in Yugoslavia living on the territory of the SR BiH**”, on November 8, 1990, enacted the “**Declaration on the Position of the Serb Nation in SR Bosnia and Herzegovina**”. This document, among other things, unambiguously lets others know that “**for the Serb people, Bosnia and Herzegovina is not acceptable as an independent state**”, which would exist “**by itself or in a confederation with other states, nor is any other form of state organization which would separate them from the integrality of the Serb nation, or reduce them to the status of a national minority**”. Instead, it is the goal of the Serb people “**to preserve its unity with the**

²² *Javnost*, October 27, 1990, p. 3.

²³ *Ibid.*, October 27, 1990, pp. 3, and November 10, 1990, p. 2.

Serb nation as a whole”, which meant, in other words, the projected formation of the Serbian state. In the implementation of this goal, the position was adopted that the Serb National council “**would organize a referendum on the essential issues of self-relevance for the Serb nation in Bosnia and Herzegovina**”. In this way, several months after its formation and on the eve of the elections, the Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the other fifth columnist organizations had publicly revealed their goals.²⁴

The manner of the implementation of this goal (i.e. of the formation of the Serb state) was in accordance with Milosevic’s claim that he had announced three months before. Namely, on August 10, 1990, in Kupari, where the leadership of the Greater Serbia movement was resting and using the opportunity for “**a broader exchange of opinions**” (i.e. on the occasion of the outing to the Mljet island, cf. *supra*), among other things, he stated: “**that a referendum could be used to resolve the problem of Serbs from Bosnia near Drina,**”²⁵

In the **Message** to the Serb people from the first half of November 1990, starting from the assessment that the Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina “**is the only real protector of the interests of the Serbian people in BiH**”, Radovan Karadzic presented the position of the Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina, according to which “**the Serbian people should make a referendum and decide what kind of a country they wish to live in**”, rejecting in this the option of confederation or of an independent Bosnia and Herzegovina.²⁶

²⁴ Ibid., November 10, 1990, pp. 12, and November 17, 1990, p. 2. The declaration was published in *Javnost*, paper of the Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina (issue no. 5, November 17, 1990, p. 2). Radovan Karadzic with his signature stood behind that document.

²⁵ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 176.

²⁶ *Javnost*, November 10, 1990, p. 1. “**Declarations**” of Serb people in the “**referendum**” about “**what kind of country they want to live in**”, according to Karadzic, “**this was the main question and a vital reason for why any Serb, male or female should vote for their Serb party. Anything else could result in dramatic twists, slavery of the Serb people and a civil war as a result of drama and misunderstanding**”.

Voting for the Serb Democratic Party, Karadzic estimated that Serbs vote for “**the Serb people rule, for safety and unity of the Serb people and their state**” (Ibid)

Indicating the significance of democracy “**for the destiny of the Serb people**”, Karadzic also approached the Serbs with a false assessment that “**the Serb people are facing the danger of being separated from their mother state of Serbia and of being located, as an ethnic minority, in a kind of a new NDH or NDBiH** [“Independent State of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, note by the translator]”. Therefore, they sent a message that the SDS “**is the only party protecting the Serb people against separation from Serbia**”,²⁷ which meant the change of borders of sovereign states, and at the same time the dissolution of the common state.

From the first half of 1991 onwards, upon instructions issued by ‘pretendents’ to the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, along with the extreme tension, general confrontation and uncertainty, and even open enmities towards the State, the process of attack against the constitutional system and the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina (arbitrary takeover and execution of state competencies, formation of parallel and opposed bodies of authority, “ethnic territorialization” and other phenomena caused by non-constitutional and illegal enactments), had been intensified in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The holders of this project were the Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Croatian Democratic Union for Bosnia and Herzegovina, that is, those political parties which, for the most part, participated within the system framework (Assembly, Presidency, Government, and the like) in the discussion striving to identify the appropriate future constitutional and legal system for Bosnia and Herzegovina, and of its centuries-long identity. In essence, this involved opening a discussion on regionalization (ethnic territorialization), that is, politization of that problem, concealing thus political goals “**with economic necessities**”.²⁸

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ I. Dautbasic, the aforementioned work, p. 184; K. Begic, **BOSNA I HERCEGOVINA OD VANCEOVE MISIJE DO DAYTONSKOG SPORAZUMA**, Sarajevo 1997, p. 55, *Javnost*, April 20, 1991, p. 1.

As written by Prof. Dr. Kasim Begic, the SDS of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the HDZ for Bosnia and Herzegovina, “**having retained the dual status of ‘ruling parties’ and participation with the SDA (the Party of Democratic Action) and opposition parties in institutional action and resolution of problems, including the work on the**

Working on the definition of “**Serbian areas**”, the authors of ethnic (i.e. single-ethnicity) regionalization had abused and misinterpreted the indicators of the previous economic development of certain parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus, the regionalization had had a political background, that is, it was used as a means for ultimate confiscation of territories and taking over of power in the “Serb” areas.²⁹

The Serbian Democratic Party and the Serb National Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in an effort to round up the Greater Serbia project, which was the **formation of the Serbian State (“all Serbs in one State”)**, put into effect a number of non-constitutional enactments. Thus, modelled after the Serbs in Knin, where in May 1990 a Community of Serb municipalities was formed,³⁰ in the spring of 1991, that is, on April 11, 1991, “**The Agreement of Association into the Union of Municipalities of Bosanska Krajina**” was accepted. This “**agreement**” on the formation of the regional union of municipalities of Bosanska Krajina was accepted by the Municipal Assemblies of Bosanska Dubica, Glamoc, Banja Luka, Mrkonjic Grad, Bosanska Gradiska, and the like.³¹ Following this, other unions of municipalities were formed, first of eastern and then of the Old Herzegovina, and the like.³²

In mid-April 1991, the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina reviewed the formation of “the Union of Municipalities of Bosanska Krajina”, and in relation to this, forwarded recommendations to the Bosanska Krajina municipalities to refrain from further regionalization.³³ However, this recommendation meant nothing to the holders of the process.

new constitution, at the same time using the forms outside the institutional framework, blatantly violated the applicable constitutional and legal system of BiH”. Therefore the extent to which this fact contains “**hypocrisy, no matter how appropriate it may be for politics, had reached its unimagined proportions**”, rightfully concludes Prof. Begic (K. Begic, the aforementioned work, p. 55).

²⁹ K. Begic, the aforementioned work, pp. 56-58; *Javnost*, April 20, 1991, pp. 3 and 5, and May 4, 1991, p. 11; **ICTY**, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraphs 39, and 233-234.

³⁰ L. Silber – A. Little, **SMRT JUGOSLAVIJE**, Belgrade 1996, pp. 105-111.

³¹ I. Dautbasic, the aforementioned work, p. 185; Kasim Begic, the aforementioned work, pp. 57-58.

³² *Javnost*, September 14, 1991, p. 3.

³³ *Ibid.*, April 20, 1991, p. 1, and May 4, 1991, p. 5.

The Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina “**expressed concern that the regrouping of municipalities following an ethnic principle will cause tensions in inter-ethnic relations**”. A number of members of the Government from the Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina had publicly declared that the decision of the Bosanska Krajina and East Herzegovina municipalities as the rightful one “**for economic**” reasons.³⁴

The Party of Democratic Action saw the formation of ethnically cleansed areas in the decision for the regionalization of municipalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the break-up of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as an attempt to realize the idea for the formation of Greater Serbia. This was the in the first place an occasion for this to organize protest rallies party in Banja Luka and Trebinje, indicating the potential damage and unforeseeable consequences that may occur due to such types of divisions.³⁵

The constituent session of “**the Assembly of the Union of Municipalities of Bosanska Krajina**”, in the presence of “**nearly one hundred representatives, delegated on behalf of fourteen municipalities of Bosnia-Herzegovina (seven from each one), which had previously adopted the decision to join together into a new region of this part of the Republic**”, was held on April 25, 1991, in Celinac. Four days later (on April 29), the representatives of eight other municipalities gave their consent to join the Union, except for Bosanski Novi, “**where on the occasion of voting, the opposition’s abstinence had prevailed**”.³⁶

At the meeting of the Regional Board of the SDS of Old Herzegovina in Foca, held on April 19, 1991, which, in addition to the representatives of ‘power and folk’ of the municipalities of Kalinovik, Foca, Gorazde, Cajnice, Visegrad, and Rudo, was also attended by the president of the

³⁴ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2445, Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of Territorial Defence, confidential, no. 04/143-6, May 8, 1991, Sarajevo, Information on Significant Factors and Manifestations on the moral and combat preparedness of the TO of SR BiH for April 1991.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ *Javnost*, May 4, 1991, p. 5. Vojo Kupresanin was elected President of the Union of Municipalities of Banja Luka, and Radoslav Brdjanin and Dragan Knezevic were both elected Vice President (Ibid.).

People's Party of Montenegro (Prof. Dr. Novak Kilibarda) and the president of the Club of Delegates of Montenegro (Dr. Mitar Cvorovic), there was "a lot of discussion **about the regionalization of East and Old Herzegovina, and Glasinac in the Sokolac region, into the union of municipalities of Herzegovina**". In the **Joint Communiqué**, signed in Foca on April 20, 1991, by the president of the Regional Board of the SDS of Old Herzegovina, on the one side, and the president of the People's Party of Montenegro, Novak Kilibarda, on the other side, it was stated that the majority of these municipalities "**relied on and bordered Montenegro, so it is quite normal and necessary to discuss with the representatives of the people and power of the People's Party of Montenegro**". Even more so, because "**the historical destiny, better say injustice, has divided up this nation of a single origin and faith**". Therefore, the "**joint assessment of all participants**" was adopted of this gathering in Foca stating, "**that this is the historical moment to use democratic means to enforce the overall unity of the Serb nation**".³⁷

Based on the "**decision**" of the Municipal Board of the Serbian Democratic Party of Pale dated April 29, 1991, and starting from the assessment that "**association of the Pale municipality into the union of the City of Sarajevo has proven to be economically unjustified**", on May 8, 1991, the Assembly of Municipality of Pale brought the "**Decision**" for the separation of the Municipality of Pale out of the Union of Municipalities of Sarajevo.³⁸

On the same day, upon the initiative of the Regional Board of the SDS, at the session of the Municipal Assemblies of Sokolac, Pale and Han-Pijesak, it was decided to perform the "**integration of these three municipalities into the Union of Municipalities of Romanija**".³⁹

In September 1991, the Serb population of the local communities of Hresa and Bulozni too (within Sarajevo's Stari Grad Municipality), due to the alleged "**inability to achieve fundamental civil rights**",

³⁷ AIIZ, inv. No. 3-1082/3, Regional Board of the SDS – Old Herzegovina – Foca, Foca, April 20, 1991, JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ.

³⁸ I. Dautbasic, the aforementioned work, pp. 185-186; *Javnost*, May 4, 1991, p. 2.

³⁹ *Javnost*, May 11, 1991, p. 3.

decided to join the “**SAO Romanija**”.⁴⁰ The “Serb population of the Olovo Municipality” also brought such a decision.⁴¹

The regional board of the Serb Democratic Party for Old Herzegovina in Foca (the region of “Old Herzegovina” encompassed the municipalities of Kalinovik, Foca, Gorazde, Rudo, Cajnice, and Visegrad), on May 3, 1991, again reviewed the **issue of regional association with the municipalities of East Herzegovina**. In relation to this, it was unanimously concluded, “**that the work on this vital issue should be even more intensified...**” In delivering this assessment to the Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Joint Communiqué of the Regional Board of the SDS of Old Herzegovina points out that “**no decisions of the Parliament or Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, can stop them on this way**”.⁴²

On May 27, 1991, in Trebinje, “**the Assembly of the Union of Municipalities of East and Old Herzegovina**” was constituted. The municipalities of Trebinje, Gacko, Bileca, Nevesinje, Ljubinje, Kalinovik, Cajnice, and Rudo enacted “The Decision on Association into the Union”. The “delegates” attended “The Assembly” from all the eight municipalities. Bozidar Vucurovic from Trebinje was selected “**President**” of the “**Union**”, and Milorad Vujovic from Bileca and Dusko Kornjaca from Cajnice were appointed “**vice presidents**”. The “**Statute**” was also adopted as well as the other enactments of the “**Union**”, and the “**proposal was also given to the municipalities of Stolac, Niksic and Dubrovnik to join this Union, too**”.⁴³

⁴⁰ Ibid., September 28, 1991, p. 2. The explanation of the aforementioned decision was really a simple lie, as well as the statement that “**...7,500 inhabitants of Serb ethnicity in the Sarajevo Stari Grad Municipality still have no representatives in the government**” (Ibid.).

⁴¹ Ibid. In relation to this, the Main Board of the SDS of Olovo assessed that “the Serb people have become increasingly upset” in this municipality, accusing the leadership of the local SDA as being responsible. In addition, it states that “the number of Muslims in Olovo has been artificially increased by unification of the local communities of Kaljina and Knezina, which belonged to the Sokolac Municipality” (Ibid.).

⁴² AIIZ, inv. No. 3-1082/6, Regional Board of the SDS – Old Herzegovina – Foca, Foca, May 3, 1991, JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ.

⁴³ *Javnost*, June 1, 1991, p. 4.

Milosevic's minister Mihály Kertesz also possessed such a physiognomy of the "SAO East Herzegovina"; however, he saw it in the composition of the Serb land of Montenegro. The evidence of the intention to break up Bosnia and Herzegovina is also visible from the aforementioned simultaneous activities in Bosanska Krajina, which was supposed to unite with the already declared so-called Kninska Krajina, into a federal unit of the "originating" Yugoslavia, and also from the fact that in essence it recognizes the conclusions of negotiations between Tudjman and Milosevic from Karadjordjevo and Tikves, in March and April of 1991. The fact that these negotiations were incomplete was also conditioned by the lack of mentioning of the other parts of Bosnia, which Tudjman thought may be divided on the basis of Serb or Croat ethnic majorities in municipalities.^{43a}

"On the eve of St. Vitus' day [Vidovdan, A Serb religious holiday]" (on June 28, 1991), the **"Serb people"** in Bosansko Grahovo took the decision **"for unification of the divided people of Krajina"**, which, in addition to Serbia and Montenegro, **"will make a federal unit"**, which is **"a historical decision of the Krajina people to form their own state territory"**.⁴⁴

In August 1991, Radovan Karadzic introduced a secret system of communications between the Main Board of the SDS and the local boards, as well as with the Republic of Serbia. Such a secret procedure of communications was pronounced mandatory for sending out reports and orders.⁴⁵

^{43a} Two fifth columnist parties (the Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Croatian Democratic Union for Bosnia and Herzegovina) were developing these negotiations in the field and marked this by formation of the "Serb Autonomous Areas (SAO)" and "CROAT UNIONS". This is, among others, evidently confirmed by Begic's map from January 1992, which had only left five municipalities and the urban part of the Sarajevo City undivided between them (K. Begic, the aforementioned work, between the pp. 68 and 69).

⁴⁴ Ibid., September 14, 1991, p. 4.

⁴⁵ ICTY, Case. No. IT-01-51-1, paragraph 59; *Dani*, special report, December 7, 2001, p. 9.

The discussions about Martić's arrest and his release, in early September 1991,⁴⁶ revealed, among other things, the strategy of efforts the leadership of the SDS of Bosnia and Herzegovina to destroy the power and to divide the joint state through the process of "**regionalization**" and the division of the police forces, allegedly resulting from Muslim provocations. This incident with Martić was important for Karadžić, who, in the discussion with Milan Babić announced his **intentions to "finish off"** with the Muslims and on many occasions mentioned "**the blockade**" of Sarajevo, as a possible result of this incident.⁴⁷

In September of 1991, Karadžić mentioned the "**blockade**" of Sarajevo once again. In a telephonic conversation, he then informed his leader Slobodan Milošević that "**Romanija is ready for the blockade of Sarajevo**", where "**no one will be able to leave Sarajevo, it will be a catastrophe**".⁴⁸ Thus, Karadžić once more announced the goals of criminal character, which from 1992 to 1995 were the policy and practice of the Greater Serbia aggressor and its collaborationists.

⁴⁶ Ibid., paragraph 32. Milan Martić (Interior minister of the "SAO Krajina" and later on the chief of police of the "Republic of Serbian Krajina"), and two JNA officers were arrested on September 8, 1991, in Otoka near Bosanska Krupa by the police of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Milošević, Milan Babić, Karadžić, and others reacted to Martić's arrest, and worked on his release. Namely, the reactions to this arrest and the efforts for his release involved "**the highest echelon**":

a) the Serbian leadership in Belgrade, including Milošević and his associates, such as Jovica Stanić;

b) the military leadership (generals Adžić, Kadijević, and Vasiljević, and colonel Ratko Mladić);

c) the leadership of the SDS of Bosnia and Herzegovina, headed by Karadžić and Krajišnik, and their close associates, such as Koljević (Ibid., paragraph 31, and inst. 52-60, and paragraph 785), and

d) Alija Delimustafić, Minister of Interior of SR Bosnia and Herzegovina (*Slobodna Bosna*, no. 174, February 14, 2002, p. 38).

⁴⁷ Ibid. The episode with Martić also reveals the dimensions of the scope at which Slobodan Milošević was executing his role, actively assisting the criminal activities of the Croatian and Bosnian Serbs, through his influence on the JNA, Bosnian Serbs, and the leadership of the Croatian Serbs (Ibid.).

⁴⁸ ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraph 689, note 1388.

Radovan Karadzic executed orders, instructions and other guidelines he had received from the leader of the Greater Serbia movement, Slobodan Milosevic. So, for instance, in mid-1991, Milosevic issued an order to Karadzic for the **realization** of direct military preparations for effecting the armed aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁴⁹ This also is one of the crown pieces of evidence about the subjection of Karadzic to Milosevic.

In the second half of 1991, the leadership of the SDS of Bosnia and Herzegovina had again initiated the break-up of Bosnia and Herzegovina through regionalization, that is, by organizing Unions of Municipalities, pointing out the fact that **“the economic aspects of the regional development concept have their confirmation throughout modern Europe and its aspirations towards ‘the new world order’”**.⁵⁰ At a press conference in mid-September 1991, Radovan Karadzic incorrectly stated that **“the regionalization itself is no longer disputable, but we need to agree about the technical details; what and how large the regions will be, that is, what their competencies will be in relation to the republic and federal authorities...”**.⁵¹ Dr. Miodrag Simovic, Vice President of the Government of SR Bosnia and Herzegovina published two extensive texts in late September and early October 1991, about **“the association of municipalities into unions”**, with the goal of justifying the **“economic aspect”** of regionalization persistently advocated by the SDS of Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁵²

The Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina, based on its Statute and the **“decision and conclusions adopted in the meeting of municipal, regional and republic bodies of the Serbian Democratic**

⁴⁹ See: p. 399, note 184, and pp. 578-581.

⁵⁰ *Javnost*, July 27, 1991, p. 4, text **“MOGUCNOSTI REGIONALNOG ORGANIZOVANJA JUGOSLAVIJE”**. The authors of the text as signed were: members of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Prof. Dr. Nikola Koljevic, and Prof. Dr. Biljana Plavsic, and the president of the SDS of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Radovan Karadzic, and Prof. Dr. Vojislav Maksimovic, Chairman of the Club of Serbian Delegates.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, September 21, 1991, p. 3.

⁵² *Ibid.*, September 28, 1991, p. 4, and October 5, 1991, p. 4.

Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, held on September 7, 1991, in Pale, on September 9, 1991, took the decision for endorsement of the “Headquarters for Regionalization”. The goal of this headquarters was to monitor the **“implementation of the Decision for the Pronouncement of Autonomous Regions, as inseparable parts of the federal state of Federative Yugoslavia and integral parts of the federal unit of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the separation of populated places from certain municipalities and their inclusion into other municipalities”**.⁵³

The president of the regional board of the SDS for Bosanska Krajina, Dr. Radoslav Vukic, on September 9, 1991, in Lusci Palanka, on the occasion of a solemn assembly celebrating the formation of the SDS

⁵³ AIIZ, inv. No. 3-915, Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina, President, no. 542-011-1/91, Sarajevo, September 9, 1991 – Decision for Appointment of the Headquarters for Regionalization.

The task of the Headquarters for Regionalization was **“to view the interest of the Serb people within Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Yugoslav community, bearing in mind its economic, developmental, ethnic, historical, sociological, geographical and every other interest, and to prepare the appropriate platforms to be used for identification of the most adequate solutions and realization of the broadest interests of the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina”**.

The Headquarters offered **“expert and any other assistance in the development of ideas and implementation of actions related to the issues of regionalization of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and establishment of appropriate relations within Yugoslavia”** (Ibid., Executive Board of the Serb Democratic Party of BiH).

The following persons were appointed into the Headquarters for Regionalization: Nenad Jovanovic, Vojin Lale, Drasko Vuleta, Dragan Markovic, Mile Drnicic, Vidoje Ijacic, Ljubisav Terzic, Aleksa Milojevic, Dragan Doknic, and Jovo Miskin. This body also engaged other experts and institutions, particularly the personnel in the field, and it consulted about any relevant issues with the bodies and leadership of the Serbian Democratic Party. In relation to this, the Executive Board of the SDS of BiH assessed that it is required, **“in this extraordinarily significant task, to establish the necessary discipline, cooperation and coordination within the Serbian Democratic Party of BiH...”** (Ibid.).

On September 7, 1991, Koljevic and Plavsic formally requested from Slobodan Milosevic to represent them at the Hague Conference. Milosevic instructed Krajisnik (through Karadzic) that he should travel abroad to represent the interests of the Bosnian Serbs in at the European Parliament in Strasbourg (ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraph 54).

for Sanski Most, in his speech, among other things, making a concrete statement of the **intention** to destroy the country and in particular Bosnia and Herzegovina, sent a message that the Serbs “**will establish their state within Serbia or as a separate federal unit, composed of the Kninska and Bosanska Krajinas**”.⁵⁴

On October 12, 1991, in a telephonic conversation with Gojko Djogo (a Belgrade writer and professor), Karadzic presented the **genocidal intentions** against the Muslims, claiming that they would **disappear** (“**they shall vanish, this people shall vanish from the face of the Earth...**”). Explaining these criminal intentions towards the Muslims (“... **they shall vanish...**”), he stated that “**there are 20,000 armed Serbs around Sarajevo**”, and “**three or four hundred armed Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina**”, “**plus there is an Army, and the arms and all**”. According to Karadzic, Sarajevo was supposed to become “**a black cauldron, where 300,000 Muslims will die...**”⁵⁵

In accordance with the aforementioned criminal intentions, policy and practice, in a conversation he had with Momcilo Krajisnik, on October 13, 1991, Karadzic stated that “**in just a couple of days, Sarajevo shall disappear, and there will be 500,000 dead people, and in one month the Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be destroyed ...**”.⁵⁶

Karadzic’s genocidal intentions and the basic goal of the “Serb unity” were supposed to be executed, among other things, by the regionalization of the “Serb territories” in Bosnia and Herzegovina, relying on Milosevic’s project of Greater Serbia, that is, of the “Union of Serb Lands”.

The goal of the **Regionalization project** was to form the “**Serb**” **Bosnia and Herzegovina**. This was openly confirmed on November 7,

⁵⁴ *Javnost*, September 14, 1991, p. 2.

⁵⁵ ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraphs 53, 61, and 200, note 400. On this occasion, Karadzic also said: “**The number of Serbs shall be reduced, and the Croats will be the only ones to benefit, because they will retain their municipalities**” (Ibid.).

⁵⁶ Ibid., paragraph 688. These genocidal intentions against the Bosniaks were also repeated by Radovan Karadzic in the discussion with Momcilo Mandic (*Dani*, February 14, 2003, p. 43).

1991, at the Fifth Session of the Executive Board, which, among other things, discussed the **“information on regionalization”**. It was concluded that the **“earlier Commission”** should prepare **“the framework of regional organization [for the Party bodies], in order to have a more comprehensive view of their organization and manner of functioning of the authorities (Assembly, Government, and the like)”**. At this, the position was taken that **“the principle that a region should encompass and round up the ethnic and territorial heritage should be respected”** and it was pointed that the **goal is “to have a Serb Bosnia and Herzegovina...”**⁵⁷ Starting from these **“commitments”**, it was concluded that all the materials that had been drafted thus far **“(The Basic Material on Demographic and Economic Analysis of Regional Development, as well as its Annex)”** should be prepared for the next session of the Executive Board, and passed to the members of this board.⁵⁸

During the implementation of the national (ethnic Serb) unconstitutional regionalization, **“the unions of municipalities”** were transformed during September, October, and November of 1991, into **“Serb autonomous areas”** (SAO), that is, **“minute states”**.⁵⁹

On September 12, 1991, at the session of the **“Assembly of the Union of Municipalities of East and Old Herzegovina”** in Trebinje, the **“decision”** to declare the **“Serb autonomous area of Herzegovina”** was taken, consisting of the municipalities of Trebinje, Bileca, Gacko, Nevesinje, Kalinovik, Ljubinje, Rudo, and Cajnice. The **“decision”** states that the **“SAO Herzegovina”** is **“an inseparable part of the**

⁵⁷ The previous, not yet exceeded, trends sought to form the **“Serbian Krajina”** (by the merger of the Bosanska and Kninska Krajinas), and by joining the eastern parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Serbia and Montenegro.

⁵⁸ AIIZ, SDS Fund, inv. No. 240/1, Minutes from the Fifth Session of the Executive Board of the Serbian Democratic Party, held on November 7, 1991.

It is interesting to point out that at the session of the Political council of the SDS, dated October 15, 1991, Milivoje Tutnjjevic, among other things, stated that **“regions must be ready to perform the blockade of commodity and financial channels towards Sarajevo”** (AIIZ, SDS Fund, inv. No. 110, Notes from the Session of the Council of the Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina, held on October 15, 1991).

⁵⁹ L. Silber – A. Little, the aforementioned work, p. 241.

federal state of federative Yugoslavia and an integral part of the federal unit of Bosnia and Herzegovina”.⁶⁰

Using this model, Bosnia and Herzegovina (except for West Herzegovina) was almost completely “**SAO-ized**” over just a brief period of time. In addition to the “**political will**” of the leadership of the SDS of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the “**desire of the Serb people to live in a federative Yugoslavia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a federal part of Yugoslavia**”, there was also the “**scientific platform**” for the implementation of this project, under the authorship and mentorship of Belgrade.⁶¹

The “Autonomous Region of Bosanska Krajina” was transformed on September 16, 1991, into “**SAO Krajina**”, that is, the “Autonomous Region of Krajina”. In October, the “SAO Romanija” was proclaimed,

⁶⁰ *Javnost*, September 14, 1991, p. 3. The Serb people from the area of Foca, too, “**based on the expressed desire, had joined the SAO Herzegovina**” (AIIZ, inv. No. 3-1082/11, Serbian Democratic Party, Municipal Board of the SDS of Foca, no. 143/91, October 17, 1991, INVITATION; *Ibid.*, inv. No. 3-1082/12, Serbian Democratic Party, Municipal Board of the SDS of Foca, Board members from among the SDS and SPO members of the SO Foca, Interim Board of the part of Old Herzegovina, et al., no. 146/91, Foca, October 18, 1991, DECISION).

In September 1991, the Party of Democratic Action accused the SDS of violation of the coalition agreement, by proclaiming “Serb Autonomous Areas”. In relation to this, the SDA Communiqué states that the “creation of the Serb Autonomous Areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina had prevented the Republic Government from functioning, while at the same time it constituted an attack against the joint power in Bosnia and Herzegovina”.

Among other things, the SDA insisted that the Serbian leadership abandons the formation of “autonomous areas” and the “spontaneously” set barricades (L. Silber – A. Little, the aforementioned work, p. 241), but this had no effect at all.

⁶¹ K. Begic, the aforementioned work, p. 58; *Javnost*, September 21, 1991, p. 5. In September 1991, in a secret study for regionalization of Bosnia and Herzegovina titled “**DEMOGRAFSKO – EKONOMSKA ANALIZA REGIONALOG RAZVOJA, ALOKACIJE PRIRODNIH I DRUGIH RESURSA U REPUBLICI – I UTICAJ TIH FAKTORA NA REGIONALIZACIJU I POLOZAJ POJEDINI NARODA – POSEBNO SRPSKOG**”, fully beyond the program of the Government of SR BiH, the Republic Institute for Social Planning of Bosnia and Herzegovina drafted the “scientific” and “expert” platform for the ‘SAO-ization’ of Bosnia and Herzegovina (K. Begic, the aforementioned work, p. 58. note 3).

seated in Sarajevo. In early November 1991, the “SAO North Bosnia” and the “SAO Birac” were also formed.⁶²

In all the “SAO’s”, delegates for “assemblies” were appointed, “statutes” were adopted, “governments” were constituted, “work programs” passed, etc. Thus, the session of the “Assembly of the Serb Autonomous Area of Romanija”, held on October 22, 1991, at Sokolac, “accepted the decisions of the council of citizens from local communities and populated places from the territory of the municipalities of Rogatica, Olovo, Stari Grad, and Trnovo, for the accession to the SAO Romanija”, constituted the “government of the SAO Romanija”, and adopted an “interim statute”, defining this area as a “democratic and autonomous unit in the composition of the Serb Bosnia and Herzegovina and Federative Yugoslavia”. The session of the Assembly of “SAO Herzegovina”, on October 21, 1991, designated the ‘prime minister’ of the first “government”, who was in charge of proposing the “composition of his cabinet and to present the basic programs of the ‘government’, before the plebiscite of the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, scheduled for November 10.⁶³ It was then decided to form the radio-

⁶² *Javnost*, September 21, 1991, p. 5, September 28, 1991, p. 4; October 26, 1991, p. 2; November 9, 1991, p. 2, and January 25, 1991, p. 2; K. Begic, the aforementioned work, p. 59; L. Silber - A. Little, the aforementioned work, p. 241.

The “Autonomous Area of Birac”, formed by the “will of the Serb people”, consisted of the territories of the municipalities of Sekovici and Vlasenica, and parts of the municipalities of Bratunac, Zvornik, Srebrenica, Kalesija, Kladanj and Zivinice, and the “populated places, districts and areas which, in compliance with this decision, may join subsequently”. The “Autonomous Area of Birac” was proclaimed as a “democratic autonomous unit of sovereign citizens and peoples, and an inseparable part of the Federative Yugoslavia as a federal state, consisting of the republics of Serbia, Montenegro, and other federal units which express their free will to remain in this federal state”.

The constituting session was opened and chaired by Momcilo Vlacic, president of the SDS of Sekovici. This session adopted the “basic normative enactments”: the decision, the statute, and the rules of procedures of the “Autonomous Area of Birac”, and appointed the president, vice president, secretary and the delegate to the “government” (Milenko Stanic, M.A.) – *Javnost*, January 25, 1992, p. 2.

⁶³ *Javnost*, October 26, 1991, p. 2. The initial session of the “Government” of the “SAO Romanija” was held on December 23, 1991 at the hotel Bistrica, on Mt. Jahorina, and it “held up the positions of the Serb Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina for

television of Herzegovina. In order to realize this **“exceptionally significant project”**, it was concluded to request help from the RTV of Serbia. **“The Assembly [...] expressed public protest to the Command of the Armed Forces due to their hesitation in undertaking serious military operations at the frontline. The army is objected to for being slow in cleaning their ranks from paid traitors, fifth columnists, indecisive members and false peacekeepers. They appeal to the officer personnel to bear in mind the traditional meaning of the officer and military honour in our nation”**. The armed forces commands were warned, **“truces have taken away too many lives of our soldiers and citizens, and that peace can be discussed and negotiated for only once the enemy is completely and permanently defeated militarily”**.⁶⁴

These **“public protests”**, **“objections”**, and **“warnings” to the commands of the Armed Forces** at the session of the **“SAO Herzegovina”** on October 21, 1991, clearly suggest that this area and state, which it is a part of, is at war.

Initially, the **“Serb Autonomous Areas” “looked ridiculous.... Jokes about the SAO’s were circulating around; however, the ever increasing number of checkpoints with armed Serbs clearly suggested that the Serbs were themselves not joking at all”**.⁶⁵

the declaration of a Serb Bosnia”. At the same time, this **“government”** congratulated and supported **“proclamation of the Serb Republic of Krajina seated in Knin”**. The press release from that session expressed **“the belief that the recognition of an independent BiH is a death blow for its statehood – with immediate or delayed effect”** (*Javnost*, December 28, 1991, p. 2).

⁶⁴ Ibid., October 26, 1991, p. 2, and November 9, 1991, p. 2; K. Begic, the aforementioned work, p. 59; L. Silber – A. Little, the aforementioned work, p. 241. **“With an appropriate speech, a retrospective of the historical paths of significance of Herzegovina in the history and spirituality of the overall Serb nation, and the review of the current developments in the Serb Lands and regions”**, the **“Assembly”** was **“welcomed by the prominent Serb representative, Chairman of the Club of Serb delegates at the Assembly of BiH, Prof. Dr. Vojislav Maksimovic”** (*Javnost*, October 26, 1991, p. 2).

⁶⁵ L. Silber – A. Little, the aforementioned work, p. 241. In relation to this, Silber and Little wrote that the **“Idea about proclamation, for instance, of Romanija, a mountainous region of exceptional beauty east of Sarajevo, for a Serb autonomous area, or a micro-state, was absurd”** (Ibid.).

The possibility of the occurrence of such absurd events in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the simultaneous existence of the Presidency, Assembly and Government of the SR Bosnia and Herzegovina, was the consequence of a very dense occupation of the country, in particular the definitive completion of putsches at the SFRY level, but also of the unfortunate coalition of the ruling parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was an imminent result of multi-party elections. Thus, Yugoslavia practically ceased from existence. This was all also encouraged by the inactivity of the UN Security Council, together with the incompetent process and international community, and in particular the lateness of work of the Hague Conference on Yugoslavia.

Recruitment into the fifth columnist activity of the largest number of citizens of Serb ethnicity possible also required significant financial funds. The all-Serb Assemblies, large meetings, mass rallies and gatherings, seminars, meetings of boards and commissions, expert teams, headquarters, and trips, accommodation of foreign guests and intensive propaganda took away a lot of money, and a part of the costs also fell on the budget of the municipalities and thus on the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As early as in the fall of 1991, “the Serb autonomous areas” stopped paying taxes and other dues to the Republic. If one takes into account the total territory of these municipalities, it becomes clear what a strong shock this was for the financial survival of the Republic.

“The Assembly of the Serb People of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, an outcome of the doubtful results of voting at the Plebiscite of the Serb People, held on November 9, and 10, 1991, at its second session dated November 21, 1991, approved all the thus far brought decisions for the formation of collaborationist Serb authorities – “the decisions on proclamation of the Serb Autonomous Region and Autonomous Areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina”.⁶⁶

This “decision” approved the following “Serb Autonomous Regions and Areas”:

⁶⁶ AIIZ, inv. No. 3-491/5, Decision on Verification of the Proclaimed Serb Autonomous Areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina; *Javnost*, December 7, 1991, p. 10; S. Cekic, **AGRESIJA NA BOSNU I GENOCID NAD BOSNJACIMA 1991. – 1993.**, Sarajevo 1994, pp. 275-276.

1. *Autonomous Region of Krajina*;⁶⁷
2. *Serb Autonomous Area of Herzegovina*;⁶⁸
3. *Serb Autonomous Area of Romanija and Birac*;⁶⁹
4. *Serb Autonomous Area of Semberija*;⁷⁰
5. *Serb Autonomous Area of North Bosnia*.⁷¹

In late November 1991, the “Serb Autonomous Area of Semberija and Majevisa” was constituted, consisting, in addition to Bijeljina, Ugljevik and Lopare, as of November 26, also of **“the non-Serb populated places gravitating to this autonomous area, belonging to the municipalities of Brcko, Tuzla, Kalesija, Zvornik, and Srebrenik”**. The president of the “Government” of “SAO Semberija and Majevisa” was also elected then (Djordje Arsenovic, an engineer). The **“proposed Decision for the Suspension of Payment of Taxes and a Portion of other Dues to the Republic”** was adopted.⁷²

⁶⁷ Ibid. *The Autonomous Region of Krajina* consisted of the following municipalities: “Banja Luka, Bosanski Petrovac, Celinac, Glamoc, Kljuc, Kotor Varos, Kupres, Laktasi, Mrkonjic Grad, Prijedor, Prnjavor, Sanski Most, Skender Vakuf, Srbac, Sipovo, Titov Drvar, and the Serb Municipality of Bosanska Krupa, as well as of parts of the municipalities from this region with a Serb majority, seated in Banja Luka” (Ibid.).

⁶⁸ Ibid. “SAO Herzegovina” consisted of the following municipalities: **“Bileca, Cajnice, Gacko, Kalinovic, Ljubinje, Nevesinje, Rudo, Trebinje and Foca, as well as of the municipalities from this region with a Serb majority, seated in Trebinje”** (Ibid.).

⁶⁹ Ibid. “SAO Romanija and Birac” consisted of the following municipalities: **“Han Pijesak, Pale, Sokolac, Vlasenica, Olovo, and Sekovici, as well as of the municipalities from this region with a Serb majority, seated in Sarajevo”** (Ibid.).

⁷⁰ Ibid. “SAO Semberija” consisted of the following municipalities: **“Bijeljina, Lopare, and Ugljevik, as well as of the municipalities from this region with a Serb majority, seated in Ugljevik”** (Ibid.).

⁷¹ Ibid. “SAO North Bosnia”, seated in Doboj, consisted of **“parts of the municipalities from this region with a Serb population majority, as follows: Teslic, Doboj, Tesanj, Derventa, Bosanski Brod, Odzak, Bosanski Samac, Modrica, Gradacac, Gracanica, Lukavac, Srebrenik, Zivinice, Banovici, Zavidovici, Maglaj, and Orasje”** (Ibid.).

⁷² *Javnost*, December 14, 1991, p. 2.

On January 8, 1991, in Sekovici, “the Autonomous Region of Birac” was formed, “as an integral part of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, thereby also of Yugoslavia”. “In honouring the will of the people expressed in a democratic way”, it was composed of the municipalities of Sekovici and Vlasenica, with their whole territories, and parts of the municipalities of Kalesija, Zivinice, Kladanj, Zvornik, Olovo, Bratunac, and Srebrenica. Milorad Vukajlovic was elected the President of the “region”, and Milenko Stanic, M.A., was designated future “chairman of government”.⁷³

As early as in January 1992, the “**Serb autonomous areas**” encompassed 62.94% (or, 32,222 sq. km) of the state territory,⁷⁴ and on March 13, 1992, the Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina submitted even an “**official offer**” for the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina (61.06% to 38.4%, or 32,260 sq.km to 18,862 sq.km).⁷⁵

The formation of the “Serb autonomous areas” practically meant the end of the territorial rounding up of the key territorial pretensions about Serbian territories. The statutory and legal independence of the “Serb areas and countries”, that is, the proclamation of the “SAO’s”, was a blatant violation of the constitutional and legal system of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the complete destruction of the system of division of competencies. The self-proclaimed “Serb areas” took over the competencies that were in the exclusive jurisdiction of the Republic, even of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (such as defence, mobilization, tax system, etc.), and seized those which, by the Constitution, were in the jurisdiction of municipalities.⁷⁶

The bodies of authority of the Serb para-state creations in 1991 **did not recognize the legal government of the Socialist Republic of**

⁷³ Ibid., January 18, 1992, p. 2.

⁷⁴ K. Begic, the aforementioned work, pp. 68-69. The “Croat communities” encompassed at the time 20.88% (or, 10,689 sq. km) of the state territory. The areas that were not encompassed by the “SAO-ization” and “HAO-ization” covered 3.52% (or, 1,818 sq. km) of the state territory.

⁷⁵ Ibid., map 3 (between pp. 100-101).

⁷⁶ K. Begic, the aforementioned work, p. 59.

Bosnia and Herzegovina in Sarajevo. They even turned to the military and political leaderships of Serbia for direct assistance, in particular for provision of materials and technical supplies, including helicopters. The legal bodies of authority of Bosnia and Herzegovina could not undertake any state-level measures even in the rest part of the Republic without the approval of the occupation commander of the Second Military District of the JNA.⁷⁷

On October 14, the Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina destroyed **“the fragile consensus which was passably maintaining the functioning of the divided Parliament. During the tumultuous session, which lasted all night, delegates of the Serb Democratic Party sneered at the proposal of the Party of Democratic Action and the Croat Democratic Union about the sovereignty of the Republic, and the position of Bosnia in Yugoslavia”**.⁷⁸ Namely, in the night between October 14 and 15, 1991, at the session of the Assembly of the SR Bosnia and Herzegovina on the issue of the future of the Republic, Radovan Karadzic **“pronounced a death verdict against the Muslim nation”**, by publicly threatening that the Muslims may disappear: **“...This is the way that you want to bring Bosnia and Herzegovina onto the same highway to hell and suffering taken by Slovenia and Croatia. Do not think that you will not take Bosnia and Herzegovina to hell, and maybe cause the Muslim nation to perish, because the Muslim people can not defend themselves if there is a war here...”**⁷⁹

Radovan Karadzic later clarified the aforementioned statement, by claiming, **“the Muslims are those who are the most endangered ones. They are the most endangered ones not just in the physical**

⁷⁷ S. Cekic, the aforementioned work, pp. 28-31; Same author, **AGRESIJA NA BOSNU I GENOCID NAD BOSNJACIMA 1991.-1995.**, in: RATOVI U JUGOSLAVIJI 1991.-1999., The Compilation of Communiqués and Discussions from the Round Table, Belgrade November 7-9, 2001, Belgrade 2002, pp. 312-312.

⁷⁸ L. Silber – A. Little, the aforementioned work, p. 241.

⁷⁹ S. Cekic, **AGRESIJA NA BOSNU I GENOCID NAD BOSNJACIMA 1991-1993**, Sarajevo 1994, p. 269; . Silber – A. Little, the aforementioned work, pp. 241-242; N. Cigar, **GENOCID U BOSNI – POLITIKA “ETNICKOG CISCENJA”**, Sarajevo 1998, pp. 47-48.

sense, and I did not mean that they could perish only physically; this is also the beginning of the end of their existence as a nation”.⁸⁰

Stating that the **“past policy of the party was designed for conditions of peace”**, at the session of the Council of the Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina on October 15, 1991, Velibor Ostojic proposed the obstruction of the work of the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a future tool, with a media war and the formation of parallel bodies of authority (both at the level of the Republic), which would, primarily, be reflected in the formation of the so-called Serb parliament.⁸¹

In spite of the unfavourable course of events on the frontline in Croatia and at the Hague Conference, the Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina was speedily increasing the tensions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Expecting the outcome of The Hague Conference, the authorities of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina did not react seriously. On October 18, 1991, “based on statutory powers”, Radovan Karadzic ordered **“the introduction of a state of emergency”** in the Serb Democratic Party. The state of emergency was mandatory for all of its bodies, members and officials in power. All the municipal boards were obligated to convene every day and organize duty rosters around 24 hours.⁸²

The delegates of the Club of the Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Serb Revival Movement (**“Serb delegates, as legally elected and politically legitimate representatives of the undeniable sovereignty of the Serb nation in Bosnia and Herzegovina”**)

⁸⁰ N. Cigar, the aforementioned work, pp. 47-48.

⁸¹ AIIZ, inv. No. 3-110, Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Council of the Party, October 15, 1991, NOTES.

⁸² Ibid., inv. No. 3-1051/3, Telegram of the Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina, October 18, 1991; Ibid., inv. No. 3-1051/8, SDS of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Municipal Board of SDS of Novi Travnik, October 19, 1992 – to the Main Board of the SDS of Bosnia and Herzegovina; **ICTY**, Case: no. IT-02-54-T, paragraph 200, note 402.

On October 19, 1991, the SDS Novi Travnik Municipal Board informed the Main Board of the SDS of BiH that, in proceeding in accordance with the aforementioned telegram of Radovan Karadzic, they “introduced the state of emergency”, at which they organized a “non-stop, 24-hour” duty roster (AIIZ, SDS Fund, inv. No. 3-1051/8).

on October 18, 1991, took the decision for the “Plebiscite of the Serb People”. This decision established the date for the “plebiscite” (November 10, 1991), **“at which the Serb people shall declare about remaining in a joint state with Serbia, Montenegro, SAO Krajina, SAO Slavonija, Baranja and West Srem, and others who declare in favour of such remaining”**, and a Commission was appointed.⁸³

The structure of the future “joint state” already by itself clearly indicates upon the intentions of the Greater Serbia movement and the state leadership of Serbia, and their collaborationists, to first destroy the existing joint state (SFRY), so they could form the projected Serb federal units (among others, SAO Krajina, SAO Slavonia, Baranja and West Srem, and of course, the “Serb Bosnia and Herzegovina”).

The **Telegram** of the Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina sent to Slobodan Milosevic on October 20, 1991, expressed gratitude to the leader of the Greater Serbia movement for **“the preservation of the Serb nation as a whole”**, with the belief, that owing to him and all the political forces in Serbia, they would realize their goals, i.e. **Serb political and state unity**.⁸⁴

⁸³ Ibid., Inv. No. 3-353/17, Decision for the Plebiscite of the Serbian Nation, Sarajevo, October 18, 1991. This decision, which came into effect **“on the date of its adoption”**, appointed a Commission for the Plebiscite in the following composition: Petko Cancar (president), Rajko Kasagic (member), Goran Zekic (member), Milos Savic (deputy), Ljubo Bosiljic (deputy), Vidoje Ijacic (deputy), and Stojan Dragovic (secretary).

⁸⁴ Ibid., inv. No. 3-921, Telegram of the Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina – to Slobodan Milosevic, October 20, 1991. This telegram, among other things, states: **“At this historical moment, when the Serb nation is exposed again to blackmailing and ultimatums, I hereby express to you, on behalf of the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, gratitude for the preservation of the Serb nation as a whole.**

We have received blackmail and ultimatums in some more difficult situations in the past also, and we coped with them and came out as winners. This time, the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Serbs in former Croatia, have decided to defend their survival and to contribute to the final realization of the Serb political and state unity.

Your stance, as well as the stance of all the political forces in Serbia, ascertain us that we shall realize our goal, which is based on the constitution, law, and justice” (Ibid.).

Four days later (October 24) in the discussion with Milosevic, Karadzic stated that the Serb collaborationists, headed by him, had prepared everything in order to conquer the territories on which they “**shall constitute full power**”. These activities were in compliance with their criminal intentions (“**fight for the lebensraum**”), which had been their goal in the first place.⁸⁵

In planning and preparation of the crime in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the leadership of the fifth columnist Serb Democratic Party also participated through the drafting, adoption and signing of numerous documents (decisions, declarations, instructions, rules of procedures, recommendations, etc.). In this way, simultaneously with the “**SAO-ization**”, constitution of the occupatory and collaborationist bodies at the level of the State was going on, primarily of the “**Serb parliament**” – “**the Assembly of the Serb people**”. Namely, the delegates of the Club of the Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Serb Revival Movement at the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at the constituent session on October 24, 1991, enacted the “**Decision on Constitution of the Assembly of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina**” as “**the highest representative and legislative body of the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina**”.⁸⁶

⁸⁵ ICTY, Case: no. IT-02-54-T, paragraphs 48, and 57-58. Karadzic stated then that **there is no way for them** (i.e., according to him, the Serbs) **in Bosnia and Herzegovina to live with the Bosniaks**, that they will “**constitute full power over the Serb territories in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that none of his (Izetbegovic’s) lawyers will not even dare peek in there**”, and that Izetbegovic “**will not be able to exert his power. He shall not have control over 65% of his territory!**” (Ibid.).

⁸⁶ *Javnost*, October 26, 1991, p. 1; S. Cekic, the aforementioned work, pp. 270-272. At the end of the first session, the “Assembly of the Serb People“ was welcomed by “reputable guests“. Stanko Cvijan, minister in the Government of Serbia in charge of relations with the Serbs outside Serbia, greeted the “delegates on behalf of the leadership of the Republic of Serbia and on his own behalf“, indicating “the revival of the Serb people even outside the Republic of Serbia”, and upon the “advantage“ of the Serb people (“that we are the most numerous nation in Yugoslavia and that we have facts on our side”). Dr. Dragan Kalinic, the so-called independent national delegate, starting from the assessment that “this is the moment when history is being created and when it is impossible to be apart from one’s nation and the destiny awaiting it”, joined as a member of the “Assembly of the Serb People“.

The “Decision”, among other things, states that the “Serb representatives” will continue working in panels and working bodies of the Assembly of SR Bosnia and Herzegovina into which they have been elected, except in cases when it is determined that the enactments of the assembly panels reviewed and adopted risk the equality and ethnic interests of the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Momcilo Krajisnik was elected the president of the “Assembly”, “who will thus continue performing the office of the top man of the Serb Parliament”, Milovan Milanovic and Branko Simic were elected vice presidents, and Milos Savic was elected the secretary.⁸⁷

At the aforementioned session, allegedly “**exercising the will of their people**”, and in fact acting upon order or in agreement with the “**Serb coordination**”, under the presidency of Momcilo Krajisnik, the

The formation of the *Assembly of the Serb People* for Dr. Nikola Koljevic was a “**historical day**”, and a “**historical moment**”, because those who had “**worked on that**” know “**how many hands and heads both the work and the thoughts were to be obtained from**” so we “**can live to attend this historical moment...**”.

Presenting the false thesis according to which “those standing behind the break-up of Yugoslavia are the Greater Germany expansionism and the local fascism”, Radovan Karadzic, among other things, pointed out that the Serbs know what their goal is – “we want to preserve the state that will allow us to achieve the political and state unity of the Serb nation...”.

“The Serb Assembly” also received the support of the Serb Orthodox Church. Archpriest Lazar Vasiljevic, on behalf of the Metropolitan of Dabar Bosnia, Vladislav, and on behalf of “**all the clergy of the Mitropolitanate of Dabar Bosnia, and on his own behalf**”, “**warmly**” greeted the “**delegates**” and conveyed to them the message that “**even in these hard and crucial days for the Serb people, the Serb Orthodox Church is with you and supporting you**”.

Pointing out that the fault for the “**strategy of dissolution of Yugoslavia**”, “**the Hague Conference being its final part**”, lies with the “**enemies of the Serb people**”, Dr. Dragan Djokanovic, president of the Party of Federalists, advocated for the “**preservation of the homeland**”, and stated that the Assembly of the Serb People needs to ensure the ethnic sovereignty of the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina now and for good”.

The illegal constitution of the Serb “**national assembly**” in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the assessment of the “Association of Serbs from Bosnia and Herzegovina in Serbia”, was a “**legitimate response to the historical challenge**” (*Javnost*, October 26, 1991, p. 4).

⁸⁷ Ibid.

Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina at the time adopted the following, “first significant conclusions”:

“The Decision on the remaining of the Serb people of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the joint state of Yugoslavia”, which denies the right of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to independence and sets the borders of the future Serb state, indicating the goals of the Serb people, i.e. the formation of “Greater Serbia”. Among other things, the “Decision” reflects the “will” of the Serbs of Bosnia-Herzegovina “that they further intend to live in the joint state of Yugoslavia, with Serbia, Montenegro, SAO Krajina, SAO Slavonia, Baranja and West Srem, and with others who declare in favour of such remaining”.⁸⁸ It was concluded that this “decision” shall come into effect after the completed plebiscite of the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to be held on November 9 and 10 [of 1991]”.⁸⁹

“The Decision on Authorizing the Representation and Protection of Interests of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, which “regulates authorizations for the representation and protection of the Serb nation in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the bodies of the Federation, relations with other states and international organizations and institutions”,⁹⁰ and “denies the right of representation of the Serb nation” for all the previous

⁸⁸ AIIZ, inv. No. 3-453, Decision on Remaining of the Serb People of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Joint State of Yugoslavia, *Javnost*, October 26, 1991, p. 4.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ **The Decision on Authorizing the Representation and Protection of Interests of the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina**; October 26, 1991, p. 4; *Sluzbeni glasnik srpskog naroda u Bosni i Hercegovini*, no. 1, Sarajevo, January 15, 1992.

The following leaders of the SDS of Bosnia and Herzegovina were authorized for “representation and protection of interests of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina”:

1. Dr. Nikola Koljevic, for participation in the work of the Hague Peace Conference on Yugoslavia;
2. Dr. Biljana Plavsic, for contacts with representatives of other states, international organizations, and institutions;
3. Dr. Milutin Najdanovic, for the Assembly of the SFRY;
4. Dr. Radovan Karadzic, for the Presidency of the SFRY;
5. Dr. Miodrag Simovic, for the Federal Executive Council.

holders of the offices in the Republic and Federation. Thus, this “decision” too confirmed the Serb goals in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This “decision” was aimed at preventing the decision-making process in the legal bodies of Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁹¹

“The Decision Announcing and Ruling the Implementation of the Plebiscite of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina”. This “decision” points out the objectives of the proclamation of “the plebiscite of the Serb people on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina” (“in order to confirm the Decision of the Assembly of the Serb People of Bosnia and Herzegovina about its remaining in the joint state of Yugoslavia, with Serbia, Montenegro, SAO Krajina, SAO Slavonia, Baranja, and West Srem, and with others who declare in favour of such remaining”), determines the questions upon which the Serb people will declare, with the time and method of organization, and the publication of the results of the plebiscite.⁹²

“The Decision on Appointment of the Chief Commission for Administration of the Plebiscite of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina”. The Commission was in charge of submitting the report on the determination of the results of the voting to the “Assembly of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina”.⁹³

“The Decision on the Status of Officials, Managing Employees and Other Employees in the Institutions of the Republic”. Although they had formed an illegal “Assembly” and started work in its “bodies”, the officials, the managing employees and other employees of the Serb

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² AIIZ, inv. No. 3-490/13, The Decision for Announcing and Administration of the Plebiscite of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina; *Javnost*, October 26, 1991, p. 4.

⁹³ AIIZ, inv. No. 3-490/14, Assembly of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo, October 24, 1991, The Decision on Appointment of the Chief Commission for Administration of the Plebiscite of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina; *Javnost*, October 26, 1991, p. 4.

The Commission had 7 members: president (Petko Cancar), and his deputy (Milos Savic), two members (Rajko Kasagic and Goran Zekic), with deputies (Ljubo Bosiljcic, and Vidoje Ijadic), and a secretary (Stojan Dragovic).

ethnicity in the republic's institutions, according to this "decision", continued "performing the tasks and duties for which they have been elected, appointed, assigned or allocated", exercising their "rights, obligations and responsibilities arising from the employment in the organ or agency in which they perform their office, that is, the tasks and duties, in compliance with the law, other regulations and general enactments".⁹⁴

The documents adopted by the "Assembly of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina" prove the facts confirming the existence of the intentions to destroy and devastate the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which at the same time suggested the political and other preparations of the Serb collaborationists from Bosnia and Herzegovina for all other forms of crime, including genocide. Thus, the "**Declaration of the Assembly of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina**", adopted on October 24, 1991, signed by Momcilo Krajsnik, President of the aforementioned "Assembly", starts from a false assessment stating that "**the rights and relevant interests of the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina have been violated**", and that "**the conspiracy to reduce the Serb nation from a constitutive nation in Bosnia and Herzegovina down to an ethnic minority has been going on for a long time**".⁹⁵

The "**Declaration**", among other things, states that "**the legitimate representatives of the Serb people in the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with full consent of the other representatives of the Serb people in the autonomous areas, in other assemblies and political forums, have formed the Assembly of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina**", which is "**the supreme representative of the people, its legitimate representative in the country and beyond, so it is only its representatives and agents that can represent the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, both in the country and abroad**".

The "**Declaration**" also expresses the "will" of the Serb people to have all the Serbs living in a single state: "**The Assembly of the**

⁹⁴ *Javnost*, October 26, 1991, p. 4., The Decision on the Status of Officials, Managing Employees and Other Employees at the Republic State Bodies.

⁹⁵ *Javnost*, October 26, 1991, p. 1. Declaration of the Assembly of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina solemnly declares that the Serb people have their historical rights and actual interests in living in a single federal state with the other parts of the Serb nation and other nations who so wish”, and that “no one may deny these rights and interests from the Serb people”.

“The Serb parliament in Bosnia and Herzegovina” invited, as the “Declaration” states later, **“all the national assemblies in the other parts of the Serb nation, as well as the assemblies of other nations who wish to live in the joint federal state, to support the rights and interests of the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this way, they will provide a dignified response to those who are making efforts to deny the legitimate interests of the Serb people and other peoples who wish to develop a joint and modern federal state”.**

At the end of this “document”, they state that **“the representatives of the Serb people from this historical first session of the Assembly of the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, are convinced that the Serb nation shall respond in any situation with all forces at their disposition, against any challenge, and that they will show their full creative potentials”.**⁹⁶

By the method of its constitution and factually, the “Assembly of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina” constituted the highest

⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 4. At its first session, the Assembly of the Serb People sent **“brotherly greetings and appeals for unity and solidarity to their Montenegrin brothers“**, reminding them of the movement for **“liberation of all Serbs“**. They once again present the fails thesis about the ‘Greater Germany appetites’ for execution of the **“final coup in Yugoslavia”**, in order to conquer **“the Montenegrin coast and expulsion of the Orthodox Slavs away from the Mediterranean, the push Montenegro into the shallow waters of history and for the Montenegrin clergy to perish”**.

Starting from the assessment that **“local destructive forces are making pressure on the political and spiritual unity of our nation”**, it states that **“we must not separate and divide ourselves, because we would be lame and blinded. The nation needs both eyes, it needs the name and surname, so that it does not get lost among such large number of other nations...”**.

Stating that **“there are no Montenegrins without Serbs and vice versa, no Serbs without Montenegrins”**, it indicates upon the fact that we should not yield in front of **“those weaker than us”**, because **“if we yield now, we should never have been born at all!”**. The appeal ends with the statement: **“Our Montenegrin Brothers, we shall win!”** (Ibid.).

collaborationist body of power. Its constitution was assessed as an **illegitimate action** by the Legislative Committee of the Assembly of SR Bosnia and Herzegovina, because “pursuant to the Constitution of SR Bosnia and Herzegovina, the election laws and the Rules of Procedures of the Assembly, the delegates in the Assembly of SR Bosnia and Herzegovina are not the legitimate representatives of peoples, but the representatives of citizens, i.e. of the voters of the constituency from which the citizens, not nations, had elected them, so thus they do not have the mandate to represent only one of the nations from that constituency...”. It was also assessed that the statement that Amendment 60 of the Constitution of the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina is in breach of the Constitution of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, placed by Momcilo Krajisnik in his introductory speech as one of the reasons for formation of the “Assembly of the Serb People”, was arbitrary, because “it is grounded, with the proper application of Article 3 of the Constitution of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia”.⁹⁷

Right after they had held the constituent session of the Assembly of the Serb People, on October 26, 1991, in Banja Luka, at the main square in town, there was a mass rally, giving support to the decision of this “parliament” to administer a plebiscite for “remaining in Yugoslavia”. The motto of this rally was: “**For Yugoslavia, whatever its size, whatever its name, but with all Serbs living in it!**”. Among the numerous paroles, the dominating one was “**Serbs in one State!**”. The essence of the rally was reduced to the following message by Radovan Karadzic: “**We know our goals very well: our freedom, in our state**”.⁹⁸

⁹⁷ K. Begic, the aforementioned work, p. 61.

⁹⁸ *Javnost*, November 9, 1991, p. 2.

At the rally, in addition to Karadzic, the political leader of the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the following persons spoke: Predrag Radic, mayor of Banja Luka; Radoslav Vukic, president of the Regional Board of the Serb Democratic Party of the *Autonomous Region of Bosanska Krajina*; Vojo Kupresanin, president of the Assembly of the *Autonomous Region of Bosanska Krajina*, Bozidar Vucurovic, president of the Assembly of *SAO Herzegovina*; Velibor Ostojic, Minister of Information of the Government of BiH; Radoslav Brdjanin, Vice president of the Assembly of the *Autonomous Region of Bosanska Krajina*; Dragan Djokanovic, president of the Party of Federalists; Nenad Stevandic, head of the *Sokol* Krajina area; and Dr. Nikola Koljevic, member of the Presidency of BiH (Ibid.).

The Chief Commission for the Plebiscite of the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, **“in order to properly administer the plebiscite for declaration of the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina about remaining in the joint state with Serbia, Montenegro, SAO Krajina, SAO Slavonija, Baranja and West Srem, and with others who so declare, and in order to determine the results of the plebiscite, to be held on November 9, and 10, 1991,”** on October 28, 1991, enacted a **Instruction for administration of the plebiscite of the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to be held on November 9 and 10, 1991.** This document determined the bodies for the administration of the plebiscite (Chief Commission, Municipal Commissions, and the individual Voting Commissions), their duties and tasks, the manner of appointment of municipal commissions, the composition of the voters’ board, then declaration of citizens (time, method of voting), determination of the results of voting, etc.⁹⁹

The leadership of the Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina had built the state administration apparatus, instructing their personnel to be taking over the control over the **“Serb”** territories. On **October 26, 1991**, Karadzic ordered all the Serb Mayors to **seize power “IN PUBLIC ENTERPRISES, POST OFFICE, PUBLIC ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BANKS, JUDICIARY, AND PUBLIC MEDIA AS A MANDATORY MATTER”** [capitals in the original; note by the author]. He sought the municipal leaders to seize power **“completely and energetically”**, which meant the announcement of an aggressive war.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁹ AIIZ, inv. No. 3-353/3, Commission for Administration of the Plebiscite of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina, INSTRUCTION for administration of the plebiscite of the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to be held on November 9 and 10, 1991.

The Chief Commission for Administration of the Plebiscite of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina also drafted the Amendment of the Instruction for Administration of the Plebiscite, pertaining to **“the participants of the plebiscite living outside Bosnia and Herzegovina”**. This document determined the place of voting of the members of the **“Serb people residing outside the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina”** (“...there where they are found”), the method of voting, formation of the commissions, appointment of voters’ boards, and determining and disclosing of the results of the plebiscite (Ibid., Amendment of the Instruction for Administration of the Plebiscite).

¹⁰⁰ AIIZ, SDS Fund, inv. No. 3-1171, ORDER OF THE SERB DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, October 26, 1991; ICTY, Case: No. IT-

Right after the first session of the “Serb parliament”, the SDS collaborationists took the measures to implement the adopted “decisions”, that is, “they switched to concrete action”. To this goal, in addition to certain activities, they organized (illegally and illegitimately) the “plebiscite of the Serb people”.¹⁰¹

02-54-T, paragraph 50. The aforementioned order was disclosed at the meeting of all the municipal presidents on October 26, 1991 (at 3 PM), in Banja Luka, under the leadership of Radovan Karadzic, and it was fully accepted at the session “of the Presidency of the Autonomous Region of Krajina” and “the Government of the Autonomous Region of Krajina”, in Celinac, on October 29 of the same year, under the leadership of Radoslav Brdjanin, vice president of the “Assembly of the Autonomous Region” (AIIZ, SDS Fund, inv. No. 3-1171).

Radovan Karadzic demanded from the municipal presidents to be “**prepared to constitute power on your respective territories; in municipalities, regions, local communities... Both during the plebiscite and after the plebiscite, it is important that you reach the power wherever possible... If you take a look at the map, we have a huge territory in BiH, a huge territory**” (ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraph 50).

According to this order, **on radio stations**, among other things, after seizing of power in the public media, they were supposed to “**DECLARE THE WAR SCHEME OF BROADCASTING**” and send “**THE REQUEST TO THE RADIO BANJA LUKA TO IMMEDIATELY BROADCAST AN HOUR OF PROGRAM ABOUT THE WAR DEVELOPMENTS FROM CROATIA**” [capitals in the original; note by the author]. Also, “**IN EACH MUNICIPALITY, CONVENE ALL DIRECTORS AND AGREE ABOUT THE METHOD OF SUPPLYING THE POPULATION WITH ITEMS RANGING FROM ELECTRICAL POWER TO THE GENERAL CONSUMPTION GOODS.**”

8. PLACE A MORATORIUM ON ISSUING OF CONSTRUCTION PERMITS, SALE OF LAND, APPOINTMENT OF DIRECTORS, THERE WHERE THE ABSENCE OF RESERVISTS IS BEING ABUSED, AND ALSO SUSPEND THE CHANGE OF OWNERSHIP OVER ENTERPRISES, ETC.

9. IT IS STRICTLY FORBIDDEN TO EMPLOY PERSONS FROM WAR AREAS, WHO ARE ABLE TO GO TO WAR, AND IF THERE ARE SUCH EMPLOYEES ALREADY, IMMEDIATELY DISMISS THEM AND RETURN THEM TO THE FRONTLINE[...]

11. MAKE A LIST OF SURPLUS COMMODITIES, AS WELL AS SCARCE ONES, AND INFORM TO THIS EFFECT THE SDS SARAJEVO – MR. ILIC” [capitals in the original; note by the author] – AIIZ, SDS Fund, inv. No. 400-0.

¹⁰¹ The constitutional-legal system of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the then Constitution of the SFRY, according to the assessment of Prof. Kasim Begic, never recognized the notion of plebiscite, and in particular the plebiscite of a nation or any other type of ethnic declaration, or “expressing of will” of the members of a single nation in

In accordance with Milosevic's instructions and positions of the Serb National Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina dated August 10 and November 8, 1990,¹⁰² and the decision of the Club of Delegates of the Serb Democratic Party and the Serb Revival Movement, dated

this manner. In relation to this, he states that, pursuant to the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, citizens are the holders of power which they exercise through their representatives in the assemblies of the socio-political communities, by referendums, at official meetings, and other forms of personal declaration (K. Begic, the aforementioned work, p. 62).

In early November of 1991, as written by Kasim Begic, **“it was reported that in Prijedor the return of the reservists was accompanied with shootouts at civilians; the ‘reservists’ are beating, drinking and slapping around people in Gacko; the paralysis of the system of power in Mostar; Ravno and the surrounding villages had been burned down; the bridges on Sava mined; ‘non-Serb buildings’ had exploded in Nevesinje; in Banja Luka, a ‘general mobilization’ was declared; Donji Vakuf was divided into the two banks of Vrbas; for the first time the ‘reservists’ were shooting around Sarajevo; the extraordinary session of the Municipal Assembly of Ilijas postponed separation from Sarajevo; the Muslims leaving Trebinje; the National Front of Yugoslavia for BiH elected the leadership at the session of the Presidency of the Council; exchange of detainees organized by the Ministry of Interior of BiH in Bosanski Samac; preparations for the ‘plebiscite of the Serb people’...”**, all of this was happening in Bosnia and Herzegovina (K. Begic, the aforementioned work, p. 29, note 4).

¹⁰² B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 178; *Javnost*, November 10, 1990, p. 12, and November 17, 1990, p. 2.

The leadership of the Greater Serbia movement, in compliance with the Greater Serbia project for formation of the single Serbian state, in 1990 also advocated for the option (although illegal) for holding of the referendum for the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. On June 27, 1990, Borisav Jovic and Veljko Kadijevic, and Jovic and Slobodan Milosevic on the next day, developing the action for **“expulsion”** of Slovenia and Croatia out of Yugoslavia, also considered the issue of the referendum for the Serbs in Croatia. According to Milosevic, first the **“cutting off”** of Croatia was to be done, so that the municipalities that have formed the union of Serb municipalities **“remain on our side, but the people later go to a referendum there and declare whether they want to remain or leave”** (B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 160-161).

On August 10, 1990, during the vacation at Mljet with Slobodan Milosevic, General Veljko Kadijevic and Radmilo Bogdanovic, in relation to the project **“that Serbia and Montenegro create one state”**, Borisav Jovic indicated the fact **that the citizens from border areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina and from “Serbian Krajinas” would declare “as to where they wish to live”**. Milosevic thought that the referendum would **“resolve the problem of the Serbs from Bosnia along the Drina river”** (Ibid., p. 176).

October 18, 1991, about “the administration of the plebiscite of the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, approved also by the “Assembly of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina” at its first session on October 24,¹⁰³ the “Plebiscite” was held on November 9 and 10, 1991, with blue voting sheets for the “citizens of Serb ethnicity” and yellow for the other nations and ethnicities. However, this did not only involve the difference in the colour of sheets, but also in the question, that is, the combination of the elements of “ethnic and constitutional” nature. For the first group of potential voters “the will of the people” was tested on “whether you agree with the decision of the Assembly of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina dated October 24, 1991, **that the Serb nation remains in the joint state of Yugoslavia with Serbia, Montenegro, SAO Krajina, SAO Slavonia, Baranja and West Srem, and with others who declare to stay**”. For the other group of the voters, the question was “do you declare that Bosnia and Herzegovina as an equal republic should remain...” (!).¹⁰⁴

Over one million and a half of voting sheets were printed for the citizens of Serb ethnicity (in blue), on which, next to the question, there were two alternative answers (YES or NO), of which one was to be chosen. There was a separate lot of some 500,000 yellow voting sheets for “those members of other ethnicities who also express the wish to come out to the plebiscite”, whereas their voting was recorded separately and was not included into the final results at the “Serb plebiscite”.¹⁰⁵

The Chief Commission for Administration of Plebiscite of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina, at the session held on November 11, 1991, in Sarajevo, reviewed the reports of the municipal commissions for administration of the plebiscite, and the results of the completed plebiscite of the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, held on November 9 and 10, 1991, on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and found as follows:

¹⁰³ *Javnost*, November 9, 1991, p. 6.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 1; K. Begic, the aforementioned work, pp. 61-62. This combination of question was accompanied with strong media and propaganda support. For this, see: K. Begic, the aforementioned work, p. 62, note 6.

¹⁰⁵ *Javnost*, November 9, 1991, pp. 1-2.

“that on the territory of BiH, a total of 1,064,157 citizens of Serb ethnicity were entered into voting lists;

that based on personal ID cards, 251,394 citizens of Serb ethnicity voted, who were not entered into voting lists;

that a total of 1,162,032 citizens of Serb ethnicity voted on the territory of BiH, as follows:

1,161,146 voted YES, 398 voted NO, and 488 were INVALID VOTES.

That on the territory of BiH, a total of 49,342 non-Serb citizens voted, as follows:

48,895 voted YES, 397 voted NO, and 50 were INVALID VOTES.”¹⁰⁶

At the “plebiscite”, of the 1,064,157 registered Serb voters in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1,161,146 Serbs and 48,895 others “voted”, meaning a “victory” of 105%. More than 50% of the entered Serb citizens declared for “remaining in the joint state of Yugoslavia, together with the Republic of Serbia, Republic of Montenegro, SAO Krajina, SAO Slavonia, Baranja and West ‘Srem’, that is, with ‘Greater Serbia’”.¹⁰⁷

The figure of 251,394 Serb citizens who were not entered into the voting lists is very problematic and suggests manipulation with the “plebiscite” as a whole. It is impossible that one fourth of the Serbs were not entered. This means that in such cases there were double votes cast, or even multiple ones, and that the results were tailored. An even

¹⁰⁶ AIIZ, inv. No. 3-356/3, RECORD of the Chief Commission for Administration of the Plebiscite of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina, November 11, 1991; Ibid., inv. No. 3-356/6, REPORT on the results of the plebiscite of the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, conducted on November 9 and 10, 1991, no. 30-05/91, Sarajevo, November 11, 1991; *Javnost*, November 16, 1991, pp. 1, and 4, and December 7, 1991, p. 10.

The record of the Chief Commission for Administration of the Plebiscite of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Report on the results of the Plebiscite of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina was signed in person by: Petko Cancar (president), Milos Savic and Vidoje Ijacic (members), and Stojan Dragovic (secretary).

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

bigger problem is about the number of those who voted against or who were invalid. The figure of the voters who had not come out to vote, although they had been entered onto the lists, was never published. **Their number was by no means insignificant.**

“The Plebiscite of the Serb People” meant a blatant violation of the constitutional and legal system of Bosnia and Herzegovina, both by the decision brought, and by the potential “constituency” and the format. Given that the “decision” for announcing of the “Serb plebiscite” was not brought by the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that this was not a republic-level referendum, at the session of November 5, 1991, the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina concluded that “the decision announcing the plebiscite does not obligated the state republic bodies, nor the municipal bodies, to directly work on administration of the plebiscite”.¹⁰⁸

At the time of holding and counting of the “results of the plebiscite”, as well as some events that “coincided” with the “declaration of the Serb people”, the leadership of the fifth columnist SDS of Bosnia and Herzegovina was preparing the strategic “capitalization of the plebiscite” at the internal and international levels. At the internal one, preparations were made for pronouncement of the “Serb republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, and at the international level, attempts were made to become involved in international peace negotiations as “separate sides”.¹⁰⁹

“The Assembly of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, at its second session, held on November 21, 1991, agreed on the “**Decision for Adoption of the Report on the Completed Plebiscite of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina**”, thereby adopting the Report of the Chief Commission for Administration of the Plebiscite of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina, held on November 9 and 10, 1991. In this way, it was determined “**that the Decision on remaining of the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the joint state of Yugoslavia, brought by the Assembly of the Serb People at the session of October 24, 1991, was confirmed at the completed plebiscite of**

¹⁰⁸ K. Begic, the aforementioned work, p. 62.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 63.

the Serb people on November 9 and 10, 1991, and that it has come into effect”.¹¹⁰

Obviously, the “plebiscite” was the platform and the excuse of the Greater Serbia movement and the Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina to reach the main goal – formation of the “Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, as part of the non-existing “Federal State of Yugoslavia”.

“The Assembly of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, based on the “expressed will of the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, through the plebiscite held on November 9 and 10, 1991, and the Conclusions of the Assembly of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina, adopted on October 24, 1991”, on November 21, 1991, adopted **“the Decision on the territories of municipalities, local communities and populated places in Bosnia and Herzegovina which are considered the territory of the federal state of Yugoslavia”**. This “decision” had determined the boundaries of another state on a part of the territory of SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina – of the future “joint state of Yugoslavia”: parts of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“the territories of municipalities, local communities and populated places”) in which on November 9 and 10, 1991, the “plebiscite” was conducted, “together with the territories of the Republic of Serbia, Republic of Montenegro, SAO Krajina, and SAO Slavonia, Baranja, and West Srem”, making up the “core of the joint state of Yugoslavia”.¹¹¹ This was in fact an attempt to legalize the counter-constitutional actions and the actual occupation rule of another state – **“the joint state”**.

Starting from the assessment that the Serb people **“is endangered”**, and that **“living together is no longer possible”**, the SDS of Bosnia and

¹¹⁰ AIIZ, inv. No. 3-491/4, Assembly of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina, DECISION for Adopting of the REPORT on the Completed Plebiscite of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina, no. 38-02/91, Sarajevo, November 21, 1991; *Javnost*, November 23, 1991, p. 7, and December 7, 1991. p. 10.

¹¹¹ AIIZ, inv. No. 3-491/9, Assembly of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina, no: 36-02/91, Sarajevo, November 21, 1991 – Decision on the territories of municipalities, local communities, and populated places in Bosnia and Herzegovina, considered to be the territory of the federal state of Yugoslavia; *Javnost*, December 7, 1991, p. 10.

Herzegovina also instituted the procedure for the constitution of the “Municipalities of the Serb people” and the “division of joint property”.¹¹²

At the “plebiscite” of November 9 and 10, 1991, the “Serb people of the Olovo municipality openly chose to constitute a Municipality of the Serb people as part of the SAO Romanija”. Thus, at the session of held on November 18, 1991, the “Assembly of the Serb People of Olovo” decided on the “Constitution of the Olovo Municipality of the Serb People”. This “decision” determined the borders of the “Serb Municipality of Olovo”.¹¹³

The Assembly of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina, on December 11, 1991, brought the **Recommendation for Constitution of the Municipal Assemblies of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina**. This document, which was an attack against the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, “recommended” to the clubs of delegates of the Serb Democratic Part in the Municipal Assemblies in Bosnia and Herzegovina, “in which outvoting is used to impose the decisions contrary to the interests of the Serb people”, to **come to decisions establishing Municipal Assemblies of the Serb people**. At this, the method was determined for the formation of the “municipal assembly of the Serb people” (it would consist of the “delegates of the Serb Democratic Party and other delegates of Serb ethnicity who give statements of accession to the assembly”. The delegates of the “Municipal Assemblies of the Serb people” were recommended to continue working in the municipal assemblies and their bodies, except if contrary to the requirements for preservation of equality and interests of the Serb people”.¹¹⁴

Based on the provisions of this document, the so-called Serb municipalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina were formed, which represented the division and disruption of each of the given municipalities, thus violating the territorial integrity of the country as a whole. This can be

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Ibid., December 7, 1991, p. 2, Decision for constitution of the Municipality of the Serb People of Olovo.

¹¹⁴ AIIZ, inv. No. 3-453, Recommendation for Constitution of the Municipal Assemblies of Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina, *Sluzbeni glasnik srpskog naroda u Bosni i Herzegovini*, No. 1, Sarajevo, January 15, 1992, p. 9.

shown on the examples of formation of the Serb municipal assemblies of Zvornik, Ilidza, and Livno.

In consistent application of the programmatic commitment of the Greater Serbia movement and the party, the leadership of the Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina began the process of proclaiming “**Serb municipalities**” in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They were “**obligated**” to take this step by, among other things, the “**plebiscite of the Serb people**”, that they should form “**Serb municipalities there where the Serbs live**”.¹¹⁵

In Zvornik, in “attendance of numerous guests from both banks of the Drina river” and the representatives of the Serb Orthodox Church, on December 27, 1991, the Serb Municipality of Zvornik was proclaimed, which shall “**initially, until the State of the Serb People in BiH is in place, operate on political terms**”. Jovo Mijatovic was elected “president”. In his speech, among other things, he said that “**the barrier between the Serb brothers – the Drina river – shall not be the Berlin Wall**”, pointing out that permanent connections shall be established “**between Serb brothers**” living on the banks of the Drina.¹¹⁶

The heads of the Serb Democratic Party, in presence of all the delegates, presidents of local boards and representatives of the Serb Orthodox Church, on January 3, 1992, also proclaimed the constitution of the Serb Municipal Assembly of Ilidza. At the same time, the “president” of the Serb Assembly of Ilidza was elected. Namely, “pursuant to Article 265, of the Constitution of SR Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the will of the Serb people on the territory of the Municipality of Ilidza, expressed at the plebiscite, held on November 9 and 10, 1991, and in compliance with the Instruction given by the Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Main Board, no. 079, dated December 12, 1991), the Assembly of the Serb People of Ilidza, at the session held on January 3, 1992, takes the decision to proclaim the Serb Municipal Assembly of Ilidza”.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁵ *Javnost*, January 11, 1992, p. 2, and February 15, 1992, p. 2.

¹¹⁶ *Javnost*, January 4, 1992, p. 9.

¹¹⁷ AIIZ, inv. No. 3-1088/7, Serb Municipal Assembly of Ilidza, no. 6/92, Ilidza, January 3, 1992, Decision Proclaiming the Serb Municipal Assembly of Ilidza. See: *Javnost*, January 11, 1992, p. 2.

The Serb Municipal Assembly of Ilidza was “the highest body of authority of the Serb people on the territory of the Municipality of Ilidza”, made up “of the delegates of the Serb Democratic Party of Ilidza and the presidents of the local boards of the SDS of Ilidza, and other delegates of the Serb ethnicity from the Municipality of Ilidza, by signing the statement of accession to this assembly”. In its further work, the “Municipality shall constitute its executive bodies of power and the required working bodies”. It shall recognize the “federal laws, as well as the Republic and municipal laws and regulations which are not in contravention with the federal laws and interests of the Serb people”. Until the bringing of the interim rules of procedures, “the assembly of the Serb people of the Municipality of Ilidza” performed tasks in accordance with the decision of the assembly of the Serb people of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the instructions given by the SDS of Bosnia and Herzegovina”.¹¹⁸

At this session in Ilidza “**some more important issues arose**”, among which “**was the regulation of the status of members of the volunteer units participating in the war on the side of the JNA**”. In relation to this, the proposal was unanimously adopted for “**the recognition of the status of combatant for all the volunteers, as well as securing of legal protection**”. Also, the conclusion was adopted according to which “**the SDS is strongly demanding that the Serb youth be allowed smooth departure into the JNA**”.¹¹⁹

It is also interesting to point out the proposal “**for protection of the Serb territories in the municipality of Ilidza**”. Namely, due to “**uncontrolled arrival of population from Sandzak to this territory, an initiative to do a separate review of the urban plan of the city will be launched, with special reference to [the city of Ilidza itself] – with full recognition of the interests of the Serb people**”.¹²⁰

On January 9, 1992, in Zavidovici, the Serb Municipality was constituted, the “president” was elected, and then “the president” of the

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ *Javnost*, January 11, 1992, p. 2.

Executive Council, and the decision was adopted “that the territory of the Serb Municipality of Zavidovici shall be subject to application of the federal laws and republic regulations, unless they are in contravention with the federal ones”.¹²¹

The bringing of the “Decision for the Proclamation of the Serb municipal assemblies” was followed with the bringing of the decision for determination of their borders, which was shown on the example of the so-called Serb Municipality of Livno.

The Assembly of the Serb People in the Municipality of Livno, “based on the Decision on the Constitution of the Assembly of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina dated October 24, 1991, and the freely expressed will of the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, through the plebiscite held on November 9 and 10, 1991”, at the session held on January 10, 1992, passed the “Decision Determining the Borders of the Serb Municipality of Livno” (“on the ethnic territories and settlements populated by Serbs”). “The line of delimitation with the territory of the previous municipality of Livno is located at the site called ‘Barjak’ in the village of Celebic, from the North of the Livanjsko polje, and the village cemetery in Donji Rujani on the South of the Livanjsko polje”. The total area of the Serb Municipality of Livno, “gravitating towards Bosansko Grahovo”, is 84 sq.km, in 10 populated villages with a population of 1,380. The remaining part of 2,400 population lives in Livno and in Gubin”.¹²²

What is interesting is the contents of the accompanying letter, sent along with the “Decision Determining the Borders of the Serb Municipality of Livno”, to Momcilo Krajisnik. Among other things, it points out as follows:

“In fact, as for the map, we can inform you that last week we agreed about the borders with the experts in Sarajevo. Namely, we are speaking about the territory of the local communities of Celebic

¹²¹ *Javnost*, January 18, 1992, p. 2.

¹²² AIIZ, inv. No. 3-1229, Decision Determining the Borders of the Serb Municipality of Livno.

and Gubin, gravitating towards the municipality of Bosansko Grahovo, populated exclusively by Serb people...”¹²³

The statements from the aforementioned decision show that the fifth columnists had prepared plans and organized themselves for working on the breaking up of the then multiethnic municipalities, which could only be accomplished through genocide, that is, by killing, slaughtering, raping, expulsion of population, and the like, only in order to form the “ethnically pure Serb territories”.

The Assembly of the Serb People of the Municipality of Maglaj was proclaimed on January 16, 1992, “and it shall be an integral part of the Autonomous area of North Bosnia”. Among the attendees were the representatives of the Serb Orthodox Church. Bosko Pejic was elected “president”.¹²⁴

On February 8, 1992, “one more Serb municipality” was formed – Bugojno, the first “president” was elected, and “one more significant decision for the Serbs in Bugojno” was brought – it was joined to the Region of Bosanska Krajina.¹²⁵ Seven days later, the Serb Democratic Party proclaimed the “Serb Municipality of Donji Vakuf”.¹²⁶

¹²³ AIIZ, inv. No. 3-1230, Letter of the Municipal Board of the SDS Livno – to the Assembly of the Serb People of Bosnia and Herzegovina – Attn. President Momcilo Krajisnik. The statement that Celebic and Gubin are populated “exclusively with Serb population” is not true, because it pertained to Gubin only. According to the 1991 Census, Celebic was populated by 316 Croats, and 131 Serbs, and Gubin by 361 Serbs (ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF THE POPULATION, Results for the Republic by municipalities and populated places 1991, *Statisticki bilten* no. 234, State Statistics Institute of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo 1993, pp. 70-71).

¹²⁴ *Javnost*, January 25, 1992, p. 2.

¹²⁵ *Javnost*, February 15, 1992, p. 2. The session was chaired by the president of the OO of SDS, Borislav Pejicic. The Serb Assembly of Bugojno was made up of nine of the eleven delegates in the Municipal Assembly of Bugojno, and the presidents of all the local boards and members of the Municipal Board of SDS Bugojno.

Nikola Mistic, Vice President of the Municipal Assembly in Bugojno was elected president of the Serb Assembly by a secret ballot. “**Ultimately, one more significant decision was adopted for the Serbs in Bugojno**” – The Serb Municipality of Bugojno was attached to the region of Bosanska Krajina (*Javnost*, February 15, 1992, p. 2.).

¹²⁶ AIIZ, inv. No. 3-1099-15, Decision for Constitution of the Serb Municipality of Donji Vakuf, February 15, 1992; *Ibid.*, inv. No. 6-511, Testimony by A.S. After the

In this way, the Serb collaborationists had factually usurped power in a number of municipalities and in reliance on the strong presence of the JNA, which, by increasing the density of occupation, had executed a silent occupation of a significant portion of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and based on the circumstances and needs, exerted the power of the “Federative Yugoslavia”, whose supreme body at the time (from October 3, 1991) was Kostic’s ‘rump Presidency’. Thus, around one third of the state territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina had become an integral part of another state.

occupation, the name of the Municipality of Donji Vakuf was changed into “Srbobran” [from ‘Srb’ and ‘*odbrana*’, meaning ‘Serb’ and ‘defence’; note by the translator].

2. Crisis Headquarters of the Serb People - Organs of the Occupying Power

The Greater Serbia and the Greater Croatia movements were, from the very beginning, anticipating the formation of the ethnically pure states. This understood either the relocation or destruction of the multi-million population that (particularly on the territories of the central republics of the SFRY, i.e. Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia) had been living intermixed for centuries. The largest number of this population was Bosniak, the third nation by number in SFRY. As such, they were the largest obstacle to formation of one or the other greater state. It was frequently pointed out that they did not have a “**reserve state**”. This is why, in addition to various forms of “relocation”, they were also subject to the most various genocidal actions.

The two million population of Bosniaks along with this constituted **the absolute majority population in Bosnia and Herzegovina**, or near that mark.¹²⁷ Without their spread across Bosnia and Herzegovina, partially or fully, neither of the “greater states” was possible. Since there was no possibility for agreement about this, that is, the overall division of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the spring of 1991,¹²⁸ in the summer of the same year, the RAM operation got aflame, as planned the previous

¹²⁷ M. Filipovic, **BOSNA I HERCEGOVINA, najvaznije geografske, demografske, historijske, kulturne i politicke cinjenice**, Sarajevo 1997, pp. 34-45.

¹²⁸ According to the agreements from Karadjordjevo in March and from Tikves in April 1991, Croatia was to take 13 of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian districts, defined by the borders of the *Banovina* of Croatia, and the municipalities across the Una river, populated by a large majority by Bosniaks. The remainder would belong to Serbia and Montenegro, or, according to Tudjman’s proposals, it would be divided by the principle of the Serb or Croat majority.

year (i.e. operation for expulsion of Croatia out of Yugoslavia and framing of the federal state, framed in the Platform of the Socialist Party of Serbia, the Belgrade Initiative and the Zabljak Constitution, which would make it inherit the image and the property of the SFRY.)¹²⁹

In the summer of 1991, for a number of reasons, the RAM operation began waning.¹³⁰ Upon decision of the Presidency of the SFRY, on July 18, the withdrawal of the JNA began from Slovenia, whereby this republic became de facto independent. This brought to internationalisation of the conflict, and for September 7, the European Community scheduled the Conference on Yugoslavia. By the end of the year, several more ceasefires were concluded (October 10 and 18, November 22, 1991, as well as January 2, 1992), the UN also got involved, whose peace forces were to take over securing of the occupied territories of the Republic of Croatia, and the Arbitration Commission of the Hague Conference rendered a number of “verdicts”, among others, the one of **November 20, stating that the process of dissolution was ended and that SFRY existed no longer.** This ordered to the legal authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina to wait for their solutions. Based on the invitation of the Brussels Declaration (of the European Community) on Yugoslavia dated December 17, 1991, **Bosnia and Herzegovina requested international recognition, which would follow after the implementation of the demanded referendum of citizens.**¹³¹

With the final establishment of the unconditional ceasefire between the JNA and the Republic of Croatia of November 22, 1991, in Igalo, that is, with its signing on January 2, 1992 in Sarajevo, and with the announced recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, and in particular with

¹²⁹ M. Kreso, **AGRESIJA NA REPUBLIKU BOSNU I HERCEGOVINU – AMBIJENT POCINJENOG GENOCIDA**, in: **GENOCID U BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI 1991-1995**, The Compilation of Works of the International Congress for Documentation of Genocide, held in Bonn on August 31 through September 4, 1995, Sarajevo 1997, pp. 43-70.

¹³⁰ Although Baranja had been taken easily, and Croatia had been cut in three with the exit of the JNA onto the sea near Slano and in Ravni Kotari, in other directions, particularly near Karlovac and Vukovar, the JNA had been stopped.

¹³¹ K. Begic, the aforementioned work, pp. 31-54.

adoption of the **UN Peace Operations Plan**, it seemed that the crisis in Yugoslavia was coming close to its end.

The most credits for the final establishment of the actual ceasefire between the JNA and the Republic of Croatia in Sarajevo on January 2, 1992 were attributed to the special envoy of the UN Secretary General and the author of the aforementioned plan, Cyrus Vance. Exactly on that day and on that occasion (after the meeting with the President of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic) stated “**he believes that there will be no expansion of the conflict to Bosnia and Herzegovina**”.¹³²

Unfortunately, the masters of mimicry and concealment of crimes, were constantly, in particularly from the beginning of the RAM operation, undertaking a very intensive destruction of the legal authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including its silent occupation and building of the developed fifth columnist, and then collaborationist, apparatus of power, parallel to the legal one, where – until possible – they ensured that they still receive their salaries. The procedure was developed in detail in the timely prepared **Instruction**, which has been analysed in more detail here (cf. *supra*). The Instruction was attributed to the Main Board of the SDS of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but it pertained to the bodies of the Serb people as a whole and was obviously not specific for Bosnia and Herzegovina only.

Obstructing the work in legitimate Bosnian-Herzegovinian authorities and working on the devastation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and practical preparations for establishment and taking over of power de facto at the lowest (municipal) level, on December 18, 1991, the Main Board of the SDS of Bosnia and Herzegovina enacted the **Instruction for the Organization and Activity of the Bodies of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina under Emergency Conditions** (hereinafter referred to as: “*Instruction...*”).¹³³ This “strictly confidential” document developed

¹³² Ibid., p. 17.

¹³³ AIIZ, inv. No. 3-1172, Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Main Board, **INSTRUCTION FOR THE ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITY OF THE BODIES OF THE SERB PEOPLE IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA UNDER EMERGENCY CONDITIONS**, Sarajevo, December 19, 1991. On December 19, 1991,

the tasks, formation and functioning of the “**crisis headquarters of the Serb people**”, the convening and proclamation of assemblies of the Serb people in municipalities, implementation of preparatory actions for formation of municipal state bodies, preparation for taking over of staff, facilities and equipment of the Law Enforcement Agency, mobilization of all the police forces “**from among members of the Serb ethnicity, and in cooperation with the commands and headquarters of the JNA, perform their gradual re-subjection**”, securing of execution of the order for mobilization of the reserve JNA compositions and Territorial Defence units, filling in of war units upon public invitations of the JNA, and the like.¹³⁴

“**The tasks, measures and other activities**” from the aforementioned “*Instruction...*” “**are implemented on the whole territory of SR BiH, that is, in all the municipalities populated by the Serb people**”.

The Instruction foresees two options for “**organization and activity of the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina under emergency circumstances**”:

this “**strictly confidential**” document was distributed to the participants of the meeting in Sarajevo, chaired by Radovan Karadzic, and, among others, attended by the delegates of the *Assembly of the Serb People*, as well as the presidents of the municipal boards of the Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The contents of this document was explained to the participant of the gathering by Radovan Karadzic (ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-61, PROSECUTOR AGAINST MIROSLAV DERONJIC – hereinafter referred as: ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-61, paragraph 10).

The “*Instruction...*” was prepared at the time when Bosnia and Herzegovina had already been occupied (this occupation then was not effective on the whole territory).

The aforementioned instruction could hardly have been drawn without the expert assistance and cooperation with Belgrade. Most probably that it had not been drafted by the bodies of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but of a foreign state, which performed the silent occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the body writing or transcribing this instruction was not the body of Bosnia and Herzegovina but a collaborationist body of the Greater Serbia aggressor.

Based on this instruction, it is obvious that, in addition to other things, there is a series of similar instructions for various levels (such as, for instance, for the “Serb autonomous areas”, and the like), and probably some chronologically earlier drafted variants, before December 19, 1991.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

1) Option A: municipalities in which the Serb people constitute the majority, and

2) Option B: municipalities in which the Serb people are not in the majority.

According to Option A (first degree), guidelines were provided for taking over of power in the municipalities in which the Serb people were in the majority (37 municipalities: 31 with absolute and 6 with relative majority). In order to realize such a goal, the municipal boards of the SDS were assigned with the task to immediately form “**crisis headquarters of the Serb people in the municipality**”. In relation to this, the method was developed for formation of this illegal, transitional body in establishment of the occupying power. It consisted of all the members of the secretariat of the municipal board of the SDS, officials in the municipality (SDS candidates for the following bodies: President of the municipal assembly or President of the executive council of the Municipality, Chief of Staff of the Law Enforcement Agency or Commander of the police precinct; commander or Chief of Staff of the municipal Headquarters of territorial defence; Secretary of the municipal secretariat of national defence or another managerial employee from this secretariat who is the SDS candidate), delegates in *the Assembly of the Serb People in BiH*, and the members of the Main Board of the SDS from BiH from the territory of the municipality. In practice, the composition of the “crisis headquarters of the Serb people” normally also included a representative of the JNA, including commanders of corps, brigades or other units, who had a key role in the decision-making.

The commander of the municipal *crisis headquarters of the Serb people* was the president of the municipal assembly or the president of the executive board of the municipality.

This was obviously an illegal body, without any grounds in any legal normative law document. At the same time, this was a party, that is, a single-party and single-nation body, which is a negation of the election results and the legally appointed and constituted bodies, and preparation and the initial step for formation of the Serb para-state bodies in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The “*Instruction...*” (Option A – first degree) develops the technology for the formation of Serb paramilitary bodies at the level of the municipality (points 4 and 5). Related to the technology,

it also states that it is necessary to “convene” and proclaim “The Assembly of the Serb people in the municipality constituted of the delegates from among the Serb nation in at the municipal assembly” (point 4).

The “*Instruction...*” orders to go even further than this, and recommends that it is needed to “implement” preparation for formation of the municipal state bodies (executive board, administrative body, minor offence court, law enforcement centre, etc.) and prepare proposals for personnel for the offices and jobs in these bodies (point 5).

The formation of ethnically pure bodies also pertained to security. In those terms, pursuant to the “*Instruction...*” it was required “**to prepare taking over of staffing, facilities and equipment of the law enforcement centre and their inclusion into the newly formed body for law enforcement at the seat of the centre**”.

The facilities of vital importance at the municipalities were by then physically secured by the legal bodies and personnel. However, as a “painless” form of their taking over by the Serbs, it was “**needed to strengthen organization of performance of physical security for the facilities of vital importance at the municipality**” (point 6).

The reality of the planning and preparation of an open armed conflict is also suggested by the part of the “*Instruction...*” (point 7) about that it is necessary “**to establish control and verify the status of the existing commodity reserves and proceed with completion and re-supply of the municipal commodity reserves with most scarce products and raw materials**”.

The war potential is particularly emphasized in the “*Instruction...*”, in which it recommends that “**an assessment of the required number of members of the active and reserve composition of police, TO units, civilian protection units, and in accordance with this, perform their filling in and undertake all other necessary actions for their activation depending on the development of the situation**” be performed (point 9). Several conclusions can be drawn out of such formulation, which were later confirmed in practice. First of all, the case involved military preparations for participation in the aggression, as the fifth column of the Greater Serbia aggressor, which were massive and all encompassing, both from the aspect of scope of individual structures, and the number

of members. This was the initiation of the formation of the armed formations, ethnically pure ones, that is, Serb ones, which committed the largest number of crimes, including the genocide against Bosniaks. We need to add to this the fact that **“the order for activation of the compositions was taken by the crisis headquarters in the municipality”**, which was already designated as an illegal, ethnically pure body.

Although that *“Instruction...”* was a fully illegal and illegitimate enactment, its provisions revoked or suspended certain human rights, such as the right to annual leave or freedom of movement, which is again viewed from the ethnic aspect. Namely, pursuant to the *“Instruction...”*, **“it is necessary to inform the Serb personnel that over the forthcoming period they should not be using annual leave, not travelling abroad, or not leaving their permanent residence”** (point 11).

Based on the aforementioned, and particularly based on what follows, as contained in point 11 of the *“Instruction...”*, it is obvious that the JNA is the main lever of the Serb option in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that it was counted with under all circumstances. Due to this, one of the tasks assigned was the creation of conditions for **“filling in of war units upon public summons by the JNA, both with manpower and material resources and cattle from the list...”**.

This point also states the other essential things that are relevant for military preparations of the Serb forces for participation in the aggression. First of all, the *“Instruction...”* insists on **“the protection of material resources of relevance to defence or resistance, as well as to the life and work of the population”**, and **“securing of continuity of production and services of vital significance to defence, resistance and life of the Serb people”**.

Option A, which was to be implemented in full in the municipalities in which the Serb people consisted the majority of population, was also given in the **“second degree”**, which in a way made a concretisation of what was given in the **“first degree”**. In this degree, it was supposed to **“convene the session of the Serb Municipal Assembly and form the executive board of the municipality, form municipal state bodies, select or appoint the officials and appoint the managing employees”** (point 1), which is a further step in relation to the first degree.

Cooperation with commands and headquarters of the JNA was openly presented, in which the need was emphasized for **“mobilization of all police forces from among the Serb people and in cooperation with commands and headquarters of the JNA perform their gradual re-subjection”** (point 2). Along with this, it was pointed out that **“the competent bodies should ensure execution of the order for mobilization of the reserve compositions of the JNA and the territorial defence units”** (point 3).

The *“Instruction...”* calls for termination of the normal money flows in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus, it was supposed to **“assign the branches and field offices of the Public Accounting Agency to prevent the physical outflow of cash and securities from the treasury in their jurisdiction at banks, post offices and other financial organizations, as well as to updated monitoring of payments in their areas of jurisdiction”** (point 4).

In the security domain, in the **second degree**, further concretisation was made of the tasks from the **first degree**. In that context, it was ordered **“to perform constant physical securing of all the vital facilities, traffic lines and communications, and production capacities”** (point 5), and **“taking over of the personnel, facilities and equipment of the law enforcement centre and taking them into function of the newly formed law enforcement body seated at the centre”** (point 6).

The aggression preparations were also expressed in relation to the commodity reserves, which were presented in an even stronger form. The need was ordered for **“prevention of uncontrolled delivery of food and other scarce products and raw materials”**, speeding up the implementation of the contracted procurements of such commodities, and placing under control of the current supply of commodities, and undertaking preparations for organized dispersion of these commodities **“on the areas at risk, having in mind the strict application of determined priorities in supply”** (point 7).

The end of this part of the *“Instruction...”* emphasizes: **“In undertaking of all these measures, one must ensure the respect for the ethnic and other rights of members of all nations and their later engagement in the bodies of power that will constitute the assembly of the Serb people in the municipality”** (point 8). This is obviously

a specific kind of contradiction and cynicism about the presence of “**other**” personnel in the Serb bodies, which would have to be so committed and loyal to them as to lose any identity.

The “*Instruction...*” also presents ‘Option B’, in two degrees, which was to be realized partially, in the municipalities in which the Serb people were not the majority. Pursuant to the “*Instruction...*”, the Serb Democratic Party was supposed to organize “**everyday sessions, with constant duty shifts**”, and to form the ‘crisis headquarters’ of the Serb people in the municipality, which among others includes “**all the members of the secretariat of the municipal board of the SDS**” and “**officials in the municipality who are SDS candidates, delegates at the Assembly of the Serb People of BiH**”, etc.

The above presented indubitably indicates that this involves a formation of ethnically clear ‘para-statal’ bodies, even in the communities where Serbs were in minority, which in fact was the reason for further ethnic confrontations and tensions. At the same time, illegal and non-constitutional changes of municipal borders were announced, with merging of some bodies with the bodies in the municipalities where Serbs are in majority. Thus, among other things, there is an order to “**take over the personnel and certain equipment of the law enforcement centres and their inclusion into the law enforcement centre in the municipality or the place in which the police precinct is being formed**” (point 5 – Option B, first degree).

After this model of merging, it was also foreseen that other bodies join places with the Serb majority.

The “*Instruction...*” contains a number of provisions pertaining to local communities and populated places with majority Serb population, in which it was necessary to establish a special regime. Thus, among others, there is an order to “**form secret warehouses and depots in the local communities or populated places with the majority Serb population, to be used for storage of food items and other scarce products, raw materials which to the maximum need to be drawn out through secret channels from the warehouses of commodity reserves at all levels, as well as from the warehouses of sales organizations**”. Organization and supervision over these tasks were to be exclusively performed by the “crisis headquarters” (point 6).

The implementation of this activity, as well as the other ones, involved application of a certain extent of conspiracy, which caused warranted apprehension and fear among members of the other nations. In those terms, in addition to **formation of secret warehouses and depots**, there is a mention about the need for establishment of secret procedures “**for the conveyance and receipt of orders for execution of tasks, measures and other activities from this Instruction**”, which were to be identified at a later stage.

The “*Instruction...*” is a document which sheds light from many aspects onto the place and role of the fifth columnist Serb Democratic Party in planning and preparation of the crime. All of this was performed in secrecy, which is seen from the mark on this document – “**strictly confidential**”.

It is also indubitable that on this occasion, the main goal was expressed of the Greater Serbia movement – formation of ethnically clean Serb territories, which was the negation of the multiethnic nature of Bosnia and Herzegovina. All the provisions of this document pertained to the Serbs only. This excluded other nations, except if they expressed written loyalty to this criminal Greater Serbia concept.

Numerous provisions of the “*Instruction...*” are an attack against the legal bodies and full negation of their constitutional and legal function. Along with the already existing legally elected and constituted bodies, new, single-ethnic ones were formed, of illegal composition and parallel to the existing ones, with the prefix of – Serb. Such were, for example, the executive board, administration bodies, minor offence court, law enforcement centres, etc. In all of this, there was a particularly significant illegal role of the “*crisis headquarters of the Serb people*”, which was with its competencies above the legal municipal bodies.

The role of the JNA is clearly expressed in this document, particularly having in mind its participation in the crimes, especially in the aggression. From October 3, 1991, with the putsch at the Presidency of the SFRY, the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces was taken over, whose headquarters even before that commanded over the JNA. Its armed force placed itself at the disposal of the Greater Serbia movement, and together with it performed all the preparations for the aggression, starting from planning, mobilization and training of manpower, armament, up to the direct participation in the armed aggression and all other forms of crime, including the genocide against the Bosniaks.

It is obvious that the preparations for the crimes, as can be seen from the “*Instruction...*” were multi-level and all-encompassing ones. They pertained to the media, economic, political, legal and military spheres.¹³⁵

On the same day on which the “*Instruction...*” was adopted, that is, on December 19, 1991, Momcilo Krajisnik, president of the so-called Assembly of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in his **Telegram** to the “Government of the Serb Autonomous Area of Krajina”, sent from the “Assembly of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, sincerely supported the demands and goals of the “**whole Serb nation**” (i.e. all the Serbs), and that was the **formation of the state of the Serb people**. In relation to this, among other things, he pointed out:

“At this hard time, unfortunately, I am not able to be with you at the place where the historical right of the Serb people to live in a single state is being certified, so please convey to the delegates and the people of Serbian Krajina my warmest congratulations and sincere wishes for the well-being of our people.

Your fight for freedom and your demands are the demands of all the Serb people and all of them are reduced to exercise of the basic right, not to allow that force, whomever it may be coming from, divide us into several states and make us a nation without a future.

All the Serbs fight for the same goal and under the same flag, and we are all convinced of the ultimate victory...”¹³⁶

Even on March 27, 1992, at the 14th Session of the Assembly of the Serb People of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Radovan Karadzic instructed the delegates to form “**crisis headquarters**”. At the time, among other things, he told them “**to find a number of reserve officers for their headquarters and to register all those who have weapons available... They need to get organized into territorial defence units, and if the JNA is there, they must be placed under its command**”.¹³⁷

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Ibid., inv. No. 3-491/13, Assembly of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo, December 19, 1991 – to the Government of the Serb Autonomous Area of Krajina, Knin.

¹³⁷ ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraph 384.

Upon approval from above, and after having received the aforementioned instructions, the municipal boards of the SDS quickly acted and formed *the crisis headquarters of the Serb people*. After Karadzic's order for their activation, the crisis headquarters took over the political power in the municipalities and began functioning in public, as municipal governments of the collaborationist creation called Republika Srpska. Those bodies ensured coordination among the party (SDS), the "government", and the JNA at the municipal level, and constituted a key mechanism for the establishment and maintenance of control over specific areas.¹³⁸

As the highest bodies in the function of the occupying power on the territories taken, under the conditions of occupation performed by the JNA, *the crisis headquarters of the Serb people* carried out the following tasks,

- **adopted decisions and orders about:**
- formation of "Serb municipalities",
- establishment and taking over of power and control over municipalities;
- proclamation of the state of emergency in municipalities,
- formation of "interim government ... of Serb municipalities",
- introduction of curfew on the territories of "Serb municipalities",
- general mobilization,
- formation of headquarters, commands and units of the "Serb TO" and taking over of the defence affairs and engagement of the TO on the territories of "Serb municipalities";
- issued instructions for the functioning of municipal bodies;
- maintained direct contacts and cooperation with the commands, units and institutions of the JNA, which secured taking over of power for the "crisis headquarters of the Serb people";
- maintained contacts and cooperation with the Republic of Serbia and its bodies, in particularly the Department of Public Security;

¹³⁸ Ibid., paragraphs 218, 237-257, 412, 624, 634, 640, 719, 776, 783, 812, 819-821, 835, and others; AIIZ, inv. No. 2-521 and 2-571; ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-61, paragraph 15.

- participated (with the JNA and the Territorial Defence) in attacking cities, towns and villages;
- organized training for the Serb “volunteers” and promoted the local paramilitary commanders;
- issued ultimatums, mainly to the Bosniak population, for surrender of arms and property, and disarmed the Bosniaks;
- closed down hospitality facilities;
- issued orders for sending of non-Serb population away for forced labour;
- planned and prepared crimes;
- issued orders for commission of crimes, including the genocide against the Bosniaks;
- coordinated attacks against the Bosniak villages;
- participated in persecution and military operations against the Bosniaks and in destruction of their villages;
- formed and controlled concentration camps, and the like.¹³⁹

In early April 1992, the Command of the 2nd Military District (Reserve Command Position) was “continuously” establishing “**contact**

¹³⁹ ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraphs 384, 412, 607, 615-616, 624, 634, 639, 648, 653, 709-710, 713, 725, 729, 760, 819-821, 828-831, 835, 850-851, and others; ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-61, paragraphs 10-15, and 15-44; AIIZ, inv. No. 3-1226, SAO Semberija and Majevisa, Serb Municipality of Zvornik, Crisis Headquarters, Zvornik, April 8, 1991, Decision for introduction of curfew on the territory of the Serb Municipality of Zvornik; Ibid., inv. No. 3-1227, SAO Semberija and Majevisa, Serb Municipality of Zvornik, Crisis Headquarters, No.: 01-1/92, Zvornik, April 10, 1992, Decision for formation of interim government of the Serb Municipality of Zvornik; Ibid., inv. No. 3-1228, SAO Semberija and Majevisa, Serb Municipality of Zvornik, Crisis Headquarters, No. 02-1/92, Zvornik, April 8, 1992, Order for general mobilization; Ibid., inv. No. 3-1223, Republic of the Serb People of BiH, Serb Municipality of Bratunac, Crisis Headquarters, No: 01-1-92, Decision Proclaiming State of Emergency due to Immediate War Danger on the Territory of the Serb Municipality of Bratunac; Ibid., inv. No. 3-1224, Serb Municipality of Bratunac, Crisis Headquarters, no: 01-6-92, April 13, 1992, Order for Formation of Headquarters, Commands and Units of the TO; Ibid., inv. No. 3-1225, Republic of the Serb People of BiH, Serb Municipality of Bratunac, Crisis Headquarters, no. 01-09-92, Bratunac April 19, 1992, Decision for Disarmament of Citizens Who Possess Weapons on the Territory of the Bratunac Municipality.

and coordination with the Crisis Headquarters in Pale".¹⁴⁰ The "Crisis Headquarters of Trnovo" established cooperation with the JNA units and worked on planning and preparation of the crime. On May 22, this body proclaimed mobilization.¹⁴¹ The Crisis Headquarters of the "Serb Municipality" of Foca, headed by Miroslav Stanic, organized training of the armed Serb volunteers and promoted local military commanders, then, together with the JNA, it was involved in preparation and execution of the attacks on Foca, in cooperation with the JNA it assigned the inmates of the Correctional and Penal Institution for forced labour, and performed other forms of crime.¹⁴² The Crisis Headquarters of Cajnice, headed

¹⁴⁰ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-1672, RKM /reserve command position/ of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 09/1580-1, April 6, 1992 – to the Command of the 2nd Military District, Operational Center, Regular operational Report.

¹⁴¹ ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraph 713. At the meeting held on April 29, 1992, the president of the "crisis headquarters" of Trnovo stated that the agreement had been reached with the JNA for participation of its units in "**cleansing**" the Municipality, and that the "**Army is already prepared to clean up the situation in Trnovo**" (ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraph 386, note 781).

¹⁴² Ibid., paragraphs 722-723, and 725.

"The Crisis Headquarters of the Serb Municipality of Foca" consisted by: Miroslav Stanic, Stanojevic (first name unknown), Josip Milicic, Radojica Mladjenovic, Dragoljub Kunarac, Vojislav Maksimovic, Velibor Ostojic, Petko Cancar, Cedo Zelenovic, and Dr. Radovan Mandic. Stanic was the president of this para-state body, and Stanojevic his deputy, Milicic was the president of the Municipality, and Mladjenovic president of the executive board (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-571; ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraphs no. 722-723).

The members of the "crisis headquarters" in Cohodar Mahala were: Vlado Avram (president), Goran Mitrasinovic (his deputy, and Dragan Stojanovic (member). Marinko Pljevaljic, Bozo Dostic, Dojcilo Davidovic, and Ostoja Ostojic made up the "Headquarters" for the area of Aladza; Milos and Radenko Vladicic in the settlement of Podmusala; Novak Drakula, Risto Vucetic, and Per Ivanovic for the settlement of Cerezluk, and for the area of Brusno-Slatina, Boro Ivanovic. Ilija Cancar, Matija and Drago Skakavac, and Rade Djurovic were the members of the "crisis headquarters" for the area of Jabuka, and Savo for the area of Brda-Kozja Luka.

The "crisis headquarters" for the area of Brod na Drini consisted of: Nenad Kalajdzic (teacher), Stamen Rungelov, Ilija Calasan, Miodrag Pjevic, and Vojo Kalajdzic.

The president of the "crisis headquarters" for the area of Brod na Drini up to Tjentiste was Jovan Vukovic, and his deputy was Nenad Vukovic.

by Dusko Kornjaca, was formed in late March or early April 1992.¹⁴³ In March of 1992, the SDS formed the Crisis Headquarters for Rogatica, headed by Rajko Kusic, close associate of Radovan Karadzic.¹⁴⁴ The SDS Crisis Headquarters for Visegrad was installed by the JNA as the civilian government in the Municipality. On April 16, 1992, Biljana Plavsic met the chairman of this headquarters, Brano Savovic, at the Visegrad Hotel, where the JNA was seated.¹⁴⁵ During the conquest of Vlasenica (on April 21, 1992) by the JNA, special units of the Ministry of Interior of Serbia, and the Serb armed formations (Arkan's *Tigers* and the like), the Crisis Headquarters took over the control in the Municipality.¹⁴⁶ In early 1992, the SDS formed the Crisis Headquarters for Bratunac, confirmed by Karadzic. By April 12, the "crisis headquarters" proclaimed the state of emergency and established power in the Municipality, brought all the decisions, orders, conclusions and other enactments on the territory of the Municipality, in the defence affairs, formation and use of the Territorial Defence and Police, then on disarmament of citizens, sought assistance from Serbia, from where in early April 1992, the Novi Sad Corps arrived, which in the middle of that month took Bratunac, in cooperation with other Serb armed formations (*White Eagles* and Arkan's troops, and the like).¹⁴⁷

Rade Elez was the president of the "crisis headquarters" for the area of Medjurjecje, and Ljubo Kovacevic, Dule (mining engineer, from Zavidovici), Vukan Perisic (land surveyor), Mile Savic, and according to unverified data, Danko Davidovic, were members (Ibid.).

The president of the "crisis headquarters" of the "Serb municipality of Konjic" was Vaso Vujcic, and the members were: Jovo Kuljanin, Radovan Gligorijevic, Vukasin Mrkonjic, Radoslav Kuljanin, Janko Glogovac, Zara Mrkajic, and Velimir Miljanic, aka Zika (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-521).

¹⁴³ Ibid., paragraph 719.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., paragraph 640.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., paragraph 648.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., paragraphs 652-653.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., paragraphs 412, and 624; AIIZ, inv. No. 3-1223, Republic of the Serb People of BiH, Serb Municipality of Bratunac, Crisis Headquarters, No: 01-1-92, /Bratunac, April 12, 1992/, Decision Proclaiming State of Emergency due to Immediate War Danger on the Territory of the Serb Municipality of Bratunac; Ibid., inv. No. 3-1224, Serb Municipality of Bratunac, Crisis Headquarters, no: 01-6-92, April 13, 1992, Order

From April 5/6, 1992, the Crisis Headquarters of the Serb Municipality of Zvornik functioned in the industrial zone of Karakaj.¹⁴⁸

In early May 1992, in cooperation with the JNA and Serbia (and vice versa), the Crisis Headquarters of the SDS of Brcko took full control over the Municipality and issued an ultimatum to the non-Serb population to surrender arms.¹⁴⁹

The president of the *Crisis* Headquarters of the Serb Municipality of Bosanski Samac established cooperation with the JNA unit, located in Pelagicevo (Tactical Group 17), and “responsible” for Brcko, Orasje, Gradacac, Modrica, and Gracanica. In mid-April 1992, Blagoje Simic, the president of this headquarters, among other things, told Colonel Major Stevan Nikolic, commander of the TG-17, that the “crisis headquarters” of Bosanski Samac had decided “**that is was time to conduct the operation for taking over of the city**”.¹⁵⁰

The “crisis headquarters” of Bosanski Samac, on May 15, 1992, issued an order for arrest of Bosniaks and Croats, following which numerous crimes were committed against them.¹⁵¹ At the time of attack on and taking of Bosanski Samac by the Ministry of Interior forces of Serbia, this body also sought assistance in manpower. To this goal, the delegation of the “crisis headquarters”, headed by Zaric, travelled to Belgrade, where at the command of the Military Air Forces and Anti-Aircraft Defence in Zemun, discussions were conducted about appointment of Dragan Djordjevic (aka Crni), chief of special units of the State Security Services of Serbia, for commander of the Second Posavina Brigade.

for Formation of Headquarters, Commands and Units of the TO; Ibid., inv. No. 3-1225, Republic of the Serb People of BiH, Serb Municipality of Bratunac, Crisis Headquarters, no. 01-09-92, Bratunac April 19, 1992, Decision for Disarmament of Citizens Who Possess Weapons on the Territory of the Bratunac Municipality.

¹⁴⁸ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2877, Republic of the Serb People of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ministry of Interior, Center of Security Services of Bijeljina, Police Precinct of Zvornik, **INFORMATION on the situation at the Police Precinct of Zvornik.**

¹⁴⁹ ICTY, Case: IT-02-61, paragraph 634.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., paragraph 607.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., paragraph 616.

After the discussions with Frenki Simatovic, the support was obtained – Djordjevic arrived in Bosanski Samac with his people.¹⁵²

By April 1992, the SDS of Doboj had secretly formed the Crisis Headquarters in that city.¹⁵³ The Crisis Headquarters of Sipovo was formed in early 1992, headed by Dragan Djukic, president of the SDS.¹⁵⁴ The Serb Crisis Headquarters of Kljuc was secretly formed on December 23, 1991. On May 1, 1992, it issued instructions for the functioning of municipal bodies under circumstances of war.¹⁵⁵ Seven days later, in taking over the “complete power” in Kljuc, the JNA forces participated. “The crisis headquarters” was “protected” by a firing squad.¹⁵⁶ “In the zone of the Kljuc municipality”, in early June 1992, the JNA formed “the Command of Defence of Kljuc”, which, in addition to the highest-ranking JNA officers, also included several persons from the “Crisis Headquarters”.¹⁵⁷

In late January 1992, the SDS of Kotor Varos formed the Crisis Headquarters, which **established direct relations** with the JNA. Colonel Peulic attended the meetings of the “crisis headquarters” and pointed out the need for cooperation between the JNA, special units and police forces. On June 12, 1992, the “crisis headquarters” ordered curfew in the whole municipality, closing down of all hospitality facilities and disarmament of non-Serbs.¹⁵⁸ In spite of “**being aware of the camp**”, this body, among other things, issued orders for taking away non-Serb

¹⁵² Ibid., paragraphs 117, and 615.

¹⁵³ Ibid., paragraph 812.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., paragraph 900.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., paragraphs 819-821.

¹⁵⁶ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2388, Command of the 30th Partd (partisan division; note by the author), pp. strictly confidential nos. 174-124, May 7, 1992 – to the Command of the 1st Partbr (partisan brigade; note by the author), for use of a part of units; Ibid., inv. No. 2-1044, Command of the 1st Partisan Brigade, strictly confidential no. I-451/92, May 14, 1992, Meeting with the municipal presidents in the area of responsibility of the Division.

¹⁵⁷ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2548, Command of the 30th Partisan Division, SP, no. 939-1, May 31, 1992 – to the Command of the 1st Krajina Corps.

¹⁵⁸ ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraphs 828-829.

population for forced labour. In addition to this, the “crisis headquarters” was the bearer of the mass exodus of non-Serbs from Kotor Varos.¹⁵⁹

The Crisis Headquarters of the Region of Krajina in Banja Luka, whose member was also General Momir Talic, commander of the 5th Corps of the JNA, on May 14, 1992, ordered disarmament of persons who possessed weapons “illegally” and issued the Order that only Serbs can hold certain offices.¹⁶⁰ At the meeting with General Talic on May 18, 1992, the Crisis Headquarters of the Autonomous Region of Krajina sent a request for opening of a corridor towards Serbia – for transportation from Banja Luka towards Serbia and the other way around. The corridor was relevant for supplying of the units of the “Army of Republika Srpska”, and it was also used by the 993rd Background Base for transportation of materials, armament and equipment from Serbia and Montenegro (the road from West Bosnia towards Serbia). All the officers supported this request.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., paragraphs 830-831.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., paragraph 760. In the capacity of commander of the 5th Corps (from the end of February 1992), having accepted the Greater Serbia policy and practice, General Momir Talic was actively working on formation, equipping and training of Serb armed formations; visiting units and speaking to them about the endangerment of the Serb people; holding regular meetings with the SDS in the area of Banja Luka; ordered formation of the camp on the military range of Manjaca, where mainly Bosniaks were brought and killed; as a member of the “crisis headquarters” of the “Autonomous Region of Krajina”, he planned and ordered destruction of religious facilities, and ordered forced deportations of the non-Serb population and confiscation of their movable property and real estate, and the like (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2550; ICTY, Case: No. IT-94-I-T, Evidence of Testimony of the colonel of JNA O.S., June 5, 1996, p. 5).

¹⁶¹ ICTY, Case: no. IT-94-IT, Evidence of Testimony of the colonel of JNA O.S., June 5, 1996, p. 27).

“The political representatives” of seven municipalities of Bosanska Krajina (Bihac, Bosanski Petrovac, Bosanska Krupa, Sanski Most, Prijedor, Bosanski Novi, and Kljuc), on June 7, 1992, at the meeting in Sanski Most, adopted a number of conclusions. Among them is the **“breakthrough by land towards the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia”**. This conclusion, just as the others, was sent to the Crisis Headquarters of the Autonomous Region of Krajina, the leadership of the “Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, and the 1st Krajina Corps (in Banja Luka) – AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2546, CONCLUSIONS from the meeting of the SUB-REGION (political representatives of the following municipalities: Bihac, Bosanski Petrovac, Srpska Krupa, Sanski Most, Prijedor, Bosanski Novi, and Kljuc).

The Municipal Crisis Headquarters of Bosanska Gradiska started functioning in late 1991 or early 1992.¹⁶² The members of the Crisis Headquarters of Bosanska Krupa were appointed on December 24, 1991, headed by Gojko Klickovic. The JNA units deployed in Bosanska Krupa (the 6th Brigade of the 10th Partisan Division) helped the SDS to take over the power.¹⁶³

The Crisis Headquarters of Sanski Most took over power in the city and on May 7, 1992, it declared the state of war. Colonel Basara, commander of the 6th Partisan Brigade, was also a member of this body.¹⁶⁴ This “crisis headquarters” provided logistical support to the 6th Partisan Brigade, and cooperated in disarmament of the population. In late May 1992, it declared the policy of forced displacement of non-Serb population of Sanski Most and on June 2, it issued a Decree on allocation of mechanization and manpower for mass burials of the killed Bosniaks in Vrhpolje and Hrustovo. Two days later, (on June 4), the “crisis headquarters” took the decision on deportation of Bosniaks and Croats into the concentration camp of Manjaca.¹⁶⁵

The Serb Crisis Headquarters of Prijedor was formed on January 7, 1992, when the Assembly of the Serb People of the Municipality of Prijedor was proclaimed.¹⁶⁶ In 1992, this body formed the concentration camps in Trnopolje, Keraterm and Omarska (on May 27, 1992, the Crisis Headquarters ordered that all the detainees from Keraterm be transferred to the camp in Omarska).¹⁶⁷

In the period from late April through early May 1992, the Crisis Headquarters of Bratunac, headed by president Miroslav Deronjic, authorized the Territorial Defence and the police forces to **disarm the Bosniaks of the village of Glogova**. After those forces, in cooperation

¹⁶² ICTY, Case: No. It-02-54-T, paragraph 776.

¹⁶³ Ibid., paragraph 386, note 781, and 783.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., paragraphs 881-882.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., paragraphs 883-888, 890, and 998.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., paragraph 835.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., paragraphs 850-851.

with the JNA, had executed the assigned task, on May 8, 1992, at the session of the Crisis Headquarters, Deronjic announced the **attack on Glogova and “the operation of permanent removal”** of Bosniaks, and he stated that, if **“the operation in Glogova goes well”**, it will also be continued **“in the city of Bratunac and in the local communities of Voljavica and Suha”**. This genocidal plan for extermination of the Bosniaks of Glogova and the Bratunac municipality was adopted, **“after the keynote by Miroslav Deronjic and the discussion”**, by the Crisis Headquarters of Bratunac.¹⁶⁸

After the adoption of the plan for attack on Glogova, the Bratunac **crisis headquarters** also led discussion about burning down of this village, in which the JNA Captain Reljic informed the Crisis Headquarters that they will participate in that operation.¹⁶⁹

In order to form **“Serb territories”**, Miroslav Deronjic ordered execution of the attack on Glogova, and then he participated, coordinated and supervised execution of this joint operation (JNA forces, Serb Territorial Defence and Bratunac police forces, and the “volunteers” from Serbia).¹⁷⁰

In the military operation against Glogova on May 9, 1992, 65 unarmed Bosniak civilians were killed, the rest (whole) population was displaced, and a large number of houses were burned down, at which the mosque also was demolished and set aflame.¹⁷¹

The next day, Deronjic went to Pale, where he informed the political and military leadership of the collaborationist creation of Republika Srpska (Karadzic, Mladic, and others), and the presidents of the **“crisis headquarters”** about this crime and other events in the Bratunac municipality. After he submitted his report, the attendees in the conference room applauded him, and Velibor Ostojic commented: **“now we can colour Bratunac in blue”**. At this, he was referring to the maps that

¹⁶⁸ ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-61, paragraphs 28-29.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., paragraphs 30-35.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., paragraphs 30-36.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., paragraphs 36-44.

were on the wall behind them, on which the “**Serb territories**” were marked in blue.¹⁷²

On May 16, 1992, the Crisis Headquarters of the Serb Municipality of Vogosca issued **the Order for ‘cleansing’ of Svrake and other areas**, that is, execution of genocide against Bosniaks.¹⁷³ The Crisis Headquarters of the Serb Municipality of Foca also formed a Court Martial, composed of: Vojislav Maksimovic, Velibor Ostojic, Rajko Bojat (president, attorney from Foca), Lela Milic (judge, former advisor in the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina), and Sloba Starovic (a car mechanic from the automobile club from Foca). This court sentenced many Bosniaks to death by shooting.¹⁷⁴

Among other things, “**the crisis headquarters**” secured recruits, supplies, material and moral support to the military units, armed and organized Serbs into armed formations, offered them logistical and financial support,¹⁷⁵ facilitated the formation of Serb police forces in

¹⁷² Ibid., paragraphs 44-46.

¹⁷³ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-1264, CONCLUSIONS from the meeting of the Crisis Headquarters of the Serb Municipality of Vogosca, held on May 16, 1992. In this order, Milan Borovcanin, a police officer, was assigned to execute the “**cleansing**”, that is, execution of the genocide. In addition to Borovcanin, the accomplishment of this goal required “**securing of one more man**” (Ibid.).

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., inv. No. 2-571.

¹⁷⁵ ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraphs 241-252. Thus, in the organization of Jovan Tintor, commander of the “Crisis headquarters of the Serb Municipality of Vogosca”, and president of the Municipal Board of the Serb Democratic Party, and member of the War Presidency of this “Serb” municipality, the arms from the JNA barracks were distributed to the “depraved” Serb people. The tanks with fuel from the **JNA barracks in Semizovac and Misoca** went into the “Serb” areas. The part of profit from its sale was coming into the pockets of Jovan Tintor, who used the thus obtained money to buy the trust of the leaders of the SDS (E. Muracevic, **UBIJENE I NESTALE ZRTVE ZLOCINA U VOGOSCI, 1992-1995**, Sarajevo 2001, pp. 32-33).

In mid-May of 1992, the Crisis Headquarters of the Serb Municipality of Vogosca, headed by commander Jovan Tintor, brought a number of orders. The order of May 14, 1992, for taking over of the “**garrison in Semizovac with all its material resources and equipment**” and the Order of May 16, 1992, “**for taking over of the Barracks in Semizovac**” explicitly state that both are “**being placed under the command of the Crisis Headquarters of the Serb Municipality of Vogosca, which**

municipalities, including the expulsion of non-Serbs from police forces, etc. The mandatory military presence in “the crisis headquarters of Serb people” ensured the hierarchy of the occupying power.¹⁷⁶

In compliance with formation of the ethnically pure Serb territories, the “crisis headquarters” also undertook other criminal activities, such as: they decided on suspensions of inflow of potable water into the city of Sarajevo; evacuation of Serb population from populated places before the Serb military attacks; formation, control and access to detainment centre and concentration camps; issued orders for arrest of persons and whole categories of people; exchanged detainees and camp inmates from such places; ordered release of detainees and inmates from camps and prisons; control of local radio stations and other media, which they used for broadcasting of their orders and decisions, etc.¹⁷⁷

The persecution and deportation, mainly of Bosniaks, was, in addition to dismissals of the non-Serb population from jobs, control of the freedom of movement, formation of courts and appointment of judges,

is under the single command of the Armed Forces of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina” (AIIZ, inv. No. 3-1187, Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serb Municipality of Vogosca – Crisis Headquarters, no. 117/92, Vogosca, May 14, 1992 - to the Command of the garrison in Semizovac; AIIZ, inv. No. 2-1264, CONCLUSIONS FROM THE MEETING of the Crisis Headquarters of the Serb Municipality of Vogosca, held on May 16, 1992). This enlivened the words of the leader **Radovan Karadzic** from November 1991, that **“the Serbs have no need for a ‘party army’, the Army is there! It just happens that their and our goals overlap completely”** (BILTEN of the State Commission for Gathering of Facts on War Crimes on the Territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, no. 7, Sarajevo, February 1994, p. 7).

¹⁷⁶ Ibid. The JNA commanders and their representatives were mainly members of the “crisis headquarters” and attended their sessions. Some members of the “crisis headquarters” were even in personal contact with General Mladic (Ibid., paragraph 251).

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., paragraph 253. Thus, for example, **Slavko Jovanovic**, on behalf of **Jovan Tintor**, president of the Crisis Headquarters of the “Serb Municipality of Vogosca”, issued order no. E 12/92, dated May 2, 1992, ordering Zeljka Beganovic to **“make the Kon-Tiki pension in Vogosca available”** to the Serb police forces, **“in order to hear the arrested and detained persons”**. This order was **“immediately executed by Branko Vlaco and the Police Precinct of the Serb Municipality of Vogosca”** (AIIZ, inv. No. 3-1189, Serb Assembly of the Vogosca Municipality, **Crisis Headquarters, No. 12/92**, Vogosca, May 2, 1992, ORDER).

a continued activity of the “crisis headquarters”. Thus, just as an example, “the Crisis Headquarters” of Kljuc “**resolved the issue related to the organized departure of Muslims, as well as related to the essential issue of status of Muslims**”. In Bosanska Krupa, the “War Presidency” suggested two options for the elimination of Bosniaks: either to organize their deportation from this territory, or this shall be executed by use of military means.¹⁷⁸

Also, the “crisis headquarters” organized the persecution of Bosniaks also by formation of “committees for emigration”, “travel agencies” [sic], and “exchange agencies”. In this, they determined the criteria for departure, including payment of services and signing of the forms stating that the Bosniaks are leaving “on a voluntary basis”. To this aim they organized convoys, buses and police escorts. In addition to this, “the crisis headquarters” also organized and supervised selection and division, that is, plundering, of the non-Serb property, and participated in its seizing.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., paragraphs 254-256. On May 31, 1992, commander of the 30th Partisan Division (colonel Stanislav Galic) issued the Order for formation of the Command for Defence of Kljuc, composed of 2-3 members of the Crisis Headquarters (AIIZ, inv. No. 2631, Command of the 30th Partisan Division, SC no. 939-1, May 31, 1992).

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., paragraphs 256-257. The commander of the “crisis headquarters” of the “Serb Municipality of Vogosca”, Jovan Tintor, is also responsible for the plundering and devastation of the UNIS factories in Vogosca, primarily for stealing of vehicles and spare parts from the **Sarajevo Vehicle Factory TAS**. In the extraordinary listing of vehicles, made in the period from April 22-28, 1992, (from the March barricades, the Factory was in the hands of the Serb criminals), on the parking lots of the TAS the following status of vehicles was found: on the stock were **1,924** Golf and Caddy vehicles for the Yugoslav (YU) market, **28** consignment vehicles (foreign commodities) for the YU market, **18** registered cars (Audi, Passat), of the Volkswagen contracted workers employed at the TAS, **30** registered cars in the vehicle pool of the TAS, **10** Golf cars, type A3 (“0” series), and some **2,200** vehicles in parts (AIIZ, inv. No. 3-1196, the Sarajevo Vehicle Factory TAS – to the Executive Board of the SO Vogosca, Report for the period from April through August 1992, August 25, 1992). All these vehicles were stolen within three months, which was also confirmed by the “war commissioner” of the “Serb Municipality of Vogosca”, in its enactment no. **03-140/92, dated August 3, 1992**, which, informing the Command of the Blazuj Brigade to have two Golf cars and one Caddy assigned to them, and “**that on the TAS stock there are no vehicles for over one month, because they have mainly been stolen, so we can not meet your request**” (AIIZ, inv. No. 3-

In the Decision, which formed war presidencies in the municipalities during immediate war danger or state of war, taken on May 31, 1992, by the “Presidency of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, the “crisis headquarters” were renamed into “**war presidencies**”.¹⁸⁰ Those bodies were made up of: the republic commissioner, and “**as a rule**”, the president of the municipal assembly or his deputy (that is, vice president) and the president of the Executive board or his deputy (or, the vice president) or a citizen from among the delegates or board members.¹⁸¹

“The war presidencies” were formed “**in the municipalities of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in which the assembly and executive body can not exercise power**”. “The war presidency” organized, coordinated and harmonized activities “**for defence of the Serb people and establishment of the legal bodies of power of the municipality**”; performed “**all the function of the assembly and the executive body unless the conditions are in place for these bodies to convene and work**”, secured “**conditions for the work of military**

1195, Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serb Municipality of Vogosca, - to the War Commissioner, No. 03-140/92, Vogosca, August 3, 1992 – to the Command of the Blazuj Brigade).

¹⁸⁰ AIIZ, inv. No. 3-1189, Decision for formation of war presidencies..., confidential, no. 03-512, Sarajevo, May 31, 1992. This decision determined that “**the crisis headquarters in the municipalities of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina**”, on the date of constitution of the “**war presidency**” (that is, in mid-June 1992), - “**War Presidencies shall be constituted within 15 days from the date this decision comes into effect**”), “**shall cease from operating**” (Ibid.). This decision, assessing that the “crisis headquarters” had played their role, was personally signed by Radovan Karadzic, president of the “Presidency of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina” (Ibid.).

¹⁸¹ Ibid. “**The Presidency of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina appointed the republic commissioner for the purpose of offering expert and other assistance**”. He had broad powers (“...he shall have the rights and the duty to undertake all measures related to filling in, organization and work of the war presidency and to ensure permanent coordination and implementation of policy and measures as determined and passed by the republic state bodies and the Main Headquarters of the army of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina”). “The republic commissioner” could also be “**authorized to cover the territories of a number of individual municipalities in compliance with the organization of the army of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina**” (Ibid.).

bodies and units in defence of the Serb people”; and performed **“other tasks of state bodies if they were not able to convene”**.¹⁸²

“The war presidencies”, ensuring the conditions for the work of military bodies and units in the **“defence”** and **“liberation”** war of the Serb people at the municipal level, and coordinating and implementing the policy and measures as determined and passed by the political and military bodies of the collaborationist Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and copying the bodies of the Third Reich, passed the racist conclusions, decisions and orders for execution of crimes against the Bosniaks.¹⁸³ The “republic commissioners” played a special role

¹⁸² Ibid.

¹⁸³ *The war presidency* of the Celinac Municipality, on July 23, 1992, adopted **“the conclusion on the status of the non-Serb population”**, by which the citizens from this category were denied their fundamental human rights. Based on this conclusion, the non-Serb population had to **“adhere to the following rules:**

- **it is not permitted to move around the city between 4 PM and 6 AM;**
- **it is not permitted to stay on the streets, in restaurants, or in other public places;**
- **it is not permitted to bathe in the rivers of Vrbanja and Josavka, nor to fish or hunt in general;**
- **it is not permitted to travel to other cities without prior approval;**
- **it is not permitted to possess fire arms, regardless of possessing the appropriate permit;**
- **it is not permitted to drive motor vehicles;**
- **it is not permitted to stay in groups of more than three persons;**
- **it is not permitted to communicate without approval with the citizens who are not residents of Celinac, meaning that their potential visit has to be announced;**
- **it is not permitted to wear military, police or forestry uniform;**
- **it is not permitted to sell land property nor exchange apartments without special permits from the municipal bodies”** (: **ETNICKO CISCENJE – GENOCID ZA VELIKU SRBIJU**, Documentation of the Gesellschaft für bedrohte Völker /prepared by Tillman Zülch, Sarajevo 1996, pp. 83-84, and 88-89; B. Macic, **ZLOCINI PROTIV MIRA**, Sarajevo 2001, pp. 376-378). The goal of those **“clearly”** defined rights and obligations was the fight for territories, that is, formation of ethnically pure (Serb) areas.

The municipal secretarial for urban planning, legal property, housing and utility affairs and cadastre of real estate of the Municipality of Vogosca, based on the Decision of the **War Headquarters**, on July 7, 1992, took the decision, according to which **“the**

in this. In the letter to the “war presidency” of the “Serb RBiH”, on June 24, 1992, the commissioner of the Serb Municipality of Vogosca, **Dr. Nikola Poplasen, among other things, proposed that the prison in Vogosca be immediately converted into a “department of the penitentiary and corrective institution of Butmir or Pale”**.¹⁸⁴ In the Decision of the War Commissioner of the Serb Municipality of Vogosca, no. 03-99/92, dated July 15, 1992, also signed by the “republic commissioner” Dr. Nikola Poplasen, Salko Halac was released “**during the day of isolation while the works on water installations at the Pretis enterprise are underway**”, in order to supply the Vogosca city with water, and after the completed task, “**he was supposed to be re-subjected to previous treatment**”.¹⁸⁵ Even the orders for “**releasing to freedom**” of certain “**detainees of the Muslim ethnicity**”, personally signed by Dr. Nikola Poplasen,¹⁸⁶ suggest the criminal activity of the bodies of the collaborationist Republika Srpska.

Ministry of Justice, for the needs of the department of the Prison of the Serb municipality of Vogosca, grants for use the house of Almas and Miralem Planjo – Semizovac (AIIZ, inv. No. 3-1193, Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serb Municipality of Vogosca, Municipal Secretariat for urban planning, legal property, housing and utility affairs and cadastre of real estate, No. 06-1-340/92 Vogosca, July 8, 1992, DECISION).

¹⁸⁴ AIIZ, inv. No. 3-1192, Serb Municipality of Vogosca, Dr. Nikola Poplasen, republic commissioner – to the Serb Republic of BiH – to the War Presidency – Pale, June 24, 1992.

¹⁸⁵ AIIZ, inv. No. 3-1194, Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serb Municipality of Vogosca – **War Commissioner**, No. 03-99/92, Vogosca, July 15, 1992, DECISION.

¹⁸⁶ AIIZ, inv. No. 3-1198, Republika Srpska, Serb Municipality of Vogosca – **War Commissioner**, No. 03-164/92, Vogosca, November 6, 1992, ORDER; Ibid., inv. No. 3-1199, Republika Srpska, Serb Municipality of Vogosca – War Commissioner, No. 03-163/92, Vogosca, November 6, 1992, ORDER; Ibid., inv. No. 3-1200, Republika Srpska, Serb Municipality of Vogosca – War Commissioner, No. 03-165/92, Vogosca, November 6, 1992.

3. The Greater Serbia Strategic Goals in Bosnia and Herzegovina

In the overall Yugoslav crisis, the sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina and its bodies of authority in all the discussions for rearrangement or division of the joint state advocated for the position on its survival, regardless of the form (federation or confederation), even agreeing to asymmetric variants. After the putsch at the Presidency of the SFRY, on October 14, the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted **the Memorandum (Letter of Intention) and the Platform on the Position of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Future System of the Yugoslav Union**.¹⁸⁷ Due to the specificity of its multiethnic composition, it saw the condition for its survival in such a union only in the case that Serbia and Croatia remain within it, and it proclaimed itself neutral in their mutual conflict. Under the conditions of silent occupation and the initiated Hague Conference (from October 8, its efforts were joined in by the special envoy of the United Nations Secretary General, Cyrus Vance), the results of this conference and the position of the European Community were waited for a whole 100 days.

Unlike them, upon the orders of its bosses from Belgrade and Zagreb, two of the three coalition partners in power, not leaving their positions in it, intensified their fifth columnist activity and destruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina at all levels.

The Brussels **Declaration on Yugoslavia** dated December 17, 1991, based on the recommendations of Badenteur's (Robert Badenteur)

¹⁸⁷ K. Begic, the aforementioned work, pp. 41-42, and 71-72; O. Ibrahimagic, **POLITICKI SISTEM BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE**, Volume 1, Textbook with Chrestomathy, Sarajevo 1999, pp. 243-246.

Arbitration Commission dated December 7,¹⁸⁸ **dissolution (break-up) of the SFRY was established** and the republics were invited to **declare about independence by December 23, 1991**, with a promise that they would recognize them by January 15, 1992. Bosnia and Herzegovina filed in a timely **Application** and responded to the **Questionnaire** of the Arbitration Commission, and by that time, the working text of the Draft Constitution of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina had also been prepared.¹⁸⁹

On that day only (January 15, 1992), the (new) Report of Badenteur's Arbitration Commission was issued, in which constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a sovereign and independent state was only still conditioned by the referendum of its citizens, as the other conditions from the December Declaration of the European Community had been met.¹⁹⁰

Based on this, on January 26, 1992, the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina rendered the Decision on Announcing of Referendum on the future status of the Republic. The referendum was scheduled and held on February 29, and March 1, 1992.

¹⁸⁸ After it “**studied the memorandums and documents prepared by the Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Croatia, Macedonia, Slovenia, and Serbia and the president of the collective Presidency of the SFRY**”, on December 7, 1991, the Arbitration Commission brought a clear position on the status of the SFRY:

- **The Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia is in the process of dissolution;**
- **It is upon the republics to resolve the problem of succession of the state that may thereof arise, in adherence with the principles and rules of international law, particularly in terms of respecting of human rights, rights of nations and minorities;**
- **Those republics that so wish may form a new association in which democratic institutions would exist of their choice**” (K. Begic, the aforementioned work, p. 33; S. Mesic, **KAKO JE SRUSENA JUGOSLAVIJA** - politicki memoari, Zagreb 1994, p. 315).

On December 9, 1991, in a letter to the Chairman of the Conference, the four-member Presidency of the SFRY assessed that the opinion of the Arbitration Commission is unacceptable. For more details on this, see: K. Begic, the aforementioned work, p. 34.

Badinteur's Commission, certified by the European Community, **established that SFRY ceased to exist by dissolution (break-up), and not by secession of individual states** (K. Begic, the aforementioned work, pp. 35-38).

¹⁸⁹ K. Begic, the aforementioned work, pp. 38-53.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

Thus, under international control, under the conditions of practical occupation of the country, accomplished by the increasing density of possession by the JNA and the illegally armed Serb armed formations; under refusal by the municipalities in which the “SAO-ization” had been completed to participate in preparations and organization of the referendum; and the attempts to redefine of the referendum question for independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the part of the Croat Democratic Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina (the so-called Livno issue), and other organized forms of destruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a significant pressure on the voters had been made. Of the 3,253,847 registered voters, in spite of the obstructions and pressures by the Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the established illegal bodies of the Republic of Serb Bosnia and Herzegovina in a significant number of municipalities, 2,073,568, or 64.95% of the total voters **responded. A positive answer** to the referendum question (sovereignty and independence) was given by 2,061,932, or **63.95% per cent** of the potential number of voters, or, 99.44% per cent of the number of voters who came to the referendum to vote (only 6,037 voters or 0.19% per cent of the voting constituency of Bosnia and Herzegovina were not in favour the referendum question).¹⁹¹

¹⁹¹ K. Begic, the aforementioned work, pp. 71-79; S. Cekic, the aforementioned work, pp. 312-313. 63.95 per cent of the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina voted for a sovereign and independent Bosnia and Herzegovina. This was a great political victory and an additional legitimacy before the international community in favour for the sought and expected recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an independent state. The Serb Democratic Party forbade the Serbs to go out to the referendum. The JNA also joined in making pressure on the voters. The main board of the Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina issued and distributed “THE DECREE FOR THE SERB PEOPLE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA”, under the title of “**WE HAVE HAD OUR OWN PLEBISCITE**”. In this announcement, all the “**Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina**” were appealed upon not to participate in preparation and implementation of the referendum, because at the “**forthcoming so-called referendum the Serbs have nothing to vote for**”, because this was allegedly “**voting for the other peoples**”. The announcement ended with the following wording: “**THE REFERENDUM? NO, THANKS!**” (AIIZ, inv. No. 3-354/9, DECREE FOR THE SERB PEOPLE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA – WE HAVE HAD OUR OWN PLEBISCITE”).

In another proclamation under the title of “**WHAT IT MEANS TO LIVE IN A SOVEREIGN BOSNIA?**” some monstrous lies were presented about how “**by voting at the referendum the Serb citizens would lose the current status of a state constitutive and equal nation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and would become an ethnic minority**”

After the Referendum and extended consultations with the allies, on April 6, 1992, the European Community recognized the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the next day this was also done by the United States of America. **Bosnia and Herzegovina was thus internationally recognized and had hence acquired full state sovereignty and its international legal subjectivity.**¹⁹²

Ignoring the results of the Hague Conference on Yugoslavia, under the conditions of silent occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the developed illegal apparatus of the still unproclaimed Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which initially had had five “Serb autonomous areas”,

in an Islamic state”. This “**so-called referendum is just a mean to accomplish the ultimate goal: THE ISLAMIC STATE, whose democratic principles are best expressed in the ‘Islamic Declaration’ by Mr. Alija Izetbegovic**” (AIIZ, inv. No. 3-488, WHAT IT MEANS TO LIVE IN A SOVEREIGN BOSNIA?). Obviously, Goebels could have been envious of the above propaganda of Nazi character!

On the roads of delivery of voting boxes to the centres for voting and counting of the votes, the members of the Serb Democratic Party imposed obstacles, and at the same time, JNA airplanes were throwing down leaflets appealing the voters why they should boycott the referendum. The commander of the 2nd Military District, general Kukanjac, on this occasion tricked the public by stating: “The famous referendum designed by Alija Izetbegovic was ended on March 1, 1992. It caused spontaneous reactions by the Serbs, who, due to fear from the attack by the Muslims, in the night between March 1 and 2, raised barricades on the streets of Sarajevo”. At the time in Sarajevo, according to Kukanjac, the Serbs set up twelve barricades and the Muslims set up two, and his command allegedly “managed to prevent the armed conflict” (Z. Suljevic, the aforementioned work, pp. 66-67).

Incidents were recorded in some places (like for instance, in Bosanski Brod, where the “TO exercise” prevented access by voters at two voting stations; in the Overhaul Centre in Hadzici, on that working day, five thousand workers received leaflets containing the message that they should not respond to the referendum; in Gornja Bijela, near Konjic, a bomb was set up at the voting station); blocked roads and railways (like in the Doboje region), blocked bus lines (from Foca to Sarajevo), set up explosions (in Cajnice); in Sarajevo, as organized by the JNA, the Serb Democratic Party set up barricades, thus blocking the capital; in some places, due to the obstruction by the local authorities and prevention of work of the voting commissions appointed by the Republic Election Commission, there was no voting of citizens at the referendum at all (in Bosansko Grahovo and Drvar – the members of the Commission had been arrested in Drvar), and the like (K. Begic, the aforementioned work, pp. 77-78, note 10).

¹⁹² Ibid., pp. 71-79.

with some thirty municipalities, was persistently working on the formation of the “**Republic of the Serb People of Bosnia and Herzegovina**” and expansion of its territory to include as large number of Serb settlements as possible in the municipalities with a non-Serb majority, so as to ensure a better position in negotiations with Tudjman about the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

This was, among other things, also reflected in refusal of preparations for the referendum of citizens that had been ordered in the Brussels EC Declaration of December 17, 1991, as well as in building of parallel connections between the illegal bodies of the Assembly of the Serb People of BiH, followed by the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its connection with the bodies of the future Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It was officially proclaimed only on April 27, 1992, when all the options had failed that pursuant to the alleged right of the Serb people to secession from Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, its rule gets expanded to cover almost the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In order to try and prevent the referendum ordered in the Brussels EC Declaration of December 17, 1991, the leadership of the Greater Serbia movement ordered its fifth columnist posts in Bosnia and Herzegovina that by the Serb New Year’s Day of 1992 they proclaim the federal unit in the composition of the “**federal state of Yugoslavia**”. Therefore, at its third session, held on December 21, 1991, the Assembly of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina brought the “**Decision to Proceed with Formation of the Republic of Serb Bosnia and Herzegovina**”, as a “**federal unit in the composition of the federal state of Yugoslavia**”. The position was taken that the Republic of Serb Bosnia and Herzegovina will be “**formed**”, in compliance with the results of the plebiscite of the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, no later than by the Serb New Year’s Day of 1992. It was planned that all the activities on formation of the Serb para-state were to be implemented by the bodies of the Assembly of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina.¹⁹³

¹⁹³ AIIZ, inv. No. 3-493/6, Decision to Proceed with Formation of the Republic of Serb Bosnia and Herzegovina, *Javnost*, December 28, 1991, p. 4; *Sluzbeni glasnik srpskog naroda u Bosni i Herzegovini*, No. 1, Sarajevo, January 15, 1992, p. 9.

When Prof. Dr. Vojislav Maksimovic “**announced the decision to being preparations for formation of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, all the delegates**

At this session, “**the Serb assembly**” also appointed “**the ministerial council**”, that is, “**the government**”. Dr. Miodrag Simovic was elected the “**President of the Government**”, and he had already been Vice President in the Government of SR Bosnia and Herzegovina. Also, the coordinator was elected for the “**governments of all the Serb autonomous areas**”.¹⁹⁴

At the same session, “**another, no less significant decision was made, which also made everybody present stand up on their feet**”, that was the recognition of the same such Serb para-state creation – the Republic of Serbian Krajina, which was formed in Croatia, through genocidal actions and other crimes, as “a federal unit of Yugoslavia”.¹⁹⁵

rose up, and welcomed the announcement of this historic action with a strong applause. This republic should encompass almost all the areas in which the Serb people had voted at the plebiscite for survival in the joint state, and it would have the status of a federal unit in the future Yugoslavia. It was also decided that the Serb Bosnia and Herzegovina would be officially proclaimed by no later than mid-January 1992, more exactly, by the symbolical holiday – the Serb New Year’s Day” (Ibid.).

During the session of the “Assembly of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, directly broadcast by televisions of Belgrade and Novi Sad, “numerous telegrams were received as support from friends from many parts”, on the occasion of proclamation of “independence of the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and its joining the Serb people within Serbia”. For more details on this, see *Javnost*, December 28, 1991, p. 4.

¹⁹⁴ *Javnost*, December 28, 1991, p. 4. The members of the “government” elected were: Ranko Nikolic, Vitomir Zepinic, Ljubisav Terzic, Momcilo Pejic, Milivoje Nadazdin, Branko Djeric, Mico Stanistic, Bozidar Antic, David Balaban, Velibor Ostojic, Vladimir Zrelec, Sava Djeklic, Ljubomir Zukovic, Tatjana Starovic-Medan, Stevo Borozan, Nedeljko Lajic, Milorad Skoko, Jovan Cizmovic, and all the presidents of the “governments of the Serb autonomous areas” in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Ibid.).

¹⁹⁵ AIIZ, inv. No. 3-493/6, Decision to Proceed with Formation of the Republic of Serb Bosnia and Herzegovina; *Javnost*, December 28, 1991, p. 4.

On the **St. Nicholas Day**, i.e. on December 19, 1991, in the capacity of the Constituent Assembly, the Assembly of the SAO Krajina proclaimed “**a new republic on the Yugoslav territory – Serbian Krajina**”. On this occasion, the “**constitution**” was adopted, and the first “**president**” was elected in this “**republic**”.

“**Serbian Krajina**” covered an area of 12,000 square kilometres, with some 300,000 inhabitants in 17 municipalities (Benkovac, Dvor na Uni, Donji Lapac, Glina, Gracac, Knin, Korenica, Karlovac, Okucani, Petrinja, Pakrac, Vojnic, Vrgin Most, Slunj, Sisak-Caprag, and Obrovac. The borders of “**Serbian Krajina**” extended from the Kupa river down to the Adriatic Sea.

The adoption of the “**decision**” for initiation of the process of formation of the “**Serb republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina**”, meant bringing of the decision on consent for formation of the “**joint state of the Serb people**”, that is, “**Greater Serbia**”. The more so, because, in the assessment of the Executive Board of the Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina of February 19, 1992, “**the place of the Republic of the Serb People of BiH is in the joint state of the Serb people...**”.¹⁹⁶

At the fifth session, held on January 9, 1992, the Assembly of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted the “**Declaration for Proclamation of the Republic of the Serb People of Bosnia and Herzegovina**”, as the last enactment in preparation for formation of the Republic of the Serb People of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a federal unit of the neighbouring state. This illegal enactment, which came into effect immediately, on January 9, proclaimed “**the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the territories of Serb autonomous regions and areas, and other Serb Ethnic Entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina**”, as a “**federal unit in composition of the federal state of Yugoslavia**”.¹⁹⁷

“*Serbian Krajina*” was “defined as an ethnic state of the Serb people and the state of all the citizens populating it”. Article 123 of its “constitution” stated that this “new state” would “build strong state relationships in order to create the joint state of the Serb people”.

On December 19, 1991, in Beli Manastir, the “large people’s assembly of SAO Slavonia, Baranja and West Srem” also took the decision to be in the composition of the “Republic of Serbian Krajina”, with Knin as the capital (*Javnost*, December 21, 1991, p. 12).

¹⁹⁶ AIIZ, inv. No. 3-292, Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Executive Board, no: 490-02/92, Sarajevo, February 19, 1992 – to the municipal boards of the SDS of BiH, regional boards of the SDS of BiH, Subject: Delivery about the Referendum: CONCLUSIONS of the Assembly of the Republic of Serb People of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at the session of January 26, 1992.

¹⁹⁷ *Javnost*, January 11, 1992, p. 1.

From early January 1992 on, the SDS was constantly setting up blockades, in particular of the municipal and administrative bodies. This activity was particularly strong with the SDS of Foca, which resulted by their leaving of the Municipal Assembly. Namely, at the meeting held on January 8, 1992, the SDS delegates “**unanimously decided not to attend the seventh regular session of the Municipal Assembly of Foca, scheduled for January 9, 1992**”. In relation to this, they stated six “reasons”, among which expectation of “**the final and concrete decision of the Assembly of the Serb People of Bosnia and Herzegovina**”, which followed on January 9, with the adoption of the

Thus, this collaborationist creation was formed as a federal unit of the joint state of the Serb people, which had existed since October 3, 1991.

Pursuant to the Declaration on Proclamation of the Republic of Serb People of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Assembly of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina, under the chairmanship of Momcilo Krajisnik, at its session held on February 28, 1992, that is, immediately before the referendum for independent and sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina, brought the **“Decision for Proclamation of the Constitution of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina”**.¹⁹⁸ In addition, this illegal

Declaration Proclaiming the collaborationist Republic of the Serb People (AIIZ, inv. No. 3-1082/13, Serb Democratic Party of BiH, Municipal Board of the SDS of Foca, no. 157/92 Foca, January 9, 1992, Conclusions from the session of the Club of Delegates of the SDS of Foca; AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2235, Transcript of the conversation between V.V. and Dj. M.).

At the end of the session, **“one more decision was adopted, perhaps symbolical but an exceptionally important one. Alija Izetbegovic and Haris Silajdzic were definitively denied the right to represent the Serb people and make decisions on their behalf at various international conferences and meetings, and the United Nations Secretary General Boutros-Ghali and Lord Carrington shall be sent a telegram informing them to this effect”** (Ibid.).

At this session, Radovan Karadzic spoke too, and his presentation, “according to the expectations, was the one that attracted most attention”. In a “spirited speech”, among other things, he pointed out that “there is no one who can introduce an ‘independent’ Bosnian-Herzegovinian state that would reach farther than the Kozja Cuprija Bridge in Sarajevo” (Ibid.).

¹⁹⁸ *Sluzbeni glasnik srpskog naroda u Bosni i Hercegovini*, no. 3, March 16, 1992, pp. 2-26; **Constitution of the Republika Srpska and the Amendments**, Sarajevo, February of 1995, p. 22.

Formation of the *Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina*, in the assessment of the SDS of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was the **“historical decision of the Serb people”**. At the press conference of the SDS, in mid-January 1992, the journalists in attendance received the communiqué which, among other things, stated: **“The Serb Assembly adopted the historical decision proclaiming the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. With this historical action, the Serb people have expressed the commitment and the decisiveness to live in the federal state of Yugoslavia... BiH is an integral part of Yugoslavia and as such it has existed in the minds of our people, and, therefore, it is quite logical and normal that the Croats in BiH be a bridge to Croatia, whereas the Serbs would be a bridge to Serbia. The classical borders between the republics are unacceptable for the Serbs...”** (*Javnost*, January 18, 1992, p. 3).

body on that same day passed a number of laws on formation of all the important bodies of the collaborationist Republika Srpska: Law on the Government, Law on State Administration, Law on National Defence, Law on Interior Affairs, Law on Public Information, Law on the National Bank, Law on the Payment System and Financial Control, Law on Public Revenues and Expenses, and the Decision on Foundation of the “Radio-Television of the Serb People of Bosnia and Herzegovina”.¹⁹⁹ Later on, many other legal enactments were also passed, and the state administration apparatus was also appointed.²⁰⁰

The bringing of the “Declaration on Proclamation of the Republic of Serb People of Bosnia and Herzegovina” and the “Decision on Proclamation of the Constitution of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina” meant constitution of the Serb collaborationist state within Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a federal unit “**within the composition of the federal state of Yugoslavia**”.

Pursuant to the Constitution, promulgated on February 28, 1992, the territory of the “Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina” was made up of the “**territories of autonomous areas, municipalities and other Serb ethnic entities, including the territories in which the crime of genocide had been committed over the Serb people in WWII**” (Art. 2), and were located “**in the composition of the federal state of Yugoslavia**” (Art. 3).²⁰¹

Not only that the proclamation of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was illegitimate and illegal, but the territory was also undefined to that extent that it can be also interpreted as covering the whole territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, on which that “Assembly” did not have power. The more so, because this was done so in order to disguise the invasion by a foreign neighbouring state.

¹⁹⁹ *Sluzbeni glasnik srpskog naroda u Bosni i Hercegovini*, no. 4, March 23, 1992, pp. 53-116.

²⁰⁰ ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraphs 49, 50, 54, and 230. Obviously, everything had been prepared and developed outside Bosnia and Herzegovina.

²⁰¹ **USTAV SRPSKE REPUBLIKE BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE**, *Sluzbeni glasnik srpskog naroda u Bosni i Hercegovini*, No. 3, Sarajevo, March 16, 1992, p. 17.

The Assembly of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina offered support to the JNA in the mobilization of the Serb people, in order to participate in the units under the command of the JNA, for execution of the aggression and other forms of crimes in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. To this goal, at the session of November 21, 1991, the following conclusions were adopted:

“ - full support shall be given to the Yugoslav Army in defence of the joint state of Yugoslavia (I).

- full support shall be given to the Yugoslav Army in mobilization of the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to fill in military formations (II).

- the Serb people is invited, as well as the other people who wish to preserve Yugoslavia, to make sure they respond to military invitations (III)”.²⁰²

On December 11, **“the Serb Assembly”** sent the **“Request to the Yugoslav National Army”** seeking that **“it use all means it has available to defend the territories of Bosnia and Herzegovina as integral parts of the state of Yugoslavia, on which the plebiscite of the Serb people and other citizens was conducted for remaining in the joint state of Yugoslavia”.**²⁰³

The process of normative and factual formation of the **“Republic of the Serb people”** was simultaneously accompanied with the activities aiming to have this community protected by military means as well, due to which, at the session held on December 11, 1991, **“the Assembly of the Serb people”** brought the **“Recommendation to the Armed Forces of the SFRY for Preservation of the Territorial Integrity of Yugoslavia”**, which was signed by Momcilo Krajisnik.²⁰⁴ In fact, this

²⁰² AIIZ, inv. No. 3-453, Conclusions; *Javnost*, December 7, 1991, p. 10; *Sluzbeni glasnik srpskog naroda u Bosni i Hercegovini*, No. 1, Sarajevo, January 15, 1992, p. 9.

²⁰³ AIIZ, inv. No. 3-492/4, Request to the Yugoslav National Army, Sarajevo, December 11, 1991.

²⁰⁴ AIIZ, inv. No. 3-492/3, Recommendations to the armed forces for preservation of the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. The Recommendation, among other things, emphasizes as follows:

documentation openly sought **“the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia”** within some other borders, which is just a corroboration of the break-up of Yugoslavia, and the order for that had been received from Belgrade.

In early 1992 (between January 9 and February 19), the para-state bodies of the collaborationist Republic of Serb Bosnia and Herzegovina, among which the Assembly of Republika Srpska, sent the **“Request to the Chief of Staff of the General Headquarters of the OS (Armed Forces) SFRY, and commanders of the 2nd and 4th military districts** (marked strictly confidential, state secret – for personal use only), seeking from the JNA as follows:

“1. Provision for use of arms and ammunition; automatic guns, machine guns, pistols, sniper guns, and hand grenade launchers and recoilless cannons (where the TO does not possess them), appropriate types and quantities of ammunition.

2. Provision for use of transport means: all-terrain vehicles (where they can not be provided from the list), armoured transporters and one helicopter each (for the regional law enforcement centres). Before the transport means are sent out of the warehouse, or out of the unit, they need to be painted in blue and marked with the sign “POLICE”.

3. Provision for use of the other resources: long-range communication radio devices (district-district, district-Government, Government-federal bodies, and we particularly need help in organization of communications and drafting and use of documents

“The Assembly of the Serb People provides unreserved support to the Yugoslav National Army and its efforts to preserve the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia within the borders and with the peoples who wish to remain within it, about which the Serb people of Bosnia and Herzegovina has clearly declared at the plebiscite held on November 9 and 19, 1991.

Starting from the constitutional role of the JNA, the Assembly of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina rightfully expects and invites the JNA, in case of threat to the Serb territories in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Serb people, as well as other peoples living on these territories in Bosnia and Herzegovina, issued by any party or any side, to offer all the required protection in defence of human lives and their property” (Ibid.).

for protection of secrecy of communications), geographic maps of the Serb territories (1:100,000, or 1:50,000), blue (air force) uniforms which would be used for the reserve police forces supplemented with the appropriate emblems”.²⁰⁵

In the above request, the authorities of the collaborationist “Republika Srpska” in the aforementioned request from the JNA also support in taking over the control over **“the Serb territories in BiH which remain within Yugoslavia”**; bringing of certain units onto the positions with which efficient assistance can be given in protecting of the border areas of the **“Serb territories”**; readiness for very quick provision of assistance in establishing control over the territory; urgent placing under control and securing of federal and republic commodity reserves and specific purpose industry facilities, until the final settlement on division of property is reached.²⁰⁶

Acting through the Assembly of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the leadership of the Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina was intensively working on breaking up of the information space of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Such a statement may, among other things, also be illustrated by the fact that **“after presentation by Velibor Ostojic, information minister”**, the Assembly of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina, at the session held on November 21, 1991, brought the conclusions proposing to the Club of Serb Delegates at the Assembly of SR Bosnia and Herzegovina **“for the division on property in joint media and creation of separate radio and TV channels”**. **“The share of property in the joint media will be used to create the basis for opening of the Serb radio-television in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which will inform objectively, truthfully and fairly about its people”**, states the aforementioned decision.²⁰⁷

In its numerous presentations, the leadership of the Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina instigated **ethnic hatred and**

²⁰⁵ AIIZ, inv. No. 3-1175.

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

²⁰⁷ AIIZ, inv. No. 3-491/12, CONCLUSIONS of the Assembly of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina, from the session held on November 21, 1991.

intolerance, aggressive war, break-up of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, that is, secessionism, and openly and clearly presented the aggressive and genocidal intentions against Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosniaks, and there are many facts corroborating this. In the introductory speech at the 2nd session of the Assembly of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina, held on November 21, 1991, in capacity of the Chairman of the “**Assembly**”, among other things, Momcilo Krajisnik said:

“We are now, and I am convinced of this, in a decisive time for the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina as for its survival, and I would also dare say – even much further and much broader than when the Serb people as a whole is at stake. We do not all of us seem to be equally aware of this fact, so everything that we are doing seems to be normal and everyday things. Those who are not aware of their role, and the acts they are making, should not be scorned, but they need to be reminded of this. Due to this, dear gentlemen, I am hereby reminding you: you are the creators of the new history of the Serb nation [underlined by M. K.], but not just of the Serb history, but the history of all the peoples as well who live in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Yugoslavia, who care about preservation of the state.

The Serbs are hard to set aflame, but even harder to put out.

It is normal, dear delegates, and this is in the tradition of the Serb democracy, if we have created the assembly of the Serb people in BiH, then we had to be aware – and we were aware – of that with the Assembly of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina, we would also receive own opposition in the same house.

We have the design the function of regions and autonomous areas in order to preserve the unity of the Serb nation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is why we should not allow that regions become separate entities divided from the other Serb people. The essence is in that, dear delegates, and you know it, I will only emphasize it on this occasion – that the Serb people not needs but must – and we had been thought this lesson by the history or our historical memory, if this is better said this way – be organized in the state and legal system in one integral whole, into one joint state, together with all

other peoples who wish us to jointly build a happier future. In order to show our interest and our will, the best way is to do this through the Constitution. (...).

I think that we would have to soon designate a Prime Minister of the government of the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, so as to be able to implement the decisions of this Assembly. It is also necessary to clearly define in which way the will of the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be expressed at the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Dear gentlemen, about anything we discuss under the institutional procedure, pertaining to the ethnic interests of the Serb nation, if we are outvoted – the will of the Serb people shall be expressed through the decisions of the Assembly of the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

We must send a message to all the peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina that we wish to preserve an integral Bosnia and Herzegovina in Yugoslavia, because it is only in the integral Bosnia and Herzegovina and Yugoslavia that the Serbs, and the other peoples, are all in one state. If someone wants to separate BiH from Yugoslavia, he has to take in account that he shall have the whole Serb nation against him, and one cannot fight a nation, nor can one exercise secession. It does not pay off to starting something if one knows beforehand that the outcome shall be negative.

(...) Dear gentlemen, let me paraphrase our former Slovenian brothers – let us separate so we can get together again. If we separate peacefully, we have a chance to get together again at a certain point in the future. (...).

The hardest adversaries are traitors and outcasts. For all those who are uncertain, neutral, weak or deluded, - and if they do not feel like traitors, we are sending this message out to them: you still have time today, and tomorrow it will be too late!

Get involved so we can create a joint state, you will be proud of not being the state breakers but state creators.”²⁰⁸

²⁰⁸ AIIZ, inv. No. 3-492/2, Introductory speech by Momcilo Krajisnik, at the 2nd session of the Assembly of the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, November 21, 1991.

The nationalist Greater Serbia policy was underpinned by the political interests – territorial expansion. Momcilo Krajisnik corroborated this very clearly, sending an open appeal for formation of the Greater Serbia: **“The Serb goal is very simple: We have inherited the historical role of fulfilling the tasks that the previous generations had failed to fully implement, and this task is to round up our ethnic territories”**.²⁰⁹

In late 1991, openly presenting the genocidal intentions against the Bosniaks, Bozidar Vucurevic was threatening: **“I am hereby informing the Serb people that we shall correct the injustice related to the borders drawn by Josip Broz with his dirty fingers. He sold the Serb land to the Croats and Muslims at a cheap price. The Muslims are just an insignificant minority, and they have to obey the Serb majority. We shall not give up, but we shall chase them, even up to Zagreb, if needed”**.²¹⁰

Upon the invitation of Dobrica Cosic, on the eve of the summit in Sarajevo, on February 20, 1991, Borisav Jovic received and talked to Radovan Karadzic, who **“explained”** to him the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.²¹¹ Namely, Karadzic, who had threatened with annihilation of the Muslims four months before, on this occasion presented a **“clear”** assessment that **“Bosnia and Herzegovina can not survive if Yugoslavia falls apart, that is can not survive by itself ‘as a state’, nor can it wholly join Croatia. Its only hope in case of dissolution of the country would be to join Serbia and Montenegro, so that they jointly form a new Yugoslavia. The Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina need to play on this card, if they can attract the Muslims”**.²¹²

Karadzic at that time openly presented the position that the Serbs, **“in case of the danger of unfavourable decisions” “shall leave the**

²⁰⁹ Ni. Cigar, the aforementioned work, p. 82.

²¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 56-57.

²¹¹ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 274-275. In relation to this, Jovic wrote that Karadzic had **“explained”** to him that **“Izetbegovic is rather insecure, he likes neither Serbs nor Croats, but he is more afraid of the Serbs, because they are a more numerous nation, not only in Bosnia, but also from the aspect of whom the Muslims should join in case of the dissolution of the country”** (Ibid.).

²¹² Ibid.

Assembly of the Republic and paralyse it". In presenting a false assessment that **"the Serb people in Bosnia is totally unarmed"**, and that it is afraid of **"killing and civil war"**, he inquired with Jovic as to **"whether the Army would protect them"**, and he received a positive response.²¹³ Karadzic was begging Jovic that, **"in case of mobilization, if a difficult situation arises, the Army recruits and arms the Serbs first of all, because they are much more reliable than the others"**.²¹⁴

At the session of the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, held on January 25, 1992, Karadzic stated that all the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina are enslaved and claimed that **"all the skyscrapers in Sarajevo were built on Serb land"**. The Serb delegates at this session also said that the Assembly building had been built on the Serb cemetery. In addition, some delegates interrupted the others, saying that **"retaining Broz's borders is pure masochism"**.²¹⁵

The anti-Islamic campaign and rhetoric was reflecting the Greater Serbia genocidal intentions and plans in the proper way. Before the referendum of citizens for independence of the Republic, Karadzic openly stated that this goal was the establishment of the Greater Serbia. In an interview, published in January 1992, when asked what the Serb strategy was, he stated: **"There is no more withdrawing. We shall fight"** until **"we have accomplished the goal determined by Karadjordje, the unification of all the Serbs, and until we have completed the fight"**. In relation to this, in the same month, Karadzic stated: **"There is no returning to the integral BiH. The time has come for the Serb people to get organized as one whole, neglecting the administrative (existing) borders"**.²¹⁶

²¹³ Ibid.

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ N. Cigar, the aforementioned work, p. 57.

²¹⁶ Ibid., pp. 52-53. Radovan Karadzic spoke about unification of all the Serbs in early November of 1994, in the message **"To the soldiers and officers of Republika Srpska"**. At the time, in the beginning of his speech, he stressed: **"We have been befallen with the duty to stop deterioration of the Serb ethnic issue. All that our predecessors have failed to do or complete must be completed by us in this tragic and martyr-like, but honourable, Serb generation"**. The accomplishing of the Greater

Speaking to the local audience, Karadzic sought to give a religious justification to his policy, attributing the Serb successes to the fact that **“the Lord has helped us. He has turned to us just in the same way we have turned to him, after so many years in which we had been making mistakes”**.²¹⁷

He frequently repeated that **“the Serb state has no need to hold enemies within its borders. The Serb state needs to be the home of the Serb nation”**. For Karadzic, this was the fight against the **“Asian darkness”**.²¹⁸

Speaking to an average Serb individual, Radovan Karadzic was creating a sense that he is not only fighting for his own nation, but for the well-being of the whole West. He was assuring his local public that the Serbs **“had defended Europe against Islam even 600 years ago... We are again defending Europe against Germany and against Islamic fundamentalism!”**²¹⁹

In mid-February 1992, facing the referendum for independent and sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the possibility of its international recognition, Radovan Karadzic openly stated that the Serb collaborationists **“had made excellent preparations... The Serbs have developed a reasonable program for full control over the territories where they constitute the ethnic majority”**.²²⁰ In fact, the criminal intentions of the leadership of the fifth columnist Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina were much broader and also included the territories where the Serbs were in minority. Therefore, taking over of full **“control”** in

Serb goals, according to Karadzic, required the use of **“all the resources and all forces”**, because at the time allegedly they **“had no other option”**. Due to this, he finished his message with the following words: **“Therefore go ahead, decisively, firmly, courageously, skillfully, quickly, wisely, slyly and just as the situation requires”** (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2854, Main Headquarters of the Army of Republika Srpska – Sector for Moral, Religious and Legal Affairs, Inv. No. 10/24-291, November 7, 1994, MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT OF RS (REPUBLIKA SRPSKA)).

²¹⁷ Ibid., p. 87.

²¹⁸ Ibid., p. 84.

²¹⁹ Ibid.

²²⁰ ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraph 202.

the municipalities was a priority action for this leadership in February and March 1992 that Karadzic was issuing orders for.²²¹

At the meeting of the so-called Club of Serb Delegates, held at the Holiday Inn Hotel in Sarajevo on February 28, 1992, Momcilo Krajisnik, among other things, said that **“the Serb nation has to have its state. Even what we have today we can call a republic. Today, tomorrow, as said by Aleksa Buha, this must be a Union of Serb lands and in the future, this theory must be an ever more present one.**

We can not abandon a half-completed project”.²²²

On March 28, 1992, in Sarajevo, in the Large Conference Room of the Holiday Inn Hotel, a Congress of Serb Intellectuals in Bosnia and Herzegovina was held, on the topic of **“the Yugoslav crisis and the Serb issue”**. The Congress was attended by some five hundred participants and guests (**“the most prominent Serb intellectuals”**, **“the Serb intellectual elite”**), **“people of various intellectuals convictions and opinions”** (**“...of various professions and various affiliations...”**), many **“reputable names of the Serb spirituality from all parts of the country populated by the Serb people”**. The Congress was also attended by the representatives of the Serb Orthodox Church, then the representatives of the Serb Academy of Sciences, the *Matica Srpska*, and the representatives of the associations of Serbs from Bosnia and Herzegovina and from all parts of Yugoslavia.²²³

²²¹ Ibid., paragraph 203.

²²² AIIZ, inv. No. 3-855, Stenographic notes from the meeting of the Club of Serb delegates held at the Holiday Inn in Sarajevo, on February 28, 1992.

²²³ AIIZ, inv. No. 3-351/23, Congress of Serb Intellectuals in Bosnia and Herzegovina – to all the public media, COMMUNIQUÉ.

The organizers of the Congress were the Political Council of the Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Serb Educational and Cultural Society *Prosvjeta* (AIIZ, inv. No. 3-351/7).

The initiation board for organization of the congress of intellectuals of the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, “starting from the general and current issues, particularly in Europe and in Yugoslavia, which, viewed in general, endanger the vital interests of the Serb people, and the need to use scientific and permanent grounds to define and protect these interests at this moment which is historical and crucial for the Serb nation”, took the decision for organization of the Congress of Intellectuals for the Serb people in

Academician Slavko Leovac opened the Congress of the Serb Intellectuals in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The meeting was greeted by Academician Pavle Ivic, president of the Serb National Assembly, and **“presented the ethnic maps drafted when the Serb Assembly was created”**.²²⁴

Bosnia and Herzegovina (AIIZ, inv. No. 3-351/12, Congress of the Serb Intellectuals in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Initiation Board for organization of the Congress of Intellectuals of the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina).

The president of the Organizational Board was Milivoje Unkovic (AIIZ, inv. No. 3-351/4 and 6).

The Congress discussed the issue of **“THE YUGOSLAV CRISIS AND THE SERB ISSUE”**. Under this issue, four topics were present: **“The Serb Issue and Today’s Yugoslav Crisis”**, **“The Serb People and the Constitutional Organization of Bosnia and Herzegovina”**, **“Spiritual Life and Cultural Heritage of the Serb People”**, and **“Social Development and the Ability of Economic Prosperity of the Serb Nation”**. The invitation list for participation in the work of the Congress includes the names of the speakers: Academicians Milorad Ekmecic, Ljubomir Tadic, and Radovan Vuckovic, and Prof. Dr. Vojislav Maksimovic, Prof. Dr. Gaso Mijanovic, Prof. Dr. Aleksa Buha, Prof. Dr. Aleksa Milojevic, Prof. Dr. Branko Djeric, Prof. Dr. Nikola Poplasen, Prof. Dr. Mile Nenadic, Prof. Dr. Milan Miljevic, Prof. Dr. Rajko Igic, and Prof. Dr. Radomir Bulatovic, as well as writers Gojko Djogo and Miroslav Toholj (AIIZ, inv. No. 3-351/10, Invitation List for participation in the work of the Congress of Serb Intellectuals in Bosnia and Herzegovina).

The Congress of Serb Intellectuals in Bosnia and Herzegovina was attended by numerous guests from Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, among whom clergy as well (the expected number of participants was some 600 persons). The total costs of 51 guests were paid by the Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Among them were Academicians Matija Beckovic, Pavle Ivic, Bosko Petrovic, Ljubomir Tadic and Milos Macura, then Prof. Dr. Vladimir Glisin, Prof. Dr. Jovan Deretic, Prof. Dr. Mirko Zurovac, Prof. Dr. Bogdan Jamedzija, Rajko Petrov Nogo, Dr. Nikola B. Popovic, Prof. Dr. Kosta Pusara, Prof. Dr. Darko Tanaskovic, Radomir Smiljanic, Brana Crncevic, Zdravko Sotra, and the like (AIIZ, inv. No. 3-351/1, the List of guests whose total costs are paid by the Party /SDS of BiH/; Ibid., inv. No. 3-351/2. the List of passengers on the round-trip route of Belgrade-Sarajevo-Belgrade, on March 27 and 29, 1992; Ibid., inv. No. 3-351/7, Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina, No. 648-06/92, Sarajevo, March 23, 1992 – Police Security Center Sarajevo, Marijin Dvor, Ibid., inv. No. 3-351/8, Association of Serbs from Bosnia and Herzegovina in Serbia, Belgrade, March 23, 1992, LIST OF PARTICIPANTS OF THE CONGRESS OF SERB INTELLECTUALS IN SARAJEVO COMING FROM BELGRADE – to the Main Board of the Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina).

²²⁴ Ibid., M. Tomanic, **SRPSKA CRKVA U RATU I RATOVI U NJOJ**, Belgrade 2001, pp. 100, 126, and 191.

In a letter to the Congress of Serb Intellectuals in Sarajevo, Dobrica Cosic sent a message that **“us the Serbs, the Muslims and the Croats, in appreciation of the historical experiences and the current status among us, have to split up and divide as soon as possible, in order to remove mutual hatred and killing, so tomorrow we can unify with as few obstacles as possible in everything that is commonly reasonable and useful for us”**. The fore so, because **“with the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the Serbs are forced to find the state and political form for solution of the ethnic issue”**. In relation to this, he saw the solution in **“the federation of the Serb Lands”**. This federation, according to him, was supposed to include not only **“all the Serbs”**, but also **“all the Serb ethnic areas”**. As a number of Serbs had to stay outside the borders of this Serb federation, even earlier (in July 1991), Dobrica Cosic had proposed a solution for this problem, too – **“planned resettlements and exchange of the population”**. He was **“aware”** that this is **“hardest, most painful, but nevertheless better than living in hatred and mutual killing”**.²²⁵

“Thematic reports and presentations” were, among others, communicated by Academicians Milorad Ekmecic, Ljubo Tadic, Radovan Vuckovic, writers Gojko Djogo and Miroslav Toholj, professors Aleksa Milojevic, Nikola Poplasen, Rajko Igetic, Gaso Mijanovic, Vojislav Maksimovic, Mile Nenadic, Branko Djeric, and the like.²²⁶

²²⁵ M. Tomanic, the aforementioned work, pp. 100-101.

²²⁶ AIIZ, inv. No. 3-351/4, 6, 7, 12, and 23. A number of the invited “reputable names of the Serb spirituality”, due to inability to attend the Congress, had sent wishes for a successful work to the organizers. Thus, on March 27, 1992, prince Tomislav Karadjordjevic sent wishes for the successful work of the Congress to the Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina, addressed to the name of Academician Slavko Leovac:

“Dear Mr. Leovac,

Thank you very much for your kind invitation to attend the first “Congress of Serb Intellectuals” on March 28, 1992, in Sarajevo.

I wish to point out my permanent concern about all of the issues pertaining to the interests of the spiritual, physical and historical protection and rights of the Serb people, particularly in the future.

Unification of all the Serbs is also the task of all the Serb intellectuals whose word must be appreciated with those hands the responsibility for the destiny of the Serb nation currently is.

“Without any prejudice”, the participants spoke about the Serb issue and the Yugoslav crisis, **“about the Serb nation and the constitutional organization of Bosnia and Herzegovina, about the spiritual life and cultural heritage of the Serb nation and its social development and economic prosperity”**.²²⁷

After the discussion, the participants of the Congress adopted a Declaration, informing the domestic and international public about the assessments and positions they had reached during their work. In assessing that **“the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as on the territories of the Yugoslav state, has found itself at a historical crossroads”**, and that **“the dramatization of the unresolved ethnic and social relations and inconsistent policy of the European powers, a large portion of the Serb people have been brought into the situation to fight for bare survival”**, a wrongful position was adopted by which **“the policy of secession and brutal breaking up of Yugoslavia into a number of small states opens up for he Serb people outside Serbia**

Please convey my appeal to all the Serb intellectuals and the Serb people for agreement and unity in the interest of defence of everything that has been accomplished through our history, our national identity, freedom, freedom of thought, words, and actions.

It is my obligation to be gain in Bosnia, to talk to our people and to hear the word of the people.

I have returned to my homeland and I shall fulfil this obligation by always and further be over there in the Serb Lands where this may be needed.

Please receive my wishes for the successful work of the Congress, with the apology for not yet being able to confirm my arrival” (AIIZ, inv. No. 3-351/20, H.R.H. Prince Tomislav Karadjordjevic, Oplenac, Topola, March 27, 1992 – to the Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Academician Slavko Leovac).

On March 27, 1992, Bratislava Buba Morina sent a telegram of the following contents to the Congress of Serb Intellectuals in Sarajevo: **“My dear countrymen. Genocide is being committed against our people again after 50 years. New graves are being dug and new black shawls are being put on. Therefore today, please do everything in order to create the plan for protection of each life, each home, in order to preserve our dignity and our origins”** (AIIZ, inv. No. 3-350, Telegram by Bratislava Buba Morina – to the Organizer of the Congress of Serb Intellectuals, Sarajevo, Belgrade, March 27, 1992).

²²⁷ Ibid.

an ethnic issue more drastically than it was in 1914 and 1941”, because “virtually one third of our people, left stateless, is entering a tragic epoch of suffering life of a harassed ethnic minority”. Allegedly not denying “the right of other nations to independently formulate their own national interests and to opt for the political and state form in which they wish to continue living”, the Serb intellectuals concluded that “it unacceptable that other nations and their political representatives impose on the Serb nation the political and legal solution which is not acceptable for it”. They believed that “it is necessary and only acceptable that the bloodshed we are testifying, the economic abyss and the legal chaos on the Yugoslav territory be overcome in a peaceful way through negotiations and solutions that will meet the relevant interests of all the peoples.²²⁸

In advocating for the “**peaceful way**”, the Serb intellectuals assessed that “**it is not realistic to question the basic interests of the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina in terms of closing the possibility for their economic, cultural, spiritual and political connecting with the other parts of the Serb nation on the Yugoslav territory**”. They did not support an independent and sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina. In relation to this, they adopted the approach by which “**the political representatives of the Serb people who would participate in sanctioning of the independent and sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina, in a way in which the Serb in Bosnia and Herzegovina would be cut off and isolated in the Bosnian-Herzegovinian state organism, would not have the support of the Serb people**”.²²⁹

²²⁸ AIIZ, inv. No. 251/15, DECLARATION adopted at the Congress of Serb Intellectuals in Bosnia and Herzegovina in Sarajevo, on March 28, 1992.

²²⁹ Ibid. There is a malicious position of those who had fought for and accepted the fascist project, and these are the Serb intellectuals, that “**they appeal to all other peoples, particularly on their intellectuals and spiritual representatives, to participate in clarification of delusions and prejudice on certain peoples and to actively contribute to stopping the process of satanization of their political and spiritual representatives. We are convinced that it is only possible to use this way to reach peace and build the political and state forms that will provide a holistic prosperity of all the peoples, each citizen and individual**”, that is, the Serb intellectual elite, convinced that “**the task of revival of the cultural, artistic, scientific and overall spiritual life of the Serb people represents the most urgent task of all the intellectual**

The Serb intellectuals in Bosnia and Herzegovina demanded “**from the political and state leadership of the Serb nation on all the Yugoslav territories to ensure integration of the Serb nation as a whole through negotiations in the process of resolving of the Yugoslav crisis**”.²³⁰

Pursuant to the orders of the leadership of the Greater Serbia movement and the agreement for separation of territories between Radovan Karadzic and Mate Boban (in Gratz, in late April, that is, May 6, 1992),²³¹ On May 12, 1992, at the 16th session in Banja Luka, upon the proposal of Radovan Karadzic, *The Assembly of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina* took the decision **on the Strategic Goals of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina**. At the time, this collaborationist body openly announced the Greater Serbia plans for occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Namely, these were the six “**strategic goals**” of fascist character, as follows:

“1. The interstate boundary with the other two ethnic communities.

2. The corridor between Semberija and Krajina.

3. Establishing of the corridor along the Drina river valley, that is, elimination of the Drina river as the border line in between the Serb states.

4. Establishing of the border along the Una and Neretva rivers.

workers first of all. Without persistent and coordinated work in order to revive the science and culture in all its national and universal dimensions, it is hard to imagine any significant progress in businesses and economy overall. Just like in the past, the Serb nation can not and will not develop its society and economy without closeness and firm relations with the other peoples in Europe, particularly on the Balkans. But integration and connections strengthen and enrich to that extent as the autonomous and authentic development and affirmation of each national culture and state organizations are allowed for” (Ibid.).

²³⁰ Ibid. Such a position in essence meant acceptance of the fascist movement – formation of the Greater Serbia.

M. Tomanic states that the Serb intellectual in Sarajevo adopted (in the Declaration) the conclusion that the only solution for Bosnia is “**a three-part union in which the Serbs will sovereignly stand on their borders**” (M. Tomanic, the aforementioned work, pp. 100-101).

²³¹ About this, see: pp. 1055-1059 of this work.

5. Division of the borders of Sarajevo into the Serb and the Muslim ones, and establishment of efficient state power in each of the parts.

6. Exit of Republika Srpska onto the sea.”²³²

General Ratko Mladic was “**fully aware**” that this involved **genocide**. During the aforementioned session of the “**Assembly of the Serb People**”, he commented in the following manner about the first “**strategic goal**” (“separation of the Serb people off of the other two ethnic communities”): “**Peoples and nations are not a pledge nor a key that you can keep in one pocket and transfer back and forth. This is something easier said than done... we can not cleanse here, nor can we sift it through a sieve, so that only the Serbs remain or that the Serbs get sifted down, and so that the others go away... I do not know how Mr. Krajisnik and Mr. Karadzic will explain this to the world. Man, this would be genocide!**”²³³

“**Fully aware**” of the goals of such a criminal plan, General Mladic demanded that it should be kept in secrecy. Therefore, at this closed session of the “**Assembly of the Serb People**” he stated: “**Let us not just have in mind what to do, but let us also think thoroughly about this, that we should be cautious and to know when to be silent. No. The thing that we are doing needs to be protected in deepest secrecy. How our representatives will represent this in the media during political discussions and negotiations, what they will say, they too need to present our goals in a way to sound as an appeal to the ears of those we want to win over to our side, without damage to our Serb nation**”.²³⁴

²³² *Sluzbeni glasnik Republike Srpske*, Decision on Strategic Goals of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina, November 26, 1993. Thus, Radovan Karadzic and Momcilo Krajisnik conveyed and adopted the tasks assigned to them by Slobodan Milosevic, in order to make an appearance of them having been brought by the “**Assembly of the Serb People**”. The Serb collaborationists in Bosnia and Herzegovina did not constitute an independent political or military factor – they were no sort of a separate entity, but they executed orders issued by the leadership of the Greater Serbia movement, by Milosevic in particular.

²³³ ICTY, Case: no. IT-02-54-T, paragraphs 63, and 401-405.

²³⁴ *Ibid.*, paragraph 403. “**Fully aware**” of the goals of this genocidal plan, Mladic at the time said: “**Ours is the common enemy, regardless of whether they are Muslim**

Two days later (on May 14), the aforementioned “strategic goals” were reviewed in a meeting “with the municipal presidents” in the area of responsibility of the 30th Partisan Division.²³⁵ The president of the Municipal Assembly of Mrkonjic Grad (Milan Malidza) presented the conclusions from the meeting held on May 12, in Banja Luka. In relation to this, he stated as follows:

“1. There has to be a state separation between the 3 ethnic communities;

2. Krajina must be connected to Serbia along the right bank of the Sava River with a strip some 25-30 km wide;

3. Creation of the corridor along the Drina river valley so that the Serbs control both the left and right banks of the Drina;

4. Establishment of borders from the river Una, down to river Neretva;

or Croat hordes. This is our common enemy. What matters now is either expulse them both outside, by use of political or other moves, or organize ourselves and expulse some of them through military force, and we will be able to handle the rest of them in one way or another” (CTY, Case: no. IT-02-54-T, paragraph 404).

²³⁵ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-1044, Command of the 1st Partisan Brigade, strictly confidential on. I-45/92, May 14, 1992, MEETING with the municipal representatives in the division’s area of responsibility.

The agenda of this meeting was as follows:

“1. Review of the situation in the municipalities from the military and political aspects;

2. Functioning of power and relations until the transformation of the JNA;

3. Messages from the meeting in Banja Luka on May 12, 1992, at the OS of Serbian Krajina and the army of the Serb Republic of BiH;

4. Reviewing and proposals for further cooperation with the JNA units in view of securing of the territory and treatment of the combatants (unit officers) on the territory of Serbian Krajina“ (Ibid.).

The aforementioned meeting was attended by: Colonel Stanislav Galic (commander of the 3rd Partisan Division), Colonel Branko Basara (commander of the 6th Partisan Brigade), Colonel Major Stevan Kokovic (Chief of Staff of the Headquarters of the 30th Partisan Brigade), Major Bosko Lukic (commander of the Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Kljuc), six presidents of “Serb“ municipalities: Jovo Banjac (Kljuc), Radoslav Djukic (Sipovo), Milan Malidza (Mrkonjic Grad), Dragan Milicic (Jajce), Nikola Zagorac (Donji Vakuf), and Nikola Misic (Bugojno), as well as Rajko Kalabic (delegate in “Serbian Krajina”) – Ibid.

5. Sarajevo must be either divided or perish from the face of the earth;

6. To review the possibility of securing an exit of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina out to the sea”.²³⁶

In the end of the meeting, Colonel Stanislav Galic, commander of the 30th Partisan Division, proposed, among other things, **“to implement the conclusions from the meeting in Banja Luka, but also send them out to the commands of units and municipalities.”**²³⁷

These were obviously **“strategic goals”** that could only be realized through use of force. The goal was to form the Greater Serbia state, meaning that there was **an intention to commit the genocide**. Operational deployment of forces and resources for practical realization of these genocidal activities had been completed in the second half of 1991.

The responsibility for realization of the aforementioned goals of fascist character fell on the military leadership of the collaborationist Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and on General Mladic in person, and they converted those goals into operational plans of the “Army of the Serb Republic of BiH”. These war strategic goals of the Serb people, **“which were quickly defined and placed before the Main Headquarters of the army, command and unit, served as some kind of a general guideline”**, based on which the military leadership planned operations. Their realization required **forces**, and **“the formation of the state and the army”** required **“the whole nation and its force”**.²³⁸

In a Decision dated June 16, 1992, General Ratko Mladic ordered to keep on with the fundamental **strategic war interests of the Serb nation**, as rendered on May 12. These goals were also emphasized in the instructions of the Main Headquarters of the Army of the Serb Republic of BiH, then in the combat reports and instructions of the corps and other units, in the discussions at numerous meetings and reports, and were also explained among the soldiers down to the lowest ranks.²³⁹

²³⁶ Ibid.

²³⁷ Ibid.

²³⁸ ICTY, Case: no. IT-02-54-T, paragraphs 63, and 401-405, and 425-427.

²³⁹ Ibid., paragraph 64.

In realization of the aforementioned “**strategic goals**” of the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as in “**integrating the Serb territories with mother Serbia**”,²⁴⁰ the Greater Serbia aggressor and its collaborationists committed numerous crimes, including the genocide against the Bosniaks.

The exit to the sea (“**the delta of the Neretva**”) was one of the “**strategic goals**” for the leadership of the collaborationist Republika Srpska. This is what Karadzic had also insisted on at the meeting of the representatives of the highest political and military leadership of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the “Republika Srpska”, held on August 25, 1995, in the residential building of the Army of Yugoslavia in Dobanovci.²⁴¹ At the time, among other things, Karadzic said “**that**

²⁴⁰ Ibid.

²⁴¹ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2889, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Supreme Defence Council, state secret no. 12-4, August 26, 1995, Belgrade, NOTES from the meeting of the representatives of the highest political and military leadership of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Republika Srpska, held on August 25, 1995, at the residential building of the Army of Yugoslavia in Dobanovci, p. 8. At this meeting, pursuant to the conclusion adopted at the 42nd session of the Supreme Defence Council, held on August 23, 1995, in the representative building of the Army of Yugoslavia in *Dobanovci*, was attended by the highest ranking state, political and military leaders of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and of “Republika Srpska”. The meeting was held on August 25, 1995, and its working part lasted from 2 PM until 8 PM, with a half an hour break for separate consultations of the representatives of “Republika Srpska”.

From the Yugoslav side, the meeting was attended by the president of FR Yugoslavia, **Zoran Lilic**; president of Serbia, **Slobodan Milosevic**; president of the Republic of Montenegro, **Momir Bulatovic**; president of the Federal Government, **Dr. Radoje Kontic**; Chief of Staff of the General Headquarters of the Army of Yugoslavia, General **Momcilo Perisic**; Federal Defence Minister **Pavle Bulatovic**; and chief of staff of the Military Cabinet of the President of FR Yugoslavia, General Major **Dr. Slavoljub Susic**.

The delegation of the “Republika Srpska” was made up of the President, **Dr. Radovan Karadzic**; president of the “Assembly”, **Dr. Momcilo Krajisnik**; Vice President of “Republika Srpska” **Prof. Dr. Nikola Koljevic**; President of the “Government”, **Dusan Kozic**; Minister of Foreign Affairs, **Prof. Dr. Aleksa Buha**; commander of the Main Headquarters of the Army of Republika Srpska, **General Ratko Mladic**; **General Major Zdravko Tolimir**; assistant commander for the background, **General Major Djordje Djukic**; and Assistant Commander of the *GS VRS* for Moral, information, legal affairs and religious issues, **General Major Milan Gvero**.

The meeting was also attended by the patriarch of the Serb Orthodox Church **Pavle** and bishop **Irinej Bulovic** (Ibid., p. 1).

they (the Serbs from Republika Srpska) ‘must remain tough’, just as before, in order to obtain the exit to the sea (the Neretva delta)’.²⁴²

After he heard information from Dr. Radoje Kontic (president of the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) about **the inability to offer assistance to “Republika Srpska”**,²⁴³ Karadzic asked Milosevic: **“Does this mean, Mr. President, that I should not go forward to Neretva and to East Slavonia?”** Milosevic **“responded that what Karadzic is proposing – is a war option”**, upon which Karadzic asked: **“Does this mean that we are giving up the territory of the Republic of Serbian Krajina and a broader exit to the sea?”**²⁴⁴

At the following meeting in Dobanovci, Karadzic indicated upon the significance of other **“strategic goals”** of the Serb people. In relation to this, he, among other things, stressed: **“We therefore must fight for a broader corridor [Brcko; note by the author] and for an as compact territory as possible, and for definitive, rather than for temporary, solutions within the conceived Union of BiH”**.²⁴⁵

The political and military leadership of the collaborationist Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at the meeting of the Supreme Council of Defence of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, on August 29, 1995,²⁴⁶ requested from Slobodan Milosevic, president of the Republic

²⁴² Ibid.

²⁴³ Ibid., p. 8. The president of the Federal Government Dr. Radoje Kontic **“informed the attendees that the economic situation in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is increasingly deteriorating and that we will not be able to help Republika Srpska as we did until recently”** (Ibid.). The president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the president of the Supreme Defence Council Zoran Lilic, among other things, warned that **“our military resources have been virtually exhausted, and some of them are almost through to the end”** (Ibid., p. 11).

²⁴⁴ Ibid., pp. 8-9.

²⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 9.

²⁴⁶ AIIZ; inv. No. 2-2890, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Supreme Defence Council, state secret, no. 12-5, August 30, 1995, Belgrade, NOTES from the meeting of the representatives of the highest political and military leadership of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Republika Srpska, held on August 29, 1995, at the residential building of the Army of Yugoslavia in Dobanovci. At this meeting, pursuant to the agreement

of Serbia, “to present the priorities he shall advocate at the conference with the representatives of the Contact Group on the issue of the former Bosnia and Herzegovina, which demand was met”. Milosevic took “a separate sheet of paper and wrote that these are: (1) a northern corridor as broad as possible (particularly near Brcko), (2) compactness of the territory; (3) as many cities as possible, and (4) an exit to the sea”.²⁴⁷ At the insistence by Karadzic, this “list of priorities” was amended with “three more items: (5) the space between Grmec and Kozara, (6) the Neretva valley, and (7) Serb Sarajevo”.²⁴⁸

between the leadership of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the “Republika Srpska”, reached at the joint meeting, held on August 25, 1995, in the representative building of the Army of Yugoslavia in Dobanovci. From the Yugoslav side, the meeting was attended by the president of FR Yugoslavia, **Zoran Lilic**; president of the Republic of Serbia, **Slobdan Milosevic**; president of the Republic of Montenegro, **Momir Bulatovic**; President of the Federal Government, Dr. **Radoje Kontic**; Chief of Staff of the General Headquarters of the Army of Yugoslavia, General **Momcilo Perisic**; Federal Defence Minister, **Pavle Bulatovic**, and Chief of Staff of the Military Cabinet of the President of FR Yugoslavia, General Major Dr. **Slavoljub Susic**.

The delegation of the "Republika Srpska" was made up of the president, Dr. **Radovan Karadzic**, vice presidents Dr. **Nikola Koljevic** and Dr. **Biljana Plavsic**, President of the Assembly Dr. **Momcilo Krajisnik**, President of the Government of RS **Dusan Kozic**, Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr. **Aleksa Buha**, commander of the Main Headquarters of the VRS General **Ratko Mladic**, assistant Commander of the Main Headquarters of the VRS for security General Major **Zdravko Tolimir**, assistant commander for the background General Major **Djordje Djukic**, and assistant commander of the GS VRS for moral, information, legal affairs and religious issues, General Major **Milan Gvero**.

The meeting was also attended by the patriarch of the Serb Orthodox Church **Pavle** and bishop **Irinej Bulovic**.

²⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 16.

²⁴⁸ Ibid.

VI

**DIRECT PREPARATIONS FOR
THE AGGRESSION**

1. Arming of the Fifth Column

In acceptance of the Greater Serbia nationalist agenda of “**rounding up the Serb lands**“, that is, “**the exit onto Serb ethnic territories**“, and the greater state concept of solution of the Serb ethnic issue, upon an order of the Federal Secretariat for National Defence and the General Headquarters of the Armed forces of the SFRY, as well as the highest political and state bodies of Serbia and Montenegro, and the *Vozd* of the Greater Serbia movement Slobodan Milosevic in person, in order to execute the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina, the commands, units and institutions of the JNA were systematically arming the Serb people, or rather, the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The role of the JNA in arming, first of all, the members and supporters of the Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and then also of the Serb ‘para-state’ municipal headquarters and units of Territorial Defence, armed units of the reserve and active composition of police forces, and other Serb “voluntary“ formations, as a form of military measures to make the silent occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (realized as early as in 1991) more effective, and to make the aggression against it more successful, is suggested by many pieces of data, particularly documents of military origin, of a high degree of confidentiality.

The data available indicate that since 1991, the JNA had intensified the activities begun long ago on the arming of the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In relation to this, it is interesting to point out the fact that the top military leadership of the SFRY, in closest cooperation with the military, political and intellectual leadership of Serbia and Slobodan Milosevic in person, directed and provided guidelines for armament of the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. **Teams of high ranking JNA officers, headed by the Chief of Staff of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, had updated the war plans, drafted war deployments and assignments, developed**

the strategy and plans for the mobilization of the Serb population, the systematic distribution and stationing of arms, ammunition, military equipment, nourishment, and the like, and did all in order to strengthen the combat preparedness of the units.¹

In compliance with the aforementioned activities and directives of the military leadership of the SFRY, as well as the military and political leadership of Serbia, in mid-1991, the Main Board of the SDS of Bosnia and Herzegovina issued the order to proceed with organized armament of the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, that is, **“the procurement of armament for all military conscripts of the Serb ethnicity”**. Thus, exercising the orders from Belgrade, the Main Board of the SDS took the position that the arming of the Serb people should be done through the JNA, and it was concluded that contact and cooperation should be established with the Army.²

The aforementioned decision was in accordance with the military intelligence and war plans for preparation and execution of the armed aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia (under the secret codes of „RAM“, „DRINA“, and „KUPA“). In mid-1991, Radovan Karadzic (as an associate of the JNA KOS, in which, in addition, he had regular consultations with the generals too),³ and

¹ **ARHIV INSTITUTA ZA ISTRAZIVANJE ZLOCINA PROTIV COVJECNOSTI I MEDJUNARODNOG PRAVA U SARAJEVU** (hereinafter referred to as: AIIZ), inv. No. 2-113, Command of the 2nd Military District, Operational Duty Team, strictly confidential no. 10/36-2525, April 30, 1992 – to the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – Operational Centre, and others; N. Durakovic, **PROKLETSTVO MUSLIMANA**, Sarajevo 1993, p. 279; *Slobodna Bosna* no. 3, Sarajevo, November 14, 1991, p. 6; **INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA**, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, PROSECUTOR AGAINST SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC (hereinafter referred to as: **ICTY**, Case: No. IT-02-54-T), the Hague, May 31, 2002.

² AIIZ, inv. No. 2-794.

³ **DNEVNI IZVJESTAJ O AGRESIJI I TERORIZMU PROTIV REPUBLIKE BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE**, Information Office of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereinafter referred to as: **Dnevni izvjestaj**), no. 65, June 28, 1992; *Vreme* (Belgrade), September 30, 1991, p. 5.

The data available obtained by the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina corroborate its previous operational intelligence on preparations for

the fifth columnist leadership of the SDS of Bosnia and Herzegovina received special instructions from Slobodan Milosevic (president of Serbia) **about the organization of direct preparations for an open aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina**. On this occasion, Karadzic was ordered as follows:

1. in order to begin the RAM action, to ensure absolute mobilization of the Serb population in Bosnia and Herzegovina, primarily on the territory of Bosanska Krajina and the Kupres Plateau;

2. within one hour from their contact, to call General Nikola Uzelac, commander of the Banja Luka Corps, who is assigned to arm all of the mobilized Serb population (“helicopters will be used to bring armament into some faraway areas”); and

3. to organize in Banja Luka “a ‘spontaneous’ rally of the Serb people”, which is “exceptionally important because of the international public”.⁴

the armed aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. Namely, these were the military intelligence plans under the codes of “RAM”, “UNA”, and “KUPA”, and the data that Radovan Karadzic, Biljana Plavsic, and Bozidar Vucurovic, as well as other persons from the leadership of the SDS, were associates of the Counter-intelligence Service of the JNA, and acted as agents of the highest rank, executing the tasks of the aggressor centre in Belgrade. Radovan Karadzic was designated as the top associate of the KOS (Ibid.). For more details on this, see: AIIZ, 2-535, **The Role of the KOS in the Aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina** (Information of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina).

⁴ Ibid.; *Oslobodjenje*, June 28, 1992, p. 5; See: note 7, p. 649, p. 399 and p. 495 of this work.

The “spontaneous” rally of the Serbs “**for support to Yugoslavia**” was of great importance to Slobodan Milosevic. Thereby he primarily wanted to show the Serb “**mood**” for Yugoslavia to the international public, and thus cover up the truth about who is the actual Commander of the armed aggression in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Milosevic had a similar scenario in July 1991, for the organization of a rally “**for Yugoslavia**” in Sarajevo, where, having in mind the significance of the international aspect, from the centre of Yugoslavia, that is, Sarajevo, the support was sought “**for Yugoslavia**” (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-1007, Conversation between Slobodan Milosevic and Radovan Karadzic – July 9, 1991).

In February 1991, in order to “resolve” the crisis in the country, the military leadership too, among other things, proposed organization of the rally “**for Yugoslavia**” in Sarajevo, which was supposed to “**raise Bosnia and Herzegovina up on its feet**” (B. Jovic, **POSLEDNJI DANI SFRJ**, second edition, Kragujevac 1996, p. 350).

After he had received the aforementioned instructions, Karadzic faxed out a special „**Order to all the Municipal Boards of the Serb Democratic Party in Bosnia and Herzegovina**“, with the following contents:

1. to immediately mobilize the reserve composition of the police forces in the municipality where the SDS has majority power;

2. to immediately mobilize the illegally formed units of the SDS Territorial Defence forces and to be placed under the command of the JNA; and

3. to immediately mobilize the Serb volunteers and to be placed under the command of the JNA.⁵

In order to ensure the implementation of the aforementioned orders, in Banja Luka, Karadzic established several significant contacts with the leading people of the SDS of Bosanska Krajina, such as for instance, Dr. Radovan Vukic, president of the Regional Board of the SDS in this area, as well as with the leadership of the SDS at the Kupres Plateau. In those discussions, Karadzic issued the order to “**raise all the Serb population up on their feet**”, because “**everything must be under a single command**”, in which he threatened to shoot to death all the Serbs who would not respond to mobilization and place themselves under the command of the SDS. If they fail to proceed upon this order even then, they were to be publicly pronounced “**as not working in the name of the SDS and as working against the interests of the Serb people**”, and they were to be then shot to death, as well as their families subjected to retaliation and denunciation.⁶

“**The anti-war rally for Yugoslavia, a single JNA, for peace**” was held (with paroles such as “**He who does not accept the JNA is not in favour of Yugoslavia!**”, “**Adzic and Kadijevic, we are with you!**”, “**JNA is the guarantor of peace!**”) in Sarajevo, on September 3, 1991, but without the planned effects (*Javnost*, September 7, 1991, pp. 1 and 5).

⁵ Ibid.; AIIZ, SDS Fund, inv. No. 1166. The aforementioned Order, among other things, stated as follows:

“**Kindly request from the JNA command to leave on the territory a portion of the territorial defence and volunteer forces under the JNA command, in order to keep peace. The operational portion may go wherever the JNA says**”.

⁶ Ibid.

The direct military preparations for crimes did not remain unnoticed. Thus, at a closed session of the Government of the SFRY (on September 18, 1991), discussing the political and security situation in Yugoslavia, alluding to the mobilization and arming of the Serb people in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The federal Prime Minister, Ante Markovic, presented the data about the contacts and orders by Slobodan Milosevic to Radovan Karadzic on that occasion, **“where Slobodan Milosevic ordered Karadzic to contact Uzelac and say – pursuant to the agreement at the highest military top – to have the arms turned over and arm the Territorial Defence of Bosanska Krajina, and use this in execution of the RAM plan”**. At this, Milosevic informed Karadzic that Momir Bulatovic (the president of Montenegro) too, **“is ready to die for Bosnia”**. At the time, among other things, Markovic concluded that **“during the war in Croatia, the Yugoslav Army had abandoned their neutral position” and that the JNA did not “just exceed its powers, but it also got involved into a civil war”**, having sided with Serbia.⁷

⁷ The testimony of Sabrija Pojskic given to the author; *Vreme*, September 23, 1991, pp. 7, and 9, and September 30, 1991, pp. 4-5; S. Mesic, **KAKO JE SRUSENA JUGOSLAVIJA – politicki memoari**, Zagreb 1994, p. 236; S. Djukic, **ON, ONA I MI**, Belgrade, 1997, pp. 252-253. At this session of the SIV, the following recording of the conversation between Slobodan Milosevic and Radovan Karadzic was read out:

“Milosevic: ... Approach Uzelac, he will tell you everything. There where you have problems, contact me.

Karadzic: I am having problems with Kupres. There is a portion of Serbs there that is rather disobedient.

Milosevic: Do not worry, it is going to be a peace of cake. Just you contact Uzelac.

(.....)

Milosevic: You will have everything, do not worry. We are the strongest...

Milosevic: Do not worry. As long as we have the Army, no one can do anything to us.

(.....)

Milosevic: Do not worry about Herzegovina. Momir has sent a message out to the people: ‘He who is not ready to die for Bosnia, let him step out now’. Nobody stepped out.

Karadzic: That is good... And what about that bombing at ...

Milosevic: Today is not suitable for the aircraft, the European session is underway“ (Ibid.).

At the aforementioned session of the Federal Executive Council, the representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina – Sabrija Pojskic (Member of the SIV) and Mustafa Cengic (Secretary for information of the SIV) strongly reacted. At the time, Pojskic indicated the existence of certain indices that the armament of the Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina has already been given to some municipalities with majority Serb population, under the disguise of military exercises.⁸

In accordance with the orders of the SDS, that is, Radovan Karadzic, in reviewing of the “**current situation at the frontline**”, at the session of November 21, 1991, the Main Board of the SDS of Bosnia and Herzegovina gave the recommendation to the Assembly of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina to “**take the decision in support of the general mobilization**” and to take the position on the “**territorial defence that needs to be transformed into the active JNA formation**”.⁹

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, since 1991, a number of cases had been revealed involving illegal transportation of weapons and ammunition for armament of the Serb people by the JNA. Thus, on May 24, 1991, in the place of Deleusi, on the Niksic – Bileca road, the employees of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic stopped a truck containing 80 automatic guns of Russian manufacture M-41, and 16,000 bullets for these weapons.¹⁰ These weapon and ammunition, as personal armament,

⁸ The testimony of Sabrija Pojskic given to the author. According to Sabrija Pojskic, this session of the Federal Executive Council clearly revealed the arming of the Serb population conducted by the JNA.

⁹ AIIZ, SDS Fund, inv. No. 74, Minutes from the session of the Main Board of the Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina, held on November 21, 1991.

¹⁰ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-551, **Information of the Ministry of Interior of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina on certain phenomena and events that have in particular affected the complexity of the security situation in the Republic, June 11, 1991**: AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2448; Ibid., inv. No. 2-2823, Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of Territorial Defence, strictly confidential no. 02/11-8, Sarajevo, May 24, 1991 – SSNO – GS OS SFRY – Operational Centre in Belgrade. In the transport vehicle was also Dusan Kozic, SDS delegate in the Assembly of SR Bosnia and Herzegovina. The vehicle was driven by Milutin Popovic (owner of the vehicle) from Ljubinje.

The truck with arms and ammunition was forwarded to Mostar. However, by setting barricades, the Serbs prevented the transport from coming to Mostar, and the vehicle was

was used by the members of the “**Karadjordje**” *Chetnik* platoon from Nevesinje.¹¹ On October 27, 1991, on the Visoko – Kiseljak road (in the village of Podgorani), a vehicle was stopped in which arms and ammunition were found with a certificate issued by the Municipal Board of the Serb Democratic Party of Visoko.¹² In Visegrad, Ustipraca, Gorazde, Doboj, Modrica, and other places, transports had been identified with major quantities of JNA weapons for the same purposes.¹³

returned to Bileca again. Upon insistence of the Commander of the barracks, “**for security reasons**”, the vehicle was placed within the site of the JNA barracks. The military investigation bodies did not allow the civilian bodies to do an on-site inspection, because “**they would conduct the required investigative actions, because this is a vehicle with arms within the site of the barracks**”, which, according to their explanation, was in the jurisdiction of the military judicial bodies.

It is interesting to point out that the Serbs from East Herzegovina opposed to instituting any procedures against persons brought into connection with the illegal transport of arms, expressing distrust of the legality and objectivity of the legal bodies for conducting the procedure, demanding that the procedure should be conducted in Niksic (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-551, and 2-2448, Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of Territorial Defence, confidential, no. 04/143-8, June 6, 1991, Sarajevo, Information on Significant Facts and Manifestations as to the Moral and Combat Preparedness of the SO SR BiH for MAY 1991).

The transport of arms in the Bileca area also involved participation of the president of the Municipal Assembly of Bileca, because the “**vehicle of the president of the SO Bileca**” was found escorting the aforementioned vehicle with arms (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2823).

¹¹ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-551; *Borba*, June 11, 1991, pp. 1-5; *Oslobodjenje*, October 1, 1993.

¹² AIIZ, inv. No. 2-549/1-12; *Oslobodjenje*, February 25, 1992.

The employees of the Police Precinct of Visoko, on October 27, 1991, on the Visoko-Kiseljak regional road (in the village of Podgorani), stopped the driver of the passenger vehicle type “Golf” (license plates SA 328-286) owned by Srpko Djukic from Ilijas. During the control of the driver and vehicle, two automatic guns (M-70 A 7.622 mm) were found, as well as three hand grenades and 350 bullets.

The aforementioned arms and ammunition were military in origin. Namely, Zdravko Miric and Blagoje Sakota had received and were assigned with the above mentioned arms and ammunition according to sonal armament at the Military Post 2651 Visoko. Miric gave his gun (M-70 A, 7.62 mm, no. 99436), 150 bullets and 3 hand grenades (M-75) to Vaso Djukic, whereas Sakota gave his gun (M-70 A, 7.62 mm, no. 99776) and 150 combat bullets to Srpko Djukic (Ibid.).

¹³ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2445; Ibid., inv. No. 2-2458; *Slobodna Bosna*, no. 3, November 14, 1991, p. 6. At one of the sessions of the Federal Executive Council, Sabrija Pojskic insisted on the Federal Secretariat for National Defence to inform the Federal Government

On November 21, 1991, near the Old Station at Bistrik, the employees of the Police Precinct of the Stari Grad Municipality of Sarajevo stopped three trailer trucks transporting military materials on the Bar – Kalinovik route. They contained 75 tonnes of rockets (25 tonnes each) for the needs of the JNA. The certificate on vehicle safety stated that the drivers of *Rumijatrans* from Bar were transporting bananas and tropical fruits, rather than dangerous matters – rockets.¹⁴

In the second half of February 1992, on the occasion of a control of military vehicles in Han Derventa (around 11 PM), the JNA military police from the barracks in Lukavica stopped four trailer trucks and two “FAP” trucks full of arms from Titovo Uzice, but without any escort, travel orders or specifications of the “commodities”.¹⁵

as to where these arms had come from. Later on, information was received that these arms were intended for the military garrison in Visoko (testimony by Sabrija Pojskic given to the author).

After the activities about armament and equipment of the Serb population in Bosnia and Herzegovina conducted by the JNA had been revealed, they were immediately covered up **“with infantile explanations of the JNA and non-understandable idleness on the part of the Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities”** (*Slobodna Bosna*, no. 3, November 14, 1991, p. 6).

¹⁴ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-536, Court Martial in Sarajevo, Kr. No. 99/91, dated November 26, 1991 – to the Ministry of Interior of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo; *Oslobodjenje*, February 1, 1992. The transporter company was *Rumijatrans* from Bar, and the drivers were: Mujo Sukurica (from Bijelo Polje), Zoran Vukmanovic (from Bukovik), and Hajrudin Sejdovic (from Bar).

On November 25, 1991, on the site of the special Unit of Police Forces of the Ministry of Interior of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Krtelji, the investigatory judge of the Court Martial in Sarajevo (1st class Captain Borislav Jamina) performed an on-site inspection of the trailer trucks and their cargo in the trailers. On that occasion, it was found that the **“trailer trucks contained military materials in crates that were sealed”**. Because these were **“JNA resources”**, in compliance with the basic Art. 211 of the Code on Criminal Procedure, on November 26, the investigatory judge sent a letter to the Ministry of Interior of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the following note: **“you are obligated to immediately surrender the trailer truck drivers, the trailer trucks with the cargo, as well as the documentation confiscated from the drivers, to the Court Martial in Sarajevo”** (Ibid.).

A number of the shells from Bar was also brought to Foca (**Dnevni izvjestaj**, No. 70, July 3, 1992).

¹⁵ AIIZ, inv. No. 3-311.

On the eve of the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina, in order to arm the Serbs as much as possible, in mid-1991, the Federal Secretariat for National Defence and the Federal Secretariat of Interior imported huge quantities of weapons and equipment from Lebanon. At the time, seven ships “docked” at the Bar harbour with 15,000 tons of armament and military equipment. According to some assessments, this arsenal could furnish an army of 100,000 soldiers.¹⁶ On this occasion, at one of the SIV sessions, Sabrija Pojskic and Mustafa Cengic conducted fierce polemics with Admiral Brovet (assistant to the Federal Secretary for national defence). Provoked by their discussion, Brovet admitted that they had to do it, because, according to him, the Croat people were getting arms from Croatia (“**the HDZ is armed**”), and, allegedly because of this, the SDS, that is, the Serb people, were to be armed too. Pojskic then asked him a question **that had granted the military leadership the right to arm the Serb people**, and asked what about his own people, that is, the Bosniaks. However, he received no answer.¹⁷

After the so-called plebiscite of the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina (November 9 and 10, 1991), with hearty assistance from the JNA, the SDS of Bosnia and Herzegovina intensified the activities related to the arming of the Serb population.¹⁸

In late February 1992, in various vehicles on the roads across Bosnia and Herzegovina, illegal arms were identified in the following quantities: 6 automatic guns, 96 automatic rifles, semi-automatic and “standard” ones, 2 pistols, 2 hand grenades, 50 bullets, 1 knife and 1 tear-gas device.¹⁹ On the occasion of departure of a portion of military reservists from the Sarajevo region to Ustikolina, in early 1992, it was revealed that they were also transporting weapons. The members of the Ministry of Interior of Bosnia and Herzegovina were picking out from the traffic such vehicles with improper documentation transporting

¹⁶ *Oslobodjenje*, February 27, 1991. The sender of the aforementioned “cargo” was from Cyprus, and it had been loaded in Beirut.

¹⁷ Testimonies by Sabrija Pojskic and Mustafa Cengic given to the author.

¹⁸ **Dnevni izvjestaj**, no. 72, July 5, 1992.

¹⁹ *Oslobodjenje*, February 25, 1992.

weapons. However, after interventions by high-ranking JNA officers, the vehicles most often continued their way to Herzegovina or to Podrinje.²⁰ The police officers of the Stari Grad (Sarajevo) Police Precinct on March 24, 1992, at the check point at Vijecnica, upon regular inspection, had stopped a car in which they found the following quantities of arms: a “Heckler” automatic gun, 3 frames for this automatic gun, 325 9 mm bullets, a “Heckler” muffler, a pistol with two frames, and one mini radio-station with a spare battery. The car was driven by Radomir Kojic from Pale, who introduced himself as the reserve commander of the special unit of the Serb Autonomous Area of Romanija.²¹

Right before the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina, the JNA was massively arming the Serb population in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The organization and realization of this task was mainly assigned to the operational agents of the Counterintelligence Service of the JNA and a major number of the JNA officers (who were associates of this Service), mainly of Serb ethnicity.²²

The federal secretariat for national defence organized, supported and approved the confiscation of arms and weapons, both infantry and artillery ones, as well as of ammunition and equipment from the JNA and TO of Bosnia and Herzegovina for armament and equipment of the Serb paramilitary formations. The JNA officers were arming the Serbs on the whole territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, distributing to them weapons, ammunition, and other materials and technical resources

²⁰ **Dnevni izvjestaj**, No. 111, August 13, 1992; *Pres Centar Armije Bosne i Hercegovine*, no. 102-02/115, October 23, 1992.

²¹ **AGRESIJA NA REPUBLIKU BOSNU I HERCEGOVINU IZ DANA U DAN, DOKUMENTI O AGRESIJI NA REPUBLIKU BOSNU I HERCEGOVINU** (hereinafter referred to as: **Agresija ...**), Information Office of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo, 1993, p. 15; *Oslobodjenje*, March 26, 1992, p. 10.

²² AIIZ, inv. No. 2-535, **The Role of the KOS in the Aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina**, (Information of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina), no. 4. There were also individual cases of involvement persons of Muslim ethnicity, who had previously been recruited as the JNA KOS associates (Ibid.).

in many JNA barracks. Thus, for instance, the barracks *Slavisa Vajner Cica* and *Slobodan Princip Seljo* (located in the Sarajevo area of Lukavica), then *Viktor Bujanj*, as well as many others, played a significant role in arming of the Serb population. Namely, from early September 1991, the aforementioned barracks were daily visited by some “unknown people who were mainly carrying briefcases with the SDS emblems on them”.²³ Among them were the escorts (Blagojevic, Kovacevic, Ilic and Batinic) and the chief of cabinet of Radovan Karadzic, whom the

²³ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-785; **POSEBNO IZDANJE O AGRESIJI I TERORIZMU PROTIV REPUBLIKE BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE**, Information Office of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereinafter referred to as: **Posebno izdanje**), no. 2, April 28, 1992.

The Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina was openly active at the JNA barracks, particularly in Lukavica. Thus, in November 1991, people from the leadership of the SDS came to visit the Command of the 2nd Military District. This was particularly intensified on the eve of the aggressor’s attack on Sarajevo, when the SDS criminals were increasingly frequently coming to see General Kukanjac for consultations. After the criminal attack on Sarajevo, at the motel at Koran and at the *Posta* Hotel on Mt. Jahorina, Kukanjac often met criminal Karadzic and other leaders of the SDS. On these occasions, they discussed about execution of offensive actions in order to destroy Sarajevo, and about other crimes, mainly over the civilian population. In early April 1992, criminal Karadzic proposed (through radio communications) to Kukanjac to shell the building of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Post Office, which General Kukanjac ordered to be done. When parting from the criminals from the SDS leadership, General Kukanjac would say “**it is ok**”, “**do not worry**”, “**we will arrange for that**”, and the like (AIIZ, inv. No. 3-317, and 374).

In early 1992, the Serb Democratic Party increased the pressure on the officers and soldiers who were not of Serb ethnicity. Thus, in the first half of April 1992, the SDS was particularly making pressure on certain officers of the 5th Corps who were non-Serbs, sending them the message through the *Glas* newspaper to leave the Corps, or that they would else make them go away. On April 18, 1992, the units of the 2nd Military District were left by: 19 officers, 5 junior officers, and 4 civilian personnel. These were “**predominantly persons of the Muslim ethnicity**” (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-91, Command of the 2nd Military District, Operational Team, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2082, April 8, 1992 – to the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – Operational Centre, and to others; Ibid., inv. No. 2-102, Command of the 2nd Military District, Operational Duty Team, strictly confidential no. 10/36-2321, April 18, 1992 – to the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – Operational Centre, and others).

JNA officers, in particularly Major Trivic, armed (with bullets of various calibres, hand grenades, “bazookas”, and the like). Ensign Nedeljko Lizdek and junior Sergeant Vlastimir Plazinic, in agreement with Colonel Milisav Gagovic and other JNA officers, during December 1991 and January 1992, first in private cars, and then in trucks, had transported infantry arms and artillery to Pale. In early February 1992 they went to Pancevo with two TAM trucks, having transported back sniper guns, night sights, and other special equipment.²⁴

Having in mind that the **“leadership of the Serb people and the Serbs as a whole are prepared for the war”**, and the **“option that Bosnia and Herzegovina will soon be recognized as a state”**, during the referendum for the independent and sovereign state of Bosnia and Herzegovina (in the night between February 29 and March 1, 1992), the command of the 2nd Military District in Sarajevo had set up barricades. Namely, on the eve and during the setting of the barricades in Sarajevo (February 29-March 2), which were, in cooperation with the Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina, directly organized and coordinated by the JNA (mainly the high-ranking KOS officers),²⁵ with the approval and knowledge of the Command of the 2nd Military District, in the time from March 1 through 4, huge quantities of armament, ammunition, equipment, food, medical and other materials and resources were taken out of the barracks in Lukavica, and distributed to the Serb population of Tilava, Vojkovici, Ilidza, Vraca, Lukavica, and some other Sarajevo areas. During March 2, some 1,500 citizens of the Serb ethnicity gathered in the barracks coming from the above mentioned areas, with some hundred passenger and cargo vehicles, seeking that the JNA provide

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-75, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 908-1, March 20, 1992 – to the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY (“attn. NGS”); Ibid., inv. No. 2-535, The Role of the KOs in the Aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina; Ibid., inv. No. 2-785; *Slobodna Bosna*, No. 20, March 12, 1992, p. 4; *Dnevni izvjestaj*, no. 2, April 26, 1992, and no. 93, July 26, 1992.

On March 1, 1992, the unit of the Military Police from the JNA barracks in Lukavica received the order from captain Radojcevic (Commander of the party of the Military Police) to block Sarajevo (AIIZ, inv. No. 3-311).

them with arms which it had promised them as early as in mid-1991. At a closed meeting between the representatives of the military authorities and the representatives of the gathered Serb population,²⁶ it was agreed that the arms shall not be distributed at the site of the barracks, or individually, but that they shall be distributed subsequently, once the mass of citizens leaves. Once the citizens had left, the loading of weapons and military equipment began into some thirty trucks and private cars. On this occasion, the following weapons were issued from the military warehouses: 122 submachine guns, 8 machine guns, 1,250 automatic guns, 272,000 bullets of all types and calibres (standard and tracing ones), 3,000 standard hand grenades and a truck of hand grenade launchers. General Kukanjac, among others, also participated in the distribution of arms and ammunition to the members of the Serb ethnicity in Lukavica.²⁷

On March 2, 1992, based on the personal approval of General Kukanjac, and “**based on the need and the current situation in Sarajevo**”, the Command of the Light Artillery Division of Anti-Aircraft Defence of the 46th Background Support issued 250 automatic handguns 7.62 mm and 60,000 bullets to the Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Novo Sarajevo. In addition to the aforementioned arms and ammunition transported from Lukavica, at the time, Colonel Major Djuro Gvozdenovic and senior Sergeant Radmilo Kovacevic also issued 100 tonnes of food, as well as large quantities of bandages and other medical materials, for the needs of the Serb “**volunteers**” from the military warehouse.²⁸

²⁶ Ibid. On behalf of the military authorities, the gathered Serbs were approached by the following JNA officers: Colonel Radomir Milekic, Nenad Bacanovic, and Colonel Majors Risto Aleksic and Djuro Gvozdenovic. At some point, the conversation was also joined by the Commander of the 2nd Military District, general Milutin Kukanjac. It is interesting to point out that these discussions were not attended by the Commander of the *Slavisa Vajner-Cica* barracks, Colonel Enver Hadzihanovic, who was in the barracks, because, according to some eye-witnesses, he was practically blocked, just as any other officers of Muslim, Croat, Albanian or Macedonian ethnicity (Ibid.).

²⁷ Ibid; *Slobodna Bosna*, no. 21, March 19, 1992, p. 4.

²⁸ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-228, Command of the 2nd Military District, confidential no. 16/28-3, March 2, 1992 – to the Command of the light artillery division of the anti-aircraft defence of the 46th background support; *Slobodna Bosna*, No. 20, March 12, 1992, pp. 4 and 6.

On March 28, 1992, at one of the military JNA barracks in Lukavica, based on the order and in personal attendance of general Kukanjac, military uniforms, automatic guns with 150 bullets each, and then one green and one black hand grenade each, as well as dry meals, were distributed to a group of Serb “volunteers” (some 500 Serbs).²⁹

At the *Slobodan Princip Seljo* barracks, on April 4, 14, and 19, 1992, upon order of general Kukanjac, the JNA was distributing arms to the Serbs. Thus, on April 4, 500 Serbs came to the barracks and were given: one automatic gun and 150 bullets each, two hand grenades and a uniform (instead of the star, the caps had the emblem of the “Yugoslav” army). Ten days later, at the mentioned barracks, the JNA armed 1,500 Serbs. In addition, on April 19, in the Primary School in Tilava, JNA officers were arming the Serb population from the territory of Sarajevo.³⁰

Other Sarajevo barracks too, in addition to the *Slobodan Princip Seljo* one in Lukavica, were involved in the drive of distribution of arms, ammunition, transport vehicles, medical materials and foods to the Serb population. The most responsible JNA officers participated in these activities. This is particularly confirmed by the example of the Sarajevo *Viktor Bubanj* barracks. Thus, the infantry armament of the JNA units that had withdrawn from Croatia in late 1991 and early 1992 (mainly from Zagreb), was – directly before and in the very beginning of the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina – distributed to the Serbs from Lukavica, Kasindol, Vojkovici, Tilava, and other Sarajevo areas. Through the SDS, these arms were sent to individual local communities and distributed to Serbs. In its division and distribution, particularly from March 1 to 3, 1992, the most involved were the most responsible officers of the KOS and the Military Police. Among them, those particularly active were Colonel Djuro Gvozdenovic, major Janko Trivic, 1st class captains Radoslav Vojvodic and Momir Tomcic

The aforementioned guns and ammunition were delivered at the site of the *Slobodan Princip Seljo* barracks in Lukavica. In the name of the TO Novo Sarajevo Headquarters, Milovan Aleksic signed that he had received these arms and ammunition.

²⁹ AIIZ, inv. No. 3-317. Leaving the barracks on this occasion, General Kukanjac told those Serbs: “**Stay put guys, come over if you need anything**”.

³⁰ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-539; Ibid., inv. No. 3-354.

(commander of the Military Police battalion), then senior Sergeant Radmilo Kovacevic, Sergeant Mile Jovanovic, and Ensign Lizdek, and others. Colonel Major Gvozdenovic and Captain Vojvodic were openly giving out arms, ammunition and food to the Serb people. They made senior Sergeants Dusan Polic and Bato Matasin, under the threat of arms, to open up the warehouses and load the arms and ammunition into trucks. The aforementioned officers also directed the setting up of the March barricades from two headquarters: at the Vrbanja Bridge, and near the Osmice motel on Mt. Trebevic. In addition to them, the other military personnel from the *Viktor Bubanj* barracks were involved in the events of March 1 through 3, 1992. Among them was the pensioned officer of the KOS, former military prosecutor, retired Colonel Budimir Djordjic. Together with Zivko Sokic, director of the prison at the *Viktor Bubanj* barracks, Djordjic had the task to coordinate work with the prominent people from the Ministry of Interior of Serb ethnicity (Zepinic, Mandic, and the like). Lieutenant Perko Alimpic, an officer of Military Police and commander of the anti-terrorist platoon, was directly securing and supplying the arms to the Serbs.³¹

³¹ AIIZ, inv. No. 3-334, 374, and 375; Ibid., inv. No. 2-785; *Dnevni izvjestaj*, no. 93, July 26, 1992.

The aforementioned and other JNA officers organized and directed the setting up of the March barricades in Sarajevo. In these activities, the major roles were played by major Tomcic and ensign Lizdek. **“That night when the barricades were set up in Sarajevo for the first time, the civilian telephone at Tomcic’s rang constantly and they were mainly asking for Tomcic or Lizdek, with the question: ‘Are we going to do something too now’, etc. For instance, Tomcic was called by Nedjo Slavisa from Dobrinja, and he told him that in his street there is one barricade, and ‘as I know the people can I tell them to remove it’, Lizdek grabbed the phone receiver from Tomcic and told him: ‘I am setting it up, and you are removing it’”** (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-785).

Very often, at major Tomcic’s there were meetings between the retired Colonel Budimir Djordjic, then Colonel Belosevic, while Colonel Simokovski also telephoned in frequently. Colonel Djordjic telephoned often and personally went to see general Adzic (as for instance, in early March 1992). In relation to this, he conveyed to major Trivic and captain Tomcic that, during his stay in Belgrade, he told general Adzic that **“he should not be giving food to these smugglers from Sokolac and from Han Pijesak, because they are reselling it, but to have it transported to the barracks or through the *Romanija* Military Institution”** (Ibid.).

The JNA officers were present at some barricades as well, such as the case was, for instance, with the barricade at Vraca, at which there were an active lieutenant and an active Sergeant in uniforms and with JNA emblems. They personally also transported arms, ammunition and food to the criminals, and among them the most active were major Trivic, captain Radislav Vojvodic, senior Sergeant Lizdek and Sergeant Mile Jovanovic, and they also kept permanent contact between the organizers of the barricades and the high-ranking officers with the Command of the 2nd Military District and the barracks in Lukavica and Svrakino Selo.³²

Major Pero Despotovic was arming the armed SDS formations in Ilidza. In this job, he closely cooperated with Ljubo Bosiljcic, a delegate of the SDS at the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Military Post 9785 in Blazuj began issuing, upon receipts, infantry weapons and ammunition to Serbs, and **“each military conscript was obligated to take them along with him when invited to the unit”**.

In all of the Sarajevo barracks, in particular in Rajlovac, on April 5, 1992, the Yugoslav National Army was distributing arms to pensioned military and civilian personnel serving in the JNA. On the next day, in Sarajevo, the JNA was distributing arms to the citizens of Serb ethnicity. At the Sarajevo area of Park (15 and 17, Mose Pijade St.), on April 17, 1992, the JNA members distributed arms to Serbs from a military truck. The JNA had also secured armament and ammunition for the needs of the Serb fascists in the areas of Pofalici, Dobrinja, and other Sarajevo areas.³³

Upon orders of major Trivic, on the occasion of the first aggressor’s attack against Sarajevo, lieutenant Alimpic was guiding the fire onto Sarajevo, from the area of Zlatiste and **“with him he had 18 Chetniks from Pale and several regular soldiers”**. Before him, that is, on the first night of the attacks on Sarajevo, the fire onto Sarajevo was guided (from Zlatiste) by Sergeant Jovica Bubalo. On the second night, he was invited by General Djurdjevac in person and he was told to reduce the fire. Given that Bubalo did not do it, General Djurdjevac called Major Tomic and told him to **“go and replace that Chetnik up over there”** (Ibid.).

³² *Slobodna Bosna*, no. 20, March 12, 1992, p. 6; Ibid., no. 21, March 19, 1992; AIIZ, inv. No. 2-785; Ibid., inv. No. 2-538, 540, 545, and 547; N. Durakovic, the aforementioned work, p. 282.

³³ *Pres-centar Armije Bosne i Hercegovine*, no. 102-02/15, October 23, 1992; *Agresija*, pp. 19, and 21; BILTEN MINISTARSTVA ZA NARODNU ODBRANU

The arming of the Serbs on the territories of municipalities of Novo Sarajevo and Novi Grad (local communities: *Omer Maslic, Blagoje Parovic, Avdo Hodzic, Kumrovec, Cengic Vila, Otoka, Alipasino Polje, Ivo Lola Ribar, Buca Potok, Dobrinja*, and the like) was done from the JNA barracks. Thus, for instance, the provision with arms of the Serb armed formations in the area of Buca Potok was done from the *Viktor Bubanj* barracks. These tasks were assigned to the officers from the Military Police of the 4th Corps of the JNA: Captain Momir Tomcic, Boro Milkovic, and others.³⁴

The duty of arming the Serbs on the territory of the Local Community of *Otoka* was assigned to Ensign Nedeljko Lizdek, also from the mentioned military unit. Thanks to him, Slavisa Stojisavljevic and Jovica Bradonjic took six “*zolja*” rocket launchers, one “*osa*” bazooka, and a hand grenade launcher with two casks of shells. Together with Dusko Stojisavljevic, Zdravko Todorovic, and others, through the JNA, Aleksandar Stamenkovic procured weapons and distributed them to the Serbs on the territory of the aforementioned local communities.³⁵

Massive and organized distribution of arms and ammunition to the Serb population was intensified in late February and early March 1992. The procurement and distribution of arms to the persons of Serb ethnicity for the area of the Drinska and Orlovska Streets (Novo Sarajevo)

THE REPUBLIKE BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE (hereinafter referred to as: *Bilten MNO*), no. 13, April 15, 1992; *Ibid.*, no. 21, April 18, 1992; AIIZ, inv. No. 2-540; **Dnevni izvjestaj**, no. 20, May 14, 1992, and no. 21, May 15, 1992.

³⁴ AIIZ, inv. No. 3-316, and 319. The distribution of arms to the citizens of Serb ethnicity in Buca Potok was organized by the JNA. Thus, just for an illustration, Milenko Glogovac, with one of the JNA lieutenants was distributing arms to the Serbs in this residential area. In early April 1992, in a military truck (covered with a canvass), they came in front of the houses of Dimso Odzakovic (Adema Buce St.) and distributed to the Serbs automatic and semi-automatic guns with ammunition. Dimsa Odzakovic received an automatic gun and 5 frames of ammunition, and his brother received an automatic gun (*Ibid.*).

³⁵ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-538; *Ibid.*, inv. No. 3-342. The Serb population in Novo Sarajevo and beyond was armed from the JNA warehouses by certain Delivoje, an active member of the military personnel, too.

was organized by Momo Garic (used to work on recruitment affairs at the Secretariat for National Defence of Novo Sarajevo, and after the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina, he was appointed commander of the Serb force for Novo Sarajevo). He received the weapons from the “Marshall Tito” barracks, and on the eve of the March barricades in 1992, he divided to numerous Serbs one automatic gun with 150 bullets each. In certain garages at Grbavica, there were heavy weapons stored, mainly cannons and howitzers with several casks of ammunition.³⁶ The members of the Serb armed formations on the territory of the Sarajevo local communities of *Omer Maslic* and *Blagoje Parovic* were also armed by Goran Smiljanic from Sarajevo.³⁷

The Serb armed formation at the localities of Kromolj and Slatina was armed with 3 heavy machine guns, 10 light machine guns, 23 rifles, 10 “*zolja*” rocket launchers, 4 hand launchers, 6 casks of ammunition and a major quantity of hand grenades. This unit had received all of that armament from the JNA.³⁸

Parallel to the formation of the Serb armed formations at Alipasino Polje, activities related to the purchasing of armament were also conducted. The Coordinator of these activities was Miso Mijatovic. In these tasks, he was most frequently helped by Mile Babic and Boro Ivanisevic. Mijatovic often went to the *Viktor Bubanj* barracks, where he arranged with the JNA members for deliveries of arms and ammunition. The result of these activities was taking out of rifles and other types of armament from these barracks, such as: 86 automatic guns, a number of mortars of 60 and 82 mm, “*zolja*” rocket launchers, hand grenade launchers,

³⁶ AIIZ, inv. No. 3-2592. Testimony of Boris Herak; *Prva Linija* (the paper of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina), no. 2, February 1, 1993, p. 3. The arms and ammunition, among others, were also given to the following ethnic Serbs: Veljko Ilic, Ranko Bogicevic, brothers Vaso and Slobodan Vaskovic, then Radomir Draskovic, Milos and Dusko Teskovic (a father and son), and others.

³⁷ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-796.

³⁸ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-795. From early April 1992, this unit was working active against the civilian population in Sarajevo and against the members of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Jovo Ninkovic (from Sarajevo) too participated in armament and war activities of this unit.

hand grenades, and major quantities of 7.62 ammunition, and *kame* (large knives), and the like. For these needs, they most commonly used the small truck owned by Boro Ivanisevic.³⁹

The Serb population in Sarajevo's Adema Buce Street was armed by the JNA member Milenko Glogovac, then the employee of the enterprise *Zrak*, Dimsa Odzakovic, and the traffic police officer Kojo Vukicevic. In addition to them, the distribution of arms, ammunition and explosive devices also involved participation of Mito and Jovan Mijovic, Jovo Mosaic, and Ranko Cicovic, residents of this area, who, as SDS activists, procured the arms from JNA warehouses, and then organized meetings with the residents of Serb ethnicity from this area and sent them for training to Vojkovici.⁴⁰

Sretko Jeremic, director of the FAMOS Factory of Special Vehicles, also conducted armament and equipment of the Serb criminals in Sarajevo. On April 29, 1992, he came to the site of the factory, bringing in three vehicles with equipment and ammunition for 150 members of the Serb territorial defence. **“Immediately, 150 Serb terrorists were clothed in uniforms and were given arms. The uniforms were carrying *Chetnik* emblems”**.⁴¹

Mico Krstovic (a lorry driver from Pofalici), through the JNA from Lukavica, had organized the procurement and distribution of arms and ammunition to the Serbs in the area of the Sarajevo settlement of Pofalici. On the eve and after the March barricades in Sarajevo 1992, Krstovic distributed to Serbs over 300 automatic and semi-automatic guns, including snipers, several light machine guns M-53, M-48, mortars of 60 and 80 mm, hand grenades and grenade launchers, then automatic guns with 150 bullets each, a number of ammunition casks, and **“a huge heap of military**

³⁹ AIIZ, inv. No. 3-326. Major quantities of the taken armament were stored at Mojnilo with Djordje Mladjen, Miodrag Beat, Mirko and Nemanja Zirojevic, whereas a smaller portion, mainly the hand grenades, were placed by Dabic into the basement of his building. For his unit, Rajko Cerovina assigned 4 automatic light guns with two casks of ammunition each (150 bullets per gun).

⁴⁰ **Dnevni izvjestaj**, no. 87, July 20, 1992.

⁴¹ **Agresija ...**, p. 33.

uniforms". Thus, for instance, he gave Sinisa Milivojevic, Marko Kuzman, Zoran Cvoro, the Tesanovic brothers, Gojko and Marko Sikiras, and others, one semi-automatic gun with 50 bullets, and one hand grenade each.⁴²

The Serb population on the territory of the local community of Kosevsko Brdo also received a lot of the arms and ammunition from the JNA. Particularly active in the distribution of this armament were teacher Mirjana Mimovic and Vlado Medic.⁴³

Slavko Petrovic, president of the SDS for this area, as well as the Mocevic from Crepoljsko, organized procurement of armament for the Serbs of Kromolj. For instance, on March 10, 1992, semi-automatic guns and submachine guns of 7.62 and 7.9 mm, and the like, were brought from the JNA warehouse to Kromolj.⁴⁴

The arming of the Serbs in Sarajevo was also organized by Bogdan Boskovic, a retired JNA Colonel, who, together with Mile Stojanovic and other Serb fascists, excelled in crimes against the detained Bosniaks in Rajlovac.⁴⁵

From the barracks in Butile, Rajlovac and Hadzici, the Yugoslav National Army was also arming the Serbs in the areas of Dobrosevici, Ahatovici, Bojnik, Doglodi, Stup, Rajlovac, and other places. Namely,

⁴² AIIZ, inv. No. 3-261, 262, and 320.

⁴³ AIIZ, inv. No. 3-385. Teacher Mimovic (Vojislava Kecmanovica Djede St.), for instance, in early April 1992, invited Milenko Ceklic (14a, Vojvode Putnika St.), and gave him an automatic gun with two frames of ammunition (her husband Bogdan Mimovic, a Montenegrin from the village of Murino, municipality of Plav, was employed at the PTT).

In a meeting of the SDS at the local community of *Kosevsko Brdo*, also attended by the president of the Municipal Assembly of Centar, Dr. Radomir Bulatovic, upon the request to distribute the arms, it was responded that this will be done "**once there is a more massive response of the Serb ethnic persons from the area of Kosevsko Brdo**".

In addition to the armament, the Serbs from the *Kosevsko Brdo* local community also had other equipment. Thus, for instance, Nebojsa Savic had a radio station.

⁴⁴ AIIZ, inv. No. 3-335, and 385.

⁴⁵ Ibid.; **Dnevni izvjestaj**, No. 61, June 24, 1992.

the JNA used military trucks to bring casks full of arms and ammunition to the aforementioned Serb villages and distributed them to the Serbs. These activities also involved participation of the commander of the barracks in Rajlovac, Colonel Miletic. In addition, many Serbs were also put in charge of arming the Serb population in the aforementioned villages, among whom these were particularly distinguishing themselves: Momo, Mile, Nebojsa and Zdravko Tintor, Maksim and Darko Milicevic (a father and son), Nedjo Vujicic, Marinko Simeunovic, Dragan and Pero Koprivica, Nikola Stanisic, Stevo Gogic, and others.⁴⁶

The JNA officers were arming the members of the Serb armed formations even in the barracks of Nedzarici. These activities involved the participation of the commander of the barracks, Colonel Major Miodrag Stanic, then his deputy Colonel Major Blagoje Tomic, senior Sergeant Srdjan Trifunovic, 1st class Captain Branko Milosevic, and Jovan Djogo (Colonel Majors Stanic and Tomic were Serbians, i.e. from Serbia, and the rest of the officers came from Kalinovik). The arms from the barracks were distributed to the members of the Serb ethnicity residing in Sarajevo, with an explanation that “**the Serbs must organize and defend themselves against the Muslims, because the same will happen in Sarajevo as what happened in Vukovar**”.⁴⁷

The distribution of arms from the *Viktor Bubanj* barracks also involved participation of Ranko Cicovic, owner of the hospitality facility in Buca Potok, who claimed he had a unit of 100 people, and he was also assisted by Branko Miocevic. The population of the Serb ethnicity were suggested that in case they are no longer able to defend their residential area, they flee to Lukavica, “**where they will be safe, because the army is there**”. On the occasion of dislocation of the active military composition from that barracks on April 3, 1992, Stanic surrendered the facility to the Serb armed formations, also joined by captain Jovan Djogo.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-538, and 545; Ibid., inv. No. 3-2906; Ibid., inv. No. 3-2831; Ibid., inv. No. 3-342; *Dnevni izvjestaj*, No. 86, July 19, 1992; *Bilten MNO*, No. 13, April 15, 1992.

⁴⁷ *Dnevni izvjestaj*, No. 89, July 22, 1992; *Slobodna Bosna*, no. 21, March 19, 1992, p. 4.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

Uros Rankovic, too, together with Zoran Bartula, Obren Balac, and Ranko Miladin, in order to plan, prepare and execute the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina, armed the Serbs from the Nedzarici barracks. Together with the aforementioned persons, he organized transfer of weapons from this barracks even to Pale. He transported certain quantities of armament (a truck of arms and ammunition) to the house of Ranko Mladjen at Mojnilo, where they placed-hid it into a trench. **“During started aggression and the war activities conducted by the aggressor with artillery fire from the Nedzarici barracks upon the Alipasino Polje residential area, by telephone, he reported to his son Veljko, who was in the Nedzarici barracks, about the position and correction of aiming at civilian facilities, at which a number of persons was killed or heavily wounded...”**⁴⁹ Major quantities of armament from the Nedzarici barracks, between March 2 and 3, 1992 (the first night of the barricades) were distributed to the citizens of the Serb ethnicity. In the beginning, the arms were distributed to **“volunteers”**, and later (**“as the tension rose”**) to the local residents too. In application of the filthiest methods of special war, commander of the barracks (Colonel Major Miodrag Stanic), released rumours that the Muslims were preparing to attack the barracks, and that due to this the arms need to be distributed to **“volunteers”**. In just several moments’ time, a truck of modern weapons was all distributed, and when the arms ran out, another truck full of weapons was driven up from the Lukavica barracks (semi-automatic guns and M-48’s). Massive distribution of arms from their warehouses allowed the Serb civilians to take weapons without any order, **“particularly when the casks of ammunition and arms were thrown over the barracks wire fence among the civilians, as raw meat among starving animals”**.⁵⁰

In many Serb houses and apartments in Sarajevo, weapons were found as well as major quantities of ammunition and explosive devices. Thus, in the basement of the house of Radomir Elek at Slobodana Vukovica St., an automatic gun M-70 and 270 bullets for it were found. In the family residence of Radmilo Radan from Sarajevo, an

⁴⁹ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-797.

⁵⁰ *Slobodna Bosna*, no. 21, March 19, 1992, p. 4.

automatic gun was found, with 2 frames, 165 bullets, 1 hand grenade, a colt of unknown make and a bag for ammunition. During the search of the apartment of Gojko Knezevic (at 20, Trg Rade Koncara), an automatic gun was found with two frames of ammunition. In the apartment of Rajko Ninkovic (at 14/3, Ivana Krndelja St.), an automatic and a semi-automatic gun was found, as well as three hand grenades and large quantities of ammunition. At 51, Adema Buce St., in the family residence of Jukics, the following quantities of armament and military equipment were found (owned by Mirko Simic): 7 M-48 guns; 2 rifles (Russian) 7.62 mm; automatic gun M-56 with frames; ammunition 7.62 mm (for the Russian rifle) in an unpacked cask – 600 pieces; 4 optical sights; 1 hand grenade (standard); 1 hand grenade; 50 bullets 9 mm (long); 261 bullets 7.9 mm; 32 bullets 7.62 mm; 1 military belt; 1 military blouse; 1 protective mask, and a military backpack.⁵¹

The JNA took large quantities of arms and ammunition from the military barracks in Lukavica to Pale, Han Pijesak, Kalinovik, Ustikolina, and to other places.

The arms and ammunition in Pale were unloaded off to hangars of the barracks at Koran, near the source of the Miljacka river, and into the other warehouse at Jahorinski Potok. The military hangars had been dug into the ground and a pine forest was planted on top of them.⁵²

In the area of Pale, where the SDS seat was found, in addition to the large number of armed formations, there was also a major concentration of armament and equipment. Thus, in Renovica, there were 17 underground

⁵¹ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-537 and 542; Ibid., inv. No. 3-342 and 356; *Bilten MNO*, no. 39, April 27, 1992; *Dnevni izvjestaj*, No. 4, April 28, 1992. Rajko Ninkovic received the aforementioned armament from Dusan Forcan who, starting from the assessment that the Serb people are allegedly at risk and need to be armed, distributed arms to the Serbs on the territory of Novo Sarajevo.

Milutin Forcan was in charge of the military affairs on the territory of Novo Sarajevo.

⁵² AIIZ, inv. No. 3-311; Ibid., inv. No. 2-785. The delivery forms/orders for transports of weapons were signed by captain Colovejic (?). The orders and delivery forms for transports of weapons, mainly guns and ammunition, never contained any exact quantity, but the order just said “a major quantity”.

warehouses of the JNA with major quantities of arms and ammunition delivered by the Serb fascist in trucks to the positions around Sarajevo. The JNA, among other things, made military transporters too, available to the Serb unit from Pale commanded by Desimir Petrovic and Rajko Kovacevic. The warehouse of this unit, which was located at Koran (behind the *Famos* enterprise), contained armament, military equipment and other material and technical resources delivered by the JNA in helicopters. The Kovacevic brothers, Milos Vukadin, Nebojsa Lizdek, Slavisa Golijanin, and others, had procured and distributed the arms to the Serbs in Pale.⁵³

On March 28, 1992, 30 tons of weapons and ammunition were also transported from Pale to the villages of Odzak and Povrsnica, and were distributed around the Serb villages in the area of Gorazde.⁵⁴

The armament of the Serb population in Han Pijesak was directed by the JNA officers Dragomir Milosevic, Milan Beronja, as well as Rvovic, and Milos Pajic (president of the SDS), and others. In the capacity of the commander of the garrison in Han Pijesak, Dragomir Milicevic was involved in armament of the armed formations of the SDS in the broader region of Romanija. When the arms began “missing”, Rvovic suspended investigative actions related to this, which had been undertaken by senior Sergeant Vlado Topalovic.⁵⁵ Milan Beronja (commander of the 3rd Mountain Battalion of the 216th Mountain Brigade) had distributed arms together with commander of the Territorial Defence of Sokolac (Slobodan Batinic), in the first half of March 1992, and equipment to the Serbs in Han Pijesak.⁵⁶

⁵³ *Dnevni izvjestaj*, no. 74, July 7, 1992, no. 75, July 8, 1992, and no. 77, July 10, 1992; *Slobodna Bosna*, no. 4, September 21, 1991, p. 3; AIIZ, inv. No. 2-538.

⁵⁴ *Agresija...*, p. 17; *Oslobodjenje*, May 31, 1992.

⁵⁵ *Dnevni izvjestaj*, No. 2, April 26, 1992, and no. 127, August 29, 1992; AIIZ, inv. No. 2-785. From September 1990, officer Milosevic was found “**under command**” of Rajko Dukic from Milici, president of the Executive Board of the SDS of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

⁵⁶ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-28091, Testimony of the Chief of Staff of the Headquarters of the 216th Mountain Brigade, Lieutenant-Colonel of the JNA, Asim Dzambasovic.

The Serb armed formations in Sokolac were well armed. Their equipment came from the warehouse of the Ministry of Interior of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was located at the same place.⁵⁷

During 1991, through the JNA, the Serb population in the area of Cajnice was armed by physician Dusko Kornjaca (from the November elections of 1990, he was the president of the SO Cajnice), a “count” and a “minister” in the so-called government of the *SAO Herzegovina*. In preparation for the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina, in addition to organized arming of the Serbs, he also organized military exercises, conducted mobilization and dug in artillery weapons in the surrounding villages and on the whole territory of the Cajnice municipality.⁵⁸

In the period from October 1991, through March 1992, Colonel Sreten Stosic, commander of the 11th Partisan Division of the 17th Corps of the JNA, through Colonel Major Veljko Bosanac, commander of the garrison in Doboje, and Colonel Major Ozegovic (from Belgrade), were distributing to the Serb “volunteers” on the territory of the Doboje region (in the Serb villages in the municipalities of Teslic, Doboje, Maglaj, Gracanica, Modrica, Odzak, Derventa and Bosanski Brod)

⁵⁷ *Slobodna Bosna*, no. 4, November 21, 1991, p. 3.

⁵⁸ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-792, and 798. During 1990 and 1991, in the capacity of president of the SDS of the Cajnice Municipality, through public addresses and through printed and other mass media, Dusko Kornjaca was instigating ethnic intolerance, which particularly came to emphasis on the holiday of the Serb Orthodox Church called Small Madonna, in Cajnice, on September 21, 1990, when in the presence of the members of the SDS from Sarajevo Vojislav Maksimovic and others, through loudspeakers he was threatening the Muslims with bloody Drina river and manslaughters from WWII.

From late April 1992, Kornjaca was the organizer and participant of many crimes against the Bosniaks in the Cajnice area (Ibid.).

During 1991, Milos Kornjaca (from Staronic, Cajnice) was arming the Serbs and organizing crimes against the Bosniaks. Drago Pojevic too (from Staronic) armed Serbs and organized manslaughter and forced expulsions of Bosniaks, burning down of their villages and plundering of their property.

Dusko Pejovic, “delegate” in the self-proclaimed *Assembly of Republic of Srpska*, during 1991 and 1992 armed Serbs and planned crimes against Bosniaks. In addition, on the territory of Southeast Bosnia, he brought in fascists from Serbia and Montenegro who committed crimes against Bosniaks (Ibid.).

some 50,000 automatic guns of 7.62 mm, a significant number of hand launchers M.57, “*zoljas*”, “*osas*”, submachine guns, hand launchers M-75-42, MB 120 mm with three combat sets of ammunition.⁵⁹

Over the same period, the commander of the 6th Infantry Regiment, Colonel Major Cazim Hadzic, distributed to the Serb “volunteer” units on the territory of Doboј, Gracanica, Maglaj and Tesanj (with the focus on Mt. Ozren), some 3,000 automatic guns, as well as all the other lethal devices of the brigade.⁶⁰

Arming the Serbs on the territory of the Doboј garrison also involved participation of Major Milovan Stankovic and Second Lieutenant Ilic. In compliance with the order and direct agreement with general DJurdjevac, for the needs of the “Serb volunteer units” on Mt. Ozren and in the villages at the foot of Ozren, during 1991, from the Doboј garrison they took out 3 to 4,000 pieces of automatic infantry arms, as well as weapons for support (mortars, howitzers, anti-aircraft machine guns and cannons).⁶¹

The numerous Serb formations on the territory of Northern Bosnia were armed up to the mortars by General Savo Jankovic, commander of

⁵⁹ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-784, and 2-2458; ICTY, Case: no. IT-02-54-T, paragraph 811. Using the aforementioned arms distributed to them by the JNa, at the same time supported by the JNA units, the Serb criminals were destroying Bosanski Brod, Derventa, Doboј, Bosanski Samac, Modrica, and other towns. Colonel Stosic took a battalion of tanks from the 6th Infantry Regiment from Colonel Major Cazim Hadzic, Commander of that unit.

It is interesting to point out that Colonel Stosic issued the order for the movement of tanks from Doboј into Bosanski Brod, thus activating the DRINA military plan. This order was published in *Slobodna Bosna*, (no. 22, March 26, 1992, p. 5). Thus, the public had the opportunity to see a photocopy of his order, with a clear seal of the 11th Partisan Division.

⁶⁰ Ibid. With this armament, the Serb criminals destroyed the Bosniak and Croat villages around Doboј, thus pushing away in the direction of Tesanj and Zepce some 20,000 Bosniak and Croat civilian refugees.

⁶¹ Ibid.; **Dnevni izvjestaj**, no. 79, July 12, 1992. Under the command of major Stankovic, Commander of the city of Doboј, a number of concentration camps were formed on the territory of the Doboј municipality.

Major Stankovic also commanded the actions of criminal attacks on the villages of Prisade, Makljenovac, Carsija, Plane, Orasje, Sevarlije, Pridjel, and others.

the 17th Corps of the JNA. With the armament that belonged to the 454th Mixed Anti-Tank Artillery Brigade from Derventa, Colonel Major Stevan Nikolic armed numerous Serbs. 1st class Ensign Slobodan Krstekanic distributed arms, ammunition and military equipment in the Serb villages around Derventa. Colonel Major Radovan Tasic, commander of the Armoured Brigade in Tuzla, armed the Serb “territorial members”, while using the tanks to destroy unprotected cities and villages, killing and wounding the civilian population. The Serb villages around Bijeljina were armed by Colonel Major Milicic, the commander of the 38th Partisan Division, from the division’s warehouse in Bijeljina.⁶²

In cooperation with colonels Milisav Gagovic and Ratko Djukanovic, Colonel Major Radislav Cvetkovic, Major Dragojlo Stosic and others, General Vojislav Djurdjevac (commander of the 4th Corps of the JNA) armed the Serb population on the territory of Sarajevo and Romanija, provided the Serbs with ammunition, trained them and supplied them food and military equipment.⁶³

The JNA officers from Serbia (Valjevo) armed the Serbs on the territory of Bratunac. In the village of Kravica, a heliport was made to allow landing of the JNA helicopters full with arms.⁶⁴

According to the available data, the arming of the Serbs on the territory of Foca was particularly intensified during 1990. From this period, there is a preserved list of 35 Serbs (containing personal names, names of fathers and surnames, years of birth, types and number of weapons with years of manufacture), who, on July 6, 1990, had received various types of arms.⁶⁵ In addition to all types of guns (M-48, automatic and semi-automatic ones), the Serbs also received submachine guns M-53,

⁶² AIIZ, inv. No. 2-784; **Dnevni izvjestaj**, no. 78, July 11, 1992. With the assistance of the aforementioned units, the JNA attacked Bosanski Brod, Odzak, Bosanski Samac, Brcko, Kalesija, Zvornik, Sapna, and other places.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ *Slobodna Bosna*, no. 3, November 14, 1991, p. 6.

⁶⁵ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-746. This armament was probably received from the JNA, although the aforementioned document does not specifically state so.

then *sarac* submachine guns, and 60 mm mortars. It is also interesting to point out that at the time, three Serb women also received arms.⁶⁶

On the eve of the Serbo-Montenegrin aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina, commander of the JNA barracks Slavko Timotijevic (born in Titovo Uzice) armed the Serb population on the territories of the Foca's villages of Zakmur, Djedjevo, Trbusce, Kuta, and the like. In addition to this, in May 1992, he also directed the attack against the Bosniak population of the village of Djedjevo, when the Serb fascists killed thirteen Bosniaks and raped a number of women.⁶⁷

The main organizers of the arming (i.e. of the procurement and distribution) of the SDS members and the Serb population on the territory of Foca, in addition to the JNA officers, were also: Novica Tripkovic (a long-time prisoner sentenced for rape and murder, was in the war in Vukovar), Momo Kovac (pensioner of the Correctional Home of Foca), Stjan Blagojevic, called "count" (used to work at the Foca department store), Vaso Pljavaljcic aka "Discipline" (pensioner of the Correctional Home of Foca and the commander of the *Chetnik Brcanski party*), Vlatko Pljevaljcic (medical technician at the Regional Medical Centre in Foca), Boro Ivanovic (principal of the Primary School in Godijen), Dragan Milenkovic (representative of the *Navip* enterprise in Foca), Slavisa Stankovic (employee of the Urban Planning Institute), and many others. Vlatko Pljevaljcic also participated in equipment of the hospital in the village of Bare for the needs of the armed formations of the SDS. Boro Ivanovic armed the *Chetnik* unit in Godijen and included it into the criminal attack on Foca. The main organizer of the arming of the armed units with artillery weapons was Savo Blagojevic (member of the Municipal Board and the *Chetnik* commander in the village of Budanj, famous from the 1992 incident, when he transported them from Bar to Foca).⁶⁸

⁶⁶ Ibid. These were the following Serb women: Vesna (daughter of Milan) Skakavac, born in 1975 (received an M-48 gun, no. 55290), Anđelka (daughter of Savo) Kovac, born in 1926 (received an M-48 gun, no. 12805), and Stoja (daughter of Milorad) Simovic, born in 1956 (received an M-48 gun, no. 62818).

⁶⁷ AIIZ, inv. No. 3-3352.

⁶⁸ *Dnevni izvijestaj*, no. 42, June 5, 1992, and no. 70, July 3, 1992.

In February 1992, the distribution of arms and ammunition to the Serb population on the territory of Foca was intensified. Then, among others, arms (guns – automatic and M-48) and certain quantities of ammunition (two boxes of bullets each) were given to: Rajko and Vukasin Milutinovic, then Lazar and Zeljko Milutinovic (a father and son), Zeljko Elez, Petar Popovic, and others.⁶⁹ The distribution of arms and ammunition to the Serbs on the territory of Miljevina were organized by Zeko, Ljubisa and Novo Miletic from Miljevina (Ljubisa used to work for the Radio and Television of Bosnia and Herzegovina). They received the arms and ammunition from the JNA barracks in Foca⁷⁰ and Ustikolina. In relation to procurement of arms, Zeko Miletic also contacted Velibor Ostojic and Vojislav Maksimovic.⁷¹

In preparation for the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina, the JNA distributed major quantities of arms and ammunition to the Serb population in the area of Ustikolina. The arms and ammunition from the Ustikolina barracks were taken in trailer trucks into the surrounding villages (Zesce, Dragocava, Josanica, Tulovici, Vranjevci, Previla, Ligate, Cvilin, and others), and distributed to the Serbs. The delivery of arms and ammunition from the aforementioned JNA barracks was an order issued by Captain Golubovic.⁷²

The organizers of armament of the Serb population in Ustikolina and the broader surroundings were: Simo Mojevic (principal of the Primary School in Ustikolina), and Petar Mihajlovic, with his son, Radisav. Upon orders by Vojislav Maksimovic, Velibor Ostojic, and Petko Cancar, in these tasks, they were actively assisted by Pero Mitrovic, Mladen Jankovic, the brothers Momo and Diko Maric, then Ciro Dubovina, called “count”, Savo Bilanac (representative of the *Prokupac* enterprise from

⁶⁹ AIIZ, inv. No. 3-261.

⁷⁰ AIIZ, inv. No. 3-3352. The JNA facilities (warehouses, storage places, and the like) were found above the village of Zakmur (on the Kmur hill).

⁷¹ AIIZ, inv. No. 3-261.

⁷² *Dnevni izvjestaj*, No. 63, June 26, 1992; AIIZ, inv. No. 3-309. In addition to the arms and ammunition, the JNA also delivered to the Serbs large quantities of oil, petrol, and food, particularly canned food.

Serbia, who, instead of food and drink from Serbia, he hauled arms over into his shop), then Radoje Zoric, Vucko and Savo Blagojevic, Cedo Fustar, and the like. Upon order by V. Maksimovic and through Marinko Bilanac, a reserve officer of the JNA, and the commander of the Ustikolina barracks, they distributed the arms and ammunition into the aforementioned and other Serb villages.⁷³

Serbs had located significant quantities of weapons onto the surrounding hills around Ustikolina, specifically above the villages of Zesca, Ligata, Tulovici, former railway station, at Cvilinsko Polje, in the houses of Danilo Ivanovic, Vojislav Maksimovic and his brother Milosav, and of Gavran and Manjak Timara. On one occasion, two tons of arms arrived in front of the house of Manjak Timara. In this way, all the Serb houses in the area of Ustikolina were well armed.⁷⁴

Strong military fortifications with heavy artillery in the area of Foca were located on the hill of Kmur above Brod na Drini, as well as on the Gornje and Donje Brdo hills above the former railway station, then at Tjentiste, in Avdagica Luka, on the Foca-Miljevina road, as well as in the village of Susjesno, above Foca. The aggressor formations had also stored a lot of arms; ammunition and vehicles at the sawmill in Brod, and major quantities of heavy weapons were stored in the warehouses in Ustikolina.⁷⁵

The organized armament of the Serb population in the area of Vogosca was conducted from mid-1991. The distribution of arms to the Serbs was particularly intensified during and after setting up of the March barricades (1992), which was jointly organized by the JNA and SDS members. Under the direction of the JNA officers and Jovan Tintor, Jovan and Mirko Jovanovic, Ilija Crnogorac, Jasmin Heto and others, transport of arms and ammunition and its distribution were organized from the barracks in Semizovac to the surrounding Serb villages. Jovan Tintor even procured arms from the port of Bar, which

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ AIIZ, inv. No. 3-309.

⁷⁵ **Dnevni izvjestaj**, No. 82, July 15, 1992.

he initially sold, later giving them away to the SDS members and other Serbs on the territory of Vogosca, Ilijas, Srednje, and Olovo. In these tasks, he was assisted by Nikola Simpraga with his son.⁷⁶

During the March barricades, Ilija Crnogorac, one of the organizers of the criminal attack on Svrake, and Jasmin Heto, transported the arms from the barracks in Semizovac onto distribution points in Malesici and to the Vogosca crossroads.⁷⁷ One of the organizers of the distribution of arms to the Serbs in Svrake was Savo Cetkovic.⁷⁸ The JNA officer (a pilot) Dusko Cetkovic (aged about 30) frequently used a helicopter to transport arms for the Serb population on the eve of the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina and, in relation to this, a number of times he even landed it on the stadium in Svrake.⁷⁹

The arming of Serbs in the area of Ilijas was organized, in cooperation with Ratko Adzic, by the following JNA officers: Colonel Jovan Bartula (commander of the barracks in Visoko) and Colonel Major Mihajlo Tucovic (commander of the barracks in Ilijas – Misoca and Semizovac), and an SDS member. They armed the SDS members and the Serb population in Ilijas. From the military barracks in Misoca and from other surrounding JNA barracks, for the Serbs of Ilijas, they provided 2,800 automatic guns, several dozens of mortars, three multiple rocket launchers, and the like, as well as the corresponding ammunition and mines. The armed formations of the SDS in the area of Ilijas were also armed with the armament and ammunition from the military warehouses

⁷⁶ Ibid., no. 69, July 2, 1992; AIIZ, inv. No. 3-385 and 1004.

⁷⁷ AIIZ, inv. No. 3-1004. Pensioner Ilija Crnogorac (from Semizovac, about 55 of age, worked part-time at Jasmin Heto's workshop for repair of chainsaws) took active participation in the crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Jasmin (son of Muhamed) Heto (from Semizovac, about 35 of age, owner of the workshop for repair of chainsaws), during the March barricades, used his own car to transport arms to the Serbs. After the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina broke out, he joined the aggressor units.

⁷⁸ Ibid. Savo Cetkovic (from Svrake – Semizovac, about 50 of age) was actively involved in the Serb units from the beginning of the aggression, stationed on the positions in Semizovac.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

in Rajlovac. In Krivajevici, too, on several occasions, arms were distributed to the SDS supporters.⁸⁰

All the persons of Serb ethnicity (of younger age) from the villages of Gornja and Donja Bioca (the Ilijas municipality) were well armed with automatic and semi-automatic arms, whereas the elderly were provided with M-48 rifles and Russian automatic guns. Some 150 people from these villages were under arms. Infantry armament and ammunition were obtained by the Serbs from the JNA officers from the military barracks in Misoca, and Dusko Pustivuk and Rade Vrljes were in charge of this task. The transport of the arms from the barracks to Gornja and Donja Bioca was done in military trucks. In addition to infantry arms, the Serbs also received artillery weapons from the JNA, which they then deployed on the locality of the aforementioned villages. Thus, three cannons, among which one howitzer, were set up above Gornja Bioca and turned in the direction of Visoko. Above these cannons, at the distance of 50 meters, two 120 mm mortars were set up, as well as three 62 mm ones. On the slopes of Mt. Paljevo there was one multiple rocket launcher set up, turned in the direction of the Visoko municipality (its servers were from Malesici).⁸¹

The *Chetnik* party in Nisici was well armed with automatic guns and hand grenade launchers.⁸²

The president of the Municipal SDS, Pero Subotic organized the arming of the Serbs on the territory of Breza. He had possessed an action plan, as well as lists of the persons of Serb ethnicity to whom the SDS had distributed arms, as well as concrete tasks they were assigned with, including the commission of crimes against Bosniaks. With Ratko Elez in the village of Smrekovici, among other things, heavy weapons were found, including a recoilless cannon.⁸³

⁸⁰ **Dnevni izvjestaj**, no. 6, April 30, 1992, no. 23, May 17, 1992, and no. 33, May 27, 1992; **Agresija...**, p. 22; *Slobodna Bosna*, no. 4, November 21, 1991, p. 3. This is the way the aforementioned officers supplied the Serb people with arms.

⁸¹ AIIZ, inv. No. 3-2592, Testimony of Branislav Herak.

⁸² *Slobodna Bosna*, no. 4, November 21, 1991, p. 3.

⁸³ **Dnevni izvjestaj**, no. 61, June 24, 1992.

The arming of the Serbs on the territory of Visoko was conducted under the command and with the approval and assistance of JNA officers, from the military barracks in Visoko. These activities were directed by the commander of the Visoko barracks, Colonel Jovan Bartula, and Vitomir Krsmanovic, a civilian serving the JNA, and an SDS member. There was very close cooperation between Colonel Bartula from the Visoko garrison and the leaders of the Municipal SDS of Visoko, particularly from mid-September 1991. This cooperation was maintained in the following activities:

- organization of courier service for mobilization of the armed Serb units;
- distribution of arms and radio devices to the Serb population;⁸⁴
- entry of Serb civilians with vehicles into the barracks (mostly at night), in order to take fuels and oils from the military warehouses;
- creation of lists of “volunteers” from the surrounding areas, that were used as couriers to carry invitations;
- visits to barracks by the Municipal Delegation of the SDS of Visoko;
- training of “volunteers” in handling arms;
- harassment of the non-Serb soldiers and officers, particularly Bosniaks and Albanians, “Serbization” of the Visoko barracks, and the like.⁸⁵

⁸⁴ *Slobodna Bosna*, no. 22, March 26, 1992, p. 5; **Dnevni izvjestaj**, No. 72, July 5, 1992, and no. 85, July 18, 1992; AIIZ, inv. No. 2-549/4 and 549/5. Colonel Major Bartula gave to the reserve captain Mladen Cebic a “scorpion” automatic gun with 150 bullets as a gift.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.* Among the main scenario makers of the “Serbization” of the Visoko barracks were:

- general major Vojislav Djurdjevac (Commander of the 4th Corps);
- Colonel Ratko Djukanovic (Chief of Staff of the artillery of the 4th Corps, otherwise married in Visoko);

In October of 1991, upon order by the commander of the garrison (Colonel Bartula), and under the control of ensign Ilija Damjanovic and through Vito Krsmanovic, the SDS Visoko members received major quantities of arms and radio devices (type RUP 3), from the JNA. The arms, transported in military trucks, were distributed to the members and supporters of the SDS and to the members of the armed units in the Serb villages of Kalotici, Vilenja, Paljike, Gornja and Donja Zimca, Muhasinovici, Biskupici, Pucisce, Kondzila, and the like. Thus, for instance, Zdravko Miric (from the village of Cekrcici – Visoko), after he “placed himself available to the JNA as a volunteer”, in the Visoko barracks (Military Post 2651), received the 7.62 mm M-70 automatic gun, 150 bullets, 3 defensive hand grenades M-70 A, and a set called “RAP”. Blagoje Sakota (from the village of Gorani – Visoko), also received the 7.62 mm M-70 automatic gun, 150 bullets, and 5 frames with a bag. In addition to semi-automatic and automatic arms, sub-machine guns and hand grenades, the Serbs also received snipers, and mortars and artillery weapons were also set up in Biskupici. Colonel Bartula turned the barrels of the dug cannons towards Visoko. The sources available indicate that on the territory of Visoko, the Serb armed formations had the following to their disposal: 7.62 mm pistols, automatic and semi-automatic guns, machine guns, submachine guns, hand grenade launchers, “maljutka” rockets, bazookas, launcher grenades, hand defensive grenades, hand rocket launchers, “osa” and “zolja” rocket launchers, as well as bullets of all calibres. The SDS leaders had also organized a communications system, and they placed the radio devices into Serb houses, with coded messages arriving from Cekrcici.⁸⁶

- Colonel Major Zoran Simovic (security authority in the 4th Corps), with his main assistants: junior Sergeant Kic, captain Mladen Cebic, and Simo Savic (a civilian in the JNA – restaurant manager);

- Colonel Major Jovan Bartula (Commander of the Visoko garrison) with associates: Stevan Harambasic, replacing the legal deputy of the 1st class captain of the First Motorized Brigade Hajrudin Hasanovic, 1st class captain Milorad Gorancic, and ensigns Ilija and Spaso Damjanovic (*Slobodna Bosna*, No. 22, March 26, 1992, p. 5).

The aforementioned officers harassed the non-Serb officers and soldiers, in particular the Croats and Bosniaks (Ibid.).

⁸⁶ Ibid.; *Slobodna Bosna*, no. 20, March 12, 1992; *Oslobodjenje*, February 25, 1992; AIIZ, inv. No. 2-549/5, Ministry of Interior, Law Enforcement Centre of Sarajevo,

The activity of arming the Serb population on the territory of Visoko also involved participation of the following persons: Mladen Cebic, reserve captain, Rajko (Rajo) Krsmanovic, Zdravko Misic, Blagoje Sakota, Momir Krajisnik, Dragomir Kapor, Ratko Adzic, Dalibor Siforija, Oliver Dabic, and others. They also organized storing of foods for the needs of the Serb armed units.⁸⁷

Certain groups of military and civilian persons from the Zenica JNA garrison and from the city itself were arming the Serb population on the territory of Zenica in the first half of 1992. In the night of February 14, 1992, in the settlement of Bare, on the territory of the Local Community of Drivusa (near Zenica), arms were unloaded from a transport vehicle and were distributed to the population of Serb ethnicity.⁸⁸ In late February 1992, in the village of Kovanici (near Topcic Polje), nearby Zenica, military and civilian persons from the Zenica garrison were distributing arms to the Serb population. Also, in mid-March 1992, in the surroundings of Zenica, the JNA was distributing arms to the members of the Serb population.⁸⁹

Police Precinct of Visoko, no. 17-23/20-375/91, October 27, 1991, Record. In the first half of October 1991, upon the decision of the Municipal Board of the SDS of Visoko, Zdravko Maric “placed” himself available to the Jna as “a reservist volunteer”, based on which, at the Military Post of 2651 Visoko, he took a 7.62 mm M-70 automatic gun, 150 bullets, 3 defensive hand grenades M-70 A, and a set called “rap”. Along with the arms, he also received a certificate stating the type of arms, and the code of the war unit in which he was assigned (the certificate had the seal of the military post, and was signed by Vitomir Krsmanovic, as the person who delivered the arms, directly obtained from the garrison in Visoko – AIIZ, inv. No. 2-549/4, Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Law Enforcement Centre of Sarajevo, Police Precinct of Visoko, no. 17-23/20-5-5-374/91, October 27, 1991, Record).

⁸⁷ Ibid.; AIIZ, inv. No. 2-785. On August 1, 1992, in Visoko, criminal reports were filed against 23 Serbs due to grounded suspicion that from May 1991 until June 1992, as the SDS members, they were falsely presenting the circumstances in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and arming the Serbs with the Jna arms – **Agresija...**, p. 15 (II).

⁸⁸ **Agresija ...**, p. 6. The investigatory authorities found 3 empty metal caskets and a part of the wooden cask for ammunition, as well as empty cardboard boxes for ammunition, and brushes for weapon cleaning, as well as 7.62 mm bullets.

⁸⁹ Ibid., pp. 7, and 12.

The organizers of the illegal arming of SDS members on the territory of Zenica were Slobodanka Hrvacanin, a member of the Political Council of the SDS of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Radovan Glogovac, Bosko Jetic, and Zarija Sarcevic, members of the senior leadership of the SDS of Zenica. In this, they were assisted by JNA representatives from the Zenica garrison – Colonel Tomislav Sipcic, major Trivic, and Krsto Lakicevic, a civilian in the service of the JNA, and others.⁹⁰

At the same time, during the evacuation of manpower and equipment from certain barracks, the JNA had distributed arms from military columns to the population of Serb ethnicity. Thus, for instance, while withdrawing from the *Josip Jovanovic* barracks in Zenica (on May 18, 1992), on the road to Kakanj, from a number of vehicles, the JNA members were distributing weapons to the Serb population. On the same day, from the column of JNA vehicles moving from the Zenica barracks via Visoko, Ilijas and Srednje to Pale, in the village of Dobrinja near Visoko, arms were distributed to the population of Serb ethnicity.⁹¹

The Serb population from the territory of Hadzici and beyond, was massively armed from the Technical Overhaul Institute (TRZ) in Hadzici. Among the main organizers of the armament, the following particularly distinguished themselves: Colonel Arizanovic, Momcilo Stanimirovic, reserve JNA officer and chief of security at the Institute, and at the same time president of the Municipal Board of the SDS, then Ratko Radic, Miso Tomas, Nedjo Banduka, aka Pededa, Obren Krstic, Rade Veselinovic, and others. The SDS members and activists, particularly the members of the reserve composition of the JNA, took out from the TRZ huge quantities of arms, machinery, ammunition and military equipment. For example, during April 1992, two military

⁹⁰ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-785; **Dnevni izvjestaj**, no. 64, June 27, 1992, and no. 106, August 8, 1992. Major Dordje Petrovic stole a certain quantity of arms in Zenica and sold it, and afterwards he fled to Slovenia. For seven days, major Trivic worked to identify the culprit, and finally he arrested four Serbs (reserve officers), who were on guard at Kaonik. Criminal Karadzic insisted that Trivic stops the investigation. In relation to this, Colonel Major Jadranko Jandric said to the arrested Serbs: “**Are you impudent, we gave you the weapons, and now you are smuggling?!**” (Ibid.).

⁹¹ **Agresija...**, p. 43; **Dnevni izvjestaj**, no. 25, May 19, 1992, and no. 26, May 20, 1992.

transports were sent in the direction of Kalinovik. The first one had over 30 trucks hauling cannons and howitzers of 105 and 155 mm, several “*praga*” guns, and transported other arms and weapons. In the second convoy from the Institute, some 20 cannons were hauled away. In addition to this, a smaller number of armed vehicles were hauled to Ilidza.⁹² Arms, ammunition and military equipment were hauled from the Zunovnica barracks in convoys and thus the Serbs were armed.⁹³

The arming of the Serb population in the valley of the Neretva was the task of Branko Simic from Zitomislici, near Mostar.⁹⁴

The Serb population, first of all, the members of the SDS in Bradina, Brdjani, Donje Selo, Borci, Celebici, Ostrozac and Konjic, were armed by Strahinja-Strajo Zivak, Dragan Vujcic, Tihomir Glavas, Dordje Jovanovic, and others. They procured arms, ammunition and military equipment, and they organized their deliveries from the military warehouses in the areas of Nevesinje, Mostar, and Hadzici. They, Zivalj in particular, were involved in the arming of the Serbs throughout 1991, and particularly intensively in the first half of 1992.⁹⁵

In the capacity of the member of the Executive Board of the SDS of Konjic (from October 1990), executing the tasks received from the

⁹² AIIZ, inv. No. 3-235, 49, and 3335. A number of armed vehicles with crews from the TRZ in Hadzici, in April 1992, were sent to Ilidza too, as support for the Serb criminals who were attacking the area of Sarajevo, killing civilian population and destroying residential, commercial, religious and other buildings. Thus, on several occasions, Momcilo Stanimirovic went there, in the capacity of the Commander of the unit. The crew of an armed transporter were: Branko Krneta – aimer, Nenad Grbic – driver, and Predrag Grbic – assistant to the machine gun operator. The crew of the other armed transporter were: Radmilo Bijelica – aimer, Draga Tot – assistant to the machine gun operator, and a certain Raso – driver (used to work in the car plant). The crews of the “praga” guns were: Boro Samoukovic, aka Ico, Slavisa Devedlaka, Nikica Subotic, Milorad Zerajic, Nebojsa Banduka, Milan Acimovic, and others. The tank drivers were: Radmilo Samardzija and Predrag Lavicki. The Commander of the tank unit was Svetozar Elcic.

⁹³ AIIZ, inv. No. 3-3335.

⁹⁴ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-794.

⁹⁵ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-521-522, and 794.

Main Board of the Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its president Karadzic, pertaining to organized arming of the Serb people,⁹⁶ from June 1991 until April 1992, Strajo Zivak⁹⁷ participated in armament of the Serb population. Thus, in June 1991, Zivak provided major quantities of infantry arms of military origin, which, after he had transported them from Nevesinje, he distributed to the Serbs on the territory of Bradina. On that occasion, in addition to the M-48 rifles, he also brought two hand grenade launchers, three PM-53's, and an English submachine gun.⁹⁸

Strajo Zivak personally made the lists of Serbs to whom he had given the arms. At receipt, each Serb had to bring a textile sack with him and pay 300 dinars. He distributed arms in late night hours, and at takeover, he ordered each individual that he must not speak about the received arms to anyone, and that he should hide it away in a special place until the time **“when the need arises”**. Zivak said that the arms were distributed in order to realize the SDS goals, while he often pointed out that **“it is only with arms that it can be ensured that all Serbs live in a single state”**.⁹⁹

⁹⁶ Ibid. Strahinja Zivak (son of Djordje and mother Bosiljka Zelenovic), was born in 1932 in the village of Brdan (SO Konjic), where he resided, an ethnic Serb, national of Bosnia and Herzegovina, pensioner, a father of two.

⁹⁷ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-794. The Executive Board of the SDS of the Municipal Assembly of Konjic was informed of the aforementioned position of the Main Board of the Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Djuro Kuljanin, president of the Municipal Board of the SDS, and proposed to come in contact with major Ranko Kuljanin, who worked as the chief of security of the UNIS factories. Thus, contact was established with the aforementioned major, and in mid-1991, an arrangement was made that the procurement of arms be conducted through Branko Simic, who lived in Zitomislici (near Mostar). Immediately after, with Vukasin Mrkajic, president of the Local Board of the SDS of Bradina, Desimir Mrkajic, Damjan Dordjic and Milos Kuljanin, Zivak went to Mostar.

⁹⁸ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-521, and 522.

⁹⁹ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-521. In June 1991, Zivak distributed the arms to the following Serbs: Danilo Zivak; Cedo and Mirko (sons of Obren) Zivak; Neno and Bozo (sons of Danilo) Zivak; Jovo (son of Savo) Dragovic; Marinko (son of Milan) Zivak; Ljubo (son of Jovo) Dragovic; Todor (son of Rade) Zelenovic; Zdravko (son of Simo) Zelenovic; Milan (son of Petar) Draganic; Rajko (son of Bosko) Draganic; Dragan (son

In addition to armament, from the JNA of Nevesinje or Bileca, Zivak also personally provided the radio station ANG-9, in order to maintain communications with the Serb armed units at Borci, as well as in other places in Bosnia and Herzegovina.¹⁰⁰

In September of 1991, Zivak transported 100 rifle guns, 3 automatic guns, and some 12,000 bullets from Nevesinje to Konjic. He initially stored these arms in his house in the village of Brdjani, and after the SDS Commission for General National Defence and Social Self-Protection gave him the list of distribution of arms by local boards in writing, he distributed these arms to the various local boards. In October 1991, from the village of Zegulje (near Ljubinje), in the *Zastava* transport car, Zivak transported into Bradina (i.e. to the house of Petar Gligorovic) 100 semi-automatic and 50 automatic guns, and 50 bullets for each automatic gun, and 100 bullets for each semi-automatic gun. He again used the list to distribute these arms and ammunition by the local SDS boards.¹⁰¹

During November 1991, a number of times, Zivak transported armament and distributed it to the Serbs. From the village of Zegulje, he took and placed into the house of Milovan Cecez in Donje Selo 300 M-48 rifles, 100 semi-automatic guns and 50 automatic ones, then 10 hand launchers, and 100 bullets for each M-48 rifle, 100 bullets for each semi-automatic gun, and 150 bullets for each automatic one, four grenades for each hand launcher, as well as 3,000 bullets for the anti-aircraft machine gun. He later distributed these arms to the members of the Serb ethnicity (by the local SDS boards) who entered into the composition of the armed aggressor formations. Again, in the same month, Zivak provided major quantities of armament and ammunition for Bradina. Thus, from Mostar, with an unknown trucker whose FAP

of Mirko) Zivak; Srdjan (son of Jovo) Gligorevic; Radenko (son of Rade) Gligorevic; Sretko (son of Jovo) Simikovic; Vito (son of Marko) Stojanovic, and Nedjo (son of Bosko) Draganic.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid. In addition to the aforementioned radio station, there was one more radio station in Bradina, sized some 20x40 cm, brought by Sretko Zivak from Dzep. Through this station, Rajko Djordjic and Sretko Zivak established connection with Jovo Jovanovic and Rajko Micevic at Borci, inquiring about the situation at Borci, asking whether the JNA is arriving.

¹⁰¹ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-794.

truck carried the JNA emblem, in order to avoid police controls, for the village of Brdjani, he transported 4 automatic and 15 semi-automatic guns, 30 M-48 rifles, as well as major quantities of ammunition.¹⁰²

The armament of the Serbs on the territory of Bradina also involved the participation of Dragan Vujicic from Hadzici. Through Zara Mrkajic, in agreement with Ratko Radic from Hadzici, owner of the café “AS”, Vujicic transported the following quantities of arms: 20 automatic and 30 semi-automatic guns, and some 5,000 bullets. These arms were taken by Radic from the military warehouse in Krupa near Zovik, stored them into his garage in Hadzici, where then they were taken over by Nenad and Damjan Gligorijevic, Vukasin Mrkajic, and Dragan Vujicic from Bradina. Through Radic, the following quantities of arms were transported into Bradina: 30 semi-automatic guns and 20 M-48 rifles, five to six casks of ammunition, two mortars, three submachine guns and 40 submachine grenades.¹⁰³

Just like many other Serbs, Tihomir Glavas (the commander of the police station in Hadzici), was arming the Serb population, too. Using a military transporter from Hadzici, Glavas transported major quantities of arms to Bradina. Arming of the Serbs in the territory of Bradina was also the activity of some Kilibarda from Puhovo – Konjic, with his passenger vehicle, and then, a trucker from Borak with a blue FAP truck 16-12, as well as a Risto from Borak (used to work at the *Elplin* factory as a driver). The arms brought to Bradina

¹⁰² Ibid.; AIIZ, inv. No. 2-522. Zivak unloaded the aforementioned arms into the garage of Zdravko Zelenovic, without his approval. For distribution of these arms, he made a list “**which he gave to Zoran Zelenovic, and through his children, Zoran notified the people from the list about the time and method of transfer of the arms**”. At taking over of the arms, each individual had to pay 500 dinars: In this distribution, the arms were received by the following Serbs: Slavko (son of Zdravko) Zelenovic; Zoran (son of Djordje) Zelenovic; Radomir (son of Obren) Dragovic; Bozo (son of Danilo) Zivak; Momcilo (son of Branko) Gligorevic; Mile (son of Andjelko) Zivak; Marko (son of Nedjo) Draganic; Mirko (son of Dimitrije) Draganic; Milo (son of Petko) Draganic; Drago and Slavko (sons of Dusan) Saran; Marinko and Mirko (sons of Milovan) Zivak; Novica (son of Boro) Draganic; Ranko (son of Zdravko) Zelenovic; Gordan (son of Zivko) Zivak, and Ratko (son of Milan) Draganic (Ibid.).

¹⁰³ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-521. At the time, Radic took the aforementioned persons to Zovik to Drago Lubura, who enabled them to load the weapons in some facility in Zovik.

were taken over by platoon commanders and assigned them to the members of the armed Serb formations.¹⁰⁴

In addition to the infantry weapons, two 82 mm mortars were also brought to Bradina (procured in Rastelica) with 80 grenades, one 60 mm mortar, one anti-aircraft machine gun, three M-53 submachine guns, two M-72 submachine guns, four hand launchers with 16 grenades and a number of hand grenades, then a sniper with a gun, *Heckler-Koch* machine guns, and the like.¹⁰⁵

Evidently, the Serb armed formations in Bradina were very well armed. All these arms were received by the Serbs from the JNA. The total armed persons in Bradina were 188.¹⁰⁶ However, “during the combat activities” in Bradina, there were a total of 300 armed Serbs, whereas in the village of Brdjani, according to some data, there were around 120 of them.¹⁰⁷

The data available indicate that the armament was transported to Bradina both for the Serbs in Bradina and for the Serb population in Donje Selo, Konjic, Brdjani, Bjelovcin, and Ostrozac. In Bradina, it was taken over by the SDS activists from those places and thus armed the Serb population.¹⁰⁸

In April 1991, in preparation for the aggression and realization of the Nazi idea of (“all the Serbs in one state”), Serb criminals stole two

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid. It was established that the arms in Bradina were stored at the house of Gojko Mrkajic, and the ammunition at the warehouse of the store *Oaza*.

¹⁰⁶ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-521. Of the total number of armed Serbs in Bradina, 18 came from the territories of Tarcin and Rastelica. Those persons had come to Bradina ten days before the combat activity was initiated by the Serb criminals. Four of them got private accommodations, and 12 in the sheds of the *Sip* enterprise. For them, in those sheds, Rajko Djordjic organized meals, and he assigned these tasks to Zara Mrkajic. Of the 18 persons from the aforementioned places, we particularly point out the following ones: Dragan Krstic, Zarko Kulas, Darko Kulas, Velimir Mijatovic, Sinisa Curic, Dragan Travar, and Boris Travar.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

tons of explosive from the warehouse of the public enterprise *Sip* in Konjic, with explosive which was located at the wood processing site near Bradina, as well as a cask of initial caps, as well as 4-5 packets of fuse.¹⁰⁹

On the territory of the Konjic municipality, in April 1992, the JNA supplied arms, including heavy artillery, to the Serb population.¹¹⁰

The JNA officers from the barracks in Donji Vakuf, and the SDS leadership armed the overall capable Serb population and mobilized it. On this occasion, **“the artillery weapons were dug in, machine gun nests and guards were set up”**.¹¹¹

Armament of the Serb population on the territory of Bugojno was synchronized from mid-1991 in cooperation between the SDS and the JNA officers. With the assistance and by way of the JNA officers, the SDS members from this territory received arms from the territories of Banjaluka, Sipovo, and Travnik. Its distribution was conducted by the previously formed Serb armed units. Those particularly active in armament of the Serb population on the territory of Bugojno were: Boro Pejicic, Vlado Bilanovic, Nikola Misic, Miodrag Poleksic, Nikola Kisin, Vlado Zubic, Novo Stanisic, Janko Kasic, Rajko Stojic, Simica Kasic, Krstan Radic, Ilija Djelmo, Momcilo Duvnjak, Cedo Bucic, Boro Milinkovic, Milan Basic, Stevo Zelen, Ilija Ikic, as well as the former police officers of the Bugojno Police Precinct: Grujo Svitlica, Djuro Djuric, Cedo Martic, and Andjelko Pavlovic, who had prior to that been to the special training at Manjaca. From the JNA, they provided some 1,500 pieces of various automatic arms with the corresponding ammunition, then certain quantities of heavy artillery, as well as radio stations and other equipment. In the second half of 1991, the *Slavko Rodic* factory in Bugojno illegally manufactured 540 combat hand grenades. In addition

¹⁰⁹ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-521. The participants of the stealing were: Velibor Mrkajic, Damjan Djordjic, Vaso and Dragan Vujicic, Dragan Mrkajic, Zdravko Zuza, Radoslav Kuljanin, and Branko Gligorijevic.

After the stealing, the explosive was stored in the basement of the house of Dragan Djordjic, and then a portion of it was transported into the house of Velibor Mrkajic (Ibid.).

¹¹⁰ **Dnevni izvjestaj**, no. 6, April 30, 1992.

¹¹¹ **Agresija ...**, p. 22 (II).

to that, combat fuses for grenades were taken out of the factory, without the sign of the manufacturer or serial numbers.¹¹²

Speedy armament of the Serb population on the territory of Bosanska Krajina was organized in mid-1991. Thus, for instance, in the summer of 1991, the JNA distributed arms to the Serbs in Sipovo. At the same time, in mid-1991, after “**the putsch against the legal bodies of the TO, and the breaking into the warehouses with arms and ammunition**”, the Municipal and party leadership of the SDS of Sipovo distributed the arms and ammunition to the Serbs only, “**among them to the extremists too, to drunkards, insane persons, *Chetniks***”.¹¹³

The 5th Corps of the JNA armed the Serbs (with their own arms, then with the arms of the Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as that one displaced from Slovenia and Croatia). The 993rd Background Support Base on a daily basis received 43 wagons of military equipment from Slovenia and Croatia.¹¹⁴ This Corps also armed the Serb Territorial Defence of Prnjavor.¹¹⁵ General Milan Uzelac issued an order to the commander of the 993rd Background Support Base to arm the Territorial Defence of Sipovo, Mrkonjic Grad and Jajce, following which Colonel Osman Selak executed the order (i.e. he issued the arms).¹¹⁶

Under the command of Colonel Branko Basara, after it was deployed in Sanski Most on April 6, 1992, the 6th Infantry Brigade armed the

¹¹² **Dnevni izvjestaj**, no. 111, August 13, 1992; *Slobodna Bosna*, No. 1, October 31, 1991, p. 8.

¹¹³ *Slobodna Bosna*, No. 21, March 19, 1992, p. 8, and no. 22, March 26, 1992, p. 4; *Oslobodjenje*, March 25, 1993, p. 5. From then until March 23, 1992, the Serb criminals had fired thousands and thousands of bullets, intimidating the peaceful population and killing individual Bosniaks. “**They partied and drunk night after night, they used hand launcher grenades to shell the Muslim houses in Sipovo, the grave and monument of Alija Djerzelez in Gerzovo, they used barricades as a means to dismiss the Sipovo leadership...**”, and the like.

¹¹⁴ *Slobodna Bosna*, June 19, 2003, p. 19.

¹¹⁵ **ICTY**, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraph 869.

¹¹⁶ **ICTY**, Case: No. IT-94-I-T, Evidence of the testimony by the JNA Colonel O.S., June 4, 1996, (hereinafter referred to as: **ICTY**, Case: No. IT-94-I-T).

Serbs. They did it by way of mobilization. In addition to that, they also armed one battalion in Kotor Varos, and Kljuc, and **“they helped a lot in arming of the Banjaluka Ministry of Interior forces”**.¹¹⁷

In the area of Bosanska Krupa, in late 1991 and early 1992, the JNA was arming the Serb population. This activity was organized by Mile Strbac, Zeljko Tabakovic, Mirko Orelj, Dragan Damjanovic, Mitar Ciganovnic, Mile Vojinovic, Branko Miljevic, Dusko Zmijanac, Ilija Ivanisevic, Nikola Tatalovic, Stanko Obradovic, and Rade Mazalov. From the second half of 1991, as members of the Presidency of the Bosanska Krupa SDS, and members of the so-called “Main war headquarters”, through the JNA they were arming the Serb population. Milan Strbac also performed the function of the commander of the so-called Serb army for Bosanska Krupa.¹¹⁸

In cooperation with the JNA, the activity of arming of the Serbs on the territory of Bihac was directed by Dragan Gacesa from Bosanski Petrovac (teacher of national defence), and others.¹¹⁹

The arming and training of the Serb population on the territory of Brcko was organized by the JNA officers from the Brcko garrison: Pavle Milinkovic (Colonel Major, commander of the Garrison, Momcilo Petrovic (captain, assistant of the commander for security), Predrag Manojlovic, Stevan Nikolic, Miodrag Kostic, Dragomir Todorovic,

¹¹⁷ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2550, pp. 9-10. This brigade participated with five battalions in “cleansing of the space around Ljubija, Brisevo, and Kozarac”, then in cleansing of the forests between Grmusa and Grabez”, and “on the war frontlines” in Bosanski Brod, Jajce, Gradacac, Bratunac, Doboje, and in Vogosca (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2550, pp. 9-10).

¹¹⁸ **Dnevni izvjestaj**, no. 110, August 12, 1992, and 114/115, August 17, 1992. On April 21, 1992, with his criminals, Milan Strbac committed an armed attack on Bosanska Krupa, in order to occupy this territory and to exterminate the Bosniaks on the right bank of the Una river.

¹¹⁹ **Dnevni izvjestaj**, no. 149/150, September 21, 1992. In addition, to the members of the so-called Serb police precinct in Bosanski Petrovac, he issued orders to commit crimes against Bosniaks in which he participated himself. He is, otherwise, one of the organizers of the concentration camps of Kozila and Kamenice. Gacesa is also directly responsible for liquidation of the Bosniak population, for plundering and destruction of their property, and for destruction of the Islamic religious facilities.

Slobodan Milenkovic, Milorad Jovovic, Radoje Bekcic, Marko Subotin, Dusan Subotic, Milovan Adamovic, Momir Cvetkovic. As active military personnel, approving the *Chetnik* ideology, in the period from August 1991 to March 1992, they distributed some major quantities of arms, ammunition and military equipment to the SDS members, particularly in Brcko and the surrounding villages. In addition to that, they planned and organized the displacement of the JNA units into the Serb villages of Pelagicevo, Zabari, Obudovac, Razljevo, Potocari, and D. Brezik, but also the carrying out of the aggression combat activity by the armed Serb formations, and the crimes against the civilians of Bosniak and Croat ethnicity, in order to form the so-called ethnically pure so-called “Serb municipality of Brcko”.¹²⁰

Branislav Filipovic (aka “The Forester”) had the approval from the JNA to provide heavy ammunition for the Serb Territorial Defence of Brcko from Belgrade.¹²¹

The JNA was also intensively arming the Serbs on the territory of Tuzla. In these activities, Colonel Mile Dubajic, commander of the “*Husinska Buna*” barracks especially excelled. He distributed arms to the Serbs in Pozarnica, Kovacevo Selo, Marici, Crno Blato, Ugljevik, and other places.¹²²

In closest cooperation with some commanders of the JNA, the leadership of the Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina organized arming of the “**reliable**” members of this political party even during 1990 and 1991. It was established that the following JNA officers received tasks from the SDS headquarters: general major Milenko Andjelic, general Ratko Milicevic, colonels Pero Simovic, Jadranko

¹²⁰ **Dnevni izvjestaj**, no. 85, July 18, 1992; S. Cekic, **VOJNE PRIPREME ZA ZLOCIN U BRCKOM**, in: J. Kadric, **BRCKO – GENOCID I SVJEDOCENJA**, Sarajevo 1998, p. 12; J. Kadric, the aforementioned work, p. 27. Even the reserve major Milisav Milutinovic was involved in the arming of the Serbs. Colonel Major Milinkovic, captain Petrovic, and major Milutinovic played a key role in arming of the Sreb population on the territory of Brcko (J. Kadric, the aforementioned work, p. 27).

¹²¹ **ICTY**, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraph 639.

¹²² *Oslobodjenje*, July 20, 1993, p. 4.

Jandric, and Slavoljub Belosevic, Colonel Major Trajkovic, and major Milivoje Loncarevic.¹²³

It is also interesting to point out the intensive activity of a number of the active JNA officers, particularly from the Counterintelligence section of the Security Department of the 2nd Military District. Pursuant to the instructions from the top military leadership of the SFRY, during 1991 and in early 1992, they focused their offensive activity onto the Ministry of Interior of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Their activity was focused primarily to creation of a distorted perception about the situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, then on certain problems in functioning of the Ministry of Interior, and organization of paramilitary formations, and the like, which had significant effect on the formation of relations and approaches of the JNA towards the official bodies of the government in the Republic, too. Namely, pursuant to the instructions from the SDS leadership, certain operational agents and inspectors of the State Security Services and the Ministry of Interior of Bosnia and Herzegovina of Serb ethnicity dosed information and data submitted to the security bodies of the JNA, such for instance: **“The Ministry of Interior is doing nothing against the Muslim extremists”**, **“against the HOS and Croatian extremists”**, that **“the Ministry of Interior services exclusively control the Serb people and the armament of the Serbs”**, that **“they are controlling the JNA”**, and **“working against the command personnel and officers of the JNA”**, and the like. In this way, the conflict was prepared between the Ministry of Interior, the bodies of the government in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the JNA, and among other things, destruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina was committed. In the context of thus designed information, the commands of the JNA Military Districts, and the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY and the SSNO, formed their own assessments of the situation, and based on them, they focused their activity on planning, preparation and conducting of the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina.¹²⁴

¹²³ Posebno izdanje, no. 2, April 28, 1992.

¹²⁴ Ibid. Numerous documents of military origin confirm this without dilemma. Thus, for an illustration, in the **Conclusions from the assessment of the situation on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the area of responsibility of the 2nd Military District**, sent by general Kukanjac to the General Headquarters of the Armed

Certain leaders of the SDS “**at all levels**”, for the purpose of the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina, used various channels to

Forces of the SFRY on March 20, 1992, he, among other things, indicates of how “**reliable sources**” as well as “**speeches of the Ministry of Interior officials on the television**” confirm the fact that “**the peoples of this Republic have armed well on the party basis**”, presenting on this occasion the data that “**the Muslims have armed some 60,000, Croats some 35,000, and Serbs some 20,000 people**” (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-75, 2-169, and 772).

The document of the Command of the 2nd Military District entitled “**Security Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina**”, addresses the paramilitary formations and their composition and relation towards the JNA. Starting at this from the false assessment that “**the leadership of BiH, parallel with negotiations under the EC auspices, for a peaceful resolution of the problem in Bosnia and Herzegovina, has also intensively worked on military organization of party armies (SDA and HDZ)**”, general Kukanjac points out that “**this process has been finalized, which is corroborated by the numerous armed actions by these forces against the JNA and the Serb population**”. Of the basic objectives and the “**activities of the paramilitary formations on the territory of BiH**”, which were stated, among others, by general Kukanjac, on this occasion we are pointing out the following ones: 1. “**Attacking on the facilities and members of the JNA inflict losses on it and challenge it to make an intervention so that after that it would be condemned for attacking democratic forces and for wishing to preserve the Communist system in the country**”, and 2. “**By committing genocide against the Serb population, make pressure for a more massive moving out into Serbia, and thus create as large as possible ethnically pure space to be placed under their control (by the forces of the SDA and HDZ), thus creating favourable conditions in the case of setting up of territorial borders**” (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-771).

According to general Kukanjac, “**on the territory of BiH there are organized, armed and active respective paramilitary formations on the party and ethnic basis (SDA, HDZ, and HOS)**” for realization of the aforementioned goals, which, in the JNA assessment, had some 100,000 manpower (SDA some 50,000, HDZ some 35,000, and HOS some 15,000). However, this document, in addition to not documenting the aforementioned figures, general Kukanjac does not employ a single word to refer to formation of the Serb armed formations. It is interesting to point out the assessment by general Kukanjac about the place, role and position of the JNA in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Namely, the general states that the JNA “**is the stabilizer of peace**” on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that until recognition of independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina (by the EC and USA), “**as the factor of peace, with its direct presence in the crisis areas of Bosanski Brod, Kupres, Mostar, Sarajevo, Bijeljina, it prevented expansion of interethnic armed conflicts**”. However, the role of the JNA on the alleged prevention of “**interethnic armed conflicts and the genocide against the Serb population of BiH**”, according to the assessment of the Command of the 2nd Military District, “**does not fit into the policies of extremist forces of the SDA and HDZ for dominance**

obtain arms even from the Republic of Serbia (Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Serbia). Leaders and numerous members of the SDS maintained constant contacts with the Federal Secretariat for National Defence, the leadership of Serbia, the authorities and other structures in Serbia. Illegal contacts, beyond the legal bodies of Bosnia and Herzegovina, were a regular practice. They clearly showed **subordination of the bodies of the neighbouring republic**. Just to illustrate, in early September of 1991, in the Government of the Republic of Serbia, with the president Dr. Radoman Bozovic, then Minister for information and Minister for relations with Serbs, and with the Vice Secretary of the Ministry of Interior, and “by telephone with the Minister of Interior”, Velibor Ostojic reached an agreement for procurement of **military equipment, radio stations, transmitters, and studio and reporting radio and TV equipment**.¹²⁵

On a number of occasions, Radovan Karadzic had sent military delegations to the minister of Defence in the Government of the Republic

over the Serb people”. In relation to this, it is stated that “**the paramilitary formations of the SDA and HDZ**”, in addition to “**the armed attacks on the JNA members and the Serb population**”, also participate in armed attacks on the JNA facilities and units, “**that are employed in prevention of the interethnic conflicts and the genocide against the Serb people (Bosanski Brod, Kupres, Mostar)**”. In this context, it is further stated that “**a massacre has been committed against the Serb population in the surroundings of Bosanski Brod and Kupres**”. At the end, this document makes the assessment that the recognition of independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the EC and the USA “**has directly contributed to creation of a general chaos, interethnic conflicts, and expansion of armed combat on this territory**”, and that thus the JNA has allegedly been “**brought into an unfavourable position**”. It is also stated that “**the top leadership of BiH (SDA and HDZ), headed by Alija Izetbegovic, with its actions and open invitations to mobilization, by tricking the public, expansion of falsities and panic, has directly contributed to the current situation in the Republic**” (Ibid.).

Obviously, the Command of the 2nd Military District and the other commands and units of the JNA, as well as the top military leadership of the SFRY were persistently disseminating disinformation on the developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and on the role and place of the JNA in this republic, and particularly on the role of the highest ranking representatives of power from among the Bosniak and Croat peoples, Alija Izetbegovic in particular. The truth is quite different from the one placed through the JNA, and numerous documents testify to this.

¹²⁵ AIIZ, inv. No. 3-1174, Information by Velibor Ostojic – to Radovan Karadzic (“confidential”), March 1992; ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraph 791.

of Serbia, general major Tomislav Simovic. During the reception of one such delegation, lead by major Dragan Gvozdenovic (Gvozden), as written by the chief of cabinet of this minister, Dobrila Gajic-Glisic, he stated that **by November 20, 1991, 80 per cent of all the preparations had been made for successful armed combat against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.**¹²⁶

Constant contacts were made between the Command of the 2nd Military District and the top leadership of the Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina.¹²⁷ Cooperation between the SDS and the commands, units and institutions of the JNA was maintained even at the lower command levels. For instance, on March 23, 1992, the president of the “Serb municipality of Kalesija” stated: **“The political and strategic decisions are coordinated with the Command of the Corps [meaning the 17th Corps of the JNA; note by the author] and the 4th Armored Brigade”.**¹²⁸ The Command of the 216th Mountain Brigade in Han Pijesak was visited daily by the representatives of the SDS from the territories of municipalities of Han Pijesak, Sokolac, Olovo, Kladanj, Vlasenica, Zvornik, Rogatica, and the like, where in attendance and

¹²⁶ D. Gajic-Glisic, **SRPSKA VOJSKA**, Belgrade 1992, pp. 260-264; M. Bojic, **OSVRT NA POLOZAJ MUSLIMANA – BOSNJAKA U JUGOSLAVIJI**, in: **STVARANJE I RAZARANJE JUGOSLAVIJE**, Compilation of works from the Round Table on Creation and Destruction of the AVNOJ Yugoslavia, held in Belgrade, on December 5-7, 1995, Belgrade 1996, p. 274.

¹²⁷ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-75, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 908-1, March 1, 1992 – to the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY (“attn. NGS”); Ibid., inv. No. 2-76, *The Government of the SAO Romanija*, strictly confidential no. 10-9/92, February 10, 1992 – to the assistant federal secretary for national defence for background activity, and the others; Ibid., inv. No. 2-77, *The Government of the SAO Romanija*, strictly confidential no. 10-8/92, February 10, 1992 – to the President of the Government of the Republic of Serbia (Attn. Dr. Radoman Bozovic).

JNA officer Predrag Bukurica (from Ilijas), served until 1991 in Zadar, and then was redeployed to Sarajevo. In mid-May 1991, he went to Belgrade, from where for the needs of the SSNO he maintained connections and contacts with the SDS leadership in the areas of Pale and Ilijas, due to which he visited Pale and Ilijas on a number of occasions (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-541).

¹²⁸ AIIZ, SDS Fund, inv. No. 1023/11, *President of the Serb municipality of Kalesija*, March 23, 1992 – to Minister Velibor Ostojic.

with approval of commander Dragomir Milosevic and commander of the 4th Corps general Vojislav Djurdjevac, constant meetings and consultations were held.¹²⁹ This, of course, was not an exception, but the system of mutual communications at lower levels.

The confiscated SDS materials indicate that the most responsible persons in the top of this party had received arms from the JNA as early as in June 1991. Namely, these were the persons who at that time were at the most prominent leadership SDS positions (designers, founders, members of the Political Council and the Main Republic Board, as well as the SDS personnel at the Government and Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina). The first and foremost one was Radovan Karadzic who was given a *Heckler* with muffler, no. 93421, and 200 bullets. Vojislav Maksimovic, the chairman of the Club of Representatives of the SDS at the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and a professor of the Sarajevo University, was provided with an automatic pistol *Scorpion* no. 24704 and 100 7.65 mm bullets; Aleksa Buha, professor of the Sarajevo University, had a *Scorpion* no. 24578 and 100 7.65 mm bullets; Petko Cancar, president of the Council of Municipalities of the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, also had a *Scorpion* no. 23722 and 100 7.65 mm bullets; Momcilo Pejic, minister of finance in the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was assigned with a *Scorpion* no. 23517 and 100 7.65 mm bullets; Komnen Pijevac, assistant minister for information in the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was provided with a *Scorpion* no. 24536 and 100 7.65 mm bullets; Ljubomir Zukovic, deputy minister for education in the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was assigned with a *Scorpion* no. 24538 and 100 7.65 mm bullets; Tatjana Starovic, deputy minister for health of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, had a *Scorpion* no. 24033 and 100 7.65 mm bullets; Milos Savic, deputy general secretary of the Assembly, had a *Scorpion* no. 24818 and 100 7.65 mm bullets; Slavko Leovac, Ph.D., professor of the Sarajevo University, had a *Scorpion* no. 24693 and 200 7.65 mm bullets; Milorad Ekmecic, academician and professor of the Sarajevo University, had a *Scorpion* no. 24889 and

¹²⁹ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2809, Testimony of the Chief of Staff of the headquarters of the 216th Mountain Brigade, Lieutenant-Colonel of the JNA, Asim Dzambasovic.

100 7.65 mm bullets; Bozidar Antic, minister at the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, had a *Scorpion* no. 24826 and 100 7.65 mm bullets; Risto Djogo, editor of the Sarajevo Radio, had a *Scorpion* no. 24803 and 100 7.65 mm bullets; Todor Dutina, writer, had a *Scorpion* no. 24361 and 100 7.65 mm bullets; Danilo Dursum, director of the Holiday Inn Hotel, had a *Scorpion* no. 25841 and 90 7.65 mm bullets; Miroslav Toholj, writer, had a *Scorpion* no. 23812 and 100 7.65 mm bullets; Milivoje Unkovic, academic painter, had a *Scorpion* no. 24582 and 100 7.65 mm bullets; Milivoje Tutnjevic, (at 20, Muhameda Dzudze St.), had a *Scorpion* no. 24311 and 100 7.65 mm bullets; and Mirko Caric (2, Pavla Goranina St.), had a *Scorpion* no. 25841 and 100 7.65 mm bullets.¹³⁰

The aforementioned documentation also records three persons under the codes of “xy”, “xz”, and “zy”, which were decoded by the bodies of the Ministry of Interior of Bosnia and Herzegovina, through their services, and established to represent Biljana Plavsic, Nikola Koljevic, and Momcilo Krajisnik (the *Scorpion* number for Plavsic is 24879, for Koljevic it is 24661, and for Krajisnik it is 24801).¹³¹

There are numerous data suggesting about the participation of the leading persons of the SDS in arming of the Serb population. Thus, the Assembly delegates Kozic and Simic led a convoy with arms through Eastern Herzegovina. Branko Simic was one of the key persons “**at the admission centre for the JNA armament**”. In one cycle, from the JNA he received: 54 mortars 82 mm, over 600 automatic guns, pistols, hand grenades, and the like.¹³²

The ‘para-state’ bodies of the Serb autonomous areas from Bosnia and Herzegovina in the function of the occupying bodies had approached the Chief of Staff of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, and approached the Federal Secretariat for National Defence, Command of the 2nd Military District, Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Serbia, Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serbia, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Serbia, Ministry for Communications with

¹³⁰ *Oslobodjenje*, February 25, 1993.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*

¹³² *Oslobodjenje*, October 1, 1993.

the Serbs Outside Serbia, the Red Cross of Yugoslavia, the Association of Serbs from Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Registry Office of the Emigrants, and the president of the Government of the Republic of Serbia (“**Attn. Dr. Radoman Bozovic**”), seeking weapons and equipment. The data available clearly confirm that the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY (the JNA) and the Government of the Republic of Serbia (the Ministry of Interior of Serbia) had formed, armed, equipped and trained the Serb armed units in Bosnia and Herzegovina.¹³³

The JNA assigned the whole reserves of armament, ammunition and equipment of the units and headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the armament, ammunition and fuel of the JNA at the JNA warehouses for distribution to the Serbs. Only the warehouses of the 2nd Military District stored reserves of armament and two sets of ammunition for units and headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and armament, ammunition and fuel of the JNA in the following quantities:

a) for the Territorial Defence: 78,400 barrels of arms and 1,500 tons of ammunition; and

b) for the JNA: 30,000 pieces of light infantry armament, 40 tons of ammunition and mines and explosive devices, and some 25 tons of fuel.¹³⁴

By March 20, 1992, the JNA had distributed in the area of responsibility of the 2nd Military District 51,900 pieces of armament (75%), and the SDS distributed 17,298 pieces (or 25%) to the Serb “volunteer units on the territory of BiH. At the same time, by March 20, 1992, the JNA distributed some 6,000 further pieces of infantry arms belonging to the Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

¹³³ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-76, *The Government of the SAO Romanija*, strictly confidential no. 10-9/92, February 10, 1992 – to the assistant federal secretary for national defence, and others; Ibid., inv. No. 2-77, *The Government of the SAO Romanija*, strictly confidential no. 10-8/92, February 10, 1992 – to the President of the Government of the Republic of Serbia (Attn. Dr. Radoman Bozovic).

¹³⁴ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-75, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 908-1, March 20, 1992 – to the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – (attn. NGS, in person).

for the arming of the Serb people. By then, 300 automatic guns had been distributed to the “reliable” pensioned officers, and “a hundred more people shall be armed in three to four days”. These persons, according to the assessment of the commander of the 2nd Military District, **“shall defend and protect residential blocks, buildings, entrances, and in particular shall protect the families of active military personnel during their work time, and in situations when such personnel goes out with units to camping, combat tasks, and the like”.**¹³⁵

The Serbo-Montenegrin aggressor even used hospital facilities as warehouses for arms. The most blatant example was the misuse of the Military Hospital in Sarajevo. In the second half of 1991, this hospital **“became an armed camp”**. Arms were transported and stored into it. Thus, according to the statement of a medical doctor who was working as a psychiatrist at the Sarajevo Military Hospital, **“in one place only there were 150 AK-47 guns and 250 hand grenades stored”.**¹³⁶

¹³⁵ Ibid. **“The reliable”** pensioned JNA officers were maximally involved in military planning, preparation and conducting of the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina. There are a lot of data about this. For illustration, we indicate the fact that Slobodan Krivokapic, a pensioned JNA officer, owner of the *Konoba* inn at Marka Marulica St., (permanently residing at 2, Marjana Baruna) in Sarajevo, before the outbreak of the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, possessed the plans for occupation of Kupres and Livno, and their integration with the *SAO Krajina*. Krivokapic also knew about a certain **“deed book file”**, a document found at the Command of the 2nd Military District, pertaining to the **“return of 70% of the territory of R BiH to Serbia”** (*Dnevni izvjestaj*, nos. 114/115, August 17, 1992).

In the order dated April 4, 1992, among other things, general Milutin Kukanjac order recruitment of the pensioned military personnel and civilians for **“preparedness in the defence of residential buildings”** (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2804, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential no. 09/80-23, April 4, 1992 – to the Command of the Military Engineering Directorate).

This order, among other things, raised the combat preparedness of the commands, units and institutions of the 2nd Military District **“up to the highest level”**. It was of special importance and **“very relevant”** that by eight PM of the same date (that is, on April 4), the full combat preparedness is also ensured **“of separate facilities as well as their protection”** (Ibid.).

¹³⁶ ∴ **RATNI ZLOCINI U BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI**, Reports by Amnesty International and Helsinki Watch, Antiwar Campaign of Croatia, Centre for Peace, Non-Violence and Human Rights Zagreb, Library Dokumenti, no. 2, Zagreb, 1993, p. 107.

After the referendum of the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina for an independent and sovereign state (February 29 – March 1, 1992), medical doctors of Serb ethnicity at this health institution in Sarajevo, separated from their non-Serb colleagues, and arms were distributed to them. Thus, for instance, captain Mladen Puskovic (a dentist), Colonel Major Vladimir Vujaklija (senior x-ray technician), and Sergeant Milorad Otovic (security officer of the hospital) received sniper guns.¹³⁷

According to the data of the military intelligence analyses in Belgrade, the JNA equipment was used to arm **50,400 people (Serbs)**, that is, full four divisions, with **200 tanks, 150 armored transporters, 400 heavy cannons, 800 mortars, and recoilless cannons**. The Republic of Serbia additionally equipped some **42,000 more people**, that is, three independent divisions. In this contingent, for instance, it was delivered as follows: 1,017 machine guns of caliber 7.62 mm, 216 machine guns 12.7 mm, 162 recoilless cannons, 441 mortars, 54 cannons of calibers 76 and 100 mm, 36 howitzers of 122 mm, 54 multiple rocket launchers of 128 and 262 mm, 90 anti-aircraft guns (PAT) of 20, 30, 40, and 57 mm, 96 medium-sized tanks, 30 self-propelled vehicles with guns, and 18 armored vehicles.¹³⁸

By March 20, 1992, on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the commands, units and institutions of the 2nd and 4th Military Districts and in collaborationist formations of the so-called Serb autonomous areas, mobilization was mainly terminated as was the arming and equipping of the “military conscripts” of Serb ethnicity.¹³⁹

After the genocide committed in Bijeljina against the Bosniaks in early April 1992, the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina sent a request to the JNA to return the armament of the units and headquarters of the Territorial Defence. The Command of the 2nd Military District informed the whole officer composition about this decision and presented to them that this armament and equipment may not be issued without

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ *Prva Linija*, no. 6, May 23, 1993, p. 13.

¹³⁹ M. Kreso, **CINJENICE KOJE UKAZUJU NA AGRESIJU NA REPUBLIKU BOSNU I HERCEGOVINU OD STRANE SAVEZNE REPUBLIKE JUGOSLAVIJE I NJENIH POMAGACA** (manuscript), Sarajevo, 1993, p. 6.

the written approval of the Commander of the 2nd Military District. However, **the JNA refused to return the arms and equipment of the legal Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina.**¹⁴⁰

All of this confirms that all the armament, ammunition, equipment, material, technical, food and other supplies that were available to the Serb armed formations had come from the JNA arsenal, from the sequestered property of the Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the Territorial Defence and the Ministry of Interior of Serbia.

“From the beginning of the combat activity”, directly or through their headquarters, the formed Serb units of Territorial Defence approached directly the SSNO for supplying with armament and military equipment from the JNA reserves. Equipment of those units, **“at the time when conditions existed”**, was done directly by assigning the armament and military equipment on the part of tactical holders (i.e. of ‘SSNO arms and services’) through the 608th Technical Supply Base of the SSNO and commands of military districts. However, due to the large number of requests and problems in resolving of this issue further at the level of the SSNO, the Chief of Staff of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, General Blagoje Adzic, on December 30, 1991, issued a confidential no. 2268-1, **Order (marked military secret) for equipment**

¹⁴⁰ **Agresija ...**, p. 19; AIIZ, inv. No. 2-88, Command of the 2nd Military District, Operational Duty Team, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-1940, April 2, 1992 – to the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – Operational Centre; Ibid., inv. No. 2-118, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-1986, April 4, 1992 – to the Operational Centre of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – Background Sector; Ibid., inv. No. 2-85, Command of the 2nd Military District, Operational Duty Team, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2000, April 5, 1992 – to the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – Operational Centre; Ibid., inv. No. 2-124, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2126, April 10, 1992 – to the Operational Centre of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – for background activity Sector.

On April 6, 1992, the leadership of the Municipal Assembly of Bihac brought the decision that within ten days the JNA should return the arms to the units and the headquarters of the territorial defence. However, the JNA refused this. On April 9, the Party of Democratic Action sent a request to issue the arms for the TO units from the Ustikolina warehouse, and this request was refused (Ibid.).

(method of supplying) of the units of the Serb territorial Defence with armament and military equipment (from the JNA reserves).¹⁴¹

The supply of the units of the Serb territorial Defence with armament and military equipment was to be done **“in the following way: the Commands – TO headquarters shall submit their applications for supplying of their units with armament and military equipment in the future to the command of the JNA unit in which area of responsibility they are located”**. The applications for supply were to be submitted to the SSNO through the competent TO bodies, **“and the units employed in the JNA compositions, through JNA units and commands.**

– The competent SSNO bodies shall analyze the applications received and, in compliance with the assessed needs and capacities, they shall provide approval for the type of arms and equipment and the unit that shall surrender the arms and equipment to the TO.

– The Command of the 608th Technical Supply Base of the SSNO, upon approval of the tactical holders (‘SSNO arms and services’), shall prepare decisions on the assignment of the arms and equipment of the TO units.

In bringing of the decision for assignment of the arms and equipment or surrender in any other way, take into account the actual needs, purpose and level of training of the TO unit compositions for use of the assigned resources.

– The command of the 608th Technical Supply Base of the SSNO shall have the duty to report to the tactical holders (‘SSNO arms and services’) about the execution of the passed decisions on the assignment of the arms and equipment to the TO units.

– The supply of the employed TO units with combat needs upon consumption is to be done in an organized fashion, through units

¹⁴¹ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2821, Technical Administration of the SSNO, confidential no. 2268-1, December 30, 1991 – to the Command of the 5th Military District. This order was served on **“all of the commands – headquarters of the TO and JNA, up to the brigade level”** (Ibid.).

– institutions on which they rely based on the chart of background securing. The procedure is in all identical for all the support units”.^{141a}

Based on the aforementioned order of the Chief of Staff of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, on January 9, 1992, General Milutin Kukanjac (commander of the 2nd Military District) issued a similar order **on the method of equipping of the units of the Serb territorial Defence with arms and equipment from the JNA reserves.** This order in its full version stated:

“1. – Supplying of the TO units with arms and equipment to be done exclusively in compliance with the applicable rules. The TO commands and headquarters shall submit application for supply of their units with arms and equipment to the command of the JNA unit in whose area of responsibility they are located.

The applications for supply shall be submitted to the SSNO through the competent TO bodies, and for the units employed within JNA units, through the commands of Corps to the command of the 2nd Military District.

2. – The command of the 2nd Military District shall assess the applications received, judge their justification and forward them to the SSNO for approval and decision to assign arms and equipment and other non-combat resources to the TO units.

The commands – TO headquarters in their applications shall take into account the actual needs, purposes and training levels of their compositions for use of the resources assigned.

3. - The Command of the 608th Technical Supply Base of the SSNO, upon approval of the tactical holders (‘SSNO arms and services’), shall prepare decisions on the assignment of the arms and equipment to the TO units.

^{141a} Ibid. It is interesting to point out how general Blagoje Adzic, in the explanation for bringing of this order, indicates upon compliance with regulations and prevention of any misuse (“...**in order to continue honoring the regulations thus preventing any misuse**”; “...**exclusively in compliance with the applicable regulations**”). He had obviously “forgotten” that it was exactly his order and other related activities were of criminal character, rather than, as he claims, compliant with the regulations and preventive against any misuse.

4. – The commands of the Corps and background bases shall have the duty to report to the tactical holders of this command about execution of the brought decisions on assignment of the arms and equipment to the TO units.

5. – Material assignments of the commands – headquarters of the TO units with the allocated arms and equipment from the JNA reserves shall be done in the spirit of the existing rules on material accounting and records in the JNA.

6. - The supply of the employed TO units with combat needs upon consumption is to be done in an organized fashion, through units – institutions on which they rely, based on the chart of background securing. The procedure is in all identical for all the support units”.¹⁴²

In compliance with the order of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, particularly dated December 30, 1991, with the order by general Kukanjac dated January 9, 1992, and the instructions of the Federal Secretariat for National Defence (particularly of February 21, and April 20, 1992), the Yugoslav National Army was **arming and equipping the Serb armed units of the territorial Defence and police, as well as other Serb armed units, both in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Croatia. In this way, the JNA armed, equipped, supplied and trained the Serb population in handling and aiming with infantry and artillery weapons, which is corroborated with numerous documents.**¹⁴³

The para-state Serb Municipal Headquarters of Territorial Defence of Bosanski Petrovac, as “**the only military unit on the territory**” of this municipality, in late 1991, “**given the political and security situation in Yugoslavia**”, and in particular the dislocation of the JNA units from Croatia onto this area, reviews the organizational and formational filling in for formation of new units, and brought the conclusion to approach the JNA, in order to supply the material resources. In relation to this, on

¹⁴² AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2815, Command of the 2nd Military District, confidential, no. 31/103-6-1, January 9, 1992 – Attn. Commander.

Just like his supervisor (general Blagoje Adzic), general Milutin Kukanjac also speaks about “**compliance**” with regulations and “**prevention**” of any misuse. He was obviously copying his commander in the criminal intentions and actions.

¹⁴³ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-195, 196, 198, and others.

December 13, 1991, the commander of this headquarters, reserve 1st class Captain Obrad Vrzina, sent a request marked strictly confidential no. 06/190-1 to the Military Post 1754 Bosanski Petrovac, and to the Command of the 530 Background Base for allocation of the infantry and artillery armament, ammunition and clothing for the soldiers.¹⁴⁴

After it received the aforementioned request, the Command of the 530th Background Base, **“in reviewing the tasks facing the newly formed units of the OpSTO [Municipal Headquarters of Territorial Defence; note by the author] of Bosanski Petrovac”** and **“in assessing the political and security situation in the broader surrounding of the area of responsibility of the 530th Background Base”**, it reached a conclusion that they are **“in the function of controlling the territory, the main and substitute communications, protection of facilities of special significance and cooperation with the JNA units in potential combat activities on this territory”**. Having in mind that the organizational and formational preparations for forming of the aforementioned units

¹⁴⁴ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-175, Municipal Headquarters of Territorial Defence of Bosanski Petrovac, strictly confidential no. 06/190-1, December 13, 1991 – to the Military Post 1754 Bosanski Petrovac; Ibid., inv. No. 2-176, Command of the 530 Background Base, strictly confidential no. 25-1, January 3, 1992 – to the Command of the 5th Military District. On this occasion, the following material and technical resources were requested:

1. pistol 7.62 mm	40 pcs
2. automatic pistol 7.65 mm	15 pcs
3. automatic gun 7.62 mm	130 pcs
4. submachine gun 7.62 mm (7.9 mm)	60 pcs
5. mortar 60 mm	12 pcs
6. mortar 82 mm	10 pcs
7. mortar 120 mm	3 pcs
8. recoilless cannon 82 mm	6 pcs
9. hand rocket launcher 90 mm	20 pcs
10. hand launcher M-57	40 pcs
11. hand rocket launcher (“zolja”)	200 pcs
12. hand defensive grenade	400 pcs
13. light compass	3 pcs
14. combat ammunition sets for infantry armament	2 pcs
15. set of clothes for soldiers	1,200 pcs (Ibid.).

of the *Municipal Headquarters of Territorial Defence of B. Petrovac* **“had already been conducted successfully”**, the representative of the commander of the 530th background base, Colonel Milorad Skondric, assessed that by **“supplying of the requested material resources they would be additionally strengthened in performing of the aforementioned significant tasks for the JNA”**, and he proposed to the Command of the 5th Military District **“to have the aforementioned request resolved positively as soon as possible”**. In this, he in particular noted that **“there has already been some very successful mobilization of military conscripts and volunteers from the territory of the SO /Municipal Assembly; note by the author/ of Bosanski Petrovac, and that they have been very actively involved and made efforts in completion of the tasks assigned to the 5th Corps and 9th Corps and the 200th Air Force Base, which confirms that this is the population firmly motivated for protection of the common homeland, who have been very positively committed to the JNA as a whole”**.¹⁴⁵

The Command of the 2nd Military District, that is, the representative of the Chief of Staff of the Technical Services, Colonel Gradimir Petrovic, on January 8, 1992, issued an order to the Command of the 530th Background Base, strictly confidential no. 32/198-5, that for the needs of the so-called Municipal Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Bosanski Petrovac, it should issue the following types and quantities of ammunition:

a) from the ammunition warehouse of Bihac:

- bullet 7.62 for pistol	2,100 pcs
- bullet 7.65 mm standard	1,500 pcs
- bullet 7.62 mm, piercing-flammable	
bullet for automatic gun	3,780 pcs
- bullet 7.62 mm, standard,	
for automatic gun	27,720 pcs
- bullet 7.62 mm, tracing bullet	
for automatic gun	7,560 pcs

¹⁴⁵ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-176, Command of the 530th Background Base, strictly confidential no. 25-1, January 3, 1992 – to the Command of the 5th Military District.

b) from the ammunition warehouse of Donji Lapac:

- instantaneous grenade for 60 mm mortar 1,440 pcs

c) from the ammunition warehouse of Bosanski Novi:

- instantaneous grenade for 82 mm mortar 1,200 pcs

- cumulative grenade for M-57 hand launcher 320 pcs

- hand grenade M-75 420 pcs.¹⁴⁶

For supply of the 6th Lika Division, on January 2, 1992 (Strictly confidential no. 32/205-3), the Command of the 5th Military District urgently requested from the Command of the 608th Technical Supply Base of the SSNO, to approve the following armament:

- automatic gun 7.62 mm M-70 B1 100 pcs

- automatic gun 7.62 mm M-70 AB2 300 pcs

- semi-automatic gun 7.9 mm, sniper, M-76 100 pcs

- mortar 60 mm M-57 40 pcs

- mortar 82 mm M-69 A 16 pcs.¹⁴⁷

The president of the Municipal Assembly of Sanski Most and deputy commander of the TO of Sanski Most, Nedeljko Rasula and Sveto Mrdja, in January 1992, submitted “**the specification of needs in armament, equipment and other materials for organization of Defence of the Serb people on the territory of the Municipal Assembly of Sanski Most**” to the JNA. In order to supply the units of the Territorial Defence, they requested the following types and quantities of arms and material and technical resources:

1. mortar – 82 mm 2 pcs

2. mortar – 120 mm 4 pcs

¹⁴⁶ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-177, Command of the 2nd Military District, confidential no. 32/198-5, January 8, 1992 – to the Command of the 530th Background Base and the OpSTO of Bosanski Petrovac.

¹⁴⁷ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-222, Command of the 5th Military District, Confidential no. 32/205-3, January 2, 1992 – to the Command of the 608th Technical Supply Base of the SSNO and to Others.

3. mortar – 60 mm	16 pcs
4. boxes of poisonous gases -	4 pcs
5. anti-aircraft gun – 20 mm	4 pcs
6. howitzers, 105 mm – 155 mm	2 pcs
7. combat armored vehicles	2 pcs
8. tanks	2 pcs
9. sniper rifles – 7.9 mm (2 with night sights)	80 pcs
10. submachine gun M-84	10 pcs
11. mine and explosive devices, anti-infantry, dispersive, surprise	3-400 pcs
12. explosive mass	2,000 kgs
13. automatic gun	800 pcs
14. semi-automatic gun	300 pcs
15. light rocket launcher – 128 mm	4 pcs
16. signaling gun	20 pcs
17. “zolja” rocket launcher	900 pcs
18. fuse caps	300 pcs
19. IR binoculars for night observation	3 pcs
20. passive sight (4 for automatic guns, 5 for snipers)	9 pcs
21. communication sets	
- RU 12	10 pcs
- RU 3	6 pcs
22. portable kitchen, set	2 pcs
23. mufflers:	
- for sniper rifles	15 pcs
- for automatic guns	5 pcs

In the assessment of Colonel Gradimir Petrovic, representative of the Chief of Staff of the Technical Services of the Command of the 5th Military District, the aforementioned resources were to be “**delivered**” to the 530th Background Base, “**for distribution to the end recipients**”.

24. manual compass	50 pcs
25. “osa” rocket launcher	1 pc
26. camouflage uniform set	120 pcs
27. dry ready meals	5-6000 pcs
29. ammunition	10 combat sets. ¹⁴⁸

This request was supplied by the Command of the 530th Background Base on January 28, 1992, to the Command of the 2nd Military District, in compliance with its order, confidential no. 31/103-6-1, dated January 9, 1992.¹⁴⁹

After he received the request, general major Ratko Milicevic (assistant commander for background activity of the 2nd Military District), on February 10, 1992, forwarded it to the SSNO – Technical Administration, in compliance with the order of the Chief of Staff of the GS OS SFRY, confidential no. 2268-1, dated December 30, 1991, **“with the request to have the I and III Administration of the GS OS [General Headquarters of the Armed Forces; note by the author] and other competent bodies to review the justification of the request and to bring the appropriate decision”**. Although he stated that the request had been submitted to the Command of the 2nd Military District

¹⁴⁸ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2820, Municipal Assembly of Sanski Most – to the JNA Command in Belgrade, **Specification List of the Needs in Armament, Equipment and Other Military Materials for Organization of the Serb People on the Territory of the Municipal Assembly of Sanski Most.**

This request was substantiated in the following manner:

“B ecause we are not able to do anythign through the Commander of the TO in Sanski Most, who is of Muslim ethnicity, and has been appointed to this post by the SDA in Sanski Most, and their joint efforts over the past year pertained to destruction of the JNA and Yugoslavia as the joint state of equal nations and ethnicities,. We wish to organize and equip ourselves for the defence of Sanski Most and the people who wish to remain in Yugoslavia. In this, we are placing ourselves directly under the JNA command. We hope that in this difficult moment youl will offer us the necessary help and that we will jointly defend our homeland“ (Ibid.).

¹⁴⁹ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2822, Command of the 530th Background Base, confidential no. 188-2, January 28, 1992 – to the Command of the 2nd Military District.

“beyond the TO bodies, due to the ‘mistrust’ of the signatories of the request against the appointed TO bodies”, and that “the request does not state whether there is a unit formation existing for which the armament and equipment are sought”, because “from the specification list attached we can not conclude what type of a unit this is”, general Milicevic concluded that “if there is a certain TO formation unit or there is a belief that it could be formed, we believe that the appropriate armament and equipment should be allocated depending on the capacities”.¹⁵⁰

General major Dusan Koturovic, Chief of Staff of the Military Post 4509 in Belgrade, **“based on the needs that have arisen”**, on February 7, 1992, issued an order to the Military Post 9808 in Pancevo, Confidential no. 11/9, to issue a warrant for allocation of the following resources for the needs of the 3rd Party of the Territorial Defence in composition of the 10th Partisan Division, with the command place located in the village of Zivaja (municipality of Kostajnica, Croatia):

1. anti-tank cannon 76 mm M-42 with
3 combat ammunition sets 6 pcs
2. self-propelling weapon 76 mm M-18 with
3 combat ammunition sets 6 pcs.¹⁵¹

Based on the order from the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, Artillery Administration (Confidential no. 11-9 dated February 7, 1992), on February 22, 1992, the Command of the 2nd Military District issued the order (Confidential no. 32/148-60) to the commands of the 993rd, 530th, and 405th Background Bases, and to the Command of the 5th Corps, to issue the following types and quantities of ammunition as supplies for the 3rd Party of Territorial Defence of the 10th Partisan Division of the 5th JNA Corps:

¹⁵⁰ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2822, Command of the 2nd Military District, confidential no. 31/103-6/2, February 10, 1992 – to the SSNO Technical Administration.

¹⁵¹ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-224, Military Post 4509 Belgrade, confidential no. 11-9, January 7, 1992 – to the Military Post 9808 Pancevo. The aforementioned resources were to be taken from the 2nd Military District.

a) **from the 1st ammunition warehouse of Krcmarice – Banjaluka**

- bullet 76 mm, instantaneously flammable for self-propelling weapon M-18 161 pcs
- bullet 76 mm, piercing, for self-propelling weapon M-18 180 pcs
- bullet 76 mm, sub-caliber, for self-propelling weapon M-18 36 pcs

b) **from the 2nd ammunition warehouse of Mrkonjic Grad**

- bullet 12.7 mm, piercing, flammable and piercing flammable tracing bullet for *Browning* anti-tank machine gun 4,400 pcs
- hand grenade M-75 150 pcs
- bullet 76 mm, instantaneously flammable for cannon M-42 450 pcs
- bullet 76 mm, cumulative, rotating, for cannon M-42 450 pcs

c) **from the 3rd ammunition warehouse of Bihac**

- bullet 76 mm, sub-caliber for self-propelling weapon M18 144 pcs

d) **from the 2nd ammunition warehouse of Golubic**

- bullet 76 mm, instantaneously flammable for the self-propelling weapon M18 290 pcs.¹⁵²

¹⁵² AIIZ, inv. Nos. 2-225, and 2-227, Command of the 2nd Military District, confidential no. 32/198-60, February 22, 1992 – to the Commands of the 993th, 530th, and 405th Background Base, and to the Command of the 5th Corps.

On February 6, 1992, *the Serb Police Precinct of Bosanski Petrovac* approached the JNA, that is, Military Post 1754 Bosanski Petrovac, and to the Command of the 530th Background Base, asking for a “borrowing” of combat weapons and equipment in order to equip “**the reserve and active composition of the police forces**”. On this occasion, the request was for the following combat weapons and equipment:

- sniper rifles, and a certain number of
combat ammunition sets 50 pcs
- “zolja” hand launcher 250 pcs
- “osa” hand launcher 150 pcs
- all-terrain boots 240 pairs
- pullovers 250 pcs
- gloves, and the like.¹⁵³

Starting from the assessment that the “**reserve and active composition of the police through its training did not face training for handling these combat weapons**”, Ljubomir Kerkez, Chief of Staff of the aforementioned ‘para-state’ police precinct also asked for assistance from the Command of the 530th Background Base “**about the implementation of training in handling and aiming using these weapons in the reserve police compositions**”.¹⁵⁴

On February 18, 1992, (strictly confidential no. 06/1-1/92), the ‘para-state’ Serb District Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Bihac approached the Command of the 450th Background Base for supply of 2,000 pcs of infantry arms, two combat ammunition sets, and 850 sets of military equipment (clothing and footwear) in order to form “**a unit of the Serb people**”.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵³ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-234, Ministry of Interior, Security Services Centre Bihac, *Serb Police Precinct Bosanski Petrovac*, strictly confidential no. 01-06/92, February 6, 1992 – to the Military Post 1754 Bosanski Petrovac. Ibid., inv. No. 2-223, Command of the 530th Background Base, strictly confidential no. 267-2, February 17, 1992 – to the Command of the 2nd Military District.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-232, /Serb/ District Headquarters of the TO of Bihac, strictly confidential no. 06/1-1/92, February 18, 1992 – to the Command of the 405th Background

After it received the aforementioned requests of the so-called Police Precinct of Bosanski Petrovac and the Serb District Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Bihac, in compliance with the order of the Chief of Staff of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY (confidential no. 2268-1) dated December 30, 1991, on March 3, 1992 (confidential, no. 32/205-16, “Military Secret – Confidential”), the Command of the 2nd Military District approached the Technical Administration of the Federal Secretariat for National Defence, with the request to approve supplying of these units with armament and equipment.¹⁵⁶

Based on the request of the Military Post 4022 from Banjaluka (confidential no. 18/4-35) dated March 26, 1992, to be urgently provided with 2,000 pieces of automatic guns (7.62 mm), **“for the purpose of better quality supply for the units and for equipping of volunteers”** on March 30, Military Post 5027 approved issuing of 986 pieces of automatic guns 7.62 mm. It is interesting to point out that the aforementioned unit in Banjaluka possessed 17,571 pieces of automatic guns of the aforementioned caliber at the time, and that according to the formation, **“it should be assigned with 21,901 pieces”**.¹⁵⁷

The supplying of the para-state Serb units and headquarters of territorial Defence, as well as bodies and units of police, with material, technical, food and various other equipment (infantry and artillery weapons,

Base. The command of the 405th Background Base forwarded the aforementioned request **“by this headquarters of the Bihac TO”** to the Command of the 2nd Military District, to the attention of general major Ratko Milicevic, because this unit **“is competent for resolving of the request”**, with the appeal that this request be reviewed in the spirit of the order by the Chief of Staff of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY no. 2268-1, dated December 30, 1991, and the order of the Command of the 2nd Military District no. 31/103-6-1, dated January 9, 1992 (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-231, Command of the 405th Background Base, strictly confidential no. 200-2, February 18, 1992 – to the Command of the 2nd Military District).

¹⁵⁶ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-230, Command of the 2nd Military District, confidential no. 32/205-16, March 3, 1992, - to the Federal Secretariat for National Defence – Technical Administration.

¹⁵⁷ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-236, Military Post 4022, confidential no. 18/4-35, March 26, 1992, Banjaluka – to Military Post 5027 Sarajevo; Ibid., inv. No. 2-235, Military Post 5027 Sarajevo, confidential no. 32/205-24, March 30, 1992 – to Military Posts 5290 and 4022 Banjaluka.

tanks, ammunition, mines and explosive devices, communication devices, food and kitchen materials for work on the field, equipment) and material reserves was directly done by the Federal Secretariat for National Defence and its commands, units and institutions. These activities were commanded personally by the Chief of Staff of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, general Blagoje Adzic. Thus, on March 13, 1992, at the Command of the 6th Operational Group (Headquarters at the Plitvice Lakes) there was a meeting held between the representatives of the Federal Secretariat for National Defence, the 2nd Military District, the commands of the corps, and the representatives of the Ministry of Interior and the 'para-state' Main Headquarters of Territorial Defence of Republic of Serb Krajina, directed by deputy Chief of Staff of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY. At this meeting, **“in relation to supplying with material and technical resources and material reserves for the units and headquarters of TO, as well as bodies and units of the police”**, the following positions were taken:

1) the 'para-state' bodies and police units **“shall receive 20,000 sets of footwear and 100 all-terrain motor vehicles**. As for the other resources, **“the Ministry of Interior had the obligation to file applications for supply”** (the priority in supplying was given to the Serb police, territorial Defence units, and infantry parties);

2) the Corps commands are obligated to provide supplies from their own resources by formation of the TO and police units and headquarters with functional armament and equipment. **“For the missing resources, they shall approach the Command of the 2nd Military District, and the requests it can not resolve shall be submitted to the SSNO competent bodies”**; and

3) the supplying of the Corps **“with the missing arms and equipment and replacement of the non-functional ones”**, as well as the supplementing **“of the lacking reserves shall be done after the redeployment”**.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁸ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-127, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential no. 10/36-2201, April 13, 1992 – to the Operational Centre of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – for background activity Sector (background report – OP 54); Ibid., inv. No. 2-134, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential

On April 7, 1992, general Milutin Kukanjac informed the commands of the 9th, 10th and 5th Corps on the aforementioned conclusions (strictly confidential no. 31/101-230), pointing out that they are obligated to proceed **“according to the conclusions brought at the aforementioned meeting”**. In addition to this, he in particular pointed out that the commands of the aforementioned Corps need to perform the supplying of resources in compliance with the formation, whereby they should be asking the supply approval **“for all the resources sought based on the formation”**. General Kukanjac also informed the commanders of the aforementioned Corps of the fact that the Command of the 2nd Military District had subsequently received the formations of the communications bases of the operational zones and background bases of the Main Headquarters of the Territorial Defence and Police of the Republic of Serb Krajina for supply with the war material reserves. At this, he pointed out that **“a certain number and types of vehicles from the Army Fund are used to supply the TO units and headquarters”**.¹⁵⁹

For the needs of the ‘para-state’ Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of the 3rd Operational Zone for Banija and Kordun with the headquarters-affiliated units of spatial structure of the municipal headquarters of territorial Defence of the collaborationist Serb Autonomous Area of Krajina (request no. 405-1, dated March 13, 1992), in compliance with the aforementioned agreement at the Secretariat for National Defence, the following material, technical, food and kitchen supplies were approved:

- pistol 7.62 mm	50 pcs
- pistol 7.65 mm (“Scorpion”)	40 pcs
-semi-automatic gun 7.62 mm	500 pcs
- automatic gun 7.62 mm	300 pcs
- rifle gun M-48 7.9 mm	400 pcs
- submachine gun 7.9 mm	50 pcs
- submachine gun 7.62 mm	300 pcs

no. 10/36-2383, April 20, 1992 – to the Operational Centre of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – for background activity Sector (background report – OP 61).

¹⁵⁹ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-183, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential no. 31/101-230, April 7, 1992 – to the Command of the 9th Corps.

- sniper gun	30 pcs
- submachine gun 84 mm	9 pcs
- “zolja” hand launcher	500 pcs
- “osa” hand launcher	50 pcs
- rocket “arrow” 2-M	40 pcs
- anti-aircraft gun 20/1	40 pcs
- anti-aircraft gun 20/3	40 pcs
- hand anti-tank launcher M-75	1,500 pcs
- protective mask	3,000 pcs
- bullet 7.62 mm for TT handgun	4,200 pcs
- bullet 7.65 mm for Scorpion handgun	12,000 pcs
- bullet 7.62 mm for semi-automatic gun, automatic gun, and submachine gun	5,000 pcs
- bullet 7.9 mm for rifle M-48	60,000 pcs
- bullet 7.9 mm for sniper gun	9,000 pcs
- bullet for hand launcher, simultaneous	1,000 pcs
- bullet for hand launcher, cumulative	1,000 pcs
- infrared binoculars	19 pcs
- infrared sniper	18 pcs
- telephone switchboard TICI-10	9 pcs
- telephone cord coils	50 pcs
- radio device RTU-100	10 pcs
- artillery binoculars	30 pcs
- artillery compass	40 pcs
- battery 180 A/C 12 V	2 pcs
- battery 130 A/C 24 V	2 pcs
- communication mechanic tools	9 pcs
- small battery 4.5 V	200 pcs
- small battery 1.5 V	100 pcs
- battery charger	9 pcs. ¹⁶⁰

¹⁶⁰ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-239, *Serb Autonomous Area of Krajina, Headquarters of the TO of the III Operational Zone of Banija and Kordun*, No. 405-1, March 23, 1992,

Based on the order of the Federal Secretariat for National Defence (marked 'State Secret', no. 892-1, dated February 27, 1992), on April 1, 1992, the Command of the 2nd Military District issued the order (Confidential, no. 14/20-38) to the Chief of Staff of the Background Service of the 2nd Military District to prepare and surrender the following list of items to the Territorial Defence of the so-called West Slavonia, in relation to this organizational and formational changes and needs for supplies, from the composition of the units of the 5th Corps and the 993rd Background Base:

- anti-aircraft cannon – PAT 2071 mm, M-75 16 pcs
(10 from the units of the 5th Corps and
6 from the 993rd Background Base)
- launching mechanism “S-2 M” 12 pcs
(from the units of the 5th Corps)
- planchette 60 x 60 1 pc.¹⁶¹

For the needs of the so-called *Zonal Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of West Slavonia*, based on the enactment of Military Post 4509 Belgrade (confidential no. 173-2), dated March 27, 1992, and telegram from Military Post 9808 Pancevo (confidential no. 11-200/1), dated April 7, 1992, the following resources were supplied:

- anti-tank launching set 9k-11 24 pcs
- artillery binoculars 8 pcs
- artillery compass 6 pcs
- artillery thermometer 6 pcs
- artillery logarithm from Military Post 9802 Visoko 16 pcs.¹⁶²

Vojnic – to the 530th Background Base of Bosanski Petrovac; Ibid., inv. No. 2-237, Command of the 530th Background Base, strictly confidential, no. 863-3, March 31, 1992 – to the Command of the 2nd Military District.

¹⁶¹ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-178, Command of the 2nd Military District, confidential no. 14/20-38, April 1, 1992 – to the Chief of Staff of the Background Service of the 2nd Military District.

¹⁶² AIIZ, inv. No. 2-184, Military Post 9808, confidential no. 11-200/1, April 7, 1992, Sarajevo – to the Command of the 2nd Military District.

In early 1992, the Federal Secretariat for National Defence took the decision that the material and technical resources for the needs of the so-called Zonal Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of West Slavonia be assigned **“free of charge”**. In compliance with this decision and based on the approval of the Infantry Administration (confidential, no. 289-2), dated March 26, 1992, then based on the telegram from the Command of the 608th Technical Supply Base of the SSNO (Confidential, no. 1194-2), dated April 8, 1992, and based on the **“urgent need on the field”**, and the request of the so-called Zonal Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of West Slavonia, on April 10, 1992, the Command of the 2nd Military District issued the order (confidential, no. 32/205-28) to assign to this ‘para-state’ creation the following material and technical resources (armament and equipment), from the 5th Corps;

- semi-automatic handgun	383 pcs
- automatic handgun	78 pcs
- semi-automatic gun 7.9 mm sniper	135 pcs
- bag for hand launcher grenade	324 pcs
- manual binoculars	589 pcs
- manual compass	393 pcs
- curve meter	102 pcs
- field periscope	5 pcs
- universal, leather, single ammunition bag	3,839 pcs
- signaling pistol	103 pcs
- machine gun	109 pcs
- mortar 60 mm	36 pcs
- mortar 82 mm	24 pcs
- recoilless cannon	46 pcs
- semi-automatic gun	327 pcs
- submachine gun	116 pcs. ¹⁶³

Based on the request of the Command of the 10th Corps (strictly confidential no. 20/40-2009), dated April 5, 1992, in the first half of April 1992, for the supply of the units of the so-called Operational

¹⁶³ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-186, Command of the 2nd Military District, confidential, no. 32/205-28, April 10, 1992 – to the Command of the 5th Corps.

Zone of Kordun, the Command of the 2nd Military District approved the following technical and material resources (ammunition, and mines and explosive devices):

- bullet for handgun 7.62 mm standard	6,300 pcs
- bullet for handgun 7.65 mm standard	4,000 pcs
- bullet for rifle gun 7.9 mm sniper, standard	19,800 pcs
- bullet piercing	10,800 pcs
- bullet tracing, for automatic and semi-automatic guns submachine guns and machine guns 7.62 mm	380,800 pcs
- bullet, piercing	175,840 pcs
- bullet for machine gun 12.7 mm “browning”, piercing	9,600 pcs
- bullet for hand launcher M-57, cumulative grenade	872 pcs
- bullet for rifle gun launcher, cumulative grenade	2,352 pcs
- bullet for recoilless cannon 82 mm, instantaneous cumulative flammable	2,232 pcs
- hand defensive grenade M-75	15,360 pcs
- anti-tank hand grenade	1,170 pcs
- bullet 26 mm signaling (all colors)	8,500 pcs
- instantaneous light grenade for launcher 120 mm	172 pcs
- instantaneous heavy grenade	3,360 pcs
- rocket 9m -14m (for personal set 9-m11)	3,044 pcs
- rocket 9m-32m (for personal set “Arrow 2-m)	198 pcs
- instantaneous flammable grenade for cannon 100 mm on tank T-55	1,486 pcs
- piercing tracing	894 pcs
- cumulative	820 pcs
- piercing flammable bullet for anti-aircraft machine gun 12.7 mm on tank T-55	7,488 pcs

- bullet for machine gun 7.62 mm standard	172,800 pcs
- bullet for machine gun 7.62 mm tracing	49,680 pcs
- bullet for machine gun 7.62 mm piercing flammable	24,840 pcs
- infantry land mine	7,950 pcs
- detonator special mechanical	30 pcs
- detonator special chemical	30 pcs
- detonator special electrical	15 pcs
- special time detonator	15 pcs. ¹⁶⁴

Based on the request of the so-called Main Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of the self-proclaimed Republic of Serb Krajina (confidential, no. 220-92, dated March 24, 1992), on April 6, 1992, for the needs of the aforementioned 'para-state' creation, the Engineering Administration supplied the list of the mines and explosive devices, which needed to be **“stored in the echelons and kept as a reserve”**:

- TNT explosive	10,000 kgs
- plastic explosive	5,000 kgs
- anti-personnel mine with deferred action	30,000 pcs
- anti-aircraft mine	3,000 pcs
- dispersive mine with deferred action	1,500 pcs
- slow burning fuse cord	3,000 meters
- detonating fuse cord	30,000 meters
- detonating cap no. 3	3,000 pcs
- detonating electrical cap	3,000 pcs. ¹⁶⁵

Based on the request from Military Post 4022 Banjaluka (confidential, no. 18/4-37 dated April 1, 1992), on April 8, 1992, (confidential, no. 32/205-28), Military Post 5027 Sarajevo issued the following material and technical resources to the aforementioned military post:

- automatic pistol 7.65 M-61	40 pcs
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¹⁶⁴ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-181, Command of the 10th Corps, strictly confidential, no. 20/40-2009, April 6, 1992 – to the Command of the 2nd Military District (Technical Service).

¹⁶⁵ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-182.

- semi-automatic gun 7.9 mm, sniper M-76	166 pcs
- automatic gun 7.62 mm, M-70AB2	111 pcs
- submachine gun 7.62 M-72B1	214 pcs
- machine gun 7.9 mm	344 pcs
- pistol M-52 for machine gun 7.9 mm	12 pcs
- hand rocket launcher 90 mm M-79	22 pcs
- mortar 60 mm M-57	26 pcs
- mortar 82 mm M-69	32 pcs
- recoilless cannon 82 mm M-60A1	2 pcs
- helmet M 59/85	164 pcs
- patrolling binoculars 7x40	90 pcs
- artillery compass PAB-ZAT	16 pcs
- desk 9S415	24 pcs. ¹⁶⁶

Based on the request of the command of the 5th Corps, (confidential no. 18/4-37 dated April 1, 1992), on April 13, 1992, (confidential no. 32/205-28), the Command of the 2nd Military District issued to the above Corps the following technical and material resources:

- automatic pistol 7.65 mm	44 pcs
- signaling pistol 26 mm	103 pcs
- mortar 60 mm	22 pcs
- recoilless cannon 82 mm	26 pcs
- universal, leather, single ammunition bag	4,340 pcs
- patrolling binoculars 6x30	262 pcs
- field periscope	16 pcs. ¹⁶⁷

In the second half of April 1992, the Serb Municipality of Bosanska Krupa approached the Command of the 530th Background Base and the 10th Corps “**for assistance in formation of the TO units and**

¹⁶⁶ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-189, Military Post 5027 Sarajevo, confidential, no. 32/205-28, April 8, 1992 – to Military Post 8248 Knin, and Military Post 4022 Banjaluka.

¹⁶⁷ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-192, Command of the 2nd Military District, confidential no. 32/206-28, April 13, 1992 – to the Command of the 5th Corps, and to the Command of the 744th Background Base.

their supply with food and technical military materials (primarily armament and ammunition)”. “Having in mind the order of the Federal Secretariat for National Defence (strictly confidential no. 359-1) dated February 21, 1992, as well as the current political situation on the territory of this municipality”, informing the Command of the 2nd Military District, in the telegram (strictly confidential no. 19/81-442) dated April 23, 1992, Grujo Boric, assistant commander for background activity of the Command of the 10th Corps, presented the opinion that **“they need to be approved a certain quantity of military resources to be issued by the 530th Background Base”**. **“Having in mind the urgency of implementation of the task for formation of units”** of the TO of the Serb municipality of Bosanska Krupa, in compliance with the order of the Federal Secretariat for National Defence (strictly confidential no. 359-1, dated February 21, 1992, on April 1992 (strictly confidential no. 31/103-401), general Milutin Kukanjac ordered to the Command of the 10th Corps and the Command of the 530th Background Base to issue **“from the surplus in the units of the 10th Corps and available reserves at the 530th Background Base”** armament, ammunition and equipment for the newly formed units of the TO of SO [territorial Defence of the Municipal Assembly; note by the author] of Bosanska Krupa. On that occasion, general Kukanjac in particular stressed that the **“lacking resources”** should be requested by telegram through the Technical Administration of the Federal Secretariat for National Defence, with **“reference to the Order of the Chief of Staff of the GS OS [General Headquarters of the Armed Forces; note by the author] of the SFRY (confidential, no. 2268-1, dated December 30, 1991) and with my approval”**.¹⁶⁸

Focusing particular activity on the disintegration of the Ministry of Interior of Bosnia and Herzegovina,¹⁶⁹ pursuant to the Order of the

¹⁶⁸ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-195, Command of the 10th Corps, strictly confidential no. 19/31-442, April 23, 1992 – to the Command of the 2nd Military District. Ibid., inv. No. 2-196, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential no. 31/103-40-1, April 24, 1992 – to the Command of the 10th Corps and the Command of the 530th Background Base (attn. Commander).

¹⁶⁹ A significant place in preparation of the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina belonged to the Counterintelligence Service of the JNA (“KOS”)

Chief of Staff of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY (confidential, no. 2268) dated December 30, 1991, and the decisions of the Assembly of the Serb People of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the formation of the Serb Ministry of Interior from 1991 and the Executive

and the Federal Secretariat for Interior Affairs (SSUP). At this, it is necessary to have in mind the relations of the KOS and SSUP towards the Ministry of Interior of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Namely, as the key lever of the KOS, immediately upon formation, the Serb Democratic Party continuously monitored the situation at the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, starting from police precincts at municipalities and all the way up to the leadership of the State Security Service and the Board of Ministers. In this context, we need to point out that all the relevant information on the situation in all the organizational units of the Ministry of Interior, were regularly forwarded to the cabinet of the president of the SDS and the minister of the SSUP. Also, a number of the personnel employed at the Ministry of Interior and the centres of security services regularly attended the sessions of the top bodies of the SDS, and kept permanent contacts with the members of the Main Boards of the SDS of Bosnia and Herzegovina. By insisting on certain staffing solutions (at the centres for security services in Banjaluka, Bihac, Doboj, and Tuzla, **“ensure that the chiefs of staff of such centres be Serbs loyal to the SDS, and that in other centres Serbs take the positions of the chiefs of staff of the Public Security Sectors”**), the SDS anticipated even the zones of war activity in Bosnia and Herzegovina – northern Bosnia (main corridor for link between the western borders of the imaginary “Greater Serbia” and Yugoslavia).

According to the instructions from the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, in the period from October 1991 until January 1992, in order to conquer the Ministry of Interior of Bosnia and Herzegovina or neutralize it as a significant defence factor in Bosnia and Herzegovina, an **“expert group”** of the SSUP visited the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (composed of the inspectors of the State and Public Security Services of the SSUP). The role of the members of this group was mainly of intelligence character. Their basic task was to gather the data on the operations, staffing and material levels and capacities of the State Security Service of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, then those data pertaining to the police precincts throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, showing in this a particular interest for the reserve and active composition of the police, their staffing, equipment, supplies, and the like.

The fact should be particularly noted that the aforementioned “expert group” had arrived in Bosnia and Herzegovina upon the invitation of the then minister of interior of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Alija Delimustafic. He, as well as his deputy Vitomir Zepinic, and a number of senior personnel at the Ministry of Interior of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its organizational units, as well as a significant number of the senior personnel of the Serb ethnicity within the police, was an active associate of the KOS (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-551).

Board of the Serb Democratic Party (no. 702/02/92) dated April 3, 1992,¹⁷⁰ from its material reserves, the JNA armed and equipped the Ministry of Interior of the Serb Bosnia and Herzegovina. Namely, the Security Services Centre of Banjaluka of the ‘para-state’ Ministry of Interior of the collaborationist Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, on April 23, 1992 (strictly confidential no. 11), approached the Command of the 2nd Military District with the request that, within the framework of its competencies, “**for the needs of the special police platoon formed at the**” Security Services Centre of Banjaluka, the following material and technical resources be assigned to them:

Helicopters:

- Gazela 4 pcs
- Transporter MI-8 2 pcs

Armored vehicles:

- Patrolling armored vehicle BRDM-2 1 pc
- Armored transporter (with recoilless gun) 3 pcs
- Combat armored transporter 3 pcs

All-terrain transport vehicles:

- All-terrain vehicle “Pinzgauer” 6 pcs
- All-terrain vehicle “Puch” 2 pcs
- All-terrain vehicle TAM-110 2 pcs

Armament:

- Pistol, 7.62 or 9 mm 157 pcs
- Automatic gun 7.62 mm with folding butt-end,
or Automatic gun 9 mm “Heckler Koch” 157 pcs
- Submachine gun 7.62 mm 7 pcs
- Machine gun 7.62 mm 3 pcs
- Sniper semi-automatic gun 7.9 mm 20 pcs

¹⁷⁰ AIIZ, SDS Fund, inv. No. 490/1-16.

- Signaling pistol 22 pcs
- Chemical gun 38 mm 6 pcs
- Chemical pistol 38 mm 6 pcs

Ammunition, mines, explosives and chemical devices:

- Ammunition (for pistol, automatic gun, submachine gun, machine gun, anti-aircraft machine gun, and recoilless gun)

3 sets by category of weapon

- Defensive hand grenade 468 pcs
- Chemical bullet 38 mm 200 pcs
- Chemical hand grenade 312 pcs
- Chemical spray 107 pcs
- Hand grenade, smoke, neutral 225 pcs
- Plastic explosive 10 kgs
- Mining explosive 150 kgs
- TNT explosive 40 kgs
- Cap no. 8 200 kgs
- Electrical detonator 150 pcs
- Slow burning fuse cord 100 meters
- Detonating fuse cord 100 meters

Communication devices:

- USW radio-station, fixed 1 pc
- USW radio-station, mobile 15 pcs
- USW radio station 33 pcs
- Mobile transmitter 1 pc

Lighting and p.a. equipment:

- Generator 5 kw 1 pc
- Battery lamp 3 pcs
- Electrical lighting equipment with hookup 1 pc
- Megaphone for vehicle 1 pc
- Manual megaphone 3 pcs

Instruments:

- Binoculars	21 pcs
- IR binoculars	4 pcs
- IR rifle gun sniper	5 pcs
- Binocular for identification of instruments with IR rays	5 pcs
- Manual compass	21 pcs
- Curve meter	9 pcs

Protective and special equipment:

- Protective mask M-1	157 pcs
- JNA helmet	157 pcs
- Bullet-proof jacket	157 pcs
- Camouflage helmet net	157 pcs
- Scuba diving equipment	9 sets
- Asbestos uniform	3 sets
- Alpinist equipment	10 sets
- Rubber stick	124 pcs
- Electric stick	30 pcs
- Helmet with visor	30 pcs
- Handcuffs	124 pcs
- "Stop" sign post	28 pcs

Tools:

- Blasting tool set	1 pc
- Demining set	1 pc
- Radio-mechanic tool set	1 pc
- Criminal technician set	1 pc
- Video camera with 10 tapes	1 pc
- Backpack welding device	1 pc
- Machine for electrical set off of mines, manual	1 pc

Food and accessories:

- Camouflage uniform	157 pcs
- Overall, camouflage or blue	150 pcs
- Transporting bag	157 pcs
- Combat backpack	157 pcs
- Sleeping bag	157 pcs
- Officer bag	22 pcs
- Hand lamp	70 pcs
- Whistle	19 pcs
- Self-propelling kitchen 150 liters	1 set
- Mobile kitchen 25 liters	3 sets
- Equipment and accessories for food preparation	3 sets
- Working equipment for cooks	3 sets
- Water tank (rubber-coated or plastic) 500 liters	1 pc
- Water dish (rubber-coated or plastic) 20 liters	6 pcs
- Tent “Kozara” for 22 persons	3 pcs
- Tent “Sutjeska” for 14 persons	3 pcs
- Foldable table	1 pc
- Foldable chairs	12 pcs
- Aluminum container for packaging (800x600x400 mm)	7 pcs
- Sports equipment (overalls, shorts, t-shirts, tennis shoes, kimono)	157 pcs

Medical materials:

- First bandage, individual	157 pcs
- Personal decontamination set	157 pcs
- Nurse medical set	5 pcs
- Medical doctor set	1 pc
- Stretchers	2 pcs. ¹⁷¹

¹⁷¹ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-197, “Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina – Ministry of Interior Sarajevo – Security Services Centre Banjaluka”, strictly confidential no. 11, April 23, 1993 – to the Command of the 2nd Military District (attn. Commander).

In compliance with the order of the Chief of Staff of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY (marked strictly confidential no. 2268-1 dated December 30, 1991), on April 24, 1992 (marked strictly confidential no. 31/103-41), general Milutin Kukanjac submitted the aforementioned request to the Technical Administration of the SSNO, with a note stating “**very urgent**”. At this, he presented his opinion “**that the request should be met primarily in terms of those resources that are not available on the market and in the quantity that can meet the most basic needs**”.¹⁷² Two days later (on April 26), the Command of the 2nd Military District issued the order to the 993rd Background Base to issue the aforementioned material resources for the needs of the *Security Services Centre in Banjaluka*.¹⁷³

The command of the 30th Partisan Division equipped certain units of the Serb police with bulletproof jackets.¹⁷⁴

Also, the 30th and 39th Partisan Divisions, then the 13th Partisan Brigade, which was in the composition of the 11th Combat Group at Kupres, as well as the 30th Infantry Division, were supplied from the 2nd Military District. Also, the 6th Lika Special Division, upon order

¹⁷² AIIZ, inv. No. 2-198, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential no. 31/103-41, April 24, 1992 – to the Federal Secretariat for National Defence – Technical Administration.

¹⁷³ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-139, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential no. 10/36-2500, April 26, 1992 – to the Operational Centre of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – for background activity Sector (the background report – OP 66).

The aforementioned material and technical resources were supplied, which is confirmed by the statement of Stojan Zupljanin in *Glas Srpski*, of April 29, 1992, that “**the Security Services Centre now has the arms and equipment, starting from automatic guns, armored combat vehicles, even anti-aircraft weapons and helicopters**” (ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraphs 593-598).

The Serb Ministry of Interior of BiH received equipment, armament and other material and technical resources also from the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serbia and the Federal Secretariat for Interior Affairs (ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraphs 262 and 270).

¹⁷⁴ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2584, Command of the 30th Partisan Division, strictly confidential no. 151-1, January 28, 1992.

by the SSNO assistant for background (strictly confidential, no. 683-59), dated October 20, 1991, was supplied with technical and material resources from the 2nd Military District, that is from the Federal Secretariat for National Defence.¹⁷⁵

Pursuant to the decision of the Federal Secretariat for National Defence (marked strictly confidential no. 352-1) dated April 20, 1992, through the 2nd Military District, directly from Serbia, the JNA armed, equipped and supplied the units of the territorial Defence and police of the Republic of Serb Krajina. Thus, the Command of the 608th Technical Supply Base of the Federal Secretariat for National Defence (strictly confidential, no. 1472-9) and (strictly confidential, no. 1472-11) dated April 23, sent telegrams to request from the Command of the 2nd Military District, “**in order to provide ammunition supplies**” of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serb Krajina, to issue ammunition to the ‘para-state’ police station in Vojnic and Benkovac “**free of charge**”. In accordance with the aforementioned requests and orders of the Command of the 2nd Military District (strictly confidential, no. 32/198-13, and confidential no. 32/198-137, dated April 25, 1992), the following quantity of ammunition was issued from the 1st Ammunition Warehouse of Bosanski Novi for the needs of the ‘para-state’ stations of “**the ministry of interior**” of Vojnic, Benkovac, and Korenica:

- bullet 7.62 mm standard, for pistol	4,200 pcs each
- bullet 7.65 mm for automatic pistol	24,000 pcs each
- bullet 7.62 mm standard, for automatic gun	750,000 pcs each
- bullet 7.62 mm tracing, for automatic gun	224,000 pcs each
- bullet 7.62 mm piercing, flammable, for automatic gun	112,000 pcs each

¹⁷⁵ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-199, Command of the 5th Corps, confidential, no. 16/4-32/1, April 25, 1992 – to the Command of the 2nd Military District, Command of the 5th Corps – cc, and also to the Command of the 30th Partisan Division – cc; Ibid., inv. No. 2-200, Command of the 993rd Background Base, confidential no. 1676-2/1, April 25, 1992 – to the Command of the 2nd Military District, to the Command of the 30th Partisan Division – cc; Ibid., inv. No. 2-201, Command of the 993rd Background Base, confidential no. 1676-1/1, April 25, 1992 – to the Command of the 2nd Military District, to the Command of the 30th Partisan Division – cc.

- bullet 7.9 mm sniper 36,000 pcs each
- signaling bullet 26 mm 6,650 pcs each
- cumulative grenade for hand launcher M-75 576 pcs each.¹⁷⁶

Pursuant to the aforementioned decision of the Federal Secretariat for National Defence dated April 20, and the decision of the Command of the 2nd Military District (strictly confidential, no. 32/198-138), dated April 25, 1992, for the needs of the ‘para-state’ station of the *Ministry of Interior* of Benkovac, the same quantity of ammunition was issued from the Golubic ammunition warehouse as for the aforementioned stations of the “Ministry of Interior”.¹⁷⁷

The units of the 10th, 9th, and 5th Corps and the warehouses of war material reserves of the Commands of the 405th and 530th Background Base, and the 2nd Military District issued the necessary quantities of arms, ammunition and equipment they had in reserve for the supply of the ‘para-state’ stations of the *Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serb Krajina*. Also, the Command of the 2nd Military District regulated the surrender of the arms and equipment which “**the soldiers of the TO and the JNA are carrying with themselves into the police units**”.

¹⁷⁶ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-203, Command of the 608th Technical Supply Base of the SSNO, strictly confidential, no. 1472-11, April 23, 1992 – to the Command of the 2nd Military District and to the Administration of the *Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serb Krajina and Ministry of Interior of Benkovac*, cc’d; Ibid., inv. No. 2-202, Command of the 608th Technical Supply Base of the SSNO, strictly confidential, no. 1472-9, April 23, 1992 – to the Command of the 2nd Military District and to the Administration of the *Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serb Krajina and Ministry of Interior of Vojnic*; Ibid., inv. No. 2-208, Command of the 2nd Military District, confidential no. 32/198-134, April 25, 1992 – to the Command of the 405th Background Base, *the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serb Krajina and the Police Precinct of Korenica*; Ibid., inv. No. 2-206, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential no. 32/198-138, April 25, 1992 – to the Command of the 405th Background Base, *the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serb Krajina and the Police Precinct of Benkovac*; Ibid., inv. No. 2-136, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential no. 10/36-2441, April 23, 1992 – to the Operational Centre of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – for background activity Sector (background report OP 64).

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

The formation resources (“**the lacking resources**”) in the equipment of the units that could not be supplied by the 2nd Military District from the resources available were supplied by the competent administrations and based on the decisions and instructions of the Federal Secretariat for National Defence.¹⁷⁸

For the needs of the ‘para-state’ station of *the Ministry of Interior* of Okucani, based on the aforementioned decision of the Federal Secretariat for National Defence and the order of the Command of the 2nd Military District (strictly confidential, no. 32/198-137) dated April 25, 1992, also “free of charge”, the following quantity of ammunition was issued from the 1st Ammunition Warehouse of Bosanski Novi:

- bullet 7.62 mm standard, for pistol	4,200 pcs
- bullet 7.65 mm standard	4,000 pcs
- bullet 7.62 mm for automatic gun	705,600 pcs
- bullet 7.62 mm piercing, flammable for automatic gun	281,000 pcs
- bullet 7.62 mm piercing, flammable for automatic gun	100,800 pcs
- bullet 7.65 mm standard	48,000 pcs
- bullet 7.62 mm tracing, standard	3,200 pcs
- bullet 7.62 mm piercing, flammable, standard	8,000 pcs
- bullet 7.9 mm sniper	3,600 pcs
- hand grenade M-75	6,650 pcs
- bullet 26 mm signaling	500 pcs
- smoke box	96 pcs. ¹⁷⁹

Pursuant to the aforementioned decision of the Federal Secretariat for National Defence, and the order of the Command of the

¹⁷⁸ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-205, Command of the 2nd Military District, confidential no. 32/198-138/1, April 25, 1992 – to the Command of the 405th and 530th Background Base.

¹⁷⁹ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-209, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential no. 32/198-137, April 25, 1992 – to the Command of the 530th Background Base, *to the Ministry of Interior of Republic of Serb Krajina and the police precinct in Okucani.*

2nd Military District (strictly confidential, no. 32/198-135) dated April 25, 1992, for the needs of the ‘para-state’ station of *the Ministry of Interior* of Petrinja, the following ammunition was issued “**free of charge**” from the ammunition warehouse of Bosanski Novi:

- bullet 7.62 mm standard, for pistol	4,200 pcs
- bullet 7.65 mm standard	8,000 pcs
- bullet 7.62 mm for automatic gun	728,000 pcs
- bullet 7.62 mm tracing, for automatic gun	212,800 pcs
- bullet 7.62 mm piercing, flammable for automatic gun	106,400 pcs
- bullet 7.65 mm standard	50,400 pcs
- bullet 7.62 mm tracing, standard	17,600 pcs
- bullet 7.62 mm piercing, flammable, standard	8,000 pcs
- bullet 7.9 mm sniper	3,600 pcs
- bullet 7.9 mm universal	72,000 pcs
- bullet 12.7 mm piercing, flammable or piercing, flammable, tracing, for <i>Browning</i>	25,400 pcs
- cumulative grenade for hand launcher M-57	128 pcs
- bullet 82 mm, cumulative, for recoilless gun	48 pcs
- bullet 82 mm, rocketed cumulative, for recoilless gun	72 pcs
- hand grenade M-75	7,350 pcs
- bullet 26 mm, signaling	500 pcs
- smoke box	288 pcs. ¹⁸⁰

Pursuant to the aforementioned decision of the Federal Secretariat for National Defence, and the order of the Command of the 2nd Military District (strictly confidential, no. 32/198-133) dated April 25, 1992, for the needs of the ‘para-state’ station of *the Ministry of Interior* of Knin, the following ammunition was also issued “**free of charge**” from the ammunition warehouse of Golubic:

¹⁸⁰ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-211, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 32/198-135, April 25, 1992 – to the Command of the 530th Background Base, to the *Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serb Krajina, and the police precinct of Petrinja.*

- bullet 7.62 mm for pistol	4,200 pcs
- bullet 7.65 mm	16,000 pcs
- bullet 7.62 mm standard, for automatic gun	722,800 pcs
- bullet 7.62 mm tracing, for automatic gun	224,000 pcs
- bullet 7.62 mm piercing, flammable for automatic gun	112,000 pcs
- bullet 7.62 mm standard	50,400 pcs
- bullet 7.62 mm tracing, standard	17,600 pcs
- bullet 7.62 mm piercing, flammable, standard	8,000 pcs
- bullet 7.9 mm sniper	4,500 pcs
- hand grenade M-75	7,350 pcs
- bullet 26 mm signaling	500 pcs
- smoke box	144 pcs
- cumulative grenade for hand launcher M-57	208 pcs
- bullet 76 instantaneously flammable for cannon M-42	100 pcs
- bullet 76 cumulative rotating for cannon M-4	2,100 pcs
- bullet 27 mm instantaneously flammable	9,600 pcs
- bullet 20 mm instantaneously flammable, rotating	5,000 pcs
- bullet 20 mm piercing, flammable	6,400 pcs
- bullet 40 mm instantaneously tracing, for cannon M-1	400 pcs
- bullet 40 mm anti-tank for M-1	160 pcs. ¹⁸¹

Based on the order of the Command of the 608th Technical Supply Brigade of the SSNO (strictly confidential, no. 1472-3), the Decision of the SSNO for free provision (strictly confidential, no. 352-1 dated April 20, 1992), and the decision of the tactical holders of this command

¹⁸¹ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-213, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential no. 32/198-133, April 25, 1992 – to the Command of the 405th Background Base, Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serb Krajina, and the police precinct in Knin.

(in documents strictly confidential, no. 32/205-30/I, strictly confidential no. 32/205-30/3, and strictly confidential, no. 32/205-30/2, dated April 26, 1992), the assistant Chief of Staff of the Technical Service of the Command of the 2nd Military District, Colonel Gradimir Petrovic ordered the commands of the 9th, 5th, and 10th Corps that they make an urgent order to allocate from their own reserves of the following armament to the ‘para-state’ units *of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serb Krajina*:

- pistol 7.62 mm *to the Police Brigade of Knin* 11 pcs
- to the station *of the Ministry of Interior of Knin* 63 pcs
- *to the police precincts of Korenica, Vojnic, and Benkovac* 60 pcs each
- *to the police precincts of Okucani and Petrinja* 62 pcs each
- armored transporter vehicle M60 for *the Police Brigade of Knin* from the 221st Motorized Brigade 10 pcs.¹⁸²

In its document Confidential no. 32/198-100/1, dated April 26, 1992, the Command of the 2nd Military District ordered to the Command of the 10th Corps and the Command of the 530th Background Brigade, for the needs of supplying the units of the so-called Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of the Operational Zone of Kordun, to issue from their ammunition warehouses the following types and quantities of armament:

- bullet 7.62 mm standard, for pistol 6,300 pcs
- bullet 7.65 mm standard 4,000 pcs
- bullet 7.62 mm standard, for automatic gun 380,000 pcs
- bullet 7.62 standard 175,840 pcs
- bullet 7.62 mm marking, standard 49,000 pcs
- bullet 7.62 mm piercing, flammable, standard 24,840 pcs

¹⁸² AIIZ, inv. No. 2-215, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 32/205-30/1, April 26, 1992 – to the Command of the 9th Corps; Ibid., inv. No. 2-216, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 32/205-30/3, April 26, 1992 – to the Command of the 5th Corps; Ibid., inv. No. 2-217, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 32/205-30/2, April 26, 1992 – to the Command of the 10th Corps.

- bullet 7.9 mm for sniper	30,600 pcs
- bullet 12.7 mm for <i>Browning</i> machine gun	9,600 pcs
- bullet 12.7 mm for tank cupola machine gun	7,488 pcs
- cumulative bullet for hand launcher M-57	827 pcs
- cumulative extra-caliber grenade	2,352 pcs
- bullet 82 mm for recoilless gun	2,232 pcs
- hand grenade M-75	15,360 pcs
- anti-tank hand grenade	1,170 pcs
- signaling bullet 26 mm	8,500 pcs
- hand rocket launcher 64 mm M-80 “ <i>zolja</i> ”	136 pcs
- grenade 120 mm instantaneous flammable	3,532 pcs
- bullet 100 mm instantaneous flammable for T-55	1,486 pcs
- bullet 100 mm, piercing, tracing for T-55	984 pcs
- rocket 9M – 14M	3,044 pcs
- rocket 9M – 32M.	198 pcs. ¹⁸³

On April 25, 1992, in the letter Confidential, no. 256, the ‘para-state’ *Zonal headquarters of the Territorial Defence in Kordun of the Republic of Serb Krajina* requested from the commands of the 10th Corps, 2nd Military Command and the 993rd Background Base, to supply “**the lacking materials and equipment**” for arming of the Police Brigade. On this occasion, the following quantities of material and technical resources were requested:

- semi-automatic pistol 7.62 mm	426 pcs
- automatic pistol 7.65 mm	92 pcs
- sniper gun	11 pcs
- automatic gun 7.62 mm	3,900 pcs
- hand launcher M-57	116 pcs
- machine gun 7.62 mm M-84 or 7.9 M-53	93 pcs
- recoilless canon 82 mm	7 pcs

¹⁸³ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-219, Command of the 2nd Military District, confidential no. 32/198-100/1, April 26, 1992 – to the Command of the 530th Background Base and the Command of the 10th Corps.

- anti-tank launching set 9-K-11	32 pcs
- mortar 120 mm	10 pcs
- cannon 76 mm M-42 (“zis”)	12 pcs
- howitzer 105 mm SQUARE METRESa-1 or M56	18 pcs
- anti-aircraft gun 20/1 mm	24 pcs
- anti-aircraft gun 20/3 mm	10 pcs
- launching mechanisms S-2 m	13 pcs. ¹⁸⁴

During March and April of 1992, the Command of the 2nd Military District distributed significant quantities of armament from the command of the 405th and 744th Background Bases to the Command of the 5th Corps. Thus, for illustration, the telegram from the Command of the 2nd Military District (confidential, no. 32/205-24) dated March 30, 1992, allocated to the Command of the 5th Corps 986 pieces of automatic guns 7.62 mm from the 993rd Background Base. In the aforementioned distributions, the Command of the 2nd Military District allocated to the Command of the 5th Corps over 90% of the armament that the aforementioned Corps had requested for supplying of the 30th Partisan Division and the so-called *Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Western Slavonia*, whereby the Command of the 2nd Military District utilized **“the overall reserves of armament of the 2nd Military District”**.¹⁸⁵

Evidently, in the preparation for the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina, the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY and the Federal Secretariat for National Defence had armed the Serb population and had given to the Serbs huge quantities of arms, ammunition and military equipment. They went so far as to actually have Serb women carrying arms, which was, for instance, the case on

¹⁸⁴ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-221, the so-called *Republic of Serb Krajina, Zonal Headquarters of the TO of Kordun*, Confidential no. 256, April 25, 1992 – to the Command of the 10th Corps, to the Command of the 2nd Military District, and to the Command of the 993rd Background Base of Banjaluka.

¹⁸⁵ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-235, Military Post 5027, Sarajevo, Confidential no. 32/205-24, March 30, 1992 – to the Military Posts 5290 and 4022 Banjaluka; Ibid., inv. No. 2-220, Command of the 2nd Military District, confidential no. 32/205-28/1, April 27, 1992, to the Command of the 5th Corps.

the territory of Kalinovik.¹⁸⁶ It was indubitably proven that the commands, units and institutions of the JNA had materially (up to heavy weapons and armored transporter vehicles), organizationally and personnel-wise, equipped members of the Serb collaborationist armed formations on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, who, together with the fascists from Serbia and Montenegro, and from the “**Serb Krajinas**” in the Republic of Croatia, had carried out the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina and committed mass crimes, including the genocide against Bosniaks, which is confirmed by numerous documents.

¹⁸⁶ AIIZ, inv. No. 3-2828.

2. The Integration of Command on Occupied Territories

The coup d'état at the Presidency of the SFRY (October 3, 1991), the Serbo-Croatian agreements in Geneva (November 10, and 23, 1991) and their effectuation in Sarajevo (January 2, 1992), together with the Vance peace plan,¹⁸⁷ definitely broke down the SFRY (as confirmed on December 17, 1992, in the Brussels European Union Declaration on Yugoslavia), thus virtually marking the non-existence of its Armed Forces.

The ignorance of the incomplete process of independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Vance, and his acceptance of the signature of the **representatives of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina who had cooperated with the illegal Presidency of the SFRY**, and the statement of how **“he believes that there will be no expansion of the conflict to include Bosnia and Herzegovina”**, had conditioned that for Bosnia

¹⁸⁷ K. Begic, **BOSNA I HERCEGOVINA OD VANCEOVE MISIJE DO DAYTONSKOG SPORAZUMA (1991.-1996.)**, Sarajevo, 1997, pp. 15-17; *Narodna armija*, January 4, 1994, p. 4, OBRAZOVANE CETIRI VOJNE OBLASTI. **The Agreement for Implementation of Unconditional Ceasefire between the JNA and the Republic of Croatia** was signed on January 2, 1992, in Sarajevo. Along with the Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary General, Cyrus Vance, the ceasefire document was also signed by: general Andrija Raseta (on behalf of the JNA), and Minister of Defence Gojko Susak (on behalf of the Republic of Croatia) – Ibid.

The Serb side had accepted Vance's plan on February 2, 1992, at the marathon meeting in Belgrade. It was signed by: representatives of the bodies of the SFRY, the JNA, of the republics of Serbia and Montenegro, then **“by the representatives of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina cooperating with the [rump; note by the author] Presidency of the SFRY”**, and the representatives of Slavonia, Baranja, and West Srem, and the representatives of the *Assembly of Serb Krajina*, and on February 10, it was also accepted by the *Assembly of the Republic of Serb Krajina* (Kasim Begic, the aforementioned work, pp. 18-19).

and Herzegovina, the Decision of the Security Council dated February 22, 1992, envisaged only an observer mission, “**and that the arrival of the blue helmets was not even in the phase of being thought about**”.¹⁸⁸ Vance thus prevented the timely deployment of the blue helmets in Bosnia and Herzegovina and thus allowed for the redeployment of the still remaining units of the JNA into its territory, thus even intensifying the density of occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

This was also the framework for the reorganization of the armed forces of the subsequently proclaimed Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This reorganization started on January 2, 1992, and ended in June of the same year. It was actually running in two phases: **the first one** – revoking of the 5th Military District, that is, its renaming into the 2nd Military District, and displacement of the Command to Sarajevo, and **the second one** – through the formal division of the armed forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia into “three” Serb armies, in which the 2nd Military District was virtually renamed into the “Army of the Serb Republic of BiH”.

The first phase, in relation to the agreement reached with Croatia on January 2, 1992, encompassed renaming of the 5th Military District of the JNA and dislocation of a part of the units from Croatia into Bosnia, and dislocation of its command from Zagreb into Sarajevo. The 4th Military District was formed in Podgorica, and it was in charge of commanding over the areas of Herzegovina up to Neretva and the upper Drina river basin. With the replacement of the 13th Corps of the JNA from Rijeka into Bileca, these two areas were placed under its command. The Military Navy District from Split was dislocated into Kumbor and was renamed into **War Navy**, and its jurisdiction was reduced up to the mouth of the Neretva River into the Adriatic. The municipalities of Neum and Trebinje were the ones from Bosnia and Herzegovina falling into the area of its responsibility. In accordance with this, the units and institutions of the SSNO, and the command of the Air Force and Anti-Aircraft Defence was displaced, together with the appropriate technical institutes, warehouses and war reserves.

The second phase of the reorganization was conducted based on the results of the Referendum dictated by the international community

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., pp. 17-21.

(February 29 and March 1, 1992), the obtained independence for the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (March 6, 1992), and the recognition of this independence (on April 6 of the same year) on the part of the international community, by the abandoning of the UNPA (United Nations Protected Areas) zones in Croatia on the part of the Yugoslav National Army, and by formal proclamation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (April 27, 1992).

Knowing that the JNA had for half a year already been the army of Serbia, the military leadership was proclaiming that “**the army will not withdraw from Bosnia and Herzegovina in another 5 to 7 years**”¹⁸⁹ and was carefully preparing the way to accomplish this. The solution was found in that, due to the international community, once the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina becomes completely effective, its withdrawal is **formally** carried out within the borders of Serbia and Montenegro, and that this gets proclaimed as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, an exclusive successor of the SFRY in all aspects. Under the conditions of inability to wage a simultaneous armed fight at two frontlines (in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Macedonia), the withdrawal of the JNA from Macedonia was quickly agreed upon under the conditions required by that republic (the 3rd Military District left Macedonia in March and displaced the Command from Skopje to Nis), and to have the armed forces on the territory of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina organized allegedly as independent armies (2nd Military District and parts of the 4th and 1st ones). Virtually, the 2nd Military District with the subjected 13th Corps in Herzegovina and upper Drina river basin would be renamed into the *Army of the Serb Republic of BiH*, whereas its parts in Croatia (integrated with the units in Baranja, East Srem and East Slavonia) would become an independent *Army of the Republic of Serb Krajina*.

The international community was supposed to satisfy itself at the withdrawal of some ten thousand “**citizens of Serbia and Montenegro**”, without armament, equipment or supplies. The directing and command over those “armies” with the overall personnel and logistical support would remain in the hands of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces, renamed into the Army of Yugoslavia, which would realize this

¹⁸⁹ B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, p. 448.

through a well designed and camouflaged “**30th Personnel Centre of the General Headquarters of the Army of FRY**”.

After the defeat and withdrawal of the JNA from Slovenia and a major part of Croatia onto the other parts of Yugoslavia, particularly into Bosnia and Herzegovina, in compliance with the order of the “rump” Presidency of the SFRY “**for development in organization of the armed forces of Yugoslavia**” dated **December 30, 1991**, the military leadership issued the approval for drafting of reorganization and transformation of the JNA into the armed forces of a new, **Federal Republic of Yugoslavia**. The previous three land military districts and the Naval Military District were dismissed and dissolved, and **four new military districts** were formed as groups at strategic level, whose commands were responsible for preparation, organization and adjustment of the combat use of the JNA on the territory of a major part of Yugoslavia:

1. The 1st Military District seated in Belgrade (commanded by General Zivota Panic). In its composition, it had four Corps, one division and the Command of the Defence of the City: **the 1st Corps** seated in Belgrade; **the 12th Corps** seated in Novi Sad; **the 17th Corps** seated in Tuzla, and **the 24th Corps** seated in Kragujevac; then **the Guardian Division** and **the Command of Defence of the City** seated in Belgrade. This Military District encompassed the whole Vojvodina, the northern part of Serbia, up to the orientation line of Kragujevac – Uzice (including Kragujevac, and excluding Uzice), and the Northeast part of Bosnia and Herzegovina.¹⁹⁰

2. The 2nd Military District seated in Sarajevo (commanded by General Milutin Kukanjac). In its composition it had four corps: **9th Corps** seated in Knin, and **the 10th Corps** seated in Bihac. This district encompassed the Western, Northern, and Central parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, up to the line of Foca-Kalinovik-Mostar (the territory

¹⁹⁰ D. Domazet, **ULOGA JNA KAO IMPERIALNE SILE U BOSANSKO-HERCEGOVACKOM RATU**, *Hrvatski vojnik*, Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia, February 1988, pp. 11-12, note 15; AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2563, Working Note of the Colonel of JNA, O.S., January 1st, 1992, p. 21; *Narodna armija*, January 4th, 1992, p. 4, OBRAZOVANE CETIRI VOJNE OBLASTI.

of Bosnia and Herzegovina without a part of Herzegovina), as well as Kninska Krajina, Lika, Kordun, Banija, and West Slavonia.¹⁹¹

3. The 3rd Military District seated in Skopje – commander general Nikola Uzelac (in March 1992, the seat was dislocated to Nis). Its composition included four Corps: **the 22nd Corps** seated in Nis; **the 52nd Corps** seated in Pristina; **the 41st Corps** seated in Bitola, and **the 42nd Corps** seated in Kumanovo. After the withdrawal of the JNA forces from Macedonia (March 1992),¹⁹² the units of the 41st Corps were dislocated into Zajecar, Knjazevac, and Paracin, whereas the major part of the forces of the 42nd Corps was deployed in Leskovac,

¹⁹¹ D. Domazet, the aforementioned work, p. 12, note 17; I. Radakovic, **BESMISLENA YU RATOVANJA**, Belgrade 1997, p. 126; AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2563, Working Note of the Colonel of the JNA O.S.; January 1, 1992, p. 21; ICTY, Case: No. IT-94-I-T, Evidence of the testimony of the JNA Colonel O.S.; June 5, 1996, p. 73; *Narodna Armija*, January 4, 1992, p. 4, OBRAZOVANE CETIRI VOJNE OBLASTI.

¹⁹² Ibid. In early March 1992, the acting representative of the SSNO (general Blagoje Adzic) and the president of the Republic of Macedonia Kiro Gligorov reached an agreement between the JNA and the Republic of Macedonia “**on temporary dislocation of the JNA from the territory of the R of Macedonia**” (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2599, Command of the 30th Partisan Division, Confidential no. 423-2, March 11, 1992 – to the 19th Partisan Brigade).

This agreement was reached based on the Decision of the Rump Presidency of the SFRY, at the session on February 14, 1992. At the time, “**in compliance with its constitutional powers**”, this body brought the conclusion on “**temporary dislocation of the JNA from the territory of the Republic of Macedonia**”. In submitting the aforementioned conclusion to its commands, units and institutions, on February 20, 1992, confidential no. 25/142-332, Command of the 2nd Military District presented the following conclusion: “**The Presidency opted for this step having in mind that the Republic of Macedonia, contrary to the Constitutional legal system of the SFRY, ceased funding the needs of the JNA and sending the recruits and military conscripts to the JNA, that it has brought the enactments for creation of an independent state, as well as that in the procedure of its international recognition it is virtually acting as an independent state. In order to avoid potential conflicts and solutions of the potential problems in a peaceful manner, the Presidency of the SFRY passed such a conclusion.**”

The previous information indicated that the leadership of R of Macedonia had brought a number of unilateral political decisions and legal enactments. Their content objectively implies an imminent conflict, if the JNA units and institutions further remain on the territory of R of Macedonia.

and a smaller part in Valjevo, of whose main portion the **20th Corps** of the JNA was formed, seated in Leskovac (a number of those units were directly redeployed onto the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina). This military district initially encompassed the Southeastern part of Serbia, Macedonia and Kosovo, and as of March 1992 – the southern part of Serbia, and Kosovo.¹⁹³

4. The 4th Military District in Titograd (the name of the city was changed to Podgorica; commander General Pavle Strugar). Its composition included three corps: **the 2nd Corps** seated in Titograd; **the 13th Corps** seated in Mostar (subsequently Bilaca); **the 37th Corps** seated in Uzice, and **the Operational Group of “Trebinje-Bileca”** seated in Bileca. This military district encompassed the Southeast part of Bosnia and the East Herzegovina, the whole Montenegro and the Southwest part of Serbia, including Sanjak.¹⁹⁴

5. War Navy, seated in Kumbor, headed by Admiral Milo Kandić (from Konjic).

Starting from the results of the plebiscite, on September 17, 1991, the Assembly of R of Macedonia brought the Declaration constituting the previous republic as a sovereign and independent state of Macedonia.

In the legislative field, at the session of November 17, 1991, the Assembly adopted the constitution of R of Macedonia and the constitutional law, making some radical changes in the area of national defence and military obligation, so that the special armed forces of R of Macedonia are established. The JNA as a federal institution, is not mentioned in any provision, whereby it came into the position of the side of force on the territory of that republic. After that, on January 22, 1992, the Assembly brought a constitutional law establishing that the R of Macedonia shall not participate in the work of the federal bodies, including the Presidency of the SFRY as the collective supreme commander” (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-510, Command of the 2nd Military District, confidential no. 25/142-332, February 20, 1992 – to the Headquarters Sector).

¹⁹³ D. Domazet, the aforementioned work, p. 12, note 16; AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2563, Working Note of the JNA Colonel O.S., January 1, 1992, p. 21; Testimony of the JNA General Ibrahim Alibegović given to the author; *Narodna armija*, January 4, 1992, p. 4, OBRAZOVANE CETIRI VOJNE OBLASTI.

¹⁹⁴ D. Domazet, the aforementioned work, p. 12, note 16; AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2563, Working Note of the JNA Colonel O.S., January 1, 1992, p. 21; *Narodna armija*, January 4, 1992, p. 4, OBRAZOVANE CETIRI VOJNE OBLASTI

6. War Air Force and Anti-Aircraft Defence (RV i PVO), with the command in Belgrade – Zemun, and commander general Zvonko Jurjevic, with the composition: **Division of RV/PVO** (Zemun, commander general Bozidar Stevanovic, a Serb); **the 3rd Airborne Corps** (Nis, commander general Marko Kulic, Croat), and **the 5th Airborne Corps**, (Zagreb – Bihac, commander general Milos Bajic, Serb).¹⁹⁵

Within the military districts, the old structure was retained, based on the Corps of varying strengths and compositions, as groups at operational level, deployed at the directions of planned use. In addition to that, under the commands of military districts were 1-2 mixed artillery brigades, a mixed anti-tank brigade, an engineering brigade, a protective motorized regiment (for securing of the military district commands, composed of the military police battalion, a commando platoon and a motorized battalion), as well as the communications regiment, the anti-chemical and decontamination regiment, and a number of logistics bases (the 1st and 3rd military districts had an independent armored or mechanized brigade each).¹⁹⁶

In this new reorganization, the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina was divided among three military districts: the 1st, the 2nd, and the 4th: the Eastern part of Bosnia, east of river Bosna was within the jurisdiction

¹⁹⁵ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2563, Working Note of Colonel O.S., January 1, 1992, p. 21; *Narodna armija*, January 4, 1992, p. 4, OBRAZOVANE CETIRI VOJNE OBLASTI; Testimonies of JNA general Ibrahim Alibegovic, and brigadier of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Izudin Hrustic.

By the decision of the rump Presidency of the SFRY on termination of active military service for some thirty generals and admirals, as of February 25, 1992, general Jurjevic was pensioned, and general Bozidar Stevanovic was appointed Commander of the RV i PVO. This decision appointed general D Mitar Trbojevic despot Chief of Staff of the General Headquarters for RV i PVO, Zivan Mircetic the Commander of the Centre of Higher Military Schools of RV i PVO, general Ljubomir Bajic the Chief of Staff of the Headquarters of the Command of RV i PVO, and Colonel Radomir Stakic assistant Commander of RV i PVO for moral education (AIIZ, inv. No. 7-52, PUBLIC RELEASE OF THE [RUMP] PRESIDENCY OF THE SFRY; Ibid., inv. No. 7-51, Command of the 7th Military District, confidential no. 1/813-4, April 29, 1992 – to the Engineering Military Directorate /attn. Commander/).

¹⁹⁶ D. Domazet, the aforementioned work, pp. 11-12.

of the **1st Military District**, the southern part was subjected to the **4th Military District**, whereas the central and western parts were under the jurisdiction of the **2nd Military District**.¹⁹⁷

The basic goal of the aforementioned organization of the JNA and division of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina among three military districts, and in particular the formation of the 2nd Military District, was to realize the projected goal on retaining the integral territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina within the composition of the new (FR) of Yugoslavia and to prevent its independence, in compliance with the decisions of the Arbitration Commission and the European Community, under the Greater Serbia domination, that is, **the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina**. Due to this, the eastern part of Bosnia and Herzegovina (east from river Boana) was allocated to the 1st Military District; the southern part to the 4th Military District, while the central and the western parts were allocated under the 2nd Military Districts.¹⁹⁸ According to the Rear Admiral Domazet, as the first strategic echelon in the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, these two military districts (**the 2nd and the 4th**) had the role of pacification of the non-effectively occupied part, modeled after the aggression against the Republic of Croatia, then of integration of the “Serb autonomous areas”, commission of crimes and demonstration of military power in the southern part of Croatia, and support to the collaborationist Serb forces on the occupied part of Croatia. The other two military districts (**the 1st and the 3rd**), as the second strategic echelon, had a reserve role, in order to strengthen the forces of the 2nd and 4th military districts, and were the holders of the attack against Bosnia and Herzegovina from the East.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid. In “an effort to ‘cover up’ the political decision of the Serbo-Montenegrin ruling political oligarchies and their supporters in Bosnia and Herzegovina for transformation of the rest of the Yugoslav union into a separate imposed state, the JNA proceeded with its own organization based on the scheme which needs to designate an emerging state, that is, to cover for those ‘republics’ which do not wish to live in (‘a rump’) Yugoslavia” (S. Arnautovic, **KAKO JE BRANJENA BOSNA: Vojno-politicki eseji i komentari**, Sarajevo, 1997, p. 5).

¹⁹⁹ D. Domazet, the aforementioned work, p. 13. The separation line between the military districts, according to Domazet, was, among other things, aimed at whosing that “Belgrade wanted not only to resolve the issue of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but

With formation of the 2nd Military District, among other things, the leadership of the Greater Serbia movement had a goal to: - reestablish the disrupted system of directing and command over the JNA; - to integrate all the “Serb” territories into a single geographical whole and place them under the JNA protection; - to organize, arm, train and equip the Serb population for the aggressive goals (occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and extermination of the Bosniaks), - to force (through demonstration and application of force) the Bosniaks, particularly their political structures and authorities to accept the imposed occupation conditions and to prevent them from organizing or offering resistance, or the like.

The command structure of the officer personnel of such a reorganized JNA was made up by 92.6% of Serbs, 7% of Montenegrins, and 0.4% of Others.²⁰⁰

The system of directing and command over all the forces was such that all the military districts were subjected to the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY in Belgrade, which coordinated “drafting of the Defence plans”, with a common goal – “protection of the outer borders and their integration into the system of Yugoslavia”.²⁰¹

With entry of the territory of Eastern Bosnia under the jurisdiction of the 1st Military District, territorially, Serbia crossed over to the west bank of the Drina river,²⁰² and with entry of the territory of East Herzegovina and upper Drina basin under the jurisdiction of the 4th Military District, territorially, Montenegro came on to the Neretva river.

In the period of silent occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, on January 17, 1992, eight days after the formation of the collaborationist *Republic of Serb Bosnia and Herzegovina*, and “**due to changes in the organization of the military territorial bodies**”, primarily in order to facilitate easier implementation of the non-constitutional mobilization, the SSNO, the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY

also to indirectly ensure seizure of the occupied territories in Croatia, because ‘naturally’ geostrategically, the 2nd and 4th Military Districts go out onto the sea, and the separation line is at Vrlika – Dalmatinska Ploca Cape (Image 5)“ – Ibid.

²⁰⁰ Ibid., the aforementioned work, p. 12.

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² Ibid., p. 13.

(III Administration) supplied the commands, units and institutions of the JNA a new **Review of the Military and Territorial Division**, “**putting out of effect the previously submitted review**”. Based on this division, the military regions and sections were formed anew, when they had been revoked in late 1987.²⁰³ Thus, on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, five military regions were formed (Sarajevo, Tuzla, Banjaluka, Mostar, and Trebinje), and 13 military sections (Sarajevo City, Sarajevo, Zenica, Travnik, Tuzla, Bijeljina, Brcko, Doboj, Mostar, Banjaluka, Prijedor, Bihac, and Titov Drvar).²⁰⁴

In this document, the **45 municipalities** were written in capital letters,²⁰⁵ meaning that the Greater Serbia movement came to rule the military territorial bodies in those municipalities (in 36 municipalities, Serbs were the majority). The official correspondence in relation to serving of the military term, serving in reserve composition, and in relation to the other issues of military obligation, was conducted with the military territorial bodies written in capitals, where they had “confidential” personnel.

The 2nd Military District (the western frontline) was formed on January 10, 1992 (as of 0600 AM), mainly using the dissolved 5th Military District (cf. the northwest frontline), and in February 1992, of the parts of units of the (former) 1st Military District, in the following composition:

- the Command (in Sarajevo, commander general Milutin Kukanjac, Serb)

²⁰³ B. Mamula, **SLUCAJ JUGOSLAVIJA**, Podgorica 2000, pp. 68-69.

²⁰⁴ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2807, Command of the 2nd Military District, confidential, no. 12/125-30, January 25, 1992 – OOPP of the 2nd Military District, REVIEW OF THE MILITARY TERRITORIAL DIVISION. The territory of the 2nd Military District had **6 military regions** (Sarajevo, Tuzla, Banjaluka, Mostar, Trebinje, and Knin) and **17 Military Sections** (Sarajevo City, Sarajevo, Zenica, Travnik, Tuzla, Bijeljina, Brcko, Doboj, Mostar, Banjaluka, Prijedor, Bihac, Titov Drvar, Knin, Petrinja, Karlovac, and Titova Korenica) – Ibid.

²⁰⁵ Ibid. These were the following municipalities: Novo Sarajevo, Hadzici, Pale, Han Pijesak, Sokolac, Rudo, Cajnice, Kalinovik, Donji Vakuf, Kupres, Tuzla, Sekovici, Bijeljina, Ugljevik, Lopare, Zvornik, Brcko, Gracanica, Bosanski Samac, Doboj, Teslic, Derventa, Trebinje, Bileca, Ljubinje, Gacko, Nevesinje, Banjaluka, Sipovo, Mrkonjic Grad, Skender Vakuf, Kotor Varos, Celinac, Prnjavor, Laktasi, Srbac, Bosanska Gradiska, Sanski Most, Bosanski Novi, Bosanska Dubica, Titov Drvar, Glamoc, Bosansko Grahovo, Kljuc, and Bosanski Petrovac.

- the 4th Corps (in Sarajevo, commander general Vojislav Djurdjevac, Montenegrin)
- the 5th Corps (in Banjaluka, commander general Vladimir Vukovic, Serb)
- 9th Corps (in Knin, commander General Ratko Mladic, Serb)
- 10th Corps (in Bihac, commander Spiro Nikovic, Montenegrin)
- 17th Corps (in Tuzla, commander general Savo Jankovic, Montenegrin)
- 65th Protective Motorized Regiment "B" in Kiseljak
- 580th Mixed Artillery Brigade "A" in Doboje
- 389th Rocket Artillery Brigade "A" Banjaluka
- Division for measuring of the initial speed of the artillery bullet (in peace and war) affiliated with the Army Command
- Centre for underwater training (in peace and war)
- 240th independent medium rocket regiment of the anti-aircraft Defence "A" (in Sarajevo)
- 340th Engineering Regiment "R" in Koran near Pale
- 367th Communications Regiment "A" in Sarajevo
- 593rd regiment of anti-chemical protection and decontamination "R" in Kiseljak
- 741st Supplementary Regiment "R" in Sarajevo
- 820th Teaching Centre "R" in Banjaluka
- 140th Intelligence Sub-Centre of the 15th Intelligence Centre (in peace and war) in Sarajevo
- Counterintelligence group (in peace and war) in Sarajevo
- 521st Overhauling Battalion "R" at the Overhauling Institute in Hadzici
- 37th Medical Platoon "R" in Sarajevo
- 42nd Institute for Preventive Medical Care (in peace) in Sarajevo
- Superior Military Medical Commission in Sarajevo (in peace)
- Military Hospital Sarajevo (in peace)
- Military Medical Centre Sarajevo (in peace)
- Military Medical Centre Banjaluka (in peace)
- 563rd Vehicle Battalion "B" Sarajevo

- Military Delegation at the Railway Transport Enterprise (in peace and war)
- Military Delegation at the Railway Transport Enterprise (in war)
- Military Institution *Romanija* (in peace and war)
- Military Engineering Directorate Sarajevo (in peace and war)
- Military Institution for Maintenance of the JNA Housing Fund (in peace) in Sarajevo
- Military Accounting Centre Sarajevo (in peace)
- Military Book-Keeping Centres of Sarajevo, Banjaluka, Tuzla, Knin, and Bihac (in peace)
- Centre for Automated Data Processing (in peace)
- 405th Background Base “B” in Knin
- 530th Background Base “B” in Bosanski Petrovac
- 744th Background Base “B” in Sarajevo
- 904th Background Base “B” in Tuzla
- 993rd Background Base “B” in Banjaluka
- Cultural and Entertainment Ensemble (in war)
- Military Orchestra of 1st Option (in peace and war) in Sarajevo
- Military Court (Superior Military Court of 2nd Option) (peace-war) Sarajevo
- Military Court of 1st Option (in war) in Sarajevo
- Military Court in Banjaluka (in peace)
- Military Prosecution Office (in peace), Superior Military Prosecution Office of the IInd Option (in war) in Sarajevo
- Military Prosecution Office in Banjaluka (in peace)
- Military Prosecution Office of Ist Option (in war)
- Military Prison Sarajevo (in peace)
- Command of the Military Region Sarajevo (in peace and war)
- Command of the Military Region Tuzla (in peace and war)
- Command of the Military Region Banjaluka (in peace and war)
- Command of the Military Region of Mostar (in peace and war)
- Command of the Military Region of Knin (in peace and war)
- 77th Skiing Polygon (in peace) Jahorina

- 185th training grounds for artillery and tank target practice in Slunj (in peace)
- The *Neretva* training grounds of Kalinovik (in peace) for artillery target practice
- The JNA Homes – Sarajevo, Bijeljina, Travnik, Capljina (in peace and war)
- Garrison Libraries – Sarajevo, Biljeljina, Travnik, Capljina, and Kiseljak (in peace)
- 55th camp of war detainees (soldiers and junior officers – in war)
- 71st camp of war detainees (officers – in war), and,
- Collection and Sales Centre Sarajevo (in peace).²⁰⁶

The reformation and renaming (in peace and war time) of the Command of the 5th Military District (Northwest frontline) into the Command of the 2nd Military District (Western frontline) was made in compliance with the Order of the Federal Secretariat for National Defence, no. State Secret 263-1, dated January 20, 1992, about rebuilding

²⁰⁶ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2816, Command of the 2nd Military District, state secret, no. 12/82-16, March 10, 1992 (NATIONAL DEFENCE, STATE SECRET), Organizational-formational changes; Ibid., inv. No. 2-2580, Command of the 5th Corps, strictly confidential, no. 1-10, January 10, 1992 – to the Command of the 30th Partisan Brigade; Ibid., inv. No. 2-2563, Working Note of the JNA Colonel O.S, January 1, 1992, p. 31; *Narodna armija*, January 4, 1992, p. 4, OBRAZOVANE CETIRI VOJNE OBLASTI; F. Heco, **ULOGA JUGOSLOVENSKE NARODNE ARMIJE U AGRESIJI NA REPUBLIKU BOSNU I HERCEGOVINU** (manuscript of a Master's Degree Paper), Faculty of Political Sciences, Sarajevo 2000, p. 80. note 164.

The JNA unit classification depending on the degree of peace-time filling was:

- the “A” classification units were filled in with 90-100% of the manpower and 100% with armament and equipment;
- the “B” classification units were filled in with 30-50% of the manpower and 100% with armament and equipment;
- the “R” classification units were filled in completely with manpower from the reserve composition, and 100% with armament and equipment (Testimony of brigadier Muharem Nadzak given to the author. About this, see: D. Marijan, **JUGOSLOVENSKA NARODNA ARMIJA U AGRESIJI NA REPUBLIKU HRVATSKU 1990. – 1992. GODINE**, p. 293, note 19).

of the organizational and mobilization structure of the JNA, in compliance with Formation no. 340.336, of the following composition:

- the Command;
- the Communications Platoon in the Airborne Remote Command Group (in peace, and the division of the communications of the Airborne Remote Command group in war);
- Calculation and analytical station of the anti-chemical Defence (in war);
- Movie team (in war);
- Fire-fighting platoon (in war).²⁰⁷

The Command of the 5th Military District was displaced from the Zagreb Garrison into the Sarajevo Garrison on **January 2, 1992**. The mobilization site was Sarajevo. The administrator of the mobilization plan was the Command of the 2nd Military District. The single registry number in war was 0701, and 6146 in war. The other elements of mobilization development were unchanged.²⁰⁸

The mobilization of the 5th Military District was dissolved and terminated, with the following commands and units:

- Command of the 32nd Corps (in peace and war)
 - Command of the 6th Lika Division “R” and the deleted peacetime MP 8401 Korenica
 - Command of the 28th Partisan Division (in peace and war)
 - Command of the 33rd Partisan Division “R” (in peace and war)
- it was dissolved after displacement.

²⁰⁷ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2816, Command of the 2nd Military District, State Secret no. 12/82-16, March 10 (NATIONAL DEFENCE, STATE SECRET), Organizational-formational changes.

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

(The resources were used to supply the 30th Partisan Division “R” in Banjaluka.)

- Command of the 43rd Partisan Division “R” (in peace and war)
– it was dissolved after displacement.

(The resources were used to supply the 47th Partisan Division “R”.)

- 1st Partisan Brigade “R” – 28th Partisan Division (in peace and war)

- 3rd Partisan Brigade “R” – 43rd Partisan Division (in peace and war)

- 4th Partisan Brigade “R” – 43rd Partisan Division (in peace and war)

- 5th Partisan Brigade “R” – 33rd Partisan Division (in peace and war)

- 6th Partisan Brigade “R” – 33rd Partisan Division (in peace and war)

- 21st Partisan Brigade “R” – 28th Partisan Division (in peace and war)

- 36th Partisan Brigade “R” – 43rd Partisan Division (in peace and war)

- 6th Motorized Brigade “B” (in peace and war)

- 73rd Motorized Brigade “R” (in peace and war)

- 236th Motorized Brigade “R” (in peace and war)

- 228th Motorized Brigade “A” (in peace and war). The manpower was integrated with the 37th Motorized Brigade “A”, seated in Raska

- 288th Mixed Anti-Tank Artillery Brigade “A” (in peace and war)

- 471st Mixed Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment “R” (in peace and war)

- 32nd Mechanized Brigade “A” (in peace and war)

- 140th Mechanized Brigade “A” (in peace and war). The manpower and the material and technical resources were integrated into the 49th Mechanized Brigade and the 14th Infantry Motorized Brigade in Zenica and Lukavica.

- 265th Mechanized Brigade “A” (in peace and war)

- 513th Engineering Brigade “B” (in peace and war)
- 841st Supplement Regiment “R” (in peace and war)
- 32nd Mixed Artillery Regiment “R” (in peace and war)
- 411th Mixed Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment “R” (in peace and war)
- 306th Light Airborne Regiment of Anti-Aircraft Defence “A” (in peace and war). The manpower and material resources were used to fill in the 17th light airborne regiment of the anti-aircraft Defence in Tuzla.
- 313th Light Airborne Regiment of Anti-Aircraft Defence “R” (in peace and war)
- 32nd Engineering Regiment “R” (in peace and war)
- 127th Engineering Regiment “R” (in peace and war)
- 258th Engineering Regiment “R” (in peace and war)
- 91st Engineering Battalion (OG-6)
- 94th Engineering Battalion (OG-6)
- 6th Mortar Battalion (in war)
- 33rd Mortar Battalion (in war)
- 43rd Mortar Battalion (in war)
- 28th Mortar Battalion (in war)
- 32nd Battalion of Military Police “A” (in peace and war)
- 32nd Supplement Battalion (in war)
- 540th Pontoon Battalion “R” (in peace and war)
- 671st Pontoon Battalion “R” (in peace and war)
- 32nd Communications Battalion “A” (in peace and war)
- 32nd Medical Battalion “R” (in peace and war)
- 32nd Vehicle Battalion “R” (in peace and war)

- 42nd Border Battalion “A” (in peace and war)
- 43rd Border Battalion “A” (in peace and war)
- 6th Transport Party (in war) – transport party on horses
- 28th Transport Party (in war) – transport party on horses
- 33rd Transport Party (in war) – transport party on horses
- 43rd Transport Party (in war) – transport party on horses
- 151st, 152nd, 153rd, 154th, 155th, 156th, 157th Crew Anti-Tank Artillery Battery (in war)
- 12th, 17th, 35th, 56th, and 74th Pontoon Party (in war)
- 894th Escadrille for Patrolling and Communications “B” (in peace and war). The manpower and material resources were used to fill in the 111th Helicopter Regiment of the 2nd Corps of the RV i PVO
- 15ht Medical Platoon “R” (in peace and war)
- 315th Centre for Electronic Surveillance and Observation “A” (in peace and war)
- 653rd Teaching Centre “R” (in peace and war)
- 243rd Vehicle Teaching Centre (in peace)
- Teaching Centre “Svetice” (in peace)
- 639th Background Base “B” (in peace and war)
- 944th Background Base “B” (in peace and war)
- 970th Background Base “B” (in peace and war)
- Collection and Sales Centre Zagreb (in peace)
- Military Hospital Zagreb (in peace)
- 20th Institute for Preventive Medical Care (in peace)
- Superior Military Medical Commission (in peace)

- Military Institution “CZ” (in peace and war)
- Military Court of Ist instance, IInd Option, of the 32nd Corps (in war)
- Military Prosecution Office, IInd Option, of the 32nd Corps (in war)
- Military Engineering Directorate Zagreb (in peace and war)
- Military Institution for Maintenance of the JNA Housing Fund (in peace)
- Military Institution for Maintenance of the JNA Zagreb Housing Fund (in peace)
- Military Directorate at the Railroad Transport Enterprise Zagreb (in peace and war)
- Military Directorate at the Railroad Transport Enterprise Dobož (in peace and war)
- Military Accounting Centre Zagreb (in peace)
- Military Accounting Centre Karlovac (in peace)
- Permanent automatic shooting grounds of “Vrapcanski Potok”, “Bosna”, “Kovacevo”, “Crna Gora”, and “Jamadol” (in peace)
- Shooting ground “Slavonska Pozega” – (in peace)
- Exercise grounds “Zurkovo” (in peace)
- Exercise grounds “Bjelasica” (in peace)
- Anti-Tank Exercise grounds “Dabrovica” (in peace)
- Shooting and exercise grounds “Gakovo” (in peace)
- Counterintelligence group of the 32nd Corps (in peace)
- Military Orchestra of the IInd Option of the 32nd Corps (in war)
- The JNA Homes: Zagreb, Rijeka, Karlovac, Varazdin, Jastrebarsko, Ilirska Bistrica, Bjelovar, Slavonska Pozega, Virovitica, Dugo Selo, Gospic, Delnice, Krizevci, Ogulin, Koprivnica, and Cakovec (in peace and war)

- Garrison libraries: Zagreb, Rijeka, Varazdin, Karlovac, Dugo Selo, Delnice, Gopsic, Jastrebarsko, Ilirska Bistrica, Bjelovar, Koprivnica, Cakovec, Krizevci, Slavonska Pozega, Virovitica, Ogulin, Samobor (in peace).²⁰⁹

The 2nd Military District was formed to ensure directing and command over the units, institutions, and commands of the JNA on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the occupied parts of the Republic of Croatia, for a more effective occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and holding under occupation of one third of the Republic of Croatia. Its formation showed the effort of the Greater Serbia movement to form an ethnically pure Serb state, exiting to the western borders of the Greater Serbia (realization of the “RAM” Plan).

The area of responsibility of the 2nd Military District mainly covered the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina (91 municipalities) and eastern parts of the central Republic of Croatia (15 municipalities – up to the line of Karlobag-Karlovac-Virovitica, without Baranja, East Slavonia, and West Srem). The area of (north)eastern Bosnia (the area of responsibility of the 17th Corps, seated in Tuzla) was until February 1992 in the composition of the 1st Military District. The Southeast Bosnia and East Herzegovina (18 municipalities) were under the command of the 4th Military District, because there was an intention to “join” this area to Montenegro.

In order to facilitate efficient functioning of the single system of directing and command, and integration of all the projected operations on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in early February 1992, the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY re-subjected the complete composition of the 17th Corps from the 1st Military District under the command of the 2nd Military District.²¹⁰

²⁰⁹ Ibid. The aforementioned commands and units of the 5th Military District were dissolved and their mobilization process was terminated by the Decision of general Milutin Kukanjac, Commander of the 2nd Military District, State Secret no. 12/82-16, of March 10, 1992. This Decision “put out of effect” the seals, stamps, formations and other documents of mobilization development for the aforementioned commands, units and institutions that had been dismissed, “such as had fallen into the hands of unauthorized people or had been captured” (Ibid.).

²¹⁰ F. Heco, the aforementioned work, p. 78.

General Milutin Kukanjac (a Serb, coming from Skopje), a good connoisseur of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with long experience of serving office in Bosnia and Herzegovina, was appointed the commander of the 2nd Military District, and general Dobrasin Prascevic was appointed Chief of Staff (Montenegrin, before that he was stationed in Zagreb). According to general Milutin Kukanjac, who, among other things, approved the so-called Serb plebiscite of November 1991, **“from the beginning, the Muslims and Croats and their leaderships were real, defined enemies”**.²¹¹

The army commanded by general Kukanjac was the **“Serb-Montenegrin part of the JNA”**. **“For the first time in history”**, this army **“had rounded up the Serb countries, together with the Serb people”**,

²¹¹ F. Heco, the aforementioned work, p. 80; Z. Suljevic, **POLITICKA I VOJNA SITUACIJA UOCI AGRESIJE NA BOSNU I HERCEGOVINU** (manuscript), pp. 81-82; TV *SRNA*, Show *MOJ GOST – MOJA ISTINA*, by Risto Djogo, July 12, 1994. Until December 31, 1991, general Milutin Kukanjac was serving the duty of Commander of the 3rd Military District, seated in Skopje. On the eve of the New Year of 1992, in Belgrade, he was told that he had been appointed the Commander of the Military District seated in Sarajevo. This involved the 2nd Military District that was to be formed.

General Milutin Kukanjac took the new office on January 3, 1992. Given that he had already spent over 20 years in service in Bosnia and Herzegovina, he knew the environment and the mentality well. During the Olympics, he had been among the most senior leadership with Branko Mikulic, Anto Sucic, Ahmed Karabegovic, and others (*Slobodna Bosna*, February 20, 1998; TV *SRNA*, Show *MOJ GOST – MOJA ISTINA*, by Risto Djogo, July 12, 1994).

As he claims himself, general Milutin Kukanjac had been the Commander of the 2nd Military District which **“covered 90 per cent of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Serb Krajina, without the eastern part of Slavonia”** (TV *SRNA*, Show *MOJ GOST – MOJA ISTINA*, by Risto Djogo, July 12, 1994).

In an order dated January 9, 1992, general Milutin Kukanjac placed his signature in the capacity of the Commander of the 2nd Military District. This document, in the left upper part, contains the letterhead of this military district (**“COMMAND OF THE 2ND MILITARY DISTRICT...”**), and in the lower right part, at the place of seal, there is a seal of round shape with the coat of arms of the SFRY and the inscription: **“COMMAND OF THE 5TH MILITARY DISTRICT”** (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2815, Command of the 2nd Military District, confidential, no. 31/103-6-1, January 9, 1992 – attn. Commander). This infers the conclusion that the Command of the 2nd Military District at the time did not yet have its own seal, because its formational building had been underway.

and took one third of the Republic of Croatia, and the larger half of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including “**the Serb part of Sarajevo**”.²¹²

On January 20, 1992, with his closest associate officers, in Sarajevo, upon his request, General Milutin Kukanjac held a meeting with the members of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina (at the Presidency Building).²¹³ However, it is neither clear on which basis he had organized this meeting, nor with what goal. As the commander of the 2nd Military District, he had no constitutional or legal powers to convene such a meeting.

On February 17, the 2nd Military District had a total **manpower of 85,097** (permanent composition: 20,270 and reserve composition: 64,827), of which the Command had 104 staff. These were mainly Serbs and Montenegrins. The independent units of permanent composition of this military district had 1,891 of manpower, and the reserve composition had 2,498, which was a total of 4,389. The background units of permanent composition had 2,339 people, and the reserve composition had 2,460, that is, 4,799 in total.²¹⁴

²¹² TV *SRNA*, Show *MOJ GOST – MOJA ISTINA*, by Risto Djogo, July 12, 1994.

²¹³ *Slobodna Bosna*, February 20, 1998, Interview by Milutin Kukanjac. This meeting was also attended by Bogic Bogicevic (member of the Presidency of the SFRY from Bosnia and Herzegovina I. Ejup Ganic and Stjepan Kljuic (members of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina) were mostly irritating for general Kukanjac, according to himself, when asking why he had been appointed and sent to the office of the Commander of the 2nd Military District when he was born in another republic, then what business does the JNA have in Bosnia, and the like. “**Of course, Biljana Plavsic and Nikola Koljevic**“, according to Kukanjac, “**were in favour of having the army in Bosnia, but all the rest wanted it out**“ (Ibid.).

²¹⁴ AIIZ, inv. No. 7-69, REVIEW OF THE NUMBER STATUS OF THE 2ND MILITARY DISTRICT AS OF FEBRUARY 17, 1992 (“MILITARY SECRET, STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL“); TV *SRNA*, Show *MOJ GOST – MOJA ISTINA*, by Risto Djogo, July 12, 1994.

As of February 17, 1992, the background bases had 3,062 manpower (193 officers, 280 junior officers, 652 civilian personnel, and 1,937 military conscripts). The **744th** background base had 1,390 people (78 officers, 110 junior officers, 298 civilian personnel, and 904 military conscripts); the **405th** - 381 people (18 officers, 37 junior officers, 48 civilian personnel, and 278 military conscripts); the **530th** - 415 people (32 officers, 48 junior officers, 63 civilian personnel, and 272 military conscripts); the **904th** - 315 people (27 officers, 37 junior officers, 80 civilian personnel, and 171 military conscripts); the **993rd** - 561 people (38 officers, 48 junior officers, 163 civilian personnel, and 312 military

The manpower by Corps was:

- **4th Corps:** 5,100 (1,905 permanent composition, and 3,196 reserve composition);
- **5th Corps:** 18,873 (3,097 permanent composition, and 15,776 reserve composition);
- **9th Corps:** 17,525 (3,252 permanent composition, and 14,273 reserve composition);
- **10th Corps:** 25,086 (5,203 permanent composition, and 19,883 reserve composition);²¹⁵
- **17th Corps:** 9,221 (2,479 permanent composition, and 6,472 reserve composition).²¹⁶

From the second half of 1991 and in early 1992, due to the military and political situation, the composition of commands, units and institutions of JNA in Bosnia and Herzegovina was rather changeable and various. A number of units had been dislocated, reformed or renamed. Therefore it is hard to determine their composition and number of manpower. With formation of the 2nd Military District and with withdrawal of a part of units from Slovenia and Croatia, there was numerous manpower and huge quantities of arms and weapons in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The organizational and formational structure and deployment of the 2nd Military District (commands, units and institutions of the 2nd Military District, the SSNO and the RV i PVO, on the territory of the 2nd Military District) **as of February 17, 1992**, was as follows:

- Command of the 2nd Military District (Sarajevo, commander general Milutin Kukanjac)

conscripts) – AIIZ, inv. No. 2-1965, LIST OF DATA ON DEPLOYMENT AND CAPACITIES OF BACKGROUND UNITS AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE 2ND MILITARY DISTRICT.

²¹⁵ Ibid. In the composition of the 10th Corps there were three operational groups (OG) and “**other units**”:

- OG-6: 4,854 (594 permanent and 4,260 reserve composition);
- OG-7: 11,476 (1,812 permanent and 9,664 reserve composition);
- OG-8: 8,452 (2,498 permanent and 5,954 reserve composition);
- Other units: 304 (299 permanent composition, and 5 reserve composition).

²¹⁶ Ibid.

Corps (five):

- **4th Corps** (Sarajevo, commander general major Vojislav Djurdjevac):
 - Command with headquarters-related units (Sarajevo);
 - 4th Communications Battalion “A” (Sarajevo);
 - 288th (4th) Battalion of Military Police “A” (Sarajevo);
 - 49th Mechanized Brigade “A” (Lukavica);
 - 6th Infantry Motorized Brigade “R” (Doboj);
 - 216th Mountain Brigade “R” (Han Pijesak);
 - 346th Light Artillery Regiment of the Anti-Aircraft Defence “A” (Lukavica);
 - 4th Mixed Artillery Regiment “R” (Kiseljak);
 - 4th Mixed Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment “R” (Visoko);
 - 76th Motorized Regiment “R” (Visoko);
 - 4th Mixed Artillery Regiment “R” (Koran);
 - 4th Vehicle Battalion “R” (Koran);
 - 4th Medical Battalion “R” (Koran);
 - 120th Light Infantry Brigade (Zenica);
 - 253rd Motorized Brigade;
 - 140th Mechanized Brigade;
 - 14th Infantry Motorized Brigade;
 - 14th Mixed Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment;
 - 340th Engineering Regiment “R” (Sarajevo);
 - 4th Engineering Battalion “R” (Sarajevo);
 - 4th Supplement Battalion “R” (Sarajevo);
 - 652nd Motorized Battalion “B” (Kiseljak).²¹⁷

²¹⁷ Ibid.; AIIZ, inv. No. 7-67, LIST OF ORGANIZATIONAL AND FORMATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE 2ND MILITARY DISTRICT; Ibid., inv. No. 7-227, UNITS OF THE 2ND MILITARY DISTRICT, SSNO, AND RV I PVO, ON THE TERRITORY OF THE 2ND MILITARY DISTRICT.

- **5th Corps** (Banjaluka, commander general major Vladimir Vukovic, and as of the end of March 1992, general Momir Talic):
 - Command with headquarters-related units (Banjaluka);
 - 5th Communications Battalion “A” (Banjaluka);
 - 5th Battalion of Military Police “A” (Banjaluka);
 - 329th Armored Brigade “A” (Banjaluka);
 - 343rd Motorized Brigade “R” (Priedor);
 - 16th Infantry Motorized Brigade “R” (Banjaluka);
 - 5th Light Artillery Regiment of Anti-Aircraft Defence “A” (Banjaluka);
 - 5th Mixed Artillery Regiment “R” (Banjaluka);
 - 5th Mixed Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment “R” (Banjaluka);
 - 5th Mixed Anti-Tank Artillery Brigade “R” (Banjaluka);
 - 293rd Engineering Regiment “R” (Banjaluka);
 - 10th Partisan Division “R” (Banjaluka);
 - 30th Partisan Division “R” (Mrkonjic Grad);
 - 19th Partisan Brigade “R” (Mrkonjic Grad);
 - 5th Supplement Battalion “R” (Banjaluka);
 - 293rd Engineering Regiment “R” (Banjaluka);
 - 188th Pontoon Battalion “R” (Banjaluka);
 - 5th Vehicle Battalion “R” (Banjaluka);
 - 5th Medical Battalion “R” (Banjaluka);
 - 5th Infantry Brigade;
 - 6th Partisan Infantry Brigade;
 - 11th Partisan Infantry Brigade;
 - 122nd Light Infantry Brigade (Skender Vakuf);
 - 134th Light Brigade;
 - 2nd Light Infantry Brigade.²¹⁸

²¹⁸ Ibid. Skender Vakuf (in March 1992) was where the 122nd Light Infantry Brigade was deployed, which on the possessed facilities had 487 military conscripts

- **9th Corps** (Knin, commander general major Ratko Mladic);
 - Command with headquarters-related units (Knin);
 - 70th Communications Battalion “A” (Knin);
 - 9th Battalion of Military Police “A” (Knin);
 - 221st Motorized Brigade “A” (Knin);
 - 160th Motorized Brigade “R” (Benkovac);
 - 271st Light Artillery Regiment of the Anti-Aircraft Defence (Benkovac);
 - 594th Engineering Regiment “B” (Knin);
 - 9th Mixed Artillery Regiment “R” (Knin);
 - 557th Mixed Anti-Tank and Artillery Regiment “R” (Benkovac);
 - 569th Supplement Battalion “R” (Knin);
 - 9th Vehicle Battalion “R” (Knin);
 - 98th Medical Battalion “R” (Knin);
 - 1st Motorized Brigade (Sveti Rok);
 - 11th Motorized Brigade (Drvar);
 - 2nd Brigade of Territorial Defence;
 - 3rd Brigade of Territorial Defence;
 - 1st Partisan Brigade “R” (Drvar);
 - 1st Motorized Brigade “R” (Gracac).²¹⁹

- **10th Corps** (Bihac, commander general major Spiro Nikovic):
 - Command with headquarters-related units (Bihac);
 - 10th Communications Battalion “B”;
 - 10th Battalion of Military Police “A”;

(AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2611, Command of the 30th Partisan Division, confidential, no. 533-1, March 25, 1992 – to the Command).

²¹⁹ Ibid.

- **6th Operational Group – OG-6 (Lika, Plitvice Lakes):**
 - 1st Light Infantry Brigade “R” (Karlovac);
 - 2nd Light Infantry Brigade “R” (Titova Korenica);
 - 4th Light Infantry Brigade “R” (Udbina);
 - 11th Light Infantry Brigade “R” (Bosanski Novi);
 - 145th Light Infantry Plaska Brigade “R” (Plaski);

- **7th Operational Group – OG-7 (Banija):**
 - 622nd Motorized Brigade “R” (Petrinja);
 - 592nd Motorized Brigade;
 - 1st Motorized Brigade of Territorial Defence;
 - 7th Motorized Brigade of Territorial Defence;
 - 11th Motorized Brigade of Territorial Defence;
 - 17th Motorized Brigade of Territorial Defence;

- **8th Operational Group – OG-8 (Kordun, Petrova Gora):**
 - 9th Motorized Brigade;
 - 2nd Motorized Brigade of Territorial Defence;
 - 3rd Motorized Brigade of Territorial Defence;
 - 4th Motorized Brigade of Territorial Defence;
 - 306th Light Artillery Regiment of Anti-Aircraft Defence (Bihac);
 - 10th Vehicle Battalion “R”;
 - 10th Medical Battalion “R”;
 - 10th Supplement Battalion “R”;
 - 185th Training Ground (Slunj);
 - 13th Partisan Brigade (Bosanski Petrovac);
 - 8th Infantry Motorized Brigade “A”;
 - 41st Light Artillery Regiment PVO “B”;

- 10th Engineering Battalion “A”;
 - 257th Motorized Brigade “R”;
 - 6th Mixed Artillery Regiment “B”;
 - 6th Mixed Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment “B”.²²⁰
- **17th Corps** (Tuzla, commander general major Savo Jankovic):
- Command with headquarters-related units (Tuzla);
 - 17th Communications Battalion “A” (Tuzla);
 - 17th Battalion of Military Police “A” (Tuzla-Dubrave);
 - 4th Armored Brigade “A” (Tuzla);
 - 92nd Motorized Brigade “R” (Tuzla);
 - 327th Motorized Brigade “R” (Derвента);
 - 18th Partisan Brigade “R” (Derвента);
 - 129th Light Infantry Brigade “R” (Derвента);
 - 395th Motorized Brigade “R” (Brcko);
 - 22nd Partisan Brigade “R” (Brcko);
 - 17th Light Artillery Regiment of Anti-Aircraft Defence “A” (Tuzla);
 - 454th Mixed Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment “R” (Tuzla);
 - 497th Engineering Regiment “R” (Tuzla);
 - 11th Partisan Division “R” (Doboj);
 - 36th Partisan Division “R” (Bijeljina);
 - 17th Mixed Artillery Regiment “A” (Bijeljina);
 - 17th Partisan Brigade “R” (Bijeljina);
 - 17th Light Infantry Brigade “R” (Bijeljina);
 - 670th Pontoon Battalion “A” (Bijeljina);
 - 17th Vehicle Battalion “R” (Tuzla);

²²⁰ Ibid.

- 336th Motorized Brigade “A” (Tuzla);
- 192nd Light Infantry Brigade “R” (Tuzla);
- 17th Medical Battalion “R” (Tuzla);
- 17th Supplement Battalion “R” (Tuzla).²²¹

Independent Units – Institutions

a) Frontline:

- 580th Mixed Artillery Brigade “A” (Vojnic, Colonel Svetozar Marjanovic);
- 389th Rocket Artillery Brigade “A” (Banjaluka, Colonel Tomislav Obradov);
- 367th Communications Regiment “A” (Sarajevo, Colonel Miletic);
- 240th Independent Medium Rocket Regiment of Anti-Aircraft Defence “A” (Sarajevo, Colonel Nenad Bacanovic);
- 65th Protective Motorized Regiment “R” (Kiseljak, Colonel Major Milan Suput);
- 593rd Regiment of Anti-Chemical Protection “R” (Bihac, Colonel Major Velizar RAbrenovic);
- 741st Supplement Regiment “R” (Travnik, Colonel Major Mladen Kolev);
- 820th Teaching Centre “R” (Banjaluka);
- Training Ground “Neretva” (Kalinovik, Colonel Rade Pavlovic);
- 77th Skiing Training Ground (Jahorina, senior Sergeant of 1st class Stevo Dejanovic);
- 461st Mixed Anti-Tank Artillery Brigade.²²²

²²¹ Ibid.

²²² Ibid.

b) Background:

- 405th Background Base (Knin, Colonel Tomo Jakovljevic);
- 530th Background Base (Bosanski Petrovac, Colonel Milan Skondric);
- 744th Background Base (Sarajevo, Colonel Dusan Kovacevic);
- 904th Background Base (Tuzla, Colonel Alojz Hrusevar);
- 993rd Background Base (Banjaluka, Colonel Osman Selak);
- 521st Overhaul Battalion (Hadzici, Colonel Major Ratko Savic);
- 37th Medical Platoon (Sarajevo, Colonel Major Radovan Dobras);
- 42nd Institute for Preventive Medical Care (Sarajevo, Colonel Jovan Milosevic);
- 563rd Vehicle Battalion (Sarajevo, major Saric);
- 262nd Technical Teaching Centre (Travnik, Colonel Major Zoran Jovanovic);
- Technical Overhaul Institute (Hadzici, Colonel Dragoslav Jovanovic);
- Technical Overhaul Institute (Travnik, Colonel Major Vid Jazbinski);
- Military Hospital (Sarajevo, Colonel Tomislav Tausan);
- Military Medical Centre (Sarajevo);
- Superior Military Medical Commission (Sarajevo Colonel Esad Gicevic);
- Military Directorate at the Railways Transport Enterprise (Sarajevo, Colonel Major Petar Obradovic);
- Military Engineering Directorate (Sarajevo, Colonel Major Mirko Simovic);
- Military Institution of Military Housing Fund (Sarajevo, Colonel Major Safet Tihic);
- Military Engineering Institution "Karlo Batko" (Hadzici, Colonel Major Pero Vujic);

- Military Institution “Romanija” (Sarajevo).²²³

c) **Others:**

- Command of the Military Region of Sarajevo (Colonel Obrad Popovic);
- Command of the Military Region of Tuzla;
- Command of the Military Region of Mostar (Colonel Dzermal Sijercic);
- Command of the Military Region of Trebinje;
- Command of the Military Region of Banjaluka;
- Command of the Military Region of Knin;
- Command of the Military Region of Petrinja;
- Military Court Sarajevo;
- Military Court Banjaluka;
- Military Prosecution Office Sarajevo;
- Military Prosecution Office Banjaluka;
- Military Prison Sarajevo.²²⁴
- Military Section of Sarajevo City (municipalities: Novi Grad, Novo Sarajevo, Stari Grad, Centar, Hadzici, Ilidza, Ilijas, Pale, Trnovo, and Vogosca);
- Military Section of Sarajevo (municipalities: Olovo, Han Pijesak, Sokolac, Rogatica, Visegrad, Gorazde, Rudo, Cajnice, Foca, and Kalinovik);
- Military Section of Zenica (municipalities: Zenica, Zepce, Zavidovici, Kakanj, Vares, Kresevo, Breza, Visoko, Kiseljak, and Fojnica);

²²³ Ibid.

²²⁴ Ibid.; AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2807, Command of the 2nd Military District, confidential, no. 12/125-30, January 25, 1992 – OOPP of the 2nd Military District, REVIEW OF MILITARY TERRITORIAL DIVISION.

- Military Section of Travnik (municipalities: Busovaca, Gornji Vakuf, Travnik, Donji Vakuf, Novi Travnik, Vitez, Bugojno, and Kupres);
- Military Section of Tuzla (municipalities: Tuzla, Lukavac, Kalesija, Banovici, Zivinice, Sekovici, Kladanj, Bratunac, Vlasenica, and Srebrenica);
- Military Section of Bijeljina (municipalities: Bijeljina, Ugljevik, Lopare, and Zvornik);
- Military Section of Brcko (municipalities: Brcko, Gradacac, Orasje, Gracanica, Srebrenik, and Bosanski Samac);
- Military Section of Doboj (municipalities: Doboj, Maglaj, Tesanj, Teslic, Odzak, Modrica, Derventa, and Bosanski Brod);
- Military Section of Mostar (municipalities: Mostar, Neum, Capljina, Citluk, Metkovic, Livno, Ljubinje, Listica, Grude, Posusje, Tomislavgrad, Prozor, Jablanica, and Konjic);
- Military Section of Banjaluka (municipalities: Banjaluka, Sipovo, Mrkonjic Grad, Jajce, Skender Vakuf, Kotor Varos, Celinac, Prnjavor, Laktasi, Srbac, and Bosanska Gradiska);
- Military Section of Prijedor (municipalities: Prijedor, Sanski Most, Bosanski Novi, and Bosanska Dubica);
- Military Section of Titov Drvar (municipalities: Titov Drvar, Glamoc, Bosansko Grahovo, Kljuc, and Bosanski Petrovac);
- Military Section of Bihac (municipalities: Bihac, Bosanska Krupa, Cazin, and Velika Kladusa);
- Military Section of Petrinja (municipalities: Petrinja, Glina, Dvor, Kostajnica, Novska, and Sisak);
- Military Section of Knin (municipalities: Knin, Dnmis, Benkovac, and Obrovac);
- Military Section of Karlovac (municipalities: Karlovac, Vrgin Most, Vojnic, Slunj, Duga Resa, and Ozalj);

- Military Section of Titova Korenica (municipalities: Korenica, Plaski, Donji Lapac, Gracac, Gospic – Teslingrad, and Otocac – Vrhovine).²²⁵
- Centre of Military Schools of the Land Army of Sarajevo;
- Musical Secondary Military School Sarajevo;
- Supply and Financial Teaching School Centre Sarajevo;
- School and Courses of the Veterinary Service Sarajevo;
- 2nd Corps of the War Air Forces and Anti-Aircraft Defence Sarajevo;
- 5nd Corps of the War Air Forces and Anti-Aircraft Defence Bihac;
- 130th Airborne Battalion Rajlovac;
- School Centre of War Air Forces and Anti-Aircraft Defence Rajlovac;
- Air Force Institute “Rajlovac” Rajlovac;
- Military Computing Centre of Banjaluka;
- Military Accounting Centre Banjaluka;
- 2nd Battalion of the 398th Communications Brigade of Sarajevo;
- 2nd Battalion of the 235th Regiment of the stationary communications Sarajevo.²²⁶
- Centre for Training of Drivers of Combat Vehicles (Banjaluka – Zaluzani);
- School Centre for Armored and Mechanized Units (Banjaluka).²²⁷

Frm the organizational composition of the 2nd Military District, the Order of general Kukanjac, commander of this District (State Secret

²²⁵ Ibid.

²²⁶ Ibid.; I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, p. 126.

²²⁷ AIIZ, inv. No. 7-227, UNITS OF THE 2ND MILITARY DISTRICT, SSNO AND RV I PVO ON THE TERRITORY OF THE 2ND MILITARY DISTRICT; ICTY, Case: No. It-94-I-T, Evidence of the Testimony of the JNA Colonel O.S., June 4, 1996, pp. 2-3.

no. 12/82-16) dated March 10, 1992, created the following commands, units and institutions of the 13th, 14th, and 31st Corps, except for such units which pursuant to this Order were dislocated, reformed, or renamed, entering the composition of the 2nd Military District.²²⁸

The Counterintelligence Group of the Command of the 5th Military District was dislocated from the Zagreb Garrison into the Sarajevo Garrison, and renamed Counterintelligence Group of the 2nd Military District.²²⁹

From the Zagreb Garrison, the 140th Intelligence Sub-Centre of the 15th Intelligence Centre was dislocated into:

- The Administration of the Centre into the Sarajevo Garrison (mobilization site of Sarajevo);
- The 1st Intelligence Sub-Centre from the Varazdin Garrison, into the Bihac Garrison (mobilization site of Bihac);
- The 2nd Intelligence Sub-Centre from the Zagreb Garrison, into the Banjaluka Garrison (mobilization site of Banjaluka);
- The 3rd Intelligence Sub-Centre was dismissed, and the manpower and material resources were integrated into the Intelligence Centre of the SSNO.²³⁰
- The 4th Engineering Regiment "R" from the composition of the 4th Corps was renamed into the 340th Engineering Regiment "R" (with an engineering battalion "A" in peace), formed after the formation 317.349, and it entered the composition of the 2nd Military District.²³¹

²²⁸ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2816, Command of the 2nd Military District, State Secret no. 12/82-16, dated March 10, 1992, (NATIONAL DEFENCE, STATE SECRET), Organizational and Formational Changes.

²²⁹ Ibid.

²³⁰ Ibid. The other elements of the mobilization development remained unchanged.

²³¹ Ibid. The other elements of the mobilization development remained unchanged.

Formation, reformation, dissolution, redislocation, mobilization and other changes with commands, units and institutions of the 2nd Military District were to be completed by the end of April 1992, and the report on execution of the Order was to be submitted

In addition to the 2nd Military District, the following JNA commands, units and institutions were also stationed on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina:

- **13rd (Rijeka, and then Bileca) Corps** (in Herzegovina – Bileca, commander general Momcilo Perisic, a Serb from Serbia) – although it was in the composition of the 4th Military District, it was subjected to the Command of the 2nd Military District;

- **Parts of the 2nd (Podgorica – Titograd) Corps** (Second Operational Group) in East Herzegovina;

- **Parts of the 37th (Uzice) Corps** (in East Bosnia nad East Herzegovina);

- **Parts of the 20th (Valjevo) Corps** (in East Bosnia); and

- **Parts of the 12th (Novi Sad) Corps** (in Northeast Bosnia).²³²

to that command, “for each unit separately, after its reformation or other projected changes, and no later than by the given end date”. (Ibid.).

For counterintelligence groups, military courts, military prosecution offices, cultural and entertainment ensemble and military orchestras, numerous names were determined, as well as war-time military posts of the commands and institutions at which they were formed, and at the same time, those commands were holders of mobilization plans for them (Ibid.).

The material resources for reformation after the new formations, and those from the dissolved units and institutions (except for the seized ones) were distributed by the tactical holders and bodies of the background of the Command of the 2nd Military District. Records of captured and abandoned technical and military equipment was made “for presentation in the division of resources balance sheet” (Ibid.).

²³² AIIZ, inv. No. 2-793, /Information of the General Headquarters of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina/, **Resources of the Aggressor at the Front in Bosnia and Herzegovina**; Testimony of the Chief of Staff of the headquarters of the 216th Mountain Brigade, JNA Colonel Major Asim Dzambasovic, given to the author; I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, p. 127; D. Domazet, the aforementioned work, p. 14, note 21; F. Heco, the aforementioned work, p. 75, note 159; Z. Suljevic, the aforementioned work, pp. 86, and 91-92. The composition of these forces also included the JNA forces from Mostar (the 10th Motorize/Mechanized Brigade, and others), Capljina, and Metkovic (Z. Suljevic, the aforementioned work, pp. 91-92).

All the command duties at the 2nd Military District were intentionally assigned to the officers of exclusively Serb and Montenegrin ethnicities. After the “cleansing” of the officers and military compositions on the ethnic and political basis, in early 1992, the largest majority of the officers and soldiers left in the commands and units of the 2nd Military District were of Serb and Montenegrin ethnicities, which had accepted the Greater Serbia ideology and policy.²³³ Such a situation was also in the

The eastern part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, under the territorial jurisdiction of the 1st Military District, was placed under the ingerence of two JNA Corps (**the Uzice and the Valjevo ones**). In early 1992, these two Corps possessed all the bridge crossings over the Drina river with their armored mechanized units (Ibid., p. 86).

²³³ F. Heco, the aforementioned work, p. 80. **The structure of the command personnel of the 2nd Military District: Commander of the 2nd Military District**, General Milutin (son of Bosko) Kukanjac, a Serb. He was transferred to this office from the 3rd Military District (Skopje), where he had been from August 1991 until January 1992. He was prematurely promoted into a general major in Decree no. 1/76 issued by the Presidency of the SFRY on December 22, 1990. He was extraordinarily promoted into a general in Decree no. 1/70, issued by the “rump” Presidency of the SFRY on December 22, 1991. He remained at the duty of the commander until May 8, 1992, when in the Decision of the “rump” Presidency of the SFRY he was dismissed and pensioned; **Chief of Staff** general major Dobrasin (son of Radovan) Prascevic, a Montenegrin. He was transferred to this office from the command of the 5th Military District (Zagreb) after it had been renamed into the 2nd Military District. He was prematurely promoted into the rank of general major in Decree no. 1/66 of the Presidency of the SFRY dated December 22, 1989; **Assistant Commander for Political Work**, general major Milan (Zivojina) Aksentijevic, a Serb. He was transferred to this duty from the 5th Military District after it had been renamed into the 2nd Military District. He was extraordinarily promoted into the rank of general major in Decree no. 623-1 of the Chief of Staff of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, dated June 29, 1991. He was pensioned on May 8, 1992; **Commander of the 4th Corps** (Sarajevo), general major Vojislav (son of Milivoje) Djurdjevac, a Serb. He was promoted into the rank of general major in Decree no. 1/66 of the Presidency of the SFRY, dated December 22, 1989. He remained at the office of the Commander of the 4th Corps until May 8, 1992, when he was pensioned; **Commander of the 5th Corps** (Banjaluka), general Nikola (son of Marko) Uzelac, a Serb. He was promoted into the rank of general major in Decree no. 1/66 of the Presidency of the SFRY dated December 22, 1989. He was extraordinarily promoted into a general in Decree no. 1/64, issued by the Presidency of the SFRY on November 28, 1991. From January 1992, he was the Commander of the 3rd Military District in Skopje. In January 1992, general major Vladimir (son of Branko) Vukovic, a Serb, was appointed Commander of the 5th Corps. He was promoted into the rank of general major in Decree no. 1/66,

command structure of the leadership of the Armed Forces of the SFRY and in the other Military Districts, directing the planning and preparation of the aggression, and participating in the crimes committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina.²³⁴

by the Presidency of the SFRY, on December 22, 1989. He was extraordinarily promoted into the rank of Colonel in Decree no. 1/64 of the “rump” Presidency of the SFRY, dated November 28, 1991. He was killed in 1993 in a military helicopter accident in Serbia; **Chief of Staff of the headquarters of the 5th Corps** general major Momir Talic, a Serb, from Valjevo, Serbia; **Commander of the 9th Corps** (Knin) general major Savo Kovacevic, a Montenegrin; **Chief of Staff of the headquarters** and subsequently **Commander of the 9th Corps** general major Ratok (son of Nedjo) Mladic, born on March 12, 1943, the village of Bozinovici, Kalinovik, Bosnia and Herzegovina. He was promoted into the rank of general major in Decree no. 1/49 of the “rump” Presidency of the SFRY dated October 4, 1991. he was appointed Chief of Staff of the headquarters of the 2nd Military District on April 25, 1992 – in the Decree of the “rump” Presidency of the SFRY. He was appointed Commander of the *General Headquarters of the Army of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina* on May 12, 1992; **Commander of the 10th Corps** (Bihac) Colonel Spiro (son of Niko) Nikovic, a Montenegrin; he was promoted into the rank of general major in Decree no. 1/66, by the Presidency of the SFRY, on December 22, 1989. He was extraordinarily promoted into the rank of Colonel in Decree no. 1/64 of the “rump” Presidency of the SFRY, dated November 28, 1991. He was pensioned on May 8, 1992; **Chief of Staff of the headquarters of the 10th Corps**, Colonel Grujo Boric, a Serb; **Commander of the 17th Corps** (Tuzla), Colonel Savo Jankovic, a Montenegrin. He was pensioned on May 8, 1992, and his duty was taken over by general major Milan Nedeljkovic, a Serb; **Commander of the 5th Airborne Corps** (Bihac), Colonel Branko Sovagovic, and subsequently general Milos Bajic, etc. (Ibid., p. 80, note 164; AIIZ, inv. No. 2-1045, Command of the 30th Partisan Division, strictly confidential, no. 865-2, May 16, 1992 – to the Command of the 1st Partisan Brigade; Ibid., inv. No. 5348, Record by Dj. Dj.; Testimonies by the brigadier of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Izudin Hrustic; D. Domazet, the aforementioned work, p. 14; ICTY, Case No.: IT-94-1T, Evidence of the Testimony of the JNA Colonel O.S., June 5, 1995, p. 5).

²³⁴ Ibid., p. 81. **The command structure of the military leadership of the Armed Forces of the SFRY: federal secretary for national defence**, at the same time the Chief of Staff of the headquarters of the Supreme command of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, general of army Veljko (son of Dusan) Kadijevic, a “Yugoslav”, from Imotski, Croatia. He was promoted into the general of army in Decree no. 1/70 of the Presidency of the SFRY dated December 22, 1989. On January 6, 1992, he withdrew from the office of the federal secretary allegedly due to health reasons (the health status was “crucial” for his decision). In the decision of the “rump” Presidency of the SFRY dated February 25, 1992, his active military service was terminated; **Chief of Staff of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY**, general Blagoje (son of Milo)

By Decree no. 2/50 of the rump Presidency of the SFRY dated April 25, 1992, general major Ratko Mladic was appointed to the office of the Chief of Staff of the Headquarters (and deputy commander at the

Adzic, a Serb. He was extraordinarily promoted into the rank of general in the Decree of the Presidency of the SFRY dated December 22, 1989. From January 6, until May 8, 1992, he was acting federal secretary for national defence, when he resigned from that office; **Commander of the 1st Military District**, general Aleksandar (son of Stevan) Spirkovski, a Macedonian. He was prematurely promoted into the rank of general in the Decree of the Presidency of the SFRY dated December 22, 1989. From September 1991, he was replaced by general Zivota (son of Grujo) Panic, a Serb, who was extraordinarily promoted into the rank of general in Decree no. 1/64 of the “rump” Presidency of the SFRY dated November 28, 1991; **Commander of the 4th Military District** Pavle (son of Andrija) Strugar, a Serb, from Pec, Serbia. He was prematurely promoted into a general major in Decree no. 1/66 issued by the Presidency of the SFRY on December 22, 1989. He was extraordinarily promoted into a general in Decree no. 1/64, issued by the “rump” Presidency of the SFRY on November 28, 1991; **Commander of the 13th Corps** (Mostar-Bileca): general major Momcilo (son of Srecko) Perisic, a Serb, Gornji Milanovac, Serbia. He was extraordinarily promoted into the rank of general major in Decree no. 1/60 of the “rump” Presidency of the SFRY dated November 19, 1991. After the declarative withdrawal of the JNA from Bosnia and Herzegovina, he was appointed to the office of Commander of the 3rd Army of the Yugoslav Military Forces. One year later, at the age of 48, he became the youngest Chief of Staff of the General Headquarters of the Army of SR Yugoslavia. At this office, he remained until 1998, when Slobodan Milosevic dismissed him; **Commander of the 3rd Military District** general Zivota (son of Velisav) Avramovic, a Serb. He was prematurely promoted into a general in Decree no. 1/66 issued by the Presidency of the SFRY on December 22, 1989. He performed this office until July 1, 1991, when he was appointed to the office of Commander of the 5th Military District. At his office, he was replaced by Colonel Tomislav (son of Milos) Simovic, a Serb. He was promoted into the rank of general in Decree no. 1/70 of the “rump” Presidency of the SFRY, dated December 22, 1991.

Even the highest security officers of the SSNO, apart from the aforementioned highest generals and commanders of military districts, played a major role in planning and preparation of the crime, such as: general major Marko (son of Krsto) Negovanovic, a Serb. He was at the office of Chief of Staff of the Security Administration from May 15, 1989, until May 15, 1991. He was pensioned on May 8, 1992. After his pensioning at his office he was replaced by general Nedeljko Boskovic, who had actively participated in the action of displacement of JNA commands and units from Slovenia (Ibid., p. 81, note 166; V. Kadrijevic, **MOJE VIDJENJE RASPADA – VOJSKA BEZ DRZAVE**, Belgrade, 1993, pp. 5-6, and 155; AIIZ, inv. No. 7-52, PUBLIC COMMUNIQUE OF THE [RUMP] PRESIDENCY OF THE SFRY; Ibid., in. No. 7-51, Command of the 2nd Military District, confidential, no. 1/813-4, April 29, 1992 – to the Military Engineering Directorate (attn. Commander).

same time) of the 2nd Military District (as of May 9, 1992, he completed the transfer of duty).²³⁵

By the aforementioned decree of the “rump” Presidency of the SFRY, the following officers were appointed and received office at the Command of the 2nd Military District:

- assistant commander for moral issues and legal affairs – General Major Milan Gvero;
- assistant commander for background activity – General Major Djordje Djukic;
- assistant commander for organizational, mobilization and personnel affairs – Colonel Mico Grubor;
- Chief of Staff of the security bodies, Zdravko Tolimir.²³⁶

On May 10, 1992, General Ratko Mladic took over the command of the 2nd Military District.²³⁷

²³⁵ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-1045, Command of the 30th Partisan Division, strictly confidential, no. 865-2, May 16, 1992 – to the Command of the 1st Partisan Brigade; Ibid., inv. No. 5348, Record by Dj. Dj.

²³⁶ Ibid. This decision was then communicated to the aforementioned officers at the Presidency of the SFRY, also in attendance of Jugoslav Kostic, Sejdo Bajramovic, and several SSNO officers. At the time, it was stated that by the Decree they shall be appointed to those offices at the Command of the 2nd Military District (AIIZ, inv. No. 5348, Record by Dj. Dj.).

²³⁷ Ibid.

3. Taking the Starting Positions

In conduct of the concealed and in preparation for the open aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY had also paid special attention to the relocation of the JNA commands and units, of material and technical resources, and war material reserves to “**secure**” premises and locations. In the second half of 1990 and first half of 1991, on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, this leadership secretly redislocated three strongest and most mobile **armored battalions of the JNA**, with all of the officer personnel and weapons:

- **Armored Battalion of the 327th Motorized Brigade** was from Derventa relocated to Banjaluka;
- **Armored Battalion of the 395th Motorized Brigade** was from Brcko relocated to Mostar; and
- **Armored Battalion** from the garrison of Novi Sad was relocated to Lukavica (Sarajevo).²³⁸

The commands, units and institutions of the **14th (Ljubljana) Corps** (commanded by general major Jovan Pavlov), after the decision of the Presidency of the SFRY on dislocation of the JNA from the territory of Slovenia into Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro (July 18, 1991), started relocating “**onto the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina**”. In the first half of August 1991, pursuant to this decision, there was a process underway of “**territorial regrouping of the JNA**”. From Slovenia, the JNA was “**relocating into Bosnia and Serbia**”, but mainly into Bosnia and Herzegovina:

²³⁸ Z. Suljevic, the aforementioned work, p. 71.

- Headquarters-affiliated units of the **14th Corps** into Doboj;
- Parts of the 1st Tank Brigade with the Light Artillery Division of Anti-Aircraft Defence into Banjaluka;
- Parts of the Alpine Brigade into Pljevlja;
- The Motorized Brigade from Postojna into Mrkonjic Grad, Doboj, and Derventa;
- The headquarters of the **31st Corps** into Tuzla;
- Mixed Anti-Tank Artillery Brigade from Ptuj into Erdut; and
- 195th Motorized Brigade from Maribor into Valjevo.²³⁹

On August 20th and 21st, 1991, a number of units of the 14th Proletarian Motorized Brigade of the **14th Corps** were dislocated into Zenica. On October 20, 1991, the first motorized battalion of this brigade was dislocated into the *Husinska Buna* Barracks in Tuzla (in the composition of the 92nd Motorized Brigade of the 17th Corps).²⁴⁰

²³⁹ S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, pp. 123-124; V. Kadjevic, the aforementioned work, p. 121; B. Jovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 366, and 370; I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 67, 71, and 76; D. Domazet, the aforementioned work, p. 11, note 14; AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2589, Military Post 3326, invo. No. 173, February 1, 1992, Mrkonjic Grad, CERTIFICATE; Z. Suljevic, the aforementioned work, p. 80; Testimony by the JNA general Ibrahim Alibegovic given to the author.

Pursuant to the Decision of the Presidency of the SFRY, 1st class captain Vlado Lazarevic was relocated from Slovenia (Postojna), together with the unit, into the garrison of Mrkonjic Grad (M.P. 3326 Mrkonjic Grad) – (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2589, Military Post 3326, invo. No. 173, February 1, 1992, Mrkonjic Grad, CERTIFICATE).

²⁴⁰ V. Karavelic, **POLITICKO-VOJNE PRIPREME AGRESIJE NA BOSNU I HERCEGOVINU I NJENO IZVODJENJE NA PROSTORU SJEVEROISTOCNE BOSNE** (manuscript of a master's degree paper), Sarajevo 2002, p. 82.

Commander of the 1st Motorized Battalion (in the *Boris Kidric* barracks in Sentvid, in Ljubljana), captain Valid Karavelic, dislocated his motorized "A" battalion and a larger number of smaller units of the 14th Proletarian Motorized Brigade, together with its commander, from Ljubljana to Zenica. The dislocation was done on August 20 and 21, 1991. The Commander of the 14th Proletarian Motorized Brigade was Colonel Tomislav Sipcic, who in the beginning of the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina was the Commander of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps of the *Army of the Republic of Serb Bosnia and Herzegovina*. On the first day of dislocation, a column of 250 military motor vehicles arrived to the Zenica barracks with the manpower and a large quantity

On September 3, 1991, pursuant to the Order of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, First Administration, strictly confidential no. 43-1, dated July 29, 1991, and the Command of the 1st Military District, strictly confidential, no. 4-28, dated August 15, 1991, **“related to the speedy dislocation of units from the 5th Military District into the area of responsibility of the 5th Corps, pursuant to the Book of Rules on the Jurisdiction of Command of the 5th Corps in Peace, for the purpose of formation and location of the units”**, The commander of the 5th Corps (General Nikola Uzelac) issued the Order, strictly confidential, no. 15-163, for formation and filling in of the dislocated units in the area of the 5th Corps. This order established formation of the 30th Partisan Division in peace and war, with the following composition: the Command with the affiliated units, three partisan brigades (1st, 13th, and 19th), 30th 120 mm Rocket Launching battalion, and 30th Transport Party.²⁴¹

of weapons and equipment, under the command of Karavelic. On the second day of dislocation, another column arrived to the Zenica barracks smaller by half than the preceding one, headed by the Commander of the brigade Colonel Tomislav Sipic. In the next seven days, 13 railway compositions came to the Zenica Railway Station with weapons, arms, ammunition and other resources and equipment. All the weapons, ammunition and equipment was transported by the Commander of the 1st Motorized Battalion into the JNA warehouse in Kaonik (near Busovaca). Two months later, on October 20, 1991, upon order by the Commander of the 4th Corps of the JNa, the 14th Proletarian Motorized Brigade was dissolved, and the 1st Motorized Battalion headed by commander Karavelic was dislocated from Zenica to the *Husinska Buna* Barracks in Tuzla – into the composition of the 92nd Motorized Brigade of the 17th Corps. The Commander of the 92nd Motorized Brigade in Tuzla was Colonel Major Mile Dubajic. The reason why this battalion was dislocated from Zenica to Tuzla was that Colonel Major Dubajic had sent one such battalion from his brigade, exactly at that time, and subjected it to the JNA forces that were attacking Vukovar. As a neglectable number of the members of this battalion had returned from Vukovar, it was necessary to have a new battalion to fill in the vacated place of this battalion in the composition of the 92nd Motorized Brigade. The initial idea of Colonel Major Dubajic was to have even this battalion from Ljubljana filled in and sent into the attack against Vukovar. However, this never happened in practice. The aforementioned battalion had remained in the composition of the 92nd Motorized Brigade, and during November and December 1991, a major number of non-Serb soldiers and officers defected it, including commander Vahid Karavelic (on December 20, 1991) – (Ibid., p. 82, note 144).

²⁴¹ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2643, Command of the 5th Corps, strictly confidential, no. 15-163, September 3, 1991 – to the Command of the 30th Partisan Division “R”. This

Upon approval of the Supreme Command, the Command of the 5th Corps mobilized certain units and dislocated certain units from the Slavonian frontline, including possessing the positions ranging from Skender Vakuf, over Mt. Vlasic – Maslovar – Motajica – Mrkonjic Grad, Jajce, Sanski Most, up to Kupres. Such deployment of the forces of the 5th Corps, among other things, **“...prevented the insurgence of the paramilitary formations and armed forces of Croatia onto the territory of Krajina”**.²⁴²

In early December 1991, the majority part of the **13th (Rijeka) Corps**, which had been transferred on ships into the Montenegrin port of Bar, was deployed in Eastern Herzegovina, with the command in Bileca. These forces were used to form the Operational Group of *Trebinje-Bileca*.²⁴³

partisan division was stationed in the area of Mrkonjic Grad (Command of the 30th Partisan Division was in the city) – (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2584, Command of the 30th Partisan Division, strictly confidential, no. 151-1, January 28, 1992).

Pursuant to the enactment of the SSNO GS OS SFRY, IIIrd Administration, strictly confidential, no. 92-3, dated January 14, 1992, it was regulated that the 1st and 19th Partisan Brigades be formed from the territory of the municipalities of Sanski Most, Kljuc, Prijedor, and Mrkonjic Grad (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2583, Command of the 30th Partisan Division, strictly confidential, no. 108-1, January 17, 1992 – to the Command of the 5th Corps).

²⁴² AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2619, Command of the 5th Corps, op. no. 321-1, April 3, 1992 – to the Command, Study.

Since August 1991, the 5th Corps had been participating in the aggression against the Republic of Croatia, across the Sava river (on the territory of West Slavonia, where it possessed the “Serb” territories in this part of Croatia (it had an army frontline).

In late January 1992, the 5th Corps was well filled in (**“there is no force that could at this moment force the 5th Corps back to the right bank of the Sava river”**) – AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2587, Command of the 30th Partisan Division, inv. No. 158-1, January 30, 1992; Ibid., inv. No. 2-2619, Command of the 5th Corps, op. no. 321-1, April 2, 1992 – to the Command, Study.

Even in early April 1992, a portion of the forces of the 5th Corps was at the Slavonian frontline, where they were still holding the possessed positions – until the arrival of the Blue Helmets (around April 20, 1992), thereby creating the conditions for safe relocation of the Corps from West Slavonia (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2619, Command of the 5th Corps, op. no. 321-1, April 2, 1992 – to the Command, Study).

²⁴³ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-5325; D. Domazet, the aforementioned work, p. 14; Z. Suljevic, the aforementioned work, p. 80; I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, p. 126.

After Slunj, the units of the **10th (Zagreb) Corps** were drawn out to the area of Bihac, and thus renamed into the **Bihac Corps**. A minor part of the forces of the 10th Corps went into the composition of the 17th Corps (in Tuzla) during November and December 1991.²⁴⁴

The 9th (Knin) Corps was the last one that left the territory of Croatia and was deployed in the area of West Bosnia (Bosansko Grahovo, Glamoc, Livno, and Kupres).²⁴⁵

On January 11, 1992, upon order by general Adzic (Chief of Staff of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY), **the 164th 122-mm Howitzer Division** marched in the direction of: Ohrid – Kicevo – Tetovo – Kosovska Mitrovica – Kraljevo – Pozega – Bajina Basta – Zvornik – Tuzla – Doboj – Banjaluka, where it went into the composition of the 5th Corps of the JNA.²⁴⁶

²⁴⁴ D. Domazet, the aforementioned work, p. 11; Z. Suljevic, the aforementioned work, p. 80; I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, p. 126.

²⁴⁵ Ibid.

²⁴⁶ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-1235, Federal Secretariat for National Defence, General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, First Administration, Operational Centre, strictly confidential no. 9-1, January 11, 1992 – Attn. Commander or Chief of Staff: to the Command of the 1st Military District, 17th and 5th Corps, to the Command of the 2nd Military District (for reference).

On January 11, in relation to this, general Blagoje Adzic informed (“**military secret, strictly confidential, coded**”) commanders or chiefs of staff of the headquarters of the 1st (17th and 5th Corps) and 2nd Military Districts, with the note of “**immediate delivery**”. To this goal, the Command of the 1st Military District was obligated to conduct “**receipt at the Pozega garrison of the:**

164th 122 mm Howitzer Division from the Ohrid Garrison marching in the direction: Ohrid – Kicevo – Tetovo – Kosovska Mitrovica – Kraljevo – Pozega – Bajina Basta – Zvornik – Tuzla – Doboj – Banjaluka, where it enters the composition of the 5th Corps. To this goal, the command of the 1st Military District shall conduct the receipt at the Pozega Garrison;

On January 11, 1992, around 19:00 hours, organize overnight accommodation and meals for 76 people, at 20:00 they arrived in Pozega, at 06:00 they are starting towards Zvornik;

Command of the 17th Corps shall inform the Ministry of Interior of BiH about passage of the column and shall receive receipt of the division in the region

The 5th Corps of the RV i PVO was transferred from Croatia into Bihac and Banjaluka.²⁴⁷

In late 1991 and early 1992, many other units arrived into the area of responsibility of the 17th Corps. In January 1992, the 4th Armored Brigade from Jastrebarsko arrived, which was deployed at and around the Dubrave Airport in Zivinice. The composition of this brigade included 60 tanks, 30 armored transporters, a large number of soldiers, as well as armament and military equipment. The commander of the Dubrave Military Airport was Colonel Major Bogdan Milovanovic (aka "Cica"). Manpower arrived to this airport, including the major part of the PVO armament and military equipment from the airforces bases from the territories of the Republics of Slovenia and Croatia. Parallel with these relocations, there was also a dislocation made to the 17th Mixed Anti-Tank Artillery Brigade of the 17th Corps from Djakovo into the Pelagicevo area, then to the 17th Mixed Artillery Regiment of the 17th Corps from Vinkovci into the Bijeljina area. From Slovenia (Kranj, Celje and Maribor), artillery and engineering regiments were brought into Travnik and one motorized brigade was also brought into Mrkonjic Grad.²⁴⁸

The 12th Mixed Artillery Regiment from Vinkovci and the 14th Mixed Artillery Regiment from Ribnica were combined to form the 17th Mixed Artillery Regiment of the 17th Corps. A part of the units from the Brcko Barracks that had participated in the combat activity in Eastern Slavonia, after withdrawal, possessed the positions on the line of Bosanski Samac – Orasje at the depth of the village of Pelagicevo. These were mainly the armored and mechanized compositions of the 395th Motorized Brigade. The units at the *Husinska Buna* Barracks in

of Zvornik on January 12, 1992, around 12:00 hours. From Zvornik to Banjaluka, provide escort of the traffic military police.

The receipt of the column shall be performed by the Command of the 5th Corps at the Banjaluka Garrison on January 12, 1992, around 21:00 hours.” (Ibid.).

²⁴⁷ I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, p. 126.

²⁴⁸ Z. Suljevic, the aforementioned work, pp. 90-91; V. Karavelic, the aforementioned work, p. 84; Testimony of the JNA general Ibrahim Alibegovic given to the author.

Tuzla (part of the 92nd Motorized Brigade and other units that had not participated in the combat activity in Eastern Slavonia), were engaged on securing the Dubrave Airport, as well as on the possession of the positions at Mts. Ilincica, Konjuh, and Javornik, in order to keep these facilities, and the activity from the internal segment of the territory, in cooperation with the other aggressor forces on the territory of Northeast Bosnia. At the Dubrave Airport, there was a unit of fighter planes and helicopters, and they were directly protecting an armored brigade with 60 tanks that had arrived in early 1992 from Jastrebarsko (the 4th Armored Brigade). From the garrison of Derventa, the 454th Mixed Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment was dislocated to Tuzla, and the 17th Light Artillery Regiment of Anti-Aircraft Defence was relocated from Vinkovci. From Doboj, the 6th Motorized Brigade and the 9th Partisan Brigade, with part of their forces took participation in combat activity in Eastern Slavonia, whereas the recruits were at the barracks, and the volunteer units and the SDS units were on the Mts. Ozren, Mali Krnji, and Trebava. From Derventa, the 327th Motorized Brigade and the 19th Partisan Brigade with part of their forces took part in the combat activity in Eastern Slavonia, whereas a portion of the units were on the positions of Mt. Vucijak and on the position at the right bank of the Sava river. The newly formed 129th Light Infantry Brigade was dislocated into Derventa from Tuzla, and the 670th Pontoon Battalion was drawn out from Slavonski Brod onto the right bank of the Sava river, to the north of Derventa.²⁴⁹

The commander of the 2nd Military District relocated the 336th Motorized Brigade (previously the 4th Armored Brigade) from Tuzla into the Bijeljina Garrison. From this 4th Armored Brigade from Jastrebarsko, in March 1992, one tank party was relocated from the Dubrave Airport into the Zvornik area.²⁵⁰

²⁴⁹ Z. Suljevic, the aforementioned work, pp. 89-90; V. Karavelic, the aforementioned work, p. 89.

²⁵⁰ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2693, Command of the 17th Corps, confidential no. 27/43-9, April 13, 1992 – to the Command of the 2nd Military District; H. Efendic, **KO JE BRANIO BOSNU**, Sarajevo 1998, p. 54; V. Karavelic, the aforementioned work, p. 90. In early April 1992, the 336th Motorized Brigade (3,000 people) was located in the broader area of Zvornik (the village of Sekovici, and the village of Tisce).

The activities related to deployment of the JNA units, weapons and equipment onto the new locations in early January 1992, were conducted by the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY. To this goal, the teams of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY and the Command of the 2nd Military District patrolled areas and facilities that could be used for (re)deployment of people, weapons and equipment. Thus, the Commission of the SSNO and the 2nd Military District (in the composition of general major Djordje Djukic, Chief of Staff of the Technical Administration of the SSNO, with five officers from the Background Sector and the 1st Administration of the General Headquarters, and Colonel Nikola Sego, with three representatives of the background services of the 2nd Military District (as appointed in the Order of the Chief of Staff of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, confidential no. 1673-74/91, dated January 7, 1992, and Order of the Commander of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 261-1, dated January 7, 1992), performed patrolling of the areas and facilities on the territories of the municipalities: Bosanski Petrovac, Drvar, Bosansko Grahovo, Glamoc, Mrkonjic Grad, Kljuc, and a part of the Bihac Municipality. At the time, the SSNO team

This brigade then had a problem of background securing. On April 13, the Command of the 17th Corps made a repeated intervention with the Command of the 2nd Military District to urgently resolve its further background securing. In relation to this, Colonel Nikola Dencic (assistant commander for background activity sector) proposed that the complete background securing of this brigade should be taken over by the Command of the Background Securing of Novi Sad.

The Command of the 2nd Military District demanded from the SSNO that the Brigade be placed within the background securing with the background bases of Novi Sad or Kragujevac (Ibid.).

On April 13, Colonel Dencic demanded urgent delivery from the Command of the 2nd Military District of the following items:

- | | |
|--|----------|
| - fuel D-2 | 30 tons |
| - fuel MB-86 | 10 tons |
| - motor oil DS-50 | 1 ton |
| - hyphoid oil HIP-90 | 0.5 tons |
| - warehouse food items for 3,000 people for 30 days (place of delivery at the village of Sekovici) – AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2693, Command of the 17th Corps, confidential no. 27/43-9, April 13, 1992 – to the Command of the 2nd Military District. | |

adopted the following working version of the proposal for deployment of commands and units, as follows:

a) **Bosansko Grahovo**

- Command of the (9th) Corps with the headquarters-affiliated units;
- 9th Communications Battalion “A”;
- 9th Mixed Artillery Regiment “A”;
- 70th Communications Battalion “R”;
- 9th Vehicle Battalion “R”;
- 569th Supplementary Battalion “R”;
- 98th Medical Battalion “R”;
- 271st Light Artillery Rocket Launcher Regiment “A” (without one division);
- Mechanized Battalion and Armored Battalion from the 221st Motorized Brigade;
 - **A total of 1,595 men, 723 non-combat vehicles, 78 artillery weapons, and 50 combat vehicles.**

b) **Glamoc:**

- 221st Motorized Brigade “A”;
- **A total of 1,250 men, 170 non-combat vehicles, and 40 combat vehicles.**

c) **Bosanski Petrovac:**

- 180th Motorized Brigade “A” (without the Armored and Motorized Battalion – Motorized Battalion at Ostrelj, and the Armored Battalion in Vakuf);
- 405th Background Base “B”;
- **A total of 2,030 men, 350 non-combat vehicles, and 30 combat vehicles.**

d) **Kljuc:**

- 557th Mixed Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment “R”;
- 594th Engineering Regiment “B”;
- **A total of 283 men, 160 motor vehicles, and 36 artillery weapons.**

e) **Drvar:**

- 11th Motorized Brigade “B” (without the Motorized Battalion);
- **A total of 1,300 men, and 130 motor vehicles.**

f) **Mrkonjic Grad:**

- 1st Motorized Brigade “R”;²⁵¹

In the period of January 8-12, 1992, the team from the Command of the 2nd Military District,²⁵² together with the teams of the SSNO and the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY,²⁵³ was

²⁵¹ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2686, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential no. 261-1, January 7, 1992 – Attn. Commander; Ibid., inv. No. 2-2687, REPORT on Inspection of the Areas and Facilities for Deployment of Personnel, weapons and equipment, of the 9th Corps.

²⁵² AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2688, /Command of the 2nd Military District, **Inspection of the Areas and Facilities for Deployment of Personnel and Equipment**, - to the Assistant Commander for background activity of the 2nd Military District, general major Milicevic, Report by Colonel Branko Filipovic, January 13, 1992. This team was made up by: Branko Filipovic (Colonel from the bodies of the Operational and Training Affairs), Gradimir Petrovic (Colonel from the bodies of Technical Services), Milca Kostic (Colonel Major from the bodies of the Supplies Services), Branko Jungic (major from the bodies of the Veterinary Services), and Slobodan Nedik (1st class captain, from the bodies of the Engineering Services).

²⁵³ Ibid. The SSNO Team was made up of: Jovan Elimirov (general major, head of the team, Chief of Staff of the Traffic Administration), Ilija Masic (Colonel from Ist Administration), Milenko Adzic (Colonel, from the Supplies Administration), Ratko Kukic (Colonel, from the Technical Administration), Drago Vukosavljevic (Colonel, from the Engineering Administration), and Radisa Negovanovic (Colonel, from the Medical Administration).

visiting in the area of responsibility of the 5th and 10th Corps.²⁵⁴ The goal of this inspection was to gather the data on the number, type and condition of the facilities for deployment of people, weapons and equipment, on the existing conditions of the infrastructure in terms of background securing and the needs for repairs, additional building, renovation or building of pre-fabricated facilities for this purpose. The focus of work was in the area of responsibility of the 10th Corps, wherein the following areas were inspected: Bihac, Bosanski Novi, Bosanska Kostajnica, Bosanska Dubica, Prijedor, Sanski Most, Banjaluka, and Bosanska Gradiska.²⁵⁵

Many regular and “volunteer” JNA units with the weapons and equipment from Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) were dislocated onto the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where they were resubjected to the already deployed Corps, in order to execute aggression, genocide and other crimes against the civilian population. The military documents available, mainly seized, to this effect offer some significant data. Thus,

²⁵⁴ Ibid. in the zone of the 10th Corps, the Command of the Corps was represented in the work by participation of Colonel Grujo Bric (assistant commander for background activity) and Colonel Major Stanimir Djordjevic (from the bodies of the Operation and Training Affairs), and in the area of responsibility of the 5th Corps, it was general major Momir Talic (Chief of Staff of the 5th Corps), and Colonel Major Saric (Commander of the 329th Armored Brigade).

²⁵⁵ Ibid. On January 13, Colonel Filipovic submitted the report on the aforementioned inspection of the areas and facilities for deployment of people and equipment, which, among other things, concludes:

“2. – The majority of the facilities are usable for stay only after extensive construction interventions, and for some locations even after renovation or construction of pre-fabricated facilities.

3. – The infrastructure of accessory facilities is in majority of the cases rather modest.

4. – Due to the specific condition of the space and facilities, I propose to meet at least minimum requirements of the existing criteria necessary for the deployment – living of people and units.

5. – A separate problem will be the accommodation of officers – the orientation is on the hotels, motels, and similar facilities.

6. – It is necessary to provide significant funding for execution of these tasks...”
(Ibid.).

during March 1992, the 5th Corps already included the 2nd Battalion of the 46th Infantry Brigade from the composition of the 51st Partisan Division from Cacak. In the area of Zvornik – Kalesija, there was the 336th Motorized Brigade deployed, which was in the composition of the 17th Corps. In the area of the villages of Celopek – Bogutovo Selo – Donja Trnava, and Ugljevik, the 22nd Partisan Brigade was deployed. On April 2, the Bijeljina Garrison was strengthened from the composition of the 336th Motorized Brigade (Zvornik) with three M-84 tanks, 1 TZ and 2 M-60 armored transporters, and after “the evident expansion of the inter-ethnic conflict”, it was strengthened with 3 more tanks, 3 armored transporters, and one truck with soldiers. Pursuant to the order of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY (strictly confidential no. 629-1 dated April 4, 1992), on April 5, from the area of Kuzmin in the 1st Military District (that is, from Serbia), the 2nd Armored Battalion of the 453rd Motorized Brigade arrived in the area of Bijeljina (near Janja). The battalion was resubjected to the 17th Corps and **“in preparedness for execution of special purpose tasks”**.

On the same date, the 2nd 122mm Howitzer Artillery Division of the 5th Mixed Artillery Regiment of the 5th Corps possessed the positions in the area of Novo Selo near Kupres. In Bosanski Petrovac (the village of Smoljani), mobilization was done of one motorized battalion, which had some 600 people on April 5. Informing the Command of the 2nd Military District about mobilization of this battalion, the Command of the 9th Corps asked the commander of the 2nd Military District to issue the order to the 630th Background Base to **“take on this unit for full background securing and to supply them with food and bed sheets”**. On April 1992, **“as planned”**, two motorized and one armored battalions arrived to the Bijeljina Garrison from the units of the 1st Military District. On April 9, 1992, there was **“a successful receipt from Serbia and sending into the areas of deployment of the 1st Military District units that were sent to the composition of the 17th Corps”**. During the night of April 13, the Tank Brigade from Bijeljina was transferred to the area of Zvornik – Vlasenica.²⁵⁶

²⁵⁶ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-84, Command of the 2nd Military District, Operational Centre, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-1905, April 1, 1992 – to the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – Operational Centre; Ibid., inv. No. 2-85, Command of the

On March 23, 1992, upon the request of the Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of SR Bosnia and Herzegovina, dated February 21, 1992, the Command of the 2nd Military District granted approval to have four 120 mm grenade launchers dislocated from the warehouse of the Municipal Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Zenica (affiliated with the MP 1132 Zenica), into the Military Post in Koran, into the facility of the Territorial Defence.²⁵⁷

In late April 1992, with the headquarters-affiliated units, the Command of the 17th Corps went out into the broader area of Ugljevik; the 92nd Motorized Brigade was dislocated onto Mt. Ozren (Bosansko Petrovo Selo); the 497th Engineering Regiment onto Mt. Majevisa (Lopare); the 904th Background Base (part of it) into the village of Vrbak (Lukavac Municipality); the 17th Light Artillery Regiment of Anti-

2nd Military District, Operational Duty Team, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2000, April 5, 1992, to the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – Operational Centre; *Ibid.*, inv. No. 2-88, Command of the 2nd Military District, Operational Duty Team, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-1940, April 2, 1992, to the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – Operational Centre; *Ibid.*, inv. No. 2-91, Command of the 2nd Military District, Operational Duty Team, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2082, April 8, 1992, to the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – Operational Centre, and others; *Ibid.*, inv. No. 2-92, Command of the 2nd Military District, Operational Duty Team, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2704, April 9, 1992, to the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – Operational Centre and others; *Ibid.*, inv. No. 2-125, Command of the 2nd Military District, Operational Duty Team, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2148, April 11, 1992, to the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY Operational Centre – for background activity Sector; *Ibid.*, inv. No. 2-145, Command of the 2nd Military District, Operational Duty Team, strictly confidential, no. 09/997-20, April 7, 1992, to the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – Operational Centre and others; *Ibid.*, inv. No. 2-161, Command of the 9th Corps – Background, strictly confidential, no. 12-112, April 5, 1992 – to the Command of the 2nd Military District – Background; *Ibid.*, inv. No. 2-179, Command of the 1st Military District, no. 1614-503 – to the Command of the 2nd Military District; *Ibid.*, inv. No. 2-180, Command of the 2nd Military District, Operational Duty Team, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-1987, April 5, 1992, - to the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – Operational Centre; *Bilten MNO*, no. 9, April 13, 1992.

²⁵⁷ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-1373, Command of the 2nd Military District, confidential, no. 32/205-22, March 23, 1992 – to the Command of the Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of SR Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Aircraft Defence into the village of Vukosavce (Lopare Municipality); the Mechanized Brigade (former 4th Armored Brigade from Jastrebarsko) dislocated the command and part of the tank units into Sekovici, and the 1st Armored Battalion was dislocated into Bosanski Brod; the 395th Motorized Brigade from Brcko with a part of forces was dislocated into the village of Obudovac (Pelagicevo), where it blocked a section of the road from Pelagicevo to Loncari, preventing the flow of traffic in this direction. General Nedeljkovic was appointed commander of the 17th Corps, instead of general Savo Jankovic. The *Husinska Buna* Barracks held 358 people (active and reserve composition); the Kozlovac facility hosted the battalion that had come from Pirot with 573 military personnel, of which 41 were officers; Bosansko Petrovo Selo had a tank party (T-34 tanks) with 9 officers and 599 soldiers; the Luzanjak facility in the same village hosted a howitzer artillery division from the 92nd Motorized Brigade with 10 reserve officers and 105 reserve soldiers; the village of Sizje had one motorized battalion of the same brigade with 16 reserve officers and 406 reserve soldiers; the village of Vozuca had one mechanized battalion with 16 reserve officers and 578 reserve soldiers (commander of the battalion was Sergeant Ranko Kaurin). Two battalions were deployed in the villages of Stog and Kulisic in the municipality of Zavidovici. The 92nd Motorized Brigade armed the Volunteer Platoon of *Queen* (on Mt. Ozren), which had some 733 military personnel and was on logistic securing with the aforementioned unit. The activity of this platoon, containing some 70 reserve officers, was directed towards Gracanica. In Kovacevo Selo near Tuzla, there was a mortar unit from the Brigade, with some 40 people. A portion of the manpower was placed around the barracks with installed mortars on positions and targeting the city of Tuzla. The 497th Engineering Regiment from the *Husinska Buna* Barracks was deployed in the Lopare Municipality, with some 425 people, of which 34 officers (the composition was mainly from the reserve and from that territory). A portion of the units was located in Priboj and Pozarnica, with some 384 military personnel, of which 24 were officers. The civilian personnel working in the Command of the 17th Corps received an ultimatum to report to work in Ugljevik immediately, otherwise they would remain jobless. Thus major Ranko Belojica threatened the civilian personnel from his unit that they would remain jobless and drafted their termination decisions, because they had not signed loyalty to the JNA. The 92nd Motorized Brigade armed some 150 people in

Lukavac, and some 500 in Tuzla, who wore the JNA uniforms and the five-armed star, and the emblem (coat of arms) of the city of Tuzla, that is, Lukavac, in addition to that.²⁵⁸

In March 1992, the 122nd Light Infantry Brigade was deployed in Skender Vakuf, which on the possessed facilities numbered 487 military conscripts.²⁵⁹

In late 1991, in connection with the termination of the war in Croatia, and in particular in early 1992, the Armed Forces of the SFRY focused particular activity on the preparation and dislocation of weapons and equipment and war material reserves and units of the JNA “**into more secure areas**”. The command and the units of the 2nd Military District received direct instructions as to that effect as well as assistance from the Federal Secretariat for National Defence and the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, and personally from its Chief of Staff general Blagoje Adzic.

From many warehouses with ammunition, fuel, basic and other equipment and supplies of the 2nd Military District, huge quantities were dislocated. By February 17th, 1992, from the Background Bases of the 2nd Military District, the following quantities were dislocated:

- from the 1st Technical Warehouse of Hadzici, 2,000 tons of ammunition (the capacity was 8,000 tons);
- from the Department of the 1st Technical Ammunition Warehouse of Krupanjska Rijeka – Pazaric, 2,500 tons (the capacity was 4,000 tons);
- from the Department of the Ammunition Warehouse of Konjic, 4,200 tons (the capacity was 4,200 tons);
- from the Department of the Ammunition Warehouse of Renovica, 500 tons (the capacity was 3,000 tons);

²⁵⁸ Dz. Pasic, **ZEMLJA IZMEDJU ISTOKA I ZAPADA**, Tuzla, 1996, pp. 226-227; Testimony by general Ibrahim Alibegovic given to the author.

²⁵⁹ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2611, Command of the 30th Partisan Division; Confidential, no. 533-1, March 25, 1992 – to the Command.

- from the 5th Technical Warehouse of Fuel of Ilijas, 620 cubic metres (the capacity was 19,620 cubic metres);
- from the Department of the 5th Technical Warehouse of Fuel of Semizovac, 200 cubic metres (the capacity was 1,200 cubic metres);
- from the 7th Technical Warehouse of Basic Items of Visoko, 1,600 tons (the capacity was 1,600 tons);
- from the 8th Technical Warehouse of Fuels of Celebici – Konjic, 16,000 cubic metres (the capacity was 16,000 cubic metres);
- from the 9th Tehcnical Warehouse of Fule of Novi Travnik, 12,000 cubic metres (the capacity was 12,000 cubic metres);
- from the 3rd Techical Warehouse of Ammunition of Ustikolina – Foca, 3,000 tons (the capacity was 11,000 tons);
- from the 10th Technical Warehouse of Fuels of Ustikolina – Foca, 17,000 cubic metres (the capacity was 17,000 cubic metres);
- from the 4th Technical Warehouse of Ammunition of Visegrad, 2,000 tons (the capacity was 7,000 tons);
- from the Department of the 4th Technical Warehouse of Ammunition of Rudo, 1,600 tons (the capacity was 5,600 tons);
- from the 6th Technical Warehouse of Fuels of Vardiste, 2,000 cubic metres (the capacity was 17,000 cubic metres);
- from the 1st Technical Warehouse of Ammunition of Drnis – Trbounje – Zitnjic, 3,300 tons (the capacity was 3,300 tons);
- from the 2nd Technical Warehouse of Ammunition of Golubic, 270 tons (the capacity was 8,000 tons);
- from the 3rd Technical Warehouse of Fuel of Kosovo Polje – Knin, 4,300 tons (the capacity was 6,300 tons);
- from the 4th Technical Warehouse of Fuel of Licka Kadrma, 5,900 cubic metres (the capacity was 9,000 cubic metres);
- from the 2nd Technical Warehouse of Ammunition of Donji Lapac, 362 tons (the capacity was 2,700 tons);

- from the 3rd Technical Warehouse of Ammunition of Vedro Polje, 957 tons (the capacity was 3,200 tons);

- from the Technical Warehouse of Bihac – Grabez, 830 tons (the capacity was 2,400 tons);

- from the Supplies Warehouse of Orljani, 2,392 tons (the capacity was 4,800 tons), that is, 3,660 sets of various supplies and accessories (kitchens, tents, clothing, footwear, etc.);

- from the 2nd Technical Warehouse of Ammunition of Doboj – Gornje Sevarlije, 2,491 tons (the capacity was 4,000 tons);

- from the Supplies Warehouse of Doboj – Donje Sevarlije, 1,330 tons (the capacity was 9,500 tons or 9,500 square metres), that is, 300 sets of various commodities);

- from the 1st Technical Warehouse of Ammunition of Banjaluka – Krcmarice, 5,580 tons (the capacity was 11,580 tons);

- from the 2nd Technical Warehouse of Mrkonjic Grad, 2,000 tons (the capacity was 6,300 tons);

- from the Department of the 2nd Technical Warehouse of Ammunition of Donji Vakuf, 5,630 tons (the capacity was 5,630 tons – the reserves were evacuated to Banjaluka);

- from the 3rd Tehcnical Warehouse of Fuels of Jajce, 5,100 cubic metres (the capacity was 7,200 cubic metres), and the like.²⁶⁰

The issue of dislocation of arms and equipment and moving out and relocation of the JNA units had been several times discussed among the highest military circles of the SFRY. Thus, for illustration, this issue was also brought up at the meeting on March 25, 1992, related to the information of the 2nd Military District “**about the situation in BiH and the proposal for dislocation of the JNA units and war material reserves**”. On that occasion, Chief of Staff of the Ist Administration of

²⁶⁰ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-1965, REVIEW OF DATA ON THE DEPLOYMENT AND CAPACITIES OF THE BACKGROUND UNITS AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE 2ND MILITARY DISTRICT (as of February 17, 1992).

the SSNO, general major Dragolju Simonovic, informed the acting federal secretary for national Defence general Blagoje Adzic with the information **“about the situation and the options of the JNA units on the BiH territory, the issues of deployment and withdrawal of the war material reserves from warehouses, and the endangered communication, command and background securing means on the BiH territory”**. After having listened to the information and the proposals, **“in reviewing of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina”**, general Adzic, among other things, assigned the following task: **“Speed up withdrawal of war material reserves, particularly of the valuable and modern weapons and military equipment, execute the more favourable option. Resolve the troop reserves within the overall process of movement and relocation of units”**.²⁶¹

At the time, general Adzic issued the order to immediately proceed with the drafting of plans and regulation of **“moving of JNA units and property out of Zenica, Capljina, and Travnik”**. **“The securing of such moving out”** required the provision of the **“required forces”**.²⁶²

²⁶¹ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-769, Federal Secretariat for National Defence, General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, Ist Administration, strictly confidential, no. 585-2, April 3, 1992 – Attn. Commander or Chief of Staff of the Headquarters and Command of the 2nd Military District. In relation to this, general Adzic ordered in the Command of the 2nd Military District that, in cooperation with the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces and the Background Sector, by April 10, they should complete **“the analysis of the space on the map clearly showing the following:**

- what is located on the safe territory;
- what can be defended successfully, with appropriate backup, until the conditions for evacuation are created (exactly show in quantities what is defended and what needs to be evacuated);
- what can be evacuated by threat and use of force, by creation of an evacuation corridor (on maps 1:25,000 for certain facilities make detailed plans), with the option of their destruction too;
- what can not be evacuated and must be destroyed (plan in more detail what can suddenly be evacuated of the major modern weapons and what can be distributed to the population for safekeeping)” – Ibid.

²⁶² Ibid.

At the time, the acting federal secretary for national Defence, among other things, also assigned the following tasks:

“Do all the preparations for the dislocation of the Command Place of the 2nd Military District onto the facility of *Goljak* in Han Pijesak”;

“In the JNA units in Nevesinje and Trebinje, plan for one armored battalion each, and in the valley of the Neretva river, along the border with West Herzegovina, have several artillery batteries as support”.²⁶³

As holders of the aforementioned tasks, general Adzic assigned the commanders of the 2nd and 4th Military Districts implement the assigned tasks in cooperation with the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY and the Background Sector of the SSNO, and the 1st Administration of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces. He also specified the deadline for their execution: April 10, 1992.²⁶⁴

In March 1992, the SSNO brought a decision for displacement of the material reserves of the SSNO (ammunition, spare parts, fixed resources, and fuel), which were deployed on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The executors were the JNA units on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, thereby creating the conditions to arm individuals and organized Serb groups. This order was issued by general Adzic, the portion of the order pertaining to material reserves by general Vladan Sljivic (assistant of the Background Sector), and the order for direct execution was issued by Colonel, subsequently general, Djordje Djukic, Chief of Staff of the Technical Administration. In order to execute this

²⁶³ Ibid.

²⁶⁴ Ibid. In late March 1992, based on the assignments from the reporting session by the commanders of military districts to the Federal Secretariat for National Defence, Commander of the 2nd Military District (General Kukanjac) assigned several tasks. They included timely evacuation of material resources “wherever objectively possible” out to more secure places and spaces, and “where this is not possible, ensure stronger security of the composition on the facility itself”. To this goal, there was the need to engage even the “units formed of the local population (JNA supporters), but these units must be in the composition and under the command of the JNA” (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2616, Command of the 30th Partisan Division, strictly confidential, no. 578-2, April 1, 1992 – to the Command, Study).

decision, general Djukic issued a number of orders: to the 608th Background Base, which was located in Pancevo (Serbia) and had a warehouse of ammunition in **Zunovnica** (Hadzici), with the capacity of some 10,000 tons, which, in addition to ammunition, also stored a certain quantity of 7.9 mm rifle guns, significant quantities of raw materials for special purpose industry, large quantities of mines (school and artillery ammunition), and there were also some spare parts for engineering machines. The order for relocation was issued by general Djukic also to the warehouse of spare parts for combat and non-combat vehicles, weapons, communication equipment, car batteries and tyres for almost all types of vehicles, which was located in **Blazuj**, as well as to the warehouse of fixed resources (infantry and artillery arms and weapons, workshops, various supplies and accessories, communications devices and equipment, various tools and engineering equipment, and the like), located in **Visoko**.²⁶⁵

For these three warehouses, general Djukic, representing the Technical Administration, drafted a plan and the order to the 608th Background Brigade that in accordance with the plan it should proceed with relocation to the following locations:

- the ammunition to Koran, into Kremna near Uzice, and into the warehouse in Niksic;
- the spare parts into the warehouses of Uzicka Pozega, and Pancevo (that is, the village of Kacarevo);
- the fixed resources into Kalinovik and Niksic; and
- a smaller quantity of the 7.9 mm rifle guns, manufactured in Germany, into Pancevo.²⁶⁶

For these needs, by way of traffic authorities, the base was provided with some 100 trucks from Vojvodina, Belgrade, and Nis (mainly by trucking organizations). Until the columns stopped moving (in late April 1992), intensive evacuation was being done from the warehouse

²⁶⁵ AIIZ, invo. No. 5351, Supplement to the Testimony by Dj. Dj.; Ibid., inv. No. 5352, Record, Supplement to the Testimony by Dj. Dj.

²⁶⁶ Ibid.

of spare parts which was mainly evacuated (it was a priority). The majority of the fixed resources warehouse in Visoko was also evacuated.²⁶⁷

In the area of responsibility of the 2nd Military District, in addition to the aforementioned warehouses, there were some other ones too that had been planned for evacuation, which was the obligation of this command (the ammunition warehouse of Ustipraca, the ammunition and fuel warehouse in the vicinity of Mostar, the ammunition warehouse in Donji Vakuf, and the fuel one in Jajce), and the ammunition warehouse in Rudo, in the jurisdiction of the 1st Military District. These warehouses too were for the major part evacuated (the resources from these warehouses were evacuated to the “**secure**” territory populated by the majority Serb population).²⁶⁸

In the jurisdiction of the Technical Administration was also the Technical Overhaul Institute of Hadzici, holding several dozens of weapons being overhauled or not taken into overhaul yet. The 2nd Military District was assigned to evacuate these weapons to Kalinovik, and from there to take one part to Niksic. This task was also for the most part executed.²⁶⁹

Many warehouses with reserve armament, ammunition and fuel were secretly dislocated by the JNA onto other locations, in order to “**ensure security and their use by the JNA**”. Thus, the ammunition warehouse of **Donji Lapac**, with 2,350 tons of ammunition was relocated into the area of Bosanski Petrovac, where a new warehouse was formed. The warehouse of **Golubic** near Knin was relocated into the area of Bosansko Grahovo, where a new warehouse was also formed. From the troop warehouse of “**Rabic**”, near Derventa, the material reserves (9,930 barrels and 200 tons of ammunition) from the TO were relocated partially to Banjaluka, and partially to the area of the village of Ukrinski Lug. From the warehouse in **Doboj**, 5,270 barrels of armament and 140 tons of ammunition were relocated into the area of the village of Tumare – Mt. Tumare (10 km to the northeast of Zavidovici). From the troop warehouse of **Krepsic** near Brcko, 10,368 barrels of armament and 137 tons of ammunition were relocated into the new warehouse on

²⁶⁷ AIIZ, inv. No. 5351, Record, Supplement to the Testimony by Dj. Dj.

²⁶⁸ Ibid.

²⁶⁹ Ibid.

the territory: Lopare – Ugljevik. From the troop warehouse of **Kozlovac** (Tuzla), 20,000 pieces of armament and 268 tons of ammunition were transferred from the TO into the new warehouse in the area of Lopare. After the dislocation of the 4th Mixed Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment “R”, all the ammunition for this unit was also relocated from **Visoko** into the village of Mokro, as well as the ammunition from the 4th Mixed Artillery Regiment. The weapons of the motorized battalion from the 46th protective regiment of the SSNO from the warehouse in **Visoko** were transferred into the warehouse of “Koran”. The war material resources and the technical and material resources of the 633rd Light Artillery Division of the Anti-Aircraft Defence from the 46th Protective Regiment of the SSNO, of the 346th Light Artillery Regiment of the Anti-Aircraft Defense (4th Corps) were transferred onto other locations. Part of the reserves from the **Butile** warehouse near Sarajevo was relocated into the area of the village of Han Kram on Mt. Romanija (Han Pijesak Municipality). From the TO warehouse in Konjic, onto the area of Koran – village of Mokro (Pale Municipality), 5,980 barrels of armament with 2 combat sets of ammunition from the TO were relocated. Some 400,000 grenades from **Vitkovici** were also dislocated to Koran.²⁷⁰

JNA had also evacuated huge quantities of materials and technical resources of the TO and JNA from the warehouses of “**Faletici**” and “**Hadzici**” (Usivak, Igman, and Krupanjska Rijeka). All the materials and technical resources from the garrisons of Visoko, Travnik, and Kiseljak, as well as the military industries from Novi Travnik, Bugojno, Vitez, Mostar, Kupres, and the Sarajevo area, were also relocated by the JNA onto other locations. From the factory of special vehicles in Sarajevo, all the equipment and armament were plundered and taken away (computers, documentation, programs, and other equipment required for production of military transporters, as well as for armament). The Han Pijesak and Koran Garrisons were activated. The abandoned pump, **“which used to be owned by the military, but was abandoned and**

²⁷⁰ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-75, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 908-1, March 20, 1992 – to the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY (“Attn. NGS”); Ibid., inv. No. 2-96; Command of the 2nd Military District, Operational Duty Team, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2200, April 13, 1992 – to the General headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY- Operational Centre, and to the Command of the 2nd Military District; **Dnevni izvjestaj**, no. 72, July 5, 1992.

neglected long ago”, was reactivated, as well as the reservoir south of Han Pijesak, for delivery and warehousing of JNA fuel reserves.²⁷¹

From the 7th Technical Warehouse of the 744th Background Base (Visoko), transportation was done of six special motor vehicles with wheels and one tracked vehicle into the 2nd Technical Warehouse of Ammunition (Koran). A portion of medical materials from the medical warehouse of the 744th Background Base (Butile) was dislocated during April 2 and 3, 1992, into the *Vestfalija* warehouse in Pale. From the TO warehouse of the *Famos* Enterprise, the JNA evacuated the TO anti-aircraft arms, and dislocated 6 pieces of combat vehicles PM-80A into the 49th Motorized Brigade of the 4th Corps. From the Sarajevo’s *Zrak* Enterprise, the JNA confiscated 12 cannons and a complete armament of the rocket department.²⁷²

On April 4, 1992, general Milutin Kukanjac ordered, among other things, the evacuation of a portion of units **“outside the garrisons, in order to be able to participate in unblocking of the military facilities and for execution of other tasks”**.²⁷³

²⁷¹ Ibid.; AIIZ, inv. No. 2-84, Command of the 2nd Military District, Operational Centre, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-1905, April 1, 1992 – to the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – Operational Centre; *Agresija ...*, Sarajevo, 1993, p. 33.

²⁷² AIIZ, inv. No. 2-115, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-1906, April 1, 1992 – to the Operational Centre of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – for background activity Sector; Ibid., inv. No. 2-116, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-1941, April 2, 1992 – to the Operational Centre of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – for background activity Sector; Ibid., inv. No. 2-117, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-1958, April 3, 1992 – to the Operational Centre of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – for background activity Sector; Ibid., inv. No. 2-535, **The Role of the KOS in the Aggression Against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina** (Information by the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina), no. 10.

Colonel Major Radoslav Andzic, former director of the *Zrak* Enterprise, with the assistance of certain JNA services, organized transportation of finished products out of that enterprise: snipers and IC devices.

²⁷³ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2804, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 09/80-23, April 4, 1992 – to the Command of the Military Engineering Directorate.

On April 4, 1992, a portion of the manpower from the Banckground Sector of the Command of the 2nd Military District was sent to the reserve command place of Pale and into the Group for Escort and Assistance in Execution of Tasks and Relocation of the 9th Corps. The representatives of the 530th and 405th Background Base had also agreed on the planned time schedule of dislocating of the technical and material resources from the 405th Background Base.²⁷⁴

During April 12, 1992, from the supplies warehouse of the 993rd Background Base, portion of clothing and footwear supplies of small sizes were transported into the supplies warehouse of the 904th Background Base. At the same time, from the 405th Background Base, 10 trailer kitchens were transported for the needs of the 993rd Background Base.²⁷⁵ A portion of veterinary materials of the 530th Background Base, which was located in Knin, was transported into Bosanski Petrovac, **“and the transportation of the other veterinary materials onto the same location is underway”**.²⁷⁶ During April 15, 1992, the materials from the medical and veterinary warehouse of the 405th Background Base were completely dislocated into the warehouse of the 530th Background Base (Bosanski Petrovac).²⁷⁷

The dislocation of units and material reserves and equipment from the **“endangered”** territories of Bosnia and Herzegovina into the **“more secure territories”** and **“secure locations”** was particularly intensified in late April and early May 1992. Thus, for an illustration, during April 24, 25, 26, and 27, and in early May, evacuation of units and materials was continued from the building of the Command of the 2nd Military

²⁷⁴ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-119, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-1999, April 5, 1992 – to the Operational Centre of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – Background Sector.

²⁷⁵ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-126, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2181, April 12, 1992 – to the Operational Centre of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – Background Sector.

²⁷⁶ Ibid.

²⁷⁷ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-119, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2248, April 15, 1992 – to the Operational Centre of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – Background Sector.

District into the Lukavica Barracks (within the Sarajevo Garrison), then from the warehouses of Background bases of Sarajevo, as well as evacuation of materials from the warehouses of Visoko, Ilijas, and Semizovac.²⁷⁸ During April 25 and 26, 1992, the supplies were partially dislocated from the supplies warehouse of the 744th Background Base into “**more secure areas**”. The dislocation of the barracks in Kiseljak was carried out on April 25, while “**the dislocation of the technical warehouse of medium-scale overhaul of the 744th Background Base of Visoko is being completed**”. For April 26, “**it was planned to dislocate the JNA members from the garrisons of Busovaca and Rajlovac in the escort of the Military Police of Sarajevo and the Liaison Officer from the Group for Cooperation with Peace Forces**”.²⁷⁹

²⁷⁸ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-108, Command of the 2nd Military District, Operational Duty Team, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2467, April 24, 1992 – to the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – Operational Centre, and others; Ibid., inv. No. 2-109, Command of the 2nd Military District, Operational Duty Team, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2489, April 25, 1992 – to the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – Operational Centre, and others; Ibid., inv. No. 2-110, Command of the 2nd Military District, Operational Duty Team, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2501, April 26, 1992 – to the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – Operational Centre, and others; Ibid., inv. No. 2-111, Command of the 2nd Military District, Operational Duty Team, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2524, April 29, 1992 – to the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – Operational Centre, and others; Ibid., inv. No. 2-112, Command of the 2nd Military District, Operational Duty Team, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2548, May 1, 1992 – to the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – Operational Centre, and others; Ibid., inv. No. 2-138, Command of the 2nd Military District, Operational Duty Team, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2488, April 25, 1992 – to the Operational Centre of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – for background activity Sector; Ibid., inv. No. 2-139, Command of the 2nd Military District, Operational Duty Team, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2500, April 26, 1992 – to the Operational Centre of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – for background activity Sector; Ibid., inv. No. 2-141, Command of the 2nd Military District, Operational Duty Team, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2512, April 28, 1992 – to the Operational Centre of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – for background activity Sector.

²⁷⁹ Ibid. In late April 1992, the commands, units and institutions of the 2nd Military District transferred the focus of the background securing onto preparation and completion of dislocation of the “**portion of the material reserves from the endangered territories, to preparation and disassembling of the stable equipment in the facilities**”.

The manpower, the complete war reserves, as well as the prospective fixed resources, were evacuated from the Visoko Garrison. Also, the material resources were evacuated from the building of the Command of the 2nd Military District and were dislocated into the Lukavica Barracks, whereas the material reserves and equipment were dislocated to “**secure locations**” from the warehouses of the background bases of Sarajevo, Visoko, Ilijas, and Semizovac.²⁸⁰

On April 25, 1992, five motor vehicles had transported various supplies (camping and other equipment and accessories) from the supplies warehouse of Butile into the 2nd Technical Warehouse of Ammunition in Koran. At their return to Butile and Alipasin Most, they transported the food items that were delivered by contracts by the enterprises from Serbia. On the same day, from the 5th Technical Warehouse of Fuel in Ilijas, 6 motor vehicles were sent to Han Pijesak containing: 12,960 kg of DS-50, 5,580 kg of DS-30, 560 kg of HUL-46, 216 kg of HUL-46, 103 pieces of 200 liter barrels and 44 pcs of 20 liter cans. 18 motor vehicles were loaded into the 7th Technical Warehouse of Fixed Resources, of which 15 vehicles with weapons for Koran, and three vehicles with soldiers and equipment for the accessory platoon that was being displaced into Hadzici.²⁸¹

By April 29, 1992, the following quantities of accessory fuels and oils were transported from the 5th Technical Warehouse of Fuels (Ilijas):

- motor oil DS-30 transported 31,320 kg left 51,040 kg

of background infrastructure which can be used at new locations“. However, in the assessment of the acting assistant commander for background activity of the 2nd Military District, Colonel Dusan Kovacevic, the dislocation of the reserves “**is very complex due to the active disruptions of execution of the tasks by the current authorities in BiH**“. During the dislocation, the command of the 2nd Military District regularly sent reports to the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-142, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2539, April 30, 1992 – to the Operational Centre of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – for background activity Sector).

²⁸⁰ Ibid.

²⁸¹ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2698, Command of the 744th Background Base, confidential no. 263-83, April 25, 1992 – to the Command of the 2nd Military District, Operational Centre.

- motor oil DS-50	68,335	114,705
- two-stroke engine oil	700	2,100
- hypoid oil HIP-90	13,205	0
- oil for stick shifts	720	360
- oil ATU-S	0	659
- oil UKM-30	77	8,717
- oil UKM-50	3,960	0
- oil ZUON	1,773	27,287
- solvent SZNM	2,009	40,879
- solvent DRNC	10,912	36,610
- grease MKL-3	700	0
- grease UM-2	1,452	14,730
- oil HU-EL	0	4,796
- oil HU-VL	0	3,392
- oil HU-L	1,076	0
- oil HU-S	493	1,193
- oil HU-T	0	857
- liquid HTA	1,207	3,058
- oil UKG	1,440	3,747
- anti-freeze	0	11,440
- hermetization grease	282	0
	<u>139,652</u>	<u>325,569.²⁸²</u>

By April 29, from the Supplies Warehouse of Butile, all the military reserve were transported to Koran – warehouse food items, including 83,000 pieces of canned meals. In addition to food, the following was also transported to Koran (in approximate amounts):

²⁸² AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2702, Command of the 744th Background Base, confidential no. 67-78, April 29, 1992 – to the Command of the 2nd Military District. On April 29, 1992, the dislocation of the accessory fuel materials was continued.

- uniform sets M 77	3,000 pcs
- military blankets	2,500 pcs
- sleeping bags	1,900 pcs
- warehouse tent sets M 70	18 pcs
- foldable beds	30 pcs
- tables	30 pcs
- foldable chairs	60 pcs. ²⁸³

On April 30, 1992, deinstallation and relocation to Koran also for the H-6 DPS-75, and MH-600 computers, with complete accessory equipment. From the supplies warehouse (of the 744th Background Base), 5 motor vehicles transported to Koran 1,000 pieces of shirts, belts, military belts, meal accessories, blankets and tent wings each, as well 2,000 pcs of military socks and 300 pairs of shoes with heightened boot-legs. From the war reserves of the 744th Background Base, the following was transported: 2 ACG D-2 with 13,000 liters to the 1st Technical Warehouse of Ammunition, 1 ACG and four barrels of D-2 with 7,500 liters into the Alipasin Most Barracks, and 2 mobile workshops and a TAM truck were towed into the site of the barracks.²⁸⁴

On April 1, 300 tons of materials were transferred from the 1st Technical Warehouse of Ammunition.²⁸⁵

From the 5th Technical Warehouse of Fuel, during the aforementioned day, the following was transported into Han Pijesak:

- gasoline MB-86	133,302 liters
- gasoline D-2	5,968 liters
- two-stroke engine oil UMD-R	700 kilograms

²⁸³ Ibid. In addition to 38 pieces of trailer kitchens of 250 liters – (old type), which had been transported earlier, over the last ten days 22 pieces of 200 liter trailer kitchens were also transported, as well as 17 pieces of 400 liter trailer kitchens – new ones, with accessory tents.

²⁸⁴ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2705, Command of the 744th Background Base, confidential no. 263-88, April 30, 1992 – to the Command of the 2nd Military District.

²⁸⁵ Ibid.

- solvent SZN-M 8,640 kilograms
- oil HU-S 8,226 kilograms
- anti-freeze silicone GA-40 2,760 kilograms.²⁸⁶

On the same day, from the 2nd Department of the 1st Technical Warehouse of Ammunition, one trailer truck and three motor vehicles transported 25 tons of ammunition for artillery support. The artillery ammunition – missiles were transported into the 2nd Technical Warehouse of Ammunition in 13 motor vehicles.²⁸⁷

In the period of April 23 – May 30, 1992, pursuant to the order of the Technical Administration of the SSNO, marked strictly confidential, no. 443-3, dated April 23, 1992, dislocation was done of the 825 tons of lethal devices:

- from the department of the 2nd Technical Warehouse of Ammunition of the 774th Background Base (Renovica) into the 2nd Technical Warehouse of Ammunition of the same Base (Koran) 25 tons
- from the 1st Technical Warehouse of Ammunition Of the 744th Background Base (Hadzici) into Temporary Warehouse of Ammunition in Kalinovik 350 tons
- from the 2nd Technical Warehouse of Ammunition Of the 904th Background Base (Sevarlije) into the 1st Technical Warehouse of Ammunition of the 993rd Background Base (Krcmarice) 450 tons.²⁸⁸

²⁸⁶ Ibid.

²⁸⁷ Ibid.

²⁸⁸ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-143, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2549, May 1, 1992 – to the Operational Centre of the General

As of April 30, 1992, in addition to the aforementioned quantities of ammunition, the following was also dislocated:

a) **fuel** – a total of 140 tons:

- from the 5th Technical Warehouse of Fuel of the 744 Background Base of Ilijas, into the area of Han Pijesak, the following was dislocated: MB-86 – 134 cubic metres, D – 26 cubic metres, and accessory resources – 160 tons;

b) **fixed resources and spare parts:**

- from the Technical Warehouse of Fixed Resources and Spare Parts of the 405th Background Base of Golubic, some 240 tons were dislocated into Bosanski Petrovac of fixed resources and spare parts;

c) **various supplies:** the following was evacuated onto secure locations:

- canned meals	213,000 pieces;
- suits M-77	4,500 pieces;
- military blankets	5,000 pieces;
- sleeping bags	1,900 pieces;
- warehouse tent M-70	28 sets;
- trailer kitchens 200-400 liters	107 pieces;
- current food reserves	864 tons;
- wheat flour T-850	380 tons;
- food reserves for the 2 nd Military District	500 tons;
- sewing and shoe repair workshops and supplies	4 sets;
- mobile washer	6 sets;
- water tank	7 sets;

Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – for background activity Sector; AIIZ, inv. No. 7-97, LIST of the dislocated resources pursuant to the order of the Technical Administration of the SSNO, strictly confidential, no. 443, dated April 23, 1992 (status as of April 30, 1992); Ibid., inv. No. 2-2708, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 31/103-53, May 1, 1992 – to the Command of the 608th Technical Supplies Base – Operational Centre (for reference).

- mechanized bread kneading facility 12 pieces;
- current reserves of clothing and footwear 7,800 sets.²⁸⁹

Huge quantities of motor gasoline and other fuels were dislocated from the 5th Technical Fuel Warehouse of the 744th Background Base. Namely, the Command of the 2nd Military District was regularly shipping trains with fuel into the warehouses of the 530th and 993rd Background Bases in Banjaluka and Knin. Thus, on April 9, 1992, a special military train with fuel was shipped from Sarajevo to Knin. From the 5th Technical Warehouse of Fuel of the 744th Background Base, on April 10, 1992, 757 cubic metres (12 waggons of tanks) of diesel fuel D-2 was delivered to the Technical Fuel Warehouse of the 405th Background Base (Licka Kaldrma). From the 3rd Technical Fuel Warehouse of the 993rd Background Base (Jajce), on April 11, 50 cubic metres of fuel D-2 and 20 cubic metres of MB-86 were dislocated to Banjaluka.²⁹⁰

From the 5th Technical Fuel Warehouse of the 744th Background Base the following was dislocated to Han Pijesak:

- motor gasoline MB-86 133,302 liters
- diesel fuel D-2 5,968 liters

²⁸⁹ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2708, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 31/103-53, May 1, 1992 – to the Command of the 608th Technical Supplies Base – Operational Centre (for reference). Evacuation of medical and veterinary materials was done to the “secure locations within the 2nd Military District. The redislocation pursuant to the decision of the Medical Administration and Veterinary Administration has not started yet“ (Ibid.).

²⁹⁰ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-92, Command of the 2nd Military District, Operational Duty Team, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2704, April 9, 1992 – to the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – Operational Centre, and others; Ibid., inv. No. 2-93, Command of the 2nd Military District, Operational Duty Team, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2125, April 1, 1992 – to the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – Operational Centre, and others; Ibid., inv. No. 2-124, Command of the 2nd Military District, Operational Duty Team, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2126, April 10, 1992 – to the Operational Centre of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – for background activity Sector; Ibid., inv. No. 2-125, Command of the 2nd Military District, Operational Duty Team, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2148, April 11, 1992 – to the Operational Centre of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – for background activity Sector.

- dispensable accessories 159,978 kilograms.²⁹¹

Under the dislocation of the various supplies and material resources from the warehouse of the 904th Background Base of Sevarlije near Dobo, a part of these resources was transported to Banjaluka. The various supplies and material resources from the Supplies Warehouse of the 744th Background Base (Butile) were partially dislocated into “**secure areas**”.²⁹²

Through the Medical Service of the 744th Background Base, medical reserves (nine pieces of Norma medical sets – 11; three pieces of Norma medical sets – 102, and four pieces of Norma medical sets 103), were dislocated from the Medical Warehouse of the 744th Background Base (Butile) to the Koran warehouse. The complete medical and other materials from the Regional Medical Centre in Foca, as organized and ordered by Dr. Sekula Stanic (director of the Centre), and with the participation of Simo Stankovic (Director of the Labor Union of the Centre), Slavko Djordjevic (medical nurse) and a certain Smrekic, were evacuated and transferred for the needs of the SDS into the field hospital of Prevrac near Foca.²⁹³

²⁹¹ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-143, Command of the 2nd Military District, Operational Duty Team, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2549, May 1, 1992 – to the Operational Centre of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – for background activity Sector; AIIZ, inv. No. 7-97, LIST of the dislocated resources pursuant to the order of the Technical Administration of the SSNO, strictly confidential, no. 443, dated April 23, 1992 (status as of April 30, 1992).

²⁹² AIIZ, inv. No. 2-138, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2488, April 25, 1992 – to the Operational Centre of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – for background activity Sector; Ibid., inv. No. 2-116, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-1941, April 2, 1992 – to the Operational Centre of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – for background activity Sector; Ibid., inv. No. 2-117, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-1958, April 3, 1992 – to the Operational Centre of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY; The Daily Report, no. 16, May 10, 1992.

²⁹³ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-142, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2539, April 30, 1992 – to the Operational Centre of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – for background activity Sector; Ibid., inv. No. 2-535, **The Role of the KOS in the Aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina** (Information by the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina).

In early April 1992, from the Rajlovac Garrison, the JNA evacuated 50 trucks of armament and a truck of grenades for the launchers installed in Reljevo, targeting Butmir, Sokolovic Kolonija, and Hrasnica. After it had possessed the *Soko* Enterprise in Mostar on April 11 and 12, the JNA used the trailer trucks of the *Kraljevotrans* Enterprise (from Kraljevo) to transport and steal all of the rocket unit equipment. On April 15, the JNA plundered this enterprise completely, and the damage caused has been assessed at 15 million US dollars. Also, on April 11, the JNA units broke into the warehouses of construction materials of the *Velmos* Enterprise in Mostar, hauling away all of the materials on that occasion.²⁹⁴

On the territory of the Mostar region, on April 13, the JNA units (soldiers and reservists) arrested and took away civilians in unknown directions and plundered public and private property. Thus, they plundered the large military warehouse of food, paints and lacquers on the territory of the *South Camp* in Mostar (they set fire onto what they had not plundered), then a number of passenger and 2 medical vehicles, one freezer truck full of meat for the needs of the city, and other various commodities from numerous houses, which they hauled away in military trucks. In Mostar, the JNA reservists plundered the Cow Farm and transferred it to Nevesinje, thus depriving the city of milk. The warehouses of *Velmos*, with major quantities of food items, were blocked in Mostar by the JNA units.²⁹⁵

In Vogosca, on April 20, 1992, the Serb armed formations took the *Pretis* Special Equipment Factory and the *TAS* Car Factory, and plundered the material resources from these enterprises in an organized manner. At this, they drove away the tanker trucks and other stolen vehicles to Gornja Josanica, in front of one of the SDS leaders.²⁹⁶

On the eves, during and immediately afterwards the Bosnia and Herzegovina referendum (end of February, and then from March 1 through 4, but also later on), large movements of military units were observed

²⁹⁴ *Bilten MNO*, no. 8, April 12, 1992; *Ibid.*, no. 9, April 13, 1992; *Ibid.*, no. 12, April 14, 1992; *Ibid.*, no. 11, April 14, 1992; *Ibid.*, no. 14, April 15, 1992.

²⁹⁵ *Bilten MNO*, no. 4-6, April 11, 1992; *Ibid.*, no. 9, April 13, 1992; *Ibid.*, no. 12, April 15, 1992; *Ibid.*, no. 13, April 15, 1992.

²⁹⁶ *Bilten MNO*, no. 24, April 20, 1992.

on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. On Sunday of March 1, while the voting places were still open, from the Tuzla area in the direction of Bijeljina and Zvornik, a unit with 35 tanks and transporters was transferred. On the same day, 20 tanks and 4 transporters took positions in the industrial zone of Zvornik. In early March, a column of 80 military vehicles started from Semberija in the direction of Sarajevo via Dobož. On the bridge connecting Zvornik with Serbia, in the first half of March, two transporters were located with their barrels targeting Bosnia (next to them were numerous machinegun nests as well). On the Zvornik Water Power Plant Dam there were three tanks located, and at the ends of the dam there were machinegun nests set up, and military patrols were patrolling under the dam. In the second half of March 1992, through the main Sarajevo city street and other city communications, a non-ending grey-green military column was flowing on several occasions, including trucks, containers, artillery weapons, armored vehicles, etc. These military convoys were hauling away the most expensive combat and technical resources from the Lukavica Barracks and from the Visoko and Kiseljak Garrisons in the direction of Mt. Romanija.²⁹⁷

On April 28, 1992, the Yugoslav National Army was making mass movements and hauling away the material and technical resources from the Bihac region towards Bosanski Petrovac and Drvar. On the same day, the JNA members surrendered the military barracks in Ustikolina, at which the Muslim refugees had sought refuge, to the Serb armed formations. On April 28, a column of motor vehicles arrived in Military Post 2439 Hadzici, with 26 empty trailer trucks, with mainly Bar and Pljevlja city registration plates, escorted by four combat vehicles, two “pinzgauer” jeeps and one tank. Of this column, 12 trailer trucks were sent to the Technical Overhaul Institute in Hadzici. At the same time, for the aforementioned Military Post, a column of eight more trailer trucks came from the direction of Blazuj escorted by three combat vehicles. Three trailer trucks went to the Communications Military Post at Usivak. It is assumed that these vehicles had arrived to haul away armament and equipment.²⁹⁸

²⁹⁷ *Slobodna Bosna*, No. 21, March 19, 1992, p. 4

²⁹⁸ *Bilten MNO*, No. 40, April 28, 1992.

On the same day, some dozen trucks and armored transporters went into the direction of the *Pretis* Enterprise, from where they returned full, probably full of equipment from the factory. On the same day, a column of 20 *Nistrans* trucks went through Rogatica towards Sarajevo escorted by one armored transporter and a military jeep. From the factory of special vehicles in Hrasnica, the JNA evacuated equipment for special purpose production. The *TAS* Enterprise was guarded by the JNA soldiers instead of by regular guards.²⁹⁹

On April 29, the military barracks in Misoca (Ilijas) was entered by six trailer trucks (owned by the “Sumarstvo” enterprise from Han Pijesak), escorted by seven JNA combat vehicles, in order to take over the (plundered) armament of the TO of Ilijas, Vares, Breza, Kresevo, and Kiseljak. On April 30, 15 trucks exited this warehouse carrying material and technical resources. In Malesici and Semizovac, they were met by the trucks of the *Sarajevo Brewery*. In order to dislocate this armament into Han Pijesak. Over 150 engines for transport airplanes were driven to the Airforce Institute of *Orao* in Rajlovac, in order to be overhauled, and there was also a transport of 20 trucks from Kraljevo escorted by the military police there. The security officers of the *Orao* Airforce Institute had also ordered manufacture of 30 pencils loaded with small caliber bullets, which can be transformed into explosive devices. The Institute itself was mined as well. At the time, the JNA was hurriedly working on forcing through of the Slatina – Radava road at the section of Mrkovici – Vogosca, which indicated of the intention to evacuate the arms and ammunition from the *Pretis* Factory. At the same time, the JNA was working on dislocating of the directorate of the Military Services Institution of *Romanija* onto Jahorina.³⁰⁰

On May 1, 1992, a column of 20 to 30 trailer trucks owned by *Srbijatrans* (from Nis), was moving from the direction of Hadzici towards Ilidza and Lukavica, escorted by a tank. A column of 50 trailer trucks of *Srbijatrans* went to Lukavica and Blazuj from the direction of Pale, whereas from Ilijas towards *Pretis* 16 trucks and an armored transporter went. From the direction of Krupac – Vojkovicci – *Famos*

²⁹⁹ Ibid.; *Dnevni izvjestaj*, No. 5, April 29, 1992, and no. 6, April 30, 1992.

³⁰⁰ *Bilten MNO*, No. 42, April 29, 1992; Ibid., no. 43, April 29, 1992.

Enterprise, 50 trailer trucks and a tank were moving. The JNA was evacuating ammunition of 120 and 122 mm from *Pretis* and was hauling it away in the direction of Semizovac. At the border between the municipalities of Teslic, Zenica and Travnik, on May 6, 1992, movement of military vehicles and helicopters was continued, moving arms, ammunition and equipment for the needs of the JNA units that had besieged Turbe in the immediate vicinity of Travnik.³⁰¹

A part of material reserves and military industry was dislocated by the JNA from the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina and it disassembled the stable equipment in the facilities of the background infrastructure that was to be used at new locations. Thus, for an illustration, part of reserves from the *Sevarlije* warehouse was displaced into Serbia (Loznica). The *Travnik* Overhaul Institute was dislocated into Serbia, because this was the only institute in former SFRY overhauling communications devices. 200 tons of explosive were hauled over from the *Slavko Rodic* factory in Bugojno into Valjevo.³⁰²

The medical materials from the Medical Warehouse of the 904th Background Base were also dislocated to Serbia (Gornji Milanovac). The reserves of medical materials of the Federal Directorate were dislocated from the Foca Warehouse into the warehouse of the *Sanitas* Public Enterprise in Montenegro (Bijelo Polje). The JNA also evacuated the military school centres from Sarajevo: of the Military High School Centre of the Land Army *General Armije Kosta Nadj*, and the School Centre of Airforces and Anti-Aircraft Defence.³⁰³

The JNA dislocated the airforce bases and warehouses in Sarajevo, Mostar, Tuzla, and Bihac, with all the material and technical resources, into Serbia and Montenegro. The Mostar Airforce Base with all the material and technical resources, including the warehouse resources,

³⁰¹ Ibid.; *Bilten MNO*, no. 46, May 1, 1992.

³⁰² AIIZ, inv. No. 2-75, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 908-1, Mrch 20, 1992 – to the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY.

³⁰³ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-142, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2539, April 30, 1992 – to the Operational Centre of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – for background activity Sector.

was dislocated to Niksic, and then into Podgorica. At the same time, the General Airborne Military High School, with all the material and technical resources, was dislocated into Belgrade. The JNA disassembled the majority of the most modern machines from the airplane and helicopter factory *Soko* in Mostar and from other factories and transferred them to Serbia, while the large quantities of lethal devices and fuel were transferred to Banjaluka. All the airplanes, including those with piston engines, as well as helicopters of the Ministry of Interior, and the planes belonging to the Aircraft Association, were dislocated by the Greater Serbia aggressor from the abandoned airports, and the majority of the airplanes were transferred to Serbia and Montenegro.³⁰⁴

The JNA also dislocated the 155th rocket regiment *VOLHOV* into the surroundings of Banjaluka.³⁰⁵

The units of VOJIN [military informing, alarming and directing; note by the author] were kept by the JNA at Mts. Jahorina, Majevisa, Pljesivica, and Kozara, whereas one platoon was located in Topola.³⁰⁶

In late March and during April 1992, the command and units of the 2nd Military District were engaged on the tasks of development, increasing and fortification of the combat preparedness, formation of “volunteer” units, securing of mobilization, conduction of combat training and exercises, evacuation of material and technical resources, reformation and preparations for dislocation of certain commands and units of the JNA on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and offering of assistance in formation of the units of police and territorial Defence of *the Republic of Serb Krajina*, then on repair, adjustment and preparation of material and technical resources for surrender to and the needs of that collaborationist creation. The basic guidelines, tasks and support related to these issues and their realization were directly offered by the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, and the Federal Secretariat for National Defence. To this goal, in addition to the tasks assigned on March 25, 1992, by the acting federal secretary

³⁰⁴ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-793.

³⁰⁵ Ibid.

³⁰⁶ Ibid.

for national Defence general Blagoje Adzic “**during review of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina**”,³⁰⁷ in late March 1992, a team was established by the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, headed by general major Dragoljub Simovic, Chief of Staff of the 1st Administration of the SSNO, as well as a team from the composition of the Command of the 9th Corps, headed by general Dobrasin Prascevic.³⁰⁸

The currently available data undoubtedly shows that the top military leadership of the SFRY was actively involved in planning, preparation and execution of the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Numerous documents corroborate this, such as the data on the visits of the Chief of Staff of the General Headquarters of the

³⁰⁷ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-144, Command of the 2nd Military District, Operational Duty Team, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-1905-1, March 31, 1992 – to the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – Operational Centre, Supplement to the Regular Report 10/36-1905; Ibid., inv. No. 2-84, Command of the 2nd Military District, Operational Centre, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-1905, April 1, 1992 – to the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY- Operational Centre; Ibid., inv. No. 2-133, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2356, April 19, 1992; Ibid., inv. No. 2-769, Federal Secretariat for National Defence, General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, 1st Administration, strictly confidential, no. 585-2, April 3, 1992 – Attn. commander or Chief of Staff of the headquarters, and to the command of the 2nd Military District; Ibid., Command of the 2nd Military District, confidential, no. 31/101-219-5, April 13, 1992 – to the Command of the 5th Corps, and others.

The delivery of the material and technical resources and material reserves allocated to the units and headquarters of Territorial Defence and bodies and units of Territorial Defence and bodies and units of the police of the *Republic of Serb Krajina* was carried out by the Background Bases of the JNA in compliance with the Scheme for background activity Securing of Units, and by the units surrendering resources that disposed of the transport capacities (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2692, to the Command of the 2nd Military District, confidential, no. 31/101-219-5, April 13, 1992 – to the Command of the 2nd Corps and others).

³⁰⁸ Ibid. The team of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, headed by general Simonovic, from March 30 until April 1, 1992, visited the 5th, 9th, and 10th Corps. After this visit, the General Headquarters made a plan for execution of tasks, and on April 6, under strictly confidential, no. 172, submitted it to the Command of the 2nd Military District. However, the content of this document is not familiar to us, because in the current phase of research we have not succeeded in obtaining it.

Armed Forces of the SFRY (general Blagoje Adzic) and commander of the 1st Military District (general Zivota Panic) to the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina even after its international recognition. Thus, in late April 1992, generals Adzic and Panic, getting interested, among other things, in the combat preparedness of their units, visited the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. On that occasion, general Adzic, as the representative of the SSNO, visited Banjaluka and talked to the commanders of the 5th, 9th, and 10th Corps, who reported to him about the combat preparedness of the units. In the capacity of acting Chief of Staff of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, at the time, General Panic visited the Command of the 17th Corps in Tuzla, in order to view the overall situation in the area of responsibility of this corps, which was subjected to the Command of the 1st Military District, seated in Belgrade.³⁰⁹

The JNA also dislocated the fire support units of large power. In early 1992, the 4th Mixed Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment “R” from Visoko was dislocated into the village of Mokro near Pale, and **“there are no more units from the 4th Corps in the Visoko Garrison”**. In the second half of March 1992, the Motorized Battalion of the 46th Protective Regiment of the SSNO was dislocated from Visoko to Koran near Pale, as well as its 633rd Light Artillery Division of Anti-Aircraft Defence, which was subjected to the 346th Light Artillery Regiment of Anti-Aircraft Defence (4th Corps).³¹⁰

At 1600 hours on April 13, 1992, the 1st Self-Propelling Artillery Battery of Anti-Aircraft Defence was also moved, with three-barrel 20

³⁰⁹ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-113.

³¹⁰ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-75, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 908-1, March 20, 1992 – to the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – “attn. NGS”.

In the Visoko Barracks, some unusual activities had sarred on March 13, 1992, with deconservation of cannons adn vehicles which were in the forthcoming days sent to Romanija. In addition to that, on March 14, **“all the fuel and lubricants were also transported to Han Pijesak”**. The Command of the 2nd Military District provided an explanation that this involved a training exercise **“which should last for three days”** (*Slobodna Bosna*, no. 22, March 26, 1992, p. 8).

mm guns, within the 346th Light Artillery Regiment of Anti-Aircraft Defence, **“in order to be introduced into the combat in the area of Dobrinja”**. From the 216th Mountain Brigade, two battalions were moved and transported to the area of the villages of Hresa and Biosko, to the northeast of Sarajevo, at some 10-15 km. From the Sarajevo’s *Viktor Bubanj* JNA Barracks, a part of the platoon for **“anti-terrorist activity”** was moved over to Tilava, whereas the other part with the communications department was transferred to the Zlatiste point. On April 15, 1992, at Mt. Mojnilo, soldiers were unloaded from a bus. In late April, part of the 1st Party of the Battalion of Military Police from the *Viktor Bubanj* Barracks was located at the water reservoir at Mojnilo.³¹¹

Coming from Lukavica and Kiseljak, the 240th Medium Self-Propelling Rocket Regiment of Anti-Aircraft Defence was deployed in the broader area of Sokolac. **“The passage through Sarajevo left a very big impression. The regiment went out to the new location without any problems, because all the measures had been taken on a timely basis”**. Part of the 346th Light Artillery Regiment of Anti-aircraft Defence went out to the fire position in the area of the Butmir Airport and the village of Brus. The 336th Motorized Brigade was dislocated from Tuzla to the Bijeljina Garrison (former 4th Armored Brigade).³¹²

After dislocation of the JNA units from Croatia into Bosnia and Herzegovina, huge quantities of combat weapons were dislocated into Bosnia and Herzegovina from many cities of Croatia, particularly onto

³¹¹ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-109, Command of the 2nd Military District, Operational Duty Team, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2489, April 25, 1992 – to the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – Operational Centre; Ibid., inv. No. 2-96, Command of the 2nd Military District, Operational Duty Team, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-22000, April 13, 1992 – to the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – Operational Centre; Ibid., inv. No. 2-785, Ministry for National Defence, Headquarters of Territorial Defence, May 1, 1992; *Bilten MNO*, no. 13, April 15, 1992.

In the composition of the platoon for “anti-terrorist action” was also major Krstovic. Immediately after coming to Tilava, he demanded that his criminals address him by the name of “Peter I” (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-785).

³¹² AIIZ, inv. No. 2-75, the Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential no. 908-1, March 20, 1992 – to the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY- (“Attn. NGS”); *Bilten MNO*, no. 45-46, May 1, 1992.

the territory of Sarajevo. Only in Lukavica a column arrived with over 500 vehicles containing weapons and armament, escorted by an armored and mechanized brigade.³¹³

In late 1991 and early 1992, before the attack on Foca, the JNA had possessed all the relevant strategic points, particularly those that were mainly populated by Serbs. At the same time, it had evacuated heavy artillery and ammunition from out of the city and set it to the strategically important places. The majority of that manpower (“**in camouflage uniforms and well armed**”) and “**a whole lot of armament**” were dislocated by the JNA onto Mt. Zabrana and in the vicinity of the “Alpine and Hunting Home” where the SDS members frequently held meetings, attended by, in addition to Velibor Ostojic, also by the criminals Radovan Karadzic and Biljana Plavsic.³¹⁴

In Pale, there was a Helicopter and Parachute unit of the JNA stationed, with eight transport helicopters and four *Gazela* helicopters. “**Around the city [Pale; note by the author] in several places there were either buried or camouflaged tanks, cannons, transporters and machinegun nests**”, which was also recorded in the area of Koran. Light and heavy artillery was deployed in Ponor (above Praca) and in Podgrab, and almost in the whole foot area of Mt. Romanija (all the way from Crvene Stijene up to Bogovici, and in particular at the site of Novakova Njiva and Novakova Pecina).³¹⁵

In Ilidza, in late April 1992, the Greater Serbia aggressor located nine tanks and two JNA transporters targeting Sokolovic-Kolonija and Butmir, the areas populated with majority Bosniak population.³¹⁶

After the completed preparations for dislocation of the command place of the 2nd Military District into the facility of *Goljak* in Han Pijesak, which was on March 25, 1992, ordered by the acting federal

³¹³ *Prva linija* (The Magazine of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina), no. 2, February 1, 1993, p. 2.

³¹⁴ AIIZ, inv. No. 3-1259.

³¹⁵ **Dnevni izvjestaj**, No. 77, July 10, 1992.

³¹⁶ *Ibid.*, no. 6, April 30, 1992.

secretary for national Defence, general Adzic,³¹⁷ during April 5, 1992, a reserve command place for the 2nd Military District was formed in the area of Pale (at the *Turist* Hotel). In the afternoon of that day, the following composition came out to this command place:

- from the Command of the 2nd Military District, 20 officers, headed by the Chief of Staff of the headquarters of the 2nd Military District;
- from the 367th Communications Regiment, six officers, twenty soldiers, and eight motor vehicles for communication;
- from the 65th Motorized Regiment, one party of the Military Police (one active military personnel and nine soldiers);
- an officer and five soldiers for serving; and
- one mini-bus, three all-terrain vehicles, and one passenger motor vehicle (a total of 28 officers, 34 soldiers, and 13 motor vehicles).³¹⁸

The JNA, in particular the Command of the 2nd Military District and the Command of the 4th Corps, **displaced numerous units, lethal and other material and technical resources** “onto safe spaces and locations”.³¹⁹

For months, the 2nd Military District (general Milutin Kukanjac) had been:

³¹⁷ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-796, Federal Secretariat for National Defence, General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, 1st Administration, strictly confidential, no. 585-2, April 3, 1992 – Attn. Commander or Chief of Staff of the Headquarters, and the Command of the 2nd Military District.

General Blagoje Adzic assigned the commands of the 2nd and 4th Military Districts as the holders of this task, in cooperation with the 1st Administration of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, determining April 10, 1992, as the end date for its execution.

³¹⁸ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-85, Command of the 2nd Military District, Operational Duty Team, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2000, April 5, 1992 – to the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – Operational Centre.

³¹⁹ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2678, Command of the 4th Corps, strictly confidential, no. 75-1, May 7, 1992.

- dislocating the warehouses of armament, ammunition, equipment, mines, explosive and other devices, “onto secure spaces, promising for the Army”;
- a number of warehouses, barracks and garrisons were abandoned, because “no conditions existed for their survival (Kiseljak, Visoko, *Stojkovic* Warehouse, *Celebic* Warehouse, etc)”;
- in early April, part of the Command went out onto the Remote Command Point outside Sarajevo;
- the majority of the commands of the 4th and 17th Corps were also evacuated outside the garrison onto new command places;
- a significant number of commands of regiments and brigades were displaced onto new territories, as well as their units, as of May 1, 1992;
- on April 26, 1992, the majority of the Command with the departments for serving, left the command of the district and went out onto the Command place outside of Sarajevo (at the Command of the District – 4 buildings, a number of officers remained, as well as parts of units for securing of buildings and for serving);
- Since April 15, 1992, almost every day, there had been columns of motor vehicles moving loaded with material and technical resources from the Command of the District;
- Parallel with this, “a number of other tasks were also performed with the basic goal to get us safely and in a planned way over onto another territory, that is, to get us leave the command of the district in the city, whose location was very unfavourable for us from all aspects”.³²⁰

In early April 1992, “**due to the complex political and security situation in the area of responsibility**”, the commands and the units of the 2nd Military District were “**at the full degree of combat preparedness**”. Pursuant to the order of the commander of the 2nd Military District, on April 6, 1992 (at 06:00 hours), mobilization started in 21 war units of this command. The organization of work at the

³²⁰ Ibid. The majority of manpower and material and technical resources had been evacuated onto the new locations.

Reserve Command Place of the 2nd Military District was established, and it was put in function, whereas during the day the course of mobilization was monitored, and the contact was established with the Crisis Headquarters of the SDS of the Pale Municipality.³²¹

The response of the reserve composition into the units of the 2nd Military District during April 6, 1992, by 18:00 hours was as follows:

	Invited:	Responded:
- officers	2,161	506 or 23%;
- junior officers	1,996	491 or 25%;
- military conscripts	35,264	13,084 or 37%;
Total invited:	38,786	Responded: 14,039 or 36,2%; ³²²

Of the total number of the invited from the reserve composition – 39,463, on April 7, by 18:00 hours, 17,082 or 43% responded, together with 24 motor vehicles:

	Invited:	Responded:
- officers	2,253	683 or 30%;
- junior officers	2,112	777 or 37%;
- military conscripts	35,098	15,622, or 44%. ³²³

³²¹ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-119, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-1999, April 5, 1992 – to the Operational Centre of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – Background Sector; Ibid., inv. No. 2-120, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2024, April 6, 1992 – to the Operational Centre of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – Background Sector; Ibid., inv. No. 2-86, Command of the 2nd Military District, Operational Duty Team, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2025, April 6, 1992 – to the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – Operational Centre.

³²² AIIZ, , inv. No. 2-86, Command of the 2nd Military District, Operational Duty Team, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2025, April 6, 1992 – to the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – Operational Centre; Ibid., inv. No. 2-90, Command of the 2nd Military District, Operational Duty Team, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2050, April 7, 1992 – to the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – Operational Centre.

³²³ Ibid.

The response of the reserve composition into the units of the 2nd Military District during April 8, 1992, by 18:00 hours, was as follows:

	Invited:	Responded:
- officers	2,152	795 or 37%;
- junior officers	1,840	1,004 or 54%;
- military conscripts	36,436	20,676 or 57%;
Total invited:	40,428	Responded: 22,474 or 55%.³²⁴

From the military background echelon, 5,112 persons from the reserve composition were invited to the mobilization. By April 9, (at 6:00 hours), 790 persons or 15.4% responded (invited 259 officers, 543 junior officers, and 4,310 soldiers, and responded 17 or 6.5% officers, 56 or 10.3% junior officers, and 717 or 16.6% soldiers).³²⁵

During the mobilization, by April 11, 1992, 22,474 military conscripts were admitted into the units and institutions of the 2nd Military District, of which the majority number was admitted into the units of the 17th and 5th Corps.³²⁶

After announcement for mobilization, the units of the 2nd Military District were also making preparations for the attack, being at the full level of combat preparedness, because “**the political and security situation in the area of responsibility is further complicating**”, in addition to the control and securing “**of the vital facilities and barracks, and at**

³²⁴ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-91, Command of the 2nd Military District, Operational Team, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2082, April 8, 1992 – to the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – Operational Centre.

During the mobilization of the units of the 2nd Military District, there were problems, particularly in the 38th Partisan Division of the 17th Corps, such as “**defecting of units, the negative influence of the crisis headquarters, threats to the commander and Chief of Staff of the division, and the like**” (Ibid.).

³²⁵ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-123, Command of the 2nd Military District, Operational Duty Team, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2105, April 9, 1992, to the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY Operational Centre – for background activity Sector.

³²⁶ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-125, Command of the 2nd Military District, Operational Duty Team, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2148, April 11, 1992, to the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY Operational Centre – for background activity Sector.

the section of the frontline on undertaking of measures of increased combat security, supply and filling in of units with food, fuel and mine and explosive devices, formation of the armed units of the Sreb territorial Defence and the Ministry of Interior of the Serb Republic of Krajina.³²⁷

As of April 7, 1992, the deployment of the JNA forces, that is, the units of the 2nd Military District, was as follows:

1) **Kupres Area of Combat Activity:**³²⁸

- in the direction of Dolina (point 1.152) – village of Strazbenica was attacked by the 3rd Battalion of the 11th Partisan Brigade;

³²⁷ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-91, Command of the 2nd Military District, Operational Duty Team, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2082, April 8, 1992 – to the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – Operational Centre; Ibid., inv. No. 2-94, Command of the 2nd Military District, Operational Duty Team, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2150, April 11, 1992 – to the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – Operational Centre.

³²⁸ On April 8, 1992, in the area of Kupres, the 9th JNA Corps undertook “**the actions of cleansing of the city, offering of assistance to population and preparation for continued planning of activity at the Kupreska Vrata and the village of Malovan**” (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-91, Command of the 2nd Military District, Operational Duty Team, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2082, April 8, 1992 – to the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – Operational Centre).

During 1991, in the Kupres area a JNA unit was stationed, and its soldiers “**were heartily welcomed by the population of the Serb villages**”. Starting from this assessment, on January 17, 1992, *The Association of Serbs from Bosnia and Herzegovina in Serbia*, seated in Belgrade, approached the Federal Secretariat for National Defence, personally the Chief of Staff of the General Headquarters, general Blagoje Adzic, with the request for deployment of the military unit on the territory of the Kupres Municipality, for the purpose of the alleged “**prevention of genocide against the Serbs**”. In relation to this, Gojko Djogo, president of the Association, who, in frequent consultations with Radovan Karadzic, Nikola Koljevic, Dobrica Cosic, and others, propagated the Serb aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina, requested that the JNA establish a garrison on the territory of that municipality, “**the more so because Kupres has voted for joining the Serb Krajina**”. Namely, the aim was that the JNA units, under the excuse of protecting the Serb population on the territory of the Kupres Municipality take over, that is, conquer the Kupres Plateau, as a strategically important place (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-223, *The Association of Serbs from Bosnia and Herzegovina in Serbia*, Belgrade, January 17, 1992 – to the Federal Secretariat for National Defence - Chief of Staff of the General Headquarters (general Blagoje Adzic).

- in the direction of the village of Zlosela – point 1.120 – Kupresko field was attacked by the tank party with a volunteer platoon from Sipovo and Zloselo;
- in the direction of the village of Zlosela – point 1.156 – village of Olovo, along the road, was attacked by the 2nd Battalion of the 13th Partisan Brigade;
- a party of mortars in the area of the village of Suhovo;
- a 105 mm howitzer battery in the area of the village of Blagaj;
- the 2nd Division of the 5th Motorized Artillery Regiment in the area of the village of Mrdjanovci, point 1.154, church, and point 1.130 Novo Selo;
- in the area of Koprivnica – Carev Mlin, the 1st Battalion of the 19th Brigade of the 30th Partisan Division;
- in the areas of Donje and Gornje Vukovsko, the platoon of the TO *Vukovsko* – in the city of Kupres, the majority was held under control by the TO party “*Kupres*”.

2) **Bosanski Brod Area of Combat Activity:**

- The TO Platoon of Bosanski Brod, the eastern part of Bosanski Brod - the area of Greda;
- The TO Platoon *Lijesce* in the area of the village of Lijesce;
- The 1st Battalion of the 327th Motorized Brigade with the 1st TO platoon in the area of the village of Kobile Gornje, with the column movement towards the village of Paraslica;
- The tank party of the 327th Motorized Brigade in the area of the village of Nareci;
- The 2nd Armored Battalion of the 336th Motorized Brigade in the area of the village of Unka;
- The 3rd Battalion of the 327th Motorized Brigade in the area of the villages of Zboriste, Bosanski Luzani, the column movement in the direction of the Ukrina River;
- The TO Battalion of *Prnjavor* and the TO party of *Trstenica* in the area of the village of Kalacka, Pavlovo Brdo, with column movement along the road;

- The anti-armored platoon of the 1st Battery of the 1st Division of the 17th Mixed Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment in the area of the village of Bjelas;
- A battery of multiple rocket launchers of the 17th Mixed Artillery Regiment, in the area of the village of Polje (point 199);
- A battery of howitzer artillery division of the 337th Motorized Brigade in the area of the village of Sekici;
- The 4th Battalion of the 327th Motorized Brigade in the area of the village of Glogovaca;
- The Command of the 327th Motorized Brigade in Derventa;
- The 2nd Battalion of the 497th Engineering Regiment in the area of the village of Betnja Mala, village of Polje;
- The command place of the 1st Operational Group of the 17th Corps in the area of the village of Podnovlje (point 179).

3) Biljeljina Area of Combat Activity:

- in Bijeljina, the Command of the 38th Partisan Division, the 17th Mixed Artillery Regiment, the multiple rocket launcher battery of the 17th Mixed Artillery Regiment, and the howitzer artillery battery of the 17th Mixed Artillery Regiment, were deployed;
- in the area of the village of Janja, the 2nd Armored Battalion of the 453rd Motorized Brigade;
- the 1st Battalion of the 17th Partisan Brigade in the area of Bosanska Raca, Galistok, the village of Brodare;
- the 2nd Battalion of the 17th Partisan Brigade in the area of the village of Gornji Sepak (Zvornik);
- the 3rd Battalion of the 17th Partisan Brigade in the area of the Trpovacka hills, near Lukavac, the village of Donje Crnjelovo;
- the command place in the area of the village of Mala Obarska;
- the mortar battery of the 38th Partisan Brigade in the area of the village of Ljesnica;
- the 22nd Partisan brigade was deployed as follows:

- 1st battalion of the 22nd Partisan Brigade in the area of the village of Celopek;
- 2nd battalion of the 22nd Partisan Brigade in the area of the village of Bogutovo Selo;
- 3rd battalion of the 22nd Partisan Brigade in the area of the village of Donja Trnava;
- The command place – in the village of Ugljevik.

4) Sarajevo Area of Combat Activity:

- 49th Motorized Brigade deployed at points, as follows:
 - Area of Vratnik – a tank platoon;
 - Area of Butmir Airport – strengthened tank platoon;
 - Area of Mt. Mojnilo – strengthened tank platoon;
- 4th Mixed Artillery Regiment in the area of Koran
- 4th Mixed Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment in the village of Mokro;
- 346th Light Artillery Regiment of Anti-Aircraft Defence in the area of Trebevic;
- 216th Mountain Brigade in Han Pijesak;
- Remote Command place of the 4th Corps at Zlatiste;
- Independent units of the 2nd Military District:
 - 240th Independent Self-Propelling Rocket Regiment of Anti-Aircraft Defence;
 - 65th Motorized Regiment.³²⁹

On April 10, 1992, the JNA Podgorica Corps used heavy artillery to attack the area of Dubrave. On April 11, the JNA moved armored weapons on the relation of Bileca – Stolac – Neum and in the area of Podvezlje. On the same day, the JNA stationed around Doboj went out from the garrison in Tuzla, and was deployed along the road towards

³²⁹ Military District, Operational Duty Team, strictly confidential, no. 09/997-20, April 7, 1992, to the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – Operational Centre.

Gracanica, only under the excuse that it is securing communications. At the same time, the JNA units went into Modrica and took the building of the Municipal Assembly, the Public Security Station, the radio station, and other important points in the city. On April 12, from the direction of Rogatica, a military column of JNA vehicles arrived, which parted in Malesici, one part continuing to Ustipraca, and stationed at the bridge towards Gorazde. A part of this column was stopped at the place of Dub, and the other part moved from Mesici in the direction of Jabuka. On the same day, from the direction of Kalinovik towards Foca, there was a JNA party moving. During the night of April 13, military units, with several annons, possessed the Ostri Rat hill on the northeast side of Mostar, and blocked the southern area of the city and the *Energopetrol* gas terminal on the left bank. Around 17:00 hours on April 14, two JNA airplanes (type MIG) in a running flight broke the sound wall above Sarajevo, which caused panic among the citizenry.³³⁰

On April 17, 1992, with artillery and armored units, the JNA and the SDS armed formations surrounded Brcko, in which there was otherwise a strong military garrison, as well as Gradacac, which was “**besieged on a wider territory**”. At the crossroads towards Brcko, there were stationed armored units of the JNA. In Pelagicevo, there was a concentrated major unit of the JNA. Near the Ugljevik Thermal Power Plant, the JNA located an artillery division and a smaller tank unit. From the direction of Rogatica towards Sarajevo, Gucevska Brigade was moving along, with 45 vehicles, and then from Trnovo towards Nevesinje, a military column with 34 vehicles, and 20 vehicles towards Kalinovik.³³¹

In various parts of Sarajevo, on April 16, 1992, there was an increased movement of the JNA units, which caused the citizens to be very upset. On that day, for example, the JNA went out to Dobrinja and Mojmilo.³³²

³³⁰ *Bilten MNO*, No. 3, April 10, 1992; *Ibid.*, no. 4, April 11, 1992; *Ibid.*, no. 5, and 6, April 11, 1992; *Ibid.*, no. 11-12, April 14, 1992; *Ibid.*, no. 13, April 15, 1992; *Agresija...*, p. 25.

³³¹ *Ibid.*

³³² *Bilten MNO*, No. 15, April 16, 1992.

On April 18, two tanks and two combat vehicles went through Vogosca in the direction of *Pretis* Enterprise; from Banjaluka towards Derventa, there was a major military column moving along, composed of tanks and other armored vehicles, and in Dobož (in the city and around it), there were stationed tanks and cannons. On April 19, four JNA tanks went into the site of the *Pretis* Factory, and in Bosanski Samac, one military unit was patrolling the city and disarming citizens. The JNA units were controlling the Sarajevo Airport and did customs clearance checkups. During the night of April 22, Vlasenica was blocked with armored transporters and strong mechanized formations of the JNA. With assistance from the JNA, the power in the city was taken over by the so-called *Serb Guard*, and Bosniaks were called upon to surrender the arms. On April 24, a column of some dozen military trucks, several combat armored vehicles, two jeeps and four “pinzgauers” with attached cannons was moving from Ilijas towards *Pretis*. On April 24, 1992, a column of motor vehicles from Visoko and the village of Vratnice started toward Ilijas, and then, after a brief stopping in the village of Ljubnice, it continued towards Sarajevo along the Zenica-Sarajevo road. On the same day, from Pale, via Trebević, towards Sarajevo, a military column started including tanks. In the area of Borijje, the JNA was burying tanks and armored transporters. On April 25, in Bratunac, a tank JNA unit was stationed, which, together with the numerous armed Serb formations, committed mass crimes against the Bosniaks, plundering their private property and hauling it away into Serbia on trucks. Using the 82 mm and 120 mm mortars from the village of Borici, the JNA was destroying the Muslim villages of Potocari, Pale, Budak, Pecista, and the like. On the same day, near the crossroads at the entrance from Vogosca, the JNA grouped artillery weapons, targeting Semizovac. The soldiers from Rajlovac, who had been there until then, were replaced by the JNA with armed Serb formations. On April 26, one party from the 216th Mountain Brigade was brought to secure the Vogosca crossroads, assigned to “secure” the *Pretis* Factory. On April 27, one military transporter from Sarajevo was sent towards Foca.³³³

³³³ Ibid., no. 20-21, April 18, 1992; Ibid., no. 22-23, April 19, 1992; Ibid., no. 33, April 24, 1992; Ibid., no. 35 and 36, April 25, 1992; AIIZ, inv. No. 2-110, Command of the 2nd Military District, Operational Duty Team, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-

On April 28, a military column of three armored transporters, one tank and three jeeps full of soldiers, started from Kalinovik towards Foca. In the area of Livno, the JNA was burying and hauling over new weapons, it used heavy artillery destroying Tomislavgrad, and on the direction of Bileca-Sokolac, a long column of military vehicles was moving along. On the broader territory of Mostar and Neum, on April 30, new military JNA forces were arriving. On the same day, a column of military vehicles with trailers passed through the Sarajevo's Airport Residential Area. With assistance of the JNA, which supplied various arms and heavy artillery to them, the armed formations of the SDS on the territory of Konjic had conquered the key points and were attacking the city.³³⁴

In the village of Biljevo – Semizovac, on May 1, three cannons were hauled over, targeting Visoko. From Banjaluka towards Derventa a column of 20 vehicles started with well armed manpower, and with 15 big caliber cannons.³³⁵

In early May 1992, the JNA units in Mostar, together with the “*seseljenci*”, possessed the by-pass main road above Mazoljice, Brankovac and Bjelusine. There they stationed numerous batteries of lighter and heavier mortars, cannons, anti-aircraft machineguns, and other weapons. Above the main road, on Mali Kuk below Mt. Velez, and in Gostina Suma on the neighboring Stolac hill, tanks and cannons of various calibers were buried. Artillery nests were also placed next to the Northern Camp. The army batteries with tanks, cannons and multiple rocket launchers were stationed in Bisce Polje (in the southern area of the city). The JNA barrels from the Hum and Brkanovo hills also had the city of Mostar as if on the palm of a hand.³³⁶

2501, April 26, 1992 - to the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY - Operational Centre, and others; The Daily Report, no. 2, April 26, 1992; **Agresija...**, pp. 29-30.

³³⁴ Ibid., no. 40, April 28, 1992; Ibid., no. 42, April 28, 1992; Ibid., nos. 44-45, April 30, 1992; The Daily Report, No. 5, April 29, 1992, and no. 6, April 30, 1992.

³³⁵ *Bilten MNO*, Nos. 46-47, May 1, 1992.

³³⁶ Ibid., nos. 46-55, May 1-6, 1992.

In the first half of May, 1992, movement of military convoys along the Olovo – Kladanj – Vlasenica, Bijeljina – Tuzla – Doboj and Doboj – Tuzla – Bijeljina routes was increased. Furthermore, the JNA had located a larger number of tanks, armed transport vehicles, mortars and anti-aircraft weaponry. An armoured battalion and two mortar batteries were located in the Zelina, Vukane and Osmaci areas, while an armoured unit led by Colonel Tacic (who had come to the Dubrave airport in 1991 with his unit, from Jastrebarsko in Croatia) was stationed in the environment of Papraca (on the border between the Kalesija and Sekovici municipalities).³³⁷

The stationing at Sarajevo Airport had continued in the second half of May 1992, where, simultaneously, Arkan's (*arkanovci*) and Seselj's (*seseljevci*) men had arrived. Helicopters had landed in Lukavica on several occasions, in order to leave loaded in the direction of Kalinovik.³³⁸

At the end of May 1992, the bridges in Ilidza (Sarajevo) were held by Serb "reserve formations" from Valjevo, Aleksandrovac and Aleksinac (all Serbia). Simultaneously, 50 Montegrins arrived in support of the Serb extremists from Vogosca. Some 300 special troops from Nis and Novi Sad arrived to the Sarajevo borough of Grbavica, committing various crimes.³³⁹

From September 1991 through March 25, 1992, the JNA – prepared by the 4th Corps – had scouted hills, gradually positioning itself on the principal strategic points around Sarajevo, on the Lukavica – Vidikovac – Brus – Pale – Borije – Hresa – Mrkovici – Poljine – Vogosca – Zuc – Brijesce – Rajlovac – Ilidza line. On that occasion, senior officials of the JNA had determined the sites where artillery weapons with calibres from 12.7 mm to 155 mm, dug trenches, and organized a system fire,

³³⁷ **Dnevni izvjestaj**, No. 15, May 9, 1992. Units of the JNA had committed numerous crimes in the area of Kalesija, burning down villages, while the population was fleeing for Tuzla. Several houses and mosques were hit by the aggressor before the attack had been stopped by defenders of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

³³⁸ *Ibid.*, no. 26, May 20, 1992; no. 27, May 21, 1992; no. 28, May 22, 1992; no. 29, May 23, 1992; no. 30, May 24, 1992; no. 31, May 25, 1992; no. 32, May 26, 1992.

³³⁹ *Ibid.*, no. 33, May 27, 1992; no. 38, June 1, 1992.

so that **“in every moment of day or night, all vital objects in the city can be covered by both sniper and artillery fire, and loyal manpower mobilized and trained”**. The actions were led by General Vojislav Djurdjevac with the following officers: Colonel Ratko Djukanovic, Lieutenant Colonels Petar Simovic, Radislav Cvetkovic and Jovan Bartula, Major Dragojlo Tosic, accompanied by retired Lieutenant Colonel Tadija Manojlovic and Major Janko Trivic, who had mobilized **“loyal manpower and trained them”**.³⁴⁰

The Commander of the 4th Corps, with a group of senior officials, had secured **“all units at the Sarajevo Garrison and the region. With senior officials – from section chiefs to high-ranking officers – a detailed assessment of possible directions and ways of action was made. Liaisons were also checked several times”**.³⁴¹

The stationing of the Army on the hills and around Sarajevo, the preparedness to fire by the 346th Light Artillery Regiment in the rayon of Sarajevo airport, as well as of Bruse, the setting of guns at Mount Trebevic and other localities, as well as military transfers and an increased presence of military vehicles, had caused anxiety with the inhabitants of Sarajevo. The Command of the 2nd Military District claimed these were **“regular JNA activities”**. At the beginning of April, on the slopes of Sarajevo, as well as at Mokro, Vucija Luka and Trebevic, artillery of the JNA had **“dug itself in”**, **holding the city and the suburbs in a ring**. These units had possessed all the coordinates of attack localities and important sites in the city, even before April 1992. Back then, the State Security Service of Bosnia and Herzegovina had possessed knowledge of the **“flattened at first attempt”** of the strategic police station at Zlatiste (in immediate vicinity of the road to Trebevic), which had proven to be a correct claim – Zlatiste was literally flattened by artillery; armoured transport vehicles of the JNA had been set at Mojmiilo hill in the night of April 3.³⁴²

³⁴⁰ Agresija ..., p. 51.

³⁴¹ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-75, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly conf. 908-1, March 20, 1992. “Personally to the Chief of Staff”.

³⁴² Ibid., Agresija ..., p. 18, Posebno izdanje, no. 2, April 28, 1992.

Units of the JNA had “secured” all important communications and objects on the whole territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was then that the units of the JNA had blocked the main checkpoints at the entry into and exit from Sarajevo.³⁴³

Based on available data, one can confidently claim that the siege of Sarajevo, aimed at its occupation, was carefully prepared in the high military circles of the JNA, and with full cooperation by the SDS. Doubtless facts – as well as the formation of artillery around the city – speak of this.

On the northern side, i.e. at the Mrkovici – Vogosca line, the aggressor had set an enforced artillery squadron of five batteries (one battery of 120-mm mortars, gun batteries of 105- and 155-mm, a canon battery of 76-mm and a battery of 128-mm grenade launchers of the *Plamen* type; whereas the first four batteries consisted of six weapons each, and the grenade launcher battery of four weapons). Furthermore, 3-5 batteries were distributed by the aggressor in a wide arch from Tihovici towards Olovo. To support all these batteries, one tank batch of 10 tanks (mostly T-55, M-84 and T-34) had been used by the aggressor.³⁴⁴

On the Rajlovac – Doglodi – Otes – Ilidza line, the aggressor had distributed an almost identical artillery squadron. The link between the Mrkovici – Vogosca line and this one had been secured by a mixed artillery squadron at Paljevo. This sector had included 105-mm and 155-mm howitzer batteries at Samin Gaj, Vlakovo and Ahatovici.

The aggressor had carried out a major concentration of armoured forces consisting of a tank battalion and a combined armoured/mechanized battalion. Two howitzer gun batteries were stationed at Ilidza, with the majority of forces in this area located at Butile and the Plandiste region.³⁴⁵

On the route - Vraca and the corner of Milinkladska and Ozrenska street - Colina Kapa, the aggressor had placed four batteries (one trench

³⁴³ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-169, Military Post 5027, Inventory 25/142-760, Sarajevo, April 16, 1992 – “Personally to the Commander”

³⁴⁴ *Prva linija*, Magazine of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, No. 2, February 1, 1993; pp. 2-3.

³⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

mortar battery of 120 mm, one cannon battery of 76 mm and two howitzer batteries of 105 and 155 mm), as well as battalion fire groups with four trench mortar platoons of 82 mm and a cannon platoon with four fieldpieces. On the crossing between Kasindolska and Milinkladska Street, two batteries of 122 mm caliber artillery were placed. Similar batteries were dug in on the Gavric hill and on the polygon above the village of Gornji Kotorac.³⁴⁶

On the route Borije-Faletici-Gornje Biosko, and on the fire positions Borija, Zecija Glava, Debelo Brdo and Gornje and Donje Biosko, three batteries were placed (trench mortar battery of 120 mm, howitzer battery of 155 mm and a cannon battery of 100 mm). Deep inside the territory of Mokro an artillery racket brigade of rackets against shielded vehicles was placed on vehicles BOV-83 and cannons of 100 mm T-12 (this brigades ammunition is placed in the warehouses of Zoimerc). For each group of such weapons a battery of racket throwers was added.³⁴⁷

The most modern instruments for the tracking and navigation of artillery were located in the underground objects on Mount Jahorina, installed by JNA troops on the eve of the aggression. These objects were secured by machineguns and cannons on the outside.³⁴⁸

The Greater Serbia aggressor had, apart from artillery, also used a large number of anti-aircraft defence weapons in the siege of Sarajevo. The attack on Sarajevo had been carried out with, among other things, 5600 pieces of artillery, 110 tanks and 180 armoured transport vehicles.

At the end of 1992/beginning of 1993, the aggressor had turned more than 2100 heavy weaponry and anti-aircraft weapons towards Sarajevo. 35 weapons were distributed per kilometre of frontline, which compares to the biggest concentration of weapons remembered in the history of warfare and equalling 25 weapons on one side.³⁴⁹

³⁴⁶ Ibid.

³⁴⁷ Ibid.

³⁴⁸ Ibid.

³⁴⁹ Ibid.

The aggressor had willingly concentrated enormous quantities of weapons in order to fully isolate Sarajevo from the “rest” of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the world (including physical, telecommunication and media blockade). The aim was to occupy the capital – with all its state, government, scientific, educational, cultural, media and other institutions – and to cut it off from the body of Bosnia and Herzegovina, hence destroying all the insignia of its statehood, together with and particularly the Bosniak people. That way it was the aggressor’s intent to change the ethnical map of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in order to insist upon the recognition of a state introduced by force in political negotiations.³⁵⁰

It is interesting to point out that the combat distribution of the aggressor does not match classical formations, but in a “mealy” manner, allowing them to attack all parts of the city and the positions of the soldiers of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The distribution had been carried out at heights, enabling direct and semi-direct shooting.³⁵¹

Speaking in terms of combat engineering, the artillery positions of the aggressor were well defined and masked. Certain important positions also included model cannons. Reserve positions were also well assembled.³⁵²

The crews and weapons on combat positions were protected by landmines in front of and on the side of commando activities, whereas protection was also strengthened by activities of heavy infantry weapons (particularly recoilless guns of 12.7 mm as well as M-84 machineguns).³⁵³

In the preparations for the siege of Sarajevo, the aggressor had established total control of all the vital communications, ensuring communications for the supply of ammunition; as well as a liaison system etc. Supply was mostly carried out from Serbia and from warehouses in the Koran – Pale area, as well as from the “Pretis” warehouse, and the Lukavica barracks.³⁵⁴

³⁵⁰ Ibid.

³⁵¹ Ibid. Yet the problem lie therein that it was not possible to carry out simultaneous artillery and lateral firing.

³⁵² Ibid.

³⁵³ Ibid.

³⁵⁴ Ibid.

Infantry, artillery and mechanized units of the JNA have, in cooperation with the fifth-column armed formations of the SDS, closed “**all accesses to the city**” on April 6, 1992.³⁵⁵

Immediately, brigades were set up at all access points to the city (at the Stup junction, Ilidza, Krivoglavci, Ilijas, etc.), organized by JNA troops and held together with SDS armed groups. For example, in Krivoglavci (on the Zenica – Sarajevo highway), there was a gun manned by army troops and the barrel directed towards gridlocked buses.³⁵⁶

It is obvious that the strategic points around Sarajevo, on the eve of the aggressor’s attack onto the city, were under total control by the JNA and the numerous members of the Serb armed formations, which were well interconnected, well armed, as well as provided with other material-technical means.

Related to the siege of Sarajevo, it is also interesting to point out the fact that, in mid-1992, the aggressor had held five frontlines in the direction of Pale. The first one was at Grbavica and Vrace where, together with local Serb fascists, “*arkanovci*” were also to be found, as well as members of the other armed formations from Serbia and Montenegro. That line was, at that moment, held by some 200 aggressor soldiers. The second line was at Osmice, held by the Serb formations from Vojkovići, from Pale, as well as groupings of locals (250 men). The third frontline was covered by members of the Uzice corps, whose headquarters were located at the mountaineering centre at Celina, and there were also a hundred tanks at their disposal. The fourth frontline had encompassed the belt from the Jahorina/Sarajevo junction on Mount Trebević towards Mount Jahorina and the TV tower on top of Mount Trebević. Some 200 soldiers, mostly from Pale, had parented the heavy artillery stationed there. The fifth frontline was related to the localities of the “Jahorina” hotel and to the military objects on Ravna Planina, where artillery with barrels turned towards Gorazde had been settled.

³⁵⁵ Posebno izdanje, no. 2, April 28, 1992. “**On that day, the miners, workers, housewives, students, pupils and citizens from Bosnia and Herzegovina departed for Sarajevo to protest against the war. Immediately after Karadzic’s order, barickades had been set up on all access points to Sarajevo (Krivoglavci, Stupska petlja, Ilidza, Ilijas, and others)**” (Ibid)

³⁵⁶ Ibid.

This unit included some hundred soldiers from Pale, and some further two hundred from Serbia. Around 500 aggressor soldiers and 500 locals had held positions in the Jahorinski potok creek. The aggressor's soldiers had occupied the localities of Varda, Brda and Glatke njive, on the Foca – Gorazde – Pale municipal boundary. This unit should also possess artillery weapons. Additional *Chetnik* formations were located at the Koran cemetery, as well as Rudo Brdo, whereas there were 300 aggressor soldiers at Renovica (100 locals, and the rest from Serbia and Montenegro). At Hresa, Gornje and Donje Biosko there were around 500 aggressor soldiers, with 500 "White Eagles" at Pale, headquartered at Borike, with 500 "*arkanovci*" settled at the Scout Home and in the "Turist" hotel. At Lapisnica, there were around 200 "special forces" of Radomir Kojic, with 200 "Serb policemen" securing the whole territory of Pale.³⁵⁷

An important fact which illustrates the preparation of the aggression on Bosnia and Herzegovina by the supreme military and political leadership of the SFRY and Serbia is the construction of a military hospital at Sokolac and the procurement of medical and sanitary equipment and specialist health workers for its needs. At the end of 1991, for the needs of a war hospital, a 7000-sq.m building had been constructed at Sokolac. To this effect, the Government of the "Serb Autonomous Region" of Romanija and its defence minister, Major Dragomir Krstovic, had requested on February 10, 1992 (strictly confidential 10-8/92), personally from the President of the Government of the Republic of Serbia ("**to the attn. of dr. Radoman Bozovic**"), the provision of "**2 helicopters to be used in the transport of the injured and the sick**". Starting from the assessment that, even though they did have a pilot, a technical crew and a heliport at their disposal, they would still not be able to ensure "**necessary personnel, technical equipment and medical machinery**", and hence, in order to have as few losses as possible, Major Krstovic had begged the Serbian Prime Minister for these two helicopters.³⁵⁸

The Government of the Republic of Serbia had solved the mentioned request in the affirmative, and provided the requested helicopters to the

³⁵⁷ **Dnevni izvjestaj**, no. 94, July 27, 1992.

³⁵⁸ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-77, so-called *Government of the Serb Autonomous District of Romanija - Ministry of Defence*, strictly conf. marked 10-8/92, February 10, 1992. – To the President of the Government of the Republic of Serbia.

Military Hospital in Sokolac. In August 1992, there were 4-5 helicopters situated in the vicinity of the heliport at the Military Hospital at Romanija.³⁵⁹

On February 10, 1992, the Government of the “Serb Autonomous Region” of Romanija had requested assistance from the Federal Department of Defence, the Command of the 2nd Military District, from the Defence and Health Ministries of the Republic of Serbia, and others, requesting medical equipment “**as soon as possible**” for the needs of its military hospital, whereas the doctors, technicians and other military personnel were to be provided from “**the territory of the ‘Serb Autonomous Region’ of Romanija and the City of Sarajevo**”; the documents state Dr. Sava Novakovic, assistant Health Minister of the Republic of Serbia and Dr. Jelena Radojkovic of the Defence ministry, as coordinators for the supplies project.³⁶⁰

In mid-March 1992, the “**hospital had been almost completely formed**”. The Military Hospital in Sarajevo and the Municipal Assembly of Sokolac were the project-carrying parties. This had, in fact, presented practical preparations for the dislocation of the military hospital from Sarajevo to Sokolac and Pale, where several teams of surgeons had been transferred.³⁶¹

Related to the fact that there were not enough material means and qualified personnel in the Sokolac hospital, its management had constantly requested the authorities in Sarajevo and Belgrade to provide it to them. Hence did Lieutenant Colonel Radovan Dobras, on April 7, 1992, create a list of “**needs in staffing and material**”? Related to staffing, Dobras requested: a transfusiologist, a medical technician – transfusioner, two anaesthesiologists, a neurosurgeon, a vascular surgeon, an orthopaedist, two general surgeons, an X-ray team, a pharmacologist, a lab pharmacologist, five instrument operators, a doctor of internal medicine

³⁵⁹ AIIZ, inv. No. 3-1289/1

³⁶⁰ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-76, *Government of the Serb Autonomous District of Romanija - Ministry of Defence* strictly conf. marked 10-9/92, February 10, 1992. – To the Assistant Federal Secretary for National Defence, and others.

³⁶¹ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-75, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly conf. 908-1, March 20, 1992. to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY “Personally to the Chief of Staff”; Ibid., inv. No. 2-494, Telefax by Military Post 1018 Sokolac, no. 35368 of April 7, 1992.

and two medical officers for the Command of the Unit. Regarding material, the mentioned Lt. Col. requested 500 pieces of blood transfusion sets; blood tests; RTG films and complementary equipment (both upon estimate); 500 blood doses; ACD solution or some other blood conservator; 200 bottles of Hemacol; 200 LGX 24%; 200 Amin-sterile; 200 Glucosalinae 10%; 500 Longacef or Linocef 2,0; 500 Klindamicyn 0,6; 1.000 Penicillin crystal à 1.000.000 mg; 20 Halotan; 30 nitrate-oxid bottles à 3 kg; 60 oxygen bottles à 3 kg; a cardiograph; heart function monitors (minimum 2); respirator gases, 50 external fixators for lower and upper extremities and blood vessel prostheses (upon estimate by vascular surgeon).³⁶²

The Greater Serbia aggressor and its collaborationists had devoted special attention in using medical institutions in criminal purposes and organizing their blockade and taking over of equipment and medicaments. Hence, on the immediate eve of the aggression, Lieutenant Tomislav Tausan had “**distributed**” a minor units of 25 military policemen dislocated from Zagreb, Croatia. Their immediate commander was a certain First Class Captain Labudovic, who had died during the aggressor's attack on Skenderija, as well as lieutenants Obrad Gvozdenovic and Kostic. Apart from the machine gun nest, placed on the top of this institution, there were many snipers shooting from hospital rooms and corridors as well. For example, during the night of May 4th, 1992, a special unit from Nis fired their guns from the Military hospital, using patients as a living shield.³⁶³

³⁶² AIIZ, inv. No. 2-495, Telefax by Military Post 1018 Sokolac. no. 011-645-961, april 1, 1992; Ibid., inv. No. 2-493, Telefax by Military Post 1018 Sokolac, april 7, 1992; Ibid., inv. No. 2-494, Telefax by Military Post 1018, Sokolac, no. 35368, april 7, 1992.

Colonel Dobras requested the “**urgent**” transfer of the people of following speciality:

1. Captain 1st Class Dobrijevic, for laboratory operations;
2. Ensign Slobodan Mraoric, medical technician – transfusionist
3. Dragan Popovic – X-ray operator
4. Dragan Mirosavljevic – qualified electrician
5. Captain Dragan Ilic, “**with all the keys**” [sic], (Ibid.).

³⁶³ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-803; Ibid., inv. No. 3-326; *Bilten MNO*, br. 51, May 6, 1992; **RATNI ZLOCINI U BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI**, a Report by Amnesty International and the Helsinki Watch, Antiwar Campaign – Croatia – Centre for peace, non-violence and human rights, Dokumenti series, No. 2 (Croatian version) Zagreb 1993; **Agresija....**, p. 38, AIIZ, inv. No. 2-538; Ibid., inv. No. 3-2827.

The first and the second floor of Sarajevo Army hospital was taken by JNA from 15th of April 1992, (*Bilten MNO*, no. 13, 15th of April 1992)

Several doctors of Serb nationality of the Sarajevo Military hospital had actively taken part in the preparation and execution of the aggression on Bosnia and Herzegovina. Putting themselves into the service of the Greater Serbia ideology, they had stolen the most modern military equipment and documentation from the hospital, and taken it with them to Sokolac.³⁶⁴

On May 1, 1992, **“valuable equipment of the hospital was removed by JNA troops”**. On May 10, much modern weaponry was discovered on the premises.³⁶⁵

Interestingly, the Military Hospital in Sarajevo was fully engaged in the Aggression of the JNA on the Republic of Croatia. This institution had organized treatment for soldiers and officers injured in the aggression on Croatia. Hence, for example, 93 injured have been treated from July to September 1991 (47 severe and 46 light injuries); with 68 in October (28 severe and 40 light injuries). Furthermore, many surgical teams from Sarajevo had been “temporarily” working at the Medical Centre in Bosanska Gradiska and the Military Medical Centre in Banjaluka.³⁶⁶

The way in which apartments, barracks and other JNA objects in Bosnia-Herzegovina were sold, especially the conditions of sale, point to the preparations of the aggression on Bosnia-Herzegovina. Military apartments could have hence been bought, instead through long-term credits, under extremely attractive conditions. This way, JNA members became apartment owners overnight; in a plot organized by the JNA and Serb officials of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including its Vice President, Dr Miodrag Simovic.³⁶⁷

In the beginning of 1992, the Command of the 2nd Military District had carried out an action to sell several military objects, including the *Jajce*

³⁶⁴ Ibid; AIIZ inv. No. 2-535, **Uloga KOS-a u agresiji na Republiku Bosnu i Hercegovinu** (by the Interior Ministry of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina), p. 10; AIIZ, inv. No. 2-803. Dr Tausan had met General Djurdjevac on May 10, 1992, saying that **“we’ll fuck [sic] their *Ustasha* [Croat, pejorative] and *Balija* [Bosniak, pejorative] mothers, we’ll show them who’s above, just thank God we got out of there alive and well”** (AIIZ, inv. No. 3-317)

³⁶⁵ **Agresija ...**, pp. 36 and 41.

³⁶⁶ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-489-492.

³⁶⁷ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-785; M. Kreso, aforementioned work, pp 23-24.

barracks, and the former Military hospital in Sarajevo which was, as a building from 1864, enjoying national heritage status. General Kukanjac assessed there were interested parties, **“yet without the money to pay for it; other games are indeed possible [...]; we’re looking for a costumer and yes, we’ll probably find one...”** as the Commander himself said. Since **“probably a part of the schools were to be dislocated as well”**, a part of them were also to be sold **“ASAP”**, as one must count with the possibility of **“obstructions at a certain point”**.³⁶⁸

For the Marshall Tito barrack campus, the JNA had, for example, requested 50 billion dinar from the City of Sarajevo, where a similar yet much better complex, housing the Military Medical Academy in Belgrade, was constructed for only 5 billion dinar.³⁶⁹

³⁶⁸ AIIZ, inv. No. 2-75, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly conf. 908-1, March 20, 1992 to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY “Personally to the Chief of Staff”.

³⁶⁹ M. Kreso, aforementioned work, p. 24.

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