THE AGGRESSION AGAINST THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

- PLANNING, PREPARATION, EXECUTION -

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THE AGGRESSION
AGAINST THE REPUBLIC OF
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VOLUME TWO
1. The “Yugoslav People’s Army” – Army of Yugoslavia

In order to realize and conceal the Greater Serbia project, the leadership of the Greater Serbia movement focused on “concrete ‘cooperation’ with the representatives of the Serb people and with the Serb people as a whole”, particularly with the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in attempts to present it as involved in a conflict. Thus it ensured that, during the aggression against Croatia, it could carry out manoeuvres and movements of JNA forces through Bosnia and Herzegovina, “which was of vital importance to the JNA”. Among other things, this enabled the “mobilization in Serb parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina to be very successful”. In this way, they resolved and, “at least to a certain extent, mitigated the problems in the JNA caused by the failure of mobilization in the other parts of the country”.1

In the assessment of the mentioned leadership, and particularly of the military one, the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina were one of the cornerstones for the formation of the common state of all the Serbs. Therefore, General Kadijevic believed that “without Yugoslavia there would be no integral state of Bosnia and Herzegovina” (“...that there will be no integral Bosnia and Herzegovina outside the Yugoslav state...”).2

1 V. Kadijevic, MOJE VIDJENJE RASPADA VOJSKA BEZ DRZAVE, Belgrade 1993, p. 147.

2 Ibid., p. 146; D. Domazet, ULOGA JNA KAO SRPSKE IMPERIJALNE SILE U BOSANSKOHERCEGOVACKOM RATU, Hrvatski Vojnik, February 1998, p. 6. In relation to this, he “invested major efforts to have the leaderships of Bosnia and Herzegovina both before the after the multi-party elections change their attitudes towards Yugoslavia and to understand that without Yugoslavia there will be no integral state of Bosnia and Herzegovina”. In this way, using even military means, General Kadijevic sought to impose on the part of the Bosnian-Herzegovina leadership, mostly
In accordance with such assessments, on July 29, 1991, General Kadijevic had sent a threatening letter to the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, demanding it to immediately repeal the Decision on Non-Sending of the July Cycle of the Recruits into the Commands, Units and Institutions of the JNA outside the Territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.3

At the meeting with the leadership of Bosnia and Herzegovina on December 24, 1991, in Sarajevo, General Kadijevic presented the positions on the role of the JNA in the current political situation in Yugoslavia.4 He developed those positions “more specifically” in relation to Bosnia and Herzegovina, pointing out, among other things, that “the Army shall not dictate solutions by using arms”, “that no creation of armed formations beyond the Ministry of Interior and JNA forces may be allowed. Any attempt at creation of paramilitary formations must be prevented in a most energetic manner [...] Bosnia and Herzegovina has the duty to meet its obligations towards the Yugoslav People’s Army, starting from recruitment, all the way to funding”, etc.5

the Bosniak one, the concept of the future Yugoslav state, that is, Greater Serbia. In this, he excluded any idea of existence of the integral state of Bosnia and Herzegovina (V. Kadijevic, the aforementioned work, p. 146).


4 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2818, Federal Secretariat for National Defence, Cabinet of the Federal Secretary, Belgrade, December 26, 1991, NOTE from the presentation of the Federal Secretary for National Defence, General of Army Veljko Kadijevic, at the meeting with the leadership of SR Bosnia and Herzegovina, held in Sarajevo, on December 24, 1991.

Kadijevic’s positions on the role of the JNA in the current political situation in the country did not correspond to the actual situation in Yugoslavia. Namely, they involved the use of empty phrases, such as for instance, assessments that the JNA “shall not use force in order to impose political solutions”, and that the basic tasks of the Yugoslav People’s Army at that point in time were “to prevent further expansion of inter-ethnic conflicts and to ensure conditions for the most peaceful possible disentanglement of the Yugoslav crisis” (Ibid.).

5 Ibid. “The more specific” development of those and other positions by Kadijevic in relation to Bosnia and Herzegovina was, unfortunately, just a setup, and that for a
As he “noticed” that the positions from the presentations of the leaders of Bosnia and Herzegovina were “non-coordinated and conflicting”, based on the positions presented during the discussion, the Federal Secretary formulated a number of conclusions and objectives that did not correspond to the factual situation.6

number of reasons. He spoke about “inter-ethnic conflicts”, and the units under his command were destroying Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is shameful and false his most energetic (sic) prevention of any attempt “to create paramilitary formations” at the time when it was exactly the regular JNA units in Bosnia and Herzegovina that were en masse arming and creating Serb formations. The conclusion about the necessity to investigate crimes “on the war torn territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina” and to conduct criminal procedures against the perpetrators is infantile.

6 Ibid. Formulated at the time of conclusion of peace in Croatia, and transferring of the conflict into Bosnia and Herzegovina, “these conclusions and objectives” fully stated:

“1) the key point for the overall pacification of the situation in the country is the cessation of war and creation of conditions for the resolution of the Yugoslav crisis in a peaceful way. The cessation of war is the basic precondition for the arrival of the United Nations peace forces onto the crisis territories. The lessons from the war being waged warn that an expansion of the war conflicts onto other parts of the country needs to be prevented at any cost.

2) The supreme principle of any military organization is that the army must always have a Commander. The Yugoslav People’s Army shall still be commanded by the Supreme Command and the Presidency of the SFRY as the Supreme Commander. We have not acted autonomously even earlier, nor have we accepted such action although even the European Community has insisted on that in a way. The JNA shall not accept the obligation and the responsibility of the institutions of political powers for bringing of political decisions.

3) The bodies of the Ministry of Interior of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the security organs of the JNA should, within a couple of days, determine the number, force and location of the paramilitary formations on the territory of BiH and undertake efficient measures for their disarmament. The successful execution of this task shall create the precondition for a peaceful resolution of the problem in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

4) The Yugoslav People’s Army, within the scope of its responsibility, shall offer assistance in organizing the return of displaced persons, not only onto the territory of East Herzegovina, but also onto all territories from which displacement has been executed.

5) It is necessary to investigate the crimes on the war-torn territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and institute legal procedures against their perpetrators.
In assessing further developments, the leadership of the Greater Serbia movement believed that, once Croatia had been “abandoned”, they should have “a strong JNA presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina”. This allegedly “corresponded to any realistic political option for developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as to the need for existence of ready and strong forces on the border to the Serb Krajina, as a guarantee that Croatia too would respect Vance’s plan”.

One of the JNA objectives, after its defeat in Slovenia, in addition to the “defence” of the Serb people in Croatia, and the evacuation of its garrisons from that republic, also consisted in conquering the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. To that goal, after the unsuccessful aggression (“adventure”) in Slovenia, two JNA corps from the territory of Slovenia were dislocated, mainly, into Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly to the border area towards Croatia. One brigade was transferred to Zenica, in an area where the Greater Serbia aggressor had concentrated numerous manpower and equipment. JNA forces from Slovenia and

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6) It is necessary that the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Military Industry Sector and the SSNO Background Sector form a joint working group (team) that will most directly handle the issues of the overall economic cooperation.

7) The authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the security bodies of the JNA shall establish mutual obligations and resolve disputed issues related to implementation of the Decision of the Presidency of the SFRY on Securing Federal Commodity Reserves by the JNA on the territory of this republic” (Ibid.).

7 V. Kadijevic, the aforementioned work, p. 147. In relation to this, General Veljko Kadijevic claims that this assessment was a proposal of the military leadership, with which “the Presidency of the SFRY” agreed and adopted the proposal (Ibid., p. 148). However, this was not even the “original” assessment of the military leadership, but of the Greater Serbia leadership, headed by Milosevic, whose assessments and proposals were executed in practice by the military leadership.

8 Ibid., pp. 147-148.

9 V. Kadijevic, the aforementioned work, p. 93. This objective, according to Kadijevic, consisted in “full control” of Bosnia and Herzegovina, “with the ultimate goal of defending the Serb people and its ethnic rights” (Ibid.). In the aforementioned defence of the Serb people and its ethnic rights, in fact, Veljko Kadijevic is deftly concealing the silent occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the open aggression which was executed later on. The Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina needed no defence or protection, because absolutely no danger threatened it at all.
Croatia had arrived into the broader area of Bileca, with much equipment, particularly artillery and anti-tank weapons and ammunition (parts of the Rijeka Corps arrived in Bileca and Kalinovik).\(^\text{10}\)

In September 1991, from Serbia and Montenegro, two JNA corps (the Uzice and Podgorica ones) penetrated into Southeast Bosnia and Herzegovina.\(^\text{11}\) Some 10,000 armed soldiers arrived in the area of Mostar.\(^\text{12}\)

\(^{10}\) Dnevni izvjestaj o agresiji i terorizmu protiv Republike Bosne i Hercegovine, Information Office of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereinafter referred to as: Dnevni izvjestaj), no. 74, July 7, 1992; AIIZ, inv. No. 2-175, Military Post 5027 Sarajevo, confidential no. 32/205-28, April 8, 1992 – to Military Post 8248 Knin, and others; Ibid., inv. No. 2-510; Ibid., inv. No. 2-793; Ibid., inv. No. 2-2129; Oslobođenje, April 5, 1992; \(\therefore\) THE WAR CRIMES IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, Reports of the Amnesty International and Helsinki Watch (hereinafter referred to as: \(\therefore\) THE WAR CRIMES IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA), Anti-War Campaign Croatia, Centre for Peace, Non-Violence and Human Rights, Dokumenti Library, no. 2, Zagreb, 1993, p. 199.

\(^{11}\) AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2128; Ibid., inv. No. 2-2809, Testimony of the chief of staff of the 216th Mountain Brigade, JNA Colonel Major Asim Dzambasovic.

The penetration of the „reservists” from Serbia and Montenegro was done on September 19, 1991, when a Montenegrin mixed brigade arrived to the Mostar Airport, with complete manpower and equipment, in full formation composition. The brigade was of mixed composition, with manpower from northern Montenegro, and from the neighbouring places of East Herzegovina. Their external emblems were like the Chetnik ones (cockades, Serb national caps, big knives, etc.) – AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2130.

The Podgorica and Uzice Corps made up the Operational Group headed by General Jevrem Cokic (chief of staff of the headquarters was General Pavle Strugar). The command of the OG was in Trebinje, and for the Uzice Corps, it was in Nevesinje. The commander of the Uzice Corps in 1991 was general Milan Torbica (AIIZ, inv. Nos. 2-5325, and 2-2130).

The Uzice Corps, in early 1992, was dislocated into the area of Foca, Gorazde, Visegrad and Bratunac, with the command in Visegrad. The duty of commander was taken over from Milan Torbica by General Ojdanic, and Torbica, instead of General Ratko Mladic, was appointed commander of the Knin Corps (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-5325).

\(^{12}\) Ibid. The penetration “of a number of JNA compositions from the Titograd and Titovo Uzice corps, in whose composition there was a large number of reservists from the SR [Socialist Republic of] Montenegro”, caused “further complication of the political and security situation in Herzegovina”. The conduct of a number of members of the reserve composition of the JNA from Montenegro, in addition to their irregular military appearance (unshaved, without complete equipment, non-military
These two corps, with the participation of a number of Serb and Montenegrin armed formations, started the attack on Dubrovnik on September 30.13

In late 1991, a part of the JNA units from Croatia were dislocated onto the territory of Bosanska (Bosnian) Krajina. With the UN peace negotiations, the JNA military forces from one part of the Croatian front (the part of Croatia marked as “pink” zones) were dislocated into Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly to Tuzla, Derventa, and Brcko. Also, once the agreement on leaving Macedonia had been reached (in early March 1992), a part of the JNA units were dislocated into Bosnia and Herzegovina, too. In addition, on the eve of the aggression, a large number of “reserve soldiers” and “volunteers” from Serbia and Montenegro were present in Bosnia and Herzegovina.14

Directly before and at the beginning of the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina (in late 1991 and early 1992), the following JNA corps were stationed on its territory, within three military districts (Second, First, and Fourth):

a) mother corps in the organizational and formational structure in Bosnia and Herzegovina: 4th (Sarajevo), 5th (Banjaluka), and 17th (Tuzla);

b) once the relocation of commands, units and institutions of the JNA from Slovenia and Croatia was complete, the organic composition of the 2nd Military District also included the following newly formed

behaviour, drunk, etc.), first during the transport through settlements, and then at the campsite and in the urban areas (Capljina and Stolac), particularly insolent and rude behaviour and treatment, caused a revolt and reaction by the Croat and Muslim population, which mostly inhabited these socio-political communities. Thus, for instance, there were cases of open nationalist behaviour and singing of Chetnik songs, opening of fire from firearms, breaking into shops and non-payment for the items purchased, and the like (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2456).

13 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2129.

14 Dnevni izvjestaj, no. 74, July 7, 1992; AIIZ, inv. No. 2-175, Military Post 5027 Sarajevo, confidential, no. 32/205-28, April 8, 1992 – to the Military Post 8248 Knin, and others; Ibid., inv. No. 2-510; Ibid., inv. No. 2-793; Ibid., inv. No. 2-2129; Oslobodjenje. April 5, 1992; RATNI ZLOCINI U BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI, p. 199.
corps: 13th (Rijeka, and then Bileca), 10th (Bihac), parts of the 9th (Knin), and the 5th Corps of RV and PVO;

c) and, parts of the Maribor, Knin, Zagreb, Podgorica, Uzice, Valjevo, and Novi Sad Corps, as well as certain forces of the war air forces and anti-aircraft defence and the Military Naval District.15

Of the total of seventeen corps of the JNA on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, fourteen of them were partially or fully stationed there, carrying out offensive combat activity against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, committing numerous crimes, including the crime of genocide against the Bosniaks. By the size in manpower and weapons, the strongest ones were the Bihac, Banjaluka, Knin, and Tuzla Corps, whose parts, among others, had also participated in the aggression against the Republic of Croatia. Their resources were: a manpower of over 100,000 officers and recruits; some 900 tanks; over 1,000 armoured transporters and other combat vehicles; then several thousand of various artillery support weapons; certain number of fighter airplanes (some 100) and helicopters (some 50); a number of rocket

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15 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-169, Military Post 5027 Sarajevo, inv. No. 25/142-760, April 16, 1992 – Attn. Commander; Ibid., inv. No. 2-2870, Command of the Bileca Corps, strictly confidential, no. 32, April 19, 1992, Bileca – to all artillery units, Order for Artillery Activity; Ibid., inv. No. 2-793 /Information of the General Staff of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina/, Resources of the Aggressor Forces on the War Front of Bosnia and Herzegovina; Ibid. inv. No. 5352, Record, Supplement to the Testimony by Dj. Dj.; Testimony of the JNA Colonel major Asim Dzambasovic, given to the author; N. Durakovic, PROKLETSTVO MUSLIMANA, Sarajevo 1993, p. 253; A. Draganovic, the aforementioned work, p. 5; M Kreso, CINJENICE KOJE UKAZUJU NA AGRESIJU NA REPUBLIKU BOSNU I HERCEGOVINU OD STRANE SAVEZNE REPUBLIKE JUGOSLAVIJE I NJENIH POMAGACA (manuscript), Sarajevo, 1993, pp. 6, 8, and 14; I. Radakovic, BESMISLENA YU RATOVANJA, Belgrade 1997, pp. 126-127; I Divjak; JEDINSTVENI U OCENI GLAVNIH KRIVACA ZA RAT, In. F. Ademovic: JNA BEZNADJE ZLA, Sarajevo 1997, p. 259; D. Domazet, the aforementioned work, pp. 11-12, and 14, note 21; Z. Suljevic, POLITICKO-VOJNA SITUACIJA UOCI AGRESIJE NA BOSNU I HERCEGOVINU (manuscript), pp. 84, 85, and 91-92. Based on the documents available, it is not possible to determine the exact number of corps and other JNA forces, nor an exact number of aggressor soldiers, nor the numbers and types of weapons and arms that Serbia and Montenegro had engaged in the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This will only be possible once all the original matter is available from all the commands, units and institutions of the JNA.
regiments, and other equipment, as well as huge quantities of war reserves. Thus, on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the JNA had a powerful military force and a huge war and forceful military industry potential, wherein a high concentration of manpower and weapons was present. All these human and material resources, used for the silent occupation of the Republic, were directly directed and commanded by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of SFRY in Belgrade, which was in service of the Greater Serbia movement, under the leadership of Slobodan Milosevic.16

The JNA also manoeuvred with a portion of the aviation units, by their transfer from the airports in Bosnia and Herzegovina to the airports in Serbia and Montenegro. West from the Drina River, the aviation units remained at the airports of Banjaluka, Glamoc, Prijedor, and Udbina. The VOJIN system retained its deployment on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina such as it was before the beginning of the aggression, it was fully activated and the reserve positions were prepared for manoeuvring the mobile systems. Special attention was paid to the anti-aircraft defence system around Banjaluka. It was integrated, reinforced, and then activated. All the currently available command places and communications centres were set into function.17

In addition to the huge quantities of modern weapons, ammunition, equipment and other material and technical resources that the JNA had at its disposal, at the time of “setting the war fire ablaze” in Croatia, and on the eve of the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federal Secretariat for National Defence and the Federal Secretariat for Interior had imported huge quantities of armament and equipment from Lebanon. Namely, in mid-1991, seven ships “arrived” to the port of Bar, containing 15,000 tons of armament and military equipment. According to some assessments, this arsenal could supply an army of a medium-sized country with 100,000 soldiers.18

16 Ibid.
17 Z. Suljevic, the aforementioned work, pp. 84-85.
18 Oslobodjenje, February 27, 1992. The sender of the aforementioned “cargo” is from Cyprus, and the “cargo” was loaded on board in Beirut.
The mentioned human resources, including many Serb armed formations as well as the materially and technically efficient JNA, have, according to the decision of the army and police command of the SFRY and the political and state government of Serbia and Montenegro and following a silent occupation, been placed in the function of executing the aggression on Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this way, on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the biggest force in the world was concentrated in such a small space. Simultaneously, the JNA has placed all the militant fascistic formations from Serbia and Montenegro, including the military formations of the SDS fifth column in Bosnia and Herzegovina, under its command.

Bosnia and Herzegovina had also had strong capacities of military industry, as an important strategic component of military power. Starting from the assessment that the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was anticipated as the central area for providing ultimate defence in a potential aggression against the SFRY, numerous strategic military infrastructure facilities were built on its territory after WWII, together with radio transmitter hubs, war command places, warehouses of ammunition, fuels, basic and various other supplies, and other equipment, then warehouses of the SFRY war reserves, and the majority part of the special-purpose military industry.19

There was much confusion about how and why this dangerous cargo found itself in the Adriatic Sea, particularly whether its destination was the port of Bar or some of the northern ports. For days, ships with Lebanese arms were docked in the waters of the Montenegrin coastal area, because, according to the director of the Federal Customs Administration, Dr. Radoslav Sekulic, before they were to be unloaded, certain papers needed to be obtained for storage in the port of Bar from the competent federal authorities. Starting from the „assessment” that the former owner has allegedly lost the right of disposal, because he had not taken over the dangerous materials within the given timeframe, and given that the warehousing timeframes in late 1991 had expired (it was that date that the permits of the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs, Federal Secretariat for Interior, and Federal Customs Administration were valid until), which meant that “all the conditions were there for them (i.e. the weapons) to be transferred into the ownership of the state of Yugoslavia” (Ibid.).

19 I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, p. 127. The following military industry enterprises existed in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Pretis, Pobjeda, Slavko Rodic, Slobodan Princip – Seljo, Igman, Bratstvo, Rudi Cajavec, Famos, Zrak, Soko-Vazduhoplovstvo, and the overhaul institutes of Orao, Hadzici, Kosmos, and Travnik (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2727, Incorporated Industry of Arms and Military Equipment of Yugoslavia, no. 3-29, January
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, they had also built a command infrastructure, able to act even under conditions of a nuclear war. On the territory of Sarajevo, there was a command place for operational strategic commanding, and around Han Pijesak (underneath Mt. Zep), there was a command place for strategic operational commanding. In Foca and Konjic, there were underground facilities built for operations of military or civilian federal institutions. In the Mt. Bjelasnica region, there was a communications centre built of large capacities, connected with smaller centres and TV relays and transmitters. There was also a network of airports built with radar and other installations – airports near Bihac and Mostar (with underground hangars), Tuzla, Banjaluka, and an airport for civilian aviation near Sarajevo.20

In the planning and preparation of the crime and participation in the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the most senior military leadership and the command staff of the JNA were engaged:

- **Federal Secretary for National Defence**, General Veljko Kadijevic (born in Imotski, Croatia, a “Yugoslav” by ethnicity);

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20 I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, p. 127.
- Chief of Staff of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of SFRY and Acting Secretary for National Defence, General Blagoje Adzic (born in Gacko, Bosnia and Herzegovina, a Serb);

- commander of the 2nd Military District, General Milutin Kukanjac (born on Mt. Zlatibor, Caietina Municipality, Serbia, a Serb);

- commander of the 4th (Sarajevo) Corps, General Major Vojislav Djurdjevac (born in Pec, Kosovo, Serbia, a Serb);

- commanders of the 5th (Banjaluca) Corps, General Nikola Uzelac (born in Croatia, a Serb), and General Vladimir Vukovic (born in Serbia, a Serb);

- commander of the 10th (Bihac) Corps, General Major Spiro Nikovic (born in the vicinity of Bar, Montenegro, a Montenegrin);

- commander of the 5th Airborne Corps, Colonel Branko Sovagovic, born in Zagreb, Croatia, a Serb);

- commanders of the 17th (Tuzla) Corps, General Savo Jankovic (born in Cetinje, Montenegro, a Montenegrin), and General Milan Nedeljkovic (born in the vicinity of Nis, Serbia, a Serb);

- commanders of the 9th (Knin) Corps, General Savo Kovacevic (a Montenegrin), and General Ratko Mladic (born in the village of Bozinovici, Kalinovik Municipality, Bosnia and Herzegovina, a Serb);

- commander of the 13th Corps (Bileca), General Major Momcilo Perisic (born in Gornji Milanovac, Serbia, a Serb);

- commander of the 4th Military District (Podgorica), General Pavle Strugar (born in the vicinity of Pec, Kosovo, Serbia, a Montenegrin);

- commanders of the 37th (Uzice) Corps, General Milan Torbica (born in Lika, Croatia, a Serb), and General Dragoljub Ojdanic (born in Titovo Uzice, Serbia, a Serb);

- commander of the 2nd (Podgorica) Corps, General Radomir Eremija (born in Croatia, a Serb);

- commanders of the Republic Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of SR Bosnia and Herzegovina: General Milos Bajcetic (born in Gacko, Bosnia and Herzegovina, a Serb), and General Drago Vukosavljevic (born in Sokolac, Bosnia and Herzegovina, a Serb);
- chief of staff of the Infantry Training Centre, “Marshall Tito”, in Sarajevo, General Milos Baros (born in Bosansko Grahovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, a Serb);

- officers at duties of commanders of brigades and municipal headquarters of Territorial Defence, and many others, who had special roles and significance in preparation and launching of the aggression.\(^{21}\)

It is obvious that all the key positions in the structure of the JNA in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina were assigned to officers who, except for generals Adzic, Mladic, Bajcetic, Vukosavljevic, and Baros, were from Serbia, Montenegro, and Croatia (none of them was either a Bosniak or a Croat). Also, the leader of the Serb Democratic Party in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Radovan Karadzic, was born in Montenegro.\(^{22}\)

Directly before the beginning of the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina, under the excuse of conducting of military exercises, the JNA had taken all the strategic positions, possessed the vital facilities around cities and settlements, fully controlling all the major communications (road and railway intersections), whereby it blocked the whole traffic in between cities and populated places. At the same time, the JNA was settling artillery armament, installing machine gun nests and guards, made fortification lines at all the strategic points around the cities, displacing

\(^{21}\) Dnevni izvjestaj, no. 7, May 1, 1992; AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2643, Command of the 5th Corps; strictly confidential, no. 15-163, September 3, 1991 – to the Command of the 30th Partisan Division „R”; I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, p. 31 and 126; D. Domazet, the aforementioned work, p. 12; F. Heco, ULOGA JUGOSLAVENSKE NARODNE ARMije U AGRESIJI NA BOSNU I HERCEGOVINU (a manuscript of a Master Thesis), Faculty of Political Sciences, Sarajevo 2000, p. 80 (note 164) and 81 (note 165).

\(^{22}\) I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, p. 30. The issue of ethnic structure of the officer composition on the command posts in Bosnia and Herzegovina, first of all, the command of the army and the command of the corps, was one of the disputable issues in the discussion held by general Veljko Kadijevic with the leadership of Bosnia and Herzegovina on December 24, 1991 (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2818, Federal Secretariat for National Defence, Cabinet of the SSNO, Belgrade, December 26, 1991, NOTE…). The domination of the Serbo-Montenegrin personnel was rightfully causing mistrust and suspicion with the majority part of the then state and political leadership of Bosnia and Herzegovina (I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, p. 31).
soldiers and the majority of heavy artillery out of the barracks, hauling over new weapons, fuel, ammunition and other material and technical resources, whereas in certain areas, particularly in Bosanska Krajina, East Herzegovina, and Bosanska Posavina, it massively mobilized the Serb population.23

In mid-April 1992, on the whole territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, according to the strictly confidential documents of the JNA (marked “MILITARY SECRET”), JNA units were “securing major communications and facilities, and were also blocking the main checkpoints into and out of Sarajevo… The units of the Knin, Bileca and Podgorica Corps were successful in conducting combat activity”. Together with the collaborationist units of the Serb Territorial Defence and police forces, Tactical Group 17 possessed all the “vital facilities” in Bosanski Samac. On April 17, a part of the forces of the 17th Corps held Bosanski Samac, and “the artillery possessed the positions in order to prevent the crossing across the Sava River from the Republic of Croatia”.24

Together with the collaborationist Serb armed formations, the JNA units possessed the transmitters of RTV (Radio and Television) Sarajevo at Mts. Kozara, Pljesivica, Majevica, Vlasic, Velez, and other


places. Thus the vascular system of the Republic’s radio and TV network was cut off, so information was mainly reduced to the Sarajevo-Zenica basin. By the end of May 1992, the JNA had taken over the intersections and other specific communication facilities, blocked and disconnected the links of the Ministry of Interior and the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and disconnected and cut off the telephonic, postal and telegraphic communications, radio and TV signals.\textsuperscript{25}

From the circular background of the blocked cities, the aggressor began an attack by firing from all the arms and weapons, including the armoured-mechanized forces and aviation, as well as use of poisonous gases, on all the infrastructural facilities in populated places, in order to paralyze the life of people, inflict massive loss, cause panic and force the existing authorities in power to capitulate.\textsuperscript{26}

The JNA units directly participated in planning and preparation of the crime, and directly in the aggression and other forms of crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus, for instance, during the attack on Kozarac (343\textsuperscript{rd} Motorized Brigade from Prijedor), only on May 27, the JNA had executed 800 people and deprived 1,200 of their freedom.\textsuperscript{27}


\textsuperscript{26} \textit{Agresija...}, p. 22; AIIZ, inv. No. 2-793; N. Durakovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 279-280.

\textsuperscript{27} \textit{INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR FORMER YUGOSLAVIA} (hereinafter referred to: \textit{ICTY}), Case: No. IT-94-I-T, Evidence of the testimony by the JNA Colonel O.S., June 5, 1996, pp. 57-58; \textit{Slobodna Bosna}, June 19, 2003, p. 17. This crime was discussed on May 27, 1992, at the reporting with the commander of the 1st Krajina Corps in Nova Gradiska (building of the Penal and Correctional Home, Croatia), when Colonel Dragan Marcetic (chief of staff of the operational training body of the corps command, duty officer of the leading team for that day in the Corps), reported to General Momir Talic (commander of the Corps), that on that day in Kozarac 800 people were killed, and 1,200 were arrested. On that occasion, a minor incident happened in communicating this information, because Colonel Osman Selak (commander of the 993rd Background Base of the JNA) was the only Muslim at that meeting. Namely, when General Momir Talic heard the information about the number of the killed Bosniaks, unaware, he turned his eyes towards Osman Selak, and asked Colonel Dragan
Pursuant to the order of General Momir Talic, these units were commanded by Major Radmilo Zeljaja.  

On June 1, 1992, General Momir Talic ordered the formation of a concentration camp at Manjaca, for 2,500 people, for which all the preparations were to be made. The retired Colonel Major Bozo Popovic was assigned as commander of the camp.  

While the JNA, led by the “Supreme Command”, was participating in the aggression against Slovenia, Croatia and in particular against Bosnia and Herzegovina, the territory of Serbia and Montenegro was its strategic base and background with complete logistical support. This involved the efforts of the government and other bodies of these republics, “unreservedly and heartily” assisting their collaborationist creation.

Marcetic: “You meant to say that 80 people died, and so you write in your report please”. Unfortunately, the fact is that on that day “over 2000 Muslims were killed [and arrested] in Kozarac”. Just like in Prijedor, these crimes were committed by the 343rd Motorized Brigade of the JNA, with the newly formed Serb war brigades (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2559, A letter by the JNA Colonel O.S. to Muharem [Krzovic]; ICTY, Case: No. IT-94-I-T, Evidence of the testimony by the JNA Colonel O.S., June 5, 1996, pp. 57-58).

ICTY, Case: No. IT-94-I-T, Evidence of the testimony by the JNA Colonel O.S., June 5, 1996, pp. 59-60. It was after the name of this commander that Kozarac was later renamed into Radmilovo.


S. Cekic – M. Kreso – B. Macic, GENOCID U SREBRENICI, “SIGURNOJ ZONI” UJEDINJENIH NACIJ, JULI 1995, Sarajevo 2000, pp. 465-470. The Republic of Serbia “was unreservedly and heartily assisting the Serb Republic”, offering it “major assistance”. This support, according to the Communiqués by the Government of the Republic of Serbia dated May 11, 1993, was motivated by the clear belief (“firmly believing”) “that a just strife is being waged in Republika Srpska for the freedom and equality of the Serb people” (Ibid., pp. 465-466). On the same day, the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia also, “in analyzing the consequences that have arisen from the decision of the Assembly of the Republika Srpska in Pale not to accept the Vance-Owen Plan”, issued the Communiqué among other things stating that the Federal Government is “forced […] to adjust all the future assistance to Republika
financed from the funds of Serbia and Montenegro. Its material securing, in addition to the war reserves, was ensured from their own resources (fuel, food, and other items). The military industry on the territory of these republics also worked for its needs.31

The political support to the aggressive war activity of the JNA from Serbia and Montenegro was intensive and multi-faceted. The front line and the “liberated” areas were visited by the members of the “Supreme Command”, ministers of the republic governments, delegates of the republic assemblies, municipal presidents, leaders of political parties, representatives of the Serb Orthodox Church, and many others.32

After the JNA had occupied the largest part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, after May 1992 (i.e. after the declarative withdrawal of the JNA), the Yugoslav Army provided the majority of technology and sources required by its collaborationist army (“Army of the Serb Republic of BiH”). This assistance and support was systematic and broad, and consisted of: direct participation in the aggression (combat operations), aircraft and anti-aircraft support, communications, intelligence, logistical, staffing, financial and medical support.33

Srpska to its objective economic capacities and to limit it exclusively to food and medicine” (Ibid., p. 467). On that day, May 11, 1993, in the capacity of the President of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, among other things, stated (to the TANJUG news agency) that Serbia “has offered very much of assistance to the Serbs in Bosnia” and that “it is a heavy burden for it in terms of the assistance going for Bosnia” (Ibid., pp. 468-469).

Obviously, in 1993, the relevant factors of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia admitted participation in the aggression and other forms of crime in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. By stating that the Serbs in Bosnia, thanks to the big assistance from Serbia, “have accomplished the majority of what they had wanted to”, Slobodan Milosevic explicitly admitted that this accomplished the goals for the purpose of which the aggressive war was being waged against Bosnia and Herzegovina (“The majority of the territory in former Bosnia and Herzegovina now belongs to the Serb provinces”) – Ibid., pp. 468-469).

31 I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, p. 168.
32 Ibid.
The Army of Yugoslavia supplied its formations in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia not only with war equipment, armament and other material resources, but it also staffed them with officers, soldiers and whole units, and funded that whole personnel. The organization, supply and use of these forces against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina were in the jurisdiction of the General Staff and the regime in Belgrade.34

In cooperation with its collaborationist formations (“the Army of the Serb Republic of BiH”, and the “Army of the Republic of Serb Krajina”), the Army of Yugoslavia was directly involved in the military operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly in Eastern Bosnia (December 1992 – August 1995),35 then around Sarajevo (in the siege of the City, particularly in the period of October 1993 – September 1994),36 and Western Bosnia (particularly in July – November 1994).37

RV i PVO, as a single system of anti-aircraft defence of the Army of Yugoslavia and its two collaborationist armies, was involved (through the participation of manpower – pilots, equipment – helicopters, training of the army and fighter pilots at airports in Serbia, etc.) in the aggression and other crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina.38 To this goal, the Army of Yugoslavia also used its secret communications and radio technical surveillance, offering even in this way significant assistance to the “Army of Republika Srpska”, as well as the intelligence and security systems.39

Numerous active officers (active military personnel) and employees as members of the Army of Yugoslavia were engaged in the “Army of the Serb Republic of BiH”. In particular in 1993, they were increasingly

34 Dz. Sarac, Surova Strategija Nasilja, in: F. Ademovic, the aforementioned work, p. 122.
35 ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraphs 411-418.
36 Ibid., paragraph 419.
37 Ibid., paragraphs 421-424 and 428-433.
38 Ibid., paragraphs 434-435.
39 Ibid., paragraphs 436-442.
individually calling for the resolution of their status in the Army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.40

The officers of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (JNA/VJ) had “voluntarily” joined the “Army of the Serb Republic of BiH”. In order to secure the officers for service in the “Army of the Serb Republic of BiH”, the General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia adopted certain benefits.41 The Army of Yugoslavia, among others, also trained the military personnel of the collaborationist Army of the Serb Republic of BiH.42

“In order to assist the Army of Republika Srpska and the Republic of Serb Krajina”, pursuant to the approval by the president of the Republic of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, the Army of Yugoslavia organized and executed training of the reserve composition of volunteers in the Special Unit Corps of the Army of Yugoslavia.43

A number of the officers of the Army of Yugoslavia were officially serving this army, where they also made their career, while in essence

40 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2670, Command of the 30th Light Infantry Division, confidential, no. 964-2, August 8, 1993 — to the Command of the 19th Partisan Brigade, and others. “The Principal Headquarters of the Army of the Serb Republic of BiH”, in the enactment no. 28/16-764, dated July 5, 1993, offered the response to this question and forwarded it to the lower ranking units, and among other things, it stated as follows:

“- Given that the General Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska and the General Staff of VJ are working on identification of a systematic solution for a single procedure in resolving the status of all the active military personnel and the employees who are members of the Army of Yugoslavia engaged in ‘The Army of Republika Srpska’, there is no need to file individual applications for regulation of the status in the Army of Yugoslavia” (Ibid.).

41 ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraphs 450-451.

42 Ibid., paragraph 450.

43 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2872, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, chief of staff of the General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia, Cabinet of the chief of staff of the General Staff, strictly confidential, no. 1734-1, September 29, 1995 – to the Military Cabinet of the President of Yugoslavia; Ibid., inv. No. 2-2872, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, chief of staff of the General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia, /strictly confidential, no. 1734-1, September 29, 1995/ – to the President of SR Yugoslavia, Mr. Zoran Lilic, Report on the Training of Volunteers in the KSJ (Special Unit Corps). For more details on this, please see: pp. 941-947 (notes 244-251), and 964-966 (notes 282-289) of this work.
being deployed into the “Army of the Serb Republic of BiH”. The Army of Yugoslavia managed the human resources (administrative services) for the officers of the “Army of the Serb Republic of BiH”, as well as employment contracts and pensioning issues. In July 1992, there were some 26,000 such officers in Bosnia and Herzegovina, paid by the Army of Yugoslavia.

Throughout the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had assisted its collaborationist creation of the Republic of Serb Bosnia and Herzegovina. This assistance flew on a daily basis, without any blockage, across the Drina River.

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia financed professional JNA officers, unranked officers, contracted soldiers, and active civilian personnel in the JNA/VJ, who participated in the aggression and other forms of crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including provision of food and clothing. All of them were continuously receiving salaries from the JNA/VJ in Belgrade.

The Army of Yugoslavia had even subjected its medical capacities (Military Medical Academy in Belgrade, and other institutions), as well as health insurance to its aggressive goals. The members of this

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44 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2876, DECREE no. 1/2-01-001/94-39 of the PRESIDENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA DATED SEPTEMBER 30, 1991; ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraphs 454-455. General Stanislav Galic and many others were officers of the Army of Yugoslavia (MP 3001, the 30th Personnel Centre of the General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia in Belgrade) – Ibid.

45 ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraphs 434 and 974.

46 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2889, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Supreme Council of Defence, State Secret, no. 12-4, August 26, 1995, Belgrade, NOTE from the meeting of the presidents of the highest political and military leaderships of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republika Srpska, held on August 25, 1995, in the residential building of the Army of Yugoslavia in Dobanovci, pp. 8, 11, and 14. At the aforementioned meeting in Dobanovci, Bishop Irinej Bulovic, among other things, “advocated for the silent revoking of the blockade on the Drina River. He was responded by Slobodan Milosevic that this blockade is only a formal one, and that the assistance is flowing across [the river] on a daily basis” (Ibid. ).

47 ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraphs 457-458 and 687.
army, as well as of the “Army of the Serb Republic of BiH”, including the police of the Ministry of Interior of that collaborationist creation, and the numerous formations and groups from Serbia and Montenegro, as well as foreign paid soldiers, who had participated in the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, used the medical and health care institutions of the Army of Yugoslavia.48

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia also offered the overall medical protection of the wounded and diseased members of the “Army of the Serb Republic of BiH” throughout the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina. From 1991 through 1995, the Military Medical Academy in Belgrade had treated 6,834 injured and 7,895 diseased brought from the war territories of the Kninska Krajina (Croatia) and Bosnia and Herzegovina. These figures do not encompass the injured and diseased from the “Army of the Serb Republic of BiH” who had gone through triage medical centres of the Military Medical Academy, and continued treatment in other health care institutions in SR Yugoslavia.49

The aggressor forces were constantly filled in with manpower and material and technical resources from Serbia and Montenegro, as well as from the territory of the Krajina Serb Autonomous District. In addition to that, as needed, particularly in the period from late 1992 and early 1993, the aggressor had also engaged the special purpose formations from the Special Unit Corps in Nis.50

The major forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina were engaged by the aggressor on the territory of the Bosanska Posavina area and in the siege of Sarajevo, and some accessory ones in Podrinje, Doboj and Vrbas - Kupres front lines, and then in Eastern Herzegovina, and on the right bank of the Una river in the direction of Cazinska Krajina.51

48 Ibid., paragraph 459. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-3030, Public Security Centre of Zvornik, Department for Foreign Nationals, Administrative and Personnel Affairs, No. 01-16-02/1-350/95, November 6, 1995, Police Precincts of Sekovici, Vlasenica, Milici, Bratunac, Srebrenica and others.

49 I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, p. 168.

50 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-793.

51 Ibid.
In Bosanska Posavina (around Gradacac and Brcko, and in some sections of the Brcko-Loncari-Bosanski Samac road), in order to conquer Gradacac and expand the Brcko-Loncari-Modrica corridor and merge Serbia with the Bosnian Krajina and Kninska Krajina, the aggressor engaged armoured – mechanized compositions in the strength of six brigades. The support to these forces was provided by the artillery grouped in three cannon and howitzer division artillery groups of calibres 122 to 155 mm, two rocket divisions *Luna R-65*, and organic artillery in the compositions of brigades-battalions.\(^\text{52}\)

In order to conquer Sarajevo, inflict mass losses in life to the population, holding of the civilians isolated from the world and other areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina and prevention of elementary existential sustenance needs (food, water, power, gas), the aggressor held the city in siege, devastated and destroyed it, with forces of total power of seven brigades from the composition of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps (which amounted to a total of some 10,000 soldiers). According to the data available, the aggressor provided support to these forces with some 120 tanks, 39 armoured transporters, 38 howitzer cannons, 27 *Praga* guns, a number of anti-aircraft guns with one or three barrels, of 20 mm calibre, and other artillery weapons for support.\(^\text{53}\)

The basic objective of the activity by the aggressor forces on the accessory directions was to conquer territories and to establish the power authorities of the collaborationist Republika Srpska, to be exclusively populated by the Serb people. In order to realize this, the aggressor executed genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law, primarily against the Bosniak population.

The Serb forces on the Doboj and Vrbas-Kupres front lines were supported by the aggressor with organic artillery from brigades and with individual rocket divisions *Luna R-65*, whereas in Podrinje they also used organic artillery from the engaged brigades, in addition to

\(^{52}\) Ibid.

\(^{53}\) Ibid. The data available, nevertheless, do not offer the possibility to assess the exact number of the Serb soldiers, and arms and weapons, which were engaged for the purpose of conquering Sarajevo.
the corps artillery from the territory of Serbia (from the areas of Bajina Basta, Ljubovija, and Mali Zvornik).54

Under the excuse of the alleged risk to the Airport in Mostar, on September 19, 1991, the JNA units of the Uzice and Podgorica Corps, filled in with a large number of reservists from Serbia and Montenegro, penetrated into Bosnia and Herzegovina, following which they possessed the Eastern and Central Herzegovina, and thus started an open aggression.55

In the first half of October 1992, the aforementioned JNA units and the Serb “volunteer forces”, commanded by general Radomir Eremija (commander of the Podgorica Corps), who had commanded the units in East Herzegovina, destroyed and levelled the village of Ravno in the Trebinje Municipality, together with some dozen surrounding villages, expelled some thousand and killed a number of Croat civilians.56 On October 13 and 14, returning from the Banjaluka area to their homes,

54 Ibid.

55 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2130; D. Pusonjic, POSLJEDNJI “TALAC” JUGOSLAVIJE, Bosna i Hercegovina ogledalo razuma, Belgrade 1992, pp. 55-57; M. Kreso, the aforementioned work, p. 6. The command place of the Uzice and Podgorica Corps was in Kifino Selo near Nevesinje.

56 Agresija …, p. 1; :: GENOCID U REPUBLICI BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI, Pravna Misao (a magazine for legal theory and practice), no. 5-8, Sarajevo, May-August 1992, pp. 274-177; M. Kreso, the aforementioned work, p. 7; K. Rotim, ODBRANA HERCEG-BOSNE, Volume 2, Siroki Brijeg 1998, pp. 155-157. After the devastation and burning down of the village of Ravno, with a Croat majority population, the JNA did not allow any access into the village. They did not even allow in the members of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or the European Monitoring Mission, with the explanation that their safety can not be guaranteed. Before the aggression, the village had had 120 houses, and now it looked horrible, whereas the JNA stated that they were only executing their task. “On cruel Herzegovinian stone, there was just a huge black burned down site which was still slightly smouldering”. On this occasion, the church had also been destroyed (Agresija…, pp. 1-2).

Starting from the assessment that a crime against civilians was committed in the village of Ravno, the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina formed a mixed state commission, headed by Prof. Dr. Ejup Ganic. After the Commission had seen a part of the village only, Dr. Ganic stated that this was “horrible… All the houses we have seen are destroyed, burned down or hit with missiles… There are also some unburied people there…” (Ibid.).
while passing through Tuzla and Kalesija, the reservists from Serbia were shooting on mosques.\textsuperscript{57}

From the very beginning of the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in order to provide support to the land forces, the JNA was also intensively using aircraft forces – aviation and helicopters. Thus, due to the lack of defence aviation that was exclusively owned by the JNA,\textsuperscript{58} from the very beginning of the aggression, Bosnia and Herzegovina was a training ground for the Greater Serbia pilots. As they had no opponent in the air, they even made up to 45 or 50 flights per day. At this, they dropped all types of aviation bombs and missiles, ranging from cassette bombs, which when throw out hundreds of smaller grenades on touchdown, to be later activated when touched or when the battery is emptied; up to flammable and devastating aviation bombs named “hogs”, weighing from 250, 500 up to 1,000 kg; and then napalm and impact explosive bombs; as well as air-to-land missiles. Over Jajce, Gradacac, and Visegrad, the aggressor threw phosphorus and napalm bombs, and in other cities, chemical irritants were used.\textsuperscript{59}

In the period from April 1992, until January 30, 1993, the JNA aviation made 3,150 flights, of which 2,700 were by October 11, 1992, and 450 flights were made after the adoption of Resolution 781 of the UN Security Council, banning flying over Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this way, the fascist regimes in Serbia and Montenegro were audaciously confirming in front of the whole world their engagement and involvement in the aggression against an autonomous, independent, and internationally recognized Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Of the total number of the aforementioned flights, 95% were flights with use of fire on the facilities on the ground. The aggressor made the majority of the flights over civilian targets and densely populated urban areas, lasting even

\textsuperscript{57} Oslobodjenje, October 14, 1991. On their way through Tuzla, on October 13, 1991, the reservists from Serbia used rifle gun fire onto two buses, damaging them, and onto the minaret of the Jalska Mosque, which caused fear and bitterness of the residents of Tuzla. On the next day, the reservists from Serbia inflicted damage on the Miljanovci Mosque in the area of Kalesija (Ibid.).

\textsuperscript{58} Agresija ..., Volume I, p. 7.

\textsuperscript{59} AIIZ, inv. No. 2-793; Prva linija (the magazine of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina), no. 1, December 8, 1992, p. 12.
up to 70 minutes, throwing out even up to several tons of bombs. The aggressor was also using agricultural airplanes converted for carrying of airborne lethal devices, as well as fighter jet planes types *Jastreb J-21, Mig-21,* and *Orao.* 60

Agressor aviation took off mainly from Banjaluka Airport, but also from the airports and heliports in Serbia, Montenegro and occupied parts of Croatia. These airports are: Ponikve near Titovo Uzice, Ladjeveci near Kraljevo, Batajica, Nis, Sombor, Pristina, Podgorica, as well as Udbine (in the Republic of Croatia). From the second half of 1992, the JNA aviation also used the airport in Glamoc, from where on September 19, 1992, it bombed even the broader areas of Bihac and Cazin, directing the deathly cargo in the form of “cassette bombs” and air-to-land missiles, mainly targeting the Bosniak residential areas and economic facilities. 61

During August and September 1992, on a number of front lines in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the aggressor used aviation. Thus, on August 3, the JNA aviation threw three “cassette bombs” of huge devastation power onto the area of Mt. Igman. 62 On the next day, a number of times, the aggressor aviation violated the air space of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. On that day, 22 take-offs were registered from Banjaluka, and the airplanes were using “hogs” and “cassette bombs” densely targeting Mts. Rogoj, Igman, Bjelasnica, and the town of Trnovo. 63 The activity

60 Ibid.


62 *Agresija* ... Volume II, p. 15. The airplanes dropping off their deathly cargo took off from the airport in Podgorica. Otherwise, even before August 3, and later on as well, JNA airplanes took off from this airport, and executed combat activity in Bosnia and Herzegovina. On June 23, 1992, in a closed meeting with the opposition, Momir Bulatovic (president of Montenegro) admitted that the Podgorica Airport is being used for taking off of airplanes for lethal actions in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Ibid., p. 59).

It is interesting to point out that in the second half of June 1992, the Montenegrin daily *Pobjeda* stopped publishing obituaries mentioning that Montenegrins have been killed in the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Ibid.).

63 Ibid., pp. 17-19. On the same day, the aggressor airplanes exerted combat activity on the territory of the Zepce Municipality, by firing six missiles (Ibid.).
of JNA aviation, bombing Tesanj on August 7 (using “hogs”, air-to-land missiles, and napalm bombs), wounded many civilians and caused broader material damage. On September 9 and 19, from the Banjaluka Airport, the aggressor aviation made over 34 flights in various directions. Stronger activity was registered in the area of Medjedja, Orahovo, and Gorazde, where, dropping off “hogs” and “cassette bombs”, they caused death and injuries to civilians, as well as large-scale devastation.

On September 12, 13, 14, and 15, 1992, JNA aviation carried out combat activity targeting the free territories of Brcko, Gradacac, Gracanica, and the settlements in the valley of the Drina River. Napalm and “cassette” bombs were used to devastate many economic and residential facilities on the territory of Brcko, where bombing caused death to 25 persons, including a pregnant woman and 12 children, whereas 32 civilians were injured. The JNA airplanes, which on September 15, took off twice from the Banjaluka Airport, targeted “cassette bombs” and air-to-land missiles the Bihac residential areas of Sokolac, Vinca, and Zaluzje. On September 17, on several occasions, the aggressor’s aviation bombed the territory of the Gorazde municipality, causing large number of civilian casualties, as well as large-scale material damages and devastation. In an effort to break the resistance of the defenders of Zepa, in addition to the artillery weapons available, the aggressor also used aviation, attacking civilians. In the attack on free territory of the Srebrenica Municipality, the aggressor also invited aviation, so that aircrafts twice in a row dropped off “cassette bombs” and the so-called “hogs” onto the positions of the soldiers of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As the aggressor did not succeed to penetrate the defence lines in Jajce, it resorted again to the use of aviation, which bombed targets in the city and the suburban settlements twice. Flammable bombs were used to cause a number of fires, and their extinguishing was largely made harder from incessant firing onto the fire brigade members. In the second wave, aggressor airplanes threw poisonous gases onto urban areas. On September 18, on the Brcko front line, the aggressor used flammable missiles onto civilian targets of the free territory of Brcko, causing devastation to the residential area of Brka, and inflicting burns

64 Ibid., p. 18.
65 Ibid., pp. 37-38.
on a number of civilians and setting dozens of houses on fire. In bombing of many cities in Bosnia and Herzegovina by the JNA aviation on September 19, only in Brcko thirty one civilians were killed (twelve women, eight children and eleven men). On September 20, the free territory of the Brcko municipality, populated by some 40,000 civilians, was the site of a fierce air attack, with use of “cassette” and napalm bombs, causing death of forty two civilians and injuring eighty six. On September 24, in Jajce, on five occasions, fighter planes threw down their deathly cargo onto this city, using “cassette” and napalm bombs, mainly in major residential areas and in the very centre of the city. Yugoslav army airplanes also exerted activity onto the area of Velika Kladusa. On September 26, 1992, the aggressor made 30 avionic takeoffs (27 from the Banjaluka Airport, and 3 from the Batajnica one), targeting the village of Kardagljije near Tesanj and the cities of Jajce and Vitez (Slobodan Princip Seljo factory). On that occasion, the aggressor used the following weapons: air-to-land missiles, “hogs” and “cassette bombs”. The attack against Jajce was taken part in by two groups of airplanes, Orao and Galeb. On the next day (September 27), the aggressor aviation made 27 plane takeoffs from the Banjaluka Airport and 3 from the Batajnica one, bombing many urban areas. During September 28, 1992, from the Banjaluka Airport, the aggressor made 45-50 avionic takeoffs. The targets were: Maglaj, Bosanski Brod, Teslic, Jajce, and Brcko. The lethal devices used were “cassette bombs”, impact explosion avionic bombs, and the so-called “hogs” of 250 kg. Thus, on the free territory of the Brcko Municipality, on that day, aggressor airplanes were dropping off cargo on four occasions. The consequences of this attack to the village of Zovik were catastrophic. Fifteen local residents were killed, whereas fifty were injured, and many facilities were destroyed, including the primary school. On September 29, 1992, on a number of occasions, the aggressor sent airplanes from the Banjaluka Airport to fire on the Zenica Steelworks.

During September 30, 1992, the aggressor also made 45-50 avionic takeoffs from the Chetnik Airport in Banjaluka. The regions of activity were: Zenica, Gradacac, Jajce, Maglaj, Tesanj, and Olovo. On this occasion, the aggressor used machine guns of calibre 12.7 mm, missile bullets of calibre 57 mm, guided missiles “air-to-land”, devastating bombs “hogs” of 250 and 500 kg, flammable napalm bombs and “cassette bombs”,

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which caused huge material devastation of residential facilities and a large number of killed and injured civilians. The victims were mainly civilians (women and children).66

In the period from October 2 through 10, 1992, the aggressor made 170-200 flights, mainly from the Banjaluka Airport and to a lesser extent from the Batajnica one. Thus, for illustration, on October 2, there were 30-35, on October 3, 20-25; on October 10, 45-50 avionic takeoffs, etc. Of the 20-25 takeoffs (airplanes Galeb-2, Jastreb, and Mig-21), on October 3, 15 exerted combat activity on Tesanj, Gradacac and Zenica, and they used machine guns, napalm, and “cassette bombs”.67

During November and December 1992, and in the first half of 1993, piston-engine aggressor airplanes exerted activity on Srebrenica and Konjevic Polje. In exerting combat activity on Srebrenica on

66 Agresija ..., pp. 39-51; Dnevni izvjestaj, no. 142/143, September 14, 1992, no. 144, September 15, 1992, no. 146, September 17, 1992, no. 147, September 18, 1992, no. 149/150, September 21, 1992, no. 152, September 23, 1992, no. 153, September 24, 1992, no. 154, September 25, 1992, and no. 158, September 29, 1992; AIIZ, inv. No. 2-793; Agresija ..., pp. 53-54. Many residential areas and cities in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, on October 2, 1992, were the target of bestial attacks by the Yugoslav aviation, which left death and destruction. Namely, either individually or in groups, the airplanes took off from the Banjaluka Airport which was controlled by the Serb criminals from the beginning of the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus, more than 40 takeoffs were registered on October 3 only. The targets of the avionic attacks on that occasion were Zenica, Gradacac, Tesanj, the area of Mt. Igman, etc. For full five hours, the aggressor used napalm and “cassette bombs” to bomb the plants of the Zenica Steelworks. Then, the aggressor aviation blew off of the face of the earth dozens of houses in Tesanj, whereas the most serious devastation was suffered by the residential area of Bukve.

On October 9, there was real hell in Gradacac; aggressor aircraft was unloading the deathly cargo onto the centre of the city and the surrounding populated areas for forty full minutes. Under the new ruins, there were 14 dead and some 40 injured civilians left. On that same day (October 9), on two occasions, Srebrenica was too the target of the aggressor aviation. On the occasion of those attacks, they used “cassette bombs” as well as the so-called “hogs”, which inflicted large-scale material damage, and “it is assumed that there were human casualties too (Ibid.).
November 9, 1992, they killed fifteen civilians, and on December 14, (in the villages of Pirici, Tegare, and Loznicka Rijeka), they killed seventy civilians, of which eighteen children. On January 7, 1993, the piston-engine airplanes exerted activity on the civilian refugee camp in the village of Potocari near Srebrenica. On March 15, 1993, on two occasions, two piston-engine airplanes bombed Konjevic Polje with twelve “hog” bombs, killing fifteen civilians, and injuring twenty four (nine with serious injuries and fifteen with light ones).68

In spite of Resolution 781 of the UN Security Council establishing the ban on military flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina (on October 9, 1992),69 the aggressor used aviation and helicopters from the territory of Serbia (from the airports of Ladjevci and Ponikve, Batajnica, and others) and from the Airport and Heliport in Banjaluka. The use of aviation and exerting of combat activity from the air was particularly intensified by the aggressor in February 1993.

During this month, there were 103 flights of aggressor aviation observed, of which 38 flights were airplane flights (types: Jastreb and Galeb), and 65 flights by helicopters (types: Gazela and MI-8). At this, 32 airplane flights (of the 38 registered ones), were with firing activity onto unprotected populated places and unarmed civilian population (the areas of Srebrenica, Bratunac, Bijeljina, Brcko, Doboj, Zavidovici, Gradacac, and Maglaj). The other airplane and helicopter flights were aimed at patrolling and transport of manpower, as well as transport of ammunition and other lethal devices. A particularly high intensity of aggressor helicopter flights was observed on the direction of Sekovici-Mt. Majevica (17). The Jastreb airplanes exerted combat activity with “cassette bombs”, missiles and machine gun fire on the territory of Srebrenica. This activity caused the death of 81 and injuries to over 200 civilians and soldiers of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Only in the period from February 1 through 19, 1993, the avionic bombing activity in the area of Srebrenica killed 56 and injured over 100 civilians. From mid-April to the first half of November 1992,

68. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-793.

in Jajce, 191 avionic flights were observed, as well as 90 in Brcko, 76 in Gradacac, 60 in Gorazde, 21 in Tuzla and Maglaj, 15 in Kladanj, and a small number in the major cities in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. During all of this time, the total number of flights made was 1,300, the majority of them firing upon civilians.70

During 1993-1995, the Greater Serbia aggressor also used aviation. Thus, on March 13, three airplanes from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia flew over the Drina River and threw down several bombs in the vicinity of the villages of Gladovici and Osatice (to the southeast of Srebrenica). In October 1994, the number of flights from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in Bosnia was increased. This practice was also continued into 1995.71

The Serb collaborationists from the “Republic of Serb Krajina” also used air attacks – fighter planes (against the 5th Corps of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina).72

The Greater Serbia aggressor was en masse using the helicopter units (transport, patrolling and anti-tank helicopters) mainly as fire support from the air and manoeuvring of troops, supply of units and transport of new forces, and supply of lethal and material and technical resources, evacuation of casualties, injured and diseased. For these needs, the following heliports were used: Zaluzani (Banjaluka), Bratunac, Sokolac (Bjelosavljevici), Pale, Sekovici, Ozren (Tumare), Bijeljina, Doboj, and Nevesinje.73

The aggressor helicopters mainly flew at night and in groups of two to four helicopters. For instance, during May 12 and 13, 1993, the aggressor was massively using the helicopters type Gazela and MI-8 for transportation of manpower and war materials in the offensive at the Brcko front line. Then, 53 takeoffs were registered of helicopters in

70 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-793; *Prva Linija*, no. 1, p. 12; ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraph 416.

71 ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraphs 416-417.

72 Ibid., paragraphs 424 and 434.

73 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-793; Ibid., inv. No. 2-800; *Agresija...*, p. 47.
groups of one to three, on the lines of: Bijeljina-Brcko, Bijeljina-Modrica, Bijeljina-Orasje, Bijeljina-Pelagicevo, and vice versa. It is interesting to point out that during the use of helicopters there were no flights of UN airplanes from the composition of the NO FLY forces. On a daily basis, transport helicopters MI-8 made several flights and regularly supplied the units executing combat activities. Thus, in the second half of October 1992, in the area of Gradacac, the aggressor transported new reinforcement in transport helicopters from the direction of Brcko and Bosanski Samac, whereas at the same time, it shot the positions of the soldiers defending Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Gradacac Municipality from the helicopters.\(^{74}\)

On the Gazela helicopters, the aggressor had mounted four high-impact anti-tank missiles, whereas the transport MI-8 in a converted version could carry 16 machine guns or the same number of missile bullets (ever since the Kosovo “events” in 1981, the JNA had had variants for chemical weapons, too).\(^ {75}\)

The aggressor particularly used Gama helicopters guided with anti-tank maljutka missiles. The combat activity of these helicopters was particularly strong in the area of Gradacac, where they fired on the surrounding villages as well as the city itself. Thus, on November 7 and 9, 1992, helicopters Gama, fired maljutka missiles on Gradacac; on November 26, on the Bihac region, killing fifteen persons and injuring six; then on November 28 and on December 7, again on Gradacac. On March 18 and 19, 1993, the Gamas were firing maljutka missiles on the village of Miljanovici, and then on March 23, on the area of Mrkonjic-Planje (near Jelah), etc.\(^ {76}\)

It is interesting to indicate the fact that, in order to transport new forces from Serbia and to supply material, technical and other resources, the Serb aggressor was also using the helicopters with UNPROFOR and United Nations markings. In late June 1992, one such helicopter landed in the village of Bukovik (area of Brcko). Into the same village,

\(^{74}\) Agresija..., p. 47; Prva Linija, no. 1, p. 12.

\(^{75}\) Prva Linija, no. 1, p. 12; AIIZ, inv. No. 2-800.

\(^{76}\) AIIZ, inv. Nos. 2-793 and 2-800;
held by the Serb aggressor forces, in the second half of June 1992, United Nations-marked helicopters landed increasingly, bringing food and ammunition to the aggressor.\footnote{Agresija..., p. 11.}

On a number of occasions the Serbo-Montenegrin aggressor used helicopter airborne landings. Thus, helicopter landings were conducted: on May 8, 1992, on the Kalesija village of Memici in the Tuzla region; on March 10, 1993, onto the village of Bogovac (on the Brcko-Tuzla road); on March 11, onto point 733 Komin; on July 17, onto Mt. Treskavica (in the area of Ljuta); on October 22, in the area of Brda (Mts. Bjelasnica – Treskavica).\footnote{Ibid., p. 40; AIIZ, inv. No. 2-800. On the occasion of the helicopter landing on Memici, some 80 Serb “volunteers” were unloaded, who then attacked the surrounding villages, set houses to fire and destroyed them, as well as the mosque in Donji Rainci.}

The targets of activity of the aggressor aviation and helicopters were civilian population, mainly of Bosniak ethnicity, in open, populated places. The waves of the aggressor aviation attacks on the civilian settlements without any military targets aimed at civilians and facilities – hospitals, maternity hospitals, child health care facilities, health care centres, schools, residential, industrial and other facilities, involving huge casualties, mainly women and children, and material damage and devastation.\footnote{AIIZ, inv. No. 2-793; Press-centar Armije Republike Bosne i Hercegovine, no. 102/02-715, January 14, 1993.}

Of the total fire activity, 10-15% was targeted at the units of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, whereas 85-90% was targeted at populated places. For instance, in the first seven months of the aggression only, the Serbo-Montenegrin aggressor spent some 108,000 tons of various ammunition, that is, 41.5%.\footnote{AIIZ, inv. No. 2-793.}

In the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Greater Serbia Nazis were stubbornly using flammable and chemical weapons, prohibited by the Geneva Convention and other provisions of international law. The aggressor used flammable weapons from the
beginning of the aggression. This is testified by the numerous institutions that were burned down in Sarajevo (the buildings of the Assembly and the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, then of the Oriental Institute, main Post Office, National and University Library, Railway Station, Cultural and Sports Centres of Zetra and Skenderija, as well as the buildings of Unis, Elektroprivreda, Energoinvest companies, and others), then in Brcko, Gradacac, Gorazde, Jajce, and the like. The aggressor used the chemical weapons for the first time on June 6, 1992, when they threw in poisonous gas into the basement of the railway station in Podlugovi (20 km to the northeast from Sarajevo), where a group of civilian prisoners were held, consisting of some 50 Bosniak civilians. From then until January 31, 1993, 255 chemical attacks were recorded, of which 100 were carried out in the broader vicinity of Sarajevo. The aggressor used chemical weapons most massively in cities, that is, on the broader territory of Sarajevo, Brcko, Gradacac, Maglaj, Tesanj, Srebrenica, Gorazde, and Jajce. The highest concentration of use of chemical weapons was recorded in August 1992 (77) and the lowest in November of the same year.  

Those of most often used ones were the phosphorus and napalm avionic bombs, as well as artillery grenades with poisonous gases. The phosphorus avionic bombs and artillery grenades were the most used on Sarajevo (the residential area of Pavle Goranin, the Old Jewish Cemetery, Mt. Zuc, and the like), then Jajce, Brcko, and the like, and the napalm bombs were the most used on Gorazde, Jajce, and Gradacac. The “cassette” and napalm bombs, together with the air-to-land missiles, caused awful devastation in mid-August 1992 in Jajce, followed by artillery attacks.

Until May 31, 1993, the aggressor used flammable and chemical weapons for a total of 365 times. On the Visegrad front line, the JNA was using the nerve paralysis poisonous gases, which can inflict loss of up to 50% even to a unit completely secured against use of biological

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and chemical weapons. In large urban communities, the aggressor most often used “humane” poisonous gases of type tear-gas and sneezing gas, that is, irritant gases. The positions of the soldiers of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina even in smaller settlements were exposed to use of phosgene and mustard gas, which were the most used ones in WWI. There are indices that blister gases were used too, which in WWI had contaminated several hundred thousands of soldiers and inflicted eight times larger loss than all the other poisons together, as well as nerve poisons.83

During the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Greater Serbia Fascists also used special parachute units and cadets of military schools. In mid-September 1992, in the composition of the aggressor forces on the Bihac front line, the following forces also participated and fought: the 83rd Special Parachute Unit from Nis, as well as the cadets of the Land Army Military Academy from Belgrade.84

On the temporarily possessed territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Greater Serbia aggressor also engaged factories for production of military equipment and warehouses of ammunition and fuel. The war equipment (weapons, armoured combat vehicles, ammunition and other lethal devices) and fuel were supplied and transported by the aggressor and its collaborationists from Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine, and other East European countries, like for instance, avionic bombs of the OFAB-250 type.85

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83 Ibid.

84 *Dnevni izvjestaj*, no. 147, September 18, 1992. In mid-July 1993, in the villages at the foot of Mt. Majevica, the cadets of the third and fourth years of the Land Army Military Academy of Yugoslavia did target practicing on live targets (*Oslobodjenje*, July 20, 1993).

85 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-793.
2. Volunteers and Volunteer JNA Units

From the second half of 1991, there were numerous volunteer units in the JNA in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which, in compliance with the Instruction for Admission of Volunteers in the JNA (September 1991) and other documents, were recruited, formed, armed, sent and trained by the commands, units and institutions of the JNA. In 1992, by municipalities, they were integrated into “light brigades”, and at the time they could have had over 100,000 of JNA volunteers. The purpose of their recruitment (they received salaries) was to compensate the unsuccessful mobilization for realization of the RAM plan.

In October 1991, on the Dubrovnik front line, in addition to the JNA, there were also active Serb “volunteer units” which, in cooperation with the JNA forces, had devastated and levelled the village of Ravno. Even documents of military origin of high degree of confidentiality also confirm existence of “volunteer units” in late 1991, particularly on the territory of the Bosnian Krajina. Based on these documents, it can be established that then in the Bosnian Krajina (for instance, in Bosanski Petrovac), mobilization was conducted of the “military conscripts and volunteers, who were in the framework of the JNA”. In early December 1991, the JNA mobilized a number of JNA “volunteers” from the Sarajevo area too, and placed them into the military barracks in Lukavica.

The leadership of the SDS of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Serb people accepted the JNA, “protecting” it “where this was objectively possible”, enlisted for war and volunteer units, cooperated to the maximum with the commands, “and acted rather responsibly”

86 Agresija …, p. 1; AIIZ, inv. No. 2-489 and 491.
87 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-232; Ibid., inv. No. 3-311.
towards the war material resources, etc. Upon invitation by the JNA, \textbf{the volunteers} responded en masse. Thus, in the second half of 1991, in the 5th Corps, the number of \textbf{volunteers} increased from day to day.

In the very beginning of 1992, in the capacity of the commander of the 9th (Knin) Corps of the JNA, even General Major Ratko Mladic was involved in the formation of the \textit{volunteer and war units} in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In relation to that, during January 1992, with his associates, he had visited Drvar several times (around January 5 and 20). Speaking to the audience on the field of the Sports and Recreation Centre, after he had visited the Drvar-based 11th Motorized Brigade filled in through mobilization, on January 20, among other things, Mladic said that they had conducted mobilization and filled in \textit{the ranks with soldiers from Drvar and the neighbouring municipalities}.\footnote{Oslobodjenje, January 21, 1992, p. 4. At the time, Ratko Mladic pointed out that \textit{there is no need for anyone in Bosnia and Herzegovina to be upset because we have conducted mobilization and filled in this war unit of ours. We are preparing this unit for the case of contingency. We are preparing it in case that Tudjman begins realizing his evil intentions and takes by force what does not belong to him...} and in order to \textit{stand in defence of the peace for our children and our weak}.}

There were volunteers in all commands, units and institutions of the JNA in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the 744th Background Base (Sarajevo), on February 17, 1992, there were 11 platoons of volunteers.\footnote{AIIZ, inv. No. 2-1965, THE LIST OF DATA ON THE DEPLOYMENT AND CAPACITIES OF THE BACKGROUND UNITS AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE 2ND MILITARY DISTRICT /February 17, 1992/. One platoon of volunteers each was deployed in: the 1st Technical Warehouse of Ammunition in Hadzici; Department of the 1st Technical Warehouse of Ammunition of Krupanjska Rijeka – Pazaric; 2nd Technical Warehouse of Ammunition of Koran – Pale; Department of the Warehouse of Ammunition of Renovica; 5th Technical Warehouse of Fuel of Ilijas; Department of}
The manpower of the “volunteer units” (JNA volunteers) in the area of responsibility of the 2nd Military District, according to some “strictly confidential” (“Military Secret”) conclusions by General Kukanjac from the Assessment of the situation on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the area of responsibility of the 2nd Military District, as of March 20, 1992, sent to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of SFRY (attn. Chief of Staff of the General Staff, General Adzic), as of that date, amounted to 69,198 people. The deployment of these units is illustrative. The majority number of “volunteer units” was mainly in those municipalities in which the Bosniaks, as per the 1991 Census, were majority population. They were largely Territorial Defence conscripts. Joining the volunteer units was stimulated in various ways. Thus, for instance, according to the aforementioned document by General Kukanjac, the “JNA volunteers” in Foca, had 3,000 members, in Novo Sarajevo and Ilidza 2,800, in Novi Grad 2,400, in Gorazde 2,000, in Travnik 1,970, in Doboj 1,844, in Zenica 1,761, in Hadzici 1,500, in Kakanj 1,270, and the like.92

The numbers of “volunteers” across the individual corps was as follows:

- 9th Corps (Knin) 2,200
- 10th Corps (Bihac) 2,300
- 5th Corps (Banjaluka) 16,750
- 17th Corps (Tuzla) 8,240
- 4th Corps (Sarajevo) 33,200.93

In the “volunteer units” formed by the 4th Corps of the JNA on the territory of the 4th Military District in the municipalities of Kalinovik,

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93 Ibid.
Pursuant to the decisions of the senior military leadership, the aforementioned “volunteer units” were spread across parties, detachments and battalions, and were, just as any other Serb armed formation, under the direct command of the JNA.95

According to general Milutin Kukanjac, the aforementioned “volunteer units” did not enter into the formational composition of the war JNA units, nor into the composition of the Serb Territorial Defence, that is, they were “outside the formational composition of the JNA and TOB”, that is, according to him, not a single “volunteer” was “intended for filing in of the war units of the 2nd Military District, and only a minor part is from the TO of Bosnia and Herzegovina”. However, based on other data, also military in origin, and particularly the conclusion by General Adzic dated March 25, 1992, on connecting of the “volunteer compositions” with the “JNA commands in the areas of their responsibility”, it can be reliably concluded that in the second half of 1991
Formation of headquarters, detachments and brigades of volunteer units with reduced composition and their “adequate” filling in with officer personnel from the JNA and with arms and equipment was determined at the General Staff of the Armed Forces of SFRY. Thus, the Acting Federal Secretary for National Defence (General Blagoje Adzic), after he had listened to the information and proposals “on the status and capacities of the JNA units on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina…”, on March 25, 1992, he ordered “to proceed as soon as possible to formation of headquarters, detachments and brigades of volunteer units of reduced composition, and their adequate filling in with officer personnel from the JNA, as well as with arms and equipment”. By April 15, 1992, all the “volunteer compositions were to be militarily organized and connected with the JNA commands in the areas of their responsibility”.96

In early April 1992, the Command of the 2nd Military District and the units “in the crisis areas of the areas of responsibility” were under full combat preparedness, with the focus on its reinforcement, by training “on the field in the training areas”, on drafting of the plan of use and control of territory, status in the units, as well as formation of police forces. During March 31, and April 1, 1992, “many volunteers” were admitted at the Bijeljina barracks.97

96 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-769, Federal Secretariat for National Defence, chief of staff of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, general Blagoje Adzic, March 25, 1992 – to the Command of the 2nd Military District; Ibid., inv. No. 2-1238. The holders of this task were the Command of the 2nd Military District, in cooperation with the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, Personnel Administration and Background Sector of the SSNO.

In the first half of April 1992, the units of the 2nd Military District conducted quick training of “volunteers” in order to capacitate them to “execute the basic combat tasks”. During April 2, 40 “volunteers” were admitted to the units of the 4th Corps of the JNA, which were “immediately subjected to intensive training”. On April 11, 497 soldiers arrived to the Bihac Airport to fill in the 9th and 10th Corps. The receipt of the remaining contingent of the soldiers assigned to fill in the corps and their deployment and transportation to the units was completed on the following day. On April 12, 90 soldiers came, so that even up to then, a total of 587 soldiers came to the Bihac Airport. A military airplane landed on the Bihac Military Airport on April 22, with 200 trained criminals, carrying cockades as emblems on their caps.98

On April 5, 1992, the commands and units of the 4th and 9th Corps were working on equipping “military conscripts” invited into the corps units. It is interesting to point out that in early April, in some JNA units there was both individual and group defection. Thus, with the units of the 5th Corps, engaged in the region of Kupres, there was individual defection from positions. With the units of the 17th Corps, they stress that “the moral is negatively affected by the defection” of the Commander and

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155 “military conscripts” from the 17th Partisan Brigade of the 38th Partisan Division.99

In mid and late second week of April of 1992, all the units of the 2nd Military District were under full combat preparedness. The focus of activity of the units beyond the collision line was, among other things, on preparation and training of the mobilized manpower “for the execution of combat tasks”. During April, in Kalinovik, there was a quick training conducted for the Serb “volunteers” of artillery specialty on cannons – howitzers of 120 mm.100

In late April 1992, “volunteers” arrived into the units of the 2nd Military District on a daily basis, and they were “immediately sent for training, and in this way, the number status significantly improved”. Thus, on April 22, 1992, some 200-250 Serb “volunteers” came from Bileca, Cajnice, and Gacko into Kalinovik, and were immediately joined by 50 local residents. After they received equipment at Military Post 3550, they went for Mostar with 33 vehicles, a mobile workshop, hospital, 2 small command headquarters vehicles, and 6 cannons. On the mentioned day, from the same military post, a JNA unit with some 25 motor vehicles and cannons went towards Foca (into Military Post 4120), where in Stara Kasaba 400 JNA “reservists” were waiting for them. Directly before the aggression, in the area of Foca, particularly in the residential area of Cerezluk, each Serb house had accommodated three to five “volunteers” from Serbia and Montenegro. On April 25, “a speedy training of volunteers and capacitating them for execution of the basic combat tasks” is being conducted at the 14th Motorized and 216th Mountain Brigade. By April 27, 240 “military conscripts” were trained in the

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100 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-93, Command of the 2nd Military District, Operational Duty Team, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2125, April 10, 1992 – to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – Operational Centre, and others; Ibid., inv. No. 2-94, Command of the 2nd Military District, Operational Duty Team, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2150, April 11, 1992 – to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – Operational Centre, and others; Agresija …, p. 32.
Banjaluka Garrison. Therefore, all the units continued with “intensive training in order to reinforce combat preparedness”. In late April, the commanders of the 9th, 5th, and 10th Corps reported on the combat preparedness to the Acting Federal Secretary for National Defence, General Blagoje Adzic, in Banjaluka.101

Many “volunteers” were also trained at Manjaca.102


102 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-1238; ICTY, Case: No. IT-94-I-T, Evidence of the testimony by the JNA Colonel O.S., June 4, 1996, pp. 1- 2; Slobodna Bosna, July 19, 2003, p. 19. The training of “volunteers” in Manjaca began in late 1991. In November 1991, this training was directed by Colonel Bogdan Subotic (assistant chief of staff of the Centre of Military Schools in Banjaluka (Ibid.).
3. Armed Units of the Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina

A special place in the planning, preparation and execution of the genocidal aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina belongs to the fifth columnist Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Namely, for the purpose of overthrowing of all the legal authority bodies of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and formation of the Serb Bosnia and Herzegovina and its integration with Serbia and Montenegro, immediately after election and coming into power, in accordance with the instructions of the Greater Serbia movement, and in particular of Slobodan Milosevic in person, and with direct assistance from the JNA, this party became involved in the activities on formation of the armed formations and arming of the Serb people.  

In mid-1991, the Main Board of the Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina, headed by Radovan Karadzic, had issued an order to all the municipal boards to form armed formations on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina and “to proceed with the organized arming of the Serb people”. In order to execute the aforementioned order, there was a need to establish direct contacts with the JNA.  

The sessions of the top bodies of the fifth columnist SDS of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the second half of 1991 reviewed the issue of formation of the Serb armed formations and military organization of the Serb people. The session of the Executive Board of the SDS on September 6, 1991, among other things, concluded that the Serbs “shall go to the JNA as

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103 AIIZ, inv. No. 3-240/1, Record from the Fifth Session of the Executive Council of the Serb Democratic Party, held on November 7, 1991.

104 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-794; Testimony by Sabrija Pojskic given to the author. This task for the territory of the Konjic Municipality was assigned to Strahinja (son of Djordje) Zivak (born in 1932, in the village of Brdjani – Konjic).
volunteers”, in order to continuously ensure that the “Serbs go to the barracks”. The political council of the SDS, at the session of October 15, 1991, also indicated upon the significance of military organization, particularly in cities. It was concluded that “in those terms the municipal and local boards need to be provided with instructions”. It is also interesting to point out the fact that this session emphasized that the JNA should be warned to secure the communications. In those terms, Milivoje Tutnjevic cautioned that “the Yugoslav People’s Army needs to be invited to secure the bridges on the Drina River”.105

Following this, there was another order by the SDS, revealed on October 26, 1991, in Banjaluka (that order was also fully accepted by the “Autonomous Region of Krajina”). According to this order, among other things, there was a need to form units for the front line and the commands of places; “establish full mobility of Territorial Defence”; “all younger people, of up to 40 years of age, to be transferred from the civilian protection to the Territorial Defence”, and re-subject it to the Corps “as war units”; “paramilitary formations, if they exist, need to be immediately dissolved and transformed into Territorial Defence”; “collect all arms and equipment from the deserters”, and the like. In order to effect “a better success of the overall action”, there was also a provision for meting out of war taxes.106

After the so-called “plebiscite” of the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina (on November 9 and 10, 1991), with direct cooperation and support by the JNA, the SDS intensified its criminal activities related to the creation of armed formations.107

In the second half of 1991, pursuant to the aforementioned orders, particularly the one for formation of “units for the front line”, and other decisions for organization of parastate bodies, in order to form the collaborationist “Republic of Serb Bosnia and Herzegovina”, as a “federal unit in the composition of the federal state of Yugoslavia”, with direct

105 AIIZ, inv. No. 3-206; Ibid., inv. No. 3-110; Notes from the session of the Council of the Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina, held on October 15, 1991.

106 AIIZ, inv. No. 3-400/1-1, ORDER OF THE SERB DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, Sarajevo, October 26, 1991. Dissolution of the paramilitary formations (“if they exist”) and their conversion into Territorial Defence was to be “mandatory”, pursuant to this order.

107 Dnevni izvjestaj, no. 72, July 5, 1992.
assistance and support of the JNA, the Serb Democratic Party began creation of armed formations. Starting from the assessment that they are “committed to Yugoslavia, to the JNA, and willing to accept deployment and accommodation of the JNA units”, on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Serbs formed paramilitary municipal, regional and district headquarters of “territorial defence”. Thus, as early as in the second half of 1991, on the territory of Bosanska Krajina, a number of illegal municipal and district headquarters of the Serb “territorial defence” were formed, such as: Bosanski Petrovac, Bosansko Grahovo, Glamoc, Pritoka – Bihac, Bosanska Krupa, Lusci Palanka, and the like. These parastate bodies of the SDS formed military units “of the Serb people”. The number status of these units on the municipal territories of Drvar, Bosanski Petrovac, Bosansko Grahovo, and Glamoc, as of February 18, 1992, amounted to 4,448 military “conscripts”. From the territories of those municipalities, after the 11th Motorized Brigade of the JNA had been formed, its composition was increased with 2,022 military “conscripts” (546 from Drvar, 584 from Petrovac, 412 from Grahovo, and 480 from Glamoc). Of the total number of military “conscripts”, 1,620 took complete military equipment to that unit (Drvar 420 sets, Petrovac 440, Grahovo 350, and Glamoc 410 sets). The number status of the units “of the Serb people” on the territories of “certain municipalities of the border area of the Bihac District”, as of February 18, amounted to 6,450 military “conscripts” (Pritoka-Bihac – 2,500; Bosanska Krupa – 3,000, and Lusci Palanka – 950 military conscripts).108

In relation to the formation of Serb units, it is interesting to point out the data indicating upon the conclusion that as early as during 1990 and in mid-1991, and particularly in the second half of this year, on the territory of East Herzegovina, Central Bosnia and Bosanska Krajina, such formations had already existed and had been “active”. Namely, as early as during 1990, before the elections, in some places of Bosnia and Herzegovina predominantly populated by Serbs, special Chetnik detachments were formed, such as the case is with the Chetnik detachment named Karadjordje in Nevesinje, headed by “Count” Arsenije Grahovac.109

108 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-232, District Headquarters of Territorial Defence of Bihac, strictly confidential, no. 06/1-1/92, February 18, 1992 – to the Command of the 405th Background Base.

109 N. Durakovic, the aforementioned work, p. 270; Borba, June 11, 1991, pp. 1-5.
In mid-1991, in the area of Ilidza, there were strong Serb armed formations, amounting to 300 armed people. Among the organizers of those units, a significant place was taken by Nedeljko Prstojevic.110

On September 18, 1991, in the peak of the mobilization crisis for the RAM plan, on behalf of the “Autonomous Region of Bosanska Krajina” in Banjaluka, Radoslav Brdjanin invited all the “volunteers” from Bosanska Krajina to immediately report to the nearest barracks. On that occasion, he stated that the “true peace in Yugoslavia depends on the power of the JNA”, that is, of the Serb occupation army.111

On the next day (September 19, 1991), the session of the Federal Executive Council, in reviewing of the political and security situation in Yugoslavia, in addition to the issue of arming of the Serb population in Bosnia and Herzegovina by the JNA, also discussed the Serb paramilitary formations. In relation to this, Sabrija Pojskic and Mustafa Cengic warned about the activity of those formations and indicated upon the danger if their activity is to be tolerated, particularly from the aspect of manner of their armament. They included the “Serb Territorial Defence” under paramilitary formations. Pojskic then proposed that all paramilitary formations be disarmed. However, the issue was brought up as to who is the one who can do that.112

The data available show that on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina a large number of Serb armed formations was formed. Based on the confiscated SDS materials, it can be reliably established that a number of such units were formed on the territory of Visoko. Formation of the Serb armed formations on the territory of Visoko was the assignment

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110 *Slobodna Bosna*, No. 20, March 12, 1992, p. 4. Thus, in July 1991, Nedeljko Prstojevic, official of the Serb Democratic Party of Ilidza, took to the barracks “the list of volunteers” from the area of Ilidza, who were “ready to make themselves available to the JNA”.


112 The statements by Sabrija Pojskic and Mustafa Cengic as given to the author. On this matter, the issue was brought up at the Federal Executive Council about the role of the JNA in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Pojskic and Cengic insisted that the role of the JNA in relation to Bosnia and Herzegovina be brought out to the clear grounds – which kind of Yugoslavia it is fighting for. However, it was evident that the JNA was representing the greater Serbia concept about formation of the “Greater Serbia”.
of 1st class captain Momcilo Gorancic, and Stevo Harambasic, from the Visoko barracks, and Nenad Vanovac, The aforementioned officers made lists of “volunteers” from the areas of Visoko, Illijas, Vares, and other places, and in addition to that, Vanovac also supervised the organization of the so-called Serb crisis headquarters. The formation of Serb military formations also involved participation of Zika Dabic, Blagoje Sakota, Branislav Krmanovic, and others. In the capacity of president of the local board of the SDS in Tusnjici, as assigned by the Municipal Board of the SDS of Visoko, in the following villages: Gorani, Tusnjici, Zagorice and Grajanin, Blagoje Sakota made polling for the “volunteers” in the JNA. In the area of Zimca, a number of such formations were created, with the “Regional TO Headquarters”, which were organized in a completely military way. The number status of those units was 470 people (the list of members of these units has been preserved). “The Regional TO headquarters” consisted of the commander and the deputy, then the commander for intelligence and security affairs, the commander for the background, then officer for general affairs, a radio communication operator and a courier. The headquarters consisted of three parties (“TO Party of Topuzovo Polje”, “TO Party of Zimca”, and “TO Party of Paljike”), which themselves consisted of four to five sections. The aforementioned units were well armed, and all the armed persons went into the composition of the parties of the “Serb territorial defence”.113

Based on the preserved lists of Serb armed units on the territory of Sarajevo (with names and surnames, years of birth, residence addresses, ranks, exact records of the assigned weapons, etc.), stationed in Ilidza, Hrasnica, Osijek, Luzani, Vojkovici, Grlica, Vrelo Bosne, Doglodi, Otes, Blazuj, Brijesce, Brijesce Brdo, local communities of M. Obradovic, 21. maj, and other locations, it can also be established that these were military armed units including a large number of Serbs (in thousands), and that in the military sense they were organized very well.114

Even at the localities of Kromolj and Slatina in Sarajevo, the Serb Democratic Party created an armed formation, which initially had 12,

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114 AIIZ, inv. Nos. 2-545, 547 and 803.
and later 50 people. The commander of this unit initially was Slavko Petrovic, who committed numerous crimes against Bosniaks, particularly in the area of Vosgosca, and later on Ranko Tadic. Among its members as of March 1992, was also Jovo (son of Andjelko) Ninkovic, a butcher.\footnote{AIIZ, inv. No. 2-795. Butcher Ninkovic was born in 1941 in the village of Bogovici (Pale), and before the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina, he had a permanent residence at 41, Slatina St., Sarajevo.}

The SDS armed Serb formations were also active in the areas of the Sarajevo local communities of Omer Maslic, Blagoje Parovic, and Otes, then at Alipasino Polje, Dobrinja, Buca Potok, Doglodi, Pionirska Dolina, and others, whereas many groups were also active in the other suburban residential areas around Sarajevo. The commander of the armed unit on the territory of the local communities of Omer Maslic and Blagoje Parovic was Budimir Obradovic, his deputy was Goran Smiljanic, and the members were Branislav Strbac, Mladen Mandic, Slobodan Mandic, Rade Ivankovic, Miodrag Nikolic, Goran Koprivica, Mladen Ninkovic, Jadranko Sekulic, Dragica Djokic, Slobodan Ninkovic, Savo Lale, Dragan Sojic, and Miro Sarovic. In the organization of units on the territory of the aforementioned local communities, those particularly active were Slavko Jovanovic, a reserve JNA officer, and designer Goran (son of Milovan) Smiljanic, member of the Municipal SDS Board.\footnote{AIIZ, inv. No. 2-796; AIIZ, inv. Nos. 2-538, 543, 545, 548; Slobodna Bosna, no. 4, November 21, 1991, p. 3.}

In the local community of Otes, Serbs formed a number of armed units. Based on the preserved lists of those units, found in the apartment of Dragan Ignjatovic, who resided at Otes, one can see their composition, organization, records of armament, and the like.\footnote{AIIZ, inv. No. 2-548. Based on the preserved lists of the composition of units which were formed by the Serb criminals in the Local Community of Otes, found in the apartment of Dragan Ignjatovic, one can identify the Serbs who were making up the sections and platoons.}

A number of JNA security officers were directly working on the organization of the armed formations of the SDS on the territory of the Sarajevo residential area of Grbavica. Among them, special activity was...
shown by Colonel Jadranko Jandric. The composition of these formations, among others, included multiple perpetrators of serious criminal offences, long-time registered narcotic traffickers, drug addicts, and bullies.118

The Serb armed forces in the area of Pofalici were commanded by Vukota Vukovic.119 Those units were organized into sections, platoons, and parties. Each platoon had five sections, with ten armed men each. Each street in Gornji Pofalici had one to two parties.120

According to the data available so far, there was one active Serb armed formation at Alipasino Polje, in the area of Dobrinja there were three, in Buca Potok there were four, in Pionirska Dolina and Kromolj there was one Serb armed formation each (all were organized in parties, platoons, and sections).121

The military issues at Dobrinja were assigned to Jovan Pejovic and Nedjo Bosnic. In direct contact with the JNA, Petar Radic and Miroslav Krajisnik formed an armed unit at Pionirska Dolina. Radic was in constant contact with the JNA officers in charge of formation, arming and training of the Serb units.122

Major Pero Despotovic, together with the leaders of the SDS, formed the Serb armed formations in Ilidza.123

Predrag Radmilovic, aka Coka, was among the first to work on the organization of the Serb military formations in Vogošca.124

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119 AIIZ, inv. No. 3-320; Dnevni izvjestaj, no. 87, July 20, 1992. These armed formations were subjected to Colonel Tomislav Sipcic.

120 Ibid. The connection between the JNA and those formations was kept by Marko Garic and a Krstovic.

121 AIIZ, inv. No. 2.538, 540 and 543; AIIZ, inv. No. 3-2905; Ibid., inv. No. 3-326 and 335.

122 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-540; Ibid. inv. No. 3-2905.


124 AIIZ, inv. No. 3-385.
On the territory of Gornja and Donja Bioca (Ilijas Municipality), two Serb armed parties were formed. The commander of the party in Gornja Bioca, which had eighty people, was Dusko Pustivuk, a reserve JNA captain, and his deputy was Rade Vrljes. The commander of the party in Donja Bioca, which had some sixty people, was Simo Crnogorac.\textsuperscript{125}

The commander of the JNA garrison in Han Pijesak, Dragomir Milosevic, directly participated in the organization of the Serb armed formations on the broader territory of Mt. Romanija. Namely, as early as from September 1990, he had been in direct contact with the leadership of the SDS of Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly with Rajko Dukic, Chairman of the Executive Board of the Party.\textsuperscript{126}

At Sokolac, in the second half of 1991, armed Serb detachments had existed.\textsuperscript{127}

In late 1991 and early 1992, in places mainly populated by Serbs, the JNA also formed lower-ranking units beyond the mobilization sites and beyond the permanent place of command (barracks). Thus, for instance, three mountain battalions of the 216\textsuperscript{th} Mountain Brigade formed such units: 3\textsuperscript{rd} Mountain Battalion in the area of Milici, 1\textsuperscript{st} Mountain Battalion in the area of Gucevo (SO Rogatica), and 2\textsuperscript{nd} Mountain Battalion in the area of Sokolac. These were the nucleus for the formation of the units of the Serb Democratic Party. Out of these JNA units (in Milici, Gucevo, and Sokolac), the units under the leadership of the SDS were derived. On March 4, 1992, from the formed battalion in Gucevo, Rajko Kusic “selected” his unit and stationed it at Borike. In this area, this unit used force to take over certain public facilities, formed checkpoints, plundered and seized the property from Bosniaks, set up barricades, etc.\textsuperscript{128}

In January 1992, General Vladimir Vukovic (commander of the 5\textsuperscript{th} Corps) promised to the president of the Kljuc Municipality and his

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{125} AIIZ, inv. No. 3-2592, Testimony of Branislav Herak.
  \item \textsuperscript{126} Posebno izdanje, No. 2, April 28, 1992.
  \item \textsuperscript{127} Slobodna Bosna, no. 4, November 21, 1991, p. 3.
  \item \textsuperscript{128} AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2809, Testimony of the chief of staff of the headquarters of the 216\textsuperscript{th} Mountain Brigade, JNA Colonel major Asim Dzambasovic.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
associates that from the territory of this municipality he would mobilize a unit equalling a battalion in force.\textsuperscript{129}

In Pale, the Serbs formed a number of armed units. The organizers of these formations were: Radomir Kojic, Rajko Kusic, Milos Vukadin – Svabo, Ratko Kusmuk, Desimir Petrovic, and Rajko Kovacevic. It is necessary to point out that they received significant support from the former employees of the Ministry of Interior, Vlastimir Kusmuk, a certain Skobo, and then from Novica Stanar, who, even before the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina had distinguished himself in molesting and abusing Bosniaks, then from a certain Jovicic, and from Boban Petrovic (an employee of the Federal Secretariat for Interior in Belgrade), who was particularly known for his cruel treatment of camp inmates.\textsuperscript{130}

The data available indicates upon the conclusion that in 1991, in the area of Foca, there were Serb armed formations organized in platoons, parties, detachments and battalions. \textit{“Working on the military organization of the Serb people”}, the Municipal SDS Board of Foca formed 8 battalions very quickly. In June 1991, according to Miroslav Stanic, president of the SDS of Foca, there was a ceremonial parade of a battalion on Mt. Zlataj, with complete armament and equipment.\textsuperscript{131}

In the area of Foca, a number of well armed \textit{Chetnik} detachments were active, such as the detachments Dragan Nikolic, Jankovic, Nikacevic, Elez, Zaga, and the like. The \textit{Dragan Nikolic} Detachment was named after the killed “Count” Dragan Nikolic, and was composed of the SDS Foca fascists, where it participated in the crimes against the Bosniaks in this area. The detachment \textit{Jankovic} was headed by Gojko Jankovic from Foca (he lived in Herceg-Novci), and it was composed of the Serb mercenaries from Montenegro and Foca, and committed crimes in the areas of Tjentiste, Prijedor, Brod na Drini, Djedjevo, Trnovaca, Miljevina,

\textsuperscript{129} Ibid., inv. No. 2-2586, Command of the 30th Partisan Division, inv. No. 157-1, January 30, 1992 – to the Command of the 30th Partisan Division.

\textsuperscript{130} \textit{Dnevni izvjestaj}, no. 74, July 7, 1992; \textit{Slobodna Bosna}, no. 4, November 21, 1991, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{131} Interview by Miroslav Stanic, president of the Serb Democratic Party of Foca, on “TV Srna”, April 8, 1995.
and in other places. The detachment *Nikacevic* was made up of the members of the active and reserve compositions of the Serb police forces. It was headed by Miodrag Nikolic (former police officer of the Foca Police Precinct), and it was considered a special unit. The detachment *Elez* was mainly composed of the members of the Elez family from Miljevina. The detachment had been commanded by Pero Elez before he was killed. The unit *Zaga* was headed by Dragoljub Kumarac (lived in Tivat), composed of Montenegrins, and the Serbs from Foca. The members of the aforementioned armed formations committed numerous mass crimes against the Bosniak civilian population on the territory of Foca.132

In the area of Rogatica, there were a number of military SDS formations active. The main organizers in their formation were Mile Sokolovic, Veljko Bojovic, Zdravko and Slavko Lubarda, Mladen Vasiljevic (commander of the police precinct in Rogatica), and the like.133

In January 1992, under JNA cover, the Serb Democratic Party of Rogatica even formed a special unit into which they recruited fifty of the “most aggressive Serb extremists”, headed by criminal Rajko Kusic.134

The Serb armed formations in the area of Doboj were headed by Drago Ljubicic, who was on the duty of commander of the *Chetnik* detachment, and his deputy Tihomir Gligoric. These formations committed some mass crimes on the territory of Doboj.135

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132 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-746; *Dnevni izvjestaj*, no. 42, June 5, 1992; *Press-centar Armiјe Republike Bosne i Hercegovine*, no. 102/02-795, January 24, 1993; AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2132, Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Command of the 1st D. Brigade, confidential, no. 16-21-1, January 21, 1993. Boro Ivanovic, principal of the Elementary School in Godijen, formed and armed a *Chetnik* unit in that place and involved it in the aggressor attack on Foca.

133 AIIZ, inv. No. 328.

134 Ibid. The members of this unit were: Ljubinaс, aka Pijano (son of Veso); Miroslav (son of Jovo) Zoranovic, aka Kinja; a certain Neskovic (son of Dusan); then a certain Neskovic (son of Milos); Goran Kanostrevac; Milos (aka Triso) Neskovic; then Zoran (son of Ratko) Neskovic; Mladen (son of Kojo) Kojic; Joja Zoranovic, Miso Bojevic, and many others. They committed numerous crimes against Bosniaks on the territory of Rogatica.

The organizers of the creation of Serb armed formations on the territory of Zenica, with hearty assistance from the JNA officers from the Zenica garrison, were: Slobodanka Hrvacanin, Radovan Glogovac, Bosko Jefic, and Zarije Sarcevic, members of the senior leadership of the SDS Zenica.136

On the territory of Bugojno, a number of Serb armed formations were created, which were organized in departments, platoons, parties and detachments.137

On the territory of northern Bosnia, General Savo Jankovic (commander of the 17th Corps of the JNA) formed a number of Serb armed units.138

The creation of the armed formations on the territory of Konjic was organized by Strahinja Zivak, member of the Executive Council of the SDS of Konjic. After he had secured over one hundred barrels of infantry arms during 1991, which he distributed to the Serbs in Bradina, in that year in Bradina, he formed a party with three platoons. Damjan Djordjic was appointed commander of the party, and the platoon commanders were Dragan Vujicic, Snjezan Gligorijevic, and Radoslav Kuljanin. This confirms that during 1991, on the territory of Bradina, Zivak put in life the order of Radovan Karadzic, leader of the SDS of Bosnia and Herzegovina, for preparation for the armed insurrection. In order to facilitate the best possible organization of the armed units of the SDS, Zivak was careful in selecting his associates, to whom he assigned tasks related to further arming, organization and preparation of crimes. To that goal, in late March 1992, in Konjic, he organized a meeting with Damjan Djordjic, Desimir Mrkajic, and Vaso Vujicic. On that occasion, it was decided that Rajko Djordjic “should take on the leading role in military organization of the armed members in Bradina and their preparations for the armed insurrection”. At the same meeting, Strahinja Zivak gave a list of military conscripts

136 Dnevni izvjestaj, no. 64, June 27, 1992 and no. 106, August 8, 1992; AIIZ, inv. No. 2-785.
138 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-785.
from Bradina to Damjan Djordjic, accompanied with determinations of military arms and specialties, to facilitate the most efficient possible organization of the armed units. All these activities related to organization and creation of those formations, including the plan of mobilization and maintaining of communications, were done in cooperation with the JNA. This is also confirmed by the document on taking over of strictly confidential materials coded Fire, which pertain to the plan for mobilization of manpower and maintaining of communications.\textsuperscript{139}

Rajko Djordjic, called Commander or Count, was appointed coordinator of the combat activities on the territory of Konjic, after his arrival to Bradina in April 1992. His deputy was Nedeljko Samoukovic, and Radovan Mrsic was assistant for organizational and mobilization tasks.\textsuperscript{140}

Rajko Djordjic established the military organization of the members of the Serb people. He formed two parties of three platoons each, and one accompanying platoon. The Commander of the 1st party was Milovan Kuljanin, and of the 2nd one Damjan Djordjic. The Commander of the 1st platoon of the 1st party was Dragan Vujicic, and of the 2nd platoon of the 1st party Dragan Mrkajic, and of the 3rd platoon of the 1st party was Ranko Zuza. Commander of the 1st platoon of the 2nd party was Mladen Gligorijevic, and of the 2nd platoon of the 2nd party Snjezan Gligorijevic, and of the 3rd platoon of the 2nd party was Branišlav Beko Gligorijevic. The commanders of the 1st platoon in the first party were Boro Koprivica, Goran Gligorijevic, Nenad Dragutinovic, and Pero Mrkajic; of the 2nd platoon of the 1st party Rajko, Mihajlo, and Gojko Mrkajic, and of the 3rd platoon of the 1st party were Slobodan, Zdravko, and Andjelko Kuljanin. The commanders of departments in the 2nd party were Milenko and Nedeljko Kuljanin (2nd platoon) and Mirko Djordjic, and Milivoje, Milan, and Djuro Gligorijevic (3rd platoon), whereas for the 1st platoon none was determined. The commander of the accompanying

\textsuperscript{139} AIIZ; inv. No. 2-521. On August 29, 1991, this strictly confidential material was taken over by Desimir Mrkajic from the president of the Bileca municipality, addressed to the “Konjic Centre – SDS”, and submitted by him to Djuro Kuljanin.

\textsuperscript{140} Ibid. Velimir Miljanic was excluded from the headquarters after he displaced his wife and children to Nevesinje to protect them.
platoon was Vukasin Mrkajic. Within this platoon, there was an 82 mm mortar deployed, which was located at Barakusa. The aimer was Damjan Gligorijevic, and his assistant was Goran Gligorijevic. The second 82 mm mortar was located above the Mrkajics’ houses. The aimer was Zoran Kuljanin, and his assistant was Zeljko Mrkajic. One 60 mm mortar was assigned to Zeljko Mrkajic, and another one to Branišlav Gligorijevic. In addition to the aforementioned weapons, the stated units also had 60 hand grenades.141

In preparation for the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the broader area of Bradina, the aforementioned armed formations dug trenches for manpower and for weapons, and built bunkers.142

During the preparations for the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina, Strahinja Zivak tried to gather as many armed persons as possible. To this goal, he had also arranged with Miladin Djordjic, from the village of Zukici, to have the armed Serbs from that village be organizationally connected, because there was a small number of Serbs in Zukici, so they could not conduct armed combat by themselves. On this occasion, Zivak stressed out that the Nazi idea of “all Serbs in a single state” may only be realized by use of force. The armed Serbs from Brdjani were also involved in the organization of military units in Bradina in the same manner.143

The organizer and leader of the Serb formations in Nedzarici was Uros Rakanovic from Sarajevo, a member of the Serb Democratic Party. From the list given to him by Momir Vukadin, of some 140 young men of Serb ethnicity, he selected 25 and transferred them to the barracks in Nedzarici, and included them into the military SDS formations in early 1992. After they received and were assigned with arms, Rakanovic transferred them to Pale for training.144

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141 Ibid.
142 Ibid. The military investigative bodies of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina found and inspected two bunkers.
143 Ibid.
144 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-797.
Formation of the armed Serb formations in Dobrovecici involved the participation of Maksim Milicevic with his son, then Nedjo Vujicic, and others.

They even organized village guards which were, among others, participated by Drago Vujicic, Veljko Mirkovic, Stevo Petricevic with his son Dragan, and Cvijan Petricevic with his son Miso. They also participated in the attack and the crimes committed in Ahatovici.145

In the second half of 1991, in the area of Podlugovi, an armed Serb formation was active, consisting of several departments. Heading this formation was a pensioned JNA Colonel. A Chetnik party was also formed in Nisici. Similar formations existed in Krivajeveci, Vares, and many other places in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Pursuant to the decisions of the most senior military ranks of SFRY, the JNA officers were directly working on organization and formation of the Serb parastate and armed units of the SDS on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. There is numerous data confirming this. Thus, as an example, general major Vojislav Đurđevac, commander of the 4th Corps of the JNA, through major Milovan Stankovic and 1st class captain Radic from the 49th Motorized Brigade in Lukavica, on the territory of Ozren, formed a number of Serb armed formations – nine detachments with thousand people each. General major Savo Jankovic, commander of the 17th Corps of the JNA, which had during the Serbo-Montenegrin aggression against Croatia in Đakovo (Slavonia) lost the whole 158th Mixed Anti-Tank Artillery Brigade (this brigade was captured on September 17, the people had been exchanged, and the weapons, resources ad equipment were kept by the Croats) and in Vinkovci he surrendered (an agreement was reached for pulling out of people and resources) the 12th Artillery Regiment, in late 1991 and early 1992 formed numerous armed Serb units on the territory of northern Bosnia, from Bijeljina all the way to Bosanski Brod and down at depth to Sekovici, and armed them with complete range of armament, up to mortars, based on the territorial principle.146


146 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-785; Slobodna Bosna, no. 22, March 26, 1992, p. 5; Testimony of General Sefer Halilovic given to the author.
The JNA also participated in formation of the Serb police forces and secured material resources for supplying of its units and bodies. In relation to this, the JNA also formed the Ministry of Interior of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Serb police), which was a collaborationist body of the Greater Serbia movement in taking over and retaining of power in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In his speech at the Club of Delegates on September 30, 1991, Karadzic stressed the importance of the police in realization of the genocidal intentions, stating that “the ultimate goal is a final secession from the Muslims and Croats forever. The most important thing for us is to have as much of reserve police as we can”.147

On October 17, 1991, the leadership of the Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina drafted the document titled “Options for Organization of the Serb Ministry of Interior”, recommending that the Serb Ministry of Interior be organized as a parallel state body. At the meeting of the Serb members of the Ministry of Interior of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina held in Banjaluka on February 11, 1992, the attendees were assigned the tasks “to conduct all the necessary preparations for the functioning of the Serb Ministry


By participating in both formation and equipping of the Serb police forces, the JNA dismissed and fired the Bosniak police officers. Commander of the 216th Mountain Brigade, Colonel Dragomir Milosevic, on March 31, 1992 informed his command that on March 30, the Serb police was formed in Han Pijesak, and that the Bosniak police officers were dismissed (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2809, Testimony of the chief of staff of the headquarters of the 216th Mountain Brigade, JNA Colonel Asim Dzambasovic).
of Interior after the promulgation of the Constitution of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina”.  

On February 28, 1992, the “Assembly of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina” adopted the Law on Interior Affairs, which came into effect on March 31, 1992. The formal taking over of the police stations on the “Serb” territories started on April 1, 1992, pursuant to Article 126, of the Law and pursuant to the Directive issued by the “minister” of justice Momcilo Mandic.  

In compliance with the Law on Interior Affairs, and in coordination and cooperation with the SFRY forces (Federal Secretariat of Interior), and the Serbian forces (Ministry of Interior of Serbia), the Serb Ministry of Interior disarmed the non-Serb population, mainly Bosniaks, and then arrested, questioned, beat and expelled civilians; participated in formation

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148 ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraph 262.

149 ZAKON O UNUTRASNJM POSLOVIMA, Sluzbeni glasnik srpskog naroda u Bosni i Hercegovini, no. 4, Sarajevo, March 23, 1992; ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraph 263.

In “performing of the tasks and duties of national security”, the Ministry of Interior cooperated “with the relevant (Federal Secretariat and the Republic and Provincial bodies for interior affairs) federal administration bodies, bodies of interior affairs in other republics and provinces, and with bodies of the armed forces performing the tasks and duties of security”. This cooperation pertained “in particular to mutual assistance in performing of tasks and duties of intelligence, coordinating of activities and making arrangements for execution of tasks and duties from its scope of responsibility which are of interest to the security of the country” (ZAKON O UNUTRASNJM POSLOVIMA), Sluzbeni glasnik srpskog naroda u Bosni i Hercegovini, no. 4, Sarajevo, March 23, 1992, pp. 76 and 82).

On April 3, 1992, the Executive Board of the Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina issued PUBLIC ADVISORY, which “fully supported the decision of the Assembly of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina for formation of the Serb Ministry of Interior in this republic. This body supports all the staffing appointments of the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, both at the Ministry of Interior and at other state bodies.

Therefore, we point out that all the staff of the Serb ethnicity, employed at the Ministry of Interior, as well as at other state bodies of Bosnia and Herzegovina, who work contrary to the decisions of the Assembly of the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina do not any longer represent the staff of the Serb republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina or the Serb people” (AIIZ, inv. No. 3-319).
of concentration camps; deported, molested and killed civilians in camps; restricted the freedom of movement; imposed forced labour; killed and massacred civilians (Bosniaks); participated in conquests, plundered and destroyed residential, religious, and other facilities, and the like. In this way, the Ministry of Interior of the Serb collaborationists in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in cooperation and coordination with the security forces of Serbia, played one of the key roles in all aspects of the crime against Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the genocide against Bosniaks.

The Serb police forces participated in combat activities and in conquering of the “Serb” territories, such as for example, on the Doboj territory, and its participation was large “(even up to 70% of police composition)”. 3,000 police members were involved in the combat activities in mid-1992 on the line from the Jewish Cemetery up to Milinkladska Street (in Sarajevo).

The police forces were also engaged in the military units, particularly in the military police.

The plunders of “all kinds” saw participation by both the soldiers and the (reserve) police members (uniformed persons, of both military and paramilitary formations), in which “large quantities of materials and commodities were confiscated”.

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150 ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraphs 258-269, and 272-273; AIIZ, inv. No. 5352, Record of the testimony by Dj. Dj.


152 Ibid., p. 8.

153 Ibid., p. 7.

154 Ibid., pp. 7, 10 and 16. “There were even cases when an officer was driving the plundered commodities, or, during the shift exchange a column is formed hauling away commodities, and once they are stopped at the check point or confronted by the authorized officials, sometimes arms were even drawn out to prevent the body of interior affairs in execution of the official action – prevention of plundering…” (Ibid.).
The Serb police forces offered assistance in the “first lines of battle”, such as for instance in Eastern Herzegovina, where it held “the first front lines”.155 To this goal, the Ministry of Interior of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in mid-May 1992, brought a special order (No. 01-1/92, dated May 15, 1992), to organize the police, as well as the other services of the Ministry of Interior, into war units, which in cooperation with the other units, including the Army of the Serb Republic of BiH,156 participated in the aggression and other forms of crime.

Starting from the assessment that successful war waging also requires an efficient system of radio communications, with direct assistance from the JNA, the Serb Democratic Party organized establishment of an illegal system of radio communications, integrating almost all the areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina. All the Serb armed formations in Bosnia and Herzegovina had well developed the system of organization and maintaining of communications, which “are functioning very well”, connecting Olovo, Sokolac, Kalinovik, Trnovo, Konjic, Pale, Ilijas, Visoko, and other places. Namely, the radio communication system was in compliance with the communications plan coded Fire. This plan contained the Conversation Code, Key for Conversation Code, Identification Table, Work Plan for Communications Radio Stations, Azimuths for Installation of Radio Antennas, and the like.157

Appropriate equipment was purchased for organization and maintenance of radio communications, of military origin (radio stations RUP-12, with the range of 12 to 15 km depending on the antenna, and RUP-3, with the range of 3 km).158

In the area of Ravna Romanija, a relay transmitter was also installed, which was secured under continuous armed guards. Senior Sergeant Milan Matic (from the Viktor Bubanj barracks) “donated” to the Government of SAO Romanija a PUH vehicle with complete communications equipment.159

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155 Ibid., pp. 9 and 13.
156 Ibid., p. 12.
157 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-521.
158 Ibid.
159 Slobodna Bosna, no. 4, November 21, 1991, p. 3; Ibid., no. 21, March 19, 1992, p. 4.
Based on the data available, it can be reliably established that the Serbo-Montenegrin JNA, pursuant to the orders and instructions of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of SFRY, and the Federal Secretariat for National Defence, in order to realize its aggressive Nazi policy — aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina, together with the military and political leadership of Serbia and with direct cooperation of the fifth columnist Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, had established numerous armed formations (units of territorial defence and police forces) from the members of the Serb people, because allegedly that nation was depraved, and it required the protection of the JNA. Thus, for an illustration, in the second half of 1991, all such units were in the composition and under direct command of the 5th Corps of the JNA, from where they were armed, equipped and were on background security (the 993rd Background Base). In addition to that, numerous documents, including the decisions of commands and units of the JNA, confirm that the JNA, “in cooperation with the Serb units of the TO and police and with aircraft and artillery support”, executed offensive and various other aggressive activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina and “cleansed” the Bosnian-Herzegovinian cities, committing genocide and other serious violations of the rules of international law. This can also be seen on the example of Bosanski Brod, where the JNA, among other things, “had cleansed” and conquered the city, and destroyed the bridge on the Sava – the only remaining link between the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia.160

The JNA units formed, trained, armed and controlled the Serb Territorial Defence in execution of military activities against Bosnia and Herzegovina. These operations were aimed at conquering of the territory and extermination of the Bosniaks. This was particularly obvious in the area of responsibility of the 5th Corps of the JNA, where the units deployed in Bosanska Krupa, the 6th Brigade of the 10th Partisan Division, took over the control of the territory, as well as in other areas, and turned over the power to the SDS.161

The JNA reports on those aggression actions suggest on the cooperation of the JNA with the Serb Territorial Defence and other armed Serb forces during these operations (execution of combat activities), in which directing and commanding was in the hands of the JNA. Thus, for example, in April 1992, the units of the JNA “successfully” executed combat activities together with the collaborationist units of the Serb Territorial Defence. On April 18, 1992, in cooperation with the Serb Territorial Defence, police, and elements of the Tactical Group 17, the units of the 17th Corps of the JNA were executing operations in Bosanski Samac, resulting in conquest of the city. The units of the Serb Territorial Defence from Zvornik, together with the armoured battalion of the JNA, were involved in the operations to conquer Kula Grad. A similar situation also existed in other places.162

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161 ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraph 386, note 781.

The chronology of those operations of conquest and the forces involved, the tactics used and most of all the location of the municipalities that were under attack, clearly show the model and methods applied by the Greater Serbia aggressor and their executors. Obviously, those operations were not isolated or spontaneous attacks, but they were part of the very well prepared strategic plans in order to conquer Bosnia and Herzegovina and form a single Serbian state.\textsuperscript{163}

The commands, units and institutions of the JNA were also engaged on formation and development of the units of the Serb Territorial Defence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, offering assistance not only in formation of the Serb bodies of authority, but also the forces of Territorial Defence.\textsuperscript{164} Apart from formation, the JNA also supplied the general and technical and material resources (mainly armament and ammunition) to the Serb units of Territorial Defence.\textsuperscript{165}

\textsuperscript{163} ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraph 391.


\textsuperscript{165} AIIZ, inv. No. 2-108, Command of the 2nd Military District, Operational Duty Team, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2467, April 24, 1992 – to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – Operational Centre, and others; Ibid., inv. No. 2-2696, Command of the 10th Corps, strictly confidential, no. 19/81-442, April 23, 1992 – to the Command of the 2nd Military District. Thus the “Serb Municipality of Bosanska Krupa”, in the second half of April 1992, approached the Command of the 530th Background Base and the 10th Corps “for assistance in formation of the TO units and their securing with general and technical supplies (primarily armament and ammunition)”. The assistant commander for the background of the Command of the 10th Corps, Colonel Grujo Borić, “having in mind the order of the Federal Secretariat for National Defence (strictly confidential, no. 359-1) dated February 21, 1992, as well as the current political situation on the territory of this municipality”, informing the Command of the 2nd Military District, in the telegram (strictly confidential, no. 19/81-442 dated April 23, 1992), presented the opinion “that they need to be approved certain materials and technical resources that would be issued by the 530th Background Base”.

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“Pursuant to the agreement reached and the promise given by Belgrade”, the Command of the 2nd Military District also staffed (with active military persons) *the Territorial Defence of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina*. However, as early as in May 1992, this

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Milutin Kukanjac, “having in mind the urgent execution of the tasks on formation of the TO units of the Serb Municipality of Bosanska Krupa”, in compliance with the Order of the Federal Secretariat for National Defence (strictly confidential, no. 359-1) dated February 21, 1992, on April 24, 1992 (strictly confidential, no. 31/103-40-1), ordered to the command of the 10th Corps and the Command of the 530th Background Base to issue “from the surpluses in the units of the 10th Crops of the reserves available with the 530th Background Base” armament, ammunition and equipment for “the newly formed units of the TO SO [Territorial Defence of the Municipal Assembly – note by author] of Bosanska Krupa”. On that occasion, General Kukanjac specifically pointed out that for the national defence, with the “reference to the order by the chief of staff of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY (confidential number 2268-1, dated December 30, 1991) and my approval” (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-195, Command of the 10th Corps, strictly confidential, no. 19/31-442, April 23, 1992 – to the Command of the 2nd Military District; Ibid., inv. No. 2-196, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential no. 31/103-40-1, April 24, 1992 – to the Command of the 10th Corps and the Command of the 530th Background Base (attn. Commander).

166 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-1674, Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ministry of Defence, no. 21-89/92, Sarajevo, April 27, 1992 – to the Command of the Second Military District.

Colonel Bogdan Subotic (minister of the “ministry of defence” of the collaborationist Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina), on April 27, 1992, sent to the Command of the 2nd Military District the “Request for Staffing with Active Military Persons”. In relation to this, “based on the necessary needs for filling in with the basic personnel at the TO of the Serb Republic of BiH, in compliance with the agreement reached and the promise made by Belgrade”, Colonel Subotic requested from the Command of the 2nd Military District to assist them with filling in with the following officers “as soon as possible”:

**1. REPUBLIC HEADQUARTERS OF TERRITORIAL DEFENCE:**

- commander of the RSTO
- operational officer
- intelligence officer
- security officer (major Spiro Pereula)
- officer for organization of mobilization (major Djordje Djukic)
- chief of staff of aviation (Colonel major Caslav Mihajlovic)
- chief of staff of artillery
- chief of staff of engineering
practice was abandoned, and the Serb Territorial Defence was included into the *Army of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina*.

The territorial defence of the Serb collaborationists was established from the existing units of the Territorial Defence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, mainly, in places with significant Serb population. Formation of such territorial defence was in contravention with the Constitution of the SFRY, and SR Bosnia and Herzegovina. The law on National Defence was promulgated on February 28, 1992, together with the Proclamation of the Constitution of the *Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina*. This law created the framework for formation of the collaborationist Ministry of Defence in the context of the formed “Republic” and for articulation of its role on the basis of the Law, including the Draft Plans for Development, Supply and Training of the Forces.\(^{167}\)

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- chief of staff of the RV i PVO
- chief of communications (Colonel major Obrad Daljevic)
- assistant for the background
- chief of staff of the legal services

**2. CITY HEADQUARTERS OF THE TO SARAJEVO:**
- commander (Colonel major Cedomir Sladoje)
- chief of staff of the headquarters
- assistant for the background
- officer for organization of mobilization
- chief of staff of communications
- four commanders of the TO brigades
- four chiefs of staff – deputies of the TO brigade commanders
- commander of the regional TO headquarters of “SAO Romanija” (Colonel major Jovo Bartula)

**3. FOR THE REGION OF DOBOJ**
- commander of the TO headquarters (major Milovan Stankovic)
- deputy commander of the headquarters of Territorial Defence (captain Nenad Garic) – Ibid.

For the officers who accepted the offered offices, according to Colonel Subotic, there was a need “to immediately draft the order for work assignment, and the rest of the officers, if possible, should be identified from this territory, and after their consent, also assign them to work” (Ibid.).

\(^{167}\)ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraph 372.
The JNA, the Ministry of Interior of Serbia, and the Ministry of Defence of Serbia, formed and armed the Serb Territorial Defence, which in May 1992, fit into the single Army of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as one of the “three Serb armies”. The “defensive” Serb structures were fully dependent on the support and supply from the JNA (armament, weapons, equipment, etc.). This assistance was ordered and organized from the highest command level of the JNA, based on the instructions of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of SFRY, that is, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and as of October 3, 1991, the illegal “Presidency of SFRY”. The units of the Territorial Defence from Serbia too jumped into Bosnia and Herzegovina, offering support to the Serb Territorial Defence and other Serb armed formations, such as for instance, the units of the Territorial Defence from Loznica or from Valjevo.\(^\text{168}\)

The National Security Council of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the domination of the Serb Democratic Party announced (by April 15, 1992) direct war danger, as well as full mobilization of the forces of Territorial Defence of the collaborationist Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. These forces were commanded by the “minister” of defence, Colonel Bogdan Subotic (a medium-ranking officer of the JNA before his newest political appointment).\(^\text{169}\)

The armed units of the SDS (the Serb Territorial Defence and the Serb police forces), according to the “reliable” data from general Milutin Kukanjac, up to March 20, 1992, had 20,000 manpower.\(^\text{170}\) However,

\(^{168}\) Ibid., paragraphs 373, 375, 381, and 386, note 781.

\(^{169}\) Ibid.

\(^{170}\) AIIZ, inv. No. 2-75, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 908-1, March 20, 1992 – to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY (attn. NGS).

In presenting the claim that, according to “reliable” information, the nations of Bosnia and Herzegovina “have armed themselves up on party basis”, General Milutin Kukanjac presented some “reliable” data on this: “Muslims – some 60,000, Croats – some 35,000, and Serbs – some 20,000 men”. However, the state of facts, particularly in the case of Serbs, was quite different. The more so, because in the same document, general Milutin Kukanjac presented the information on the “volunteer units” in the area of responsibility of the 2nd Military District, whose number on this basis only was some 70,000 men, and the quantities of the armament distributed to Serbs (Ibid.).
this number in reality was much larger.\textsuperscript{171} In September 1991, only on
the territory of Bosanska Krupa, the Serb Democratic Party had 5,000
people under its control.\textsuperscript{172}

For the purpose of conducting the aggression against Bosnia and
Herzegovina, (mainly through active or pensioned officers), at the barracks
in Sarajevo and elsewhere, the JNA organized and conducted special
training for the Serb civilians (“\textbf{Serb volunteers}”). In relation to this,
it is interesting to point out that in some municipalities of Bosnia and
Herzegovina with predominantly Serb population (Drvar, Glamoc,
Grahovo, Bosanska Dubica, Sipovo, Nevesinje, Trebinje), even before
the elections (1990), there was a semi-secret training conducted of the
Knin Chetniks with a lot of local “volunteers”. In the second half of 1991,
the Lukavica barracks of \textit{Slobodan Princip-Seljo} and \textit{Slavisa Vajner-
Cica}, and then the barracks of \textit{Viktor Bubanj}, and others, were daily visited
by the members and supporters of the SDS, among whom even those
from the most senior leadership of that party. Thus, in early September
1991, at the office of the first class captain Momir Tomcic, commander
of the 228\textsuperscript{th} Battalion of the Military Police of the 4\textsuperscript{th} Corps of the JNA,
meetings were held, attended by: Colonel Slavoljub Belosevic, Major
Janko Trivic (he chaired the meetings), then Captain Boro Milkovic,
Sergeant Perko Alimpic, Ensign Nedeljko Lizdek, senior sergeants Vlastimir
Plazinic, and Miladin Matic, pensioned Colonel Budimir Djordjic, and
the like. Major Janko Trivic (a KOS associate) was in charge of the training
of the members and supporters of the Serb Democratic Party. Colonels
Belosevic and Djordjic were in direct contact with the Federal Secretariat
for National Defence and with General Blagoje Adzic in person. As
the secretary of the Union of Communists – Movement for Yugoslavia
(SK-PJ), Colonel Djordjic was also in permanent contacts a number of
teachers and assistant teachers at the Faculty of Political Sciences in
Sarajevo, who accepted the Greater Serbia ideology and policy.\textsuperscript{173}

\textsuperscript{171} General Ziero Suljevic claims that the overall forces of the Serb Democratic
Party, grouped into infantry brigades, detachments, battalions and parties, had some 70,000
able people (Z. Suljevic, the aforementioned work, p. 93).

\textsuperscript{172} ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraph 783.

\textsuperscript{173} \textit{Slobodna Bosna}, No. 4, November 21, 1991, p. 3; N. Durakovic, the
aforementioned work, p. 270; \textit{Slobodna Bosna}, No. 22, March 26, 1992, p. 8; AIIZ, inv.
No. 374; Ibid., inv. No. 2-785.
At the aforementioned meetings, in compliance with the position of the JNA to have the SDS members and the other Serbs “voluntarily” report for military training and shooting exercises, it was agreed that the JNA officers, under the form of “volunteers”, execute the training of the armed forces of the SDS for the aggression and other crimes. Following this, groups of 15 to 20 people kept coming to the barracks, first from Sarajevo, and then from Pale, Foca, Sokolac, Zenica, Celinac, and other places of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the Lukavica training, major Trivic also organized training for some 250-300 Serb taxi drivers for handling of mortars, and “zolja” and “osa” rocket launchers. At the same time, Major Pero Despotovic brought some thousand of Serb “volunteers” to the same barracks.\(^{174}\)

The training mainly lasted for two weeks. The theoretical part of the training was conducted in the aforementioned barracks, and the practical, that is, the combat shooting exercise, was conducted in Vojkovici, Tilava, and Pazaric. The focus in the training was on the shooting exercises with “zolja”, and “osa” rocket launchers, and with 60 mm mortars. The sniper, as well as all the pistols and machine guns, were studied in detail. The training was conducted by major Trivic, who was the organizer and director of these activities, and then captains Momir Tomcic and Boro Milkovic, sergeants Perko Alimpic and Nedeljko Martinovic, and from time to time, sergeant Bogoljub Pelemis, senior sergeant Matic, and the like, also got involved (all these officers were from the 228th Battalion of the Military Police of the 4th Corps of the JNA). Sergeant Alimpic, military police officer from the Viktor Bubanj Barracks, was the conductor of the training for the participants at the barricades in Sarajevo (February 29 – March 2, 1992), working to facilitate their acquisition of knowledge of all the technical details related to the blockade of Sarajevo as well as possible.\(^{175}\)

After the completed training, in concordance with the arrangement with the high-ranking JNA officers, the “volunteers” went back home with

\(^{174}\) AIIZ, inv. No. 2-875; AIIZ, inv. No. 3-2905; Dnevni izvjestaj, No. 93, July 26, 1992; AIIZ, inv. Nos. 3-334, and 374; Slobodna Bosna, No. 21, March 19, 1992, p. 4.

\(^{175}\) Ibid.
the equipment assigned, whereas the arms for them were transported in military vehicles into family residences and apartments.\textsuperscript{176}

At the \textit{Slobodan Princip Seljo} Barracks in Sarajevo (in Lukavica), the Serb “volunteers” were also trained for activities with armoured and mechanized weapons. Captain Dunjic (commander of that armoured and mechanized unit), with the assistance of Mocevic – member of the senior SDS leadership in Vojkovici, personally did the selection and recruitment of the “volunteers” from that place. After the completion of training and after departure of “volunteers” from Vojkovici (a group of 70 to 80 Serbs, of varying military specialties), in the organization of the SDS and president Ratko Adzic, a large group of “volunteers” from Ilijas arrived to the aforementioned barracks (250-300 Serbs).\textsuperscript{177}

In the second half of 1991, under the command of general Milan Uzelac, the Banjaluka Corps of the JNA focused special attention to training of the arms. This Corps “trained the territorial defence members \textbf{and volunteers quickly and efficiently}”.\textsuperscript{178} On February 1 and 2, 1992, the Command of the 13\textsuperscript{th} Partisan Brigade of the 30\textsuperscript{th} Partisan Division organized and conducted training at the garrison of Mrkonjic Grad (the village of Kula).\textsuperscript{179} On June 1, 1992, General Momir Talic ordered to arm all the soldiers who had been in training at Manjaca (training in driving tanks, shooting from all the combat JNA vehicles, and training of infantry units).\textsuperscript{180}

In late September 1991, in the area of Kovanj – Kramer Selo (Rogatica Municipality), the JNA organized training for 800 Serbs in handling automatic arms, mortars, and anti-aircraft machine guns.\textsuperscript{181}

\begin{itemize}
\item[176] Ibid.
\item[177] AIIZ, inv. No. 3-318.
\item[178] AIIZ, inv. No. 2-785; \textit{Slobodna Bosna}, No. 3, October 14, 1991, p. 4.
\item[179] AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2585, Command of the 30th Partisan Division, confidential, no. 156-1, January 30, 1992 – to the Command of the 5th Corps.
\item[181] AIIZ, inv. No. 3-328.
\end{itemize}
The training of the Serbs on the territory of the Otoka Local Community was the duty of Ensign Nedeljko Lizdek from the 228th Battalion of the Military Police of the 4th Corps of the JNA.\textsuperscript{182}

The training of the Serb armed formations of the Local Community of Buca Potok was conducted by captains Momir Tomcic and Boro Milkovic. The training was conducted at the Vojkovici shooting grounds, then at Tilava, and at other places. Shooting was organized from pistols of all types, then from automatic guns, machine guns, from “zolja” and “osa” rocket launchers, and hand grenades.\textsuperscript{183}

Training in handling arms on the territory of Dobrinja was conducted by Nedjo Bosnic, Dragutin Mihajlovic, and others. The training of Serbs in handling anti-aircraft guns, “purchased” by the Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the needs of provision of security for the Orao Airborne Institute, also saw active participation of Nebojsa Cekrlija, director of this Institute (he was appointed director by the Serb Democratic Party). Those guns were donated by Cekrlija to the Serbs, who used them to destroy family houses in the areas of Sokolje and Brijesce on a daily basis.\textsuperscript{184}

Massive and intensive training in arms handling of the armed members of the Serb Democratic Party and other Serbs from the territories of the Sarajevo Municipalities of Novi Grad and Novo Sarajevo was organized in February and March 1992. The training was done at Tilava, Lukavica, and Vojkovici. One combat shooting training in Vojkovici was attended by some thousand people.\textsuperscript{185}

The training in arms handling saw particularly active involvement on the part of the members of the Serb armed formations from Alipasino Polje. Namely, the JNA had organized training for them on a number of occasions. One of those training sessions was organized in late February 1992 at the Viktor Bubanj barracks, attended by 80-90 people, and the

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{182} AIIZ, inv. No. 2-538.
\textsuperscript{183} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{184} AIIZ, inv. Nos. 2-540, and 541.
\textsuperscript{185} AIIZ, inv. No. 2-538.
\end{flushleft}

\textbf{919}
second one around March 10, when combat shooting was conducted from infantry arms at the shooting grounds in Vojkovici, where participants received 30 bullets each for single and burst fire.186

In Kalinovik (at the training ground in Grajsovic), in mid-March, a training was organized, attended by some 60 people (all of them from Rajko Čerovina’s party). The training was conducted by captain Dragan and sergeant Boro. This training ground was used for training in handling mortars, recoilless guns, hand grenade launchers, “zolja” rocket launchers, and “they also briefly refreshed knowledge in handling automatic guns”. From this arsenal of arms and weapons, first the officers, and then the “volunteers”, fired several missiles and a number of bullets each. In Lukavica, at the Tvrdinici training ground, on March 20, training was again organized for the members of the aforementioned Serb formations, first in infantry arms, and then in handling hand grenade launchers and mortars, as well as “zolja” rocket launchers, attended by some forty Serbs.187

Even at Tilava, the JNA conducted some brief training and shooting exercises. Thus, in addition to the other Serbs, Gojko Knezevic and Mile Babic (from Alipasino Polje) went to Tilava, where the JNA officers demonstrated to them how to handle automatic guns, “zolja” rocket

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186 AIIZ, inv. No. 3-326. On the occasion of the combat shooting in Vojkovici (around March 10, 1992), with the members of the Serb armed formations from the area of Alipasino Polje, the other side of the shooting ground was at the same time used for shooting training by a group of members of the parastate territorial defence of the so-called “Serb Bosnia and Herzegovina”, led by Miroslav Krajisnik, made up of members of Serb ethnicity from the territories of the Local Communities of Kosevo and Kosevsko Brdo (Ibid.).

187 AIIZ, inv. No. 3-326, 334, and 356. Miso Mijatovic and Mile Babic also participated in organization of the aforementioned training along with the JNA members.

In late March 1992, in the apartment of Gojko Knrijac (17, Cetinska St.), a meeting was held attended by some thirty Serbs, among which there were also commanders of platoons and detachments. Then, Mijatovic, just like several times earlier, demonstrated the map of the Sarajevo city, with marked areas of the city which were allegedly supposed to fall under the rule of the Serb criminals. The aforementioned meeting was also used to present the plan for attack on the TV building and the Novi Grad Police Precinct (Ibid.).
launchers, hand grenade launchers and hand grenades. On this occasion, the combat shooting exercise from automatic guns was also conducted.\textsuperscript{188}

Special training was conducted in Pancevo. Thus, during 1991, the training for the Serbs (from Sarajevo) was organized in that place, which lasted for 17 days. This training, among others, was attended by Nikola Briga, personal body guard of Jovan Tintor. In relation to this, the sources available also indicated upon the fact that “\textit{a captain has been sending people from Lukavica and Tilava out to Pancevo for training}”\textsuperscript{189}

Even on the territory of the Centar Municipality (Sarajevo), pursuant to the JNA request that the Serbs “voluntarily” report for military training, military training was organized for the members and supporters of the Serb Democratic Party and other Serbs. The records of the “volunteers” for military training and shooting exercises were conducted by Petar Rudic, president of the Municipal Board of the SDS of SO Centar, and

\textsuperscript{188} AIIZ, inv. No. 3-356.

\textsuperscript{189} AIIZ, inv. No. 3-354, and 356; Ibid., inv. No. 2-538. Training in Pancevo for the purpose of the genocidal aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was organized pursuant to the instructions of the most senior military leadership of the SFY. Special role in these activities belonged to the Second (intelligence) Administration of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFY. It is interesting to point out that the military intelligence service of the JNA, in addition to the counterintelligence service, had a significant role in planning, preparation and conducting of the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina. Among the numerous facts unmistakably corroborating this, we shall indicate upon the instructive arrangement for the intelligence agents from the composition of the 2nd Military District of the JNA, held in the second half of March 1992. At the time, as per the instructions of the Second (intelligence) Administration of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFY, a meeting was organized at the Intelligence School Centre in Pancevo, for the intelligence agents from the Sarajevo, Banjaluka, Tuzla, Bihac, and Knin Corps (from the composition of the 2nd Military District), Bileca Corps (from the composition of the 4th Military District), and the Uzice Corps of the JNA. For this arrangement, intelligence officers were selected of varying ranks (from chiefs of staff of divisions for intelligence affairs of military district commands, chiefs of staff of divisions for intelligence affairs of corps commands, to intelligence officers in brigades and specialized parties). This meeting was used to elaborate on the place, role and significance of the military intelligence service and specialized patrolling and commando units in conduction of the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina. At this, among other things, priority targets for the attack were identified (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-535).
Miroslav Krajsnik, from the Pionirska Dolina Local Community. The coordinator of these activities was Slavko Bajic, member of the Kosevo II Local Board of the SDS.190

The military training and combat shooting exercises for the Serbs from the territory of the Centar Municipality, as organized by the SDS and JNA, was held from the fall of 1991. The training was conducted at the Viktor Bubanj and Marshall Tito barracks, and the combat shooting exercises at the military shooting ground in Vojkovici. At this shooting ground, in addition, the JNA also gave out arms and ammunition, but it also physically secured the shooting ground.191

At the Rajlovac Barracks, the JNA organized mortar shooting training. Thus, for instance, Slavisa and Ljubisa Vrljes from Bioca (Ilijas Municipality) attended that training, and later on they served mortars at Paljevo as part of the aggressor units.192

In early February 1992, Colonel Nenad Bacanovic organized training for 100 civilians from the area of Kasindol (Sarajevo), mainly members of the Serb Democratic Party. It consisted of the training in handling personal arms. It was conducted at the site of Mali Kriz, a place near Tvrdinici. The training was conducted by first class captain Milos Radosavljevic, and Captain Dragan Siljegovic, and they were controlled

Both before and during the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the participants of this course organized various intelligence and combat activities and formed groups of intelligence agents specialized in psychological propaganda activities. In relation with this, there is a method very specific and unprecedented by its monstrosity, used by the intelligence agents at the Kupres Plateau. Namely, first the mass media disseminated some very perfidious propaganda activity, with hearty involvement by the SDS, about the depravity of the Serbs at Kupres. Following this, groups of JNA special forces were thrown into the villages of Gornji Malovan and Donji Malovan, exclusively populated by Serbs, which executed manslaughter over a number of elderly and weak Serb civilians, and then they disseminated the news stating that these villages were attacked by the Ustashas and that they massacred the Serbs. This was the incentive for the already prepared arrival of the Knin Corps to the Kupres Plateau, commanded at the time by Ratko Mladic (Ibid.).

190 AIIZ, inv. No. 3-335. The training in handling arms and weapons in the village of Kromolj was organized by “some guy named Vlado“.
191 AIIZ, inv. No. 3-2905.
192 AIIZ, inv. No. 3-2592.
by Major Novica Zivanovic, one of the most forceful advocates of the SDS among the JNA soldiers in Lukavica.\textsuperscript{193}

The training of the Serb “volunteers” for the aggressions against the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was also conducted at the Technical Overhaul Institute in Hadzici (TRZ). During 1991, the TRZ admitted a large number of Serb “volunteers” for training and capacitating, both in handling of various types of arms and weapons, operating of armoured vehicles, and in making repairs, overhauls of the engines on armoured vehicles, interventions on artillery weapons and the like.\textsuperscript{194} These persons, mainly young, were deployed into the armoured, firing, vehicle and artillery plants. After the completed training, they were sent to the front lines in Croatia, where they participated in the aggression against this Republic.\textsuperscript{195}

In late March 1992, the TRZ “\textit{conducted a mass admission of reservists from the territory of Hadzici, mainly younger persons, exclusively of the Serb ethnicity}”. In accordance with their arms and specialties, and their professions, they were deployed at various plants for training. A number of the “volunteers” from the firing plant, who had been trained in handling anti-aircraft machine guns and anti-aircraft guns, were deployed at machine gun nests built for the purpose of the alleged defence of the TRZ. In the same period, all the expert persons, mechanics and others, were withdrawn from the plants, and together with the “volunteers“, they formed crews for artillery weapons, armed vehicles, tanks, and the like.\textsuperscript{196}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{193} \textit{Slobodna Bosna}, no. 20, March 12, 1992, p. 4.
\item \textsuperscript{194} AIIZ, inv. No. 3-3335. The management of the Technical Overhaul Institute told its employees that these were young mechanics that had come for additional training from military schools.
\item \textsuperscript{195} Ibid. In addition to these “volunteers”, a large number of mechanics of all types from the Technical Overhaul Institute also participated in the aggression against the Republic of Croatia. Thus, for illustration, in early June 1991, a large number of technicians from the tank program were sent to Croatia (Glinia, Maslenicki bridge, Zadar, Vukovar, and the like).
\item \textsuperscript{196} Ibid. At the same time, a number of heavy artillery weapons were pulled out from the Technical Overhaul Institute and dug in at certain elevated points. The management of the Institute explained this by the fact that this is allegedly in the function of defence of the Technical Overhaul Institute.
\end{itemize}
Many Serb “volunteers”, among whom a significant number were from Bugojno, attended special training at Manjaca. Namely, the JNA used the cattle breeding farm buildings at Manjaca for training of the Serb fascists.197

After a reception at General Djurdjevac’s, in January 1992, at Nisici (in the nearby place of Bukva), Captain Boro Milkovic was training the Serb “volunteers” (Chetnik units). Throughout February 1992, he was training a number of Serbs (400) from Foca in the Kalinovik barracks. The focus of the training was no 82 and 120 mm mortars. After the training, the trainees exercised shooting from “zolja” and “osa” hand grenade and rocket launchers.198

As per the order and in agreement with general Djurdjevac, the training of the units of the Serb Democratic Party in the region of Doboj was organized and directed by major Stankovic and junior sergeant Ilic. To this aim, major Stankovic was in constant contact with general Djurdjevac. Thus, for instance, in February 1992, he visited Sarajevo to see the general on several occasions.199

For the members of the Serb armed formations from the territories of Han Pijesak, Sokolac, Rogatica, Vlasenica and Pale, the training was conducted at the locations of Crvene Stijene, Vukova Pecina, Perisino Brdo, and Luburic Polje, on Mt. Romanija. The organizer and director of the training was Captain Rvovic, as well as the “marticeveci” group.200

In late 1991, on Mt. Romanija (Crvene Stijene, the site called Zdrijelo), training was organized for the Serb “volunteers” in handling

197 ∴ RATNI ZLOCINI U BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI, p. 213. During the summer and fall of 1991, the JNA used these buildings as a concentration camp for war detainees, captured during the aggression against the Republic of Croatia. From April or May 1992, these facilities were used for placement of the camp inmates from Bosnia and Herzegovina.

198 Slobodna Bosna, no. 4. November 21, 1991, p. 3. During March 1992, a Serb armed unit from Foca (some 400-500 men) was being trained at the Kalinovik garrison (AIIZ, inv. No. 3-1173, Serb Municipal Assembly of Foca – to the General Staff of the JNA, attn. general Blagoje Adzic, Foca, March 17, 1992).


arms. In early March 1992, some hundred people were at the training, “either uniformed or civilians”, including a number of Serbs from Sarajevo. The training lasted for some twenty days. The trainees of the military training first exercised how to disassemble and assemble arms and the manner of loading with ammunition, then handling snipers and the like. After several days, the “volunteers” had combat shooting exercise firing into bags filled with straw, at some 150 to 200 m distance. Also, the training included the manner of using knife, packing and setting up tents, orientation in the country with the help of the compass, and moving along azimuths. After the training was completed, all the trainees were divided into four groups and sent homes, under the understanding that they would be called upon if needed. Ten days later, they were invited by telephone to report to their groups and come again to Mt. Romanija for supplementary training, where they stayed for seven days. After the completed training, all of them gave

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201 AIIZ, inv. No. 3-336, and 356. Among others, the aforementioned training was attended and completed by brothers Milos and Momo Gluhovic, and Gordan Ivetic, Milan Furtula, and Dragan Mladen from Sarajevo. “When they arrived into the aforementioned area [Crvene Stijene, the Zdrijelo locality; note by the author], as per the previous agreement, they gave off a previously arranged code sign, they flashed the flashlight twice, and then they received the same answer. When they arrived to that place, Count Dragan Djujic appeared in front of them and greeted them by saying “May the Lord help you, my heroes”, and they responded by saying “May the Lord help you too”, and then he asked to see their personal ID cards in order to verify their identity” (Ibid.).

On April 10, 1992 (about 19:30 hours), from the room of the residential building (Gruje Novakovica St. no. 12/X), in which they all lived, accompanied by brothers Momo and Gordan Ivetic, Milos Gluhovic sniper fired onto a passer-by lady who was moving from the direction of the TV Sarajevo Building, along the side of the Novi Grad Municipality Building, in the direction of Svrakino Selo. After that, they ran back into the apartment, where soon after they were deprived of liberty and taken to the Police Home, and then into the premises of the Security Services Centre, where they were taken samples of by using paraffin gloves. On that occasion, Milos stated that he had even earlier fired at passers-by, specifically at dusk hours – three or four times, and that, before that event, on April 5, 1992, he shot a girl with sniper fire, near the school building at Svrakino Selo (Ibid.).

202 Ibid. Then, Milos Gluhovic and Gordan Ivetic left for the village of Bogovici, where they reported to Radomir Pandurevic, and Ranko Gluhovic left for Zdrijelo, where he reported to Rajko Kusic. At this training, they also arranged for the manner of future communication.
an oath before “count” Djujic, “so that he formed them into ranks and one by one they approached the Serb flag holding a knife in their hand, pronouncing “I hereby swear to the Lord and King that I will faithfully serve the Serb people, not sparing our lives in that effort”.203

In Pale and on Mt. Romanija, weapons from Kiseljak and Lukavica that had been set up for action were used for training. Namely, “JNA volunteers” of Serb ethnicity were trained on them using combat ammunition, with the barrels turned in the direction of Sarajevo. The training was conducted on 155 mm howitzers and 128 mm multiple rocket launchers. The whole activity was directed by Colonel Djukanovic, Major Dragojlo Tosic, and 1st-Class captains Radomir Pesic and Dragan Petkovic. In addition, even within the site of the barracks in Pale, the Serb fascists were conducting training for handling of three-barrelled 105-mm guns, whereas the 155-mm cannons and 120-mm mortars were placed within the site of the barracks.204

The organizers of Serb armed formations in Pale recruited the Serb fascists and took them for military training in Pazaric and Pancevo (Serbia).205

Criminal Nedjo Vujicic, from Dobrosevici, organized and conducted training for the Serb armed formations in Bojnik and the local church in Reljevo. The training of Serbs in Dobrosevici also involved participation of Maksim Milicevic and his son Miso, as well as some others.206

In early 1992, particularly during and after the organization of the March barricades by the JNA and the Serb Democratic Party, the training of the Serb “volunteers” was intensified at the JNA barracks in Semizovac.207 Among the organizers was Momcilo Soskic, a reserve

203 Ibid.

204 Slobodna Bosna, no. 22, March 26, 1992, p. 8; Dnevni izvjestaj, No. 75, July 8, 1992.

205 Dnevni izvjestaj, No. 74, July 7, 1992.


207 AIIZ, inv. No. 3-1004. Before the arrival of the Serb “volunteers”, the “recommending” of all the persons of non-Serb ethnicity was completed from the JNA barracks in Semizovac.
A JNA officer (a tradesman from Semizovac, at about age 55). The training in handling fire arms was also conducted in Krivoglavci on a daily basis. The training was also participated by Mirko (son of Dusan) Jovanovic, aka “Curcija” (from Semizovac). 208

In the second half of 1991 and in early 1992, groups of some 150 to 200 “reservists” from the surrounding Serb villages were trained in Visoko in handling and aiming with various types of arms. Such “training” was also repeated with other groups of “reservists” who were successively sent to the Visoko barracks. After the completed training, the Serbs took away with them the arms they were assigned with during the training. 209

It is also interesting to point out the fact that women too were trained in handling arms. Thus, training was organized in handling arms in Ulog for the Serb women from the village of Jezero (Kalinovik Municipality). “Every morning, they went to that training and they came back in the evening”. The following women were under arms: Radmila (20), Jovanka (50), Vaska (50), and Sava Golijanin (45), and Sava Govedarica (55). Every Serb woman shepherd from that village carried a hand grenade along. “None of the Serbs concealed their weapons, they carried them around publicly”. 210

After conducting of mobilization in Bosanski Petrovac, in the village of Smoljani the “Military Headquarters” was formed, which organized training for the Serb population and at the same time procured and transported heavy weapons. In addition to able men, the training also included women, as well as children from the ages of 12 to 16. 211

Special training for the aggression and commission of crimes against the Bosniaks was completed by some Serbs in Serbia (Pancevo, and Bubanj Potok), where they were trained for a long time. Thus, during

208 Ibid.

209 Dnevni izvjestaj, No. 72, July 5, 1992, and no. 85, July 18, 1992; Slobodna Bosna, no. 22, March 26, 1992, p. 8; AIIZ, inv. No. 2-549/4, and 549/5.

210 AIIZ, inv. No. 3-2828.

the review of troops of the group of “seseljeveci” at the Monumental Part of Vraca on April 18, 1992, their leader Branislav Gavrilovic, among other things, said that “he had been trained for eleven months for this war and that with his soldiers he is going to execute all the tasks”. A number of Serbs from the area of Brcko, in organization of the Brcko garrison command, completed special training in Bubanj Potok.212

After they had participated in the crimes against Bosniaks in the surroundings of Vlasenica in May 1992, together with the “volunteers” from Sekovici, the units of the Novi Sad Corps organized training on armoured transporters for the members of the “Serb TO of Vlasenica”.213

In June 1992, the Serbs were systematically trained for the genocidal aggression. In the first half of June 1992, in Bijeljina, training was conducted, from where, following that, each ten days some four hundred new soldiers would be sent to the Brcko front lines. In mid-June 1992, training was organized for some 10,000 “reservists” at the location of Manjaca. After the completed training, a number of them were sent in trucks, escorted by tanks and armoured transporters, in the direction of northern Bosnia.214

With the members of the Serb Democratic Party, the JNA members organized special training for snipers and prepared many sniper nests in Sarajevo, Zenica, and other places of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus, the Serb snipers were trained on the training ground above Crvene Stijene.215 On March 15, 1992, in Sarajevo, Colonel Major Dejan Pavlovic with his closest associates prepared a number of sniper nests in Sarajevo.216

212 Agresija …, p. 56; J. Kadric, BRCKO – GENOCID I SVJEDOCENJA, Sarajevo, 1998, p. 27. Verification of the knowledge acquired in Bubanj Potok was done every month for several days. What the Serbs had learned in Bubanj Potok was later practically demonstrated by them in taking over Brcko, and particularly in the Banjaluka concentration camp (J. Kadric, the aforementioned work, p. 27).


215 Posebno izdanje, no. 2, April 28, 1992. They were transported to that training in the JNA vans.

216 Ibid. In late April 1992, three sniper nests were discovered in Sarajevo.
A number of the officers from the Security Department of the Command of the 2nd Military District, with the assistance of Branislav Vucetic, aka Vule, from Grbavica, organized evacuation of the snipers from the Holiday Inn hotel, who had fired on the innocent and unarmed civilians (and children) in front of the building of the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.217

The sources available reliably show that, pursuant to the directives and guidelines from the most senior military leadership of SFRY, and the state and political leaderships of Serbia, and Slobodan Milosevic in person, with the direct support of the Serb Democratic Party, the JNA formed and organized in military terms numerous Serb armed formations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It trained them and staffed them with officer personnel, supplied them with arms, ammunition, equipment and other JNA resources, connected them to the commands of JNA units and institutions in their areas of responsibility, provided for mobilization in the areas mainly populated by Serbs, and the like. All these “units” were under the command and control of the JNA. There are numerous documents corroborating this. Indeed, there were attempts with some “volunteer units” to “slip away from under control”. Thus, in early 1992, some leaders of the Serb Democratic Party advocated for “distancing from the JNA and creation of a new army”. In addition to this, there were cases that “certain activists, some working bodies and various assemblies of the SAO’s impose some kinds of conditions – ultimatums to the Army, advocate for placing of the army compositions under some kinds of their own commands in some smaller areas, and the like (which in particularly pertains to the Mt. Ozren region)”. Starting from the assessment that this can have “negative consequences for the JNA, particularly as to the aspect of filling in of units with manpower”, General Milutin Kukanjac undertook “some concrete measures”. In relation to these aforementioned cases, he indicated that “these problems would soon be discussed with the leaders of the SDS Sarajevo, because if it happens that some of these volunteer units slip away from under the control, some serious consequences may occur”. Given that numerous SDS members had contacted with the government authorities and other bodies in Serbia, general Milutin Kukanjac believed it would

217 Ibid.
be good to have the “SSNO indicate to the leadership of Serbia upon these cases and to recommend their stronger influence on elimination of deviant behaviour in these regions”. In relation to this, General Milutin Kukanjac talked to the “top leaders of the Serb people (Karadzic, Koljevic, Plavsic, Krajisnik, and Dukic)”.218


The political and military leadership of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, headed by “Vozd” Slobodan Milosevic, under the conditions of being unable to further retain its troops in the sovereign and as of April 6, internationally recognized Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and UNPA (United Nations Protected Area) zones in Croatia, was seeking new organizational solutions in order to establish a favourable form to mask the continuity and absolute control over all the military potentials in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. To this goal, it decided to do yet another reorganization of its armed forces. By this reorganization, the leadership of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would formally have carried out the “transformation” of the JNA into “three Serb armies” (the Army of Yugoslavia, the Army of the Republic of Serb Krajina, and the Army of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina). In essence, even such armed forces would remain a single armed force of the newly declared Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, under the command of its General Staff and the rump Presidency as the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces in Belgrade, and it stayed on the territories conquered for the Greater Serbia thus far.219 In relation to this, the


According to Kadijevic, the JNA “only presented the basis from which three armies were formed – the Army of FRY, the Army of Republika Srpska, and the Army of the Republic of Serb Krajina”. In relation with this, General Kadijevic stated that this was “done in a very organized way given the interior and international circumstances”. This task, according to him, was “a very relevant one”, and was “established by the
tradition of the term “army” was abused, both in the sense of the armed forces of a state, and in the sense of its operational strategy corpus (for instance, in WWI: the Uzice Army of the Kingdom of Serbia, and the Sanjak Army of the Kingdom of Montenegro, as well as the traditions of the main headquarters of the National Liberation partisan detachments, that is, main headquarters of the National Liberation Army and the Partisan detachments of Yugoslavia from the National War of Liberation, 1941-1945). Within this framework, at the meeting in Belgrade on April 30, 1992, where, in addition to Slobodan Milosevic, Borisav Jovic, Dr. Branko Kostic, Momir Bulatovic, and general Milan Panic (chief of staff of the General Staff of the JNA), the leadership also attended of the fifth-columnist SDS of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the “Republic of Serb Bosnia and Herzegovina” (Radovan Karadzic, Momcilo Krajisnik, and Nikola Koljevic), the decision was taken on the formation of the army “for the Serbs in BiH”.220

The topic of the aforementioned meeting was also the issue of “withdrawal” of the “citizens of FRY from the JNA” in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Given that thus far the European Community had already recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Greater Serbia leadership was demanded to withdraw the JNA from this state. This was “expected and foreseen” by Milosevic and Jovic, so they were afraid that they

JNA leadership as a priority one. The explanation for determination of this “priority” task as presented by Veljko Kadijevic is more than ridiculous: “because the other nations in Yugoslavia have started to create their own armies in various ways, and the Serb and Montenegrin nations used to consider the JNA their own army, just as they considered the Yugoslav state their own state, and therefore, it is the obligation of the JNA in the first place to provide to the new Yugoslavia and the overall Serb nation their army, without which there is no not just freedom, but life as well on this territory and under the conditions imposed by the enemies” (V. Kadijevic, the aforementioned work, pp. 163-164).

The formal “transformation” of the JNA into “three Serb armies” was completed at the Third Administration of the General Staff of the SFRY/FRY, which required few organizational efforts (it involved only a change of the military symbols and flags (Ibid.; AIIZ, inv. No. 5339, Record, Supplement to the Testimony of A.K.).

220 B. Jovic, POSLEDNJI DANI SFRO, second edition, Kragujevac 1996, p. 448. According to Jovic, this operation was “too significant for the leadership of the Greater Serbia movement, and even still more significant for the Serbs in BiH”, because “they received their own army” (Ibid.).
would bring the JNA “into the position to be declared a foreign or an aggressor army”.221

In relation to the withdrawal “of the remaining” citizens of FRY from the JNA in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a false piece of information was presented that at the time Bosnia and Herzegovina had some 10-15% of citizens of FRY from the JNA in this state, which, according to the leadership of the Greater Serbia movement, totalled to some 10,000 people. It was assessed that this is not a problem, because even without them, Bosnia and Herzegovina “is left with some 90,000 JNA soldiers, mainly of Serb ethnicity, and the Serb leadership from BiH can take over the political leadership over them”.222

The Serb collaborationists, headed by Karadzic, allegedly agreed.223 There was allegedly also a time frame agreed of 15 days for the “withdrawal” in view of implementation of that delusion of the world public (about which they had allegedly argued quite a lot).224

At this meeting in Belgrade, where instructions were designed and given in order to conceal the actual status – that “the three Serb armies”

221 Ibid., p. 448. In relation to this, Jovic mentions the ridiculous statement that withdrawal, according to him, of “some 10-15% of the remaining citizens of FRY from BiH”, accounting for “only some 10,000 people”, “is neither a technical nor a traffic problem”, but the problem is in “that Branko Kostic has recently incautiously stated that he, as the ‘vice-president of the Presidency’ of the SFRY, shall never sign off the order for withdrawal of the JNA out of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and also in that Milan Panic has stated that the army shall not withdraw from out of Bosnia and Herzegovina before some 5 to 7 years, although this republic has been internationally recognized as an independent state. The public has very seriously received this, and neither of them has taken any serious thoughts when giving such statements. How can we force our army to stay in some other independent state beyond its will, without risking it being declared undesirable” (Ibid.).

222 Ibid.

223 Ibid. According to Borisav Jovic, Momcilo Krajsnik was asking “a series of questions: how shall this army be financed, who shall give them salaries, who shall secure their pensions, etc”, which, wrote Jovic, “is all existing as a problem, but it is not decisive to our discussion”.

224 Ibid.
still continue to be the single armed forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (with three operational strategy bodies), it was, among other things, agreed that General Ratko Mladic be appointed to replace General Milutin Kukanjac.225

The order for establishment of the “Army of the Serb Republic of BiH” was brought by the SSNO on May 10, 1992, and it was signed by the representative of the Federal Secretary for National Defence (General Blagoje Adzic). This order was for formation of the “Main Headquarters”, in the following composition: commander General Major Ratko Mladic, Chief of the General Staff General Major Manojlo Milovanovic; assistant for moral and information, General Major Milan Gvero; assistant for the background General Major Djordje Djukic; Chief of Staff for security Colonel Zdravko Tolimir, and Chief of Staff for mobilization Colonel Mico Grubor. On the following day (May 11, 1992), General Kukanjac transferred the lined up Command of the 2nd Military District to General Mladic.226

In execution of the aforementioned “agreements” from Belgrade, on May 12, 1992, at the session in Banjaluka, where the “strategic goals”

225 Ibid. Borisav Jovic wrongfully states (or is it a technical omission) that at that time it was agreed that general Ratko Mladic be appointed at the position of General Vukovic.

On the same day (that is, April 30), in Banjaluka, General Blagoje Adzic heard the situation reports from general Momir Talic (commander in Banjaluka), Ratko Mladic (in Knin), and Spiro Nikovic (in Bihac), all of them corps commanders in these cities, and he agreed about formation “of the new army of the Serb BiH”. Blagoje Adzic avoided to say anything on this, but this was done by the local Serb politicians (such as for instance Radoslav Brdjanin), who stated: “We have to engage the Krajina population here right now in order to form single armed forces for the protection of Kninska Krajina, Lika, Kordun, Banija, West Slavonia, and Bosnian Krajina…”, and “the composition of the army would include the forces of the Knin, Bihac, Banjaluka, Tuzla, Sarajevo, Bileca, and the Fifth Corps of the RV and PVO, whose organizational structure would be adjusted to specific conditions…” (I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 137-138).

of the Serbian people were brought, the Assembly of the Serb People of Bosnia and Herzegovina formally formed the Army of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and appointed general Ratko Mladic the commander of the “Main Headquarters” of this Army. Thus, the Army of Yugoslavia did not withdraw from Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was only relocated into the “Serb” territories and took the starting positions for the pacification of the ineffectively occupied part of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

227 AIIZ, inv. No. 3-1217, Decision on Formation of the Army of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, no. 03-234/92, May 12, 1992; ICTY, Case. No. IT-02-54-T, paragraph 397. According to General Ratko Mladic, this “decision” “created the conditions to use the armed people and members of the Serb people from among the former JNA and the resources and equipment available to do the transformation of units and to form the Army of the Serb Republic, which was created amidst the fights from up in Grahovo down to Trebinje” (AIIZ, inv. No. 2.2681, Main Headquarters of the Army of the Serb Republic, “Military Secret. Strictly Confidential”, EXPOSÉ by the Commander of the General Staff, General Major Ratko Mladic, on the accomplished results on the front line, on the condition of the army of the Serb Republic, on the problems and tasks in the forthcoming period, September 1992, p. 1). This “decision”, as claimed by General Ratko Mladic, allowed to the “armed people, to the Serbs in the former JNA, using the materials and equipment available, to transform the units and form the Army of Republika Srpska” (ICTY, Case. No. IT-02-54-T, paragraph 399).

The “decision” for formation of this army deftly avoided the formulation on that the commands, units and institutions of the JNA made the backbone of the “Army of Republika Srpska” (V. Kadijevic, the aforementioned work, p. 148). Instead, it adopted the statement that the thus far “units and headquarters of territorial defence should be renamed into the commands and units the Army”, its organization and formation to be subsequently established by the “President of the Republic” (AIIZ, inv. No. 3-1217, Decision for Formation of the Army of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, no. 03-234/92, May 12, 1992). In this way, the Serb collaborationists made an effort to conceal the actual state of facts.

The “decision” on the formation of the Army of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina came into force “as of the date of its adoption”, and was to be in effect until “the proclamation of the Law on the Army of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina” (Ibid.).

The Army of the Serb Republic of BiH was officially proclaimed on May 18, 1992 (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2563, Working Note by the JNA Colonel O.S., May 18, 1992, p. 205).

228 I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 137-138; S. Biserko, the aforementioned work, p. 227; D. Domazet, the aforementioned work, p. 14; ICTY, Case: No. IT-94-IT, Evidence of the testimony by the JNA Colonel O.S., June 5, 1996, p. 5.
The newly formed Main Headquarters of the Army of the Serb Republic of BiH as of May 19, 1992, took over the function of the highest ranking command of the Army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was by then mainly held by the Command of the 2nd Military District.229

Appointment of the Main Headquarters of the Army of the Serb Republic of BiH is one more confirmation of the unity of the armed forces and of the attempt to delude the international public. Inauguration of this Headquarters also refers to the conclusion that, by the analogy of the system of armed forces from the 1941-1945 National Liberation Movement, there was an intention to emphasize the original sovereignty of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its armed forces, with simultaneous and unquestionable belonging to the armed forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

In such a constellation, on May 19, 1992, general Ratko Mladic was appointed commander of the 2nd Military District, and from then until May 19, he had a dual function: he was heading the 2nd Military District, closed down on May 19, and also heading the newly formed Army of the Serb Republic of BiH, which was agreed on April 30, 1992, at the aforementioned meeting in Belgrade. This provided for the continuity in directing and commanding over the armed forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The jurisdiction of the newly formed Main Headquarters included the majority of the 2nd Military District, and a minor part of the 4th Military District. The other parts of the 2nd Military District were used to form the Army of the Republic of Serb Krajina, and the forces of the 1st, 3rd, and the 4th Military Districts, deployed on the territories of Serbia and Montenegro, went into the composition of the “third Serb army” (the Army of SR Yugoslavia). In this way, the organizational

structure of the JNA, leaving the possibility for dual interpretation, was “adjusted to the specific conditions…”  

In concealing the past military activities and seeking to emphasize its own subjectivity, on May 20, 1992, the Presidency of the Serb Republic of BiH announced general mobilization of “all the citizens of SR BiH, both on the territory of the Republic and for those living outside the Republic”. This mobilization covered all the men aged from 18-60, and women aged from 18-55, and the material resources that were subject to mobilization. The general working obligation was also introduced.

In June 1992, the Presidency of the Serb Republic of BiH took the “Decision” to establish, organize and form the Army of the Serb Republic of BiH. The composition of this army included the forces of the 9th (Knin), 10th (Bihac), 5th (Banjaluka), 17th (Tuzla), 4th (Sarajevo), 13th (Bileca), and the Fifth Airborne (RVO and PVO) Corps of the JNA. Thus, this army was (initially) consisting of six corps, based on the corps of the 2nd Military District, thereby reducing the reorganization to renaming of the JNA corps into the corps of the Army of the Serb Republic of BiH:

- 1st Krajina Corps (from the units of the 5th Corps of JNA);
- 2nd Krajina Corps (from the units of the 9th and 10th Corps of JNA);
- East Bosnia Corps (from the units of the 17th Corps of JNA);
- Sarajevo-Romanija Corps (from the units of the 4th Corps of JNA);

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230 Ibid. In order to delude the public, on June 16, 1992, on the territories of Serbia and Montenegro, the military districts were cancelled, and the army became the highest ranking strategic organizational whole of the Army of Yugoslavia, made up of three armies: the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Armies of the Corps and Brigade compositions (D. Domazet, the aforementioned work, p. 14, note 23).

231 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2654, Command of the 1st Krajina Corps, strictly confidential, no. 467-2, May 21, 1992 – to the Command of the 10th Partisan Division, and others.

232 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2681, Main Headquarters of the Army of the Serb Republic (“Military Secret. Strictly Confidential”). EXPOSÉ by the commander of the Main Headquarters, general major Ratko Mladic, on the accomplished results on the front line, on the condition of the army of the Serb Republic, on the problems and tasks in the forthcoming period, September 1992, pp. 1-3).
- **Herzegovina Corps** (from the units of the 13th Corps of JNA);
- **Aircraft and Anti-Aircraft Defence.**

The aforementioned corps of the land army had each: one command of the corps, with headquarters-affiliated units, 8-12 infantry brigades, one or two mechanized or tank brigades, one or two artillery regiments, one anti-tank artillery regiment, one artillery-rocket regiment of the PVO, one engineering regiment, one medical battalion, one military police battalion, one communications battalion, one or two vehicle parties, and then atomic and chemical protection units, and background units or institutions, and as needed, other specialized units too, depending on the area of responsibility and the topographic and tactical configuration of the land.

**The Fifth (Banjaluka),** that is, the 1st Krajina Corps of the Army of the Serb Republic of BiH was an exceptionally strong one. As of June 1, 1992, it had (under the state of war) over 78,000 in manpower. The **Military Aircraft** was formed from the 2nd and 5th Corps of the Military Aircraft and Anti-Aircraft Defence of the JNA, taking over the mobilization and territorial infrastructure, with the major warehouses which were still filled in from Serbia and Montenegro. Thus, their headquarters-affiliated units and the corps support units remained in the same role, with a new emblem.

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233 AIIZ, inv. No. 5352, Record, Supplemented Testimony by Dj. Dj.; I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 137-138; S. Biserko, the aforementioned work, p. 227; D. Domazet, the aforementioned work, p. 14; ICTY, Case No.: IT-02-54-T, paragraphs 398 and 679; AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2870, Command of the Bileca Corps, strictly confidential, no. 32, April 19, 1992, Bileca – to all the artillery units, Order for artillery activity; Ibid. inv. No. 2-2681, Main Headquarters of the Army of the Serb Republic (“Military Secret. Strictly Confidential”), EXPOSÉ by the commander of the Main Headquarters, general major Ratko Mladic, on the accomplished results on the front line, on the condition of the army of the Serb Republic, on the problems and tasks in the forthcoming period, September 1992, p. 3.

234 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2663, Command of the 2nd Krajina Corps, strictly confidential, no. 32-1, June 2, 1992 – to the 11th Brigade; D. Domazet, the aforementioned work, p. 13, image 6.

235 ICTY, Case: No. IT-94-I-T, Evidence of the testimony by the JNA Colonel O.S., June 5, 1996, p. 24; AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2563, Working note by the JNA Colonel O.S., June 1, 1992, p. 237; Slobodna Bosna, June 19, 2003, pp. 17 and 19. As of June 1, 1992, 78,000 people were recorded for meals, excluding the forces with 1,800 people each from the two municipalities of Sipovo and Srbac, and 15,000 of the so-called Doboj Group – AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2563, Working note by the JNA Colonel O.S., June 1, 1992, p. 237; ICTY, Case: No. IT-94-I-T, Evidence of the testimony by the JNA Colonel O.S., June 5, 1996, p. 24.
Second Krajina Corps, seated in Drvar, had some 22,000 manpower. The forces of both corps, as well as the 15,000 from the so-called Doboj Group, and with 1,800 people each from the territories of the Sipovo and Srđac municipalities, that is, a total of some 120,000 manpower, was logistically supported by the 993rd Background Base. Three days later, the 1st Krajina Corps had over 100,000 people. According to the data available, the Herzegovina Corps had 22,000 people, the East Bosnia one had 23,000, and the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps had 12,000 soldiers and officers.

In September 1992, under the direct command of the Main Headquarters of the Army of the Serb Republic of BiH there were six operational compositions (five corps of land army and Air Forces and Anti-Aircraft Defence), “with clearly differentiated areas of responsibility,

236 ICTY, Case: No. IT-94-I-T, Evidence of the testimony by the JNA Colonel O.S., June 5, 1996, p. 24; AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2563, Working note by the JNA Colonel O.S. (volume 2), June 6, 1992, p. 26. The data on the number of people at the 2nd Krajina Corps (some 22,000 manpower) was presented by Colonel Minic, assistant commander of this corps for logistics, at the meeting held on June 6, 1992 (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2563, Working note by the JNA Colonel O.S. (volume 2), June 6, 1992, p. 26).

237 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2563, Working note by the JNA Colonel O.S., June 6, 1992, p. 241. This piece of data was presented on June 4, 1992, by Colonel Vaso Tepsic, assistant commander of the 1st Krajina Corps for logistics, at the meeting held at the Command of the Corps (Ibid.). Therefore the data is not exact as provided by the counter-admiral D. Domazet, stating that the 1st Krajina Corps had 55,000, and that the 2nd Krajina Corps had 14,000 people (D.Domazet, the aforementioned work, p. 13, image 6).

238 D. Domazet, the aforementioned work, p. 13, image 6. The exact number of the overall forces of the Army of Republika Srpska of BiH, without making available of all the documentation from all of its commands, units and institutions, is hard to establish. Counter-admiral D. Domazet claims that on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the first half of 1992, there were 6 corps (the 1st and 2nd Krajina ones, the Sarajevo-Romanija one, the East Bosnia one, the Herzegovina, and the Drina ones), with 135,000 people, 550 tanks, more than 1,300 cannons in 430 armed carriers (Ibid. p. 13, image 6, and p. 14).

The aforementioned number of corps in the aforementioned period is not exact, nor is the time of their activity, nor their overall forces. First of all, then there was no Drina Corps existing. The aforementioned corps (five rather than six) were active as of May 19, 1992, when the Army of the Serb Republic of BiH was formed, rather than “in the first half of 1992.” (Probably Domazet had referred to the period from May 19, 1992 on). In addition to this, Domazet did not take into account the forces of the Aircraft Forces and Anti-Aircraft Defence, or any other forces from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
The filling levels of units varied. The units and institutions directly subjected to the “Main Headquarters” (the so-called headquarters-affiliated units) and the units of the Air Forces and Anti-Aircraft Defence were the least filled in (33-44%). The operational compositions were filled in with strength of 76-108%. However, certain joint tactical units within the corps, “due to shortage of military conscripts of certain specialties”, in September 1992 were either not formed yet or were filled in at the minimum level. This particularly pertained to the units of technical arms (artillery, anti-aircraft defence, engineering and communications). Some brigades were filled in even up to 400% in relation to the prescribed formation.239

Certain units and institutions of the then non-existing JNA were even after May 19 holding their prior names (for instance, the 30th Partisan Division, and the 993rd Background Base of the 2nd Military District), as well as the very name of the JNA, and the terms of “military personnel and civilian personnel serving the JNA”.240

In late 1992, the sixth corps of the land army was formed – the Drina Corps.241

239 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2681, Main Headquarters of the Army of the Serb Republic (“Military Secret. Strictly Confidential“), EXPOSÉ by the commander of the Main Headquarters, general major Ratko Mladic, on the accomplished results on the front line, on the condition of the army of the Serb Republic, on the problems and tasks in the forthcoming period, September 1992, pp. 1-3. This was the consequence of negative events, where military conscripts, even whole units, were linked exclusively to the local municipal and rural areas, and it was not possible to move them even onto the territory of the neighbouring municipality (Ibid.).


The Drina Corps was among other things formed due to the challenge of the strained chain of the Eastern Bosnia enclaves: Gorazde, Zepa, Srebrenica, and Konjevic Polje – Cerska, on the territory which was classified as priority in the Greater Serbia occupation strategy.
The Army of the Serb Republic of BiH wore uniforms and rank epaulettes worn by the members of the JNA and the Territorial Defence, however, the emblems on caps were changed. Previously, this was the blue-white-red flag with the letters JNA on it. After May 19, the JNA sign was removed, and the basic emblem on the caps was the “Serb flag”, and on the left upper arm there was the Serb flag on the circular background with an inscription of “The Army of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina”.242

The shortage at the commands and units of the Army of the Serb Republic of BiH of active officers was “a particular problem”. Of the total number of Serb officers originating from Bosnia and Herzegovina, by September 1992, the “Army of Republika Srpska” “was only joined by 21.30% (there had been 4,206, and there came 900)”. This was one half of the formational needs of this army.243

The commands, units and institutions of the JNA, in compliance with the decisions of the Greater Serbia leadership and Milosevic in person, “made up the backbone of the Army of Republika Srpska, with complete armament and equipment”. This army, “with full reliance on the Serb people and its universal support”, “took over the front line from the JNA” in Bosnia and Herzegovina.244

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242 AIIZ, inv. No. 3-1217, Decision on Formation of the Army of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, no. 03-234/92, May 12, 1992; ICTY, Case: No. IT-94-I-T, Evidence of the testimony by the JNA Colonel O.S., June 5, 1996, pp. 48-49.

243 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2681, Main Headquarters of the Army of the Serb Republic (“Military Secret. Strictly Confidential”), EXPOSÉ by the commander of the Main Headquarters, general major Ratko Mladic, on the accomplished results on the front line, on the condition of the army of the Serb Republic, on the problems and tasks in the forthcoming period, September 1992, pp. 1-3. ICTY, Case No.: IT-02-54-T, paragraphs 450-451. Thus, over 21 per cent of those JNA officers joined the “Army of the Serb Republic of BiH”.

244 V. Kadijevic, the aforementioned work, p. 148; AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2681, Main Headquarters of the Army of the Serb Republic (“Military Secret. Strictly Confidential”), EXPOSÉ by the commander of the Main Headquarters, general major Ratko Mladic, on the accomplished results on the front line, on the condition of the army of the Serb Republic, on the problems and tasks in the forthcoming period, September 1992, pp. 1-3. ICTY, Case No.: IT-02-54-T, paragraph 62; AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2571, Information on the events in Banjaluka from September 10-17, 1993, Presentation by general Milan
By handing over the front line to the *Army of the Serb Republic of BiH*, according to General Milutin Kukanjac, the JNA surrendered the effectively occupied territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to him, this amounted to “at least 50 per cent” of the whole territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.245

**The officers** (Serb officers and junior officers) originating from Serbia and Montenegro had not at all left Bosnia and Herzegovina even after May 19, 1992. In May 1992, the *Army of the Serb Republic of BiH* included a lot of officers who were not nationals of Bosnia and Herzegovina. A number of such stated they wanted to be redeployed to the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. However, they could not leave Bosnia and Herzegovina, because the *Main Headquarters of the Army of the Serb Republic of BiH* issued an order (confidential, no. 25/143-1) dated May 19, 1992, banning this.246 Bosnia and Herzegovina was left...

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245 TV SRNA, Show MOJ GOST — MOJA ISTINA, hosted by Risto Djogo, July 12, 1992. In this show, among other things, General Milutin Kukanjac expressed as guest his worry that some territories taken by the JNA were later lost, such as for instance: the left bank of Neretva, Mts. Zuc and Mojmilo, etc., which is something he could never “understand” (Ibid.).

246 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2745, Command of the 1st Krajina Corps, confidential, no. 12/1-291, May 30, 1992 – to the Command of the 10th Partisan Division and others. In late May 1992, the officers who were not nationals of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and who had stated for redeployment onto the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
by the soldiers serving the staffing term (some 8,000 of them: Serbs, Albanians, Montenegrins and Muslims), and cadets of military schools, originating from Serbia and Montenegro. The Serb soldiers originating from Bosnia and Herzegovina who found themselves outside Bosnia and Herzegovina were returned into Bosnia and Herzegovina and entered the units of the Army of Republika Srpska.247

made constant inquiries to the commands, units and institutions of the Army of the Serb Republic of BiH about their redeployment. Due to this, on May 30 (confidential, no. 12/1-291) the Command of the 1st Krajina Corps provided the following explanation, referring to the enactment of the Main Headquarters of the Army of the Serb Republic of BiH, confidential, no. 25/143-1, May 19, 1992:

“1. Replacement of the remaining JNA members who are FRY nationals, who had expressed the desire to leave for that country, shall be made once the conditions are in place for that, and once the appropriate replacement is provided for them;

2. Their departure from the units is only possible upon approval of the corps commander, in an organized and planned way, accompanied with the prescribed permits and order for redeployment;

3. Any arbitrary departure from the units or positions shall constitute defection and shall be prevented on the territory of the Serb Republic of BiH, and appropriate measures shall be undertaken against individuals. Measures shall be undertaken against such individuals even in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and at the JNA“ (Ibid.).

247 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2559; ICTY, Case: No. IT-94-I, Evidence of the testimony by the JNA Colonel O.S., June 5, 1996, pp. 34, and 77-78. Even after May 19, 1992, those officers, soldiers and civilians who had been born in this area remained on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as those born on the territory of the Republic of Serb Krajina. In addition, according to the plan of the Personnel Administration of the SSNO and the Order of the (deputy) chief of staff of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, General Zivota Panic, as of May 11, 1992, officers, soldiers, and civilians of the JNA remained in this area, in order to improve the filling in of the Territorial Defence and the Police of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the Republic of Serb Krajina (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-1374, Federal Secretariat for National Defence, General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, Ist Administration, Administrative Centre, 31.53-3, May 11, 1992 – to the Command of the 5th, 10th, 13th, and 17th Corps, and the 4th Military District (carbon copy to the 2nd Military District).

At the 4th Ozren Light Infantry Brigade, in April 1994, there was also sergeant Dragan (Petar) Strkalj from Zrenjanin (born on October 13, 1968, in Knicanin, Zrenjanin Municipality, personal ID no. 159251, Police Administration of Zrenjanin) – AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2856, Command of the 4th Ozren Light Infantry Brigade, no. 407-1/94, April 10, 1994, AUTHORIZATION.
As the commands, units and institutions of the JNA made the “backbone” of the newly formed Army of the Serb Republic of BiH, this, among others, pertained to its staffing structure, too. The commands, units and institutions of the Army of the Serb Republic of BiH were in essence made up of the officer personnel of the JNA commands and units that they were created from by renaming. This first of all pertained to the armoured and mechanized brigades, and commands of corps and their headquarters-affiliated units and institutions. Some hundred light infantry brigades, created from the brigades with the same names, formed by municipalities of the “JNA volunteers”, absorbing the detachments of the then Territorial Defence, could be satisfied with a smaller number of active officers and they were mainly filled in with the reserve officers and junior officers. The filling in was made from the Serb officers born in Bosnia and Herzegovina, serving on the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The filling in with officer personnel was also done with the other officers from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, who had “voluntarily” applied for deployment in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The lower formational duties in the commands were filled in with the reserve officers of the Serb and Montenegrin ethnicity coming from Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.248


248 AIIZ, inv. Nos. 2-1082 through 2-1104; F. Heco, the aforementioned work, p. 123. The command structure of the collaborationist Army of the Serb Republic of BiH was as follows: commander general major Ratko Mladic; chief of staff of the headquarters general major Manojlo Milovanovic; assistant commander for moral and information general major Milan Gvero; assistant commander for logistics general major Djordje Djukic; assistant commander for security Colonel Zdravko Tolimir; assistant commander for mobilization Colonel Mico Grubor; commander of the 1st Krajina Corps general major Momir Talic; commander of the 2nd Krajina Corps general major Grujo Boric; commander of the East Bosnia Corps general major Stanislav Galic; commander of the Drina Corps general major Milenko Zivanovic, and commander of the Herzegovina Corps, general major Radovan Grubac (F. Heco, the aforementioned work, p. 123, note 228.

The commanders of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps were the following generals: Vojislav Djurdjevac, Tomislav Sipeic, Stanislav Galic (from September 1992 until
According to Article 271, the General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia took active military officers from the Army of Yugoslavia and deployed them into the commands, units and institutions of the Army of the Serb Republic of BiH. Among them, the following ones were participating in the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the other forms of crimes:

- General Major Stanislav (son of Dusan) Galic (commander of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps);
- Colonel Nikola (son of Nikola) Kajtez, from the Military Post 3001 Belgrade (he was the commander of the 6th Sana Infantry Brigade in the 1st Krajina Corps);
- Colonel major Vinko (son of Jovan) Pandurevic (as of June 7, 1994, he was the commander of the 1st Zvornik Infantry Brigade);
- Colonel major Slobodan (son of Punisa) Radonjic;
- Colonel major Ratko (son of Petar) Skrbic (from the Military Post 2270 Krusevac);
- Major Gojko (son of Jovo) Starcevic (from the Military Post 3001 Belgrade);
- 1st-class Captain Marko (son of Nedeljko) Maricic (OMJ, specialty 31401);
- Sergeant Miomir (son of Novak) Jasikovac and many others.

August 1994), and Colonel Dragomir Milosevic (from August 1994 until November 1995) – ICTY, Case No.: IT-02-54-T, paragraphs 398 and 679; Testimony of the chief of staff of the headquarters of the 216th Mountain Brigade, JNA Colonel Asim Dzambasovic given to the author.


250 Ibid.; AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2753, Nikola Kajtez, Colonel of the ARJ PVO, December 7, 1992 – to the Command of the 1st Krajina Corps, REPORT ON TRANSFER OF
A number of officers, such as for instance Marko Maricic and Milovan Todorovic, demanded return to the Army of Yugoslavia. However,
they demands were rejected, and they were also on that occasion threatened with military court if they leave the unit of their own free will.251

The competent officer shall dismiss him from professional military service in compliance with the provisions referred to in Article 113, paragraphs 2, and 3, of the Law on the Army of Yugoslavia.

Explanation

The official records show that the aforementioned has been in continuous professional military service since July 23, 1961, that he has more than 30 years of insurance/working record, and that the competent officer has determined that the needs of the service require termination of his professional military service.

Based on the aforementioned, it was concluded that the cause is in place for terminate the aforementioned person’s professional military service pursuant to Article 107, paragraph 2, of the Law on the Army of Yugoslavia, thus it has been decided as in the pronouncement of this decree.

This decree shall be final and no appeal shall be allowed against it, but an administrative dispute may be instituted with the Supreme Military Court in Belgrade within 30 days from the date of serving. The complaint shall be submitted in two copies, directly to the Court or by registered mail.

PRESIDENT
Zoran Lilic, in person"

(AlIZ, inv. No. 2-2876).

Colonel major Vinko Pandurevic, in compliance with the general practices, upon the Order of the chief of staff of the Personnel Administration of the General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia, no. 5-185, dated June 7, 1994, was appointed to the duty of the commander of the 1st Zvornik Infantry Brigade of the Army of Republika Srpska (AlIZ, inv. No. 2-3046, Military Post no. 7111, int. no. 05/2-112, April 1, 1995, Han Pijesak, DECISION).

251 AlIZ, inv. No. 2-2749, Military Post 7421, confidential no. 1652-2/3, October 7, 1993 – to the Command of the 1st Krajina Corps. Request of the 1st class captain Marko Maricic and 1st class sergeant Milovan Todorovic, for the return into the Army of Yugoslavia was reviewed at the session with the commander of the 1st Krajina Corps. On that occasion, it was “assessed that, in accordance with the needs of the service and the order of the commander of the Main Headquarters of the Army of the Serb Republic of BiH that the aforementioned persons should still be kept in the unit until the war ends. As for those persons who act arbitrarily and in an undisciplined manner, upon the order of the commander of the 1st Krajina Corps, measures from one’s competency need to be undertaken, and also institute the procedure as needed for prosecution before the Military Disciplinary Court” (AlIZ, inv. No. 2-2748, Command of the 1st Krajina Corps, confidential, no. 12/1-468, September 19, 1993 – to the Command of the 6th Sana Light Infantry Brigade, attention commander).
The Army of the Serb Republic of BiH, in addition to the manpower, particularly the active officers, also received “the overall armament, ammunition…” and other resources (fuel, equipment), disposed of in Bosnia and Herzegovina by the JNA. All the movable and immovable property of the JNA, with the renaming of the 2nd Military District, upon the SSNO Decision, was transferred to the Army of the Serb Republic of BiH. At the same time, the federal reserves (some 40,000 tons of fuel, 3/4 diesel and 1/2 gasoline, and between 1,000 and 1,200 tons of kerosene, stored in two civilian warehouses), were transferred by way of appropriate decision into the competency of that collaborationist creation.  

The Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina “received almost all of the armament, ammunition…” and other resources disposed of by the JNA commands, units and institutions on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The JNA displaced “more than 90 per cent of the armament, lethal devices of all kinds, and other equipment, into safe areas” and surrendered this all to the Serb Republic of BiH, “which used this to arm its own army”.  

In addition to the seized armament of the Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the reserve composition of the police forces, the JNA also provided to the Army of Republika Srpska large warehouses,

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252 I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, p. 137; ICTY, Case No.: IT-02-54-T, paragraphs 62, 398, 406, and 679; ICTY, Case No.: IT-94-IT, Evidence of the testimony by the JNA Colonel O.S., June 5, 1996, pp. 28-29, and 47-49; AIIZ, Record, Supplemented Testimony by Dj. Dj.; Ibid., inv. No. 5348, Record, Testimony by Dj. Dj.; Ibid., inv. No. 5350, Record, Supplemented Testimony by Dj. Dj.

253 I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, p. 137; ICTY, Case No.: IT-02-54-T, paragraphs 62, 398, 406, and 679; ICTY, Case No.: IT-94-IT, Evidence of the testimony by the JNA Colonel O.S., June 5, 1996, pp. 28-29, and 47-49. In the assessment of general Ilija Radakovic, the JNA surrendered some 70% of the armament to the Army of the Serb Republic of BiH, thus ensuring its multiple overpower and strategic advantage (Ibid).

The JNA provided the Serb collaborationists in Bosnia and Herzegovina with the full armament and equipment. In relation to this, General Milutin Kukanjac (commander of the 2nd Military District), as the guest on TV SRNA on July 12, 1994, publicly stated: “We have given you the arms. What would you have waged war with if it had not been for us, with sling toys?” (TV SRNA, Show MOJ GOST – MOJA ISTINA, hosted by Risto Djogo, July 12, 1994).
military equipment, fuel and lubricants for vehicles, medical materials, artillery, helicopters, armament, ammunition, then strong military industry capacities, large (federal) war reserves of equipment, and the like. From the JNA and the Army of Yugoslavia, the Army of the Serb Republic of BiH also received all the armoured capacities, and support for maintenance of the weaponry too. Thus, for instance, in May 1992, the 1st Krajina Corps took over tanks and armoured combat vehicles, armament, ammunition, fuel, and other materials, stored at the 993rd Logistical Base of the JNA.254

Even later on, the commands, units and institutions of the collaborationist Army of the Serb Republic of BiH were continuously receiving fuel for vehicles, medical materials, supplies and technical resources and other commodities on the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.255

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254 ICTY, Case No.: IT-02-54-T, paragraphs 415, 443-444, 686, and 967; I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, p. 127.

In his address against the Decision of the District Court in Belgrade against his detainment, after his arrest on April 1, 2001, Slobodan Milosevic stated that the assistance to the Serb collaborationists in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina was his strong commitment and direction. In relation to this, he stated that these costs constituted a state secret, and that he was providing for equipment “ranging from a needle up to the fortifications for security forces and special anti-terrorist units, particularly ranging from light arms and equipment up to helicopters and other weapons…” (ICTY, Case No.: IT-02-54-T, paragraph 967).

The JNA had also seized the weapons of the Territorial Defence of the City of Sarajevo from Faletici. About this plunder, general Milutin Kukanjac, who “from the very beginning believed that the Muslims and Croats and their leaderships and their peoples were real defined enemies”, stated: “We have created some extraordinary conditions for you, let us not itemize now. I have even snatched before their eyes the arms and weapons of the TO together with that Territorial guy of yours, I have seen him on the TV, some guy named Kojic, who did a fantastic job jointly with my people about evacuation of Faletici. These were terribly large resources…” (TV SRNA, Show MOJ GOST - MOJA ISTINA, hosted by Risto Djogo, July 12, 1994).

While general Milutin Kukanjac was in charge, “not a single cannon or tank, or mortar, were left to the Muslims, nor did they obtain them” (Ibid.).

The JNA, subsequently the Army of Yugoslavia, operationally planned, prepared, coordinated, directed and lead combat operations


Ist class captain Novoslav Nikolic, commander of the 4th Ozren Light Infantry Brigade, on February 8, 1994, authorized Radenko (son of Berko) Lukic “to make the payment and to take over the vehicle fuel (D2 and gasoline) on the territories of the Republic of Serb Krajina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2857, Command of the 4th Ozren Light Infantry Brigade, No. 197-1/94, February 8, 1994, AUTHORIZATION).

On February 23, 1994, “for take over of fuel from the Army of Yugoslavia for transports of casualties and medical materials”, for the needs of the 4th Ozren Light Infantry Brigade, captain Nikolic issued the permits for three vehicles (trucks TAM 130 I-II, registration plate ZE 190-50, TAM 200 I-T 80, registration plate ZE 100-325, and vehicle Golf, registration plate ZE 103-002).

On April 4, 1994, captain Nikolic authorized Rade (son of Radisav) Todorovic (born on September 8, 1962, in Vozuca, Zavidovici) “that in the name of the 4th Ozren Light Infantry Brigade on the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia he can procure materials and weapons, as well as other commodities needed for the work and life of the unit with the competent institutions and business organizations” (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2859, Command of the 4th Ozren Light Infantry Brigade, No. 394-1/94, April 4, 1994, AUTHORIZATION).

Six days later, captain Nikolic issued the authorization to junior sergeant Dragan (son of Petar) Strkalj (from Zrenjanin) “that in the name of the 4th Ozren Light Infantry Brigade on the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia he can procure materials and weapons, as well as other commodities needed for the work and survival of the unit”. This authorization was valid until May 4, 1994. (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2860, Command of the 4th Ozren Light Infantry Brigade, No. 407-1/94, April 10, 1994, AUTHORIZATION).

On the same day, captain Nikolic sent an “appeal for assistance” to Ziroskop Belgrade in Belgrade, with the request that for the needs of the 4th Ozren Light Infantry Brigade they give them the following resources: 8 pieces of sniper mufflers, 8 pieces of automatic gun mufflers, and the muffler for the scorpion guns (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2861, Command of the 4th Ozren Light Infantry Brigade, No. 406-1/94, April 10, 1994, “ZIROSKOP BELGRADE” Belgrade).

In the capacity of major and commander of the Military Post 7029 Petrovo Selo, on July 6, 1994, Novoslav Nikolic issued the CERTIFICATE, confirming that the vehicle batteries (12 pieces, type special, 143 Ampere per hour, 12 volts) “are intended for and shall exclusively be used for the needs of the MP – 7029”. These vehicle batteries were to be taken over from the Trepca Sombor battery factory by the firm PO Komerc Sid from Sid, and to deliver them to the MP – 7029 (AIIZ, , inv. No. 2-2861, Military Post 7029, No. 657/1/94, July 6, 1994, Petrovo Selo, CERTIFICATE).
against Bosnia and Herzegovina. The JNA and Army of Yugoslavia units participated in the offensive actions on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including parachute and commando forces. All the strategic and operational plans for the use of commands and units of the Army of the Serb Republic of BiH were drafted at the General Staff of the Army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in Belgrade, and then, according to the already developed line of directing and commanding, they were supplied to the Main Headquarters of the Army of the Serb Republic of BiH, as the tactical holder, for implementation and execution. This army (JNA/VJ) issued all orders in Belgrade and sent them to their forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Army of the Serb Republic of BiH), which regularly reported to their supreme command (in Belgrade). These two armies were in fact a single army. The staffing policy was implemented through the 30th Personnel Centre (M.P. 3001 in Belgrade), from where (through Belgrade), in addition to the overall logistical support, planning and other needs for the purpose of the aggression, regular official correspondence also went, as well as telephone communications. This is the way used to order the use of chemical


257 AIIZ, inv. Nos. 5341, and 5344, Record, Supplemented Testimony by A.K. The Army of the Serb Republic of BiH was also using mortar shells filled with chemical masses, produced in Russia and in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Thus, the 27th Background Base disposed of these shells (calibre 60, 80, and 120 mm), with the inscription in Russian. These chemical shells were used during the operation Lukavac – 93, Pancir 1, Pancir 2, Pancir 3, and Brugle-94.

The operation under the code name of Lukavac – 93 is the operation carried out by the Army of the Serb Republic of BiH in the period from June 28 trough August 18, 1993, at the Trnovo section: on the broader areas of Mts. Jahorina, Bjelasnica, Treskavica, and Igman, with the goal of merging of forces of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and Herzegovina Corps, and possession of the road communication Lukavica – Trnovo – Dobro Polje – Foca, that is, division of the units in Gorazde from the majority of forces of the 1st Corps of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In this operation, chemical shells were used (against the units of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina) by the following units: Tactical Group Foca, commanded by Colonel Marko Kovac; 1st Guardian Motorized Brigade, commanded by Colonel Lazic; 1st Sarajevo Mechanized Brigade, commanded by Colonel Veljko
and other agents.\textsuperscript{258}

Even through the enterprises from Serbia and Montenegro, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia secured logistics (most advanced radar centres, aircraft bases, expert assistance, communications, intelligence services, armament, ammunition, equipment) for the Army of the Serb Republic of BiH.\textsuperscript{259}

The Serb Republic of BiH procured armament and military equipment from the enterprises in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. On July 20, 1995, the enterprise Unis Holding Pretis from Vogosca signed a contract...
with the Technical Overhaul Institute in Kragujevac for procurement of the following types of resources, armament and military equipment:

- shells 60 mm 5,000 pcs
- shells 82 mm 5,000 pcs
- aircraft bombs of high destruction power 100 100 pcs
- aircraft bombs of high destruction power 250 100 pcs
- bullets 7.62 mm for automatic and semi-automatic rifles 2,000,000 pcs
- cartridges for automatic rifles 2,000 pcs
- basic charge M-74 5,000 pcs

Four days later, a Barter Contract was again signed between the aforementioned companies, by which the Military Technical Institute was obligated to deliver the following commodities:

- aircraft bombs of high destruction power 100 100 pcs
- aircraft bombs of high destruction power 250 100 pcs
- shells 60 mm 5,000 pcs
- shells 82 mm 5,000 pcs
- bullets 7.62 2,000,000 pcs
- basic charge M-74 for 128 mm shell 18,835 pcs

260 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2734, /Barter/ Contract concluded on July 20, 1995, between: 1) The Technical Overhaul Institute of Kragujevac, represented by director Colonel Borisav Todorovic (as the vendor), and, 2) UNIS Holding Pretis – Vogosca, represented by director Milorad Motika (as the buyer).

261 Ibid., no. 2-2735, Technical Overhaul Institute of Dordje Dimitrijevic – Djura, confidential, no. 819-1, July 24, 1995, BARTER CONTRACT.

The Unis Pretis Vogosca factory was obligated to deliver the following commodities to the Technical Overhaul Institute:

- cut lumber 500 m3
- bandages for waggon wheels 100 pcs
- construction iron materials 500 tons
- steel profiles 0 14 100 tons
- engines 1600 ccm for Golf vehicles using petrol 50 pcs
- waggon bearers 250 pcs (Ibid.).
The Army of the Serb Republic of BiH procured its fuel and lubricants in Yugoslavia and in the Republic of Croatia. In relation to procurement and deliver of fuels and lubricants, the Government of the Serb Republic of BiH was negotiating directly with the Government of the Republic of Croatia. The Ministry of Defence of the Serb Republic of BiH was in charge of implementing the delivery of fuels from the Republic of Croatia, more specifically, from Split (using the road communication via Grahovo) and from Ploce (using the road communication via Stolac). As for fuel (mainly D-2), in the period from mid-1993, and in largest quantities from the beginning of 1995, it was delivered in civilian tanker trucks onto the territory of the Serb Republic of BiH. 262

The Serb collaborationists also received fuel from the Croats during the transports of the Croat population from the areas of Central Bosnia, sent off to the territory of the Sokolac Municipality, where a collective centre was formed for movement of Croats, following arrangement between the political and military leaderships of the Serb Republic of BiH and the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia. 263 In addition, the fuel transaction was also implemented through contacts also arranged for the intelligence and other officers of the Army of the Serb Republic of BiH and the Croatian Council of Defence. 264


In terms of purchase of fuel, in 1993, the collaborationist Serb Republic of BiH made trade agreements with the collaborationist Croatian Community (Republic) of Herzeg-Bosnia, too. Such arrangements were personally agreed by the presidents of the collaborationist governments, Vladimir Lukic, and Jadranko Prlic. The meeting at that level were held in the village of Rujan (at the separation line in the municipality of Bosansko Grahovo) – Ibid.

263 AIIZ, inv. No. 5350, Record, Supplemented Testimony by Dj. DJ. “The Army of the Serb Republic of BiH, in agreement with the government of the Serb Republic of BiH, secured transport means for movement of Croats out of Central Bosnia into Mostar and the Republic of Croatia (through Bosanska Gradiska). This task was implemented, for which the Army of the Serb Republic of BiH received some 60 tons of fuel from the Republic of Croatia.

264 Ibid. Colonel Petar Salapura (chief of staff of the Intelligence Administration of the Main Headquarters of the Army of the Serb Republic of BiH) was in charge of
In order to secure ammunition and mines and explosive devices, in addition to the assistance from Yugoslavia and the Republic of Croatia, the Serb collaborationists from Bosnia and Herzegovina had also maintained certain contacts with Russia, too. To that goal, in March 1995, General Ratko Mladic visited Russia. In addition, on December 27, 1995, Russia was also visited by general Djordje Djukic, together with Colonel Spasoje Urosanin (chief of staff of he Administration for Production of the Ministry of Defence of the Republika Srpska), and a certain Sasha (a Russian by origin, residing in Belgrade), asking for ammunition, mines, shells, spare parts for weapons, and other equipment.265

From May 1992, until the end of 1995, the Army of Yugoslavia had a leading role in the combat operations against Bosnia and Herzegovina. It ensured manpower (where thousands of military personnel were on payrolls of the Army of Yugoslavia), thus filling in the Army of the Serb Republic of BiH with officer personnel from the Army of Yugoslavia (throughout the course of the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, those officers were coming from Belgrade). The officers of this collaborationist army were appointed and promoted by the president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the chief of staff of the General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia.266

265 Ibid. inv. No. 5348, Record, Testimony by Dj. Dj.
266 ICTY, Case: no. IT-02-54-T, paragraphs 398, 407, 447, 452, 679, 687, and 967; AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2559; Slobodna Bosna, June 19, 2003, p. 18. Such, for instance, among others, the following officers were appointed and promoted:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name and Surname</th>
<th>Name of Father</th>
<th>Registration Number</th>
<th>Number of Official Military Bulletin</th>
<th>Date of Official Military Bulletin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VLADO LIZDEK</td>
<td>Velja</td>
<td>4/93</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Mar 8, 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOVAN BARTULA</td>
<td>Manojlo</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Feb 10, 1994</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Securing of assistance and support for the *Army of the Serb Republic of BiH* was done based on the plan for logistical supply, maintenance of transport, funding of personnel, airborne and anti-aircraft activities, medical support, and the intelligence services of the Army of Yugoslavia.

The overall logistical support, particularly the combat resources (armament, ammunition, spare parts, fuel), then food, vehicles, and other supplies, arrived from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which supplied commands, units and institutions of the *Army of the Serb Republic of BiH*. Both soldiers and officers of the “Army of the Serb Republic of BiH” were treated at the hospitals of that state. The military equipment was also repaired in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.267

| JOVAN BARTULA | Manojlo | 2/92 | 2 | Feb 13, 1992 |
| VLADIMIR RADOJCIC | Milan | 6 | 4 | Feb 10, 1994 |
| MILORAD SEHOVAC | Marinko | 6 | 9 | Mar 28, 1994 |
| MILAN MALJKOVIC | Ilja | 6 | 4 | Feb 10, 1994 |
| MILAN MALJKOVIC | Stojan | 6 | 9 | Mar 28, 1994 |
| MILAN MALJKOVIC | Bogdan | 6 | 17 | May 30, 1994 |
| PERO DESPOTOVIC | Cvijetin | 6 | 9 | Mar 28, 1994 |
| VELJKO STOJANOVIC | Kosta | 6 | 4 | Feb 10, 1994 |
| VELJKO STOJANOVIC | Kosta | 2/92 | 3 | Feb 27, 1992 |
| RADOMIR FURTULA | Arsen | 92/3 | 21 | Oct 22, 1992 |
| NILAN SLADOJE | Manojlo | 6 | 7 | Mar 10, 1994 |
| DRAGAN JOSIPOVIC | Bojo | 6 | 9 | Mar 28, 1994 |
| BLAGOJE | Radomir | 1996 | 14 | Jul 3, 1996 |
| KOVACEVIC | Radomir | 99 | 12 | May 10, 1999 |
| BLAGOJE | Radomir | 6 | 19 | Jul 14, 1994 |
| KOVACEVIC | Radomir | 6 | 19 | Jul 14, 1994 |
| MILOVAN VISIC | Radisa | 6 | 9 | Mar 28, 1994 |
| MOMICILOR GORANCIC | Bojo | 6 | 9 | Mar 28, 1994 |
| DUSAN KUKOBAT | Radovan | 6 | 4 | Feb 10, 1992 |
| CEDO SLADOJE | Risto | 6 | 4 | Feb 10, 1992 |
| RADENKO GENDO | Milan | 6 | 4 | Feb 10, 1992 |

(AIIZ, inv. No. 7-53).

267 Ibid. All the logistics, as well as the officers, throughout the duration of the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, arrived via Belgrade (these connections were never cut at any time) – *Slobodna Bosna*, June 1, 2003, p. 18; ICTY, Case. No. IT-02-54-T, paragraphs 446-447, 452, 687, and 967. Thus, in the period from August 5, through September 14, 1992, the Operational Group Doboj received from Serbia and Montenegro huge quantities of materials, including light weapons, artillery, tanks and rocket ammunition. On January 1, 1993, there were 29 trailer trucks in line waiting for the transport of materials from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (for the 1st Krajina Corps) – ICTY, Case. No. IT-02-54-T, paragraphs 445-447, and 686.
In the period of 1992 – 1995, for the needs of the Army of the Serb Republic of BiH, various materials, technical and other combat resources were supplied from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (topographic maps of various proportions, artillery compasses, mortar aiming charts, cat’s eyes for night artillery aiming, measuring tools, manual compasses, binoculars for patrolling, aiming devices, etc.), medical materials and medicines (oral antibiotics, oral pain killers, oral sedatives, cardiotonics: Isoptine, Persantine, Lanicor, Lanitop; syringed medicines, disinfectants, dressings, serums, etc) and equipment. On August 6, 1992, Military Post 4578 Belgrade issued an order to Military Post 2143 Belgrade to issue the following resources for the needs of Military Post 4022 Banjaluka:

- set KLK-2 1 pc
- switchboard TLCI-10 1 pc
- PKON-10A 1 pc
- cord PkZP-12/250 m 1 pc


The members of the Army of the Serb Republic of BiH were also sent for examinations and treatment to the Military Medical Academy in Belgrade (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2855, Command of the Operational Group of Doboj, confidential, no. 3524-1, Doboj, July 21, 1994 – to the 4th Ozren Light Infantry Brigade; Ibid., inv. No. 2-2856, Command of the 4th Ozren Light Infantry Brigade, No. 410-1/94, April 11, 1994, AUTHORIZATION; Ibid., inv. No. 2-2858, Command of the 4th Ozren Light Infantry Brigade, no. 256-2/94, February 23, 1994, AUTHORIZATION). Thus, for instance, commander of the 4th Ozren Light Infantry Brigade, Ist class captain Novoslav Nikolic, on April 11, 1994, issued the AUTHORIZATION to private Zlatko (son of Stojan) Jovic (born on January 2, 1959) in Vozuca, Zavidovici) “to transport the injured soldiers to Belgrade and back, with the vehicle type Golf, registration plate ZE 102-999, as well as to tank fuel for the return” (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2856, Command of the 4th Ozren Light Infantry Brigade, no. 410-1/94, April 11, 1994, AUTHORIZATION).  


issued an order to Military Post 4798 Belgrade to issue the following communication means:

- telephone switchboard TLCI-10 1 pc
- telephone M-63 5 pcs
- PKON-10 1 pc
- vehicle batteries 5TB-5.5 20 pcs
- cord PTK-56 6 pcs.

In late November 1994, the Assembly of Vojvodina issued 12 tanker trucks of engine fuel D-2, as well as certain quantities of ammunition, for the needs of the 1st and 2nd Corps of the Army of the Serb Republic of BiH.271


271 Ibid. inv. No. 2-2719, War Presidency of the Petrovac Municipality, strictly confidential, no. 534/94, November 22, 1994 – to the Commander of the Joint Forces of the VRS of the Bihać Corps Front line, attn. general Manojlo Milovanovic, Jasenica. President of the War Presidency of the Petrovac Municipality (Nikola Kreman), on November 22, 1994, in relation to this, notified general Milovanovic, commander of the Joint Forces of the Army of Republika Srpska, that “from the Assembly of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina, president Dr. Savo Stupar informs that on November 21, 1994, 12 tanker trucks of engine fuel D-2 were tanked for the needs of the 1st and 2nd Corps of the Army of Republika Srpska. He also informs that the requested quantity of ammunition was also loaded as needed by the same user, and that these will be shipped off soon.” (Ibid.).

On May 23, 1995, in the capacity of the president of the Petrovac Municipal Assembly, Nikola Kecman approached the Assembly of Vojvodina, asking for a delivery of 90 tons of engine fuel D-2. This request was explained in the following way:

“Please do accept the truth that we are in an ultimately hard position, both in terms of defence of the people and territories, and in terms of functioning of our war economy.

The people, the material goods and the territories have been endangered by our enemy.

Everyone who is able to carry a gun has been mobilized.

We lack many a thing in order to keep the Army in the state of combat preparedness, in order to enable the war economy to produce the resources necessary to wage a war, and for survival of the population. However, our major shortage is in fuels, particularly engine fuel.

Therefore please kindly deliver to us 90 tonnes of engine fuel D-2, for the needs of the Army and functioning of the war economy” (Ibid.).
There are also indications that the Government of Montenegro was also directly supplying the collaborationist Republika Srpska with materials and technical resources.\textsuperscript{272}

Rocket engines 122 m GRAD were also procured in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{273}

\textsuperscript{272} Ibid., inv. No. 2-2731, Republika Srpska, Petrovac Municipal Assembly, Executive Board, No. 01-110-1-83/94, April 21, 1994 – to the Government of the Republic of Montenegro, Ministry of Energy, Attn. Mr. Bojovic, Podgorica. This request was explained by Bogdan Latinovic (president of the Executive Board of the Petrovac Municipal Assembly) in the following way:

"Please grant your approval for delivery of 32,000 liters of engine fuel D-2 for the needs of the spring sowing and functioning of the public services at the Petrovac Municipality, Republika Srpska.

Given that the directorate for commodity reserves, due to problems in supply, has not been able to deliver the planned engine fuel to the Petrovac Municipality for the spring sowing and that, according to the most recent information, such possibility shall not even exist, please as an urgent matter approve the designated quantity of engine fuel for our needs.

Please be informed that almost the whole male population of the Petrovac Municipality is found at the front lines and that they can do the sowing only during the several days when they are off duty, and it is impossible to do so without machinery. Because it is our imperative to provide for self-sustainability in feeding ourselves, we have to sow the planned areas, particularly because we have purchased and distributed the seed materials.

We would also use a certain minor quantity of this fuel for the needs of the war hospital of the 2nd Krajina Corps in Petrovac, because these days we expect to see some intensified enemy attacks at the Bihac-Petrovac front line.

The engine fuel for Petrovac would be taken over by the enterprise "Grmecprodukt" from Petrovac, and would be transported by driver Zoran Grbic with the trailer truck, registration plates: TD-139-95, and with the tanker truck, registration plates: 13-70-TD.

We are hoping for your understanding and urgency of delivery" (Ibid.).

\textsuperscript{273} AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2737, "Pretis", Holding Vogosca, May 10, 1994 – Main Headquarters of the Army of the Serb Republic of BiH, attn. General Mladic. Milorad Motika (director of the Pretis Holding in Vogosca) on May 10, 1993, approached the Main Headquarters of the Army of the Serb Republic of BiH, "attn. General Mladic", with the request to intervene "with the chief of staff of the General Staff of VJ, General Perisic. Your request letter for 1,000 pcs of rocket engines 122 mm GRAD to be sent to the assistant minister of defence of FRY for Military Economy Sector for approval, that would be sent to HOLDING "Krusik" Valjevo, for the needs of the HOLDING "PRETIS"" (Ibid.).
The Supply Administration of the Army of Yugoslavia was supplying the Army of Republika Srpska with explosives, too.\textsuperscript{274} The weapons for operational support were also procured at the Military Technical Institute in Belgrade, where operators were also trained.\textsuperscript{275}

The Serb Republic was using the services and equipment of the testing grounds in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for testing of artillery ammunition and other armament and military equipment, for the testing of which it did not have the testing grounds on the territory of that collaborationist creation.\textsuperscript{276}

Based on contracts, the Serb collaborationists procured in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia supplies and commodities, and procured steel, copper, gun powder, fuses, TNT, bullet shells, and containers.\textsuperscript{277}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{274} AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2733, Main Headquarters of the Army of the Serb Republic, Sector for the Background, confidential, no. 12/10-22, January 23, 1994 – to the Ministry of Defence of RS.
\item \textsuperscript{275} AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2736, “Pretis” Vogosca, strictly confidential, no. 47, February 19, 1994 – to the chief of staff of the Headquarters of the VRS, general Manojlo Milovanovic.
\item \textsuperscript{276} AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2728, ORDER by the president of the Government of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, No. 02-99, Pale, August 20, 1992. The Ministry of Defence of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina signed an agreement about this with the competent institutions of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Thus, for instance, with TOC KoV – Training Ground of Nikinci, there was an agreement for testing of the 105 mm bullet with the TE shell (testing of ammunition safety) – AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2729, TOC KoV – Nikinci Testing Ground, FIRE TESTING PROTOCOL, September 17, 1993, TESTING OF 105 MM BULLET WITH TE SHELL.
\item On August 22, 1992, UNIS – FACTORY SARAJEVO – VOGOSCA sent to the TOC (technical testing centre) Nikinci certain quantities of 120 mm shells and gun powder (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2730, UNIS – FACTORY SARAJEVO – VOGOSCA, ORDER – DELIVERY FORM no. 779/93, August 22, 1993 – TOC NIKINCI).
\item In the aforementioned order, Prof. Dr. Branko Djeric (president of the “Government”) ordered the Ministry of Economy “to find some satisfactory solutions for the enterprises of specific purpose production from the Serb Republic and bodies from the FRY for collection of receivables on completed domestic and export transactions” (Ibid.).
\item \textsuperscript{277} AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2732, “Unis Pretis” Vogosca, etc. PS/CS, April 4, 1995, EI “Birac“ Zvornik, Order for Assignment; Ibid., inv. No. 2-2731, “Pretis“ Vogosca, strictly confidential, no. 419/94, December 20, 1994 – to the Main Headquarters of the Army of Republika Srpska, Sector for the Background; Ibid., inv. No. 2-2733, Main Headquarters of the Army of Republika Srpska, Sector for the Background, confidential, no. 12/10-22, January 23, 1994 – to the Ministry of Defence of RS.
\end{itemize}
Transportation of commodities from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia into the Republika Srpska and vice versa was a continuous activity for the enterprises of special purpose production and overhaul institutes within the composition of the Army of Republika Srpska.\footnote{278} Securing of materials and technical resources and overall logistical support and assistance to the Army of the Serb Republic of BiH by the Army of Yugoslavia was established and well developed at the highest level. Since the end of 1993, the unit commands of the Army of the Serb Republic of BiH, in compliance with the joint position and arrangement of the chief of staff of the General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia, and commander of the Main Headquarters of the Army of the Serb Republic of BiH, and the order of the commander of the Main Headquarters of the Army of the Serb Republic of BiH dated October 23, 1993,\footnote{279} sent all the requests for

\footnote{278} AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2740, Ministry of Defence, strictly confidential, no. 05-21-2179/95, May 22, 1995, - to the enterprises of specific purpose production and overhaul institutes.

\footnote{279} AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2811, Command of the 1st Krajina Corps, strictly confidential, no. 18/1-15/1, October 24, 1993 – to the Command of the 1st Sipovo Light Infantry Brigade.

Chief of staff of the General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia, and the commander of the Main Headquarters of the Army of the Serb Republic of BiH, in 1993 took a joint position and agreement about the purchase of all types of materials and technical resources (ammunition, mines and explosives, fuels, spare parts, food, medicines, etc.) from the Army of Yugoslavia, In compliance with this and with the order of the commander of the Main Headquarters of the Army of the Serb Republic of BiH strictly confidential, no. 02/2-860, dated October 23, 1993, on October 24, 1993, general Momir Talic issued the order regulating in detail the procedure for procurement of materials and technical resources from the Army of Yugoslavia. This order was explained by the commander of the 1st Krajina Corps (general Momir Talic) in the following way: “Namely, in the course of the war thus far, in addition to the regular supplying of units and commands of the VRS [Army of Republika Srpska – note by author], using the plan of PoOb [“background security” – note by author], there were also parallel channels arising for supply of units, which, in addition to the authorized persons, also involved various donors and the like as suppliers. Such additional way of supplying of commands and units produced uncontrolled, unplanned and non-purposeful outflow of all types of military weapons, materials and equipment from the VJ [Army of Yugoslavia – note by author], and placed certain commands and units into less equitable position, as well as that certain weapons and equipment came into the hands of the enemy, and also certain individuals used this to become shamefully rich, which caused deep dissatisfaction with the members of the VJ and VRS” (Ibid.).
allocation of any type of materials and technical resources by the Army of Yugoslavia to the commands of Corps (background bodies), which integrated them and submitted them to the Main Headquarters of the Army of the Serb Republic of BiH (Background Sector). The request was also accompanied with the exact type and quantity of materials and technical resources, and the source – the military post in the Army of Yugoslavia from which the materials and technical resources were secured.  

The Background Sector of the Main Headquarters of the Army of the Serb Republic of BiH integrated the requests received by arms and specialties, and thrice a month (on the 10th, 20th, and 30th), it submitted them to the commander (General Mladic) for signature, and then forwarded it to the General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia for approval. After the approval from Belgrade, the background sector of the Main Headquarters of the Army of the Serb Republic of BiH used background bases to effect allocation and distribution of the approved materials and technical resources to the units, in compliance with the prescribed accounting documentation.

The Army of the Serb Republic of BiH was also logistically assisted and supported by the UNHCR and UNPROFOR. Thus, the 1st Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade, for the period January – June 1995, received the following food items from the UNHCR (the Commissioner for Refugees):

- oil 1,178 liters
- fish 2,535 kilograms
- tea 18 kilograms

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280 Ibid. Since that time, not a single request of the commands or units not sent via the aforementioned way and without the personal signature of the commander of the Main Headquarters of the Army of the Serb Republic of BiH and chief of staff of the General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia was reviewed or approved. “Against such persons who submit requests directly to the units of the Army of Yugoslavia, without signatures of the aforementioned persons, criminal procedures shall be initiated.”

From October 23, 1993, “not a single command or institution of the Army of Yugoslavia shall approve or issue any kind of materials or technical resources without approval and personal signature of the chief of staff of the General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia“ (Ibid.).
- canned breakfast meat 4,667 kilograms
- meat pate 75 kilograms
- dried yeast 200 kilograms
- potato 1,500 kilograms
- meat 1,662 kilograms
- hog fat 50 kilograms
- seeds 1,500 packages.

In the period from July 1 through 31, 1995, at the time of the genocide against Bosniaks in and around Srebrenica, the aforementioned Bratunac brigade received from the UNHCR the following quantities of vehicle fuels:
- D-2 (diesel fuel) 30,000 liters
- MB (vehicle petrol) 400 liters.

The Army of the Serb Republic of BiH was funded from Belgrade. This army performed its ordering, executive and payroll functions through the Army of Yugoslavia. The active composition (officers, junior officers, and civilians serving the JNA) of this army was regularly receiving salaries and pensions from Belgrade, from the Army of Yugoslavia, that is, from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The payroll of the Army of Yugoslavia in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia included all the JNA officers deployed or later sent to the Army of the Serb Republic of BiH. General Djordje Djukic (assistant commander of the Army of the Serb Republic of BiH for the background), in a meeting at the Command of the 1st Krajina Corps in Banjaluka, on June 4, 1992, spoke about financing of the Army of the Serb Republic of BiH. In relation to this, among other things, at the time, he said: "The Federal Government shall fund this army with the number of members as of May 19, 1992, which was on their account", and that "the Government of the Serb BiH has

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rendered the decision on funding the military conscripts that constitute the balance".282 This meant that the “government” of the collaborationist Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall only finance the balance.283

Active military personnel (officers, junior officers and contracted soldiers) and employees in the Army of Republika Srpska received salaries from the Army of Yugoslavia (the employee lists were submitted to the Military Accounting Centre of the General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia, Belgrade, for payment).284 The payments of cost reimbursements for the active military personnel and employees for troop travel during the time spent on assignments at the commands and units of the Army of Republika Srpska were also made by the Accounting Centre of the Ministry of Defence of the Army of Yugoslavia in Belgrade.285 Payments

282 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2556; Ibid., inv. No. 5348, Record, Testimony by Dj. Dj.; Ibid., inv. No. 2-2743, Command of the 2nd Krajina Corps, confidential, no. 23/35-273/1, March 26, 1993 – to the 1st Brigade and to others; Ibid., inv. No. 2-2563, Working note by the JNA Colonel O.S., May 18, 1992, p. 238; ICTY, Case: No. IT-94-1-T, Evidence of the testimony by the JNA Colonel O.S., June 5, 1996, pp. 28-29, 49, and 62-64; Colonel Selak claims that the reserve officers and military conscripts of the Army of the Serb Republic of BiH received salaries from the “government” of the collaborationist creation of the Republika Srpska (Ibid., pp. 54 and 61). The orders for pensioning of the active military personnel were signed by the Ministry of Defence of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The decisions for pensioning were received from the SSNO’s Institute for Social Security of Insured Military Personnel of the Army of Yugoslavia in Belgrade (Ibid.).

From the end of 1993, the salaries for the officer personnel of the Army of the Serb Republic of BiH were paid through the 30th Personnel Centre (institution of the Army of Yugoslavia). This was done in November 1993, through a decision of the Supreme Council of Defence, in charge of the defence policy of SR Yugoslavia (composed of the federal president and the presidents of the two republics), run by Slobodan Milosevic. Monthly payments for this centre were some 1,600,000 DM. Between 1993 and 1997, the payroll of the Army of Yugoslavia contained some 4,000 officers in the Army of the Serb Republic of BiH (Dani, June 20, 2003, no. 314, p. 14).


284 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2742, Command of the 30th Light Infantry Brigade, confidential, no. 86-76, March 6, 1993 – to the Command of the 10th Light Infantry Brigade.

285 Ibid., inv. No. 2-2743, Command of the 2nd Krajina Corps, confidential, no. 23/35-273/1, March 26, 1993 – to the 1st Brigade and to others.
of checks of the Postal Savings Bank Belgrade for the active military personnel, contracted soldiers and employees at that collaborationist army were effected through the Military Accounting Centre of the General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia, twice a month (for the current month).  

For all the active military personnel in the Army of the Serb Republic of BiH the salaries were paid from Belgrade through postal transaction accounts. An agreement on this was made between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Through the 30th Personnel Centre of the General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia in Belgrade, the salaries and other benefits were accounted, such as: pension record, separate living, medical treatment, certification of health care cards, applications for apartments, education of officers, seaside resorts, and the like. Officers and civilians in the Army of the Serb Republic of BiH, kept at the 30th Personnel Centre of the General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia received the same salaries as these categories of military personnel in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  

Pursuant to Articles 156 and 157 of the Law on the Army of Yugoslavia, the professional soldiers (professional officers, professional junior officers, contracted officers, contracted junior officers, and contracted soldiers) of the Army of Yugoslavia serving at commands, units and institutions of the Army of Republika Srpska, the right was acknowledged for insurance record in double duration as well as the right to

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286 Ibid., inv. No. 2-2744, Command of the 2nd Krajina Corps, confidential, no. 23/35-301, April 5, 1993 – to the 1st Brigade and to others.


be compensated for aggravated (special) conditions, ranging from 34-38 per cent.

relation to regulation of the double duration insurance record for professional soldiers (professional officers, contracted officers and junior officers, and contracted soldiers), were provided by the 30th Personnel Centre of the General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia. Thus, for instance, the General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia, Sector for Staffing, Mobilization and Systems Issues, Personnel Administration, confidential no. 14-2649/162, August 30, 1994, pursuant to Articles 156 and 157, of the Law on the Army of Yugoslavia (Official Bulletin of FRY, no. 67/930, in ruling upon the request by Colonel Nikola (son of Nikola) Kajtez, who requested acknowledgment of right to a double insurance record, rendered the following:

“DECISION

Acknowledging the right for NIKOLA, son of Nikola, KAJTEZ, Colonel, from Military Post 3001 Belgrade, for a double insurance record, in the period from December 7, 1992, up to the present moment.

Explanation:

On July 24, 1994, NIKOLA, son of Nikola, KAJTEZ, Colonel, from Military Post 3001 Belgrade, filed a request for acknowledgment of the right to double insurance record for the period from December 7, 1992, up to the present moment.

By inspecting the documents attached from the official records, it was established that the conditions are met as referred to in Article 264, paragraph 3, of the Law on the Army of Yugoslavia, for acknowledgment of the right to the double duration insurance record, therefore it was decided as in the pronouncement of this decision.

This decision shall be final in an administrative procedure and no appeal may be filed against it, but a complaint may be filed to the Supreme Military Court of Belgrade, within 30 days from the day of service. The complaint shall be submitted in two copies, directly to the court or by registered mail” (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2751).

289 Ibid., inv. No. 2-2752, Military Post 7421, confidential no. 1778-2/20, December 3, 1993, Sanski Most, DECISION; Ibid., inv. No. 2-2754, Military Post 3001 Belgrade, confidential, no. 6/8-59-12, July 15, 1994, DECISION. The officers serving “The Army of Republika Srpska” who based on the decisions of the General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia completed assignments “in the crisis areas” were entitled to compensation under aggravated (special) conditions. Thus, for instance, on July 15, 1994 (confidential, no. 6/8-59-12), pursuant to Article 156, of the Law on the Army of Yugoslavia (Official Bulletin of FRY, no. 67/93), and Article 71, paragraph 1, of the Book of Rules on Compensation of Travel Costs in the VJ (Official Military Bulletin, no. 38/93), in ruling upon the case of recognizing the right to compensation for service under aggravated (special) conditions, Military Post 3001 Belgrade rendered the following:
On July 5, 1992, at the meeting with the assistant commanders for logistics of the 1st and 2nd Krajina Corps, then commander of the 14th Background Base, and the commander of the Air Forces and Anti-Aircraft Defence of the “Army of the Serb Republic of BiH”, general

“DECISION

RECOGNIZING THE RIGHT FOR GOJKO, son of Jovo, STARCEVIC, Major serving at MP 3001 Belgrade, to receive compensation for service under aggravated (special) conditions, as follows:

in the amount of 30% of the basic salary (Article 24, paragraphs 1, and 2 – that was recognized to him in an earlier decision.

Increase in the compensation in the amount of 4% of the basic salary (Article 24, paragraph 3, as of October 31, 1992;

The total amount of compensation as per this decision amounts to 34% of the basic salary.

The increase in the amount of compensation of 4% of the basic salary (Article 24, paragraph 3), shall be carried out analogously to the date stated in line item under b), once the conditions are in place for this.

Explanation:

The procedure established that GOJKO, son of Jovo, STARCEVIC, Major serving at MP 3001 Belgrade has been carrying out his duty on the territory determined in the decision of the chief of staff of the General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia as an area of service under aggravated (special) conditions as of October 31, 1992.

The amount of compensation stated under a) and b) in the pronouncement of this decision has been meted out pursuant to Article 24, paragraphs 1, 2, and 3, of the Book of Rules.

Based on the aforementioned, all the requirements are met for recognition of the right to compensations prescribed in the provisions of Article 24, paragraphs 1, 2, and 3, of the Book of Rules.

Based on the aforementioned, all the requirements are met for recognition of the right to compensations prescribed in the provisions of Article 24, paragraphs 1, 2, and 3, of the Book of Rules on Compensation of Travel and Other Costs in the VJ/SVL, no. 38/93, therefore it was decided as in the pronouncement of this decision.

LEGAL REMEDY ON APPEAL: Appeal shall be allowed against this decision within 15 days from the date of its service. The appeal shall be filed through regular channels” (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2754, Military Post 3001, Belgrade, confidential, no. 6/8-59-12, July 15, 1994, DECISION).
Djordje Djukic reemphasized the fact that “funding of active military personnel and civilians has remained at the federal level”, and “the funding of the soldiers with the number status as of May 20, 1992, has remained at the federal level. Following this, and over this number, the socio-political communities from which the person has arrived shall pay him”, that is, the funding was provided by the socio-political communities from which the soldiers were coming.290

For all the military personnel leaving to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in order to visit families, receive medical treatment in health institutions, transport of mail, and “carrying out official tasks”, the commands, units and institutions of the Army of Republika Srpska organized centralized transportation at the level of that collaborationist creation.291

The area of the Republika Srpska of BiH was (factually) in the same economic system as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The National Bank of Yugoslavia formed the National Bank of the Republika Srpska, performing the function of the central bank for that territory.292 In mid-February 1993, a single monetary system and a single monetary policy were defined on the territories of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Republika Srpska, and Republic of Serb Krajina. The national banks of the aforementioned collaborationist states coordinated all the instruments

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291 AIIZ, inv. No. 2.2746, Command of the 2nd Krajina Corps, confidential, no. 21-70/1, May 31, 1993 – to the Command of the 1st Light Infantry Brigade, and to others. To this goal, even on May 31, 1993, the Command of the 2nd Krajina Corps issued the order for transportation of military personnel to Belgrade and vice versa, specifying introduction of a permanent bus line, the place and schedule of departures to Belgrade and returns from Belgrade, and the like.

292 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2759, National Bank of Yugoslavia, REPORT (“STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL”), pp. 1-9. The National Bank of Republika Srpska was formed on May 12, 1992 (a new Law was passed on the National Bank, the Acting Governor and the members of the Board were appointed). The bank began operating on the premises of the field office of the National Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina, from which, among other things, expert assistance and work methodology was used, as well as minting of bills, and the like (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2760, National Bank of Republika Srpska, ANNUAL REPORT for 1992, Banjaluka, May 1993).
of monetary and credit regulations with the appropriate decisions of
the monetary credit regulation of the National Bank of Yugoslavia. To
this goal, the interest rate policies, the discount rates, mandatory reserve
policies, that is, the rates of mandatory reserves of the national banks of
the Republika Srpska and Republic of Serb Krajina were fully coordinated
with the appropriate instruments of the National Bank of SR Yugoslavia.
The foreign currency reserves of the national banks of the aforementioned
“republics” were integral parts of the foreign currency reserves of the
National Bank of SR Yugoslavia, and kept in accounting on separate
accounts abroad and on sub-accounts with the National Bank of SR
Yugoslavia. The orders for use of the foreign currency reserves from
the territories of the national banks of the “Serb republics” were given
by the National Bank of SR Yugoslavia.293

The leadership of the Greater Serbia movement had surrendered
all the JNA background bases to the Army of the Serb Republic of BiH.
Thus, the 993rd Background Base of Banjaluka was renamed into the
14th Background Base of Banjaluka. Pursuant to the order of the minister
defence of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as of June
15, 1992, Colonel Milan Skondric was appointed commander of that
Base, and Colonel Osman Selak was dismissed from that office.294

In addition to the 14th Base, three more background bases were also
active on the territory of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina:
the 35th (in Bijeljina), the 27th (in Sokolac), and the 30th (in Bileca).295

293 Ibid.

294 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2555, Command of the 14th Background Base, confidential,
no. 28-24, July 10, 1992, RECORD...; AIIZ, inv. No., 2-2555, Order no. 2-18 by the
Minister of Defence of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, dated June 15,
1992 – to the Command of the 14th Background Base.

295 AIIZ, inv. No. 5348, Record, Testimony by Dj. Dj.
5. Other Armed Formations and Groups from Serbia, Montenegro, and Croatia

In addition to the regular units of the JNA/Army of Yugoslavia, and the Serb collaborationist armed formations from Bosnia and Herzegovina, various other armed units and groups from Serbia, Montenegro, and Croatia also took part in the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which, in fact, constituted the embodiment of the hegemony goals of the parties to which they belonged, and as one of the instruments in realization of the Greater Serbia policy, foremost by the ruling circles in Serbia and Montenegro. The basic common feature of all these formations and groups, that had their seats and logistics in Serbia and Montenegro, was the Chetnik ideology and the Chetnik movement, with all of its features (genocide, and other crimes of the most horrid scope).

Based on the data available, it can be established that the following armed formations and groups took part in the aggression and other crimes in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as coming from the territories of Serbia and Montenegro:

- **Arkanovci** (or the Serb Volunteer Guard), led by Zeljko Raznatovic-Arkan.
- **Seseljevci** (Serb Chetnik movement), led by Vojislav Seselj, president of the Serb Radical Party,
- **White Eagles**, led by Mirko Jovic, president of the Serb Party of National Defence;
- **Royalists**, led by Mihajlo Mladjenovic, president of the Serb Royalist Block;
- **Serb Guard**, of Vuk Draskovic’s Serb Revival Movement, led by S. Lajinovic,
- Vukovarci, members of various armed compositions who participated both in the aggression and crimes on the territory of Vukovar, and beyond;

- Special Forces of the Federal Secretariat for National Defence;

- Special Forces of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serbia;

- Marticevci, units led by Milan Martic from Knin;

- Volunteers of various pro-Chetnik organizations from Serbia and Montenegro;

- Yellow Wasps and the like.296

From the beginning of the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, there was a relation of inferiority of the aforementioned armed formations and groups to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of SFRY, that is, to the high-ranking JNA officers and legal authorities in Yugoslavia, as well as Serbia and Montenegro. This was foremost reflected in formation, single commanding, planning, preparing, leading and execution of the global and specific war activities and military operations, funding, material supply, armament, staff training, etc. The data available show that all those armed formations were armed and trained on the territory of Serbia, with expert, financial, logistical and staffing support of the JNA (Army of Yugoslavia) and the Ministry of Interior of Serbia. This is, among others, also confirmed by the members of those formations.297 Thus, General Momcilo Perisic gave the Seseljevci


During the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and oftentimes later on too, in some sources and reference books the aforementioned armed formations are treated as “paramilitary” ones, although they were mainly integral parts of the Yugoslav People’s Army/Army of Yugoslavia, and under direct command of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY/FRY.

uniforms, fuel, armament and vehicles, and the Ministry of Interior Special Forces trained them and participated in commission of crimes together with them.\textsuperscript{298}

All of these armed formations and groups from Serbia, Montenegro, and Croatia, were mainly in the composition and under the single command and control of the high-ranking JNA officers. Milosevic and the Government of the Republic of Serbia deployed various armed formations and groups across Bosnia and Herzegovina, supporting all of their “paramilitary” activities. The leader of \textit{Seseljevi} Branislav Gavrilovic received the rank of a JNA major for the “services” he performed for this army. JNA provided all the Serb armed formations and groups with armament,

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\textsuperscript{298} AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2565, Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Military Unit 5001/5, No. 09/29-35, Sarajevo, July 1, 1995 – to the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In relation to this, Branislav Vakic, a \textit{Chetnik} count and representative of Seselj’s Serb Radical Part at the Assembly of Serbia, in September 1994, among other things, stated: “...in early 1992, we started off for the Serb Herzegovina, and we got the arms from the TO of Trebinje, and this was ordered to be done by the president of SAO Herzegovina, Mr. Vucurovic. We received fuel and uniforms from the special units of military police, from general major Bozovic, which, just like the then JNA, were located at Kumbor near Herceg-Nov. From general Bozovic, we also received vehicles, I personally got one myself. Many a time have I, together with the \textit{Chetniks}, using my vehicle, entered the “Marshall Tito“ Barracks in Podgorica, where I cooperated with officers and received fuel. The vehicles that were broken I sent to Danilovgrad for repair, and I have documents to prove that. I can also document that on this section of the front line, that is, in Herzegovina, we cooperated with the JNA units from Montenegro.

In early 1993, the Turk converts, let me not honour them by calling them Muslims, started off with an offensive, and attacked the JNA there. It did not react at the time, but the territorial forces of Skelani invited the \textit{Chetniks}. Then, at least initially, we were somewhat armed by the Yugoslav Army, and then by the Ministry of Interior of Serbia... There was not enough armament and uniforms for all of us. We sought assistance from general Perisic personally, the now chief of staff of the General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia, who then was the commander of the Third Army in Nis. From Skelani, I went to visit him three times, he promised to me and he really gave me uniforms for 80 soldiers, some underwear, some food, a night sight binoculars which I did need. I received no arms from him, but he connected me with general major Ojdanic, commander of the Uzice Army. General Ojdanic later on referred me to general Mile Mrksic, who was concentrated in Skelani. At the time, the Yugoslav Army needed us and the cooperation was good...” (Ibid.).
\end{flushright}
ammunition, vehicles, fuel, food, water, drinks, cigarettes, bed sheets, underwear, and other supplies. The Serb “volunteers”, who were coming to the Lukavica Barracks “all the time incessantly, both in groups and individually”, received from the JNA armament and other materials and technical resources, and equipment.\textsuperscript{299} The members of those formations, together with the officers and junior officers of the JNA, participated in mass crimes against Bosniaks. Thus, for instance, the 6th Brigade of the Banjaluka Corps, in addition including some one hundred \textit{Arkanovci, Seseljevcy, White Eagles} members, commanded by JNA captain Dragan Mijatovic, on June 1, 1992, made an attack against the village of Hrustovo (on the territory of Sanski Most), populated by Muslims, and killed and slaughtered some 150 local residents.\textsuperscript{300}

The aforementioned armed formations and groups, in particular Arkan’s \textit{Tigers}, kept close connections with the Serbian Ministry of Interior, worked with the units for special operations of the State Security Services of Serbia, and were key participants in the armed attacks in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in numerous crimes. The Serbian Ministry of Interior, through Stojcic and Simatovic, on the territory of the collaborationist Republika Srpska, Seselj had “freedom of movement” (ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraph 530).

For instance, Vojislav Seselj had a document authorizing him to receive arms deliveries from the JNA. He possessed a JNA vehicle, which confirmed that the JNA supplied him with the transport means for the arms. On the territory of the collaborationist Republika Srpska, Seselj had “freedom of movement” (ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraph 530).

In participation in the aggression against the Republic of Croatia, particularly in Vukovar, and in November 1991 Seselj was there too, he stated: “\textit{We are all of us a single army}”, that is, everyone was under the single command of the JNA (Ibid., paragraph 135).

\textsuperscript{299} \textit{Dnevni izvjestaj}, No. 6. April 30, 1992, no. 7, May 1, 1992; no. 16, May 10, 1992, no. 19, May 13, 1992, no. 62, June 25, 1992, and no. 80, July 13, 1992; AIIZ, inv. No. 3-317; ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraphs 135, 139, and 374. The members of the Serb armed formations were constantly receiving arms and ammunition from Serbia, mainly from Uzice and Kragujevac, where they were repaired and cleaned.

\textsuperscript{300} Ibid.; RATNI ZLOCINI U BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI, p. 37; ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraphs 127-132, and 144. It is interesting to point out that almost all the displaced persons and refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina interviewed by the representatives of the Helsinki Watch stressed that the JNA was playing the main role in the attack against their cities or villages, either by direct participation in the aggression attacks, or by previous arming of the Ser armed formations (Ibid.).
in special military barracks (Mt. Tara, Bubanj Potok, Kula, Goc, and Erdut), before they were sent to Croatia or Bosnia and Herzegovina.\textsuperscript{301}

The Serbian Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defence and Slobodan Milosevic were directly involved in the training, planning, deployment and operations of the aforementioned units, groups and volunteers, and informed of their activities in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the genocide against Bosniaks.\textsuperscript{302}

The members of the aforementioned armed formations were trained at the “training centres” in Han Pijesak, Bileca, Bijeljina, Banjaluka, and Sarajevo (Lukavica) on fighter weapons of the JNA and with the assistance of its main instructors (senior and junior officers of close specialties). They did marches-past and held speeches, such as, for instance, the one did by Seselj in Bijeljina, and Arkan in Ilidza, and at other places. They also directed organization of the “Serb crisis headquarters” and combat training, for which, for instance, Arkan’s deputy “Legija” in Ilidza and at the Lukavica Barracks received credits from general Mladic and Colonel Milisav Gagovic.\textsuperscript{303}

The common feature of the aforementioned armed formations was also in their composition, which, in addition to the regularly mobilized “volunteers”, also encompassed problematic types, psychopathic patients, and renowned criminals of various profiles. They were supported by the Serbian authorities, particularly by the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defence, and for them, the participation in the aggression and other forms of crime was the foremost opportunity to meet their basest

\textsuperscript{301} ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraphs 127-132, 135, 139, and 315.

\textsuperscript{302} ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraphs 125, 139, and 316.

instincts, such as cruel murders and harassment of civilian population, drug trafficking and money forging, destruction of various buildings, and the like, as well as the material gain that they obtained by plundering public and private properties. For almost all the members of these formations, the main motivation for involvement was the promised unhindered plunder and contracted cash salaries, which, in essence, are the features of a mercenary army. This is illustrated by a number of facts, from hauling away a large number of trailer trucks for transport of the plundered real estate, to the high interest taken in "cleansing of the liberated villages and city blocks", which, among other things, constituted an unlimited opportunity for illegal seizing of money, gold and other valuables from the unprotected population. For these reasons, many of them, upon very arrival onto the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, made arrangements for distribution of the plundered commodities with partners and family members from outside Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as purchase of houses, cottages, and cars, while believing that they “would soon gain a large fortune”. We can find the confirmation for such a conclusion in their plans that after “the job was done quickly” and once they left Sarajevo, they would “go to Kosovo where things are boiling up”.304

The profile of the members of the aforementioned armed formations is also suggested by the data that they committed massacres against civilians in order to “train” and “strengthen” the newcomer followers, and that a number of them, mainly specialized in certain specific activities, were paid by “performance”, that is, by the number of killed persons, primarily civilians.305

Arkan’s Tigers were among the most brutal criminal perpetrators in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Arkan was openly supporting the commission of crimes and trained his members to do this.306

The armed “volunteer” formations with Chetnik emblems (Chetnik cockades, large knives, etc.) from Serbia and Montenegro, according to the data available, rushed into Bosnia and Herzegovina for the first time in

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304 Ibid.; ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraphs 313-314.
305 RATNI ZLOCINI U BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI, p. 37.
306 ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraphs 127-130.
time in late 1991, together with the regular JNA units, which committed the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina. In early March 1992, from Serbia (Priboj, Uzice, and Valjevo), five buses with Serbian “volunteers” started off towards Bosnia and Herzegovina, via Visegrad to Sarajevo. According to the data available, the members of the aforementioned armed formations, who had been trained mainly at the special training grounds in the central part of Serbia, as well as at the JNA barracks in Serbia and Montenegro, were in major numbers transported from the aforementioned republics onto the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in late March and early April 1992, that is, at the time of an intensifying aggression against the eastern and central parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the mass crimes committed against the Muslim population. The initial formations of Arkanovci, according to the data collected thus far, arrived onto the territory of Bosanska Krajina and Northeast Bosnia in late March 1992. On March 25, 1992, groups of Arkanovci and Seseljevci were noticed in Banjaluka, and these were also deployed at the bordering “Krajina lines” from the Sipovo side. From the border place of Stupna, only divided by the Pliva River from the Jajce Municipality, there was a shootout in the night of March 24/25, onto the villages of Cerkazovici and Ljaljici, surrounding Jajce, populated by some four hundred residents of the Muslim and Serb ethnicities. During March 31/April 1, 1992, in close cooperation with the Serbian Ministry of Interior, Arkan arrived to Bijeljina with a group of uniformed and well equipped forces, starting killing the Bosniak civilians, where “explosions and rifle gun shooting” were heard.307


The attack onto Bijeljina, in addition to the JNA and other Serb armed groups, also saw participation of the forces of the Federal Secretariat for National Defence (ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraph 266).
Together with the Seseljevci and the members of JNA, on April 2, 1992, the Arkanovci groups continued with crimes against the Bosniaks of Bijeljina. Then, Arkan’s armed formations, after the Muslim believers exited the Sulaymaniyya Mosque, slaughtered two persons in the presence of all the other present at the site, and when the others withdrew into the mosque, a number of hand grenades were thrown after them, and all of them were thus killed. The leader of Arkanovci, Zeljko Raznatovic-Arkan, an international criminal, reported to the commander of the Bijeljina Garrison, general Prascevic (who responded to his report in a military way). Arkan was hugging Biljana Plavsic while all around on the streets there were corps of dead Bosniaks lying around, which was even recorded by the TV cameras.308

In early April 1992, Arkan’s Tigers arrived in Zvornik, Arkan being among them. On April 7, he met the Bosniak political leadership at the Jezero Hotel in Mali Zvornik. On that occasion, Arkan surrendered the ultimatum to the Bosniak leadership to surrender, or Zvornik shall be attacked by the troops stationed from the other side of the Drina River.309

The taking over of Zvornik (May 8-11), then Brcko (in early May 1992), and other places where the Serbs were not the majority, in addition to the JNA troops, the Serb territorial defence and other Serb formations, including the Seseljevci, also saw participation of Arkan’s units and they killed a large number of civilians.310

In April 1992, the Arkanovci took the “Alhos” factory in the industrial zone of Karakaj, where for a time they used to have their command.311


309 ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraphs 660-661.

310 Ibid., paragraphs 138, 267, 390, and 664.

311 Ibid., paragraph 659.
In the first half of April 1992, in addition to the JNA, **Bratunac** was also entered by Arkan’s and Seselj’s units, as well as the units of special police from Belgrade. These and other Serb forces on that territory, particularly in May 1992, committed numerous crimes against Bosniaks.312

The attack and takeover of **Foca, Vlasenica, Rogatica**, and other places, saw participation of the JNA forces (particularly the Uzice Corps), the Serb collaborationist Territorial Defence and police forces, then **Arkanovci, Seseljevci, and White Eagles**, as well as the special units of the Ministry of Interior of Serbia, committing numerous crimes against Bosniaks.313

The initial groups of **Arkanovci** arrived in the territory of Sarajevo, more specifically the locality of the Airport, on April 10, 1992, after the crimes committed in Bijeljina, Zvornik, and Skelani (Srebrenica). After having visited the **Arkan units** in Bijeljina, on April 23, Biljana Plavsic sent an invitation to Arkan to come with his units to Sarajevo. However, their major concentration (along with **Arkanovci**, there was also evident presence of the **White Eagles** and other volunteers, as well as the large number of units of active and reserve compositions of the JNA), was noticed in Pale on April 15, from where they probably deployed themselves across the Republic, after the march-past of the part of the JNA units and members of the Serb **Chetnik** movement from Serbia and Montenegro, including **Arkanovci**, which was performed on April 18 at the Monumental Park at Vraca. Since then, their participation had begun in combat activities, that is, mass crimes and plunders on the territory of Sarajevo, particularly in Grbavica and Ilidza, and at other places. A result of the close cooperation of their leader nicknamed **Legija** with general Mladic and the commander of the barracks in Lukavica, that is, Colonel Milisav Gagovic, was the stopping and detaining of the convoy consisting of 7,200 women and children that was heading to Split on May 19, at Ilidza. Dissatisfied with the development of events related to this, because Mladic, although he had accepted, could not, due to the pressure of the public, meet his demands to “**detain the convoy and to exchange it for the soldiers in the barracks**”, as well as with

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312 Ibid., paragraphs 625-628. At the time, Arkan, Vojislav Seselj, and Radmilo Bogdanovic were staying in Bratunac.

313 Ibid., paragraphs 410, 640-641, 652, and 725.
the “cowardice of the Serbs at Ilidza who do not want to fight”, and “lack of organization of the command composition and the soldiers at Ilidza”, the leader of the Arkanovci, the aforementioned Legija, received support from Arkan in his request to withdraw his men from Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, the intervention and requests of Mladic and Gagovic ruled that the Arkanovci should remain and be transferred to the barracks in Lukavica, where they trained the mobilized people and volunteers, and took part in the combat activities and crimes.314

Various Serb forces, including the active and reserve members of the JNA, the local Serb TO and police forces, as well as Arkan’s Tigers, and members of the special forces of the Ministry of Interior of Serbia, under the command of Zivojin Ivanovic, on May 1 and in the next day launched an attack on Brcko, where they committed genocide against the Bosniaks, particularly in the Luka Camp.315

The “reputation” of the Arkanovci in the fifth columnist SDS and JNA is testified by the direct contacts and arrangements sought and realized with Legija by Radovan Karadzic, Ratko Mladic, Milisav Gagovic, and a number of lower-ranking leaders of the SDS, that is, criminals in the Serb “crisis headquarters” of Ilidza, Nedzarici, and Lukavica (Kotorac). Even before their arrival in Sarajevo, the Arkanovci and the White Eagles had the reputation acquired through commission of crimes on the territory of the Serb Autonomous Province of Herzegovina, for which they received

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315 ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraphs 633-639.
a “special recognition” from the “government” of this province and from the Command of the Garrison in Bileca on May 4, 1992.316

In late September 1992, in the area of Sanski Most, Arkan’s units were committing crimes. In August 1994, the Tigers were formally placed under command of the units for special operations of the State Security Services of the Ministry of Interior of Serbia, known as the Red Berets. In September 1995, in large numbers, Arkan’s troops arrived in Sanski Most again, where they participated in combats and other forms of crime in West Bosnia.317

The members of the White Eagles318, led by Milan Lukic, arrived


317 ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraphs 131, and 896-897; AIIZ, inv. No. 5352, Record, Supplemented Testimony by Dj. Dj.

in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina also in early April, from Uzice, via Visegrad and Rogatica. Those forces, in cooperation with the JNA and other armed formations, committed numerous crimes in the area of Visegrad and other places of Eastern Bosnia, including the genocide against Bosniaks. Together with the JNA and the SDS criminals, and other Serb armed formations, on April 7, 1992, the *White Eagles* took Foca and committed cruel murders, plundered homes and shops owned by Bosniaks, and burned down whole villages. Together with the other *Chetnik* formations, the *White Eagles* took part in the march-past at Pale, on April 15, 1992. Following this, they participated in combat activities, crimes, plunders and arsons in Bijeljina, where on April 18, they plundered a humanitarian aid convoy, then in Rogatica, on April 19, in Sarajevo, in the areas of Vraca and Grbavica, on April 21, and in Trebinje, Bileca, Mostar, Gacko, Modrica, Bratunac, and other parts of the Republic. In late April 1992, at the request of *SAO Herzegovina*, Mirko Jovic (president of the Serb National Revival) sent some 400 *White Eagles* onto the areas of Gacko, Bileca and Trebinje, who made themselves “available” to Bozidar Vucurevic and joined the “already arrived members (five hundred) of the *Chetnik* gang of Vojislav Seselj, among whom a large number was of released prisoners from Serbia and Montenegro”.

At the same time, a group of them was inserted into the territory of Mostar, too, in order to “install fear” among the population, whereas the others were already leaving “traces of bloody crimes across Gacko”. On April 23, 1992, two hundred and fifty *White Eagles* arrived to the JNA Doboj Barracks. Together with the JNA members, criminal forces of the SDS and other *Chetnik* formations, in late April 1992, the *White Eagles* also took part in attacking and destroying of Bosanski Brod. On that occasion, they rocketed (with multiple rocket launchers, tank shells and 155 mm howitzers) the plans of the Bosanski Brod Oil Refinery. Among their cruel crimes, we need to distinguish direct

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In early September 1991, at the International Press-Centre in Belgrade, Mirko Jovic, president of the National Revival Party, stated: “*If a state recognizes the sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia within their administrative borders and thus allows for occupation of the now liberated Serb territories, the Serb National Revival shall have to resort to violence... the Croatian and Bosnian Embassies in those countries shall be blown up, and the Serb National Revival shall become the Serb national defence*” (*Oslobodjenje*, January 21, 1992, p. 6).
participation in liquidations, harassment and plundering of the Bosniak population in the areas of Zvornik and Srebrenica during April, and then in Bratunac in the period from May 10th though 13th, 1992, and in Vlasenica, Visegrad, Doboj, and other places. On May 4, 1992, some 200 new members of the *White Eagles* were brought to the Sarajevo residential area of Grbavica. On May 8, 1992, some 1,500 “volunteers” from Serbia came into the village of Tilava (to the old chicken farm), and among them were some *White Eagles*, too.\(^{319}\)

*The White Eagles* also took part in the attack on Trnovo (June 1, 1992), then in the takeover of Bileca (June 10, 1992), of Fazlagica Kula (June 17), and other places.\(^{320}\)

By the end of April 1992, on the territory of *SAO Herzegovina*, together with other *Chetnik* units, the *Seseljevci* were also “securing the border”, and sometimes, in civilian clothing, they would go into some parts of Mostar, in order to commit diversions and armed attacks. In the area of Buna (region of Mostar), *Seseljevci* arrived on April 12, 1992, requesting the members of the Serb police precinct to join them in the attacks against the Bosniak population on the left bank of the Neretva river (in Rotimlje, Hodbina, and Dubrave).\(^{321}\)

On February 29, 1992, on the first day of the referendum for independent and sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Serb *Chetnik* count and president of the Serb Radical Party, Vojislav Seselj, arrived in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the village and monastery of Knezina, in his Order 124, as “the only Serb *Chetnik* count directly engaged in the current liberation war of the Serb people, in following the tradition of the Serb *Chetniks*, for extraordinary accomplishments in this war, big


A unit of “Arkanovci” consisting of some 300 criminals arrived in the village of Tilava on May 5, 1992 from Serbia.

\(^{320}\) *ICTY*, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraphs 714, 716, and 737.

\(^{321}\) *Posebno izdanje*, no. 19, June 5, 1992; *Agresija*, p. 15; *Bilten MNO*, no. 9-10, April 13, 1992; *Oslobodjenje*, March 25, 1992, p. 3.
courage and war skills shown by the most prominent Chetnik commanders”, he promoted 18 new Chetnik counts. Thus, the following “Serb heroes from all the Serb countries” were promulgated into the rank of Chetnik counts: Zdravko Abramovic, Branslav Bakic, Srecko Radovanovic, Slavko Crnic, Nedeljko Vidakovic, Slavko Aleksic, Mitar Maksimovic-Manda, Miroslav Vukovic-Cele, Milisav Dakovic-Ceko, Tomislav Nikolic, Milan Lancuzanin-Kameni, Zoran Drazinovic-Cica, Jovo Ostojevic, Ljubisa Petkovic, Todor Lazic, Mirko Blagojevic, Dragan Cvetkovic, and Branislav Gavrilovic-Brne.322

In late March 1992, a group of Seseljevci switched from Serbia into Bratunac, Zvornik, and Bijeljina, where Vojislav Seselj performed the march-past and, at the barracks, with the JNA officers, arranged for further “combat activities”. At the same time, groups of Seseljevci also came to the territory of Bosanska Krajina, particularly into the Banjaluka region. After the crimes committed in Bijeljina, Zvornik, and Skelani, in early April 1992, Seseljevci arrived in Pale and the area of Sarajevo. In the Sarajevo region, they were mainly located in the areas of Lukavica, Mojimlo, Vraca, and Grbavica. A group of Seseljevci, of approximately 200 criminals, led by Branišlav Gavrilovic (known for the crimes committed against the Croatian population of Vukovar, Borovo Selo, and Borovo Naselje), fired on Sarajevo for the first time on April 14, and 15, 1992, in the artillery attack on the City Public Transportation Company (Gras) Terminal. Together with other Serb fascist formations, on April 21, 1992, this group took part in the criminal infantry and artillery attack on the territories of the Novi Grad, Novo Sarajevo, and Centar Municipalities. Before the attack, a march-past was first performed of all the aggressor’s units on the locality of the Monumental Park of Vraca, among which there were also Gavrilovic’s units in disguise uniforms and with white bands around their heads as a distinguishing sign. This attack, as well as its operational preparations, was directed by major

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322 AIIZ, inv. No. 7-59, Transcript of the clip broadcast on the Srpska Television. On that occasion, the Chetnik counts gave oaths, which “rejoiced” Mt. Romanija, which “does not speak to enemies”, and “which had not heard them for fifty years”. This oath stated: “As a Serb Chetnik count, I swear by God and St. Sava, that with all of my forces I shall fight for the freedom of the Serb people and recovery of the single Serb state in the Balkans, to encompass all the Serb countries, so help me God. Amen” (Ibid.).
Dragomir Krstovic, together with Gavrilovic, Miso Jovanovic, and Radomir Spahic. The JNA also provided support to them, particularly officer Krstovic, who, in addition to having the main command over the armed Serb formations, and coordination of the armed activities with the JNA commands, was incessantly opening fire from a tank. In addition to him, this attack on Sarajevo also saw direct participation of the following JNA officers: Colonels Gagovic, Kovacevic, and Tomislav Tausan, then captains Petkovic, Stojanovic, and others. A significant role was also played by General Milutin Kukanjac, commander of the 2nd Military District, general major Vojislav Djurdjevac, then Dule Parezanovic – aide to general Kukanjac, and others.

In the attack on Sarajevo, Branislav Gavrilovic was injured, and his group was besieged by the defenders of Sarajevo. Inquiring about

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On the eve of the attack on Sarajevo (April 20, 1992), the operational preparations of the criminal formations of the SDS were directed by the JNA major Dragomir Krstovic. “At the SDS headquarters, all the plans are developed in detail, the order is issued for mobilization of terrorists and armed formations of the SDS. Krstovic, who, on April 20, inquired about the health of the two shot JNA soldiers with Colonel Tomislav Tausan, chief of staff of the Military Hospital in Sarajevo, stated: ‘We shall get even for that. What does that guy Kukanjac think now? Do you know where the Serb border is. This border is the whole city, man’, and he continued: ‘They are in the grotto anyhow, and they are not clear about it, hey. Once we cut off their water and electricity, they will stink themselves rotten. We have mined this road here above Sokolovic Kolonija, we have destroyed everything. They can not move anywhere, man, they are blocked everywhere. Let them just move now, we should kill them all to the last one.’ Colonel Tausan responded: ‘As they say, I rely on God, and I’m off to the hills myself’.

324 Ibid. After the defenders and residents of Sarajevo had pushed back the aggressor’s attack and turned it into a counter-offensive, major Krstovic fled to Pale upon the notice of Colonel Pero Simovic from the Security Department of the Command of the 2nd Military District. The Serb criminals, “having seen that Krstovic was fleeing, they requested that he should be liquidated, screaming how he “had cooked it all up”. In the evening hours of April 21, 1992, the real cannonade started, artillery shelling onto the innocent population of Sarajevo, without precedent in its whole history. The fired shells were killing mothers, children, and innocent civilians”.

325 Ibid.
their position from Belgrade, in contact with Gavrilovic and the criminal headquarters of the SDS in Pale, Vojislav Seselj placed an ultimatum to criminal Radovan Karadzic “that his people must be pulled out from the siege in Grbavica, otherwise he shall withdraw all his people from all of the front lines”. With some major losses, the Seseljevci suffered a number of defeats on the territory of Sarajevo, inflicted by the defenders of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the territory of Bosanska Krajina, Seseljevci appeared in major numbers in late April 1992. Thus, in Banjaluka, on April 24, large groups of the Serb armed formations arrived – Seseljevci and Arkanovci. Arkanovci, White Eagles, and Seseljevci, who arrived into this area within the Novi Sad Corps of the JNA, as well as the members of SDS armed formations, in early May, 1992, after usurpation of the power in Bratunac, began arresting, taking away and liquidating Bosniaks. For each killed Bosniak, the leadership of the Serb Democratic Party paid them 100 KM. In late May 1992, a group of some three hundred “Seseljevci” arrived in the Lukavica Barracks (near Sarajevo).326

A group of Seseljevci, led by Slavko Aleksic, was also involved in sniping at Sarajevo from the Jewish Cemetery at Grbavica.327

In late May 1992, a group of Seseljevci led by Branislav Gavrilovic, took out 39 Bosniaks from the concentration camp in Pale, and massacred them in a cave on Mt. Romanija, which was to constitute “the baptism by fire” and “training” for a number of new criminals. The victims were so deformed that even some of the criminals from the group were not able to watch that, because of which Gavrilovic got cross and forced them by threatening them with firearms to slaughter the innocent people themselves, showing to them in person “how this is to be done”.328

The Royalists and the members of the Serb Guard were mainly located on the territory of Foca, where from the beginning of the aggression they committed cruel crimes against civilian population, expressing

326 Posebno izdanje, no. 1, April 25, 1992, and no. 19, June 5, 1992; Bilten MNO, no. 35, April 25, 1992.

327 ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraph 687.

particular aggression in taking away and physically harassing the civilians of Bosniak ethnicity in the Foca concentration camps.329

The so-called Vukovarci, as “experienced soldiers”, according to the data available, in the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina and the combat activities in the areas of Kalesija, Sarajevo (Hrasno, Grbavica, Vraca), and other places, in cooperation with the JNA, were actively involved in the genocide, plundering, arsons and other crimes. Thus, for instance, on May 10, 1992, in the villages of Bulatovci, Hajvazi, Memici, and Brda, one unit of Vukovarci committed numerous crimes against Bosniaks.330

In preparation and execution of the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina, a significant role was played by the Federal Secretariat for Interior, particularly its secretary Petar Gracanin, who, in addition to the material assistance (“establishment of cooperation and all forms of assistance, particularly in arms and ammunition”), on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, also sent special police units, who were involved in combat activities, genocide, and other crimes, as well as in training of the personnel of the “Serb Ministry of Interior”. Thus, in mid-1992, among the 5,000 of aggressor’s soldiers at the Kupres Plateau, and among the 300 soldiers on Mt. Komar, there were also members of the special unit of the Federal Secretariat of Interior (SSUP). Upon the order of Petar Gracanin, in late July of the same year, two parties of the SSUP Special Forces arrived in Bijeljina.331

The facts about participation in the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina and continued arrivals and barge-ins of the units of the “Special Brigade” of the SSUP into Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the task to take part in “cleansing of the ground”, unquestionably speak about the role of this federal body and its involvement into the plans for conquering of Bosnia and Herzegovina and integration of the “liberated Serb territories in Bosnia and Herzegovina” into the Federal

329 Posebno izdanje, no. 19, June 5, 1992.
Republic of Yugoslavia. Gracanin’s negotiation with “establishing of cooperation and all forms of assistance, particularly in arms and ammunition”, between the “minister” Mico Stanisic and general Ratko Mladic, in terms of synchronizing the combat activities, also speaks enough about the longer-term plans of the Federal Secretariat for Interior on the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The data available also reveal Gracanin’s contacts with certain members of the Chetnik armed formations, located at Vraca in Sarajevo, and in other places. His special units, in cooperation with the JNA and other Serb armed formations and groups, participated in the aggression, genocide, and other forms of crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina (in Bijeljina, Zvornik, Sarajevo, and other places).332

The Ministry of Interior of Serbia (the public and state security) had a significant role in planning and execution of the crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the capacity of the president of Serbia, and via ministers of interior (Radmilo Bogdanovic and Zoran Sokolovic), and the chief of the State Security Services (Jovica Stanisic), and of the Public Security Services (Radovan Stojcic), Slobodan Milosevic had unlimited power over the Serbian Ministry of Interior.333


333 ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraphs 105, and 107. In 1991, a “Military Headquarters” was formed at the Ministry of Interior of Serbia, headed by Radmilo Bogdanovic, and its essence was made up of the Personnel Committee, headed by Zoran Janackovic. The other members of this committee were: Jovica Stanisic, Frenki Simatovic, Radovan Stojcic, and Radmilo Bogdanovic (from the Ministry of Interior of Serbia). They established closed connections with the high-ranking JNA officers, such as with generals Zivota Panic (commander of the 1st Military District), Bozidar Stevanovic (commander of the First Airborne Corps, and later commander of the RV and PVO), and Slavoljub Djukic (commander of the Territorial Defence of the Republic of Serbia). Those JNA officers were very loyal to Slobodan Milosevic (ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraphs 279, and 283).

On September 29, 1991, the aforementioned officers organized a successful putsch against general Kadijevic, because general Adzic had refused to take on Kadijevic’s position at the SSNO (Ibid., paragraph 284).

The following generals were reactivated: Ljubicic, Gracanin, and Mamula, as well as a number of other officers, in order to also offer support in formation of the special police units and military structures in Croatia (Krajina) – Ibid., paragraph 285.
On behalf of Milosevic (under his control and authority), Jovica Stanisic contacted the leaderships of the SDS of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.334 The funds and personnel of the Serbian Ministry of Interior were directly involved as a tool in the hands of Milosevic for participation in occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (and Croatia), and other forms of crime.335

The Serbian Ministry of Interior was also involved in establishment of and support to numerous armed formations, involved in commission of crimes, providing the overall logistical and other support.336 This Ministry sent armed formations and groups into Bosnia and Herzegovina, such as in April of 1992, when one of the leaders Dragan Djordjevic (Crni) arrived with his people to Bosanski Samac.337

Together with the “paramilitary” formations, the members of the Ministry of Interior of Serbia took part in the attack against Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in other forms of crime, such as for instance, in January of 1993, in Skelani, and against Srebrenica.338

One of the first groups that contained those Special Forces was from Knin (Croatia), and was sent to Mt. Fruska Gora (Serbia) for training with the State Security Services. This training was organized by Frenki Simatovic,339 who trained the Serbs from Croatian Krajina


335 Ibid., paragraph 114.

336 Ibid., paragraph 115, note 241. The top leadership of the Ministry of Interior of Serbia (Novica Stanisic, Frenki Simatovic, and Radovan Stojcic) directed and organized the Serb forces in (Croatia and) Bosnia and Herzegovina, which took part in crimes. This ministry, in cooperation with the JNA and the Ministry of Defence, supported, armed and coordinated various paramilitary formations, including the ones commanded by Arkan, and they supported and facilitated commission of crimes, and the like (ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraphs 420, and 423).

337 Ibid., paragraph 117.

338 Ibid., paragraph 115, note 241.

339 Ibid., paragraph 19. After the training, this group was fully integrated into the State Security Services of the Ministry of Interior of Serbia.
in Bubanj Potok (at the Training Centre – Military Base of the JNA near Belgrade).  

From time to time, the Serbian Ministry of Interior released prisoners and pre-trial detainees from prison in place of their membership in special units. The released criminals were given the SDB (State Security Services) cards, which permitted them to pass through police checkpoints and border crossings. For the officers of special forces, SDB identification cards were issued in the Republic of Serbia, in the “Serb Republic of BiH”, and “Republic of Serb Krajina”, allowing them to travel throughout the territory without stopping.

The State Security Services included such units as: Grey Wolves and Red Berets, Cayman, Scorpions, Blue Guys, and others. These units became powerful armed formations in the Serbian Ministry of Interior controlled by Slobodan Milosevic, whose control over them was implemented through progress in execution of goals in the joint criminal undertaking.

The members of the special forces of the State Security Services of the Ministry of Interior of Serbia (Red Berets) commanded by Frenki Simatovic, during 1991, secretly distributed arms, hand grenades and other equipment used to instigate crimes in the area of Knin. In cooperation with the JNA, White Eagles, and other formations, in Mostar, in May and June 1992, the Red Berets took part in the operations with the JNA. During those operations, the Serb forces, including he officers of

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340 Ibid. See: D. Gajic-Glisic, SRPSKA VOJSKA, Belgrade 1992, p. 103. Frenki Simatovic was the commander of the units for special operations (ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraph 119).

341 ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraph 120. Those identification cards permitted them to conceal the fact that they were coming from Serbia (Ibid.).

342 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2126, Ministry of Interior, Special Police Brigade, front line command place – Trnovo, Dispatch no. 113/95, June 30, 1995 - to the headquarters of the police of Pale, and others; Ibid., inv. No. 2-2125, Ministry of Interior, Special Police Brigade, front line command place – Trnovo, no. 118/95 – to the Ministry of Interior, and others; Ibid., inv. No. 2-2127, headquarters of the police forces, front line command place – Trnovo, no. 150/95, July 24, 1995 – to the Ministry of Interior of RS, and others; ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraphs 121 and 420.
the State Security Services, were involved in commission of numerous crimes, among which murders of a large number of non-Serb civilians.\textsuperscript{343}

The special forces of the Serbian Ministry of Interior were involved in the crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They kept presence and actively participated in the name of Milosevic in the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the genocide against Bosniaks, and other forms of crime. During 1994, the \textit{Red Berets} were fighting in Bosnia and Herzegovina under the command of Frenki Simatovic. Those who used to be the members of Arkan’s \textit{Tigers}, were still receiving salaries from Arkan, although the money for their living needs was paid by the \textit{Red Berets}. They were instructed not to ever publicly admit that they were coming from Serbia.\textsuperscript{344}

The special forces of the Serbian Ministry of Interior collaborated with the JNA at places such as Plitvice in Croatia, and Eastern Slavonia, with the \textit{Army of the Republic of Serb Krajina}, and with the supporters of Fikret Abdic.\textsuperscript{345} The \textit{Red Berets} trained the Serb police forces from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia and cooperated with the SDS. The Special Forces units also cooperated with the Serb armed groups, such as \textit{White Eagles} or the group of Branslav Vakic. This cooperation included both training and actual fight.\textsuperscript{346}

During 1994, and 1995, too, the special units of the Ministry of Interior of Serbia took part in the combat operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, exercising offensive actions (for instance: in November

\textsuperscript{343} ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraph 122.

\textsuperscript{344} Ibid., paragraphs 21, 123, 268-269, 687, and others. In the night of May 7, 1992, members of the special forces of the State Security of Serbia rushed into the building of the Agricultural Cooperative in Crkvina (Bosanski Samac), where 52 men were detained, and they killed at least 16 detainees (Ibid., paragraph 613. The surviving detainees had to load the corps onto the truck and clean away the blood and body parts in the warehouse).

The units of the special forces from Nis were also firing on Sarajevo and other places, killing innocent civilians (\textit{Agresija …}, p. 56).

\textsuperscript{345} Ibid., paragraph 124. The supporters of Fikret Abdic were assisted by various units for special purposes, as well as by Arkan’s \textit{Tigers} (Ibid., note 258).

\textsuperscript{346} Ibid.
1994, against the 5th Corps of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in June 1995, in the zone of Sarajevo – Trnovo).347

The special forces of the Serbian Ministry of Interior were supplied by Milosevic in everything that the unit may have requested, because they were authorized to operate on behalf of the interests of Serbia, “anywhere in former Yugoslavia, or throughout the world, if needed”.348

The forces of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serbia (two platoons each from the police detachments of Kajman, Blue Guys, and Scorpion), in cooperation with the other units, in late June 1995, took part in the combat operations against the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina at the site of Lucevik (on the Trnovo-Sarajevo road).349

With the joint forces of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serb Krajina, and Republika Srpska, even during the month of July, the units of the Ministry of Interior of Serbia took part in the offensive combat activities on the “Trnovo” and “Sarajevo” front lines.350

The forces of the Ministry of Interior of Serbia also participated in the crimes in and around Srebrenica, which was a UN “safe area” (from the afternoon hours of July 11, 1995, and later on).351

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348 ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraph 125. In April 2001, Slobodan Milosevic admitted that he was providing the funding for, as he put it, “security forces and anti-terrorist forces“ (Ibid.).


350 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2871, Republika Srpska, Ministry of Interior, Cabinet of the Minister, no. 64/95, July 10, 1995 – to the Commander of the Special Police Brigade, and others; Ibid., inv. Nos. 2-2127, and 2723, Headquarters of the Police Forces, Front line Command Trnovo, no.: 150/95, July 24, 1995 – to the Ministry of Interior of RS and others.

351 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2871, Republika Srpska, Ministry of Interior, Cabinet of the Minister, no. 64/95, July 10, 1995 – to the Commander of the Special Police Brigade,
One armed unit close to the State Security Services of the Ministry of Interior of Serbia, coordinated very successfully with the forces of the HVO, commanded by Ivica Rajic, in the areas of Kiseljak and Kresevo, in commission of crimes against Bosniaks.352

**The fascists of Milan Martic** from Croatia (Knin) also took part in the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was as early as on June 8, 1991, that Martic’s Special Forces rushed into Bosnia and Herzegovina (Titov Drvar and Bosansko Grahovo); where in Drvar they held a march-past of their supporters (some four hundred members, among whom there was a platoon of women, too).353

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and others. On July 10, 1995, “based on the order of the supreme commander of the Armed Forces of the Republika Srpska, in order to break down the enemy offensive from the protected zone of Srebrenica”, the Ministry of Interior of the Republika Srpska issued the following order:

“1. allocate part of the Ministry of Interior of the RS forces that participates in the combat activities at the Sarajevo front line and send it as a separate unit into the area of Srebrenica, during tomorrow, July 11, 1995.

the composition of units comprises other special detachment of police from Sekovici, first party of Public Security Centre Zvornik forces, mixed party of the joint forces of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serb Krajina, Serbia, and Republika Srpska, and a party from the camp of the Jahorina Training Centre.

I hereby appoint Ljubisa Borovcanin, deputy commander of the Special Police Brigade, to the commander of the Ministry of Interior unit.

Withdrawal of the party of joint forces of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serb Krajina, Serbia, and Republika Srpska, from the Trnovo front line during the night. Gathering of the unit shall be carried out on July 11, 1995, in the afternoon hours.

Upon the arrival to the point of destination, the commander of the unit shall contact the chief of staff of the headquarters of the Corps, general Krstic” (Ibid.).


353 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-551, Information of the Ministry of Interior of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina on some phenomena and events having particular influence on the complication of the security situation in the Republic, dated June 11, 1991; *Borba*, June 11, 1991. During the march-past of the units at the Sports and Recreation
His supporters were also the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina—members of the SDS, demonstrating in this way the force for further expansion of Milosevic’s Nazi creation in which “all the Serbs shall live in a single state”. Martic’s formation was well armed with various types of armament (automatic, semi-automatic, machine guns, hand rocket launchers, even 120 mm cannons).354

During the second half of 1991, with the support and awareness of the top military and police leadership of SFRY, as well as the political leadership of Serbia, in order to prepare for the aggression, Milan Martic rushed into Bosnia and Herzegovina several times. On September 8, 1991, a group of Marticevci (15 to 20 uniformed persons in disguise uniforms) executed an attack on the Police Precinct and released three masked and armed members of the TO of Banjaluka, who had been arrested. On the same day, in a military vehicle, the police arrested Martic, during his visit to Bosanska Krupa. This increased the unrest with the population and led to the blockade of roads. Upon the order of Petar Gracanin, on September 9, after a “drama night”, in Bosanska Krupa, Martic was released and delivered to the Commission of the SSUP and SSNO, headed by general Aleksandar Vasiljevic (chief of staff of security at the JNA), who used military helicopters to take him to Knin, although there was a search warrant for him in place.355

During March 1992, in the area of Bosanska Krajina, particularly on the territories of the Sipovo and Jajce Municipalities, groups of military persons rushed in many coloured camouflage uniforms, with Centre in Drvar, Martic used an improvised stall to address the unit and the civilians in attendance with the following words: “We have come here to our brotherly nation to visit them, and with this phase we are also ending the exercise that we have successfully completed here in Titov Drvar, and that this is not going to be the last exercise in this area, and that on this occasion the artificial border is removed between the Serb populations of Titov Drvar and Kninska Krajina”.

Following Milan Martic, speeches were held by the presidents of the Municipal Assemblies of Titov Drvar (Dragan Knezevic), and Donji Lapac (David Rastovic).

354 Ibid.

355 Vreme, September 16, 1991, pp. 24-25; Oslobodjenje, December 31, 1991 – January 1 and 2, 1992, p. 4. Thus, Milan Martic returned to Knin with the assistance of the military and police leadership of the SFRY.
yellow stars, called “military police” by some, and “red berets” by some others, whereas they were called Marticevci by some third ones. Their arrival brought unrest in the aforementioned area, given that they started with crimes against the Bosniak and Croat populations. In the second half of March 1992, Milan Martic himself landed into Sipovo in a military helicopter.  

In late March 1992, some fifty police officers of the SAO Krajina came to Ilijas from Knin. “For days now, they have been routing homes and apartments of members and supporters of the SDA, but of the SDP too, as well as the other non-Serb parties, identifying persons, doing searches and issuing threats without any authorization…”

IN late May 1992, in Bosanska Otoka, the aggressor units, among them mainly the Marticevci destroyed 70% of the residential buildings. On that occasion, the aggressor was also using tanks, and in front of the infantry, Marticevci placed a “human wall” of forty detained Bosniaks from Bosanska Krupa.

In June 1992, together with the JNA members and other criminals, the so-called Martic’s Serb Police from Kninska Krajina took part in the barbaric attack on Brcko, committing mass crimes. The members of the Knin red berets also took part in the crimes against Bosniaks in the areas of Prijedor and Kozarac, particularly in the village of Hambarine, where the Serb fascist slaughtered thousands of civilians, mainly Bosniaks.

Martic’s units also took part in the aggressive attacks and crimes on the territory of Northern Bosnia. After the occupation of Derventa, on July 12, 1992, some 2,000 of “Marticevci” arrived in Doboj, who “plundered everything they came across and hit and killed whoever opposed that, and at 19, Celjska St., they raped two girls in front of

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357 Slobodna Bosna, no. 22, March 26, 1992, p. 5.
358 Dnevni izvjestaj, no. 38, June 1, 1992.
359 Agresija …, p. 59; Dnevni izvjestaj, no. 118, August 20, 1992.
their mother”. In mid-July, Marticevci were also involved in the attack on Odzak. After the completed training in Knin, together with the special forces of SSUP, in mid-1992, a group of Marticevci from Serbia took part in the crimes on the territory of Donji Vakuf, committing “murders, taking hostages, and taking away of the population to concentration camps”. In August 1992, in addition to the Serb collaborationists from Bosnia and Herzegovina (the so-called local Chetniks) and a significant number of the aggressor soldiers from Serbia and Montenegro (among whom were also Seseljevci, Arkanovci, White Eagles, and others), Marticevci also arrived in Han Pijesak.360

The so-called volunteers from Serbia and Montenegro (as separate groups of armed formations, that is, Chetniks), were located on all the temporarily occupied parts of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and together with the other aggressor units, took part in the combat activities and crimes against civilians, mainly Bosniak.361

In the night between April 12 and 13, 1992, a new group of Serb volunteers came in JNA helicopters to Pale from Serbia and Montenegro. The next day, the JNA started with mobilization of the Serb population in the Rudo Municipality, and the mobilized soldiers started off towards Visegrad and Kalinovik.362

Among the volunteers from Serbia and Montenegro, a special place belonged to the Serb Eagles of Sinisa Vucin, the militia of Dragoslav Bokan, then to the Chetnik Iron Regiment Pavle Djurisic, and the Chetnik detachments of Vuk Kalajic, Jankovic, Dragan Nikolic, Zaga, and the like, as well as to the so-called week-enders, veterans from the aggression against Croatia, persons who were in the Foreign Legion and other Chetnik formations of undetermined names. These volunteers in their extremity did not by a bit lag behind the members of the aforementioned armed formations, although their “closer specialty” was slaughtering of

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362 Agresija ..., p. 25.
Bosniaks, killing of Bosniak women, and plundering of social and private properties, that they took away into Serbia and Montenegro in organized convoys of cargo trailer trucks.\textsuperscript{363}

In late June 1992, in cooperation with the leadership of the SDS, the Greater Serbia aggressor intensified bringing in of “fresh Chetnik units” from Serbia and Montenegro onto the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo in particular. After in mid-1992, general Mladic assessed that the “Serb forces” are insufficient to execute his fascist plan to take over Dobrinja and keep control over the Airport, additional mobilization was conducted of armed formations in the areas of Lukavica, Nedzarici, Ilidza, and Rajlovac. However, due to catastrophically poor results, criminal Ratko Mladic requested an urgent meeting with Karadzic and other leaders of the Serb Democratic Party. In that meeting, held in “the seat of the Serb Ministry of Interior and Judiciary”, on the premises of the former prison at Kula (attended by Radovan Karadzic, Nikola Koljevic, Momcilo Mandic, and general Ratko Mladic with associates), Mladic presented in more detail about the “difficult situation” and suggested the failure of the “Dobrinja operation”, unless new forces and combat resources are procured as soon as possible, first of all, artillery grenades, as well as “experienced officers”, “the lack of whom was felt in some decisive battles, such as the case was at Pofalici and Mt. Zuc”. It was also assessed that, due to the increasing pressure of the international public and, as they concluded, “turning the UNPROFOR away from them”, they must take Dobrinja by no later than June 28, as well as a part of Nedzarici, which, as they believed, would allow for the Airport to remain under the Serb control. Otherwise, the meeting resulted in numerous charges onto the account of the UNPROFOR in a tone of open animosity, from which one could unquestionably conclude that the Serb fascists were even ready for armed incidents and conflicts with the members of the UNPROFOR.\textsuperscript{364}


\textsuperscript{364} \textit{Posebno izdanje}, no. 24, June 28, 1992.
Following this, regrouping started of the available “Serb forces” at the locality of Lukavica, Kasindol, a part of Dobrinja, Ilidza, Rajlovac, and the Airport, and Ratko Mladic and Momcilo Krajisnik were assigned to secure urgent arrival of new units, ammunition and food, primarily flour, from Serbia and Montenegro, as soon as on the same day.365

After that, on June 24, and 25, 1992, 300 of Seseljevci came into the Lukavica Barracks. In order to accommodate them, it was decided that a number of camp inmates were to be taken to the Vrbanja Bridge and released, which was done. Sticking to the specified deadline (June 28), and thanks to the newcomer fascists, general Mladic immediately organized an offensive towards the “unconquered” part of Dobrinja. In addition, a notice arrived from Stara Pazova into the Lukavica Barracks that on June 27, 1992, four buses of volunteers, that is, White Eagles, were arriving from Staro Sajmiste, and their accommodation was requested in Pale, with the note that they are “ready to fight immediately”. Due to the lack of space in the barracks, through Karadzic, Mladic effected that yet another number of camp inmates (women and children) from Dobrinja and Hadzici be relocated into the Butmir prison, which was not gladly accepted by Momcilo Mandic, because of the “stuffiness of the place”, whereas the remaining inmates in the barracks would probably be used as a human shield in case of an attack on the barracks.366

On the other hand, through some “friends”, without problems, Momcilo Krajisnik established contact with the headquarters of the Arkanovci and secured a large group of Chetniks, with the note that, “if needed, even thousands of them shall come”. Upon the order of Momcilo’s brother, Mirko Krajisnik, this group “must be in Sarajevo on Saturday June 27, 1992, until 10:00 hours, whatever it takes”. Krajisnik was then also notified that the JNA Kremni Garrison near Uzice there was a trailer truck loaded with shells, with a request to send another truck, because “there is a lot of that there”, whereas the trailer trucks that had left for Kragujevac to pick up the ammunition and grenades were ready to return to Sarajevo. In relation to this, the message noted that in Kragujevac, for the time being, they can not

365 Ibid.
366 Ibid.
deliver these “commodities” because of “domestic needs”, as well as the fact that several days before a trailer truck had been sent to the Lukavica Barracks, and reached its destination. At the same time, a number of trailer trucks with flour, oil and sugar arrived in Rajlovac and Lukavica, and were unloaded at the UPI Distribution Centre, that is, the Klimamont Building.367

The data available corroborate sending of the Chetnik units from Serbia and Montenegro even onto the territory of Eastern Herzegovina where, in the opinion of Karadzic and Mladic, “the situation is critical”, and “may endanger the whole territory of the Serb Republic of BiH, and the whole concept of creating a common Serb state”. There were also some new JNA officers at the Lukavica Barracks, who, probably with a high compensation in money, had arrived from Serbia, and were immediately deployed on the positions, particularly the artillery ones, around Sarajevo. In addition, on June 25 and 26, 1992, regrouping was noticed and reinforcements of the artillery positions around Sarajevo. This was confirmed also during June 27, with intensification of the aggressor attacks at the locality of the Airport and the surrounding residential areas, particularly Dobrinja, Nedzarici, and Butmir, and this was all under the framework of Karadzic’s request that within the 5 km diameter around the Airport, all the locations must be “ethnically cleansed”.368

In late June and early July 1992, some 300 members of the “special forces” from Serbia were transferred onto the territory of Northeast Bosnia, 200-300 of Arkanovci, and 100-150 of the so-called kninjas, whereas some 5,000 Chetniks arrived in the areas of Hresa, Crepoljsko, and Vucja Luka. At the same time, helicopters landed on the positions of the Serb armed formations destroying Gorazde from Montenegro, bringing in new volunteers, who, from July 8 through 19, burned down a number of the villages surrounding Gorazde and expelled the overall Bosniak population, according to the already normal scenario.369

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367 Ibid.
368 Ibid.
In the first half of July 1992, the Serb armed formations in Pale had some 10,000 able military personnel. At the time, a major group of armed formations was found in Vogosca: Arkanovci, Seseljevci, and White Eagles, commanded by senior JNA officers, armed with modern infantry armament (all of them also carrying long knives), and they were roughly 300 in number.370

On an almost daily basis, Ratko Adzic did the march-past of the Chetnik formations of some 500-600 men, which he sent to the combat positions around Ilijas, from where they incessantly launched attacks on the areas of Breza and Visoko. At the time, volunteers were coming in buses and trucks to Pale on a daily basis from Belgrade, Cacak, Valjevo, and other cities of Serbia, who were mainly accommodated together with the Arkanovci and Seseljevci, at hotels on Mt. Jahorina, in the hospitality facilities and motels in the areas of Pale, Koran, Renovica, in Kalovita Brda, in the Home at Majdani, in Careve Vode, and in Mokro. This territory too contained headquarters and training centres (a recruitment centre of the Serb armed forces was located in Mokro).371

The shipping of manpower and weapons and equipment from Serbia and Montenegro into Bosnia and Herzegovina was directed by the SSNO. This is also corroborated by the fact that Colonel Stevan Nikolic, aka “Krueger”, in late June 1992, informed Srecko Radovanovic (Reserve Major) that general Delic from Belgrade, with the permission of general Mladic, approved reinforcement of the aggressor units in Pelagicevo.372

The participation of the armed formations and groups from SR Yugoslavia in the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina is suggested by numerous documents. Among these, we would like to point out to the documents found with the aggressor soldier Petar Zelen, from Backa Palanka, who was killed at the Brcko front line. Namely, what was found with him was the certificate from Military Post 9840 Brcko,

370 Dnevni izvjestaj, no. 72, July 5, 1992, No. 77, July 10, 1992, no. 79, July 12, 1992, and no. 80, July 13, 1992. Among the members of the White Eagles was Vasilije Popovic too, who also took part in the aggression against Croatia (around Knin).

371 Ibid.

372 Dnevni izvjestaj, no. 68, July 1, 1992.
stating that the aforementioned “military conscript” is found on the front line in the composition of the volunteer party from Novi Sad, commanded by Mirko Zugic, by whom the certificate was signed. In addition, there was an emblem found on Zelen, with an inscription of Palanka – Guerrilla.\textsuperscript{373}

The Serb armed formations and groups from Serbia, Montenegro, and Croatia, ranking from the units of the special forces of the Serbian Ministry of Interior up to the larger organized groups and smaller units, mainly took parts in the crimes committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina and fought in cooperation with the JNA, and later on, with the Army of Yugoslavia, and the collaborationist Army of Republika Srpska, and sometimes even independently. Slobodan Milosevic supported and exerted influence over such formations and groups, being aware that they were committing numerous crimes.\textsuperscript{374}

One formation of volunteers from Serbia, commanded by a certain Peki, committed a major number of executions of the Bosniaks from the UN “safe zone” of Srebrenica in July 1995.\textsuperscript{374a}

The number of Serb armed formations and groups from Serbia and Montenegro, as well as from the Republic of Croatia, that took part in the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the genocide against Bosniaks, and in other forms of crime, is hard to establish. Milos Minic claims that only by August 14, 1992, some 100,000 people from Serbia were fighting “\textit{on the front lines in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina}”. Of this number, only from Vojvodina, there were 40,000 people “\textit{in these wars and on those front lines}”.\textsuperscript{375}

By his own testimony, Vojislav Seselj sent out “\textbf{some 30,000 volunteers wherever the Serbs were fighting}”, and Milosevic equipped

\textsuperscript{373} \textit{Dnevni izvjestaj}, No. 107, August 9, 1992.

\textsuperscript{374} ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraph 21.

\textsuperscript{374a} AIIZ, inv. No. 2-3042, Republika Srpska, Ministry of Interior, Police Precinct Bratunac, April 9, 2004, OFFICIAL NOTE.

them with arms, ammunition, made the barracks in Bubanj Potok available to them, as well as transportation to the front line, and the like.376

376 M. Bojic, JNA JE RADILA NA RUSENJU REPUBLIKE BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE, in: F. Ademovic, the aforementioned work, p. 87, note 3.
6. Armed Formations of the Union of Communists – Movement for Yugoslavia

One of the coordinators and immediate organizers of the formation and arming of the Serb armed formations on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina was also the Union of Communists – Movement for Yugoslavia (SK-PJ), and its People’s Front. Namely, this was a political party which, after the failure of the Yugoslav communist organization, gathered all the officers and civilians serving the JNA through the line of command, as well as a significant number of veterans’ organizations, the Union of Reserve Military Officers, declared Yugoslavs, and all those, who mainly supported Milosevic’s policy and were ready to even become militarily involved “for the salvation” of Yugoslavia.377

Given that the SK – PJ gathered mainly the JNA members and thus, in fact, constituted a semi-military organization under the JNA umbrella, that is, an extended arm of the JNA, in direct contact with the highest military leadership of SFRY and the political and military leaderships of Serbia and Montenegro, this party focused significant activity on formation of special military units, which “immediately placed themselves under the leadership of the first competent JNA command”. This fact shows that the SK – PJ directly participated in planning, preparation and conducting of the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina. These activities particularly included involvement of General Stevan Mirkovic, pensioned Colonel Budimir Djordjic, and others.378

The activity of the SK – PJ on formation and armament of the armed formations was particularly evident in the areas of Bosanska Krajina, a part of Semberija and Posavina, and in the Doboj region.

377 N. Durakovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 245-246. There were 99 per cent Serbs among the members of this party.
On the territory of Bosanska Krajina, in cooperation with certain members of the Union of the Veterans of the National Liberation War – SUBNOR, then with former camp inmates and pensioned officers of the JNA, recruited some 5,150 persons into those units. Specifying by municipalities in terms of units and their members, on January 15, 1992, this board submitted a memo to the Yugoslav Board of the SK-PJ, seeking to be supplied with the same number of firearms.379

The Municipal Board of SK-PJ for Modrica, with its president Vojio Radiskovic (sales director of the PP Hemija), who had actively involved himself in the preparations for the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina, included 445 persons into their lists, for whom on March 20, 1992, they made a specification of the required armament and equipment. On that occasion, they requested to be supplied with 300 automatic and 100 semi-automatic rifle guns, 40 submachine guns, 10 M-48 rifles, 50 pcs of “scorpion” automatic guns, and the like, as well as the corresponding ammunition.380

On the territories of Doboj and Teslic as well, lists were made of the persons who had applied as volunteers for filling in of the war units of the JNA, in which the SK-PJ gave its own “contribution”.381

The JNA was arming the members and supporters of the SK-PJ. They used this armament, supplied and heartily distributed to them by their “mother”, for the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina and for the crimes against unarmed civilian population. Among the members of the SK-PJ, there were also a number of direct perpetrators “of the unrestrained Greater Serbia nationalism and fascism.” Thus, for instance, the members of the SK-PJ from the villages of Vranjak, Dugo Polje, Botajica, and Milosevac, together with the JNA and other Serb criminals, on May 3, 1992, took part in the aggressive attack on Modrica. Gavro Drinic, from the leadership of the SK-PJ, former chief of staff of the police in Modrica, entered the city with six transporters and took the Radio, the Municipality Assembly Building, the Police

379 Dnevni izvjestaj, no. 110, August 12, 1992.
381 Ibid.
Precinct, and the like. Predrag Lasica, leader of the Pale board of the SK-PJ, took part in the crimes against Bosniaks in Pale.\textsuperscript{382}

7. Foreign Mercenaries

Given the shortage of manpower on the front line, the Greater Serbia aggressor and its collaborationists had brought in and involved foreign mercenaries (foreign nationals) into combat activity, too. Based on the data available, we can surely claim that the composition of the aggressor’s units also included foreign citizens – mercenaries, mainly Ukrainians, Russians, and Romanians. The recruitment of foreign nationals for the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was the job of a specialized agency in Belgrade, managed by Vojislav Seselj.383

Organized recruitment of foreign nationals into the units of the Army of Republika Srpska went through the Bureau of Republika Srpska in Belgrade,384 among others, also employing Major Jovan Djogo. He was


384 AIIZ, inv. Nos. 5342, and 5352, Record, Supplemented Testimony by Dj. Dj. This Bureau was formed in 1992. The first chief was Dutina, and then Momcilo Mandic. For a time, the Bureau was formally under jurisdiction of the “Government” of the Republika Srpska, and later on, by the decision of R. Karadzic, president of the Republika Srpska, it was promulgated into an “institution of the republic, not the Government”. It was located on Mose Pijade St., in the Federal Commodities Reserves Building, and it had some 25 employees (AIIZ, inv. No. 5352, Record, Supplemented Testimony by Dj. Dj.).

The Bureau was dealing with the issues related to the needs of citizens, and resolving a number of issued for the needs of the collaborationist Republika Srpska. Thus, this body provided various travel documents and organized visits for the representatives of the Republika Srpska to other countries, then, reception of humanitarian aid from Yugoslavia and abroad, taking care of the injured after they are released from hospitals and rehabilitation centres, arrivals of foreign journalists and politicians who visited Republika Srpska, and the like. Major Djogo was in charge of resolving all of the military issues for the needs of the Army of Republika Srpska in Belgrade. In February 1993, he was injured on
in charge of military issues of interest for this collaborationist army, including the receipt of volunteer soldiers from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and other East European states, and of their sending to Bosnia and Herzegovina. From this Bureau, foreign mercenaries were sent, mainly to the Main Headquarters of the Army of Republika Srpska (personally to major Mico Grubor, who was chief of staff of the personnel administration of the Main Headquarters of the Army of Republika Srpska), from where they were forwarded to the corps.

Among the victims in the aggressor’s attack on Jajce, in late October 1992, nine soldiers were identified as being nationals of Ukraine, Russia, and Romania. The testimony by one of the detained soldiers who had arrived to the Jajce front line from Ukraine states that he had been recruited through a specialized agency in Belgrade, in charge of recruitment of foreign nationals in the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that together with 15 of his friends, he was supposed to receive 3,000 DM from that same agency after the fall of Jajce. Similar statements were given in September 1992 to the investigative bodies of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina by some Romanian citizens too, arrested during the aggressor’s attack on the Sarajevo residential area of Stup.

The aggressor was continually bringing in permanent contingents of foreign mercenaries onto the Bosnian-Herzegovinian war front,

Mt. Jahorina, from where he was transported by a JNA helicopter into Belgrade, and was taken to the Military Medical Academy for treatment. After rehabilitation, he took over the aforementioned duty at the Bureau. All arrangements or linkages were secured through him by which military conscripts were returning to Republika Srpska. In this way, people were mobilized with the use of force and taken to the Bijeljina Barracks (4,500 mobilized for the Republic of Serb Krajina, and 1,500 for Republika Srpska, where, after they received military clothing, they were taken by vehicles into the units they were deployed in (Ibid.; AIIZ, inv. No. 5342, Record, Supplemented Testimony by Dj. Dj.).

385 AIIZ, inv. No. 5342, Record, Supplemented Testimony by Dj. Dj.
386 Ibid. The units determined to receive of mercenaries were: White Eagles, the Commando Detachment of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, commanded by Major Srdjan Knezevic, then the 1st Sarajevo Brigade (into the unit of count Slavko Aleksić, who held the line at the Jewish Cemetery), and “sometimes some of the brigades of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps...” (Ibid.).
thus filling in their units. Thus, in mid-summer of 1992, among the Serb “volunteer units” on the territory of Ilijas, commanded by Ratko Adzic, there were also active military formations from Ukraine. These mercenaries, dressed in black uniforms, committed mass crimes against Bosniaks, in addition to infantry arms, also using objects for torture and inflicting of serious bodily injuries, such as, for instance, sticks for pulling out of eyes, and the like.388

In the first half of November 1992, the aggressor brought in a new contingent of foreigners: 600 Romanians to Mt. Ozren, and 200 Russians to Vogosca. The mercenaries from Romania, Russia and Ukraine also participated in the attacks on Mt. Zuc in the first half of November of 1992.389

From October 25, 1992, until April 26, 1993, Sergei Victor Sukharov (a Russian) “participated in the combat activities of the Army of Republika Srpska”.389a

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389a AIIZ, inv. No. 2-3033, Command of the 2nd Light Infantry Brigade, records no. 08-357/93, April 25, 1993, CERTIFICATE. Major Boro Antelj, commander of the 2nd Light Infantry Brigade, on April 25, 1993, issued the CERTIFICATE confirming that in the aforementioned period Sukharov “participated in the combat activities of the Army of Republika Srpska” and stated that “he still retains the status of the soldier of the Army of Republika Srpska...“ (Ibid.).

Rajko Mijanovic, assistant commander for intelligence and security affairs of the Command of the 2nd Light Infantry Brigade, on September 20, 1993, issued the APPROVAL for Sergei Sukharov “to purchase for his own needs, in the value of 200 DM, of the following items: coffee, cigarettes, tobacco“ (AIIZ, inv. No. 3-3033/1, Command of the 2nd Light Infantry Brigade, confidential, no. 09-666, dated September 20, 1993, APPROVAL).

Sukharov had a passport issued by the World Service Authority, no. 233108, issued on October 21, 1991, by the USA office in Washington (Washington D.C., USA). This document (issued by the World Service Authority Administration of the World Government of World Citizens) was valid for travel to all countries, unless they required a visa. The document could not be assigned to another person. The address stated on the visa application was: THE FOREIGN LEGION (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-3033/2-6).
In its aggressive attack on Mt. Zuc, in the second half of January 1993, the aggressor had some 200 Russians amongst its ranks, too. At the same time, a number of Ukrainians were found in Ilidza, whereas in early February a whole detachment of 600 Russians arrived in Kalinovik, and “17 Russian special forces arrived in Zvornik, from where they were immediately transferred to the neuralgic areas in the region of Srebrenica”. It is also necessary to indicate upon the fact that a large number of the Ukrainians, who were recruited in the composition of the UNPROFOR units in Bosnia and Herzegovina, after returning from the “peacekeeping” missions, changed their clothing with the UN emblems for the clothing of the Serb fascist volunteers, where they killed Bosniaks, raped their women, destroyed, plundered and burned down their villages and cities, and also committed other crimes.390

In early 1993, there were also some 2,500 Russian mercenaries among the aggressor ranks on the front line in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Of this number, some 150 of them were on Mt. Majevica only. In the large-scope Serb offensive on Teocak, in the first half of March 1993, the artillery weapons were operated by the Russian mercenaries as members of two Chetnik brigades.391 During the Serb offensive on Olovo, there was “mention of arrival” of 2,000 Russian mercenaries in Ilijas. At Grbavica, too, there were a number of Russian units.392 A sergeant major Bikov became a captain and a “tank commander” in the “Army of the Bosnian Serbs”. Special Forces member Igor Vasilievich Guskov trained the special units in Bijeljina. After he participated in the aggressor ranks in the Northeast Bosnia, he went to Drvar and took part in the offensive activities on Mt. Grabez near Bihac. The combat activities on the line of Loncari-Orasje saw participation of a detachment consisting of Russian mercenaries, commanded by Mikhail Posthimanov.


392 Oslobodjenje, March 1, 1994. A foreign reporter observed the transfer of a number of Russian units onto Grbavica. After he “identified” this, he tried to film them, but, he was subjected to a number of troubles because of that.
In addition, on the side of the Serb aggressor, there were also many other Russian special forces members participating, such as the case on the territory of Northeast Bosnia, where Russian mercenaries were hired as crews and commanders of the artillery batteries.  

A group of Kazaks (some 400 of them), led by ten Russian special forces officers, in early March 1993, took part in the offensive actions in the areas of Orasje and Gradacac. In addition, the Kazaks also took part in the aggressor’s attack on Mt. Trebevic, then in the vicinity of the Vrbanja Bridge, and at Stupsko Hill on the territory of the Sarajevo city.

In the second half of 1994, a number of Russians (Roman Malishev, Yuriy Sarapov, Denis Kvartzov, and others), participated in the attack on Mosevacko Hill. Even during 1995, foreign mercenaries were coming to Bosnia and Herzegovina, where they participated in the armed attacks against the Republic.

Several Russians and Greeks also participated in the attack and takeover of the UN “safe area” of Srebrenica, from July 6 through 11, 1995.

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394 Ibid. It is interesting to point out that, for instance, near Teocak, the soldiers of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina observed that the Serb criminal commanders had made particular efforts to remove the corps of some of the killed fascists from the front lines. These were in fact the corps of the killed Russians from the mercenary battalion, with some 300 of manpower (Ibid.).

395 Oslobodjenje, March 1, 1994.

396 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2390, Command of the Detachment of the SRK, strictly confidential, no. 01/511, October 17, 1994, to the Command of the SRK. In that year, five Russians and one Bulgarian arrived in the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps (AIIZ, inv. No. 5342, Record, Supplemented Testimony by Dj. Dj.).

397 AIIZ, inv. No. 5342, Record, Supplemented Testimony by Dj. Dj.. Thus, in that year, three Russians and one Greek arrived in the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps (Ibid.).

397a AIIZ, inv. No. 2-3070, Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Command of the 2nd Corps, RRPSi “OKRESANICA”, strictly confidential, no. 06/7795, July 7, 1995 – to the Intelligence Body of the 2nd Corps, RI Daily Report, p. 59; Ibid.,
After the armed forces of the Serb Republic (the units of the army and the police), with cooperation of the units from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as well as the volunteers from Russia and Greece, took the UN safe area of Srebrenica on July 11, 1995, Karadzic in person (“for the purpose of marketing, he needs it for some purposes”) ordered that in Srebrenica, in addition to the Serb flag, a Greek one should also be posted, whose members (that is, the Greeks), in addition to others, also participated in the attack and takeover of Srebrenica (Ibid., inv. No. 2-3071, Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, VJ 5022/5, strictly confidential, no. 05/1107, KONJUH, July 11, 1995, REPORT; Ibid., inv. No. 2-3072, Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Command of the 2nd Corps, RRPSt “OKRESANICA”, strictly confidential, no. 09/11795, July 11, 1995 – to the Intelligence Body of the 2nd Corps, RI Daily Report.)
8. Logistical Support and Reinforcement in Manpower

Even after proclamation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Greater Serbia aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina had its universal logistical support. With reorganization of the Armed Forces, upon communication of the results of the referendum in Bosnia and Herzegovina and after the country became independent, the JNA was formally withdrawn from Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Army of the Serb Republic of BiH and the Army of the Republic of Serb Krajina, which, “independently”, nevertheless still remained part of the single armed forces of Yugoslavia, that is, of Serbia and Montenegro.

The logistical support of the Armed Forces of SFRY, and later on, of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, was strictly centralized and was conducted through the bodies of the background security at the commands of military districts, and the background bases with their network of warehouses.

The background bases were formed on December 28, 1989. They formationally belonged to the SSNO. There were a total of 16 of them. Each background base was responsible for a specific geographical territory and provided logistical support to the JNA units stationed in this area.398 In those terms, nothing changed with proclamation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The background security of the JNA was based on material reserves possessed by the JNA, and the economic resources of Yugoslavia. These were: armament, ammunition, fuel, various food and other supplies,

398 ICTY, Case: No. IT-94-1-T, Evidence of the testimony by the JNA Colonel O.S., the Hague, June 4, 1996, pp. 4-5.
equipment (personal and common), medicines, services in the overhaul domain, that is, everything that understood logistical security of an army.399

All the background bases that were located on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina (the 744th, 993rd, 904th, and 530th ones), with a network of their warehouses, located at over 30 sites, were supplied through the SSNO from Serbia, and is, from the background bases and public enterprises of that Republic.400 These background bases supplied commands, units and institutions of the JNA in Bosnia and Herzegovina and part of the Republic of Croatia, with all material and technical resources and equipment: ammunition, armament, spare parts, overhaul of tanks, vehicles, weapons, communication devices, and equipment, food, clothing, medicines, etc.

Parallel with the combat integration, there was also logistical integration of the commands, units, and institutions of the JNA with the Serb paramilitary creations and armed formations. Thus, in 1991, the 530th Background Base was dislocated into Bosanski Petrovac from the 5th Military District. On December 20, 1991, the Federal Secretariat for National Defence made a decision (strictly confidential, 683-165) for undertaking of measures, “due to the overburdened condition of the 993rd Background Base – Banjaluka, and the problems that may arise in relation with that”, to have the paramilitary Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of the Serb Autonomous Province of Krajina rely on the 530th Background Base, too. In compliance with that decision, on April 7, 1992, the SSNO made a decision for formation of the Background Bases of the TO of the Republic of Serb Krajina. In relation to this, assistant to the Federal Secretary for the Background, general major Mr. Vladan Sljivic, issued an order on that day to the commands of the 1st and 2nd Military Districts and to the parastate Main Headquarters.

399 Ibid.

400 M. Kreso, the aforementioned work, pp. 17-18. from the capacities of the 993rd background base and the Military Medical Centre in Banjaluka, in the first half of April 1992, a provisional background unit was formed for background security TG-11 (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-121, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2051, April 7, 1992 – to the Operational Centre of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – for the Background Sector).
of the Territorial Defence of the Republic of Serb Krajina in Knin, in compliance with Article 45 of the Interim Book of Rules on Competencies of the Organizational Units of the SSNO, for provision of background security for all the decisions and institutions on the territory of the Republika Srpska Krajina.

The background security of all the units and institutions located on the territory of the Republic of Serb Krajina and the preparations for their dislocation into new regions of deployment were to be done “with one’s own powers and resources, with maximum engagement of the background bodies, commands of military districts and background bases”. The problems that the commands of the military districts were not able to resolve with their own powers and resources were to be referred to the competent administration of the Sector for the Background of the SSNO. Formation of the Background Base of the Parastate Main Headquarters of Territorial Defence of the Republic of Serb Krajina and the zone bases and their filling in with material resources based on the formation were, based on their request, to be done from the reserves of the military districts by way of background bases. At this, this activity was “to involve to the maximum possible extent the background bodies of the Corps in their respective areas of responsibility, and Pob VO”. All the costs for preparation of the units and relocation “fall on the burden of the annual plan for financing of the units”. The reliance of the units of territorial defence onto the background bases of military districts started undertaking of provision of meeting the needs for financial security of the units of Territorial Defence on the territory of the Republic of Serb Krajina.401

On April 8, 1992, the commander of the 2nd Military District, General Milutin Kukanjac, informed the commands of the 5th, 9th, and 10th Corps, as well as of the 530th and 993rd Background Base, of the aforementioned order of the SSNO and issued instructions in terms of

executions of the tasks assigned. Among other things, he ordered that the formation of the background base of the Main Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of the Republic of Serb Krajina and the background bases of operational zones and their filling in with material resources need to be done from the reserves of the 2nd Military District, by way of its own background base, pursuant to the request of the Main Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of the Republic of Serb Krajina. In order to relay the units and headquarters of the territorial defence of the Republic of Serb Krajina, the Command of the 2nd Military District also made the supplementation to the plan of background security.402

Assistance in organization of the background bases of the territorial defence of the Republic of Serb Krajina was provided by the Operational Administration of the SSNO. Acting chief of staff of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of SFRY, General Zivota Panic, with a SSNO team and the territorial defence of the Republic of Serb Krajina, on April 15, 1992, visited the Territorial Defence of the Republic of Serb Krajina. Based on this tour and the tasks assigned in order to realize the background bases of the territorial defence and the police forces of the Republic of Serb Krajina, a working group was formed with the Sector for the Background of the SSNO, consisting of five members, assigned, jointly with the commands of the 12th, 5th, 10th, and 9th Corps, as well as the 405th, 530th, 993rd, and 793rd Background Bases, to provide for the organizational and formational constitution of the background bases, for deployment of personnel by formational appointments, for recruitment of potential conscripts for the police and for the war units that are remaining on the territory.403

Supply and securing of food items, fuel, armament, ammunition, motor vehicles and other material and technical resources for the commands, units and institutions of the 2nd Military District, as well as for the Serb volunteers, was done in the organization of the Federal Secretariat for

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402 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-165, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no.31/103-30, April 8, 1992 – to the Command of the 5th Corps, and Others.

National Defence, that is, from Serbia and Montenegro, and from the Serb collaborationist *Krajina* areas. Numerous documents corroborate this.

On April 2, 1992, among other things, the supplies warehouse of the 744th Background Base received from the suppliers in Serbia 19 tons of canned meat from Banski Karlovci, and 5 tons of fat from the Public Enterprise of *Banat* from Kikinda.404

On the same day, the *Igmanški Mars* Barracks at Butile and the Banjaluka Garrison received three tanker trucks of heating oil each.405 On April 4, the supplies warehouse of the 993rd Background Base received 20.3 tons of hog fat from the PE *29 Novembar* from Subotica, and the supplies warehouse of the 904th Background Base received 60 tons of flour from Sremska Mitrovica.406 During April 5, the 993rd Background Base received from the *Karadjordjevo* Military Institution 60 tons of sugar, 40 tons of concentrate feed for hogs, and 70 tons of fresh potatoes.407 On the same day, the supplies warehouse of the 530th Background Base received 8 tons of hard cheese, 11,000 liters of fruit

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On the same day, the supplies warehouse of the 530th Background Base received 5 tons of canned dog food (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-123, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2105, April 9, 1992 – to the Operational Centre of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – for the Background Sector). A day before, that is, on April 1, 1992, the supplies warehouse of the 993rd Background Base, among other things, received 8 tons of canned dog food (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-115, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-1906, April 1, 1992 – to the Operational Centre of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – for the Background Sector).

405 Ibid. Of the three tanker trucks with heating oil received on April 2, 1992, at the Banjaluka Garrison, two were sent to the “Kozara” Barracks, and one to Okucani.


407 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-121, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2051, April 7, 1992 – to the Operational Centre of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – for the Background Sector.
juice, and 5 tons of cookies, and the Banjaluka Garrison received 52 tons of heating oil.408

On the next day, the supplies warehouse of the 993rd Background Base received: 60 tons of sugar, 70 tons of potato, 3 tons of dried sausages, 1 tons of fresh sausages and hot-dogs, and 2,054 kg of bacon.409 For the needs of the units in the Banjaluka Garrison, on April 7, the following was received: 108,000 pieces of fresh eggs; 3.8 tons of milk powder; 2.2 tons of melted cheese; 4.2 tons of sliced cheese; 2.3 tons of jam; 114 kg of pepper; 500 kg of powder paprika, and 1,000 tons of *vegeta* spice. The Loznica Garrison supplied with fresh milk all of the units and commands on the territory of the 17th Corps.410

The focus of the work in the background security of the Command of the 2nd Military District on April 9, 1992, was on “supplying the staple needs of the units deployed on the broader territory of Pale-Sokolac, as well as the supply of fuel from the Ilijas warehouse into the Licka Kaldurma warehouse”. At the same time, the composition of the background platoon for the needs of the 11th Operational Group received supplies of food items and other general material supplies. In relation to this, “measures were undertaken for organization of movement of the supply convoys with heavy military escort”. However, execution

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409 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-120, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2024, April 6, 1992 – to the Operational Centre of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – for the Background Sector.

of these tasks was made harder by the “increasingly poor staffing with civilians and partially with active military personnel, primarily of the Muslim and Croatian ethnicities, who have been leaving the service”.411

In the first half of April, the Command of the 2nd Military District agreed with the bodies of the Supplies Administration of the Federal Secretariat for National Defence and bodies of the public enterprises from the territory of Serbia that for the needs of its units from the composition of the 9th, 5th, 10th, and 17th Corps, food items and fuel should be supplied on a regular basis. In accordance with this agreement, many supply convoys of motor vehicles of the SSNO hauled in from Serbia huge quantities of foods, fuel, armament, and other materials and technical resources to the units of the 2nd Military District and the Republic of Serb Krajina. Thus, from Serbia, via Sremska Raca and Bijeljina, on April 10, a convoy started of 20 to 25 motor vehicles with food items and 3 tanker trucks of heating oil for the Banjaluka Garrison and for the units in the Republic of Serb Krajina. On that occasion, the Banjaluka Garrison received the following supplies and material resources: 178 tons of wheat flour (type 850); 20 tons of cans (meals ready to eat); 6 tons of liver paste cans; 11.1 tons of various cheeses; 19.2 tons of dried meat products; 2.1 tons of butter and 42 tons of heating oil (two tankers). During April 10, under “full military security escort”, the Command of the 2nd Military District supplied the units, primarily with food items, in the broader region of Pale and Sokolac. On April 11, the Knin Garrison received: 17 tons of various cheeses; 11 tons of dried meat products; 1.5 tons of milk powder; 0.7 tons of butter, and 100,000 pieces of fresh eggs. A cooling truck with dried meat products from the Agricultural Production Plant “Kikinda” on April 12, 1992, was transported from Tuzla for the needs of the units in the Sarajevo and Rajlovac Garrisons.412


412 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-123, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2105, April 9, 1992 – to the Operational Centre of the General Staff of the
On April 14, 1992, two convoys of the SSNO for the supply of the units of the 2nd Military District were sent off from Serbia. The movement of one convoy in Ljubovija, and the other one in Sremska Raca, “is continued as per the plan”. During April 15, the Public Enterprise of PIK Kikinda from Kikinda supplied the Commands, units and institutions of the 2nd Military District with food items, primarily with fresh meat and dried meat products. On April 17, a convoy of over 100 motor vehicles arrived from Serbia in the Banjaluka and Bihac Garrisons, and on April 18, it arrived in the Knin Garrison. On April 17, the Tuzla Garrison received from Serbia the following materials and supplies: 30 tons of beans; 10 tons of rice; 18 tons of kitchen oil; 40 tons of canned MRE’s; 18 tons of canned meat; 14 tons of corn powder; 7.5 tons of various cigarettes; 72,000 pcs of fresh eggs, and 4 tons of fresh yeast. On the same day, for its own needs, the Sarajevo Garrison received as follows: 37 tons of liver paste; 4 tons of fresh meat, and 3 trailer trucks of food items for the needs of the Romanija Military Institution. For its own needs, the Banjaluka Garrison received as follows: 20 tons of dried meat products; 5 tons of fresh meat; 36 tons of fresh potatoes; 9.5 tons of canned meat (MRE’s); 35 tons of liver paste; 20 tons of canned meat; 20 tons of fat; 16 tons of corn powder; 8 tons of dried yeast; 24 tons of pasta; 5 tons of cigarettes; 195 tons of wheat flour (of which 71 tons for Knin, and 46 tons for Glina), and 90 tons of heating oil. On April 17, for its own needs, the

Bihac Garrison received as follows: 108,000 pcs of fresh eggs; 4 tons of milk powder; 800 kg of butter; 12 tons of all types of cheeses; 10 tons of dried meat products; 6 tons of fresh meat; 18,000 pcs of fruit juices; 4 tons of cigarettes, and 250 liters of glycerine oil. On April 18, on the back route transportation from the Supplies Warehouse of the 904th Background Base into the Kragujevac Garrison, two 1,000 kg washing machines and one standard ironing machine were transported. From the public enterprises in Serbia, the Supplies Warehouse of the 530th Background Base received as follows: 20 tons of sugar; 18 tons of pasta; 14 tons of corn powder, and 3 tons of dried yeast, and the Knin Garrison received: 40 tons of pasta, 20 tons of sugar, 21 tons of canned boiled vegetables and 250 liters of glycerine oil. During April 18, “materials and supplies were unloaded from the motor vehicles that had arrived from the territory of the 1st Military District, and the materials and supplies were loaded on that were to be evacuated”. At the same time, “reception and storage was organized for a convoy of 26 motor vehicles arriving in an organized manner on April 21, 1992, from the 3rd Military District in the territory of the 2nd Military District”.

During April 19, the garrisons along the lines of Tuzla-Bijeljina-Knin, and Ljubovija-Sokolac-Sarajevo, received convoys of motor vehicles from Serbia bringing in various food items of the units of the 2nd Military District. For movement of military vehicles, the JNA used the roads: Sremska Raca-Bijeljina-Tuzla-Doboj-Stanari village-Prijedor-Banjaluca-Mrkonjic Grad-Kljuc-Bosanski Petrovac, and further towards Bihac and Knin, and also: Bijeljina-Tuzla-Kladanj-Olovo-Sarajevo, as well as the road: Ljubovija-Bratunac-Tekija village-Vlasenica-Podromanija-Pale, and a poorer road down to Sarajevo. By redistribution of the Traffic Administration of the SSNO, the units of the 2nd Military District received from the Traffic Training School Centre and the 341st Artillery Training Centre 32 motor vehicles, and this was done on April 20. The staple food items for the 3rd Technical Ammunition Warehouse of the 744th Background Base in Ustikolina were brought in helicopters on April 20, 1992.\footnote{AIIZ, inv. No. 2-128, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2225, April 14, 1992 – to the Operational Centre of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – for the Background Sector; Ibid., inv. No. 2-129, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2248, April 15, 1992 – to}
During April 21, convoys were organized under military escort “to supply the subjected units”. Thus, 65 motor vehicles were transporting food for Bihac and Knin. The Public Enterprise of Takovo from Gornji Milanovac regularly supplied food into the garrisons of Travnik, Derventa, Konjic, Ustikolina, and the like.\textsuperscript{414}

On April 22, the Banjaluka Garrison received: 6.4 tons of salami; 4.9 tons of hot dogs; 1.8 tons of fresh sausages; 2.9 tons of durable sausages, and 3.1 tons of bacon, and the Bihac Garrison received 3 tons of milk cartons and 16 tons of fruit juice. On April 22, 3,500 kg of young beef was received for the units of the 993rd Background Base. During April 24, the 904th Background Base took 60 tons of flour from the enterprise Zitopromet.\textsuperscript{415}
In late April 1992, the supply groups of motor vehicles of the SSNO from the transporting enterprises from Serbia increased their activity on supplying of units and receipt and transportation of supplies and materials into the commands, units and institutions of the 2nd Military District. Thus, for instance, during April 25, and 26, from the 534th Background Base, the following supplies and materials were received:

a) at the Tuzla Garrison: 5 trailer trucks of supplies and materials (unknown types and quantities of all the supplies);

b) at the Banjaluka Garrison: 15 tons of dried meat products; 21 cans of MRE’s; 11.6 tons of cheese of all types; 2.1 tons of jam; 4.5 tons of milk powder (of which 1.7 tons for the School Centre of Armoured and Motorized Units), and 112 kg of pepper. On the same day, Banjaluka sent back 18 trailer trucks on a back route transportation;

c) at the Sarajevo Garrison and the surrounding garrisons: 53 tons of cans and liver paste; 14.5 tons of fruit juices; 13 tons of milk powder; 10 tons of cheeses of all types; 11 tons of fresh potatoes; 19 tons of concentrate to feed layer hens; 5 tons of fresh meat, and 4 tons of dried meat products. The aforementioned quantities of food items were transported to Pale via Ljubovija and Han Pijesak, where they were unloaded. On that occasion, portions were retained in Pale and Han Pijesak, and a portion is “transported to the end users” in the organization of the Command of the 2nd Military District. In addition to this, 50 tons of heating oil also arrived in Pale for the needs of the Lukavica and Rajlovac Barracks; “but for security reasons they were not unloaded. Measures are being undertaken and solutions are being sought to deliver the same to the unload place”;

d) For the Bihac Garrison, a number of vehicles also supplied certain quantities of supplies and materials (quantities supplied unknown).416

Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – for the Background Sector; Ibid, inv. No. 2-129, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2248, April 15, 1992 – to the Operational Centre of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – for the Background Sector; Ibid., inv. No. 2-100, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2297, April 17, 1992 – to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – for the Operational Centre, and others.

416 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-139, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2500, April 26, 1992 – to the Operational Centre of the General Staff of the
During April 29, 1992, the units of the 2nd Military District received as follows:

a) **at the Banjaluka Garrison**: 19 tons of fruit juices, 15.5 tons of cheeses of all types; 2 tons of meat, 314 tons of flour. The aforementioned food item quantities were supplied to the garrisons of the Republic of Serb Krajina;

b) **at the Bihac Garrison**: 7 tons of snack components and one motor vehicle with the same items for the needs of the 200th Military Hospital;

c) **at the Sarajevo Garrison**: 30 tons of kitchen oil; 10 tons of toast and 500 kg of dried yeast, upon the order of Military Post 2082 Belgrade; 10 tons of canned string beans; 25 tons of canned boiled vegetables; 3 tons of tomato puree; 18 tons of pickled cucumbers; 22 tons of pickled peppers, from Military Post 1119 Nis, and 45 tons of heating oil.417

During April 30, 1992, “a successful receipt took place of the material reserves supplied from the territory of the 1st Military District”. At the time, “the planned supply was made to the units of fresh meat and dried meat products” from the Agricultural and Industrial Combines of Kikinda from Kikinda and Slavija from Belgrade. On that day, the following was received and mainly unloaded in Pale: 14 tons of canned MRE’s; 25,600 liters of fruit juices; 60 tons of flour; 22 tons of corn powder; 47,160 pcs of fresh eggs; 13.5 tons of wafer products, and 1.5 tons of soup concentrate. On the same day, the 405th Background Base of Knin “sent a supply” of supplies and materials for the background bases of the “Area Headquarters of the Territorial Defence” of Vojnic.418

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417 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-142, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2539, April 30, 1992 — to the Operational Centre of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – for the Background Sector.

418 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-142, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2539, April 30, 1992 — to the Operational Centre of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – for the Background Sector.
In April 1992, the commands and units of the 9th and 10th Corps were “predominantly engaged” on “consolidation of the authorities” and on offering assistance to the parastate Main Headquarters of the Territorial Defence and the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serb Krajina with formation, equipping and filling in of these units with material, technical and other resources (equipment, arms, etc.). By April 19, for the needs of mobilization of this parastate creation, 64 motor vehicles TAM 110 T-7 were painted over. During April 20, 1992, 32 motor vehicles were received from the Traffic Training School Centre and the 341st Artillery Training Centre, which were assigned to the units of the 2nd Military District through redistribution by the Traffic Administration of the SSNO. After completed painting of all the motor vehicles during April 23, 22 motor vehicles were driven off and transferred to Knin, and 12 to Benkovac. In the period between April 23 through 26, 45 motor vehicles TAM 110 T-76V were transferred to the police units of the Republic of Serb Krajina, as follows: 20 for Knin, 12 for Benkovac, and 13 for Petrinja.\footnote{AIIZ, inv. No. 2-130, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2272, April 16, 1992 – to the Operational Centre of the General Staff of the SFRY – for the Background Sector; Ibid., inv. No. 2-134, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2383, April 20, 1992 to the Operational Centre of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – for the Background Sector; Ibid., inv. No. 2-142, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2539, April 30, 1992 – to the Operational Centre of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – for the Background Sector; Ibid., inv. No. 2-162, Command of the 993rd Background Base, strictly confidential, no. 47-120, April 23, 1992 – to the Command of the 2nd Military District and the Command of the 5th Corps; Ibid., inv. No. 2-92, Command of the 2nd Military District, Operational Duty Team, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2549, May 1, 1992 – to the Operational Centre of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – for the Background Sector; Ibid., inv. No. 2-143, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2549, May 1, 1992 – to the Operational Centre of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – for the Background Sector.}

It is interesting to point out that the representative of the commander for the background of the Command of the 2nd Military District, Colonel Kovacevic, in his Background Report – OP 71 dated May 1, 1992, sought from the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY to “use the DP from the territory of the Republic of Serbia to secure as soon as possible 150 tons of fresh potatoes for the needs of the 5th Corps in Banjaluka” (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-143).
On April 27, 1992, for the police forces of the Republic of Serb Krajina, the 993rd Background Base submitted 55 motor (painted) vehicles. On the next day, the representatives of Vojnic took 12 pieces, and on April 30th, 15 pieces were transferred to Korenica.\footnote{AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2700, Command of the 993rd Background Base, strictly confidential, no. 47-124, April 27, 1992 – to the Command of the 2nd Military District; Ibid., Command of the 993rd Background Base, strictly confidential, no. 47-126, April 29, 1992 – to the Command of the 2nd Military District, and the like.}

On April 1, 1992, the supplies warehouse of the 993rd Background Base received 1,700 mountain caps.\footnote{AIIZ, inv. No. 2-115, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-1906, April 1, 1992 – to the Operational Centre of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – for the Background Sector.} On April 2, 1992, among other things, the supplies warehouse of the 744th Background Base received 15,040 pieces of towels from the Serbia supplier (from the Public Enterprise of Cveta Dabic from Titovo Uzice.\footnote{AIIZ, inv. No. 2-116, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-1941, April 2, 1992 – to the Operational Centre of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – for the Background Sector.} For the needs of the “clothing confidential, no. 10/36-2704, April 9, 1992 – to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – Operational Centre, and Others; inv. No. 2-93, Command of the 2nd Military District, Operational Duty Team, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2125, April 10, 1992 – to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – Operational Centre, and others; Ibid., inv. No. 2-102, Command of the 2nd Military District, Operational Duty Team, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2321, April 18, 1992 – to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – Operational Centre, and Others; Ibid., inv. No. 2-2699, Command of the 2nd Military District, Operational Duty Team, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2500, April 26, 1992 – to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, for the Background Sector.}

The 405th Background Base was doing a daily filling in of the units of the Area Headquarters of the Territorial Defence and the units of the police forces of the Republic of Serb Krajina, at which 15 motor vehicles were engaged on a daily basis (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2707, Command of the 405th Background Base, no. 1114-2, April 30, 1992 – to the Command of the 2nd Military District).\footnote{AIIZ, inv. No. 2-114, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-1906, April 1, 1992 – to the Operational Centre of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – for the Background Sector.} On April 1, 1992, the Command of the 2nd Military District requested the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY (Background Sector) to secure 700 sets of clothing and footwear from their reserve stocks for the needs of the units of the 17th Corps “deployed in the crisis area”.\footnote{AIIZ, inv. No. 2-116, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-1941, April 2, 1992 – to the Operational Centre of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – for the Background Sector.}
of volunteers” and the mobilized units of the 5th Corps, on April 3, 1992, the Command of the 2nd Military District sent a request to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of SFRY to secure 5,000 sets of clothing for the needs of the Banjaluka Garrison, “as well as the regular supply of heating oil”.423

In order to equip “military conscripts” mobilized in the units of the 5th Corps, the Command of the 2nd Military District requested to be supplied with: 5,000 army backpacks; 5,000 transport bags, and 1,500 sets of eating accessories (knives, forks, spoons).424

On April 11, the same command urgently requested from the General Staff of the Armed Forces of SFRY “to supply food items for current meals for 3,000 people for 30 days; fuel D-2, 90 tons; MB-86, 30 tons; oil DS-50 100 liters, and oil HIP-90, 600 liters”. These resources “need to be urgently supplied to the Sekovic region (on the Zvornik-Kalesija road)”.425

During April 14, for the needs of the “military conscripts” of the 5th Corps, 503 sets of various clothing supplies were issued from the

At submission of its Background Report to the Operational Centre of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, the Command of the 2nd Military District requested from the Background Sector to have the administration of the Federal Secretariat for National Defence “make an intervention with the DP Ljubisa Miodragovic for a supply of 300 meters of canvas cover, in order to equip the motor vehicles TAM 110 T7 being transferred to the police forces of the RS Krajina”. On that occasion, Colonel Dusan Kovacevic, representative of the assistant commander for the background of the Command of the 2nd Military District, requested that for the needs of clothing of volunteers being recruited at the 49th Motorized Brigade of the 4th Corps 500 pairs of shoes with heightened boot-legs should be supplied, sizes 43 through 46 (Ibid.).426


supplies warehouses of the 530th and 993rd Background Bases. From the units of the Territorial Defence of the 6th Operational Group of the 10th Corps, which entered the composition of the *Territorial Defence of the Republic of Serb Krajina*, military supplies were withdrawn into the Bihac Garrison in the following quantities: 2,355 military wind jackets, military green M-77, 2,703 military shirts, military green M-77, 1,585 military trousers, military green M-77, 1,579 pairs of shoes with heightened boot-legs, and 1,127 military shirts, military green M-75, as well as smaller quantities of other supplies. On the same day, in the back route transportation, 1,200 pairs of shoes with heightened boot-legs were sent from the Bihac Garrison to the shoe repair shop of the 993rd Background Base for repair.

On April 18 and 19, 1992, 299 sets of clothing supplies were issued for clothing of the “military conscripts” mobilized into the units of the 5th Corps; on April 20, 1992 – 215 and part of the kitchen accessories for the needs of the units in Mrkonjić Grad, and on April 21, 99 sets of clothing supplies. During April 25 and 26, from the 524th Background Base of the 1st Military District, in addition to food items, the Banjaluka Garrison received the following clothing items: 10,000 of short military underpants, 12,000 pairs of socks, 10,000 pcs of winter undershirts, and 10,000 pcs of summer shirts.

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427 Ibid.

Convoys of vehicles went to Belgrade from the 993rd Background Base, from where they brought in the necessary logistics, including armament.\textsuperscript{429}

On April 23, 1992, among other things, this Base received a convoy of 18 cargo motor vehicles, bringing in ammunition from the 3rd Military District (2,888 of 122mm ammunition for D-30; 3,513 pcs of 155 h1 bullets, and 592 128 mm bullets for the “Flame” multiple rocket launcher).\textsuperscript{430}

Due to the general mobilization in the area of Bosansko Grahovo, and mobilization of two battalions in the broader region of Drvar, from the reserves that were intended for filling in of the \textit{Main Background Base of the Republic of Serb Krajina} in Knin, for the needs of the 9\textsuperscript{th} Corps, on April 25, 1,500 sets of clothing and footwear were issued, as well as 1,000 pcs of sleeping bags. On April 26, the 5\textsuperscript{th} Corps issued 40 sets of clothing for “\textit{military conscripts}”.\textsuperscript{431}
On April 26, 1992, the Tuzla Garrison received the following materials and supplies from Mladenovac: 1,500 pairs of shoes with heightened boot-legs; 500 pcs of belts for officers; 10,000 pcs of towels; 5,000 pcs of undershirts; 2,000 pcs of gloves; 5,000 pcs of short underpants; and from the Zuce warehouse: 3,000 pcs of shirts, trousers and wind jackets each; 1,530 pcs of mountain caps; 1,140 pcs of M77 caps; 9,900 pcs of short underpants; 9,000 pcs of summer undershirts, and 10,000 pairs of socks.432

In late April 1992, “there were still increased demands for the supply of clothing and footwear for clothing of volunteers”. On April 30, the public enterprise of “Bosna” Banjaluka controlled and received 100 pairs of shoes with heightened boot-legs. On May 1st, 41 sets of clothing and footwear, and 300 sets for clothing into the 4th and 9th Corps were issued for “military conscripts”.433 During March and April 1992, there were intensified military movements and vehicles on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus, for an illustration, in addition to the military movements and an increased number of military vehicles in Sarajevo, on March 20, from the direction of Niksic towards Trebinje, that is, Mostar, as well as from the direction of Knin towards Kupres, intensified movement of major military JNA forces was observed.434

In the afternoon hours of April 9, 1992, two JNA convoys moved through Tuzla in the direction of Doboj with some 50 vehicles – trucks, tanks, and other armoured vehicles, transporting military equipment and manpower, at which they were specifically equipped with anti-aircraft and other combat weapons. On April 12, 1992, some 30 military trucks

432 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-140, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2508, April 27, 1992 — to the Operational Centre of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – for the Background Sector.

433 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-143, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2549, May 1, 1992 – to the Operational Centre of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – for the Background Sector.

434 Agresija …, Sarajevo 1993, pp. 14, and 27.
started off from Bileca towards Stolac. On the same day, the JNA tanks moved on towards Podvelezje, and helicopters transported ammunition onto Mt. Hum.\textsuperscript{435}

During April 13, 1992, a large contingent of JNA units was sent from Serbia towards Vlasenica. On the same day, JNA helicopters were moving manpower, military equipment and weapons into the Serb villages on the territory of the Visegrad municipality, in order to attack the city. Only during April 15, there were 15 such flights registered. On April 15, under the command of general Dragoljub Ojdanic, the units of the Uzice Corps entered Visegrad, took the city and established control over the Visegrad hydropower plant. On that day, a military convoy started off from Uzice with 100 heavy trucks in the direction of Visegrad, with attached artillery weapons. There was also an infantry battalion moving along from the direction of Pljevlja towards Foca. In mid-April, the JNA aircraft landed at the Butmir Airport and moved in Serb fascists from Serbia and Montenegro. On April 18, 10 tanks arrived in the Dubrave Airport near Zivinice, with posted Serb flags with \textit{Chetnik} insignia.

On April 22, 1992, 30 armoured vehicles (tanks and transporters) were driven in to Ilidza area, a number of which were stationed in front of the \textit{Kristal} restaurant and around the Forestry School, whereas on the section between the Butile Military Garrison and the village of Osijek, there were some twenty helicopter flights registered.\textsuperscript{436}

In the second half of April of 1992, for the needs of its commands and units in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the JNA from Serbia brought in both ammunition and mines and explosive devices. Thus, for an illustration, on April 21, 26 motor vehicles from the 3rd Military District transported ammunition and mines and explosive devices via Raca to Tuzla and Banjaluka. During April 23, 18 motor vehicles from the 3rd Military District brought in ammunition to the Command of the 993rd Background Base (Banjaluka). On that occasion, the following quantities of ammunition were hauled in:

\textsuperscript{435} \textit{Bilten MNO}, no. 1, April 9, 1992; Ibid., no. 7, April 12, 1992; Ibid., no. 13, April 15, 1992. The JNA units occupied Stolac on the following day.

\textsuperscript{436} Ibid., no. 10, April 13, 1992; Ibid., no. 9, April 13, 1992; Ibid., no. 14, April 15, 1992; Ibid., no. 10, April 13, 192; Ibid., no. 13, April 15, 1992; Ibid., no. 20, April 18, 1992. \textit{Dnevni izvijestaj}, No. 1, April 25, 1992; AIIZ, inv. No. 3-2829.
- 122 mm bullets for d-30 2,888 pcs
  Full gunpowder cartridge
- 122 mm bullets for d-30 2,169 pcs
  Reduced gunpowder cartridge
- 155 mm chemical bullet 1,344 pcs
- 126 mm bullet for multiple rocket launcher “Flame” 529 pcs.

Expert teams from the technical overhaul institutes from Serbia worked on inspection and repair of the combat weapons and equipment of the JNA in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus, on April 25, 1992, two such teams arrived in the units of the 9th Corps (the team Sever from Subotica, and another one from the Technical Overhaul Institute in Cacak), which were immediately assigned to work. In late April, “the combat weapons and equipment were repaired in the area of Livanjsko Polje”.

During the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina, drivers also arrived from Serbia. For instance, on April 3, 1992, the 2nd Military District took over 15 traffic soldiers from the Traffic Training School Centre in Kraljevo, and “we received 15 driver soldiers redeployed to

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437 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-135, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2401, April 21, 1992 — to the Operational Centre of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – for the Background Sector (background report – OP 62); Ibid., inv. No. 2-162, Command of the 993rd Background Base, strictly confidential, no. 47-120, April 23, 1992 – to the Command of the 2nd Military District and the Command of the 5th Corps; Ibid., inv. No. 2-138, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2488, April 25, 1992 – to the Operational Centre of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – for the Background Sector (background report OP 65). The aforementioned quantities of ammunition were mainly located in the 1st and partially in the 2nd Technical Warehouses of Ammunition of the Command of the 993rd Background Base in Banjaluka. At the same time, “the commodities and resources are also loaded on for transport to Pančevo and Kragujevac”.

us” from the Artillery Training Centre in Kovin. All of them were distributed into the units during the day.439

The Serbo-Montenegrin aggressor continuously sent over officers and soldiers who, after they had been received and deployed into units of the 2nd Military District of the JNA, executed the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina and committed numerous other crimes, particularly against Bosniaks. There is undoubted evidence of this. Thus, for instance, on April 9, 1992, “trained soldiers were received” from the 1st Military District (from Serbia), who were deployed into the units of the 10th Corps. During that day, 791 soldiers were received and deployed.440 On the same day, a part of officers and trained soldiers were received for the 1st Motorized Brigade of the 9th Corps, as arriving from the 1st and 3rd Military Districts.441

During April 10, among other things, the units of the 9th Corps were also working on receipt of soldiers from the 1st and 3rd Military Districts of the JNA.442

During April 11, 497 soldiers arrived at the Bihac Airport for filling in of the 9th and 10th Corps, whereas “the rest will be coming on April 12, 1992”. The focus of work of the 10th Corps on April 12, 1992, was to receive the soldiers at the Bihac Airport and to deploy them into units. On that day, a total of 90 soldiers arrived, and by April 12, the total number of soldiers arrived was 587.443


440 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-92, Command of the 2nd Military District, Operational Duty Team, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2704, April 9, 1992 – to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – Operational Centre, and Others.

441 Ibid. The number was not determined.

442 AIIZ., inv. No. 2-93, Command of the 2nd Military District, Operational Duty Team, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2125, April 10, 1992 – to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – Operational Centre, and others.

443 inv. No. 2-95, Command of the 2nd Military District, Operational Duty Team, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2180, April 12, 1992 – to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY – Operational Centre, and others.
In early May 1992, some 50 tanks arrived from Serbia to Mt. Romanija via Sremska Mitrovica. In mid-May, 1992, in order to reinforce the forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the aggressor mobilized new people in Serbia and Montenegro. To this aim, from the direction of Pljevlja, Bijelo Polje, and Prijepolje, towards Gorazde, new convoys of military vehicles started moving. At the same time, convoys of military vehicles were also moving in the direction of Simin Han-Dubrave and from Kalesija towards Tuzla, and military vehicles and helicopters were sent in the direction of Kalesija, which, in spite of carrying the sign of the Red Cross, were transporting manpower and armament from the *Husinska Buna* Barracks.444

Republic of Serbia was regularly supplying arms and ammunition to the Serb fascists who participated in the genocidal aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina. There are numerous data corroborating this. Thus, for an illustration, on May 13, 1992, for the needs of the Brcko Garrison, the following materials and technical resources were supplied from Military Post 5053-19 in Belgrade:

- 7.62 bullet 74,100 pcs
- instantaneous mine 600 pcs
- hand launcher grenade 160 pcs
- cumulative grenade M-57 4 pcs
- anti-aircraft cannon bullet 30 mm 1,600 pcs
- cannon 20 mm bullet 2,400 pcs
- bullet 20 mm GMZ 1,500 pcs
- hand grenade M-75 108 pcs
- hand grenade PPM-79 12 pcs.445

On June 1, 1992, from Uzice towards Medjedja, a unit of 35 tanks was sent. In the first half of June 1992, some 150 Serb soldiers


445 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-507. The aforementioned materials and technical resources, upon the order of Colonel N. Stanisic, were transferred by Miroslav Janjic, and received by Colonel M. Radivojevic.
arrived onto the Brcko front line, who had participated in the “fighting around Knin”, that is, in the aggression against the Republic of Croatia. The aggressor explained the fact that they were sending Serb criminals onto the Brcko front line by the fact that “Bijeljina is defended in Brcko, through which the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina has to be connected to Kninska Krajina”.446

In late June 1992, based on the intelligence provided by Colonel major Predrag Manojlovic, commander of the Brcko Barracks, for the needs of the Brcko and Bosanski Samac, ammunition was brought in from Belgrade. New quantities of ammunition for the needs of the “Serb territorial defence of Brcko” were approved by the JNA officers from Belgrade: Janjic, Radivojevic, and Stanisic. In addition, the JNA also offered personnel assistance to the Serb criminals on the Brcko front line, by recruiting military officers from Serbia.447

In mid-1992, new forces in manpower and armament were coming to the Brcko front line from Serbia. It is significant to point out the fact that the aggressor was constantly bringing in new forces from Serbia and Montenegro onto the Brcko front line, tasked to penetrate the corridor, in order to connect the SAO Krajina with Serbia. During June 21, and 22, 1992, on a number of occasions, helicopters brought in armament and equipment for the Serb Chetnik formation from Vogosca, which counted 450 well armed fascists. Chetniks from Sokolac were brought in military helicopters using corridors Mt. Zvijezda-Mt. Konjuh, and Vozuca-Romanija, who participated in the crimes in the Drina region.448

In late June 1992, the Greater Serbia aggressor consolidated its units and equipped them with the newly delivered quantities of armament and ammunition from Serbia. Under the preparations for a general attack on Gorazde, on this territory, the aggressor concentrated joint forces of the JNA and the armed formations from Serbia and Montenegro, supplying

446 Ibid., no. 62, June 25, 1992, no. 64, June 27, 1992, no. 68, July 1, 1992, no 72, July 5, 1992, and no. 73, July 6, 1992.

447 Dnevni izvjestaj, No. 68, July 1, 1992; AIIZ, inv. No. 2-507.

even new quantities of arms and ammunition. The Serb fascists in the broader area of Doboj, who, among other things, also had land-to-land rockets available, also received assistance in the form of soldiers of the Knin Corps with full military equipment, as well as a tank unit.449

The aggressor kept hauling in new reinforcements in manpower and weapons and equipment from Serbia and Montenegro to the Bosnian-Herzegovinian front lines. Thus, in the first half of July 1992, around Priboj, huge forces of volunteers were concentrated (several thousands of people) from Serbia and Montenegro, with infantry and heavy weapons, in order to attack Bosnia. Among major centres for distribution of arms and weapons in Bosnia and Herzegovina were the JNA Garrisons in Niksic and Pljevlja. After having received reinforcements in manpower and armament from Serbia and Montenegro, where trailer trucks hauled in armament and ammunition for them, the Serb fascists from the Gorazde region undertook a new offensive against Gorazde. New volunteers were deployed on the positions around Cajnice, on the right bank of Drina River, and in the area of Rogatica.450 In the attack on Gorazde (first half of July 1992), the aggressor used aircraft, two armoured and mechanized brigades, six artillery batteries, four batteries of multiple rocket launchers, 40 trucks with ammunition, and six divisions.451

In the night between July 15 and 16, 1992, on the cargo railway station in Prijepolje, the aggressor unloaded 58 armoured combat vehicles—tanks, armoured transporters and self-propelling artillery weapons. The contingent had arrived in Prijepolje by a special train from the interior of Serbia, and immediately after unloading it was sent to Pljevlja, and later on to Cajnice and Gorazde. On July 19, a new contingent of 40 tanks arrived to Rudo from Serbia, in order to assist the Serb fascists in attacking Gorazde. In late July, a convoy of motor vehicles with arms

449 Ibid., no. 87, July 20, 1992; Bilten MNO, no. 101, June 24, 1992.

450 Ibid; Dnevni izvjestaj, no. 79, July 12, 1992. In order to gain reinforcement in manpower and armament, the Serb fascists in the Gorazde area (Dobro Stankovic, Dragomir Arsic, Dusko Kornjaca, and Zoran Vukodragovic) visited Montenegro. At the time, Serb criminals Brane Petrovic and Stanko Stanojevic from Rogatica went to visit Serbia too, in order to bring in “new” fascists and haul in materials and weapons.

and ammunition came in from Uzice. In early August, from the direction of Bijeljina, eight buses of volunteers from Serbia came in onto the Brcko front line. In the areas of Kraljevo and Pozarevac, in mid-August, a large number of armoured units were concentrated, periodically sent by the aggressor onto the Bosnian-Herzegovinian and Slavonian front lines. The units of armoured and mechanized corps from Uzice and Novi Sad were also sent and were active on the front lines in Bosnia and Herzegovina, taking an active part in the aggression. In addition to those units, there were also a number of elite units sent to the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina from Nis, as well as the guardian units from Belgrade and Pozarevac. Certain military equipment and specialized units were brought in and deployed onto the military and civilian airports in Serbia and Montenegro, thereby largely increasing the combat preparedness of the military air forces of Serbia.452

Pushing in of fresh aggressor forces from Serbia was particularly typical from the territory of Ljubovija and the zone controlled by the Novi Sad Corps. Of the 100 tanks of the Novi Sad Corps, which in September 1992 rushed into the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 35 were active in the direction of Brcko, 35 along the Gradacac-Tuzla section, and 30 along the Caparde-Zvornik section.453

In mid-September 1992, the aggressor was intensively hauling in new reinforcements in manpower, armoured and mechanized and other combat resources from Serbia. Thus, among other things, from the direction of Pljevlja towards Gorazde and Foca, 40 tanks came in. From Srem, onto the territory of Bijeljina-Brcko, armoured and mechanized forces were coming in. In the second half of September 1992, in the area of Visegrad, the aggressor formed a major concentration of forces from the direction of Uzice. Also, the aggressor from the territory of Serbia launched


In the second half of August 1992, the aggressor forces on the rights bank of the Drina river (from the Republic of Serbia) used heavy artillery fire from tanks to attack the Bosniak villages on the opposite bank of the river, in the area of Srebrenica (Dnevni izvjestaj, no. 118, August 20, 1992).

453 Press-centar Armije Republike Bosne i Hercegovine, no. 102/02-36, September 13, 1992; Ibid., no. 102/02-54, September 16, 1992; Agresija ..., p. 39 (II); Dnevni izvjestaj, no. 139, September 19, 1992.
artillery attacks on the villages of Podrinje. The offensive of the Serb fascists from Serbia and Montenegro, with the support of their aviation, was continued in late September to include the area of Visegrad.454

Fresh forces from Serbia, Montenegro and the SAO Krajina, with tanks, armoured transporters, ammunition, equipment, and other materials and technical resources, were also brought in by the Greater Serbia aggressor in late 1992. Thus, during October, particularly in its second half, and in November 1992, there was a regrouping and concentration of new forces in place. In early October, 50 tanks TR-77 and TR-80 came in to Bijeljina from Serbia (they were a Romanian variety of the T-55 tank). In mid-October, the concentration of the aggressor forces (particularly of the units of the Novi Sad Corps) was particularly strong in the areas of Gradacac and Brcko. In addition, the manpower and equipment of the Podgorica Corps, withdrawing form the Prevlaka Peninsula, were concentrated in Eastern Herzegovina, in the areas of Gacko, Tjentiste, Foca, and Gorazde, and in the areas of Stolac, Ljubinje, and Nevesinje.455 In transferring its forces onto these areas, the aggressor was even using helicopters. On the Doboj front line, with periodical cannon attacks on the defence lines and civilian targets towards Usora, there was also a noticeable concentration of new and regrouping of the existing aggressor forces, particularly in the areas of Kostajnica and Rudanka, where on October 14, 1992, 50 trucks with Chetniks arrived. The aggressor also brought in new reinforcements from Serbia and Montenegro on the Brcko front line too, so that in the areas of Vranovaca and Omerbegovaca only, on the road between Brcko and Bijeljina, on October 18, 12 new tanks had arrived. On all the front lines around Jajce, during the weekend of the third week of October 1992, the aggressor forces were reinforced, whereas from Banjaluka towards this city and towards Travnik “there is a major armoured and mechanized enemy formation moving in” (October 18, 1992).456

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454 Ibid., no. 102/02-68, and 102/02-69, September 18, 1992.

455 Ibid., no. 102/02-127, October 5, 1992; Ibid., no. 102/02-375, November 16, 1992; Dnevni izvjestaj, no. 174, October 15, 1992.

Thus, 12 new aggressor tanks came into the areas of Gacko and Bileca from the composition of the JNA units that were withdrawing from the Prevlaka Peninsula.

In the second half of October, the aggressor continued transferring the armoured and mechanized forces from the Dubrovnik front line into Eastern Herzegovina, along the sections of Gacko-Tjentiste-Foca, and Nevesinje-Stolac-Mostar. New reinforcements in the Gorazde area were transferred by the aggressor in transport helicopters from the direction of Brcko and Bosanski Samac. For new reinforcements in manpower and armament being transferred from Serbia and Montenegro, due to inability to use road transportation because of the cut communications on the section of Brcko-Loncari, the aggressor was using transport helicopters. In late October and early November 1992, the Serbo-Montenegrin aggressor executed a new regrouping of forces and brought in fresh forces from Serbia (units of the Novi Sad Corps), Montenegro, and the collaborationist Krajinas.457

In mid-November 1992, the aggressor executed a new concentration of strong armoured and mechanized forces on the border of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia towards Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly in the areas of Bajina Basta, Dobrun, Metaljka, and Mratinje, aiming to execute a push-through onto the free territory of Srebrenica, and to open up the corridor of Rogatica-Sokolac-Olovo-Zavidovici, towards the Krajinas. Due to incessant shelling from the direction of Bajina Basta and the slopes of Mt. Tara in Serbia, new civilian casualties were recorded on the free territory of Srebrenica.458 The aggressor forces in the area of Visegrad were supplied with manpower, armament and ammunition from Serbia (Bubanj Potok, Kremna, Cacak, and even from Belgrade – Banjica and Topcider). The goal of reinforcing of the aggressor capacities in the area was to launch an offensive on the communications of Ustipraca-Medjedja, and Trnovo-Grebak-Zorovici-Gorazde. To this goal, in late November, the aggressor forces were assisted by the newly coming Uzice Corps of the Army of Yugoslavia. In early December, on the Bihac front line, in preparation for a new offensive, the aggressor was hauling in new reinforcements from Knin and Lika.459

458 Ibid., no. 204, November 14, 1992.
Reinforcements in manpower and supplying of materials and technical resources from Serbia and Montenegro to the Serb criminals were even continued into 1993 and later on. This is testified by a number of data, corroborating convoys of military trucks full of manpower, equipment, ammunition, armament and other resources, entering and arriving in Bosnia and Herzegovina on a daily basis.

In the night of January 15/16, 1993, the forces of the Uzice Corps from Bajina Basta attacked the free territory of the Srebrenica municipality. Across the Drina bridge at Bajina Basta, into Bosnia and Herzegovina rushed in 12 tanks, 7 transporters, and a major number of motor vehicles. On January 18, these forces were even reinforced with one more armoured and mechanized unit of the Uzice Corps.460

In late January and early February 1993, the aggressor continued with concentration of the armoured and mechanized units and infantry on the territory of Serbia, against the border towards the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and their transfer across the Drina River. Thus, 29 tanks were transferred from the territory of Serbia, of which 17 at Sljunkara (Celopek), and 12 across the Hydropower Plant of Bajina Basta Dam, as well as a major number of combat armoured vehicles and “Praga” cannons. From the composition of the Valjevo Corps, via Ljubovija bridge, and from the Uzice Corps, via Skelani bridge, three to four infantry brigades crossed into the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with some 5,000-7,000 soldiers.461

In early February 1993, some 7,000 Serb soldiers from the composition of the Uzice and Valjevo Corps, with all available weapons, rushed into Bosnia and Herzegovina, in order to attack Bratunac and Srebrenica. The operation was personally commanded by general Ojdanic, commander of the Uzice Corps, who had “gained fame” in Prizren, where he had taken part in liquidation of some 150 Albanians during the “events” in Kosovo. At Drina, the Uzice and Valjevo fascists were received by the members of the Serb National Guard, who had

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461 Ibid., no. 102/02-840, January 29, 1993.
executed numerous crimes on the Brcko and Bratunac front lines. At the same time, the Serb artillery was firing from all weapons available from the territory of Serbia.462

The fascists from Serbia were even reaching Posavina, where they were deployed by the Headquarters for Receipt of Volunteers (seated in Bijeljina). The aim of their arrival was to participate in the combats for expansion of the “Northern Corridor”, which was of particular significance to the aggressor at the moment when they intended to offer stronger assistance to their “brothers” in Kninska Krajina.463

In mid- and late February 1993, at the border between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro, strong forces of the Army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were located in order to intervene and assist the Cajnice fascist units in their criminal actions. In order to launch a large-scale offensive, in order to break down the defensive combat of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in late February 1993, Serbia sent 120 tanks of Soviet production, T-64 and T-72, onto the Bosnian-Herzegovinian front line.464

Probably in the first half of 1993, the aggressor brought in from Serbia and deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina the equipment for surveillance and electronic intrusion of the actions of the NATO fighter and bomber aviation. Thus, at bridges and major communications on the territory of Yugoslavia, as well as on the temporarily occupied territory in Bosnia and Herzegovina, two independent battalions were deployed for electronic activity. Each battalion had 83 special and 19 all-terrain vehicles, served by 40 officers and 280 soldiers. They were deployed in parties, and each party also secured some of the important facilities. The special equipment they possessed also included radio intruders SPB-7, and SPO-8 (of Russian origin).465

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462 Ibid., no. 102/02-864, February 2, 1993.

463 Ibid.


465 Prva linija, no. 6, May 23, 1993, p. 3. They were used to intrude aiming and panoramic radars on the fighter and bombing aircraft, and the radars for guidance of
In mid-1993, the free territory of Gorazde was attacked by numerous Serb armed units and parts of the Yugoslav Army from Kraljevo and Pljevlja, reinforced by groups of foreign mercenaries from Russia and Romania. These units were supported by 40 armoured transporters, 31 tanks, 12 “Praga” cannons, and a large number of artillery weapons, served by the cadets of the final years of education, using this as repetition and practice for their theoretical knowledge, aiming into “live flesh”.466

In the second half of December 1993, in cooperation with the collaborationist forces of the Serb Republic of BiH (reinforced forces of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps by one brigade each from the Herzegovina and the 1st Krajina Corps, and the 500 members of the Ministry of Interior of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina), the special forces of the Army of Yugoslavia (up to 120 manpower and a helicopter division) executed active offensive activities against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the section of Vogošca-Zuc-Pofalici-Lukavica-Hrasnica.467

On the temporarily taken areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina, even snipers received reinforcements from Serbia. Thus, for instance, on the...
occupied part of Grbavica, some dozen "archers" arrived, members of an archery association, and for their bloody job, depending on the effect, they were as a rule exceedingly highly paid.468

Obviously, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia constituted the main source for the provision of manpower and supply of material, technical, food and clothing, medical, veterinary, traffic and other resources and equipment for the commands, units and institutions that executed the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina and committed numerous crimes against the civilian population, including the genocide against the Bosniaks.

VIII

THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA IN THE AGGRESSION AGAINST THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
1. The Croatian Nationalist Ideology

In various periods and in various ways, beginning with the “father of the Homeland” and founder of the modern Croatian nationalism Dr. Ante Starcevic, through the Radic brothers and the Croat Peasant Party, and Dr. Vlatko Macek and the Ustasha headman Ante Pavelic, all the way to Dr. Franjo Tudjman, the issue of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosniaks has always been a current one in Croatian nationalist ideology. All the political views of the Croatian nationalists, from assimilatory aspirations (“the flowers of the Croatian nation”), to the complete denial of ethnic identity and legal and stately subjectivity, contain a continued negation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state, and of the Bosniaks, as a nation.1

The Greater Croatia ideology, created in the strife against the Austro-Hungarian domination and in rivalry against the similar Greater Serbia ideology in the 1860s, authored by Dr. Ante Starcevic, believed that Bosnia and Herzegovina was a Croatian country, and that the Muslims were Croats. Based on his nationalist political idea, Bosnia and Herzegovina had allegedly historically been a constituent part of Croatia, populated by the “branch of our purest people”, that is, the nation of the “purest and noblest Croatian blood”. Based on this ideology, Ante Starcevic had built his concept about the historical right Croatia has over Bosnia and Herzegovina.2

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2 E. Redzic, the aforementioned work, pp. 144-145. Starcevic’s Greater Croatia nationalist ideology had determined the “sense and direction of the Croatian national
In the early 20th century, under the influence of Starcevic’s nationalist doctrine, the first political organization of the Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Croatian National Community) also adopted the position that the Muslims were by ethnicity “indisputably” Croats, and Bosnia and Herzegovina was ethnically and state-wise and legally the Croatian country, and that the integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina with Croatia constitutes the natural aspiration of the “Bosnia-Herzegovina Croats”. In this way, “the Croatian policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina did not change its path, but became even more organized and had received a legitimate ethnic leadership in Bosnia and Herzegovina”.

The Croatian political circles fostered an idea about integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina into the state and national Croat motherland, that is, the aspiration to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina into Croatia. The Bishop Josip Stadler also supported the position that the integration of Bosnia within Croatia must take place. Stjepan Radic stressed out the claim to Bosnia and Herzegovina, “which must become an integral part of a united Croatia”. All to the end of WWI, Croatian politics had been advocating their position about the unification of all the Croatian countries, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, into an independent state component of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.3

During the SHS Kingdom (Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes), when Croatian politics consistently insisted on an independent Croatian state, Stjepan Radic, leader of the HRSS, believed that Bosnia and Herzegovina constituted “a semi-tribal and semi-historical homeland”, and that the Muslims were “Croats of Islamic faith”. Dr. Vlatko Macek, leader of the HSS, during the preparations for the Agreement with Cvetkovic, President of the Government of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, did not deem that the Muslims were a formed nation, although he did have their political significance in mind. He claimed that the Muslim scholars “recognize themselves as Croat ones”, which would lead them to the position of the Croatian national policy stating that the Bosniaks in Bosnia and Herzegovina constitute a part of the Croatian nation. Macek accepted the option of autonomy of Bosnia and Herzegovina

state policy in all the political periods that have been the milestones of the history of Croatia in the second half of the 19th and the first half of the 20th Centuries”.

3 Ibid., pp. 146-147.
within Croatia. Just like the Pravasi (HSP) party members, he also deemed that the Muslims were “the purest Croats”.  

In the Serbo-Croatian agreement dated August 26, 1939 (the negotiations between Belgrade – Prince Pavle and Cvetkovic’s government, and Zagreb – Macek’s Croatian leadership), Bosnia and Herzegovina was divided, while fully neglecting of the Bosniaks: it was agreed that 13 of its districts would be included into the Croatian Province named Banovina Hrvatska (the whole of the West Herzegovina, with Mostar, then Bugojno, Fojnica, Travnik, Derventa, Gradacac, Brcko, and others). The thirty-eight remaining districts were planned for the Serb part of Yugoslavia, that is, the Province (Banovina) of the Serb Country.

Under the auspices of fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, that is, Mussolini and Hitler, on April 10, 1941, the collaborationist creation of the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) was created, that was aimed to implement the program of the Nationalist Movement in Croatia – from the Adriatic Sea, all the way to the Drina River.

During WWII, when the German and Italian occupation of Croatia was proclaimed to be the national liberation of the Croatian people, practically annexing the whole of Herzegovina, Ante Pavelic claimed that the “Muslims were the flowers of the Croatian nation” and that the NDH is a national state of all the Croats, including the “Croats of Islamic faith”.

With the disappearance of the collaborationist NDH of Pavelic, Starcevic’s Greater Croatia nationalist ideology as followed by Josip

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5 BIH I BOSNJACI, p. 6.
6 Ibid.
7 E. Redzic, the aforementioned work, pp. 149-150; BIH I BOSNJACI, p. 6.

During the fascist creation – the so-called NDH, the Bosniaks had no factual power in this string puppet state, although the official Pavelic doctrine referred to them as the “flowers of the Croatian nation” (For more details, please see: M. Hadzijahic, POSEBNOST BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE I STRADANJA MUSLIMANA, Sarajevo 1991, pp. 39-40.)
Franko, Stjepan Radic, and Dr. Vlatko Macek, had suffered a historical defeat. From then on, it had been reduced to the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁸

Franjo Tudjman, the Croatian nationalist, historian, the new “father of the Homeland”, and the founder of the Croatian Democratic Union, “sublimed the aforementioned historical ideas and views towards Bosnia and Herzegovina into an ideological and political bastard that had resulted in an open aspiration to cut apart Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to integrate its territories significantly into Croatia”.⁹ He was constantly disputing and denying the state and legal subjectivity of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the ethnic identity of the Bosniaks. In his “scientific” works, political speeches, articles, interviews, at press conferences, there was a constant claim present that neither is Bosnia a state, nor the Bosniaks a nation. Therefore, he believed that Bosnia and the Bosniaks must disappear.¹⁰

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⁸ E. Redzic, the aforementioned work, p. 153.
⁹ BIH I BOSNJACI, pp. 7-9.
¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 7-9; M. Minic, PREGOVORI U KARADJORDJEVU O PODJELI BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE, Sarajevo, 1998, pp. 21-104.

For Franjo Tudjman, the Bosniaks were dangerous fundamentalists who “were using Bosnia as a basis for the expansion of their ideology throughout Europe, even in the United States. The civilized countries need to unite in order to remove this threat. Bosnia had never really existed as a state. It needs to be divided between Serbia and Croatia.”. He was “obsessed with the idea of the Province of Croatia”. According to Tudjman, the division of Bosnia “was a historical necessity, because Bosnia should not have been created after WWII” (M. Minic, the aforementioned work, pp. 41, 92, and the like).

In his book “NACIONALNO PITANJE U SUVREMENOJ EUROPI” (Zagreb, 1990), Franjo Tudjman claims that Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to be part of the Croatian federal unit, because it is historically linked to Croatia, and that “the Muslim population by its large majority, by its ethnic composition and speech, is indisputably of the Croatian origin...” (F. Tudjman, the aforementioned work, pp. 102-121. Quoted from: BIH I BOSNJACI, pp. 21-22; INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW COMMITTED ON THE TERRITORY OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA FROM JANUARY 1ST, 1991, Case no. IT-95-14-T, BEFORE THE TRIAL PANEL I, PROSECUTOR AGAINST TIHOMIR BLASKIC, VERDICT (hereinafter referred to as: ICTY, case no. IT-95-14-T), the Hague, March 3, 2000, paragraph 103.)
Franjo Tudjman claimed that Bosnia and Herzegovina has no future and that it needs to be divided. He was “sure that Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosnian Muslims can not survive as an autonomous historical and political entity”. He presented this idea, which “became known to the broader public only in the late eighties, in semi-public, private political conversations, even in the early sixties…”\textsuperscript{11}

He became a politician of nationalist ideas and rhetoric in the negation of Bosnia and the Bosniaks. As early as in the sixties, Tudjman advocated the thesis that Bosnia and Herzegovina is a communist utopia, and that it is “best to eradicate this illusion as early as in its embryonic phase, before it has caught root”. He claimed that “the republic borders are unjust, that Bosnia is an artificial creation of Tito and that it was supposed to belong to Croatia”.\textsuperscript{12}

In the sixties, Tudjman got interested in the resurrection of the Province of Croatia, and took an affirmative approach towards it. He was obsessed with an alleged fact that the Cvetkovic-Macek Agreement (1939) “had been very positive for the Croatian people”. He came to the conclusion that “the same kind of territorial and ethnic division also needs to be done today, with minor modifications”. According to him, Bosnia and Herzegovina was “at a time in the past exclusively a Croatian and Catholic country”, which was “changed by force by the Turkish and Serb penetration”,\textsuperscript{13} and that Croatia “does not even possess the naturally inherent purely Croatian parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina (which had not been joined to the Province of Croatia back in 1939)...”\textsuperscript{14}


\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., pp. 56-57.

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., 57-61.

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., p. 63. For this border “brigandage”, Tudjman was fiercely attacking the Communists, and in particular, the Croatian ones. Fascinated with the phenomenon of Milosevic, he was ready to divide up Bosnia and Herzegovina with him mainly on this
According to Franjo Tudjman, Bosnia and Herzegovina was “created by the Turkish occupation of Croatian territory”, which Croatia has allegedly had the right over even until nowadays. He advocated the thesis that Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to be divided up between Croatia and Serbia. He was also radically negating the ethnic subjectivity of the Bosniaks (Muslims according to him), as the most numerous nation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, convinced that “the Muslim religion was created by a merger of historic circumstances within its [Croatian – note by M.C.] ethnic entity”. A number of times, he stated that “the Muslims are historically, linguistically and geopolitically originally predominantly Croats”.

According to Franjo Tudjman, the Bosniaks “wish to create a fundamentalist state, by overwhelming Bosnia with 500,000 Turks... The influence of the Islamic Bosnia shall then expand through Sanjak and Kosovo onto Turkey and Serbia. Izetbegovic is a fundamentalist representative of Turkey, and he is jointly plotting for the creation of a Greater Bosnia with it... A large Muslim state is not only a danger to Serbia and Croatia. It also constitutes a danger to Europe and the United States... The new borders shall resolve their problems and reduce tension.”

Franjo Tudjman claimed that the Muslims are not an autonomous national entity, but the “Islamized branch of the two nearby nations, Croats and Serbs”. After the Bosniaks opted for such a national name, Franjo Tudjman “welcomed” this change. In relation to this, at the 4th meeting of the Croatian Democratic Union, in February 1998, he stated that this will “facilitate the psychical orientation of the Muslims in Croatia, because if Bosniaks of the Muslim faith are in Bosnia, it is clear that Croatia will not have Bosniaks of Croatian faith but that they can only be Croats of Muslim faith”.

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15 Ibid., p. 64.
16 Ibid., pp. 64-65.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid., pp. 67-68.
19 Ibid., pp.76-77; Slobodna Bosna, July 31, 1999, p. 49.
In a discussion with French philosopher Bernard Henri Levy and the French Minister for Humanitarian Issues, Bernard Kouchner in Zagreb, on January 18, 1993, Franjo Tudjman represented the racist idea in relation to the existence of Bosnia: “The Bosnian nation does not exist. It has no right or heritage of a nation, because the nation is a territory, but a nation is also the same origin, the same blood. And how many people are there on the territory of the so-called Bosnia of various origins, various blood. How these peoples, mixed and therefore impure, may constitute a whole? No my gentlemen, Bosnia must disappear as a nation”.20

Tudjman also presented his Nazi ideology and politics in relation to Bosnia and Herzegovina to US diplomat Warren Zimmermann, claiming that “Bosnia had never existed as a state. It needs to be divided up between Serbia and Croatia”. According to him, “the Bosniaks are dangerous fundamentalists, who are “using Bosnia for expansion of their ideology in Europe, even in the USA. Civilized countries need to unify in order to remove this threat”.21

He repeated the same claim on August 16, 1995 in Zagreb, in a discussion with Richard Holbrooke and Carl Bildt, when he “held a lecture for Holbrooke on the alleged danger coming from the Muslims, and repeated that Bosnia as an autonomous and unified country has no future whatsoever”.22

20 Nacional, Zagreb, August 30, 1996, pp. 38-40. During the aforementioned meeting, the Croatian Army, jointly with the units of the collaborationist HVO, was fiercely attacking Gornji Vakuf. Upon Kouchner’s insisting, Tudjman “stopped the war in Central Bosnia”. Namely, “lifting up the receiver of an old telephone at the Esplanade Hotel, in order to impress the French Minister Kouchner he was having a dinner with, Tudjman stopped the war in Central Bosnia”. Returning to his seat and after he had sat down, Franjo Tudjman said: “Now, Mr. Kouchner, you can be satisfied, I have stopped the war. This is my present that I owe you.” (Ibid.).

21 M. Minic, the aforementioned work, p. 40-41; S. Omeragic, DOGOVORENI RAT, Sarajevo, 2000, p. 6.

22 C. Bildt, MISIJA MIR, Sarajevo 1998, p. 139. “This was”, Bildt wrote, “immoderate even in Tudjman’s proportions, an unusual piece of insolence. Holbrooke was a little bit shocked” (Ibid.).
2. The Negotiations in Karadjordjevo and Graz

The nationalist leadership of the Republic of Croatia, headed by Franjo Tudjman, had had aggressive territorial aspirations towards Bosnia and Herzegovina, making an effort to have Croatia occupy at least the territories of Bosnia and Herzegovina which had belonged to the Province of Croatia after the Cvetkovic-Macek Agreement (1939). About the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Franjo Tudjman wrote: “The Turks had incorporated a major part of Croatia into Bosnia. In addition, historically, Bosnia and Herzegovina is linked to Croatia and they jointly make an indivisible geographical and economic unit. Bosnia and Herzegovina takes the central part of this whole, separating upper Pannonia from lower Pannonia. The creation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a separate entity places Croatia, both territorially and geographically, into a very difficult situation in economic terms, and therefore in political terms and in a broader sense, very unfavourable for life and development, and unfit and unfavourable in administrative terms. These factors largely explain why the agreement made in 1939 between Belgrade and Zagreb (the Province) envisaged the incorporation of the following Bosnian regions into the Province of Croatia: the whole of Herzegovina, Mostar, and those districts of Bosnia where Croats are the majority.”

In accordance with his Croatian nationalism, expressed in the anti-Bosnian and anti-Bosniak policy, and in the desire to annex a part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, on March 26, 1991, Franjo Tudjman met Slobodan Milosevic in Karadjordjevo, where they secretly arranged for the “normalization of the Croato-Serb relations”, that is, for the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina between Serbia and Croatia, in

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23 ICTY, case no. IT-95-14-T, paragraph 103; I. Radakovic, BESMISLENA YU RATOVANJA, Belgrade, 1997, p. 120.
order to form “Greater Serbia” and “Greater Croatia”. At the time, according to Stipe Mesić, it was agreed that Croatia would get “the territories of the Province (Banovina) and Western Bosnia, Kladusa, and Bihac”. As claimed by Mesić, at the time, Milosevic said: “Franjo, please take Cazin, Kladusa, and Bihac on top of that, this is the so-called Turkish Croatia, and Serbia does not need it”.

The negotiations and arrangements for the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina were continued even after Karadjordjevo, at the level of the two statesmen and their, that is, Croatian and Serb experts. Namely, after the arrangement in Karadjordjevo, Franjo Tudjman and Slobodan Milosevic met again a number of times, among which once in Tikves (Baranja) on April 15, 1991, which resulted in the formation of the Croatian and Serb fifth-columnist organizations and collaborationist creations in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in coordinated aggression by Serbia and Montenegro, and the Republic of Croatia against Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Both Tudjman and Milosevic had admitted about the arrangement in Karadjordjevo for division of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Ante Marković, President of the Federal Executive Council of SFRY, as he testified before the Hague Tribunal in January 2004.

Ibid. Franjo Tudjman considered the west Bosnia to be an integral part of the Republic of Croatia. He even corroborated such a position at the meeting with his closest associates at the Presidential Court on October 22, 1993. Then, among other things, he stated that the Republic of Croatia had made arrangement with Fikret Abdic to, “if a division comes around, that is, when the division comes around, that this western Bosnia should be an integral part of Croatia…”

Ibid.
After Karadjordjevo, in accordance with this agreement, the Serbo-
Croatian teams were formed in order to ensure a more detailed drafting
of the policy of division of Bosnia and Herzegovina ("to coordinate
the maps of division of Bosnia and Herzegovina between Serbia
and Croatia"). From the Croatian side, the team included Dr. Dusan
Bilandzic, Josip Sentija (he soon resigned), and Zvonko Lerotic, and
from the Serb side Academician Dr. Smilja Avramov, Academician
Kosta Mihailovic and Vladan Kutlesic. The task of these groups was
to "divide Bosnia, not into three, but into two parts — the Serb and the
Croatian ones. The Muslim part was not mentioned". After
October 1991, while the artillery of the Novi Sad Corps was destroying Vukovar,
Zagreb was hosting a delegation of the leadership of Serbia, headed by
Dr. Smilja Avramov (special advisor to Slobodan Milosevic), and Belgrade
was hosting a delegation from Croatia, headed by Hrvoje Sarinic (chief
of cabinet of Franjo Tudjman).

After Karadjordjevo, Franjo Tudjman claimed that Bosnia can very
hardly survive and that Croatia shall return to the borders of the Banovina
and include Cazin, Kladusa, and Bihac, too. Secret preliminary negotiations
were made using maps for conclusion of agreement with Milosevic on
the division of Bosnia. The interview given by Dusan Bilandzic to
Nacional on October 25, 1996, confirms that during the Karadjordjevo
negotiations, Franjo Tudjman and Slobodan Milosevic agreed to “have
two commissions meet to discuss the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina:
Tudjman at the time told us that he had agreed with Milosevic in
principle, and that we have to specifically develop this on the maps...“.
It is on this basis that the agreement for the division of Bosnia and
Herzegovina was confirmed by the Serb and Croatian collaborationist
leaders, Radovan Karadzic and Mate Boban respectively, in Graz, on

27 BIH I Bosnjaci, 116-117; S. Omeragic, the aforementioned work, p. 13;
M. Minic, the aforementioned work, pp. 33-39.

28 S. Omeragic, the aforementioned work, pp. 13-15.

29 BIH I Bosnjaci, 116-117; ICTY, case no. IT-95-14-T, paragraph 105; M.
Minic, the aforementioned work, pp. 33-35.

30 ICTY, case no. IT-95-14-T, paragraph 105; M. Minic, the aforementioned
work, pp. 33-35; I. Radakovic, the aforementioned work, p. 123.
On the eve of 1992, during the discussion with Croatian media reporters, Franjo Tudjman openly presented his position on the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Namely, speaking about the options for the establishment of peace (the agreed truce was signed in Sarajevo, on January 2, 1992) between Croats and Serbs, Tudjman stated that this “can be accomplished so that the national goals of Serbia be realized and that it no longer has the reason for expansion, while at the same time Croatia would also receive its regions, because the current Croatian pretzel is not natural... It is in the Croatian interest to have this problem resolved in a natural way, like the Province was arranged. At this, a part of the ‘land of Bosnia’ could still remain where the Muslims would have the majority, and this state of Bosnia could be a buffer between Croatia and Serbia. This would at the same time also end the existence of the colonial creation of Bosnia and Herzegovina”.

The execution of the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina after the actual aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was more specifically assigned to Radovan Karadzic and Mate Boban. Pursuant to the negotiations and arrangements made between Milosevic and Tudjman about the division and destruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in late April 1992, they secretly met in Gratz. At this meeting (Karadzic-Boban Agreement) between the Serb and Croatian collaborationist leaders, held on May 6, the commitment was reached “to have all the disputed issues, including setting of the border between the two constitutive units – Croatian and Serb – in Bosnia and Herzegovina resolved amicably and by agreement”.

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31 Slobodna Bosna, January 23, 1992, p. 8. In this meeting Franjo Tudjman, in a very relaxed atmosphere, spoke about the annexing of Cazinska Krajina and the West Herzegovina areas to the Republic of Croatia, claiming that “the population of these areas has a high interest in such a thing”. At that point, in a good mood, Franjo Tudjman switched from one to another reporter group, making jokes, saying that in this way “he is rounding up his own state similar to a pretzel into a Bosnian somun round bread cake” (Ibid.).

32 Z. Tomac, TKO JE UBIO BOSNU?, Part II, Zagreb 1994, pp. 35-36; ICTY, case no. IT-95-14-T, paragraph 105; K. Begic, the aforementioned work, pp. 69, and 93, note 12; L. Silber – A. Little, the aforementioned work, p. 338; M. Bojic, the aforementioned work, p. 381.
“The representatives of the Croat and Serb ethnic communities” reached a common agreement “to ensure compact space and communications in the setting of borders between the two constitutive units in the area of Kupres, as well as in the Bosnian Posavina (Derventa, Bosanski Brod, Bosanski Samac, Odzak, Orasje, Modrica, and Brcko)”.

Commenting on this meeting, on May 11, 1992, Washington Post reminded of the pact between Hitler and Stalin just before WWII on the division of Poland, stating that Tudjman and Milosevic representatives attended this meeting. At this, the Washington Post qualified the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Croatia as “predatory states” (K. Begic, the aforementioned work, p. 93, note 12).

Ribicic claims that the formation of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, in particular the agreement for division of territory between Boban and Karadzic, “contributed to eruption of war between the Croats and the Muslims, the more so because it was associated with the broadly present opinion that in Karadjordjevo, Milosevic and Dr. Tudjman had talked about the option for division of Bosnia and Herzegovina without and on the account of the Muslims” (C. Ribicic, the aforementioned work, pp. 47, and 97-98). Such a conclusion was contrary to all the documents of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia and of the Croatian Democratic Union for Bosnia and Herzegovina as analyzed by Ribicic. If the formation of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia and the agreement in Gradac between the Greater Croatia and Greater Serbia collaborationists on the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina were “without and on the account of the Muslims”, then there can be no mention at all about a war that the Bosniaks “have contributed to”. The case involves aggression plans and prepared crimes against Bosnia, particularly the Bosniaks, because, of their national, ethnic and religious affiliation.

The Serbo-Croatian contacts in relation to the war in Croatia and the division of Bosnia were conducted, according to Stipe Mesic “at two levels. On one level were the contacts between Milosevic and Tudjman, and the second-level contacts were between the representatives of the RS and HZ H-B, Karadzic and Boban, who met in Gratz. Boban returned and said that there were no longer any non-clarified issues between the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Serbs” (M. Minic, the aforementioned work, p. 88).

Immediately after the meeting in Graz, in Zagreb (at the Presidential Courts), Mesic met Franjo Boras, an official of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, and with Nikola Koljevic. They were having a joint meal with Tudjman. When Mesic saw Boras and Koljevic, they told him that “these are unofficial meetings with Tudjman, because the issue of Bosnia has already been resolved. I was not invited to an official meeting, just for a meal” (Ibid.).

33 Z. Tomac, the aforementioned work, pp. 36-37. At this meeting, Karadzic clearly made it known to Boban what the significance was of the corridor through Northern Bosnia for the Serbs, the one in Posavina, along the Sava river valley, constantly stating “that
However, “in relation to the working map on the division”, there were disagreements identified, such as the borders in and south of Mostar.34

Both sides agreed that, based on their decisive effort on the principles adopted at the European Community Conference on Bosnia and Herzegovina, in terms of disputable and other areas, they would honour “the agreed criteria for definition of ethnic territories, with the arbitration of the European Community”. In relation to this, it was agreed that the arbitration division should be done in the agreed time frame by May 15, 1992.35 Therefore, pursuant to the arrangements made, an agreement was reached for cessation of the reasons “for armed conflicts between the Croats and Serbs on the whole territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, and they announced “the general and permanent truce under control

not a single solution is acceptable without a wide corridor in Posavina”. In relation to this, he believed that “the best border is the one naturally formed by the Sava river” (L. Silber – A. Little, the aforementioned work, p. 338). “Croats have asked for Brcko – which, by the 1991 census, was Muslim, Serb, and Croat. ‘The Serbs have rejected this, because it is them who have built it and it is fully Serb’, stated Karadzic.” (Ibid.).

34 Ibid. Namely, “in relation to the working map on division, disagreements exist in the following areas:

1. In the city of Mostar, the Serb side believes that the border is the Neretva river, and the Croatian side believe that the whole city of Mostar is within the Croatian ethnic unit.

2. South of Mostar, the Croatian side believes that the Croatian ethnic unit includes the area defined in 1939, that is, the border of the Province (Banovina) of Croatia.

The Serb side believes that the border between the Croatian and the Serb unit is the border of the Neretva river”. (Ibid.).

According to the writing of L. Silber and A. Little, “in this war, in terms of river control, Karadzic proposed that the Neretva river, running through Herzegovina, be the border. However, Boban proposed that this be the main street of Mostar – Marsala Tita Street. They committed that they would take into account the ethnic composition of the territories and agreed to accept EC arbitration unless they are able to resolve it themselves – in terms of the western region around Kupres, and the seven cities in the north, in Posavina” (L. Silber – A. Little, the aforementioned work, p. 338).

35 Ibid. This agreement terminated the existence of reasons for cessation of the European Community Conference on Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Karadzic and Boban sought urgent continuation of the Conference.
of the European Community, coming into effect on May 6, 1992, at 24:00 hours” 36

After the Karadzic-Boban agreement and the concretization of the territorial separation, that is, the Serbo-Croatian division of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in which the Serb collaborationists received the corridor through Northern Bosnia and significant part of Bosnian Posavina, which was immediately afterwards bartered for Kupres,37 the basis was

36 Ibid. Z. Tomac claims that the Boban-Karadzic agreement reached in Gratz in late April 1992 “was a big strategic mistake”, which, according to him, contributed to generation of mistrust among the Bosniaks towards Croats and termination of their alliance, and that it involves the war “between the Bosniak Muslims and Croats...” (“a bloody and useless war between the Muslims and Croats...”) (Ibid.). The aforementioned evaluations and conclusions by Z. Tomac, who has aspirations to answer the numerous questions about, as he says “who has killed Bosnia”, are mildly put unserious and cannot be corroborated by original documents, including the Boban-Karadzic agreement, which he speaks about and which he has published. The very analysis of this agreement, without mentioning any other facts, indicates to some contrary conclusions from the ones reached by Z. Tomac.

37 Ibid., pp. 36 and 37, and 69-70; M. Spigelj, SJECANJA VOJNIKA, Zagreb 2001, pp. 335-336. The Karadzic-Boban agreement, officially reported by the HINA Agency on May 7, including the topics discussed, has been also commented by Martin Spigelj, in particular its point 3 (“Both parties agree to ensure compact space and communications in the setting of borders between the two constitutive units in the area of Kupres, as well as in the Bosnian Posavina (Derventa, Bosanski Brod, Bosanski Samac, Ožak, Oraše, Modrica, and Brcko)” (Ibid.). In relation to this, he correctly concludes that “the compact space and communications” are an existentially important problem when viewed from the Serb aspect, “because without the Posavina corridor, there is no spatial (territorial) link of Serbia with the insurgent areas in Bosnian Krajina, populated by a Serb majority, and the Serb para-state in Croatia. And without this communication, the Serbs west of the Derventa-Bosanski Brod line remain cut off and isolated from the mother country, de fact in a Croato-Bosniak surrounding, incapable of sustaining themselves either militarily or economically for any longer-term period”. In the light of that, Spigelj continues, “the mention of Kupres can be understood as well, which had already been in the Serb arms at the time, having fully broken up the disorganized and unequipped defence in the combats of April 7-10, and which had obviously been offered by them as a replacement for Posavnina. The whole formulation about the appreciation of the compact space and communications is therefore reduced to a pure barter of Posavina for Kupres” (M. Spigelj, the aforementioned work, pp. 335-336).
formed for coordinated actions by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the Republic of Croatia, and their collaborationists, on the occupation and destruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at which the Tudjman regime was reduced down to an associate relation towards the basic Greater Serbia aggressor.38

In the late 20th century, in accordance with his deep hatred against the Muslims, and his position that he should “unify all the Croats into one state, under one flag – under his leadership”,39 Franjo Tudjman particularly brought up current his fascist policy about division of Bosnia and Herzegovina with Serbia, after coming into power in 1990. The aspirations of Franjo Tudjman for the joining of the “Croatian” territories of Bosnia and Herzegovina were continued into the time of the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus, for instance, on May 6, 1995, at a dinner, where he was sitting next to Paddy Ashdown, President of the Liberal Democratic Party of Great Britain, Tudjman clearly confirmed that the Republic of Croatia has territorial aspirations towards Bosnia. Namely, after he had roughly sketched how Bosnia would look in ten years on the back of the menu, Franjo Tudjman explained to Ashdown that it would not exist, that is, 

38 As claimed by Mesic, at the time when “war broke out in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, Tudjman used to say: “We do not have any single unresolved issue with the Serbs any more. There are only some marginal issues left. In principle, we have set the borders between ourselves and the Serbs”. According to Mesic, this was also frequently repeated by Mate Boban, who, just like Tudjman, used to say: “We no longer have any unresolved issues with the Serbs. The Serbs were temporary enemies to us, and the Balijas [this is what he called the Muslims – note by S. M.] are the permanent ones” (Dani, June 1, 2001, pp. 42-43).

After the occupation of one third of their state territory, the leadership of the Republic of Croatia, primarily President Tudjman, (by way of permanent truce, as of January 2, 1992), froze any activity against the Greater Serbia aggressor and its collaborationists in Kninska Krajina (“one third of the territory of Croatia was left occupied for four years…”), and, in cooperation with the aggressor against their own state, they waged, jointly with the Greater Serbia aggressor and its collaborationists, the aggressive war against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in order to conquer territory in a neighbouring state (M. Spiegelj, the aforementioned work, pp. 359-360).

it would be divided between Serbia and Croatia (one part of Bosnia will belong to Croatia, and the other one to Serbia). In addition, he said “that then there will no longer be any Muslim territory if former Yugoslavia and that it will be just a minor element... of the Croatian state”.40

40 ICTY, Case: No. IT-95-14-T, paragraph 106; M. Minic, the aforementioned work, pp. 44-45. Franjo Tudjman was convinced that ultimately the Serbs would swap Banja Luka for Tuzla.
3. The Greater Croatia Fifth Column
in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Immediately after Karadjordjevo and Tikves, under the motto of the “protection of the endangered Croatianness in Bosnia and Herzegovina” and the “protection of strategic interests of the state of Croatia”, Franjo Tudjman initiated and mobilized the political movement of Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina – the fifth columnist, and then also collaborationist party of the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and its military component – the Croatian Defence Council.\(^4\)

The documents available show the actual political goals of this party – formation of the Croatian state in Bosnia and Herzegovina and its joining to the Republic of Croatia, “regardless of the means and regardless of the price”. The goal was “to reach a Greater Croatia, Croatia within ‘maximum borders possible’, and this goal is so important that it gives a blessing to all the means available, regardless of the horrible consequences that may be caused”. This political decision “had beforehand and on an informed basis included the aspiration for division of Bosnia and Herzegovina, regardless of the means, regardless of the price, regardless of the victims, including forced creation of ethnically homogenous areas”\(^5\) involving numerous crimes, including genocide. Franjo Tudjman and the HDZ applied “the effort to create a Greater Croatia against the efforts for creation of a Greater Serbia”.\(^6\)

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\(^4\) BIH I BOSNJACI, pp. 7-9; M. Minic, the aforementioned work, pp. 21-104; C. Ribicic, the aforementioned work, p. 26, note 6.


\(^6\) C. Ribicic, the aforementioned work, p. 25.
In order to implement this long-term task – the formation of the “common Croatian state”, in compliance with the Greater Croatia policy, instructions, procedures and directives issued by Franjo Tudjman, President of the Republic of Croatia and of the HDZ, from whom orders were received as to how to proceed, the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina undertook a number of organized activities. The more so because, according to the Act of Incorporation, as of August 18, 1990, the HDZ of Bosnia and Herzegovina was “constitutive part of the single HDZ organization, seated in Zagreb”.44 Thus, at the working meeting of the presidents of Crisis Headquarters of the Herzegovina Regional Community and the presidents and representatives of the Crisis Headquarters of the Travnik Regional Community, held on November 12, 1991, in Grude, the following conclusions were adopted:

1) That “the Croatian people in BiH must ultimately undertake a decisive, proactive policy, which needs to bring to realization the centennial dream – a common Croatian state”.

In order to realize this “historical” goal (“… to have it as our reality, soon…”), the aforementioned “regional communities” adopted the position to “proceed with formulation and promulgation of the legal and political enactments (proclamation of the Croatian state in BiH, conducting of the referendum for joining the Republic of Croatia within its ethnic and historical (now potential) borders”.

2) Starting from the assessment that “in a portion of the leadership of the HDZ for Bosnia and Herzegovina, there are still some forces that are objecting against these historical interests of the Croatian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina” and that these forces are “advocating in favour of the non-existent sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina, in which the Croatian people would be doomed to genocide and historical

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44 S. Cekic, the aforementioned work, pp. 33-36, and 307-318; C. Ribicic, the aforementioned work, pp. 46 (note 47), 47, 77, 92, 144, and 151.

45 S. Cekic, the aforementioned work, pp. 33-34 and 306-309; M. Culic, the aforementioned work, pp. 70-71.
annihilation”, the presidents and representatives of the “regional communities”, “demand decisive moves that are expected by our people and for the purpose of which this people have opted for the HDZ, one hundred percent”.46

The representatives of the aforementioned “regional communities” assessed that “any further hesitation” would weaken their positions, both within the Croatian people and with the international community. Thus, they concluded that they must “show both to Europe and the world what the Croatian territories in BiH are and where our future is”. They adopted the conclusion that the Croatian people “will under no conditions accept any other solution except the one within the borders of free Croatia”.47

In order to implement the adopted conclusions, the representatives and presidents of the aforementioned “regional communities” adopted the following positions as imperatives:

“a) clearly profile the party policy of the HDZ in Bosnia and Herzegovina, strengthen its staffing and select those people who will be able to carry these tasks to the end;

b) initiate political and legal initiatives internally and internationally;

c) prepare even better in military terms for conflict with all such forces that will attempt to stop this imminent process in creation of the free Croatian state;

d) beforehand, decisively prevent any public or covert activity in the leadership of the HDZ for Bosnia and Herzegovina that would contradict these decisions or harm them in any way”.48

It is significant to indicate upon the fact that the aforementioned “regional communities” had also brought similar conclusions at “prior separate sessions” too. It is even more interesting to point out that based

46 S. Cekic, the aforementioned work, pp. 33-34 and 306-309.


48 Ibid.
on the aforementioned conclusions as of November 12, 1991, it can reliably be claimed that “the Croatian people of these regions still remains with the unanimously accepted options and conclusions adopted in negotiations with the President of the Republic of Croatia, Franjo Tudjman, held on June 13, and 20, 1991, in Zagreb”.49

At the aforementioned meetings between Franjo Tudjman and the leaders of the HDZ of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the HDZ, held after the meeting with Slobodan Milosevic in Split (June 12) and in Belgrade (June 19), discussing the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the political decision was made to form the “Croatian state” in Bosnia and Herzegovina.50

The idea of Franjo Tudjman, formulate on June 13, and 20, 1991, on “proclamation of the Croatian state in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, and its final merger with the Croatian state (the Republic of Croatia), was “bloodily developed” by Dario Kordic, Mate Boban and others for six months.51 In addition, these two regional communities also took similar positions on October 15, 1991, in Grude, and on October 22, 1991, in Busovaca. All of this testifies of the continuity of such political option within the HDZ.52

Six days after the adopted conclusions in Grude, in order to “proclaim the Croatian state in Bosnia and Herzegovina” and in order “to join it to the Republic of Croatia” (“…within the borders of free Croatia”), relying on the Republic of Croatia, the HDZ of Bosnia and Herzegovina passed a “whole range of laws”. Thus, at the session held on November 18, 1991, in Grude, the ”elected representatives of the Croatian people”

49 Ibid.
50 M. Culic, the aforementioned work, pp. 69-70.
51 S. Cekic, the aforementioned work, pp. 33-34, and 306-309; C. Ribicic, the aforementioned work, pp. 26, 157, and 166; M. Culic, the aforementioned work, p. 70. Joining of the “Croatian communities” to the Republic of Croatia, according to Raic, was their ideal, their desire (C. Ribicic, the aforementioned work, p. 148).
52 S. Cekic, the aforementioned work, pp. 306-309. The representatives of the HDZ of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the representatives of towns and municipalities, kept in contact with Dr. Franjo Tudjman and went to visit him “and in large teams, too”, seeking guidance for their activity (BIH I BOSNJACI, p. 38; K. Rotim, the aforementioned work, volume I, p. 269).
passed the “historical” Decision on Establishment of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia – a collaborationist creation of the Republic of Croatia in Bosnia and Herzegovina, built after the model of the “Serb autonomous areas”, and “based on ethnic and religious discrimination”.53

The Decision determined that the seat of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia should be in Mostar, that the “community” may admit other municipalities of Bosnia and Herzegovina too, “upon consent by the founding municipalities”; that the Community shall “respect the democratically elected government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina until such time as the state independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina exists in relation to the former or any future Yugoslavia”, and “all the applicable international enactments that are foundations of the modern civilization relationship in the society”.54

The Decision “formed” the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, as a “political, cultural, economic and territorial whole”, and its territory was determined. Its territory is made up of the “areas of municipalities” – a total of 30, with various ethnic structure (in the largest number of them, the Croats were the majority, and in others they did not constitute the majority, and in some they did not even have relative majority): Jajce, Kresovo, Busovaca, Vitez, Novi Travnik, Travnik, Kiseljak, Fojnica, Skender Vakuf (Dobretici), Kakanj, Vares, Kotor Varos, Tomislavgrad, Livno, Kupres, Bugojno, Gornji Vakuf, Prozor, Konjic, Jablanica, Posusje, Mostar, Siroki Brijeg, Grude, Ljubuski, Citluk, Capljina, Neum, Stolac, and Trebinje (Ravno).55

53 S. Cekic, the aforementioned work, pp. 34-35, and 310-311; C. Ribicic, the aforementioned work, pp. 13, 18, and 36-39. The Decision for Establishment of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia was amended at the session of the Presidency of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, held on July 3, 1992, with the revised text published in the Narodni list HZ Herceg-Bosna, No. 1/1992, Mostar, September 1992, pp. 2-3.

54 S. Cekic, the aforementioned work, pp. 310-311; The Decision for Establishment of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, Narodni list HZ Herceg-Bosna, No. 1/1992, Mostar, September 1992, pp. 2-3.

55 Ibid. The Decision established that the internal system of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia and the relations with the other communities shall be regulated in separate regulations. The Decision came into effect immediately, that is, as of the date of its passing, that is, on November 18, 1991.
The territory of the *Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia* here did not include the Bosnian Posavina and the Prekounje areas, that is, the “Turkish Croatia”. This could be the consequence of the agreements reached between Tudjman and Milosevic, of which some had already been implemented (the Serbs from West Slavonia, under a form of “preventive evacuation”, were relocated into Bosnia). The Bosnian Posavina is a key issue for Greater Serbia. Without the corridor through Posavina, there is no territorial or communication link between Serbia and the occupied Podrinje with the Bosnian and Kninska Krajinas. Along with this, Slobodan Milosevic had not solution for the Prekounje area, that is, for the “Turkish Croatia”, so he heartily gave this to Franjo Tudjman as a gift.

Resulting from the non-genuine mutual cooperation between Tudjman and Milosevic, and their collaborationists, in late 1991 and early 1992, “Croatian Communities” were formed in these areas, which in November

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On November 12, 1991, in Bosanski Brod, the *Croatian Community of Bosnian Posavina* was formed, “with the purpose of integration of political activities on defence of the Croatian territories” (K. Rotim, the aforementioned work, volume 2, Siroki Brijeg 1998, pp. 270, and 280-281).

The main board of the Croatian Democratic Union for Bosnia and Herzegovina, at the session including ministers and representatives in the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, on November 28, 1991, confirmed, sanctioned and party-wise legalized the formation of the “Croatian communities” in Bosnia and Herzegovina: of the *Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia* and the *Croatian Community of Bosnian Posavina*. The Presidency of the Croatian Democratic Union for Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the same day, also had “both Croatian communities legalized by the party” (C. Ribicic, the aforementioned work, pp. 127-128).

With formation of the “Croatian communities” (Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia and the Croatian Community of Bosnian Posavina), the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina was continued and received “an additional incentive” (Ibid., p. 47). In mid-January 1992, in Sivsa, “at the specific Croatian ethnicity of Usora”, the *Croatian Community of Usora* was formed, made up of the parts of the municipalities of Doboj, Teslic, and Tesanj (K. Rotim, the aforementioned work, volume 1, p. 519, and volume 2, p. 263; Slobodna Bosna, May 22, 1999, THE FILE, p. 17).

Two days after the decision was brought by the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina to cast a republic-level referendum for establishment of the status of Bosnia and Herzegovina (K. Begic, the aforementioned work, pp. 73-74), on January 27, 1992, the *Croatian Community of Central Bosnia* was proclaimed, with four municipalities
1992 had joined the single “Croatian Community” – the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia.57

In order to proclaim the Croatian state in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Tudjman had permanently had in mind that this understood inclusion of the “Croatian communities” and the Cazin Krajina into the Republic of Croatia.

The municipalities that “entered” the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia (“Founding municipalities of the HZ HB”), according to Mate Boban, had – according to the Census – an overall population of 55% Croats, 27% Muslims, 9% Serbs, and the rest were “Others”. In order to increase the number of Croats in the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, at the meeting with the President of the Republic of Croatia, on December 27, 1991, in Zagreb, Mate Boban “revealed” the key for increasing the number of Croats by 11% - “by cleansing the border areas, factually adjoining areas of Herzeg-Bosnia”. In this way – by way of crimes – “a 65% of Croats in this Herzeg-Bosnia” would be achieved, which, according to Mate Boban, a number larger by 2% than the one in Serbia (63%).58

The establishment of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia was aimed at formation of a separate “mini-state community”, not defence from the “cruel aggression”, as stated in the preamble of the Decisions on the reason for the establishment. The formation of proper armed forces, “which, among other things, defend the ‘sovereignty’ of the HZ HB, without even mentioning the sovereignty of the

57 All of the aforementioned “Croatian communities”, as well as the Vrhbosna one, based on the Decision of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia dated November 17, 1992, joined the single “Croatian Community” – Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia (K. Rotim, the aforementioned work, volume 1, p. 517, and volume 2, p. 266).

58 C. Ribicic, the aforementioned work, p. 133.
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, is a significant element of autonomy of the HZ HB and its separation out of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina”. The most significant “element of autonomy of the HZ HB is a gradually built and autonomous legal system, completely separate from the legal system of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina”.59

The formation of the collaborationist Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia and its secession from the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was aimed at – joining the neighbouring state, the Republic of Croatia. The Croatian people in the Travnik regional community, according to Dario Kordic, at the meeting between the President of the Republic of Croatia, Dr. Franjo Tudjman, and the delegation of the HDZ of Bosnia and Herzegovina, attended by the officials of the Republic of Croatia, held in Zagreb, on December 27, 1991, “live with the idea of final joining the Croatian state and they are ready to realize this using all means available, and the young guys have this Croatian spirit burning inside”. The merger with the Republic of Croatia, according to him, is the only option that the Croats have to believe in, “even if it may be in three months’ or in a year’s time”. Only through “a clear state mechanism of the State of Croatia, that would be the safeguard for the Herzeg-Bosnian Croats” would it be possible to “set borders of the Croatian soil on the territory of Herzeg-Bosnia” and prevent “the Croatian population from annihilation”.60

Based on the documents of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia (from the Decision for establishment, until the formation of the “Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia” and later on), it can be established that the autonomy and secession from the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in order to join the Republic of Croatia, was the ultimate goal of this collaborationist creation. The potential for association with the Republic of Croatia after formation of the “Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia” was “prevailing, both in the bodies of the HZ HB and the HDZ of Bosnia and Herzegovina (after the dismissal of Stjepan Kljuic), and in the ruling structures of the Republic of Croatia”. Even

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59 Ibid., pp. 86-89.

60 Ibid., pp. 157-158.
the enactments issued by this creation “contain a lot of elements expressing in various ways the link between the HZ HB and Croatia”.

Formation of the ethnically homogenous HZ HB, in order to associate with Croatia, was again confirmed one month later. Namely, at the second regular session on December 23, 1991, in Tomislavgrad, the Presidency of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, “based on the quality and comprehensive discussion”, brought a number of conclusions, among which the following: “The Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia once again confirms the will of the overall Croatian people of Herzeg-Bosnia, expressed on November 18, 1991, in Grude, by bringing the historical decision on establishment of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, constituting the legal ground for entry of these territories into the Republic of Croatia”.

At the aforementioned session, the Presidency of the HZ HB denied legitimacy for Stjepan Kljuic in his autonomous proceeding. Then, among others, the conclusion was brought “authorizing President Mr. Mate Boban, vice-presidents Bozo Raic and Dario Kordic, and secretary Ignac Kostroman, to have full legitimacy in representing the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia in the negotiations in Zagreb on

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61 Ibid., pp. 89.92. The ultimate goal of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia was to associate with the Republic of Croatia. This was even confirmed by Jadranko Prlic in his discussion at the joint session of the Presidential Council of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, Presidency of the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Executive Council of the HDZ of BiH, held on March 6, 1994, in Mostar, discussing the negotiations in Washington (“Report on the Washington Negotiations”). Speaking about the Washington agreement, and that the “interest of Croats is not the same on all the territories of BiH”, he pointed out that “if the ultimate goal is not met at this moment – and this is the association with the Republic of Croatia, it does not automatically mean that this is a defeat” (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2945, MINUTES from the joint session of the Presidential Council of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, Presidency of the HDZ of BiH, and the Executive Council of the HDZ of BiH, Mostar, March 6, 1994, p. 6).

62 Ibid., pp. 26, and 124. At this session, “the meeting was held of all the presidents of municipalities, 30 municipalities constituting the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, presidents of municipal boards of the HDZ, representatives in the Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina from that area”, attended by “all the legally elected representatives of the Croatian people in Herzeg-Bosnia either through the part or at the first democratic elections as the legal representatives of the government”.
December 27, 1991, (as well as in the future, related to the further programmatic activity of Herzeg-Bosnia and the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina”). Concluding that there are no personal conflicts between the leadership of the HZ HB and the President of the HDZ, Stjepan Kljuic, and that this involves “a conflict between two political concepts of the policy so far”, it was assessed that “Stjepan Kljuic has gone away from the determined and agreed policy”, thus “causing big confusion for the members and the Croatian population on the ground”.63

Given the fact that all of its bodies consisted in full and only by the HDZ candidates (the HDZ is the only political party of the HZ HB), the mono-party monopoly of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, from the aspect of integration and association with the Republic of Croatia, was of decisive importance, because the HDZ of BiH “is a constitutive part of the HDZ organization seated in Zagreb (Art. 4 of the Act of Incorporation of the HDZ of BiH brought in Sarajevo, on August 18, 1990)”. In offering the answer to the question “how did the leadership structure of the HDZ BiH and the HZ HB understand and realize this statutory decision”, Ribicic states that this was discussed by Mate Boban at the meeting of the top officials of the HDZ of Croatia and the HDZ of BiH, at the meeting in Zagreb, on December 27, 1991, in the position that “the HZ HB has proclaimed itself to be an independent Croatian territory, but that the ‘Croatian leadership’ shall decide on the point of association of this territory to Croatia”. On this basis, after dismissal of Stjepan Kljuic, according to Ribicic, the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina “became not only the constitutive part of the HDZ of Croatia, but also the part of the HDZ of Croatia, subordinated to the centralized leadership of the party in Zagreb and President of the party, Dr. Franjo Tudjman”.64 Obviously, the HDZ of Bosnia and Herzegovina never was an autonomous political factor.

Along with the option of secession of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia from Bosnia and Herzegovina, and accession to the Republic of Croatia, from July 3, 1992, when the Presidency of this creation adopted the revised text of the Decision on establishment, the “reserve option” also

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63 Ibid., p. 126.
64 Ibid., pp. 26, and 92-93.
appeared “to remain within Bosnia and Herzegovina, to be based on a non-unitarian, that is, (con)federal model of the state system”; at which “the pragmatic position ruled was prevailing in terms that the autonomy and sovereignty of the HZ HB need to be established and protected, regardless of whether it will ultimately become/remain an autonomous state community, an autonomous part of the new (con)federal Bosnia and Herzegovina, or it shall accede to Croatia as its autonomous province or canton with a special status”.65

At the meeting between the President of the Republic of Croatia, Franjo Tudjman, and the delegation of the HDZ of Bosnia and Herzegovina, attended by the officials of the Republic of Croatia, held in Zagreb on December 27, 1991, when the supporters of the political concept of a sovereign and independent Bosnia and Herzegovina were defeated, Franjo Tudjman dictated the option of accession of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia to the Republic of Croatia.66 After that, the Croatian and Serb collaborationists continued with contacts, for the purpose of concretization of arrangements for the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina between Franjo Tudjman and Slobodan Milosevic (on January 8, 1992, in Zagreb, on February 27, and May 6, 1992 in Gratz, etc.).

The political leadership of the Republic of Croatia, headed by Franjo Tudjman, in early April 1992 established a military formation in Bosnia and Herzegovina – the HVO, “a formally independent, but actually part of the armed forces of the neighbouring state”.67 Namely, pursuant to Article 7 of the Decision on establishment of this creation, at the extraordinary session in Mostar on April 8, 1992, the Presidency of the HZ HB brought the Decision on formation of the Croatian Defence Council, “as the supreme body of defence of the Croatian people in the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia”.68

65 Ibid., pp. 90-92.
66 Ibid., pp. 113-171.
67 Ibid., p. 12.
68 S. Cekic, the aforementioned work, pp. 35, and 223; Narodni list HZ Herceg-Bosna, no. 1, Mostar, September 1992, p. 4; AIIZ, inv. No. 2-1679, Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, Croatian Defence Council, Main Headquarters, No. Z-01-11, Grude, April 10, 1992 – to all the municipal headquarters of the Croatian Defence Council, ORDER; C. Ribicic, the aforementioned work, pp. 54-55.
The decision on formation of the Croatian Defence Council, seated in Mostar, was illegally brought by Mate Boban in the capacity of the President of the HVO and the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, on April 8, 1992, on the same day when the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina brought the decision for formation of the Territorial Defence – legitimate military organization of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus, he did not accept the Territorial Defence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, because “for the Croats in Herzeg-Bosnia, it does not exist”.69

Two days later, starting from the assessment that the “Croatian people have been left on their own”, and that it has “by itself organized and defended – created its defence – formed its defence forces”, the Presidency of the “Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia” brought the “Decision that the Supreme Command over those forces shall only be assigned to the CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL” [capital letters in the original – note by the author] This body, according to the Order of the President of the HZ HB and HVO, Mate Boban, as of April 10, 1992, sent to all the municipal headquarters of the HVO, “was the only legal one”, and this term was “the only official one”.70

The Croatian Defence Council had had its Main Headquarters, and in the HZ HB municipalities, it had its municipal headquarters. For instance, in Bugojno, one such was established in Bugojno on April 8. As of April 10, 1992, pursuant to the aforementioned order by Mate Boban, the Main HVO Headquarters “only communicates with the municipal headquarters of the Croatian Defence Council”, and “all the other military formations on the territory of the HZ of Herzeg-Bosnia are either illegal or enemies”, and “all other names shall be omitted from official use”.71

General Ante Roso, commander of the Main Headquarters of the HVO, on May 8, 1992, pursuant to Boban’s illegal decision dated April

69 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-1679, Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, Croatian Defence Council, Main Headquarters, No. Z-01-11, Grude, April 10, 1992 – to all the municipal headquarters of the Croatian Defence Council, ORDER.

70 Ibid.

71 Ibid; K. Rotim, the aforementioned work, p. 176.
8, issued the order for “suspension” of the Territorial Defence of the (Republic) of Bosnia and Herzegovina, believing it illegal on the territory of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia. On this territory, based on this order, “the HVO units were the only legal units”. All other military units were obligated to “join the single system of defence and recognize the HVO headquarters as the main command” on the territory of this collaborationist creation.72

On May 11, 1992, Tihomir Blaskic (“The Commander of the HVO ARMED FORMATIONS”) issued a Command implementing the Order of Ante Roso, based on which the units of the Croatian Defence Council “on the territory of the Kiseljak Municipality” became “the only legal military units”, and the Territorial Defence was pronounced illegal. Thus, the order by Ante Roso, the general of the Croatian Army, was implemented fast. President Franjo Tudjman and Tihomir Blaskic also applied the same policy in terms of control over the ammunition factory in Vitez, threatening that they would blow it up if it gets attacked by the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.73

In the first half of 1992, in some places of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the HVO units suspended the legal bodies of the Republic and usurped power. In relation to this, the “ORDER” of May 10, 1992 is particularly indicative, signed by the vice-President of the HVO, Dario Kordic, and commander of the Busovaca HVO municipal headquarters, Ivo Brnada. This document suspended the legal power in Busovaca, and pursuant to the orders of the HVO of HZ HB, the HVO took over all the power functions; the legal Busovaca TO units were proclaimed paramilitary formations and they were imposed an ultimatum “to surrender all weapons they possess, or to have all those forces placed under the

72 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-1106, Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, Croatian Defence Council, Main Headquarters, Confidential no. 01-33/92, Grude, May 8, 1992, ORDER.

Each member of the HVO military units was “obligated to wear the HVO emblems (coat of arms badge on the cap and the textile HVO coat of arms on the left arm sleeve)”. It was forbidden “to form private units, and the persons who do not respect this order were forbidden from judging and dismissing of armed units”. This order “put out of effect all the orders of the TO command and it is to be deemed illegal on this territory”.

73 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2114, Municipal Headquarters of the HVO, Confidential, no. 11-05/92, Kiseljak, May 11, 1992, ORDER; ICTY, Case no. IT-95-14-T, paragraph 118.
command of the HVO, including placing of HVO emblems on them”; the agreement was suspended between the HVO and the Busovaca TO about division of armament and the decision was brought “to take over the overall armament, equipment and resources and barracks on the part of the HVO”; there was the need to establish contact with the “Serb army at Kaonik” (with the Zenica JNA garrison); the town of Busovaca was fully blocked, and under the threat of arms, the will of the “extremist group” was imposed in the whole area.74

Pursuant to the Statutory Decision on the Interim Establishment of Executive Power and Administration on the territory of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, dated May 15, 1992, and amended on July 3, 1992, the Croatian Defence Council became the supreme body of executive and administrative power on the territory of the HZ HB. Just like each of its members, it reported to the Presidency of the HZ HB. In this way, the Presidency of HZ HB secured control over the municipal HVO and single implementation of its regulations on the whole territory of the HZ HB.75

The HVO was organized as a government, with President, vice-presidents, department heads and others, in which department heads had the status of the office of ministers in the government. The HVO performed central supervision over the work of its departments and municipal HVOs, it could revoke or suspend their enactments, and dismiss them, which, according to Ribicic, is of “particular importance to establishment of the state power on the whole territory of the HZ HB”.76

74 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-1105, and 1277, Croatian Defence Council, Municipal Headquarters of Busovaca, No. 62/92, May 10, 1992, ORDER.
75 S. Cekic, the aforementioned work, pp. 35, and 314-316; C. Ribicic, the aforementioned work, p. 54.
76 S. Cekic, the aforementioned work, pp. 314-316; Narodni list HZ Herceg-Bosna, No. 1, Mostar, September 1992, pp. 5-7; C. Ribicic, the aforementioned work, pp. 53-56. The affairs of executive power and administration on the territory of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia were performed by heads of departments. The Croatian Defence Council of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, pursuant to the Statutory Decision, had 6 departments: Defence Department, Department of Interior, Economic Department, Finance Department, Department of Social Affairs, and Department of Judiciary and Administration (Narodni list HZ Herceg-Bosna, No. 1, Mostar, September 1992, p. 7).
In accordance with the Statutory Decision on Interim Establishment of the Executive Power and Administration on the territory of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, the HVO was granted broad authorities to regulate “economic and other relations on the territory of the HZ HB” through decrees, decisions, rulings and conclusions.77

The municipal HVOs were formed in mid 1992. Thus, for instance, the municipal HVO in Bugojno was formed on July 7, 1992, when Mate Boban, President of the HZ HB and the HVO, pursuant to Article 2 of the Statutory Decision on Interim Establishment of the Municipal Executive Power and Municipal Administration, brought the Decision on Appointment.78

With the Decree on Armed Forces of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, passed on July 3, 1992, the Presidency of the HZ HB established the armed forces, as the “fundamental bearer of armed resistance”, protecting the sovereignty of the HZ HB and defending “its territorial integrity”. Namely, the Decree regulates “the rights and obligations of citizens, powers of the Croatian Defence Council (hereinafter referred to as: the HVO), administration bodies and legal entities, in defence of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia (hereinafter referred to as: HZ HB), and other issues relevant to the defence system”. The Decree also governs: the duties of citizens in defence (working, military and material obligation, then obligation of participation in civil defence, and “in the surveillance and alarming service”, powers of the HVO, bodies of administration of the HZ HB and legal entities in the defence affairs (HVO, administrative bodies and other bodies of the HZ HB), legal entities, directing

77 Narodni list HZ Herceg-Bosna, No. 1, Mostar, September 1992, p. 7.

78 AIIZ, inv. No. 6-112, Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, Croatian Defence Council, no. 444, Mostar, July 7, 1992, Decision on Appointment of the Municipal HVO of Bugojno. At the time, the following persons were appointed: Vladimir Soljic (President of the HVO, Ante Bagaric (co-President of the HVO), Pavo Pavlovic (deputy head of the Office for General Administration), Leon Cosic (head of Office for Economy), Branko Saric, head of the Office for Defence), Mihovil Strujic (head of the Office for Social Affairs), Zeljko Zelic (commander of the police), and Zvonko Brajkovic (deputy head of the Office for Finance).

The aforementioned decision came into effect “as of the date of its passing” (AIIZ, inv. No. 6-112; C. Ribicic, the aforementioned work, p. 46, note 48).
and commanding over the armed forces, filling in of the armed forces, mobilization of the armed forces, flags and emblems of the armed forces, active professional composition of the armed forces, the right to compensation, penal provisions, and transitional and final provisions.79

The Decree on the Armed Forces of the HZ HB made efforts to have this collaborationist creation presented as an autonomous and sovereign state community, which got separated from the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.80 However, in reality, this creation was executing the orders of the superior, the one who had formed it, that is, of the Republic of Croatia.81

The HVO was serving the enforcement of the Greater Croatia goals of the Republic of Croatia. Together with the collaborationist formations of the HVO, subordinated to the Croatian Army, executing its (occupation-related) tasks, the Croatian Army occupied part of the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia), believing it to be Croatian, in order to associate it with the Republic of Croatia. The HVO members had also believed that Franjo Tudjman was their President and supreme commander.82

The HVO was therefore in the service and under direct command by Zagreb, where the political and military leadership of the Republic of Croatia had appointed leaders, high-ranking HVO officials.83 The HVO

79 Narodni list HZ Herceg-Bosna, no. 1, Mostar, September 1992, pp. 12-23; C. Ribicic, the aforementioned work, pp. 56-58, and 95.

80 Ibid. The supreme state bodies of the Republic of Croatia, particularly the Parliament and the Government (of the democratic unity) were, according to Ribicic, officially supporting the integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, “but part of the state structures and the ruling HDZ were nevertheless working on the option of accession of the HZ HB to Croatia” (C. Ribicic, the aforementioned work, p. 96). However, this support was of declarative nature.

81 Having in mind this reality, it is not possible to accept the conclusion by C. Ribicic that the HZ HB, “in terms of armed forces, coordinated its activity with the Republic of Croatia, and represented the fundament for the financial, personnel and other assistance of Croatia to the HVO” (C. Ribicic, the aforementioned work, p. 56). This was not “coordination of activities” with the Republic of Croatia, but execution of tasks assigned by its leadership structures.

82 ICTY, Case: no. IT-95-14-T, paragraph 109.

83 Ibid., paragraph 112, note 230.
was no autonomous political or military factor in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. These were collaborationist forces under the command of the Republic of Croatia, that is, within the single system of directing and commanding by the Croatian Army. Even some of the highest-ranking officers of the Croatian Army were appointed members of the HVO.84

The Republic of Croatia had possessed and exerted full control (formed, ordered, armed, equipped, sustained) over the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, and the Croatian Defence Council, and over the Croatian political and military leaderships in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in general.85

The bodies of the collaborationist Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia passed decrees, decisions, rules of procedures, regulations and many other enactments, which governed the matter governed by laws in states, important to the activity of each state community. All the enactments adopted by the HZ HB were only modified in order to conceal the truth, but they were brought as per the orders of the supervising instances of the Republic of Croatia. The organization of power in the HZ HB was mainly taking over certain solutions and names of bodies from the contemporary Croatian constitutional legal system and historical tradition. The official language was “Croatian”. Many documents of this collaborationist creation prescribe the use of the Croatian language at schools, institutions, and the like. The official currency was the Croatian dinar. The Flag of the armed forces and the coat of arms of the HZ HB (“the historical flag” and the “historical coat-of-arms”) were mainly identical to the solution from the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia from 1990. The import of commodities from Croatia into the HZ HB was governed in a special way (certain customs regulations were not applicable to the commodities

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84 ICTY, PROSECUTOR AGAINST IVICA RAJIC, aka Viktor Andric, INDICTMENT (hereinafter referred to as: ICTY, PROSECUTOR AGAINST RAJIC), Case: No. IT-95-12, the Hague, September 13, 1996, paragraphs 34-35, 37, 40, and 42; ICTY, Case: no. IT-95-14-I-T, APPEAL PANEL, PROSECUTOR AGAINST ZLATKO ALEKSOVSKI, VERDICT (hereinafter referred to as: ICTY, Case: No. IT-95-14-I-T), the Hague, March 24, 2000, paragraph 78, note 182.

85 ICTY, Case: No. IT-95-14-T, paragraph 744, ICTY, Case: No. IT-95-14-I-T, paragraph 78, note 182. The Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia and the Croatian Defence Council were fully subordinated to the Zagreb regime.
imported from Croatia), and the like. Such system is the expression of the overall relations between the HZ HB and the Republic of Croatia, which was in various ways, even financially, supporting the HZ HB.86

The HZ HB bodies had accepted all the legal enactments issued, suggested or ordered by Franjo Tudjman (all of his ideas and instructions were realized by the HZ HB). These bodies exercised state policy and executed direct instructions from the bodies of the Republic of Croatia, which is, in addition to many authors and certain officials of the HDZ of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and documents, also indicated by the fact that the HDZ of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as the decision-making political force in the HZ HB, was a constitutive part of the HDZ of Croatia, seated in Zagreb.87

Therefore, this was no sovereign state community, because its highest bodies were subordinated to another state, but a collaborationist body of the neighbouring state, occupational force – the Republic of Croatia, enforcing the state policy and executed the decisions of this occupational force which was superimposed to it.88

In late August 1993, the non-constitutional and collaborationist creation of the HZ HB, in compliance with the dual role of the arbitrators from the international community and the new peace plan (Owen-Stoltenberg Plan), behind which the initiative (a joint proposal) of Milosevic and Tudjman stood,89 was again illegally transformed into a “republic”. Thus, it “improved its governing structures” for forming the Croatian republic. On August 24, 1993 in Livno, the headquarters of the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina proclaimed the collaborationist creation of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, and constituted the “house of representatives” that had the function of the parliament.90

86 C. Ribicic, the aforementioned work, pp. 22, 75, 77, and 93-95.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid., pp. 75-77.
90 Sluzbeni list R BiH, No. 6, p. 85; C. Ribicic, the aforementioned work, pp. 101-111.
Four days later, that is, on August 28, 1993, “in compliance with the political decisions of the Croatian Democratic Union for Bosnia and Herzegovina, as the legitimate representative of the political will of the Croatian people”, the house of representatives of the “Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia” passed the **Fundamental Decision on Establishment and Proclamation of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia**. In the Decision, the **HZ HB** is called the “republic” and “state community”, which meant “**a step forward in the process of autonomy in relation to the HZ HB**”. In this way, the then “community” (HZ HB) became a “republic”, defined as “**single and undividable democratic state of the Croatian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, based on human rights and freedoms, rule of law and social justice**”. This is a new name for the “community” which has the same territory (**the area of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia**), with Mostar as the capital of the “republic”.

The Fundamental Decision suggests that “**the people shall exercise its rights in the Republic**”, in which the power “**derives from people and belongs to people as the community of free and equal citizens**”, at which “**people shall exercise power by electing their representatives and through direct decision-making**”. However, this mono-ethnic definition of the “Republic” (“**the state of the Croatian people**”) is still present, in spite of being supplemented with principles on human rights and freedoms, rule of law and social justice.

The Fundamental Decision on establishment and proclamation of the **Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia** (hereinafter referred to as:...
HR HB), envisages for passing of the Constitution, “indicating upon the ambition for establishment of its statehood”, which will, among other things, also determine its “final borders”, then the coat of arms, the flag, and the anthem. It was also envisaged that the “Republic” shall freely associate into the union of republics, where “certain rights and obligations of the Republic” may be exercised “in the joint bodies of the union of the republics”, stressing that “the sovereignty of the Republic is undividable, unalienable and non-transferable”.93

Pursuant to the Fundamental Decision, the state power in the HR HB was established on the principles of parliamentary democracy and division of power into the legislative (house of representatives), executive (government), and judicial (independent courts). The President and the members of the government were elected and dismissed by the house of representatives, upon the proposal of the President of the republic. The President of the republic “shall represent the Republic in the country and abroad, expressing its constitutional unity and ensures single activity on the part of all the state power bodies”. He is “the supreme commander of the Armed Forces of the Republic, he shall appoint and dismiss the highest ranking military officers, upon the obtained opinion from the Government of the Republic”.94

In spite of the reaffirmation of sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Security Council Resolution (no. 859) dated August 24, 1993,95 the HR HB had all the state-like features. Until the passing of constitution and constituting of its bodies, the regulations of the HZ HB were applied, “as well as the regulations of the current Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina when not in contravention with the regulations of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia”. The functions of the state authorities until selection and appointment of the bodies, as per the provisions of the Decision, were performed by the bodies of the HZ

93 Narodni list Hrvatske Republike Herceg-Bosna, no. 1, Mostar, October 1993.
94 Ibid.; C. Ribicic, the aforementioned work, pp. 102-103.
95 ∴ REZOLUCIJE VIJECA SIGURNOSTI UN O BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI (hereinafter referred to as: ∴ REZOLUCIJE ...), Sarajevo, 1995, pp. 86-88.
The duty of the President of the “Republic” until his election was performed by the President of the HZ HB.96

The HR HB is a logical continuation of the activity of the Croatian Democratic Union, which were aimed at formation of the “Croatian state”. The “Republic” was formed and organized only and exclusively as the state of one people – Croatian. Based on the statement determining the territory on which this “Croatian state” will exist, and this is – the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina -, it can be concluded that the HR HB remains in its framework. However, having in mind a number of facts, such as: firstly, the Fundamental Decision refers to the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as the “current”, and the Serb collaborationists were referring to it as the “former”; secondly, the HR HB was created pursuant to the political decisions of the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina, “as the legitimate present of the political will of the Croatian people”; thirdly, Mostar (the centre of the HR HB) became the capital of the HR HB as promulgated in March 1994; fourthly, the use of the notion “constitution”; fifthly, the HR HB acted against sovereignty and integrity of the R BiH, etc., obviously show that the goal is – formation of the Croatian state (“single and undivided”), with established statehood.97

The statement on the Croatian state within the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina is of declarative character, such as the case with the statement on association of this republic into the union of republics (this position arose under the influence of the conversation and double-faced proposals from the international community for the resolution of the Bosnian “crisis”, in fact, about its division). The international recognition was only still lacking.

At its second session, held on September 30, 1993, the House of Representatives of the HR HB brought the Law on the Government of the HR HB, establishing (the Government “as the supreme body of executive power and administration on the territory of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia” and its “organization and competencies”. For its work, the Government reported to the House of Representatives

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96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
of the HR HB, and to the President of the HR HB, whereas the HVO, the precedent of the government, reported to the Presidency of the HR HB.98

On November 20, 1993, the House of Representatives of the HR HB passed the decision on election of the President, vice-President and members of the government.99

All the enactments of the HR HB contain all the relevant elements of the state organization, already contained in the HZ HB enactments, so they, both in terms of contents and terminology (constitution, house of representatives, government, supreme court, President of the republic), involve formation of a new state community. In this way, “the HR HB gained a new organizational structure, designed as permanent, and no longer limited to the period of the war or war danger”.100

The Declaration of the House of Representatives of the HR of Herzeg-Bosnia, dated February 8, 1994, introduced significant contents-related changes in the activity of the HR HB. This declaration states that the “House of Representatives… is the only legitimate legislative body of authority of the Croatian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, arising from the right and obligation to represent and exercise its “ethnic, religious, cultural and economic freedom and independence”, and to preserve the “historical and cultural heritage” and to realize its state constitutionality within the framework of independent Bosnia and Herzegovina, within its internationally recognized borders, “as the state of three equal state constitutive nations”.101

Under the influence and constellation of the existing political and military conditions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and internationally, the

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98 Narodni list Hrvatske Republike Herceg-Bosna, no. 1, Mostar, October 1993, p. 6; C. Ribicic, the aforementioned work, p. 195.
99 Narodni list Hrvatske Republike Herceg-Bosna, no. 4, Mostar, December 1993. The person elected President of the “Government” was Jadranko Prlic, President of the HVO of “HZ HB”.
100 C. Ribicic, the aforementioned work, p. 108.
representatives of the House of Representatives of the HR HB took the position in favour of the “urgent cessation of war” and “political solution of the state crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, that is, the internal organization of the state based on the principle of forming of a union of three republics in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In each of the three republics, the House of Representatives was in favour of “cultural, religious and ethnic autonomy and local self-governance for each of the nations”. According to the House of Representatives, preservation of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina is only possible with the consent of “each of the three equal state constituting nations (Croats, Serbs, and Muslims) and all of them together”, through the Union of the Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Such a union “must be governed as a democratic, multi-party and parliamentarian state, ensuring and guaranteeing all the basic rights and freedoms for each of its constitutive nations, as well as citizens, regardless of their ethnic affiliation, religious orientations, political affiliation, sex, or social status”.

The rights of the Croatian nation in Bosnia and Herzegovina “to self-determination and realization of statehood, independence and autonomy”, according to the House of Representatives, was possible to “realize and guarantee” only “through the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia in the Union of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, respecting the right of the other two constitutive nations (Serbs, Muslims) to secure the same using the same principle for themselves”.

Under the influence of the new conditions and relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly the international ones, the collaborationist, fascistic creation of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia accepted the normatively and declaratively significant programmatic political document. However, nothing actually changed. This was actually an incompetent attempt to use existing political circumstances (internal and international) to delude the domestic and world public and extort the recognition of the HR HB, as a separate entity, which could, equally

102 Ibid.
103 Ibid.
104 Ibid.
with the Serb entity and the Bosniaks, establish a (con)federal Bosnia and Herzegovina in the form of a union of three republics.\textsuperscript{105}

By the Washington Agreement, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was governed based on the principle of cantons, 3 of which with Croatian majority, 3 with Bosniak majority, and 2 mixed ones. The Croats in BiH accepted the Federation only under the condition that Croatia guarantees their integrity through a confederal link with Croatia.\textsuperscript{106}

After signing of the Washington Agreement, on September 13, 1994, Franjo Tudjman convened a session in Zagreb, inviting all the head people of the \textit{HR HB}, representatives of the Church, and certain opposition leaders. The goal was to “give a brief on the current situation in \textit{Herzeg-Bosnia}, but also to reemphasize the significance of the Washington Agreement for sovereignty of the Croats in BiH”. Among other things, Franjo Tudjman stated as follows at this meeting: “\textbf{Until the Federation or Confederation is established, \textit{Herzeg-Bosnia} needs to remain a guarantee for the interests of the Croatian people}”.\textsuperscript{107}

In spite of signing peace plans for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Franjo Tudjman was constantly obstructing the adequate solution to the problem in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He remained firm with the belief of his expansionist nationalist policy.\textsuperscript{108}

Even after the signing of the Washington Agreement, instead of forming the legal structure of bodies and institutions at all levels, as envisaged in the Constitution of the Federation, those authority structures were retained as preceding this agreement, including not only retaining

\textsuperscript{105} C. Ribicic, the aforementioned work, pp. 108-111.

\textsuperscript{106} H. Sarinic, the aforementioned work, p. 135. According to Marinko Culic, the Washington Agreement formed the Bosniak-Croatian Federation, including an article to the Agreement (non-mandatory however), opening an option that this part of Bosnia and Herzegovina be associated in a confederation with Croatia (M. Culic, the aforementioned work, pp. 68-69).

\textsuperscript{107} Ibid., p. 167.

\textsuperscript{108} M. Culic, the aforementioned work, pp. 72-73.
in life, but also strengthening of *Herzeg-Bosnia*. The existence of *Herzeg-Bosnia* was even confirmed by Franjo Tudjman, during his official visit to Sarajevo, on June 14, 1994. Namely, at the brief press conference then, among other things, he stated that “*Herzeg-Bosnia* exists and will remain until the Federation is realized, and the foundations for the Confederation are laid down at the same time”, and that it “needs to be included as a fundamental basis, both for the Federation and for the confederation”.

Franjo Tudjman believed that he (they) would never accept a federation without confederation, “*because then the danger from majorization and islamization is huge*”. He presented this assessment also on November 18, 1994, in his discussion with the British Ambassador, Gavin Hewitt.

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109 For more details on this, please see: K. Begic, the aforementioned work, pp. 194-197.

110 Ibid.

111 H. Sarinic, the aforementioned work, p. 178. Tudjman’s dreams about a Croatian-Bosniak confederation had failed (M. Culic, the aforementioned work, p. 76).
4. Occupation of a Part of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Following the new secret negotiations between Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo Tuđman about the division and destruction of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with its collaborationist formations (Croatian Defence Council)\(^{112}\), the Army of the Republic of Croatia launched an

\(^{112}\) With the formation of the Croatian Defence Council as the supreme “body of defence of the Croatian people in the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia”, on April 8, 1992, headed by Mate Boban, after organization of “defence” through crisis headquarters in local communities and municipalities, the military forces were formed – the municipal headquarters of the HVO, with power to direct and command the units. Initially, departments and platoons were formed on the territorial principle, and they grew into parties of manoeuvre character, and these grew into battalions. All the municipalities had units at the levels of battalions. The battalions and other units were subordinated to the municipal headquarters. Pursuant to the Decree on the Armed Forces of the “HZ HB” (Narodni list Hrvatske Republike Herceg-Bosna, no. 1/92), dated July 3, 1992, the HVO developed and perfected its military organization. The units were integrated, constituting the basis for formation of larger professional units.

Pursuant to the Order of the Main headquarters of the HVO of HZ HB, brigades were formed in the majority of the municipalities of HZ HB (with formation of brigades, all the municipal headquarters had been suspended on December 31, 1992), “which improved the quality of commanding, and the mobility of the units”. The brigades were autonomous units under the command of the GS HVO of HZ HB. The majority of the municipalities had one brigade each. Two municipalities had two brigades each. Some municipalities had joint brigades. Each brigade had its own area of responsibility, including the areas of a number of municipalities. Each brigade consisted of the appropriate number of battalions, the number of which depended on the area of responsibility of each respective HVO battalion. The brigade commanders were foremost responsible for planning and execution of combat activities in the areas of responsibility of the brigades they commanded, and in those terms, they issued orders.
occupation offensive against Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus, in compliance with the Greater Croatia program on formation of the “joint Croatian state within its ethnic and historical borders”, the Republic of Croatia became openly involved in the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, thus becoming an aggressor itself when it used to be a victim of the Greater Serbia aggression.


With establishment of the collaborationist Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia (November 18, 1991), the officers of the Croatian Army formed, organized and led the armed units in this collaborationist creation.

Four operational zones were even formed in the HZ HB, consisting of a number of brigades.

In the process of reorganization and transformation of the armed forces of HZ HB, in order to form more powerful, quick and manoeuvre-aimed units, professional and special units were also formed, then units of artillery, Military Police, with over 3,000 manpower, and civilian police. Of the existing units (battalions, brigades and the like), guardian brigades and later even military districts.

The armed forces of the HZ HB were organized into commands, units and institutions. They consisted of the active and reserve units, and they also had peace-time and war units. The commander of the collaborationist Armed Forces of the HZ HB, was formally the President of the HZ HB, Mate Boban, that is, Dr. Jadranko Prlic, as of August 14, 1992. However, the actual and only supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the HZ HB was President Franjo Tudjman, supreme commander of the Croatian Army.

The presidency of the HZ HB, headed by Mate Boban, President of the HVO and the HZ HB, also prescribed the formation of the Main headquarters of the HVO, formed within the Defence Department, seated in Grude, and then in Mostar. Formation of the Main Headquarters of the HVO of HZ HB started in early April 1992, “at the time of the conflicts at Kupres”.

Heading the Main headquarters of the HVO in the period of 1992-1995, in the function of chiefs of staff, that is commanders, were the following high-ranking officers of the Croatian Army in turn: brigadier Milivoj Petkovic, general Slobodan Praljak, then again brigadier Milivoj Petkovic, then general Ante Roso, and Tihomir Blaskic.

The formation, organization, development and other issues related to the collaborationist formations of the Croatian Army (Croatian Defence Council) were addressed by the author in a separate study, which has as yet not been published.
Thus, the Croatian Army had been present in Bosnia and Herzegovina since that time,\textsuperscript{113} which was constantly corroborated through its immediate participation in the aggression and other forms of crime, including, in addition to the logistical supply, directing and commanding, also the overall support to its collaborationist forces – Croatian Defence Council.

On December 7, 1991, the meeting of the representatives of crisis headquarters and military commanders of the Central and Southern Dalmatia, held near Ploce, was also attended by the representatives of the municipalities of the \textit{Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia}. Among them, in the capacity of “\textbf{military commissioner}” of the “\textbf{Main headquarters for the Croatian Union of Municipalities of Bosnia and Herzegovina}” was also Mate Boban, President of the \textit{Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia}.\textsuperscript{114}

The following was concluded at that meeting:

1. to draft a joint plan for defence of the Central and Southern Dalmatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina;

2. to regulate the status and salaries of officers “\textbf{leading the units in Herzeg-Bosnia}”;  
3. “\textbf{to carry out redistribution of arms}” and to “\textbf{train special units}”; 

\textsuperscript{113} M. Spegelj, the aforementioned work, pp. 328-329.  
\textsuperscript{114} Ibid., p. 328. This meeting was also attended by Perica Juric, minister of interior of the Republic of Croatia, Miso Munivrana, assistant minister of defence of the Republic of Croatia, and others.

Immediately after establishment of the \textit{Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia}, the Main Headquarters of this collaborationist creation was also formed and a “\textbf{high commissioner}” was appointed, who was heading it. This duty was performed by Mate Boban, President of the \textit{Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia}, and of the Croatian Defence Council, who had participated in that capacity in the meeting near Ploce, on December 7, 1991, attended by the representatives of the crisis headquarters and military commanders of the Central and Southern Dalmatia, and the representatives of the municipalities of the \textit{Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia}. From November 1991, this collaborationist creation saw participation of active armed units lead by the officers of the Croatian Army, which indicates to the conclusion that as early as since then, the Croatian Army had been present in Bosnia and Herzegovina (M. Spegelj, the aforementioned work, pp. 328-329).
4. The Main Headquarters of the Croatian Army shall organize a joint command for the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia and for the Central and Southern Dalmatia, that is, Southern Croatia;

5. to have the communications system in West Herzegovina “fit into the communications system of Croatia, through the PTT enterprise in Split and its chief, Juraj Buzolic”.\footnote{Ibid.}

At the next meeting, held in Glavice near Sinj, on December 28, 1991,\footnote{Ibid.} the following was decided:

1. to appoint the commander and command for the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia and Southern Croatia, initially seated in Imotski, “and in the case of war in Herzeg-Bosnia”;

2. to “immediately resolve the status and salaries of the officers in Herzeg-Bosnia”;

3. to have “the supplies strengthened in terms of arms, ammunition, clothing and footwear” for the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia;

4. to “make a joint organization in operational and strategic terms” from Neum up to Travnik and from Trebinje up to Livno;

5. to have a “special unit” formed which would be the Rapid flying Regiment King Tomislav of some 900 men, commanded by Daidza.\footnote{Ibid., p. 329. According to Martin Spiegelj, Daidza asked for arms and equipment, so in relation to this, he was told that “he would receive them from the quantities conquered at the Male Bare warehouse, otherwise intended for use in Dubrovnik.” (Ibid.).}

\footnote{Ibid. This meeting was attended by: minister of defence of the Republic of Croatia Gojko Susak, commander of the Croatian War Navy Sveto Letica, captain of the military vessel Petar Simac, general Martin Spiegelj, then Mate Boban, Daidza, and others.

According to general Martin Spiegelj, the meeting in Glavice was the “operative development of the arrangements from the secret meeting” of the President of the Republic of Croatia Dr. Franjo Tudjman and the delegation of the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina, attended by the highest officials of the Republic of Croatia, held in Zagreb the day before, on December 27, 1991.}
At the third meeting, held a month afterwards—on January 28, 1992, the following conclusions were adopted:

1. regulation of status and salaries of the officers “leading the units in Herzeg-Bosnia”;
2. engagement in joint defence of the Neretva river delta;
3. formation and equipping of “autonomous and combined Muslim-Croatian units” 118

The meetings of December 7 and 28, 1991, among other things concluded to draft the joint plan of defence and to form the Joint Command for South Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, that is, the part of Bosnia and Herzegovina which was the territory of the collaborationist Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia. These conclusions, in particular formation of the Joint Command, were implemented by General Bobetko, after he had been appointed commander of the Southern Frontline, on April 10, 1992. 119

All of the aforementioned meetings discussed regulation of the status and salaries of the officers of the Croatian Army who were leading the

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General Martin Spegelj claims that he presented “many arguments against such foundation of the unit and warned that the besieged Dubrovnik is at stake, because, although dissipating day in day out, the enemy’s 37th Corps can still push out onto the left bank of Neretva and harm Ploce and endanger Ploce and Metkovic. Unable to explain that the defence of Dubrovnik is more important than a quick flying regiment, I at least tried to save what could be saved and I managed to enforce that half of the arms goes to Daidza, and the second half – mainly small arms and some 80 mm mortars – goes to the defenders of Dubrovnik. This was then transported to the city in rubber motor boats” (Ibid., p. 320).

118 Ibid., pp. 328-329. This meeting too (the place of the meeting was not established) was attended by General Martin Spegelj, where he spoke, just like at the meeting on December 28, 1991. According to himself, Spegelj warned of the necessity to establish alliance “with the Muslims and with everyone who want to defend Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that all of this needs to be done through legal channels and through an inter-state agreement such as the one that we used to have with Slovenia” (Ibid., p. 329).

armed units in the *Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia*. This collaborationist creation was discussed as though this was not at all the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but the territory of the Republic of Croatia. This was obviously shown in the aforementioned conclusions, as well as the testimonies of General Spegelj.\(^{120}\)

**The regular units of the Republic of Croatia**, commanded by the high-ranking officers of the Croatian Army, participated in the combat activities against Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to conquer a part of the Republic. These were the following units – either complete or partially – of the **Croatian Army**:

- **forty-five brigades** (1\(^{st}\) Brigade; 1\(^{st}\) A Brigade – 1\(^{st}\) Brigade of the National Guard District – ZNG; 2\(^{nd}\) Brigade; 3\(^{rd}\) Brigade; 3\(^{rd}\) A Brigade – 3\(^{rd}\) Brigade of the ZNG; 4\(^{th}\) Brigade; 5\(^{th}\) Brigade; 7\(^{th}\) Brigade; 100\(^{th}\) Brigade; 101\(^{st}\) Brigade; 102\(^{nd}\) Brigade; 103\(^{rd}\) Brigade; 104\(^{th}\) Brigade, 105\(^{th}\) Brigade; 106\(^{th}\) Brigade; 108\(^{th}\) Brigade; 109\(^{th}\) Brigade; 110\(^{th}\) Brigade; 111\(^{th}\) Brigade; 112\(^{th}\) Brigade; 114\(^{th}\) Brigade; 115\(^{th}\) Brigade; 116\(^{th}\) Brigade; 117\(^{th}\) Brigade; 118\(^{th}\) Brigade; 119\(^{th}\) Brigade, 120\(^{th}\) Brigade; 123\(^{rd}\) Brigade; 126\(^{th}\) Brigade; 127\(^{th}\) Brigade; 128\(^{th}\) Brigade; 139\(^{th}\) Brigade; 140\(^{th}\) Brigade; 141\(^{st}\) Brigade; 145\(^{th}\) Brigade; 153\(^{rd}\) Brigade; 156\(^{th}\) Brigade; 157\(^{th}\) Brigade; 159\(^{th}\) Brigade; 162\(^{nd}\) Brigade; 163\(^{rd}\) Brigade; 166\(^{th}\) Brigade; 175\(^{th}\) Brigade; 203\(^{rd}\) Brigade; and the 1\(^{st}\) Medical Brigade;

- **four regiments** (1\(^{st}\) Volunteer Regiment of *King Tomislav*; Regiment of *Bruno Busic*; 5\(^{th}\) *Domobran* Regiment, and 11\(^{th}\) *Domobran* Regiment;

- **eight battalions** (60\(^{th}\) Autonomous Battalion of *Ludvig Pavlovic* – unit for special purposes; 2\(^{nd}\) Autonomous Battalion; Autonomous Battalion of *Frankopan*; 66\(^{th}\) Battalion of Military Police; 67\(^{th}\) Autonomous Battalion of Military Police; 4\(^{th}\) Autonomous Battalion of *Zrinjski*; 33\(^{rd}\) Engineering Battalion, and the Battalion of *Matija Vlacic*);

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\(^{120}\) M. Spegelj, the aforementioned work, pp. 328-329. Drafting of the joint plan of defence and formation of the Joint Command for South Croatia and the *Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia* (in early April 1992), logistic securing of material and technical resources, support in the officer personnel, training of the units of the *Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia* in the Republic of Croatia, the single system of communications, etc., corroborate the aggressive intentions of the Republic of Croatia.
- **an artillery regiment** (4th Artillery Regiment);
- **two divisions** (55th Light Artillery Division of Anti-Aircraft Defence from Sisak, and 2nd Motorized Artillery Division of the Operational Zone of Osijek);
- **one mixed party of the naval parachute infantry** (Mixed Part of the Naval Parachute Infantry);
- **one helicopter escadrille** (helicopter escadrille);
- **two tactical groups** (Tactical Group 2 – TG 2, and Tactical Group 4 – TG 4);
- **ten special units** (Group for Anti-Tank Action – POG from Sisak, **Giants**; **Tigers** from Zagreb; **Scorpios**; **Alkari**; **Wolves**; **Pumas** from Varazdin; **Kune** from Osijek; **Spiders** from Split, and **Thunderbolts** from Sisak);
- **a number of commando and other types of units**.\(^{121}\)

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With the aforementioned and other forces, in the period from

November 1991 through March 18, 1994, the Republic of Croatia participated in the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, perpetrating numerous crimes, including the genocide against Bosniaks, particularly in Central Bosnia and the valley of the Neretva river. Together with its collaborationist units, the Croatian Army attacked and destroyed many cities and towns, such as for instance, Prozor, Mostar, Sovici, Doljani, Ahmici, and other places. These forces occupied a number of cities and villages, and besieged others, and in doing so, they intensively shelled them and prevented arrival of humanitarian aid and staple food items.

On April 10, 1992 (at 22:30 h), pursuant to Article 52, paragraph 1, point 1 of the Law on Defence, “given the extraordinary circumstances in relation to escalation of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, also endangering the border areas of the Republic of Croatia”, President of the Republic of Croatia, Franjo Tudjman, passed Order no. PA 7-28/I-92, appointing Janko Bobetko, General of the Army District, commander...
of “all the units of the Croatian Army on the southern frontline from Split to Dubrovnik”. The same order establishes the powers and tasks of General Bobetko. He was the one to whom “all the commands of the aforementioned sector were subordinated, including those from the Croatian War Navy”. The task was that “as needed, from their composition, the headquarters of the Southern Frontline would also be formed”.  

President Franjo Tudjman brought this order having in mind “the extraordinary circumstances in relation to escalation of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina”. This means that based on the circumstances prevalent in the neighbouring state rather than in the Republic of Croatia, he brought such a decision. Indeed, he claims that “the escalation of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina” “also endangers the border areas of the Republic of Croatia”.  

The operational area of responsibility of the Southern Frontline encompassed the southern part of Croatia and apart of the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (part of Herzegovina and Central Bosnia), on which the collaborationist creation of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia was formed.  

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124 J. Bobetko, the aforementioned work, pp. 27, 124, and 202; AIIZ, 2-1678, Republic of Croatia, President, ORDER, no. PA 7-28/1-92, Zagreb, April 10, 1992, 22:30 h, published in: J. Bobetko, the aforementioned work, p. 202. On April 10, 1992, General of the Army District Janko Bobetko took on the Southern Frontline, in the capacity of the commander of the Southern Frontline, with competencies of commanding over all the naval and land forces in this segment of the front (Ibid.).

125 Ibid.

This frontline initially saw involvement of the 1st, and then 115th, and 116th Brigades of the Croatian Army, with the 4th Brigade also arriving subsequently (from Metkovic, Ploce, and Split).127

The territory of the Republic of Croatia from Dubrovnik to Split constituted the Operational zone whose command was in Split (OZ Split), under the command of Mato Viduka. All the units of the Croatian Army within the OZ Split were under direct command of the commander of the Southern Frontline, General Bobetko.128

Pursuant to the aforementioned order by Franjo Tudjman, and other documents and direct testimonies by generals Janko Bobetko and Martin Spiegelj, the war goals of the Republic of Croatia can be established – occupation a part of Bosnia and Herzegovina.129 This is even more
strongly expressed in the Order of the commander of the Operational zone of Split (IZM Ploce), dated April 12, 1992. Namely, on April 12, General Bobetko arrived in Ploce, to his front command position, and ordered to the commander of the Operational Zone of Split, Mato Viduka, to send a part of the Croatian Army forces into the broader area of the Slipcici village, south of Mostar. 130

The order was issued “based on the current situation in Herzegovina, in relation to the order of general of the army district Janko Bobetko”. It was ordered to the commander of the 4th Battalion of the 4th Brigade of the ZNG to march during the night of April 12-13, 1992, with his unit in the direction of Rab-Opuzen-Metkovic-Ljubuski-Citluk-Slipcici village, in order to arrive in the area of the Slipcici-Tepcici-Dobro Selo villages, in order to organize persistent defence, with maximum obstruction and digging in, in order to prevent “the enemy

the actual intentions of passing such an order and of his appointment as the commander of the Southern Frontline. Namely, he claims that, several hours before passing such an order, on the same day in the evening hours he talked to minister Susak, and warned him that the “major danger for Croatia is cutting off or cutting through of the southern part of the frontline”. Following this, (one hour before passing such an order), they went to see President Franjo Tudjman, and explained to him the complexity of the situation. At the time, Janko Bobetko told Franjo Tudjman that, in his assessment, “the enemy is preparing a multi-sided attack, whose basic directions lead to conquering of the Neretva valley, that their ultimate point is the Ploce port, that the current position north of Metkovic up to Mostar is critical…”. Then, general Janko Bobetko proposed to Franjo Tudjman to draft an order “giving him the authority and responsibility to perform this task”, which was actually done by Franjo Tudjman at 22:30 h.

Instead of such explanation, in the sub-title “Preparations and organization of defence of the broader area of Herzegovina and preparations for the Cagalj Operation”, general Janko Bobetko openly expresses his authority, tasks and goals – taking of the “broader area of Herzegovina” (J. Bobetko, the aforementioned work, pp. 200-202, and the like).

General Martin Spegelj claims that the goals of activity of Bobetko’s group were – “taking of the largest territory possible, in order to divide up BiH with Serbia” (.: RAT U HRVATSKOJ I BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI 1991-1995, hereinafter referred to as: RAT..., edited by Branka Magas and Ivo Zanic, Zagreb – Sarajevo 1999, p. 135).

130 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-1680, Command of the OZ Split, IZM Ploce, class: 8/92-01/17, reg. No. 6030-08/91-01, April 12, 1992 - to the Commander 4/4 brigade of the ZNG, Order, published in: J. Bobetko, the aforementioned work, pp. 201-203.
from pushing through in the direction of Citluk”. Vladimir Perak, commander of “defence” of that part of Herzegovina had already been in Citluk at the time.  

Pursuant to the aforementioned order, the units of the 4th Brigade of the ZNG (4th Battalion) took the “sensitive and key positions in Herzegovina”.  

Pursuant to the order by Franjo Tudjman dated April 10, 1992, that he was “the commander of all the units of the Croatian Army at the Southern Frontline from Split to Dubrovnik”, General Bobetko was (in addition to being the commander of the Southern Frontline) also the commander of the Main Headquarters of Herzeg-Bosnia. In that capacity, on April 12, he also issued the (first) Order to Colonel Vladimir Perak.

After Kupres was taken by the Greater Serbia aggressor (on April 7, 1992), where the Croatian army was defeated, the Croatian units

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131 Ibid.
132 Ibid.
133 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-1682, Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, Croatian Defence Council, Main Headquarters, April 12, 1992, Order to Colonel Vladimir Perak, published in: J. Bobetko, the aforementioned work, p. 204.

With this order, general Janko Bobetko forced Colonel Perak to surrender the duty of command in the direction of Citluk. As general Janko Bobetko wrote, he had defended this direction “with small, non-dug and poorly deployed forces”, “he was working based on the orders from KOS”, and after dismissal, “he was quick to get lost from that part of the frontline and according to some reliable information, today he is living in Belgrade” (Ibid.).

134 In appreciation of the operational and tactical significance of the Kupres Plateau and the Kupreska Gate range, during 1991, on this territory the JNA had deployed significant armored and mechanized forces, under the excuse of regular exercising activities. Those JNA forces on the Kupres Plateau had participated in the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In late March 1992, the Croatian Army made a breakthrough towards Kupres from the south, and in the first phase it realized certain results, entering Kupres (ZLOČINI U VRBANJI JULI 1993, Sarajevo 2001, p. 86).

In the beginning and in the first half of April 1992, on the Kupres Plateau, the JNA units (the 5th and 9th Corpses) were waging some intensive combat activity. In the period from April 2 through 11, the JNA broke down three brigades of the Croatian Army, as well as the HVO and HOS forces. In these combats, the Croatian forces had
withdrew and abandoned their positions. In the phase of abandoning Suica and descent of the Chetniks from Kupres to Suica, together with Miroslav Tudjman, Vukojevic, and Mato Boban, General Bobetko arrived in Suica. He undertook certain measures to preserve Suica, in order to “save” the whole of that area, through which the front line at Suica remained “defended”,135 that is, occupied by the Croatian army.


135 J. Bobetko, the aforementioned work, p. 205. According to general Janko Bobetko, Mate Boban is “one of the most responsible persons in Herzegovina”, with whom he constantly cooperated and visited the frontlines (Ibid., p. 205).
in order to accomplish the following goals: “defence this territory, preserve it and create the preconditions for the attack activities towards Dubrovnik, and for preparation of the operation “Cagalj”, meaning liberation of the left and rights banks of the Neretva, conquest of Stolac, Blagaj, and together with the HVO forces, from the direction of Mostar, the taking of the very city”. Thus, on April 15, he issued the order to the commander of the Dubrovnik Sector defence to take the positions on the line of Budisavina-Crnoglav-Stolovic, and defend them at any price until further notice, and to defend at any price the region of Metkovic-Dracevac-Mt. Bulutovac-Hutovo Blato. In the same order, General Bobetko also commanded the Main Headquarters of the Croatian Defence Council to take the right bank of the Neretva from the units of the Territorial Defence and to prevent “the passage of the Chetniks from the left onto the right bank of the river” and to obstruct from tank attacks and to persistently defend the direction of Surmanci-Sevas Polje, that is, Sevas Polje-Surmanci, “as the probable direction of attack of an armed battalion”.

For the sake of easier and more efficient coordination of forces on the territory of South Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (the area of the collaborationist Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia), within the Operational Zone of Split, there was a Forefront Command Place of Ploce formed (IZM Ploce), seated in Ploce. General Bobetko, commander of the Southern Frontline, issued orders from the IZM Ploce on the combat activities of the Croatian Army in the part of the Republic of Croatia and in the neighbouring state – parts of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (part of Herzegovina and Central Bosnia).

“For the sake of more efficient commanding and coordination of the combat activities at the Southern Frontline”, General Bobetko

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136 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-1682, Republic of Croatia, Main Headquarters of the Croatian Army, Command of OZ Split, IZM Ploce, class: 8/92-01/26, no. 6030-03/92-01, Ploce, April 15, 1992, published in: J. Bobetko, the aforementioned work, pp. 208-211.

In this order, General Bobetko even determined the time (hour and date) for defence preparedness. Based on this order (too), it is obvious that the Main Headquarters of the HVO in Grude was subordinated to General Janko Bobetko.

137 Cf. note 126, supra.
undertook certain organizational measures in “settling” of this portion of the front (he began “settling” the part of the units that were found in Herzegovina, in an effort to come closer with the part of the Command to the Livno, Mostar and Duvno directions). In relation to this, on April 15, 1992, in Grude, he had formed an IZM – Forefront Command Place of the Southern Frontline (the command place was located in the Grude Tobacco Station), where the Main Headquarters of the Croatian Defence Council was situated. In this way, he approximated his command place and created a bigger insight and bigger operational efficiency in “settling of the territory”.138

In his absence, pursuant to the Commands dated April 16, 1992, General Bobetko appointed Colonel of the Croatian Army Milivoj Petkovic the responsible officer at the IZM in Grude, with “all the powers of commanding and coordinating of the combat activities”.139

On the same day, that is, on April 16, 1992, General Bobetko appointed the composition of the command at the IZM Grude, Command of the

138 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-1683, command of the Southern Frontline, IZM Grude, April 16, 1992, Formation of the IZM of the Southern Frontline, published in: J. Bobetko, the aforementioned work, pp. 205-207. On this command, in addition to the personal signature of the commander, General Janko Bobetko, there is also a round seal with the Croatian flag in the middle and the inscription: “GLAVNI STOZER HERCEG-BOSNE” (General Staff of Herzeg-Bosnia).

With these organizational measures, General Bobetko regulated “all the organizational issues in functioning of all the directions of the frontline” (J. Bobetko, the aforementioned work, p. 205). Namely, from the forefront command places in Ploce and Grude, he was planning and conducting all the aggression actions by the units of the Croatian Army and its collaborationists – the HVO in Herzegovina and in Central Bosnia.

139 Ibid. Bruno Stojic was appointed the logistics support officer.

“Regarding the settling of the situation in Tomislavgrad, shown through instigating and violent action by the armed groups against the current Command, encouraged most probably by the local leaders”, based on the order by General Bobetko, Milivoj Petkovic, commander at the IZM Grude was made “was made available to the Command of Tomislavgrad” from May 16, 1992 until further notice, and “Major Ante Jelavic would represent him” at the IZM Grude (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-1689, Republic of Croatia, Command of the Southern Frontline, Command of OZ Split, IZM Ploce, class: 8/92-01/85, no. 6030-01/92-1 Ploce, May 16, 1992 – to General Major A. Roso, published in: J. Bobetko, the aforementioned work, p. 220).
Southern Frontline: Milivoj Petkovic, Colonel; Jure Zadro, Lieutenant; Dzevad Saric, Captain; Petar Martinovic, Lieutenant; Andjelko Juricic, Sergeant; Bozo Zovko, Sergeant; Bruno Stojic, a civilian; Zarko Keza, captain; Andjelka Stojic, a civilian; Pero Majic, a civilian, and Ante Jelavic, Major.

Two platoons (a platoon of military police and a communications platoon) were placed directly under the Command at the IZM Grude. The command was placed on the payroll of the Operational Zone of Split.140

From April 19, 1992, General Bobetko was the commander of the Southern Frontline Forces and the commander of the Main Headquarters of the Croatian Defence Council, subordinated to the Command of the Southern Frontline, that is, to General Bobetko.

By formation off the IZM Grude, the commanding and coordination over the combat activities of the Croatian Army and the Croatian Defence Council on the territory of the collaborationist Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia was conducted from two forefront command places of the Southern Frontline: IZM Ploce, and IZM Grude. 141

After formation of the IZM in Grude, General Bobetko proceeded with “formation of the commands for individual directions”, determining the time, the goals, the tasks, and their compositions. For the “organization and defence” of the direction of Tomislavgrad, on April 20, 1992, Bobetko issued an Order regulating the composition of that command. Namely, “for the sake of accomplishing efficient, operational and secure commanding in the units of the HVO of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia”, he appointed the officers at the Command of defence


The functioning of the IZM Grude of the GS HVO Grude was ensured by “one passenger vehicle with a driver”. Based on the aforementioned order, a number of persons were temporarily placed “on the payroll of the OZ Split”. The list of these persons was to be compiled by Colonel Milivoj Petkovic and to be submitted to the financial department of the Operational Zone of Split.

141 See note 126.
of Tomislavgrad: Zarko Tole (Colonel), Commander; Zeljko Siljeg (Major), Vice Commander; Jozo Smiljanic (Captain), Chief of Staff of the Operational Training Department; Stjepan Zrno (Captain), officer in the Operational Training Department; Ivan Tanjic (Sergeant), Chief of Staff of the artillery; Stipo Cavar (Captain), Chief of Staff of the anti-aircraft defence; Zdravko Krajina (Captain), Chief of Staff of the communications; Ante Bartulovic (Major), Chief of Staff of the engineering; and Ivan Letica (Sergeant), Chief of Staff of the intelligence.142

Starting from the assessment that each organization, on the occasion of forming the command, from among the significant issues related to clear definition of responsibility and determination of the closer and broader tasks must also regulate the competencies and the areas of responsibility of the subordinates, on April 21, 1992, in Grude, General Bobetko issued the Order making the division of the areas of responsibility and the tasks, “as one of the principal issues at the line of command”. With this order, “for the sake of more effective and operational commanding”, he made the distribution of the areas of responsibility and appointed the responsible officers for the area of Livno and the area of Tomislav-Prozor-Konjic. For the Livno direction (area of Livno), he determined that the responsible person will be General Major of the Croatian Army Ante Roso, and for organization of defence in the direction of Tomislavgrad (the area of Tomislavgrad-Prozor-Konjic), he appointed brigadier of the Croatian Army Miljenko Crnjec. In his orders, General Bobetko specified the time, goals, closer and broader tasks and the compositions of the commands, and clearly linked the lines of reporting, obligations, competencies and areas of responsibility of his subordinates. General Ante Roso was directly subordinated to the Command of the Southern Frontline (“this command”), at which “all the reports and requests” were to be submitted to IZM Grude, and brigadier Miljenko Crnjec


The other vacancies were to be filled in “based on the staff inflow”.

The aforementioned command came “into effect immediately”.
was “obligated to establish the most successful cooperation and coordinate all the activities in that area”.

Around April 20, General Bobetko also formed the Command of Sector for Siroki Brijeg, Citluk, Ljubuski, and Capljina, headed by general major of the Croatian Army Slobodan Praljak.

143 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-1687, Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, Croatian Defence Council, Command of the Southern Frontline, IZM Grude, Grude, April 21, 1992, Division of the areas of responsibility, Command – to general major Ante Roso, brigadier Miljenko Crnjec, published in: J. Bobetko, the aforementioned work, pp. 215-216.

In mid-May 1992, due to the situation related to directing and commanding at the Command of Tomislavgrad, on May 16, 1992, general Janko Bobetko issued the order to general Ante Roso, in order to strengthen that command, so that he would “use his influence and most energetic action” to prevent “all groups and individuals who wish to promote themselves in commanders of various levels”. In relation to this, among other things, general Ante Roso was ordered as follows:

“2. At introducing order, have the most energetic approach, from disarmament to application of repressive measures and arrests.


In the end of this order, General Bobetko pointed out that the situation in Tomislavgrad will immediately be reported about to the minister of defence of the Republic of Croatia, “and he would be asked to arrive on site as an urgent matter, and to use his authority to remove any groups or individuals who are referring to that they are directly reporting to the Minister” (Ibid.).


On April 21, 1992, General Bobetko informed his subordinated commanders: generals Roso and Praljak, and brigadier Miljenko Crnjec, “that on April 23, 1992, at 20:00 hours at the Forefront Command Place of Grude (Tobacco Station) the reporting session shall be held on the following issues:
In the aforementioned enactments, General Bobetko set exact tasks, as well as the composition of the commands of specific directions. He believed that regulation, method of work, responsibilities and communications are some of the direct tasks that they will have towards the IZM Grude. In relation to this, he also issued the first Command on their appointment and taking on the duty, their obligations, arising from the assessment, and all measures for further building of the system and defence of those directions.\textsuperscript{145} The aforementioned measures were aimed at “\textbf{organizational settling of the unsettled and unclear situation in terms of commanding,} \textit{...}'\textsuperscript{145}

\begin{itemize}
\item 1. Situation, assessment and measures in relation to the frontline;
\item 2. Proposed measures and ideas for combat activity in their areas of responsibility (precisely and well-argumented);
\item 3. Specific needs in logistical support for strengthening of the current defence capacity given the realistic possibilities” (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-1687, Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, Croatian Defence Council, Command of the Southern Frontline, IZM Grude, Grude, April 21, 1992, Division of the areas of responsibility, Command – to general major Ante Roso, general Slobodan Praljak; brigadier Miljenko Crnjec).
\end{itemize}

On April 25, 1992, for the sake of balanced use of the equipment, armament and other equipment seized at the Capljina Barracks, commander of the Southern Frontline, General Bobetko, issued the following command personally to general major Praljak:

\begin{itemize}
\item “1. Supply me with an exact listing of the arms and technical equipment seized at the Capljina Barracks.
\item Propose which resources are needed for your units, and what could be distributed to other units.
\item 2. After de-mining of the warehouse, proceed in the same way with the ammunition and other resources, as stated in point 1 of this Command;
\item 3. This is to be held URGENT and this command is to be treated in such a manner;
\item 4. Send the list of the arms and technical equipment and other items by COURIER” (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-1690, Republic of Croatia, Command of the Southern Frontline, Command of OZ Split, IZM Ploce, class: 8/92-01/47, no. 6030-01/92-1, Ploce, April 25, 1992 – to the Command of Sector for Siroki Brijeg, Citluk, Ljubuski, and Capljina, attn. general major Slobodan Praljak).
\end{itemize}

responsibilities and manner of execution of tasks”, that is, “quick settling of this rather serious space in Herzegovina”. All should be done in order to conquer that territory, meaning taking of the left and right bank of the Neretva, then of Stolac, Blagaj and (together with the HVO forces) of Mostar.\footnote{J. Bobetko, the aforementioned work, p. 211.}

General Bobetko transferred to the south part of the front, including Herzegovina, a special unit for anti-tank combat from Sisak, among others. This group for anti-tank combat (POG), “skilled and equipped for day and night action”, was sent, together with Commander Jadranko Garbin, to the composition of the \textit{156th brigade of the Croatian Army}.\footnote{AIIZ, inv. No. 2-1689, Republic of Croatia, Command of the Southern Frontline, Command of OZ Split, IZM Ploce, class: 8/92-01/48, no. 6030-01/92-1 Ploce, April 25, 1992 – to Commander of the 156th Brigade of HV, captain of the corvette Ante Urlic, published in: J. Bobetko, the aforementioned work, p. 218. On April 25, 1992, General Janko Bobetko issued to the commander of the 156th Brigade of the Croatian Army, captain of the corvette Ante Urlic, “the Command for re-subordinating and use of the anti-tank group from Sisak” (Ibid.). Based on this order, the POG entered the composition of the 156th Brigade of the Croatian Army, \textit{“both in the tactical and in the logistical sense”}, and also, the commander of the POG was obligated to report at 9:00 AM on a daily basis about the situation and the completed activities of the group and to propose the daily tasks, including the responsibility and obligation of the commander of the 156th brigade of the Croatian Army, Captain Urlic, in terms of proposing of goals and determining of priorities. General Janko Bobetko personally knew all the people in the composition of the POG, and warned captain Urlic to pay attention and take care of them (Ibid.).}

Janko Bobetko issued orders to the HVO, such as the orders dated April 28, 1992, submitted to the Croatian Defence Council of Posusje,\footnote{AIIZ, inv. No. 2-1691, Command of the Southern Frontline, IMZ Grude, April 28, 1992, published in: J. Bobetko, the aforementioned work, p. 223.} and June 14, 1992, related to issuance of military accreditations to the members of the units of the Croatian Defence Council.\footnote{AIIZ, inv. No. 2-1705, Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, Croatian Defence Council, Command of the Southern Frontline, IZM Grude, Grude, June 14, 1992, Issuance of Military Accreditations to the members of the HVO units, COMMAND.} The civilian authorities of the “Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia” were also
subordinated to the Croatian Army. For illustration of this statement, we shall indicated upon the order from General Bobetko to the presidents of the Stolac and Neum municipalities, dated April 29, 1992, for formation of units.150

In order to take the Neretva valley, with the city of Mostar, among other things, General Bobetko reinforced his forces by bringing in new units of the Croatian Army from the Republic of Croatia. Thus, in late April 1992, in Sinj, the Tactical Group (TG) was deployed with some 800 well armed and experienced soldiers, “prepared for use on the territory of Livno-Tomislavgrad”.151

Based on the proposals and requests of the minister of defence of the Republic of Croatia, Gojko Susak, on May 7, 1992, General Bobetko appointed brigadier Zdravko Andabak to the office of commander of the Sector Mostar-Siroki Brijeg-Citluk-Capljina, as a replacement for general Praljak, who had been dismissed from his previous duty.152


This order developed the manner of recording manpower and mobilizations of those able for combat activity, and formation of units, directing and commanding, logistical support, and the like.


The transfer of duty was conducted in Grude, on May 8, 1992, (at 16:00 hours), in the presence of General Bobetko. Pursuant to the Law on the Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia, general Praljak was obligated to file “the comprehensive report on the status and problems of the Sector”.

At the time, in the Sector of Brigadier Andabak, Marin Pivcevic was appointed to duty, “performing the duty he also performed in the previous units or as determined by commander Andabak” (Ibid.).
Given that the Chetniks “could engage in other directions of action too, such as Bugojno, Travnik, Konjic, and Prozor”, “in order to organize effective defence and integration of the existing commands in Central Bosnia”, on May 19, 1992, General Bobetko issued the command (“the command shall come into effect immediately”) for formation of the IZM – Forefront Command Place of Central Bosnia in Gornji Vakuf. Zarko Tole, brigadier of the Croatian Army, was appointed commander. Pursuant to that order, he had all the powers of coordination and commanding over the forces on the territory of Central Bosnia: Busovaca, Vitez, Novi Travnik, Travnik, Bugojno, Gornji Vakuf, Prozor, Tomislavgrad, and Posusje (the area of responsibility of IZM Central Bosnia).153

On May 19, 1992, General Bobetko appointed Colonel Ivan Kapular commander of the defence forces of Tomislavgrad.154

On the same day (May 19), “in order to reinforce the Bugojno defence forces, to create security and firmness in the direction of D. Vakuf – Bugojno”, General Bobetko also issued the Order for preparation and deploying of the “Frankopan” Battalion into Central Bosnia – to Bugojno. Major Ivan Zoric – Zulu was in charge of preparation and its transferring to Bugojno.155

153 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-1701, Republic of Croatia, Command of the Southern Frontline, Command of OZ Split, IZM Ploce, class: 8/92-01/91, no. 6030-02/92-1, Ploce, May 19, 1992, Formation of the IZM “Central Bosnia”, published in: J. Bobetko, the aforementioned work, pp. 219-221. Based on this command, brigadier Tole was authorized to appoint the required number of officers and junior officers “for effective work on the IZM”.


Zeljko Siljeg was in charge of commanding over the units until the arrival of Colonel Kapular.


The Frankopan Battalion could only be used based on the command of brigadier Zarko Tole.
In early June 1992, “based on the conditions created for inclusion into defence efforts of the military conscripts expelled from the territory of the Stolac municipality, in order to ensure a more effective combat activity”, General Bobetko decided to form the Stolac Battalion, and on June 6, he issued the Command on its establishment. This order determined the method of forming of this unit, its equipping (“this shall be done by the Frontline logistics” – Command of the Southern Frontline), and training.156

In the period from April 12, until mid-July 1992, under the direct command of the commander of the Southern Frontline, general Janko Bobetko, the main body or parts of the following units of the Croatian Army were participating in the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina:

- 1st “A” Brigade of the ZNG;
- 4th Brigade of the ZNG (on the territory of Ljubuski and Citluk);
- 101st “R” Brigade of the ZNG;
- 115th Brigade (on the territory of Livno and Tomislavgrad);
- 116th Brigade (from Metkovic – on the territory of Capljina and Stolac, commander of the brigade Luka Dzanko);
- 126th Brigade (on the territory of Livno and Tomislavgrad);
- 153rd “R” Brigade;


- This order determined the units to do the training:
  - Patrolling platoon – autonomous patrolling company of Vojista;
  - 120 mm mortar platoon – 116th brigade of the Croatian Army;
  - 76 mm cannon platoon – 116th brigade of the Croatian Army;
  - Engineering squad – 4th brigade of the Croatian National Guard.

Brigadier Luka Dzanko was personally in charge of execution of the aforementioned command.
- **156th Brigade** (on the territory of the Dubravska Plateau and beyond, commander captain of the corvette Ante Urlic);

- **Tactical Group 2 (TG-2)**, commander Colonel Ivan Beneta;

- **Tactical Group 4 – (TG-4)**, (on the territory of Livno and Tomislavgrad);

- **Tactical Group (TG) of Sinj**;

- **Battalion “Frankopan”** (in the area of responsibility of IZM Central Bosnia, commander major Ivan Zoric)

- **Group for anti-tank combat (POG)**, from Sisak;

- **Communications platoon (N) of the Main Headquarters of the Croatian Army.**

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- **1st Volunteer Regiment *Kralj Tomislav*** (in the area of Capljina, commanded by Nijaz Batlak, aka Mate Sarlija, “Daidza”).


158 AllZ, inv. No. 2685. In 1991 and later on, many Croats from Stolac and other regions of Bosnia and Herzegovina were members of the Croatian Army. Thus, just for an illustration, Ivica Boskovic (son of Jozo and mother Luca), born on July 21, 1963, in Crnici (Stolac), from January through June 1992, was the member of the Volunteer Regiment *Kralj Tomislav*, stationed in Vrgorac. At the time, the following persons also joined that unit together with him:

**Luka Peric**, from Crnici (Stolac), in mid-1993, member of the Battalion *Ludvig Pavlovic* in Capljina. He participated in the combats against the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Gornji Vakuf and Mostar;

**Bosko Prce** (from Crnici-Stolac), in late June 1993 he was the member of the 4th Battalion from Stolac;

**Miro Cemeras** from Capljina;
From mid-1991, there were also the “Special Units of the HV” in the Croatian Army, which were “intended for tasks of patrolling and deployment in the depth of the enemy’s defence”. These units were commanded by General Ante Roso, former legionary, who had passed top French commander education, and had experience with such actions, and who was in charge of their formation and inclusion into the Croatian Army.\textsuperscript{159} Such Special Forces of the Main Headquarters of the Croatian

\textbf{Zeljko Marjanovic} (from Celjevo, Capljina);

\textbf{Ivica Ivanovic} (from Celjevo, Capljina), et al.

Regiment \textit{Kralj Tomislav} was commanded by Nijaz Batlak, alias Mate Sarlija, aka \textit{Daidza}. The training was done by Bozan Simovic, Bozo Curcija, officers of the Croatian Army, and Miro Rupcic from Polog. All the members of that unit were granted Croatian citizenship.

After the completed training, this unit rushed into Bosnia and Herzegovina (in the area of Krusevo-Mostar). \textbf{In May 1992}, the unit attacked and took the JNA barracks in Capljina.

Around June 6, 1992, several members of the Regiment \textit{Kralj Tomislav} (from Vrgorac) separated from the main composition of that unit and formed the First Autonomous Battalion \textit{Ludvig Pavlovic}. The unit was stationed in the JNA Barracks in Capljina, which they named after Bozan Simovic. At those barracks there were some other units too, such as for instance, the First Herzegovina Brigade, the Military Police, the HOS units, and a \textit{Domobran} unit (Ibid.).

\textsuperscript{159} AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2957, Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, Croatian Defence Council, Main Headquarters of the HVO, no. 02-2/1-01-4312/93, Mostar, December 26, 1993 —to the Republic Fund of Pension and Disability Insurance of the workers of the Croatian regional services in Split; M. Spegelj, the aforementioned work, p. 342. General Spegelj claims that in Croatia, parallel with the HOS, “\textit{some more formations beyond the HV system and the single command vertical}” began to arise, and that the majority had “\textit{sources in the Ministry of Defence, that is, behind them was Minister Susak himself}”. In spite of that he states that such units “\textit{are not in the Croatian Army at all, they act autonomously, they mine houses, plunder, and they are in conflict with the HV and its commanders}”, they were formed with the knowledge and “\textit{under the green light of President Tudjman}”, who, in a discussion with Martin Spegelj, confirmed that the case involves such type of units under the command of the Main Headquarters of the Croatian Army. Upon Spegelj’s claim that this is not so, Franjo Tudjman answered: “I can not understand that” (M. Spegelj, \textit{SJECANJA VOJNIKA}, p. 342).

According to Spegelj, general Ante Roso was at the Main Headquarters only formally, where “\textit{he never appeared with a report on those units}”, and “\textit{was responsible exclusively to the minister of defence, just like the goals and tasks of his units were exclusively}
Army included the following units:

1. The First Volunteer Regiment *Kralj Tomislav* or the Speed flying Regiment, commanded by Brigadier Daidza. Its command place, pursuant to the enactment by minister Susak dated February 4, 1992, was at the Military Resort in Basko Polje.160

2. Battalion *Frankopan*, commanded by Colonel Ilija Tot, arrived in Bosnia and Herzegovina in early April 1992, to the frontline near Suica.161

In the jurisdiction of that minister”. In relation to this, Martin Spigelj claims that “neither the GS HV nor the commanders of the operational zones and brigades had no supervision or the right of command over them” (Ibid., p. 343). Due to “all of this”, Martin Spigelj “experienced those formations as paramilitary ones”, so in a number of reports to President Franjo Tudjman, Main Headquarters of the Croatian Army, minister of defence and Office of Protection of the Constitutional Order (to Josip Manolic), “he documented their existence and overall negative activity”. After that, “soon a command came that all such units be immediately included into the HV formations”. However, according to Spigelj, “this never happened”, because the minister of defence “was promising one thing while doing the other”, and thus “the special units existed all the time until the end of 1993, beyond any systematic or legal supervision” (Ibid.).

Having in mind the fact that the “special units” were backed by Minister Gojko Susak and President Franjo Tudjman, who “knows all and tolerates them”, obviously they did not have the character of paramilitary formations. The more so because these units, according to Martin Spigelj, “were created as the revolutionary units of Minister Susak, with the ideology of neo-fascism” (Ibid., pp. 342-346).

160 M. Spigelj, *SJECANJA VOJNIKA*, pp. 343, and 405-406. The manner of formation, organization and other issues related to that unit, according to Martin Spigelj, were determined by Gojko Susak “beyond the supervision of the GS HV or any other command of the HV” (Ibid., p. 343).

161 Ibid., p. 344. Battalion *Frankopan*, made up mainly of the “soldiers with military experience from all the frontlines”, commanded by Colonel Ilija Tot, with Battalion “Zrinski”, was formally in the composition of the Brigade *Zrinski-Frankopan*. The commander of that brigade was Ante Roso. The commander of the Battalion *Zrinski* was Colonel Milenko Filipovic (Ibid., pp. 344-345).

Colonel Ilija Tot was a legionary, who had arrived in the Republic of Croatia in 1991. He was the “real soldier, the most educated and the most competent among them, and the only one with an officer rank”. Several days after the arrival in Suica, where the JNA forces of Colonel Ratko Mladic “had fully broken down the defence, which was dissipating”, Ilija Tot took over the command “and in several days he accomplished a high degree of organization in the Operational Zone”. He openly clashed with
3. Party Uskok from Osijek,\textsuperscript{162} and others.

Under the command of General Bobetko, for a long time since, the Croatian Army had been planning the aggressive offensive of the Croatian Army in Bosnia and Herzegovina - taking of the Neretva valley and in particular of the cities of Capljina, Mostar, and Stolac. After taking of Capljina,\textsuperscript{163} the Croatian Army waged an attack operation in the valley of the Neretva river, under the name of Cagalj. Namely, the case involves the operation of the Croatian Army, in order to take the southern part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, thoroughly prepared by General Bobetko in order to expel the Greater Serbia aggressor from the left bank of the Neretva and to take Stolac and Mostar.\textsuperscript{164} Janko

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\textsuperscript{162} Ibid., p 345.
\textsuperscript{163} AIIZ, inv. No,. 2-1690, Republic of Croatia, Command of the Southern Frontline, Command of OZ Split, IZM Ploce, class: 8/92-01/47, no. 6030-01/92-1, Ploce, April 25, 1992 – to the Command of Sector for Siroki Brijeg, Citluk, Ljubuski, and Capljina, attn. General major Slobodan Praljak; J. Bobetko, the aforementioned work, pp. 27, 125-126, 219-247, 249, 263, and 270-271. Before the operation Cagalj, the Croatian Army had taken Capljina. With forces under his command and with volunteers from the area of Sunja, General Praljak was attacking Capljina (the attack lasted for 2-3 days). He was seeking the support of the artillery of the 156th Brigade, which was located in the broader area of Gabela. The forces of the Mostar HVO were controlling and besieging Capljina. After that, Capljina was taken and it served as the basis in carrying out of the operation Cagalj (Ibid.).

One more party of the Croatian defence forces (HOS) too participated in taking of Capljina, and later on went into the composition of the Croatian Army and took part in all the operations in Herzegovina (Ibid.).

\textsuperscript{164} J. Bobetko, the aforementioned work, p. 249. General Bobetko assessed that the Greater Serbia aggressor would cut Croatia in half in the Neretva valley, because, according to him, “\textit{this is the old dream of Serbia: to reach the sea and take the port of Ploce}” (Ibid., p. 27).

In late April, 1992, the Greater Serbia aggressor had gathered elite forces from Serbia (from Nis and other cities), and moved ahead to attack in the direction of Neum,
Bobetko believed that unless the left bank of the Neretva is ruled, with all the dominant elevated points, it was not possible to conduct operations at more depth towards Dubrovnik, “because there was a danger that they would even let us to south, but that they also cut off our retreat in the broader area of Gabela and Metkovic”.165

In the period from late April through mid-July 1992, General Bobetko issued numerous orders regulating all the organizational issues, duties, for both individuals and sectors, “in preparation of the Herzegovina territory for the forthcoming operations, pertaining to expulsion of the Chetniks and the Yugo-army from the valley of Neretva, taking of the city of Mostar, which conditioned further extension of the offensive activity on the Dubrovnik frontline”. These measures were “the precondition for preparation of the future operations, without which, we would obviously have no prospect to go into a rather risky operation, the ultimate part of which is the taking of Mostar”.166

In the period of June 7-17, 1992, the Croatian Army was carrying out offensive combat activities “on the broader territory of Mostar”. In the operation Cagalj (the beginning of the attack was determined for June 7, 1992, at 4 in the morning), the Croatian Army pulled out on the line of Blagaj-Ortijes-Mostar Airport, conquered this line and the Airport, Metkovic, Ploce. Their goal was to push through to the left bank of the Neretva river, burn down Neum and arrive in the Neretva valley. The combat lasted for three days and three nights. According to General Bobetko, the Croatian Army withstood that attack, halving the Greater Serbia forces (breaking their spine), after which they started retrieving and changing their combat positions. (Ibid., pp. 125-126).

According to Janko Bobetko, the Greater Serbia aggressor regrouped the forces and moved ahead in the direction of the Neretva river. In the second half of April, “a rather big military force was gathered for execution of the final task, meaning the attack on Neretva” (Ibid., p. 132).

The biggest danger for Croatia, as written by General Bobetko, was cutting off or cutting through of the southern part of the frontline. According to his assessment, the enemy was preparing an attack from a number of sides, whose basic directions were leading to ruling the Neretva river, and having their ultimate point in the port of Ploce (Ibid., p. 200).

165 Ibid., p. 263.
166 Ibid., pp. 219-247.
merged with the forces of the 4th Brigade and the Mostar Croatian Defence Council, and rules all the dominant positions for this region of Herzegovina. In this way, operation Cagalj was ended – at the time, the Croatian Army, with the majority of the 4th Brigade and the forces of the Croatian Defence Council, in cooperation with the Mostar Battalion (of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina), which on that occasion grew into a brigade, whole conquered the east bank of the Neretva river, the city of Mostar and the broader area of Bijelo Polje, and pushed back the JNA units commanded by General Momcilo Perisic from Mostar from the left and right banks of the Neretva river. After that, the Greater Serbia aggressor began withdrawing its forces and arms from that part of Bosnia and Herzegovina.167

Bobetko’s pushing back of the Greater Serbia aggressor’s units from that area of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in spite of the existing disagreements, such as the borders in and south of Mostar (river Neretva and the border of the Province of Croatia),168 was in concordance with the aggressive policy and practice of Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman,

167 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-1710, Republic of Croatia, Command of the Southern Frontline, Command of OZ Split, IZM Ploce, class: 8/92-01/150, no.: 1080-01-01-92-1, Ploce, June 18, 1992 – Attn. Mr. Andabak, Attn. Mr. Jaganjac; Ibid., inv. No. 2-2947, Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, Croatian Defence Council, Main Headquarters of the HVO of HZ HB, strictly confidential, no. 01-2762/92, Mostar, December 15, 1992 – to the Head of Defence of the HZ HB; J. Bobetko, the aforementioned work, pp. 263-264, and 272-273. With this special operation, according to Bobetko, the Croatian Army “cleansed” the left bank of the Neretva river, and “the Croatian people in Herzegovina has preserved a part of its territory until to-date” (J. Bobetko, the aforementioned work, pp. 271-271).

General Janko Bobetko was proud of them “having preserved” Herzegovina (“that part of the Croatian space, I mean the part populated by the Croatian people”). Related to the aforementioned, he pays tribute and indicates upon the people who, “in whole that organization, have grown and proven their responsibility”, such as, in addition to Gojko Susak and Mate Boban, Colonel Ante Gotovina (later General), Ivan Kapular (later General), Zarko Tole (later General), “which was decisive in the defence of the city of Livno”, then rear admiral Davor Domazet (Ibid., pp. 248-249).

It is interesting that General Bobetko never mentions the activities of the Autonomous Battalion of Defence of Mostar, which gave an exceptionally big contribution in liberating of Mostar, particularly in the combats of June 14, 1992.

168 Z. Tomac, the aforementioned work, pp. 36-37.
and their collaborationists, on conquering and division of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the Operation Cagalj, in the spirit of the negotiations on the division of the territory (in Karadjordjevo and Gratz), the JNA withdrew.169 The territorial divisions here were implemented on the field. At this, the units of the Greater Serbia aggressor withdrew from Mostar and Stolac, and those areas were taken by the Croatian Army. The withdrawal of the JNA from the Neretva valley was accompanied by the withdrawal of the Croatian Army from Bosnian Posavina (except for the Orasje pocket).170

With Operation Cagalj, according to Bobetko, the Croatian Army had definitely and for good defended and preserved the Croatian people in Herzegovina, and created “favourable conditions for the creation of an army…” The very operation created some “very favourable operational conditions for the final operation on the Southern Frontline, with the basic goal to push out the Montenegrin aggressor and to break out to Prevlaka, meaning the unblocking of Dubrovnik and retrieval of the overall territory…”171 In that kind of a situation, the

169 Operation Cagalj in the Neretva valley, according to general Spigelj, was transformed “into advancing and withdrawing – scattered advancing of Bobetko’s group and scattered withdrawing of the Montenegrin army” (RAT…, p. 134).

170 Z. Tomac, the aforementioned work, p. 76. After the Karadzic-Boban agreement “there was a cease of enmities with the Serb formations in Bosnia and Herzegovina”. “…The enmities between the HV and HVO on the one side, and the Serb army, on the other side, almost ceased…”. According to Spigelj, in the Operation of liberation of the south of Croatia and taking of south Herzegovina (Operation Cagalj), the Serb army had pulled back. In relation to this, he brought up a justified question – “Does this have to do anything with the Bosnian Posavina? Has the south of Croatia been swapped for Bosnian Posavina?”. In asking these questions, he stated that, “regardless of the answer, one should have in mind that on both places the combats were actual, that armed fighting was conducted, that people were dying, because for the sake of their own and the world’s public, the players of the war had to mask the agreement using the deaths of their own soldiers at the frontlines. For those soldiers, the war was a cruel reality, not a conference room combination exercise”. In Posavina and in the south of Croatia, serious armed fighting was conducted (M. Spigelj, the aforementioned work, pp. 359-362). Such development of events was in compliance with the Karadzic-Boban Agreement, following which the reasons ceased from existence for “armed conflicts between the Croats and Serbs on the whole territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina” and the conditions were in place for “arbitrary setting of borders” (Z. Tomac, the aforementioned work, p. 37).

171 J. Bobetko, the aforementioned work, p. 267.
Croatian Army ruled “Mostar, Bugojno, Travnik, Jajce, Konjic, and other smaller and larger parts”.\textsuperscript{172}

According to General Bobetko, the Croatian Army took part in “the defence and cleansing of its territory from the Chetniks” (The Croatian Army and the Croatian people in Herzegovina, and the HVO\textsuperscript{a}). According to him, the Croatian Army was defending “the Croatian people against, clearly, the common enemy”.\textsuperscript{173}

After the completion of the Operation, Bobetko warned Mate Boban and “the other responsible people in Herzegovina that they should be quick in forming the government in Mostar, in leaving Grude and proceeding to form the army, because further development of events could turn in some different directions, too…”\textsuperscript{174}

On June 14, 1992, contrary to international law and against the will of the state leadership of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, General Bobetko conducted the mobilization of its population into military (collaborationist) formations of the neighbouring country. “Based on the need that had arisen for proving the membership of the HVO units”, he issued the Order for issuance of military accreditations for the members of the Croatian Defence Council. For all the members of the Croatian Defence Council units of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, accreditations were due to be issued no later by June 30, 1992.\textsuperscript{175}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{172} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{173} Ibid., p. 273. For general Janko Bobetko, Herzegovina is “the southern part of the Croatian territory” (Ibid., p. 275). In relation to this, he claims that the Croatian Army has also preserved “the Neretva valley, and Herzegovina” (Ibid., p. 291).
  \item \textsuperscript{174} Ibid., p. 270.
  \item \textsuperscript{175} AIIZ, inv. No. 2-1705, Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, Croatian Defence Council, Command of the Southern Frontline, IZM Grude, Grude, June 14, 1992, Issuance of the Military Accreditations to the members of the HVO units, published in: J. Bobetko, the aforementioned work, p. 234.

Issuance of the military accreditations for the members of the Main Headquarters of the HVO (IZM Grude) was, based on this order, in exclusive jurisdiction of the legal department of the Main Headquarters of the HVO, “and as for the other members of the HVO units, it was in the jurisdiction of the legal department of the OS HVO HZ HB” (Ibid.).
\end{itemize}
On June 15 and 16, General Bobetko issued the order “for active defence” and “for support to the forces in the activity on Stolac” to the 4th Brigade (4th Battalion) of the Croatian National Guard, to the 156th Brigade and the Tactical Group – 2 (TG -2), and part of the forces of the Croatian Defence Council.\textsuperscript{176}

On the territory of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, General Bobetko was an absolute commander, on which there are numerous documents existing. Among them we shall point out, for instance, his command (Class: 8/92-01/150, no. 1080-01-01-92-1), dated June 18, 1992, sent by him to the officers Ivan Andabak and Jasmin Jaganjac. After taking of the east bank of the Neretva river and the city of Mostar, “in order to settle the combat order on the reached lines, full control of the military facilities and the recording of the war prize”, he ordered to the aforementioned officers:

- that the command of the southeast Herzegovina (Operational Group JIH Medjugorje) from Medjugorje should be relocated to Mostar;
- that on the reached lines they should arrange the combat order and proceed with engineering arrangements;
- that the areas of responsibility should be divided and that each unit should be made responsible for the assigned area;
- that they should transfer a part of the artillery immediately to the broader area of Stolac, and coordinate the fire activity with the units of the Stolac Croatian Defence Council;
- that they should direct the offensive military action towards Bijelo Polje until “it is finally liberated and the communication across Mt. Velez is cut off”, that is, until the taking of Bijelo Polje and the broader area;
- that they should secure the conquered facilities with guards, determine their commanders, make the inventory lists, and prevent stealing of property;
- that they should make the list of the seized equipment, particularly the artillery, tanks, motor vehicles and ammunition of all sorts;

\textsuperscript{176} J. Bobetko, the aforementioned work, pp. 235-238.
that they should proceed with de-mining of the facilities and major communications, using fully trained teams;

- that they should proceed with rehabilitation of the battleground “bury the killed enemy soldiers at certain location and make the records to that effect”;

- that they should prevent departing of civilians to the left bank of the Neretva in the broader area of Mostar (“Use the authorities in Mostar in order to prevent the return of the refugees until the full level of security for citizenry”);

- that they should prevent (using the military and civil police) breaking into apartments, stealing of property or any violent behaviour;

- that they should transfer the detained “enemy ‘officers’” from Mostar into Ploce (those in charge of exercising this command were Brigadier Ivan Andabak and Major Jasmin Jaganjac);

- that “the war headquarters is determining the priority of the tasks to be conducted by the civilian bodies”;

- that they should conduct mobilization of all the bodies and civilian services and introduce war obligation for rehabilitation of the situation in Mostar.177

General Bobetko was also issuing orders to the subordinated units of the Croatian Defence Council for bringing in of the detainees,178 on


178 J. Bobetko, the aforementioned work, p. 239. Thus, on June 18, 1992, he issued one such order to the Command of the HVO Mostar. All “the detained enemy officers and civilians, who had certain functions in the structures of the enemy power” were to be sent to the Ploce prison during the night of June 18, 1992. The person in charge of surrender of the detainees and the seized documents was Major Jasmin Jaganjac. The taking over of the detainees “shall be done by Mr. Ivan PENGA” [capitals in the original], who “possesses the badge of the Military Police of RH no. 0207”. The Police Precinct of Grude was obligated to secure the vehicles for the transportation of the detainees and an escort vehicle.
organization of protection of the economic facilities in Mostar,\textsuperscript{179} sending of tank crews to Mostar,\textsuperscript{180} and the like.

In the area of the Kupres Plateau, in the first half of April 1992, the Republic of Croatia engaged four brigades of the Croatian Army:

- 1\textsuperscript{st} Brigade,
- 106\textsuperscript{th} (Osijek) Brigade;
- 109\textsuperscript{th} (Vukovar) Brigade;
- 126\textsuperscript{th} (Sinj) Brigade (in part).\textsuperscript{181}

\textsuperscript{179} Ibid., p. 204. Related to this, on June 29, 1992, having in mind “the necessity of functioning of certain economic facilities in Mostar (Hydropower Plant Salakovac, Hydropower Plant Mostar, the Aluminium Plant, Soko, etc.)”, General Janko Bobetko issued the Order to the Operational Group of Southeast Herzegovina (JIH Medjugorje (“Attn. Mr. Zdravko Andabak”) to draft the defence plans for all the important economic facilities and to ensure their protection. The focus in planning was to be on “defence against the attack on the facilities and on anti-commando security”.


“For the sake of stabilization of the front in the Podvelezje area”, on June 30, 1992, commander of the Southern Frontline, general Janko Bobetko issued an Order to the Municipal headquarters of the HVO of Siroki Brijeg (Attn. Petar Cavar) to send the tank crews to Mostar and to “secure the communications system”.

Even in the Bosnian Posavina, in the spring and summer of 1992, there were certain units of the Croatian Army deployed. In that part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, those units acted within the Operational Group of East Herzegovina, whose seat was in Slavonski Brod. The commander of that operational group was Colonel Vinko Stefanek. In the documents available (“Military Secret: strictly confidential”) of the Command of the Croatian Army – Operational Group of East Posavina, in May and June 1992, he also appeared as the commander of the Croatian Defence Council.182

Upon proclamation of the Boban-Karadzic agreement, on May 6, 1992, “on the cessation of war between the Serbs and the Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, contrary to Tudjman’s agreements with Milosevic and Karadzic about the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

The aforementioned brigades of the Croatian Army were waging the combat activities against the JNA in the direction: Suica-Tomislavgrad. In the first half of April 1992, they were defeated and for the most part broken down, and at that they had some 250-300 dead and a significant number of wounded members. In those combats, the units of the 9th JNA Corps seized several hundreds of barrels of infantry arms, a major number of “zolja” rocket launchers, bazookas, one self-propelling vehicle, one tank T-55, three dumpers, four dredgers and eight motor vehicles with ammunition (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-94).

the leadership of the 108th Slavonski Brod Brigade passed the decision on the “liberation of the Bosnian Posavina”. In that process, “they very quickly expanded the liberated territory to include Odzak, and 16 km into the depth”, and in doing so they destroyed 32 “enemy tanks”.183

In May 1992, the following units of the Croatian Army were active in Bosnian Posavina

- 108th Brigade of the ZNG;
- 131st Brigade;
- 139th Brigade;
- 157th Brigade;
- Tactical Group 123 (TG-123);
- 2nd Motorized Artillery Division of the Osijek Operational Zone.184

On May 21, 1992, Colonel Vinko Stefanek issued the Command on the Establishment of the IZM – East, of the artillery units in Odzak. In this order, he determined the tasks of that forefront command place,185

183 Z. Tomac, the aforementioned work, pp. 69-73.

In March 1992, parts of the 108th Brigade of the ZNG were found in the area of Bosanski Brod, deployed in the surrounding villages around this city (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2650, Command of the 5th Corps, March 29, 1992, Stara Gradiska – to the Command of the 30th Partisan Division).

185 Ibid. The tasks of the IZM East, pursuant to that order, were:

“- Integrate the artillery units added to the OG, to be active in the eastern sector of the system:

2. MAD (2 batteries of howitzers 152, squad NORA) battery of self-propelling howitzers SOI ‘GVOZIKE’,
   Howitzer platoon 203 mm;
   Anti-tank platoon;
the time of establishment,\textsuperscript{186} the holder of implementation,\textsuperscript{187} the associates in implementation,\textsuperscript{188} the logistical support\textsuperscript{189} and deployment of the artillery units.\textsuperscript{190} In addition to that, in this order, Colonel Vinko Stefanek

\textbf{Liaise with the ODZAK Brigade, Samac Brigade, our forces in MODRICA, GRADACAC, ORASJE, as well as the units of the HV to be active or already active in the eastern sector (139th Brigade, 157th Brigade, TG 123).}

Ensure maximum monitoring of the situation on the frontline, and coordinate and actively support our forces, constantly upset the enemy by firing on the enemy strongholds, for instance, artillery units, command places, warehouses, and communications” (Ibid.).

\textsuperscript{186} Ibid. In relation to this, this order stated as follows: “Proceed immediately with establishment of the IZM-East. The Activity of the IZM-East from the moment of establishment, 24 hours a day until the withdrawal of this command. The organization and the working schedule shall be regulated in a separate command” (Ibid.).

\textsuperscript{187} Ibid. “The person in charge of establishment and work of the IZM-East is the commander of the 2nd MAD [motorized artillery division – note by the author] OZ [Operational Zone – note by the author] of Osijek, who shall also be the commander to the added units and for his work he shall report to the commander of the OG and the head of artillery of the OG” (Ibid.).

\textsuperscript{188} Ibid. “For the successful work of the IZM-East use the officer staff from the Command of the 2nd MAD, OG and the 108th Brigade of the ZNG. Establish communications with the equipment from the 2nd MAD, OG, and Commanding Battery of the 108th Brigade of the ZNG” (Ibid.).

\textsuperscript{189} Ibid. “all the artillery units of the OG are logistically relying on the brigades on whose areas of responsibility they are deployed, and in terms of command, they rely on the IZM-East. For the logistics problems not resolved in the brigade on whose area the units are deployed, rely on the OG and the logistics of the 108th Brigade of the ZNG”.

The brigades which before the order had disposed of the “subordinate units shall be obligated to inform the units of this command immediately and place them to the availability to the OG, that is, IZM East, with the overall quantity of the artillery ammunition they have available” (Ibid.).

\textsuperscript{190} Ibid. IZM East, that is, the commander of the 2nd MAD, Jozic, was obligated to proceed immediately “with deployment of the artillery units as follows:

- VP of the first howitzer battery, 2nd MAD, in the area of s. STITAR with the sector of activity from s. LEPENICA to the east, to s. G. SLATINA to the west.

- VP squad NORA in the area of s. STITAR with the sector of activity from s. GORICE to the east, to s. GORNJI ZABAR to the west.
also identified the task of the artillery of the 139th Brigade of the Croatian Army, indicated upon the need to respect and investing of maximum efforts and material and technical resources available for implementation of that order, determined the time of beginning and end of execution

191 Ibid. “The task of the artillery of the 139th Brigade is to withdraw the howitzers of the 122 mm M 38 from the VP in the area of s. JARUGE and thus liberate the area of the VP for taking by way of the platoon of the third battery of the 2nd MAD. To use the battery MB 120 mm to take the VP in the broader area of SLAVONSKI SAMAC with the tasks of covering with artillery fire of the s. ODMUT, s. TURSINOVAC, s. TISINA, BOSANSKI SAMAC. This unit is obligated to use the radio connection directly to link to the IZM East, and upon their request to open fire. Ensure 1.5 BH of ammunition for the M.B. battery for execution of the task. The other artillery units from the mother composition of the 139th Brigade, just like any added units which are not exempted in this command from the 139th Brigade to be used in the directions of activity of the Brigade. The plan of use with the working map of the artillery on the map 1 : 50,000, as well as the status of equipment and artillery ammunition available to be supplied to the head of the artillery of OG East Posavina” (Ibid.).

192 Ibid. “All the units from autonomous battalions up to brigades active on the eastern part of the responsibility of the OG are obligated to honour this command and invest maximum effort and all the material and technical resources to implement it as soon as possible” (Ibid.).
of that order,\textsuperscript{193} as well as the time of reporting (in writing) to the Command of the Operational Group on the “degree of completeness” and on the “things executed”.\textsuperscript{194}

In May 1992, in the capacity of the commander of the Croatian Army too — of the Operational Group of \textit{East Posavina} and the commander of the Croatian Defence Council of the \textit{Croatian Community of Bosnian Posavina}, Colonel Vinko Stefanek, a high-ranking officer of the Croatian Army, was also issuing orders to all the brigades of the Croatian Defence Council in Bosnian Posavina. On May 16, 1992, “\textit{in relation to the development of the situation on the warfield of BiH, and the best quality commanding over the units and their use}”, he issued the order “to responsibly proceed towards the end of the establishment of the brigade commands and all of their parts, arms, and services”, and in doing so, also determining the “\textit{end date for supply of the report on the establishment of units, command place and listing of the material and technical resources in the units}” (“by May 19, 1992, at 12:00 hours”).\textsuperscript{195}

The command of the Operational Group of \textit{East Posavina}, Colonel Vinko Stefanek, on May 20, 1992, issued the order to all “\textit{the members of the OG}”, that is, all the brigades of the Croatian Defence Council in Bosnian Posavina, for determining the persons (two each) for training in Zagreb on the telecommunications systems, “\textit{for the needs of maintaining}”

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{193} Ibid. The execution of that order was supposed to start “\textit{immediately, and no later by 12:00 hours of May 23, 1992, it was supposed to be executed in full}” (Ibid.).
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{194} Ibid. In relation to this, the end of the order stated: “\textit{Written reporting required to the command of the OG on a daily basis by 20:00 hours, on the degree of execution, and on May 23, 1992, by 15:00 hours report to be submitted on the things executed}”. (Ibid.).
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{195} AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2225, Croatian Defence Council, Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, No. 06-05/92, /Slavonski Brod/, May 16, 1992 – to the Bosanski Brod Brigade and others.
\end{flushright}
the communications on the territory of the OG”. The next day, “for the needs of the best quality cooperation possible with the Operational Group”, Colonel Vinko Stefanek issued an order to all the Croatian Defence Council brigades in the Bosnian Posavina for appointment of the couriers to receive and deliver mail in the Operational Group.

All the units of the Croatian Defence Council in Bosnian Posavina were subordinated in May and June 1992 to the Croatian Army, that is, to the Operational Group of East Posavina in Slavonski Brod, commanded by Colonel Vinko Stefanek. On May 24, 1992, he issued the order to the commanders of the brigades of the Croatian Army (108th, 123rd, 139th, and 131st Brigades, and 157th Tactical Group) and commanders of all the brigades of the Croatian Defence Council in Bosnian Posavina (from 101st to 109th), that on May 26, 1992, on the premises of the Operational Group of East Posavina, in Slavonski Brod (at 10:00 hours) they should submit the report (“for the month of May”) “on the following issues”:

1. Assessment of the status of directing and commanding in the units.

2. Assessment of the status of the operational and tactical position of the brigade, in the areas of responsibility, and strength and intentions of the enemy on the Sava bridgehead; problems and proposals.

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196 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2226, Republic of Croatia, Croatian Army, Operational Group of East Posavina, class: 8/92-01, no: OG-01-92-199/2, Slavonski Brod, May 20, 1992, - to all the members of the OG.

This order determined: the number (two persons each), the requirements to be met by the candidates (telecommunications or electronic qualifications), place (Zagreb), time of duration (3-5 days), conditions of accommodation, method of application, etc.


This order determined the manner of appointment of the couriers: “Appointment of the courier is to be done in an ORDER [capitals in the original – note by the author], with certification of the commander of the brigade, and he needs to immediately report to the Operational Group with the ORDER [capitals in the original – note by the author] for appointment, so that we could establish the courier link” (Ibid.).
3. Staffing and material and technical resources status.

4. Show the surplus of the MTS after dissolution of a part of the units.

5. The number of admitted and deployed volunteers.

6. The assessment of the combat moral and security situation, and work on establishment of the lists of able men in cooperation with the Ministry of Interior and the military police.

7. Report on return of the population on the PZT [temporarily occupied territory – note by the author]”.198

On May 25, 1992, in the capacity of the commander of the Croatian Defence Council of Bosnian Posavina, Colonel Vinko Stefanek issued the order for attack to the 107th Brigade of the Croatian Defence Council of Gradacac, in which he pointed out the forces, goals, and the status of the Greater Serbia aggressor and its collaborationists,199 then the goals of his, that is, Croatian forces (“our forces”),200 as well as the


Speaking about the Greater Serbia aggressor, Colonel Stefanek stated as follows:

“The enemy is using the forces of the 17th K [17th Corps of the JNA - note by the author], Chetnik volunteer formations and local Serb population, formed in Tactical Group 17 (TG-17), making efforts to occupy Modrica and merge with the forces on the occupied territory of Bosanski Samac and thus, relying on the Bosna river, separate our forces in the depth of the liberated territory of Odzak and the Republic of Croatia, and then occupy the territory of the Gradacac and Breko municipalities.

It has drawn out the parts of the TG-11 that have suffered major loss on the territory of Bosanski Brod via Podnovlje across the Bosna river, it has regrouped the forces for activity from the southern direction towards Modrica” (Ibid.).

200 Ibid. The 107th Brigade of the HVO Gradacac “organizes circular defence of the territory by relying on the territory where the Croatian and Muslim population is gravitating, in collaboration with the part of forces of the 104 Brigade Modrica, and the 108th Brigade Brcko” (Ibid.).
“neighbours”\textsuperscript{201} and the “preparedness for attack”,\textsuperscript{202} the tasks for the units,\textsuperscript{203} and the like.\textsuperscript{204}

On June 13, 1992, commander of the Main Headquarters of Bosnian Posavina, Colonel Vinko Stefanek sent a letter to all the Brigades of the Croatian Defence Council of Bosnian Posavina (101\textsuperscript{st} HVO Brigade Bosanski Brod; 102\textsuperscript{nd} HVO Brigade Odzak; 103\textsuperscript{rd} HVO Brigade Derventa, 104\textsuperscript{th} HVO Brigade Bosanski Samac; 105\textsuperscript{th} HVO Brigade Modrica; 106\textsuperscript{th} HVO Brigade Orasje; 107\textsuperscript{th} HVO Brigade Gradacac, and 108\textsuperscript{th} HVO Brigade Brcko), informing them that on June 14, 1992 (at 17:00 hours), at the Command of the Operational Group in Slavonski Brod,

201 Ibid. The order stated: “In the area of s. Zivkovo Polje, s. Cadrak, s. Kornica – 104th Brigade of the HVO, and from the eastern side of the territory Gradacac, forces of the 108th Brigade of the HVO – Brcko, on the northern part of the territory the occupied parts of the Bosanski Samac municipality” (Ibid.).

202 Ibid. To this aim, Colonel Safranek decided “By energetic activity, launch an attack and rule the area of s. Donji Skugric and on the reached line determine the defence cooperation with the forces of the 104th Brigade of the HVO in s. Zivkovo Polje. In the area of s. Krusevica and s. Samarevac, disarm the enemy forces. At other lines of the area of responsibility, organize strong defence” (Ibid.).

Colonel Safranek also determined the time of the attack preparedness: May 27, 1992 at 7:00 hours.

203 Ibid. In relation to this, Colonel Safranek specified the following tasks:

“5.1. – With a part of forces of the 197th Brigade of the HVO, from the lines possessed, use energetic activity to conduct the task:

Rule the area of s. Borovo Polje and s. Donji Skugrici (including church tt-149) and place under control the broader area of the crossroads, and determine defence on the reached lines.

5.2. – Use part of the forces to neutralize the enemy in the area of s. Krusevica and s. Samarevac by disarming or energetic activity and prevent its merger with the majority of the forces” (Ibid.).

204 Ibid. In all the units, there was a need “to form the anti-tank groups with arms for close anti-tank combat. On all directions, on favourable and tank-passable directions, use engineering units to arrange the defence line using maximum obstacles (hedgehogs, tetrahedrons), in combination with the anti-tank mines, and defend the obstacles” (Ibid.).

“The dynamic of activity” was to be “coordinated with part of the forces of the 104th Brigade of the HVO in the area of s. Zivkovo Polje” (Ibid.).
a meeting shall be held that “requires mandatory presence of the commander of the brigade and the HVO representative for the municipality of the related brigade”.

In mid-July, 1992, the 116th Brigade of the Croatian Army (from Metkovic) was in Stolac, as well as certain HOS forces. On June 13, 1992, a tank unit arrived to the Dubrave Plateau (tanks T-55), in the composition of the 1st Brigade of the Croatian Army from Zagreb, under the name of Tigers.

In the attack against Novi Travnik on June 1992, in addition to the HVO and HOS units, parts of the 113th (Split) brigade took part too, in collaboration with the 123rd (Varazdin) Brigade.

On the territory of Bosnian Posavina, in mid- and late 1992, there were many units of the Croatian Army engaged, which, in cooperation with the defenders of these areas, Croats and Bosniaks, made efforts to stop the Serb offensive and prevent the breakthrough of the corridor, that is, establishment of the communication Knin-Banja Luka-Bijeljina-Belgrade. These were:

- 105th (Bjelovar) Brigade;
- 106th (Osijek) Brigade;
- 108th (Slavonski Brod) Brigade;
- 109th (Vukovar) Brigade;
- 111th Brigade;
- 127th (Virovitica) Brigade;
- 3A Brigade (1st Battalion of the 3rd Brigade of the ZNG),

205 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2232, Croatian Defence Council, Croatian Community of Bosnian Posavina, class: 035-01/92-01, no. BP-01/92-37, Slavonski Brod, June 13, 1992 — to the 101st HVO Brigade and others.

206 AIIZ, inv. No. 2699.

- Military Police from the composition of the 68th Battalion of the Osijek Military Police;
- Battalion Korace and other smaller combat groups from Pozega and Osijek.\(^{208}\)

In mid-July 1992, pursuant to the Karadjordjevo agreement and concretization of such aggressive policy by the Serb and Croatian

\(^{208}\) M. Spegelj, the aforementioned work, pp. 338-340, 346, and 417-419. In fierce multi-month battles in this area, numerous units of the Croatian Army were engaged, in particular the 108th Brigade, as well as other strong combat groups, including the Military Police from the composition of the 68th Battalion of the Osijek Military Police. These military and police forces, in addition to the area of Slavonski Brod, were also active in the area of Bosnian Posavina, where they successfully cooperated and instructed “the military police units of the HVO under formation” (Ibid., pp. 418-419).

On June 28, 1992, the Army of SR Yugoslavia and the Serb collaborationist forces broke through a narrow corridor near Brdsko. In spite of that, the defenders were still holding some significant parts of Posavina, including Bosanski Brod and a broad belt of villages in front of it, as well as the bridgehead in Orasje. Croatian Army General Stipetic was appointed commander of the Slavonian frontline. He was assigned by general Tus, chief of staff of the General Headquarters of the Croatian Army with the task to stop withdrawal of the units of the Operational Group of East Posavina from Doboj towards Derventa and Bosanski Brod, and to organize defence at the reached lines (Ibid., pp. 338-340).

In spite of a number of organizational and logistical problems, the defence was stabilized at the line of Obodski Channel – Ukrina River – Korace village, where some fierce fighting lasted for three months. At this front, a number of brigades of the Croatian Army were symbolically engaged, except for the 108th, which acted all the time. From mid-August, other units of the Croatian Army were engaged too, that is, stronger combat groups (Ibid.).

After the breaking of the Serb offensive, the conditions were created for a counterattack, the holder of which was to be the 108th Brigade, which was rested and staffed as per the plan to that goal in the second half of September. Along with this brigade, it was also anticipated to engage the 103rd (Derventa) and 101st (Bosanski Brod) Brigade of the HVO, which were also rested and partially filled in with new staff. In addition, the first battalion of the 3rd Guardian Brigade was also in reserve. In that way, in the assessment of general Martin Spegelj, “a very favourable relation of forces was created and one could objectively count on success” (Ibid., pp. 338-339). However, parts of the 3rd A Brigade (3rd Brigade of the ZNG) suddenly left the battlefield before the Serb forces had perforated a narrow corridor near Brecko – on June 28, 1992 (Ibid., p. 339).
collaborationists in Graz in late April 1992 (about division of two constitutive units in the area of Kupres and in Bosnian Posavina), and divisions in the field, the units of the Croatian Army in North Bosnia – in and to the south of Mostar (in June 1992), “were dissipating”.209 Then the Croatian Army started withdrawing from Bosnian Posavina. Military conscripts “both Croats and Muslims” “were abandoning arms” and “together with the other refugees were fleeing into the depth of the territory of Croatia, and at no price shall be returning to Bosnia and Herzegovina”.210

In the second half of August 1992, the situation in Bosnian Posavina was deteriorating, particularly at the Derventa frontline, where the situation was critical. This was brought about by the sudden abandoning of the territory, dissipation of units and fall of the territories largely without combat, particularly abandoning of positions by the 108th Brigade of the Croatian Army, before a replacement arrived for it. Due to this, the 101st Brigade of the Croatian Defence Council from Bosanski Brod “suffered huge losses, dozens of killed and over one hundred of injured members”.211

The 108th Brigade of the Croatian Army, “the strongest, best equipped and rested”, as soon as it was introduced into the frontline, in the night of October 5/6th, withdrew from the position across Sava into Bosanski Brod “under very suspicious circumstances”, without the knowledge of the Command of the Slavonian frontline and the Operational Group of East Posavina. In such a situation, positions were also abandoned by two brigades of the Croatian Defence Council (101st and 103rd).212

209 Ibid., p. 413; Z. Tomac, the aforementioned work, pp. 36-37. In essence, this involves concretization of the territorial division, that is, on the Serbo-Croatian division of Bosnia and Herzegovina, by which the Greater Serbia aggressor had received a broad corridor through Northern Bosnia and a significant part of the Bosnian Posavina in exchange for the area of the Kupres Plateau and the Neretva valley.

210 M. Spegelj, the aforementioned work, p. 413.

211 Ibid., pp. 415-418.

212 Ibid., pp. 338-340.
The units of the Croatian Army and the Croatian Defence Council were abandoning the frontline in Bosnian Posavina without combat.\textsuperscript{213}

\textsuperscript{213} Ibid. The issue of “sudden” pulling out of the Croatian Army, that is, defection, was tried to be detected by general Martin Spegelj, who was personally, on several occasions, in the capacity of the chief inspector of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia, inspecting in Bosnian Posavina (a whole inspection team was there for a month). Just like the other associates from the inspection team, he always came to the conclusion that this events “were interfered with by someone invisible, that the strings are pulled from somewhere afar, from the head of an omnipotent person”. Speaking about that, he claims that “\textit{a number of facts remains completely non-interpretable}”. In relation to this, he presents a number of such facts, such as, among other things: parts of the 3A Brigade, even before the Serb forces had perforated the narrow corridor near Brcko, on June 28, 1992, had left the battlefield near Modrica and arbitrarily left to Osijek, stating that they only wanted to go to the 160th Brigade, which, according to Martin Spegelj, is defection; parts of some gathered brigades of the Croatian Army (2nd, 105th, 111th, 127th and 136th), when the advancing of the Serb forces was stopped after the perforation of the corridor and when in late September the basis was created “\textit{for liberation of Posavina and for offensive towards Doboj}”, did not cross the Sava “\textit{or they did, but a couple of days later pulled out into Slavonski Brod, without getting involved in the final defence}”; after the Command of the Slavonian frontline, headed by General Stipetic, intervened and ordered that three brigades (the 108th of the Croatian Army and the 101st and 103rd of the Croatian Defence Council) should return to Bosanski Brod, in spite of the promise, the Command of the 108th Brigade did not do so; the pulling down of the bridge between two cities (Bosanski Brod and Slavonski Brod) by the chiefs of staff of the engineering forces of the 157th and 108th Brigade of the Croatian Army (Stokovic and Tomakic), with knowledge and assistance of the special Police from Slavonski Brod, in spite of the effort by the Command of the Slavonian Frontline to preserve the bridge across the Sava between the two cities at any price.

In the phase of withdrawal of forces from Doboj and attempt to organize the defence at the access roads to Derventa and Brod, generals Slobodan Praljak and Pavao Miljevac appeared at the frontline, as well as many others, spreading defeatism, thereby causing the departure of the Croatian Army from the frontline. This also included the involvement of general Cermak, and the political leadership of Slavonski Brod, with mayor Meter (Ibid., p. 340).

Based on the aforementioned and other facts, generals Martin Spegelj and Petar Stipetic concluded that withdrawal of the units from Bosanski Brod “\textit{was an act of open diversion and treason}”, and that “\textit{the main reasons for the breakdown were the undefined and unclear positions of the official policy about engagement of the HV units in Bosnian Posavina}”. Such a conclusion, substantiated with data, was communicated independently both in writing and verbally, to President Tudjman and defence minister Susak, and surrendered the part of the documentation to the Office for Protection of the
The official commands were “put in an impossible situation”, particularly because of the double commanding. “Some emissaries were coming from Zagreb”, certain persons from the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia, to see lower commands, commanding them contrary to the commands by General Stipetic, commander of the Slavonian frontline, to withdraw from that area, because they will be overrun by tanks. Due to “serious violation of subordination (double commanding), there was a major loss of territories and even worse loss of human lives”.214

The 55th Light Artillery Division of the Anti-Aircraft Defence from Sisak active on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992. In early October 1992, it was stationed in the area of Tomislavgrad. The commander of the Division in Sisak was Captain Josip Sikic, and the commander of the unit in Tomislavgrad was Marijan Maric.215

Constitutional Order, too. Tudjman formally formed the Commission to allegedly investigate the reasons for the fall of Posavina, “but this was a move as an attempt to pacify the public” (Ibid., pp. 340-341).

Thus, the “defenders of Posavina”, according to Martin Spiegelj, not knowing that all had been agreed, were dying “in a battle lost in advance, and to make things even weirder, it is very possible that the agreement is not either known to the Chetniks, who are also suffering major losses” (Ibid., p. 338).

214 Ibid., pp. 415-418. In explanation of the phenomenon of panic, in the capacity of the main inspector of the Ministry of Defence of Croatia, where on July 16 and 17, 1992, he visited Slavonski Brod and Bosanski Brod, Martin Spiegelj got a hold of a number of data “that certain political persons from Zagreb were coming and explaining that it is not either possible or needed to hold Bosnian Posavina” (Ibid., p. 414).

It is obvious, claims general Spiegelj, that someone was commanding “the abandoning of Derventa and other positions in Bosnian Posavina” (Ibid., p. 415).

Prof. Dr. Zdravko Tomac claims that the military leadership from Zagreb was insisting, “threatening by defection and arrests”, that Croatian Army be withdrawn from Bosnian Posavina. In this way, according to him, “2,600 people were withdrawn and what had been taken through much strife was surrendered to the enemy without combat” (Z. Tomac, the aforementioned work, pp. 69-73).

The order on the withdrawal of the Croatian Army from Bosanski Brod, claims Tomac, was executed secretly. In relation to this, he mentions that “the fall of Bosanski Brod, or the loss of the major part of Bosnian Posavina is not the result of a military defeat but the consequence of a command for withdrawal and insufficient support, which was sometimes even an obstruction for those who were fighting there” (Ibid.).

215 AIIZ, 2-1888, Republic of Croatia, Croatian Army, Military Post no. 30033, No. 1812/92, Sisak, October 3, 1992, COMMAND; AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2145, Republic of
Two brigades of the Croatian Army too participated in the attack against Novi Travnik (on October 19, 1992): **114th Brigade** (part) from Sibenik, and **123rd Brigade** from Varazdin.216

After the taking of several facilities in the city (in the night of October 21/22), a fierce artillery attack on Prozor was launched on October 23, 1992,217 by the Croatian Army, together with the forces of the

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Croatia, Ministry of Defence, Main Headquarters, Command of OZ Zagreb, 55th LTRD PZO, no. 3091/92, Sisak, November 4, 1992, COMMAND.


The attack on Prozor was commanded by Colonel Siljeg. Then the city and the surroundings were unmercifully shelled with all the available Croatian heavy artillery and T-53 tanks.

On September 25, 1992, Colonel Siljeg (an active officer of the JNA) issued the order to the HVO of Bugojno, Gornji Vakuf, and Prozor, (“STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL, MILITARY SECRET”), which came “into effect IMMEDIATELY”, on “formation of the units for attack activities”:

1. At the level of municipal headquarters of the HVO of Bugojno, G. Vakuf, Prozor, form the units for attack activities at the level of the HVO municipal headquarters – Brigades, and for making interventions on the sensitive directions with 150-200 of manpower.

2. The aforementioned formations need to be formed from experienced soldiers, equip them with a necessary communications equipment, arms for PP and POB, support equipment (MB 60 and MB 82 mm), anti-aircraft machine guns and nitro-glycerine guns, vehicles for transportation, and at least three combat sets of ammunition for each piece of weapons.

3. After receipt of this command, immediately proceed with formation of the units, and training the personnel for attack actions (exercises by units up to platoons), and be ready to exercise tasks in the next 7 to 10 days.
Croatian Defence Council, with (parts of) 114th Sibenik and 113th

4. Ensure that the manpower should be gathered on a single place and always ready for combat actions upon command.


Colonel Siljeg issued the aforementioned command “based on the order of the GS HVO, no. 01-2173/92, dated September 21, 1992, in order to ensure special units for attack actions at the level of the municipal headquarters of the HVO – Brigades, and for making interventions on the sensitive directions” (Ibid.).

From August 31, 1992, when the operational zones of the HVO of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia were formed, he was directing the command of the Operational Zone of the Northwest Herzegovina, seated in Tomislavgrad. This command included the areas of the municipalities: Posusje, Livno, Duvno – Tomislavgrad, Kupres, Prozor, Gornji Vakuf, Bugojno, Jablanica, and Konjic (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2113, Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, Croatian Defence Council, Main Headquarters, strictly confidential, no.: 01-2054/92, Formation of Operational Zones, COMMAND.

Ibid. In the Operational zone of responsibility of Northwest Herzegovina, seated in Tomislavgrad, under the direct command of Colonel Siljeg, six brigades of the Croatian Defence Council were active:

1. Herceg Stjepan – in the areas of Konjic and Jablanica;
2. Eugen Kvaternik – in the area of Bugojno;
3. Ante Starcevic – in the area of Gornji Vakuf;
4. Kralj Tomislav – in the area of Tomislavgrad;
5. Petar Kresimir IV – in the area of Livno, and
6. Rama – in the area of Prozor.


On the eve of the attack on Prozor, on October 22, 1992, the HVO units in Jablanica were risen “into full combat preparedness, they distributed the arms and equipment”, and “they were additionally strengthened and armed with light and heavy weapons”. The road to Prozor was also blocked (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-1758, Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, Croatian Defence Council, Municipal Headquarters of Jablanica, no. 252/92, Jablanica, October 22, 1992, REPORT).

On the same day, brigadier Milivoj Petkovic, commander of the Main Headquarters of the Croatian Defence Council, issued the order (coded – urgent) to the subordinated
Split brigades, and with the support by the special units of *Giants* and *Tigers*, which were under the command of the Main Headquarters of the Croatian Army.²¹⁹ It was then that the units of the Croatian Army and the Croatian Defence Council took the city and committed numerous crimes against the Bosniaks.²²⁰

All the transports of equipment, material and technical resources and manpower of the Territorial Defence “travelling towards Novi Travnik were blocked” on October 23, 1992. The situation on the territory of the Gornji Vakuf municipality, on that day “was tense but under control” (AIIZ; inv. No. 2-1760, Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatian Defence Council, Municipal Headquarters of Gornji Vakuf, No. 774/92, October 23, 1992 - to the Command of the OZ Central Bosnia, Vitez and Busovaca, Attn. Colonel Tihomir Blaskic, Attn. Dario Kordic).


²²⁰ Ibid.; AIIZ, inv. No. 2091-2095. On that occasion, in the organized attack over 100, mainly civilians, were killed, then numerous homes were burned down and plundered, and almost the whole Bosniak population was expelled and detained in
The Battalion *Frankopan* of the Croatian Army too part as well in the aggressive attack against Gornji Vakuf in October 1992.221

The involvement of the Croatian Army against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992 was also known to the United Nations. In Resolution 752 dated May 15, 1992, the Security Council demanded that “all forms of interference coming from outside of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, including the elements of the Croatian Army, “should immediately be suspended and that the neighbours of Bosnia and Herzegovina should take an urgent action to terminate such interference and to honour the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina”.222 In Resolution 47/121 dated December 18, 1992, the General Assembly demanded that, pursuant to the aforementioned Resolution of the Security Council, “all the parts of the Croatian Army…” in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina “should withdraw immediately…”223 However, this withdrawal never happened.

b) Overt Aggression (January 1993 – March 1994)

During 1993 and 1994, the Republic of Croatia launched a number of offensives against Bosnia and Herzegovina. The first one began in January 1993, when the units of the Croatian Army tried to penetrate in the source basin of the Vrbas river, in order to merge with the units concentration camps. Then, according to Colonel Bob Stewart, “the Croatian patrols were detaining and killing everything they ran onto” (Ibid.).

221 Ibid.; ZLOČINI U VRBANJI JULA 1993, pp. 95-96; S. Omeragic, the aforementioned work, p. 155.

The presence of the Croatian Army at Gornji Vakuf was also confirmed by the commander of the Operational Zone for Northwest Herzegovina Zeljko Siljeg, who, in the negotiations after the failed attack on the city, openly said that the same units of the Croatian Army were involved in the attack on Gornji Vakuf as those attacking Prozor (*Bosna*, no. 1, February 11, 1994, pp. 15, and 23; ZLOČINI U VRBANJI JULA 1993, pp. 95-96.

222 ∴ REZOLUCIJE..., pp. 31-32.

of the Central Bosnia Operational Zone. Then two battalions of the 114th Brigade of the Croatian Army, *Scorpios* from Trogir and *Alkari* from Sinj again attacked on Gornji Vakuf. 113th Brigade of the Croatian Army was also involved in the attack on this city, as well as Battalion *Frankopan* and the special units *Giants* and *Tigers*, and *Wolves* from Split.\(^{224}\)

Numerous units of the Croatian Army and the Croatian Defence Council suffered defeats at Gornji Vakuf. In January and February 1993, Colonel Zeljko Siljeg commanded (over the forces of the Croatian Defence Council) in the attack on Gornji Vakuf, and cooperated with the HVO forces in Central Bosnia.\(^{225}\)

On March 12, 1993, the unit for special purposes *Ludvig Pavlovic* was “on the field in Herzegovina”.\(^{226}\) In late March 1993, a similar

\(^{224}\) Bosna, no. 1, February 11, 1994, pp. 15, and 23; ZLOCINI U VRBANJI JULIA 1993, pp. 95-96; S. Omeragic, the aforementioned work, p. 155.

On January 26, 1993, brigadier Milivoj Petkovic, chief of staff of the Main Headquarters of the Croatian Defence Council, issued the order (“MILITARY SECRET, STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL”), to colonels Dario Kordic and Tihomir Blaskic on the full combat preparedness of the units, that is, on the preparedness of the units for the attacks against the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is interesting to point out that this order under count 1 states that “the defence line towards the Chetniks needs to be weakened to the minimum level” (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2272, Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, Croatian Defence Council, Main Headquarters of HVO HZ HB, Mostar, January 26, 1993 – to the OZ S/B [Central Bosnia Operational Zone – note by the author], IZM Vitez, attn. Colonel Dario Kordic, attn. Colonel Tihomir Blaskic).

\(^{225}\) ZLOCINI U VRBANJI JULIA 1993, p. 96; S. Omeragic, the aforementioned work, p. 155; Slobodna Bosna, February 6, 1999.

\(^{226}\) AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2966, Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, Croatian Defence Council, Defence Department, Main Headquarters of the HVO, no. 09-451/93, Mostar, March 12, 1993 – to the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Croatia, Police Administration of Zagreb. On March 12, 1993, Colonel Ivica Primorac, assistant chief of staff of the Main Headquarters of the HVO for professional army, approached the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Croatia (Police Administration of Zagreb) with the request to approve “issuance of citizenship certificates to the members of the Croatian Army, units for special purposes *Ludvig Pavlovic*. PPN (Special Purpose Unit) *Ludvig Pavlovic* is currently on the field in Herzegovina, and they urgently need the citizenship certificates in order to regulate the status in the Croatian Army” (Ibid.).
In early April 1993, the units of the Croatian Army from Split and Imotski rushed into Stolac and the broader surroundings. In mid- and late April 1993, in addition to the Croatian Defence Council, the Croatian Army too participated in the attack on a number of villages of the Prozor Municipality (Toscanica, Parcani, Paros, and the like). The Croatian Army too took part in the attack on Sovici and Doljani, in mid-April 1993.

In April and May 1993, 113th and 114th Brigades of the Croatian Army took part in the combats around Jablanica, reinforced with the

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227 S. Omeragic, the aforementioned work, p. 156.

228 AIIZ, inv. No. 2699. From then, “demonstration of force has been permanently present, as well as shooting into buildings from infantry arms” in the area of Stolac…. Since the arrival of the Croatian Army units, this area is constantly subject to “playing Ustasha songs through loudspeakers, and the person most distinguished in this is Marina (son of Niko) Prc, residing in the village of Jasoc, Stolac Municipality. It has often happened that, in a drunken state, the mentioned Prc would insult the Muslims in the city, shoot from automatic guns, and arrested and brought Muslims into the Command of the HVO...” (Ibid.).

229 AIIZ, inv. No. 2091-2095; M. Hero, the aforementioned work, pp. 86, 134, and 141-142. The attack on the village of Toscanica was conducted by the Croatian Army and the HVO from three directions: Grevici, Lizoperci, and Hudutsko, firing from all the available infantry arms and weapons (anti-aircraft machine guns, submachine gun M-84, submachine gun M-53, automatic rifle guns, sniper guns), with artillery support (60 and 82 mm mortars). The aggressor soldiers wore emblems of the HVO and the marks with the letter “U” on their caps, and their uniform was of three different colours (multi-colour, grey, and black). On that occasion, several civilians were killed (the majority had escaped), and many houses were plundered and put to fire. In Parcani, civilians were used as “live shields”. In Paros, also, several civilians were killed (Ibid.).

230 AIIZ, inv. No. 2700 and 2703; Ibid., inv. No. 2-2293, Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, AR BiH – 4th Corps, Security Body, Ministry of Interior, RO SDB Jablanica, Jablanica, May 7, 1993 – N SVK OS R BiH and others; ICTY, Case: No. IT-98-34-I, paragraph 9. Attacking the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the soldiers of the Croatian Army and the Croatian Defence Council destroyed everything on their way. They were wearing black uniforms, with black bands around their heads, with the letter “U”, and on one shoulder a black band, with a twice larger letter “U”, with a dead man’s skull in the middle of that letter. On their sleeves some had the marking of HV and HOS, and some the HVO one. One member of the Croatian Army was recognized by Anica Kladusak, from Sovici – his name was Branko, from Zagreb (she claims that he used to live at Crnomerec) – AIIZ, inv. No. 2700 and 2703.
special units Tigers and Giants. In the first half of May 1993, Split Brigade and Neretva Brigade also participated in the large offensive in the broader area of Mostar, as well as some special units of the Croatian Army from Dubrovnik. In the counterattack of the Croatian Defence Council on the locality of Pijesci-Bivolje Brdo-Blagaj against the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, some 2,400 soldiers took part, of which some 2,000 were members of the Croatian Army (some 750 members of the Slavonia Brigade, 250 members of the 1st Brigade Tigers, and some 1,000 soldiers from Metkovic). In late June 1993, parts of 163rd Brigade of the Croatian Army rushed into Bosnia, too.\footnote{\textit{Bosna}, no. 1, February 11, 1994, pp. 15 and 23; AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2153, Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 4th Corps, Security Sector, official note, August 2 and 3, 1993; S. Omeragic, the aforementioned work, p. 155; ICTY, Case: No. IT-98-34-T, paragraph 10. The participation of Tigers in the attack on the area around Jablanica was proven by finding a corpse of a soldier, with his accreditation having the logo of the unit. The soldier’s name was Tomislav Bajic, and his accreditation had the seal of the “Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia — Main Headquarters of the Special Forces” (\textit{Bosna}, no. 1, February 11, 1994, pp. 15, and 23).}

In the aggression of the Republic of Croatia against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the first half of 1993, according to the data of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the following units of the Croatian Army took part, too:

- 113th (Split) Brigade;
- 114th (Sibenik) Brigade;
- 123rd (Varazdin) Brigade;
- Elements of a brigade from Metkovic (in the areas of Buna, Dubrave, and Stolac);

Pursuant to the Hague indictments against Mladen Naletilic and Vinko Martinovic — the goal of this offensive — “of the campaigning for the so-called ‘ethnic cleansing’ by the forces of the HV and HVO, was to effect control over the municipalities of Mostar, Jablanica, and other municipalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to force the Bosnian-Muslim population to leave these areas, that is, significant reduction and conquering of that part of the population. The resources used for this purpose include killing, beating, torturing, expulsions from homes, devastation of the cultural and religious heritage, plundering, denying of the basic civic and human rights, and mass persecutions, detaining and arresting, and all of this was done based on
- A tank unit (in the broader area of Mt. Cvrsnica).

In the spring of 1993, “transferring the activity in Bosnia and Herzegovina from the south, along the Neretva valley, for several months, the Croatian Army was waging some fierce battles with the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and unsuccessfully too…” In that offensive against the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Croatian Army and the Croatian Defence Council were in a very difficult position. At the time, in general, the Croatian Defence Council “was surviving a crisis in operations against the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina in almost all the areas where they were in contact”.

Due to this, “there was a danger to have this crisis ended with a scattered withdrawal to the south along the Neretva valley and into West Herzegovina, and to lose the enclaves in Central Bosnia. And then, panic was going on in Zagreb around President Tudjman and the solution was being sought in negotiations and arrangements…”

the systematic discrimination pattern on an ethnic basis. Resulting from this campaign, dozens of thousands of the Bosnian Muslims left Mostar, Jablanica and other municipalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The traditional ethnic diversity of these municipalities was almost completely eliminated, and ethnically cleansed institutions and society were imposed on these territories” (ICTY, Case: No. IT-98-34-I, paragraph 11).

232 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2123, COMMUNIQUE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, May 13, 1993. Due to the armed aggression against its territory, on May 13, 1993, Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina filed a protest against the Republic of Croatia, demanding an unconditional suspension of the attacks and withdrawal of its units from the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Among other things, it was pointed out that the Government shall be “forced to approach the international community and demand protection from the aggression” (ICTY, Case: No. IT-95-14-T, paragraph 87).

233 RAT..., pp. 129, 134—135. Franjo Tudjman claimed that in the spring time of 1993, the Croatian Army clashed with the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, allegedly because the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina at the time wanted to push out to the sea and take Ploce and the southern part of Croatia up to Neum. Speaking about this, general Martin Spegelj claimed that “a regular corporal knows that at the time the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina was in a terrible situation, and that it did not even occur to it to even possibly undertake something like that. In fact, with this myth Tudjman wanted to justify the participation of the Croatian army and the HVO in the fight against the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state” (RAT..., pp. 235).
The participation of units of the Croatian Army in the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was thoroughly evidenced by the International Court for Criminal Prosecution of the Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of the International Humanitarian Law Committed on the Territory of Former Yugoslavia from January 1, 1991 in the Hague (hereinafter referred to as: the Hague Tribunal) in the process against Tihomir Blaskic. Thus, among other things, “a witness said that he had heard from a high-ranking official of the Croatian Government that in 1993, the HV soldiers had been sent to BiH to fight against the Muslim forces. Another witness spoke about the HV soldiers dismissed from duty, because they did not want to go to Bosnia, and about other soldiers who had to replace the HV emblems with the HVO emblem while they were in Bosnia. Admiral Domazet, defence witness, confirmed that in April 1993, in Bosnia there was the staff of the Croatian Army, to which he himself belonged while he was the ‘head of administration’ of the Intelligence Service of the HV. … The presence of the HV in BiH was confirmed by one more witness, who spoke about the character of the HV intervention, and one more, who believed that the presence of the members of the Croatian Army in Bosnia between 1992 and 1994 was not in accordance with the law, because the Parliament of the Republic of Croatia had never passed any such decisions. Other pieces of evidence also indicate upon the general presence of the HV in Bosnia”.234

The Hague Tribunal also located and specifically identified the places in which the presence of the Croatian Army was observed. Thus, the Croatian Army was present in the areas of Livno and Tomislavgrad; in October 1992, while he was on the post of the deputy minister of defence of the Republic of Croatia, general Praljak “was seen in Mostar”; the units of the Croatian Army were also present in the area of Capljina, even in the surroundings of Mostar, and in the areas of Prozor and Gornji Vakuf; in July 1993, the Croatian Defence Council in Mostar received the assistance from a “large number” of soldiers of the Croatian Army. “The significant presence” of the Croatian Army in Bosnia was obvious in Prozor, Gornji Vakuf, Jablanica, and other places. During the summer of 1993, a helicopter from Croatia often landed at the quarry in the area

234 ICTY, Case: No. It-95-14-T. paragraphs 77, 83, and 85.
of the Lasva valley (Vitez Municipality), which was located some 2 km to the south from the base of the British Battalion of the UNPROFOR, in order to keep direct communication from Croatia, in particular with the Croatian Defence Council in Central Bosnia.235

The involvement of the Croatian Army in Bosnia and Herzegovina in mid-1993 was also confirmed on August 2, 1993 by Cedric Thomberry, chief of the UNPROFOR for civilian affairs. After his return from Central Bosnia, at the time, at a press conference, he claimed that the Croatian Army is present in Bosnia.236

In July 1993, on the occasion of attack on Bugojno, the special unit of “Pumas” from Varazdin tried to unblock the besieged units of the Croatian Defence Council. In the repeated offensive on Gornji Vakuf, in July 1993, the following units (in whole or in part) of the Croatian Army took part:

- 3rd Brigade of the ZNG (from Osijek);
- 5th Guardian Brigade (from Zagreb);
- 109th Brigade (from Vukovar);
- 113th Brigade (from Split);
- 114th Brigade (from Sibenik);
- 123rd Brigade (parts) from Varazdin;
- Brigade (parts), from Vinkovci;
- Battalion Matija Vlacic, a special purpose unit.237

235 Ibid., paragraphs 86, 93, and 94; M. Hero, the aforementioned work, pp. 77, and 80-82. Stating the certain documents speak “about significant presence” of the Croatian Army, the ICTY has established that these documents also offer “some specific data on the units used, that is, on the equipment and armament available to those units” (Ibid.).

236 S. Omeragic, the aforementioned work, p. 158.

237 Bosna, no. 1, February 11, 1994, pp. 15, and 23; AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2294, Participation of the HV/Croatian Army/ on the Bosnian-Herzegovina frontline and other forms of support from the Republic of Croatia; Ibid., inv. No. 2-2997, Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, Croatian Defence Council, Brigade Dr. Ante Starcevic, USKOPLJE, no. 1-5/1-351/93, November 5, 1993 – Military District of Tomislavgrad, EXTRAORDINARY REPORT; M. Spegelj, the aforementioned
In late July and early August 1993, new forces of the Croatian Army arrived in Herzegovina: some 750 members of the **1st Guardian Brigade Tigers** in Citluk, and a certain number also in Capljina.\(^{238}\)

The aforementioned forces had most probably arrived upon the request of general major Slobodan Praljak, commander of the Main Headquarters of the Croatian Defence Council. On July 24, 1993, this general approached to the President of the Republic of Croatia, Dr. Franjo Tudjman, minister of defence of the Republic of Croatia Gojko Susak, and chief of staff of the Main Headquarters of Croatia, army general Janko Bobetko ("DEFENCE MILITARY SECRET, STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL"), with the request for assistance in arms and manpower ("assistance to the HVO units"). In relation to this, general Slobodan Praljak requested as follows:

1. That the HVO area of responsibility, Popovo field to the right – Drenovac to the left (area of responsibility of the TG-2), defended by the HVO with 750 soldiers in one shift, be taken over by the HV units.

   This is an extremely significant defence sector, because it is via this area that the Serbs have the shortest access to Capljina (Metkovic) and Neum. A better equipped HV unit is also a guarantee for prevention of any Muslim penetration towards Neum (it is not excluded that the aggressor may be joint Serbo-Muslim forces).

   With this replacement, the HVO receives free forces needed for engagement on other frontlines.

2. For the activity in the direction of G. Vakuf – Bugojno, as an assistance to the forces of Bugojno, we URGENTLY need a small battalion well equipped, with a part of its support (tanks, artillery).

3. For cutting off of the Muslim forces of Jablanica and Mostar in the area of Salakovac-Ravni-Podgorani, we also need a professional battalion. We would attack Jablanica with the HVO forces and a part of the requested units.

4. If possible, we would kindly request that these be the units from the 4th and 5th Guardian Brigade of the HV" (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2999, Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, Croatian Defence Council, GS HVO, no. 02-2/1-01, 1573/93, Mostar, July 24, 1993 – to the President of RH Dr. Franjo Tudjman, Minister of Defence of RH Gojko Susak, Chief of Staff of GS HV army general Janko Bobetko).
In August 1993, a strong infantry and artillery unit of the Croatian Army from Vinkovci was stationed in the village of Trnovaca near Gornji Vakuf, from where it was constantly attacking the city and the surroundings.239

In the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1993, among others, the following units (in whole or in part) of the Croatian Army took part:

- 1st Brigade;
- 2nd Brigade (from Sisak);
- 3rd Brigade (parts), from Osijek;
- 4th Brigade;
- 5th Brigade;
- 7th Brigade (parts) from Varazdin;
- 60th Autonomous Battalion Ludvig Pavlovic.240

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239 S. Omeragic, the aforementioned work, p. 155.

In the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 60th Autonomous Battalion of the Croatian Army Ludvig Pavlovic took part too, as a special purpose unit, seated in Vrgorac, [that is, Capljina]. The commander of that unit in September 1993 was Colonel Dragan Curcic (AIIZ, inv. Nos. 2-2233-2233A).

In the documents available, Colonel Dragan Curcic also appears as the commander of the 60th Autonomous Battalion of the Croatian Army Ludvig Pavlovic, seated in Vrgorac, and as the commander of the Special Purpose Unit Ludvig Pavlovic, seated in Capljina. In that capacity, on September 11, 1993, he issued two CERTIFICATES on the membership of that unit, certifying that Dalibor (son of Bozo) Barusic (born in Tuzla on July 5, 1973), “residing in Zagreb – Novi Zagreb Municipality”, is the members of that “unit, where he performs the duty of soldier”, with the same number and date, but with different place of seat or issuance (Vrgorac and Capljina), and with different format, size and contents of the text on the seal. On one certificate, the seal of the round shape contains the text: “MILITARY POST No. 3280 VRGORAC”, and the other states: “REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, CROATIAN
In that year, “thousands and thousands of HV soldiers” took part in the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, among which “hundreds of HV officers” and “some dozen generals”, and in doing this, “HVO commanders were transposed into HV and vice versa”.

In the assessment of General Martin Spegelj, in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, “all paramilitary armies, which were beyond the regular system and under direct command of Minister Susak” were also active against the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Ibid., p. 327). In relation to this, he claims that during 1993, particularly in the fall, “whole units or their selected parts, that is, military groups under direct control of minister Susak which were not in the legal military system passed on into Bosnia and Herzegovina, but a chaos was created due to the absolutely incompetent commanding. A defeat is threatening in the conflict with the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in spite of the open cooperation between the HVO and the Serb army, so it becomes ultimately necessary to set up a more efficient commanding” (Ibid., p. 362).

The aforementioned argumentation based on which general Martin Spegelj seeks to deny the participation of the Republic of Croatia in the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is contradictory to the facts presented by himself, by citing the units, the number of soldiers and officers, including the generals of the Croatian Army, who were on the “Bosnia-Herzegovina battlefield”. Further, speaking about Bobetko’s operation on the southern frontline in 1992, he decidedly states that in that operation, among other things, a good part of the Popovo field has been conquered, at which according to him, too (General Martin Spegelj) “it is relevant that this part of our country has been liberated” – Ibid., p. 330.

Numerous documents, beginning with the Order by Franjo Tudjman about appointment of general Janko Bobetko the commander of the Southern Frontline undoubtedly suggest about participation of the Republic of Croatia in the aggression against the Republic of
In mid-1993, Franjo Tudjman assigned the task to the Defence Minister (Gojko Susak) and Chief of Staff of the Main Headquarters of the Croatian Army (General Bobetko) about assistance and involvement of the Republic of Croatia against Bosnia and Herzegovina. He did this because, according to him, it is in Herzeg-Bosnia that “the issue of the future borders of the Croatian state” is being resolved. At the same time, he indicated that “it is very important then to defend those positions held by the HVO over there”. According to him, these were: Novi Travnik, Vitez, Busovaca, and Mostar, however, “the problem of Gornji Vakuf needed to be resolved as soon as possible”.242

To his highest-ranking officers, including Josip Lucic, Franjo Tudjman issued the order to undertake everything possible in relation to engagement of manpower in the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In relation to this, Lucic “made the talks at the level of the Zagreb Operational Zone, at the level of the Osijek Military District, in the area of Austria, and at the Headquarters” To all the people whom he knew, “who had some tangible link to Herzegovina, by their origin or the like”. To this goal, “volunteer formations were organized from the predominantly lower commanding structures, that is, those that had gone down there”, that is, to Bosnia and Herzegovina.243

Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is also corroborated by general Martin Spegelj, who, among other things, claims that the political and military leadership of the Republic of Croatia has organized and lead “the war against the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina” (Ibid., pp. 363-364).

Unlike general Spegelj, Stjepan Mesic decidedly states that “in the discussions at the Croatian Parliament, it was claimed that there is no cohabitation between the peoples in BiH and that it is best to effect the division” (S. Mesic, PUT U RAT, in: RAT…, p. 36).

242 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2477, Shorthand Transcript of the meeting between Franjo Tudjman, Janko Bobetko, Imre Agotic, Josip Lucic, and Gojko Susak, at the Presidential Court on October 22, 1993, Dani, October 25, 2002, p. 23. Since then, “and further on”, according to Tudjman, “those operations were being conducted, and we had a certain success. But, this task was never completed until the end…” At the Meeting, Tudjman stated that he heard “that we have been offering assistance, but there are certain objections, too, from that frontline, that according to some persons, in terms of materials and in terms of manpower, there has not been sufficient assistance on our part…” (Ibid.).

243 Ibid.
On a number of occasions, Josip Lucic prepared “volunteers”, “upon various bases for this space”. Among them, in addition to others, were Andabak, Milicevic, Kozul, and the like, and 90 members of the 1st Brigade that Lucic knew. All of them were sent to Bosnia and Herzegovina and in October 1993 “they are still there; they have been down there for months…” Those “volunteers”, participating in the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and other forms of crime, “warred for a long time, for two years”. They were mainly Croats, originating from the Republic of Croatia.244

The whole 5th Brigade of the Croatian Army under the leadership of Kapular, with its composition, was gradually withdrawn from the Vinkovci frontline, and was transferred to the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. “These were some 2,500 people, plus all the artillery, armour and complete command, except for two or three officers”.245

In relation to engagement of the manpower (or, as concealed by the state and military leadership using the expression volunteers) from the Republic of Croatia against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, there were certain problems, too. The officers who were preparing the volunteers against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina never had “any written instruction and it is very hard to award these people back afterwards…”. Working on this, Josip Lucic also had a statement (written) from one of those volunteers, because he had requested him to “supply him with a written statement”, based on which it can concluded that they (the volunteers) “are not accepted in those terms as they had expected, not that they receive a good welcome, but to receive an organized welcome, so that they know where they were going to be used, so that they know what they were going to do. After some time, on average a month after, I think [that is, Josip Lucic – note by the author] that 50 per cent of the people returned. Because, they said, watch, these are the people that had warred for a long time, for two years…”

In late 1993, even the members of the Croatian Army, either born or originating in Bosnia and Herzegovina, were “not interested in going down there any longer, they are not interested… it seems that interpersonal relationships were spoiled with money” (Ibid.).

244 Ibid. An analysis showed that, out of 100 “volunteers”, 22 were originating from Herzegovina.

245 Ibid. The aforementioned data on this brigade were presented at that meeting by General Janko Bobetko, chief of staff of the Main Headquarters of the Croatian Army. However, Minister Gojko Susak denied this. Namely, he replied to Janko Bobetko by claiming that “the whole of the Fifth Brigade had never been in Herzegovina, never
The main task of the 5th Brigade was to take Gornji Vakuf. To this goal, the unit was launching aggressive attacks day and night (from the end of July 1993). Even on October 23, these forces were “holding the position” in the city itself, and “they had also withdrawn a part of the forces for rest”, but “there was still a reinforced battalion there, some 700 people, with all the artillery and armour in the broader area of Gornji Vakuf”.

On October 13, 1993, 83 soldiers of the Croatian Army were found “on the defence line of Mostar”.247

more than one thousand men from the Fifth Brigade, when you are mentioning 2,500 people; 2,500 people is the brigade. It was never engaged, it used to be engaged down there at Zemunik for five months, and then it was transferred to Herzegovina, the already tired people. Never more, now [October 22, 1993 – note by S.C.] there are some 700, never were there more than one thousand people from the Fifth Brigade over there, it was not possible” (Ibid.).

Upon this, General Janko Bobetko confirmed again that the complete 5th Brigade of the Croatian Army had been in Herzegovina. Minister Gojko Susak then reacted: “Mr. General, please, I did not interrupt you while you were speaking. Even this morning you have ordered Kapular to withdraw the brigade”. Upon this, Janko Bobetko repeated twice; “Not true, not true!” (Ibid.).

The further conversation between Gojko Susak and Janko Bobetko went as follows:

“SUSAK: ‘General, I would like it if we once listened to the brigade commanders, their version too, because he, when he called me, then he went to see you back. And you told him that you would resolve that evening with the President’.

BOBETKO: ‘Please, as I am being talked to, just be equal and open, do not accuse me” (Ibid., p. 24).

246 Ibid. Due to this, according to general Janko Bobetko, “for the next ten days, too” there was the need to “think about bringing in of new forces on the volunteering basis, so they get replaced, because the men can not hold on that long”. Two days before, on October 20, 1993, general Janko Bobetko had discussed this with officer Zarko Tole in Dubrovnik, who had asked for a meeting with Bobetko. Janko Bobetko promised him that “he would be there and that he should come, that a breakdown of the situation is, beginning with the fact that the forces are tired, which is true, and that for the time being he believes that they have no, I mean the Muslims, any fresh forces for any kind of counterattacks, which should not be underestimated, he must be prepared…” (Ibid.).

247 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2982, Mostar, October 13, 1993, no. 02-4/3-01/01-1657/93, THE LIST OF CROATIAN SOLDIERS ON THE LINE OF DEFENCE OF MOSTAR. These are the following soldiers:
In late October 1993, the members of the 1st and 2nd Brigades of the Croatian Army were also found “on the position to the south of Mostar, on the positions towards Blagaj”. One group was lead

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<td>4. Zdenko Cikoja;</td>
<td>5 Goran Bakac;</td>
<td>6. Dalibor Posavec;</td>
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<td>22. Predrag Tomas;</td>
<td>23. Marinko Knezovic;</td>
<td>24. Ivan Milicevic;</td>
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<tr>
<td>31. Marijan Juric;</td>
<td>32. Stanko Ramljak;</td>
<td>33. Bozidar Delac;</td>
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<td>34. Mario Cicak;</td>
<td>35. Mario Cicak;</td>
<td>36. Branko Mikulic;</td>
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<td>40. Slavko Topic;</td>
<td>41. Ivan Topic;</td>
<td>42. Mate Pavkovic;</td>
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<td>43. Vjekoslav Brekalo;</td>
<td>44. Akif Meskovic;</td>
<td>45. Damir Ormoz;</td>
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<td>46. Ivica Radic;</td>
<td>47. Franjo Bura;</td>
<td>48. Senad Avdovic;</td>
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<td>49. DENis Pupic;</td>
<td>50. Ivica Feric;</td>
<td>51. Ante Burilovic;</td>
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<td>52. Marko Pranjic;</td>
<td>53. Rade Mikus;</td>
<td>54. Miroslav Nadarevic;</td>
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<td>55. Zeljko Mendas;</td>
<td>56. Sinisa Spicko;</td>
<td>57. Vedran Ivelja;</td>
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<td>58. Nenad Labrovic;</td>
<td>59. Velimir Ujdur;</td>
<td>60. Drazen Basic;</td>
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<td>61. Drazen Ivankovic;</td>
<td>62. Goran Jesic;</td>
<td>63. Darko Prelec;</td>
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<td>64. Goran Trisovic;</td>
<td>65. Marino Silic;</td>
<td>66. Darko Salamun;</td>
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<td>67. Davor Klanac;</td>
<td>68. Bozidar Zupanic;</td>
<td>69. Kresimir Pfeifer;</td>
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<td>70. Damir Pukljak;</td>
<td>71. Zdravko Tausan;</td>
<td>72. Zlatan Kulenovic;</td>
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<td>73. Husein Melic;</td>
<td>74. Milodar Rozic;</td>
<td>75. Ivica Rezek;</td>
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<td>76. Franju Djuran;</td>
<td>77. Zoran Sturlic;</td>
<td>78. Davor Azinovic;</td>
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<td>79. Kruno Stepanic;</td>
<td>80. Momir Melsa;</td>
<td>81. Nenad Kampic;</td>
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<td>82. Jozo Sutic;</td>
<td>83. Ibrahim Bostandzic (Ibid.).</td>
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The aforementioned soldiers from the Republic of Croatia received “small certificates that they are members of the first light attack battalion of the Military Police”.

by Colonel Horvat.249

The aggression also saw participation of the 3rd Brigade of the Croatian Army, which, just like the 5th, pulled out “from the sensitive Slavonian territory”, was attacking Mostar.250

Bosnia and Herzegovina was also attacked by the Legion of Honour. In the period from October 18, through November 4, 1993, this unit of the Croatian Army was executing the “combat tasks on the Uskoplje [Gornji Vakuf – note by the author] frontline”.251

Even in early November, 1993, Franjo Tudjman dictated the task to the political and military leadership of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia – “to link Kiseljak with Busovaca, and then to see if we can, then, hold that line”. He insisted that “it is this we need to be focused on, as well as on taking of Uskoplje, as because of the links with Novi Travnik and Vitez, it also needs to be linked to Bugojno, at any price”.252

The necessity of military victory and “breaking of the spine” of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Central Bosnia,

249 Ibid. A part of those forces “fell apart.... it was disorganized....”

250 Ibid. The forces of the 3rd and 5th Brigades, according to General Bobetko, did “very much in terms of stabilization of the frontlines at Vakuf and Mostar” (Ibid.).

251 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2996, Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, Croatian Defence Council, ZP Tomislavgrad, IZM Prozor, no. 01/4706, November 4, 1993 – to the Professional Unit Ludvig Pavlovic Capljina. This unit, according to the report by Zeljko Siljeg (commander of the Operational zone of Northeast Herzegovina – Military District Tomislavgrad (IZM Prozor), dated November 4, 1993, “was perfect in executing all of the combat tasks. There were no problems with this unit, both during the execution of the combat tasks, and outside the combat assignments. It was a model unit”. Due to this, claims Colonel Siljeg, the Legion of Honour was needed to him, “on November 12, 1993, until 12:00 hours, for execution of attacking activities” (Ibid.).

252 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2457, Shorthand transcript of the meeting between Franjo Tudjman and Jadranko Prlic, Mate Boban, Slobodan Praljak, and Milivoj Petkovic, in the villa Dalmacija in Split, November 5, 1993, Dani. October 25, 2002, pp. 20, and 26. Indicating upon the taking of Central Bosnia “at any price”, at the time, Franjo Tudjman advised “that they should not move ahead” then (“at the moment”), “for political and military reasons, with the operation near Mostar” (Ibid.)
in order to “round up the territory”, that is “the living space”, was particularly insisted on by Jadranko Prlic. Namely, the formation of the collaborationist Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia and the numerous crimes committed in its name, in particular the genocide against Bosniaks, in the assessment of the political leadership of this fascist creation, in particular of Jadranko Prlic, President of the “Government”, have shown that “the political idea with which the Croatian people have entered the defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina [read: the destruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina – note by the author], that those are rare who believe and think differently”. In presenting such an assessment, at the meeting of Franjo Tudjman with the political and military leadership of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, in villa Dalmacija in Split, on November 5, 1993, Jadranko Prlic only believed “that the basic problem is in execution of this idea, meaning, in which way we execute that idea in practice and through protection of space and through direct power and through all those relevant functions meaning the autochthony and sovereignty of a nation…”. Indicating upon the “results” on the plan of “defence”, and “in terms of military organization”, from the aspect of his profession (economy), he insisted to check whether the “Croatian Community/Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia” is a “cost-effective investment for Croatia, having in mind all that has been invested through arms and on other things”. He believed that in those terms they need to propose “options of more complete approximation”. Among these options, on November 5, 1993, Prlic thought that “the military victory is necessary in order to retrieve both the situation and the mood”. This option, according to him, was clear, and it “did not need expounding on at all”. Be it Mostar, be it Vakuf, or this new operation planned up there, merging of Kiseljak with Busovaca. We have to approximate to rounding up of the territory”, claimed Jadranko Prlic. At this, he believed that “without breaking of the spine of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the direction of Central Bosnia” “we can hardly expect any kind of special solution with that dominant group among the Muslims, headed by Alija Izetbegovic”.253

253 Ibid. P. 25. The “Government” of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, headed by Jadranko Prlic, in the spring of 1993, similarly to the Nazi “living space”, in order to “round up the territory”, modelled upon the designer of the concept “of the rounding up of the Croatian state at the expense of Bosnia and Herzegovina, if needed through exchange of population too”, promoted by Franjo Tudjman, determined
At the meeting in villa Dalmacija in Split, on November 5, 1993, with the political and military leadership of the Croatian collaborationists from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Franjo Tudjman insisted on such organization “that we should at least defend that line for which we somehow managed to get an approval for at the international conference [the Owen – Stoltenberg Plan, the author], meaning Novi Travnik, Vitez, and Busovaca”. In addition, at the time too he pointed out the need, “for strategic reasons, to rule the whole area of Prozor, Uskoplje, Bugojno, Jajce, not allowing the offensive intentions of the Muslims to penetrate south of Mostar”.254

In the first half of November 1993, Franjo Tudjman issued the command on establishment of the Main Headquarters of the HVO. It included the following officers of the Croatian Army: generals Ante Roso and Miljenko Cmijec, then Ljubo Cesic-Rojs, assistant chief of staff of the Department for logistics, and the officials of the HDZ of Croatia: Drago Krpina, chief of staff of the Political Administration of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia, and Ivan Tolj, who was also performing this duty in various periods, as well as Goran Dodig, official at the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia, and Josip Juras, assistant minister of defence of the Republic of Croatia. Ante Roso was appointed commander. Posusje was determined as the command place.255

Both proposals and conclusions, “even on displacement of certain brigades from certain areas that would also include displacement of the population from those areas and their concentration on certain directions” for which it insisted that “they can both become and remain Croatian” (254 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2457, Shorthand transcript of the meeting between Franjo Tudjman and Jadranko Prlic, Mate Boban, Slobodan Praljak, and Milivoj Petkovic, in the villa Dalmacija in Split, November 5, 1993, Dani, October 25, 2002, p. 26).

Such Nazi politics and practice were “exclusively pragmatically viewed”, sought by the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia and Jadranko Prlic in person, President of its collaborationist government. In spite of the fact that Jadranko Prlic knew about the effort “that each Croat should remain living where they are”, he claimed that “there is some pragmatics, there is a concentration of powers, there is all the rest…” (Ibid.).

254 Ibid.
255 M. Spegelj, the aforementioned work, p. 363. The aforementioned Tudjman’s order for formation of the Main Headquarters of the Croatian Defence Council was
In the morning of November 8, 1993, in compliance with the aforementioned order, it was ordered that the newly formed Main Headquarters of the Croatian Defence Council also be supplemented by the following units of the Croatian Army needed for security:

- units of the Military Police from the 66th Battalion of the VP of the Croatian Army for direct protection;
- units from the Communication Regiment for organization and communications security;
- the needed number of officers and soldiers for organization of the logistical base;
- uniforms with the HVO emblems, and such same registration plates for the vehicles.256

With arrival of the newly formed Main Headquarters of the Croatian Defence Council and the units of the Croatian Army from Zagreb to Posusje, the then Main Headquarters of the Croatian Defence Council in Mostar ceased to exist, with its staff who had already come from the Croatian Army to work in Posusje, including the previous commander of the Croatian Defence Council, general Milivoj Petkovic. In Posusje, Ciro Grubisic (official of the Croatian Democratic Union of the Republic of Croatia) joined Dodig and Juras (liaison officers).257

formally pertaining to the redeployment of the aforementioned officers to the Southern Frontline, and actually, on November 8, all of them were supposed to be flown by helicopter to Posusje.

Goran Dodig and Josip Juras were appointed for liaison between the Main Headquarters of the HVO and the minister of defence Gojko Susak, and President Franjo Tudjman.

This order was read by chief of staff of the Main Headquarters of the Croatian Army, general Janko Bobetko, on November 7, 1993, in the War Conference Room, on the first floor of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia in Zagreb. On that day, after the end of the working hours, Janko Bobetko invited the members of the Main Headquarters of the Croatian Army and the chiefs of staff of all its departments, as well as generals Ante Roso and Miljenko Crnjec, then Ljubo Cesic, Drago Krpina, and Ivan Tolj. Admiral Davorin Domazet was also attending that meeting.

256 Ibid. Uniforms were to be secured fro all the units of the Croatian Army with HVO emblems, “and such identical registration plates for the vehicles” (Ibid.).

257 Ibid. According to the writing of General Martin Spigelj, Grubisic is a butcher by profession, who later was the Consul General of Croatia in Mostar.
General Bobetko (chief of staff of the Main Headquarters of the Croatian Army), in accordance with the aforementioned order of President Franjo Tudjman and “the historical task of the new GS of the HVO”, on November 9, 1993, in Ploce, held a meeting and assigned the tasks. It was concluded that the attack operation needs to be urgently prepared from Gornji Vakuf towards Central Bosnia, in which the Croatian Defence Council would receive reinforcement from the Croatian Army in artillery and manpower:

- 350th Commando Platoon;
- 2nd and 5th Guardian Brigade, with a tank party;
- One battalion of the 7th Guardian Brigade;
- Communications unit; and
- Helicopter squadron.258

This aggressive operation was personally planned by army general Janko Bobetko.259 The operation started on November 15, 1993. It was conducted from the forefront command places in Prozor and on Mt. Makljen.260

In that new offensive in November 1993, the Republic of Croatia engaged 9,000 soldiers of the Croatian Army. At the time, Gornji Vakuf was attacked by the following units (in whole or in part) of the Croatian Army:

- 3rd Brigade (from Osijek);
- 5th Guardian Brigade (from Zagreb);
- 113th Brigade (from Split);
- 114th Brigade (from Sibenik);

258 Ibid.

259 Ibid. Due to the fact that “the legionary sergeant Roso was not up to the task”, as claimed by Martin Spigelj, this operation was personally planned by Janko Bobetko. According to general Martin Spigelj, he was enthusiastic about accepting and executing the political and military plans of President Franjo Tudjman and minister Gojko Susak, and “during the whole 1993, he engaged the HV and its combat machinery in the war for division of Bosnia and Herzegovina” (M. Spigelj, the aforementioned work, p. 363).

260 Ibid., pp. 363-364.
- 7th Guardian Brigade (from Varazdin);
- 1st Guardian Brigade Tigers (from Zagreb);
- 5th Domobran Regiment (from Osijek);
- /11th/ Domobran Regiment (from Vinkovci);
- Battalion “Matija Vlacic”, special forces unit of the Main Headquarters of the Croatian Army,
- Soldiers from Virovitica.\(^{261}\)


5th Domobran Regiment from Osijek arrived to the Uskoplje Frontline on November 6, 1993, with 307 soldiers, where it possessed the positions in the area of Mackovac – Potrlica, “organizing active defence in shifts with overall manpower”. It was “successful in executing all of the assigned tasks and contributed to preservation of the reached lines of defence, and with active defence it enabled the units that went into attacks in the attack directions to shift the line of defence in our favour”, states Colonel Zeljko Siljeg (commander of the Military District of Tomislavgrad – IZM Prozor), in his report dated December 5, 1993. (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-3009, Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, Croatian Defence Council, ZP Tomislavgrad, IZM Prozor, No. 01/5384, Prozor, December 5, 1993 – to the Combat Group of the 5th Domobran Regiment Osijek).
Due to the heroic defence offered by the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the aforementioned operation failed. The aggressor forces and their collaborationist units had big losses, particularly the 5th Guardian Brigade of the Croatian Army in Gornji Vakuf. The

On November 03/04, 1993, the Domobran Regiment from Vinkovci (11th Domobran Regiment) “was introduced in the area of responsibility of the Brigade Dr. Ante Starcevic”. Its number of manpower then was 182 soldiers (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2997, Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, Croatian Defence Council, Brigade Dr. Ante Starcevic, Uskoplje, no. 1-5/1-351/93, November 5, 1993 – Military District of Tomislavgrad, EXTRAORDINARY REPORT).

The aforementioned “manpower from Vinkovci was not welcomed by the local people, they were not adequately accommodated, they slept on the concrete, they did not have breakfast or lunch provided, both at Uzricje and in the city [Gornji Vakuf – note by the author]. …”. Due to this, on November 4, 1993, from the commander of the Brigade Dr. Ante Starcevic, Colonel Zeljko Siljeg, commander of the Operational Zone of Northwest Herzegovina (Military District of Tomislavgrad, IZM Prozor) requested to supply him with a “written report by 06:00 hours on November 5, 1993, in relation to the aforementioned” (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2995, Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, Croatian Defence Council, ZP Tomislavgrad, IZM Prozor, no. 01/4705, November 4, 1993 – Brigade Dr. Ante Starcevic).

Battalion Matija Vlacic was one of the special, top elite units of the Croatian Army. It was under direct command of the Main Headquarters of the Croatian Army, and one of its best trained units. Commander of that unit was captain Ante Zoni Maksan. That unit also has its own base in Sapjane, near Opatija, where the soldiers are trained under repressive discipline and psychological training based on the legionary principle. Commander of the base was Captain Mario Juzvisen (AIIZ, inv. Nos. 2-1890, and 2-1892; Bosna, no. 1, February 11, 1994, pp. 15, and 23.

262 M. Spiegelj, the aforementioned work, pp. 363-364. According to general Martin Spiegelj, that brigade had big losses, “because the HVO Brigade Bruno Busic had not completed its part of the task and secured its passage over the Vrbas river”. In addition to that, Martin Spiegelj claims that the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina “has grown into a force that nobody expected it to, and which has messed up many plans. It was backed by the most numerous Bosnian-Herzegovina people – the Muslims (Bosniaks) on whom no one had seriously counted so far either in political negotiations or in the military sense; both Milosevic and Tudjman were convinced that they were dealing with an non-enlightened and politically swayable mass which, under their pressure and squeezed in between the two military forces has to accept what it is left with”. In this way, according to Martin Spiegelj, everything “got more complicated and nothing was certain any more; the main players of the war – Milosevic and Tudjman – and their strategy were facing a catastrophe. Finally, the United States of America and some other major forces, a little bit voluntarily but
350th Commando Platoon, planned by General Bobetko to be landed by parachuting from helicopters onto the range on the Gornji Vakuf – Travnik road, had to return to Ploce due to a snow blizzard over Mts. Vrana and Cvrsnica.263

In mid-November 1993, the forces of the Croatian Army and their collaborationist formations (Croatian Defence Council) were also grouped in the areas of Prozor, Glavaticevo, Bjelimici, and Kiseljak. At the time, there were between 7,000 and 8,000 soldiers of the Croatian Army and the Croatian Defence Council around Kiseljak.264

Immediate military participation of the Republic of Croatia in the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina during 1993 was also confirmed by Slobodan Milosevic and David Owen. Namely, in the negotiations in Geneva on November 29, 1993, in the discussion with Franjo Tudjman, among other things, Slobodan Milosevic claimed that “Croatia is directly involved in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina”. During the negotiations in Dobanovci, on December 9, 1993 (Slobodan Milosevic, Radovan Karadzic, Momcilo Krajisnik, Hrvoje Sarinic, Mile Akmadzic, David Owen and Thorwald Stoltenberg), David Owen stated that the Republic of Croatia “is directly involved in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina”.265

In the first half of January 1994, the following units of the Croatian Army participated in the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina:

- 175th Brigade;
- 5th Domobran Regiment;
- 6th Domobran Regiment;
- 11th Domobran Regiment;

...a little bit more by force, stop this mutual butchering, and impose the Dayton agreement. Although it has stopped the combat activity, a stable or just peace is still not in sight” (Ibid., pp. 363-364).

263 Ibid. According to Martin Spigeli, this “was actually fortunate, because an even bigger catastrophe was avoided in that way”.


265 H. Sarinic, the aforementioned work, pp. 54, and 71.
- Special units;
- Battalion Matija Vlacic;
- Tigers (from Zagreb);
- Thunders (from Sisak), and the like. 266

In late January 1994, the following units of the Croatian Army (in whole or in part) participated in the attack on the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina:

- 1st Guardian Brigade, in the broader area of Prozor;
- 3rd Brigade of ZNG, (from Osijek), in the area of Prozor-Gornji Vakuf;
- 5th Guardian Brigade (from Zagreb), in the broader area of Mostar;
- 7th Brigade (from Varazdin), in the area of Gornji Vakuf;
- 109th Brigade (from Vukovar), in the area of Prozor-Gornji Vakuf;
- 113th Brigade (from Split), in the area of Mostar and the broader area of Dreznica;
- 114th Brigade (from Sibenik), in the area of Prozor-Gornji Vakuf;
- 175th Brigade, in the area of Gornji Vakuf;
- Brigade (parts), from Vinkovci, in the area of Prozor-Gornji Vakuf;
- Brigade (parts), from Varazdin, in the area of Prozor-Gornji Vakuf;
- Battalion Black Legion – Battalion for the Special Patrolling Purpose, in the area of Prozor-Gornji Vakuf;
- Four brigades, a tank battalion (20 tanks), and two artillery divisions, in the area of Bosnian Posavina (the broader area of Orasje);
- A number of special units of the Croatian Army: Tigers, Pumas, Matija Vlacic (in the area of Mostar), and the like. 267

266 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2944, Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, Ministry of Defence, Main Headquarters of the HVO, no. 02-2/1-01-54/94, Mostar, January 8, 1994 – to the minister of defence of the HR HB, Regular Weekly Report; Oslobodjenje, January 29, 1994, pp. 1, and 3. In late January, five new additional brigades of the Croatian Army and the HVO were also moving in the direction of Prozor.

In January 1994, the Republic of Croatia transferred a number of its brigades and a number of other units into Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the first half of 1994, the 175th Brigade of the Croatian Army participated on the “Uskoplje-Rama frontline”.

The commander of the Brigade was Frane Primorac. The head of security in the Brigade, seated in Prozor, was Miroslav Vidovic. Captain Andrija Skoko was the assistant commander for logistics.

268 H. Sarinic, the aforementioned work, p. 89; AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2944, Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, Ministry of Defence, Main Headquarters of the HVO, no. 02-2/1-01-54/94, Mostar, January 8, 1994 — to the minister of defence of the HR HB, Regular Weekly Report); Oslobodjenje, January 29, 1994, pp. 1, and 3; S. Omeragic, the aforementioned work, p. 153; R. Delic, the aforementioned work, p. 321, note 6. At the negotiations in Geneva, on January 18, 1994, after the completion of the bilateral negotiations with the international intermediaries, the Croatian delegation met the Serbian one. In the discussion with Franjo Tudjman, among other things, Slobodan Milosevic pointed out that “the Muslims want the war. They are concentrating around Travnik, Vitez, and Busovaca, and they are also planning a general attack on Grbavica. I can see that due to this you have transferred five brigades into Bosnia”. Upon which Franjo Tudjman, with a smile, answered: “These are volunteers”, upon which Slobodan Milosevic responded “I am not your UN” (H. Sarinic, the aforementioned work, p. 89).

269 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2946, Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, Ministry of Defence, class: 801-02/94-01/04, reg. no. 02-01-94-1, Mostar, April 22, 1994 – to the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia, the Cabinet; J. Babic, PRVI DOKAZI DA JE HRVATSKA VOJSKA BILA AGRESOR U BIH, Nacional, Zagreb, March 6, 2001, p. 10. Writing about this, Jasna Babic derived a wrong conclusion, claiming that the 175th Brigade is a “blatant example of the so-called parallel command military and political line, which avoided not only the constitutional competency of the Parliament, but also the Main Headquarters of the HV”. It is possible that the Parliament did not pass such a decision, but the forming of this brigade and its participation, as well as of the other Croatian units, in the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was with the awareness of the Main Headquarters of the Croatian Army and the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia, in particular of the supreme commander Franjo Tudjman, and his defence minister Gojko Susak.

270 Nacional, March 6, 2001, p. 10. The leaders of the 175th Brigade are still at high positions in Croatia: Primorac is working at the Croatian Military Academy (Croatian Military University), and Miroslav Vidovic is the aide-de-camp of Petar Stipetic, chief of staff of the Main Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia. Primorac sent all the reports on the activity of that brigade to general Janko Bobetko, chief of staff of the Main Headquarters of the Croatian Army.
The organization, mobilization and the composition of the 175th Brigade of the Croatian Army was ordered by the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia, on December 14, 1993 (according to a written order by Minister Gojko Susak). Pursuant to the order of the minister of defence of the Republic of Croatia, no. 512-01-93-4890, dated December 28, 1993, the Brigade was sent to Bosnia and Herzegovina (“... to the frontline...”), where from December 31, 1993, it participated in the aggression against that Republic.

Pursuant to Susak’s order, the 175th Brigade was to be formed from among the Bosnian-Herzegovina Croats, who had fled to Croatia after January 1, 1992, and who had been treated as defectors. The person in charge of (forced) mobilization was Ivan Andabak, “co-founder and leader of the Siroki Brijeg Convict Battalion”. After the mobilization, the mobilized persons were treated as volunteers in front of the public and the international diplomacy. All the members of the brigade received HVO emblems and classical infantry arms. After the training in Pozega and Delnice, the Brigade (with some 1,500 soldiers) was sent to Bosnia and Herzegovina in December 1993. They were taken to the so-called Southern Frontline in 170 busses. During the crossing of Mt. Vran, the brigade got stuck in the snow, so “they got towed out by the UNPROFOR tug trucks”. On December 31, 1993, it took over the “frontline” in the Uskoplje-Rama area.

The first armed attack on the forces of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was conducted by the 175th Brigade on February 24, 1994. In the area of Kicalj, 2 of its members were killed. The second attack was conducted by the Brigade in the area of Zvisca, in April 1994, where 2 members were injured and some 10 were killed, and 5 members of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina were detained.

Even in the end of April and later on, this Brigade was in Bosnia and Herzegovina. On April 22, 1994, defence minister of the HR HB, Vladimir Soljic, approached the defence minister of the Republic of Croatia, with the proposal to do as follows:

1. To withdraw the 175th Brigade from the territory of HR Herzeg-Bosnia.
2. The withdrawal is to be conducted successively, by May 15, 1994.
3. To enable the members of the 175th Brigade to transfer into one of the Gmtbr [Guardian motorized brigades – note by the author] of the HVO, of their own choice.
4. The material and technical resources of the Brigade to be temporarily stored into the free MO of HR HB” (Ibid.).

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271 Ibid. Pursuant to Susak’s order, the 175th Brigade was to be formed from among the Bosnian-Herzegovina Croats, who had fled to Croatia after January 1, 1992, and who had been treated as defectors. The person in charge of (forced) mobilization was Ivan Andabak, “co-founder and leader of the Siroki Brijeg Convict Battalion”.

The brigade was funded from the state budget of the Republic of Croatia, and its members received salaries as members of the Croatian Army.\textsuperscript{273}

Before and at the time of the 175\textsuperscript{th} Brigade, there were more units of the Croatian Army at the “Uskoplje-Rama frontline”. In late January 1994, \textit{with the arrival of our second battalion}, a number of the units of the Croatian Army and Croatian Defence Council were pulled out of that territory, and these areas were assigned to the 175\textsuperscript{th} Brigade of the Croatian Army, with domicile units added to it (3 parties: Zdrimci, Dobrosin, and Kakanj).\textsuperscript{274}

In late January and early February 1994, on the eve of signing of the Washington Agreement, according to the information of the United Nations Security Council, the Republic of Croatia had deployed units of the Croatian Army, \textit{together with heavy military equipment, into the central and southern parts of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina} Due to this \textit{serious hostile act against a UN member state}, the Security Council seriously condemned Croatia.\textsuperscript{275}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[273] Nacional, March 6, 2001, p. 10.
\item[274] Ibid; Oslobodjenje, January 29, 1994, pp. 1, and 3.
\item[275] S. Omeragic, the aforementioned work, p. 157. In early February 1994, due to the participation of the Croatian Army in the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia was threatened with sanctions from a number of relevant places. Thus, on February 2, the AFP News Agency reported the statement of a Danish ministry official that the ministerial meeting of the European Union in Brussels on February 7 and 8 shall discuss potential sanctions against Croatia \textbf{due to its military participation in Bosnia}. In a TV interview (reported by AFP on February 4), among other things, German chancellor Helmut Kohl sated \textit{“that the Croatian leaders have not managed to kept their oath, given when they were recognized by the international community, that they shall not make military interventions in the neighbouring countries. Croatia does not keep its promises. This is a scandal and we have to condemn this in the most serious manner”} (K. Begic, the aforementioned work, p. 166).

In the communiqué dated February 4, 1994, the Security Council too threatened Croatia with sanctions unless it withdraws \textbf{its troops from Bosnia}, seeking from the secretary general to notify about withdrawal of the Croatian Army and arms from Bosnia within a two-week period (Ibid., pp. 166-167).
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
In late January and early February 1994, the international representatives in Bosnia and Herzegovina were receiving reports that “the units of the Croatian Army were arriving to Bosnia and Herzegovina to assist the HVO”. In January and February 1994, on a number of occasions, general Martin Garrod himself saw military convoys and many members of the Croatian Army in movement towards Prozor and Gornji Vakuf. In the capacity of witness of the prosecution in the Case Kordic and Cerkez, on February 1, 2000, before the Hague Tribunal, among other things, he stated: “There were a lot of denials, but we also had many sightings, and I personally saw many HV convoys moving along the mountain road from Tomislavgrad to Prozor. They were mainly without registration plates, but the HV emblems were clearly visible… Many of them (vehicles) were transporters, some transported soldiers, and some were towing mortars or artillery”.

The members of the EUMM (European Union Monitoring Mission), too, confirm the participation of the Croatian Army in the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus, A.D., protected witness of the prosecution in the Case Kordic and Cerkez, an EUMM member, on the occasion of return from Zenica to Mostar, from the meeting of all regional centre managers, was stopped with his then regional centre manager Martin Garrod, on the road known as the “Triangle Route”. “We had to pull over from the road, and to let pass a formed military unit. We saw the HV emblems on the vehicles and soldiers. This was for the first time that I personally had a definitive evidence of my observation on the rumours that the HV involvement had been present for months. This was a convoy of significant size. My assessment was… that it had some 50 vehicles and we were stopped on our trip for some 20 minutes, maybe more, and the equipment we saw included artillery, D130-120mm, and a certain number of vehicles with multiple rocket launchers… We saw the HV emblems on the vehicles, including tiger heads. We believed that this was a HV unit from Split… My assessment is that this unit was of the size of battalion or more. Somewhere between 800 and 1,000 people” (Bilten FHP, 15, p. 31, Testimony of A.D., protected witness of the prosecution (he used to be a member of the EUMM – European Union Monitoring Mission between 1993 and 1995) in Case Kordic and Cerkez – ICTY, Case: No. IT-95-14/2-T, January 26, 2000).

His observations and observations of the regional sector manager were also confirmed by Tim Mike. This report “was dated as January 18… They too saw movements of
The participation of the Croatian Army in the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was also confirmed at the joint session of the Presidential Council of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, Presidency of the HDZ of BiH, and the Executive Council of the HDZ of BiH, held on March 6, 1994, in Mostar, discussing one point of the agenda “Report on the Negotiations in Washington”. Ivan Milas stated “that it is needed to strengthen the negotiation team to the maximum, to strengthen the defence forces”, because, according to him, Croatia “was tasked to specify these areas and prevent them from being Islamized”, and he pointed out that “the main interest is to suspend the war and Croatia is forced to withdraw its regular troops from this territory”.277

Because of involvement of the Croatian Army in the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, General Anton Tus objected to President Franjo Tudjman. Franjo responded to him by saying “that the matter does not involve military but political issues, and that the world does not want an Islamic state in the heart of Europe!”278

The Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina again stopped the aggressive offensive of the Croatian Army. At the time when the Croatian Army and the Croatian Defence Council were suffering military defeats in Bosnia and Herzegovina as inflicted by the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly “at the moment when the HVO was on the verge of defeat”, the Peace Agreement between the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Croatian Defence

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278 RAT..., p. 91.
Council in Zagreb (February 23, 1994), and the Agreement in Split (March 12, 1994), were signed, which was followed by the Washington Agreement (March 18, 1994).279

“Thousands and thousands of the HV soldiers” and “hundreds of HV officers” took part in the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.280 Judging by the number of units, and thousands and thousands of soldiers and hundreds of officers of the Croatian Army, participating in the armed attacks against Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is obvious that the Croatian Army was rather numerous in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is possible that the armed forces of the Republic of Croatia were even more numerous than those of the Croatian Defence Council. However, the exact number of the members of the Croatian Army in the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is hard to establish, unlike that of its collaborationist formations — Croatian Defence Council, which had between 45,000 and 52,000 soldiers.281 Only in the areas

279 M. Spegelj, the aforementioned work, p. 365; K. Begic, the aforementioned work, p. 170; RAT..., p. 91. For more details, see: R. Delic, the aforementioned work, pp. 318-334.

280 M. Spegelj, the aforementioned work, p. 336.

281 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2947, Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, Croatian Defence Council, Main Headquarters of the HVO of HZ HB, strictly confidential, no. 01-2762/92, Mostar, December 15, 1992 – to the Head of Defence of the HZ HB; Ibid., inv. No. 2-2943, Minutes from the meeting with Mr. minister G. Susak held at the Ministry of Defence on December 22, 1993; Ibid., inv. No. 2-2944, Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, Ministry of Defence, Main Headquarters of the HVO, no. 02-2/1-01-54/94, Mostar, January 8, 1994 – to the minister of defence of the HR HB, Regular Weekly Report.

Prva Linija (no. 7, August 30, 1993), and Bosna (no. 1, February 11, 1994, pp. 15 and 23), claim that all the regular units of the Republic of Croatia and of the Croatian Defence Council in Bosnia and Herzegovina had between 45,000 and 50,000 soldiers. However, this data is not exact, because only the total number of members of the Croatian Defence Council was over 50,000 soldiers.

In mid-December 1992, the units of the Croatian Defence Council had 45,000 people (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2947, Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, Croatian Defence Council, Main Headquarters of the HVO of HZ HB, strictly confidential, no. 01-2762/92, Mostar, December 15, 1992 – to the Head of Defence of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia).
of Mostar, Prozor, and Gornji Vakuf, in January 1994, there were 12 brigades of the regular Croatian Army active, with some 15,000 to 18,000 soldiers. In the area of Posavina, the aforementioned military units at the time had between 10,000 and 12,000 soldiers. Thus, between 25,000 and 30,000 members of the Croatian Army took part in the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in January 1994.282

The Republic of Croatia planned, prepared and directed all of its aggressive operations against Bosnia and Herzegovina from the Main Headquarters of the Croatian Army and the Ministry of Defence in Zagreb, from where orders arrived in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where – in addition to the Croatian Army – they were only executed by the local commands of the Croatian Defence Council. Through Grude, the Croatian Defence Council forwarded the reports on all the developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina to Zagreb, from where it then received instructions as to what it needs to undertake, so that in the hierarchy sense the Croatian Defence Council only functioned as an integral part of the Croatian Army.283

In December 1993, HVO’s payroll included 42,000 people (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2943, Minutes from the meeting with Mr. minister G. Susak held at the Ministry of Defence on December 22, 1993). In addition to minister Susak, the meeting was attended by the minister of defence of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia Perica Jukic, “with all his assistants”.

The aforementioned data was presented by brigadier Crnjec and minister Jukic. At the time, the number of people in the Military District of Mostar amounted to some 16,000-17,000 soldiers, with the anti-aircraft defence, regiment and a tank unit (Ibid.).

In January 1994, the number of manpower in the units of the Armed Forces of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia amounted to 52,900 soldiers:

- **Military District Vitez** with brigades 110th “Usora”, 111th Xp and Brigade Bobovac-Vares: 20,000 soldiers
- **Military District Mostar**: 14,000 soldiers
- **Military District Orasje**: 6,900 soldiers
- **Military District Tomislavgrad**: 12,000 soldiers.


282 *Oslobodjenje*, January 29, 1994, p. 3.
283 *Bosna*, no. 1, February 11, 1994, pp. 15, and 23.
Minister Susak stayed at the Main Headquarters of the Croatian Defence Council in Posušje regularly for three days in the week (Fridays, Saturdays, and Sundays) and held meetings. Among others, these meetings were attended by the officials of the Croatian Democratic Union of the Republic of Croatia, and the Parliamentary representatives Ivic Pasalic and Ivan Milas, then the chief of intelligence services Miroslav Tudjman, Ljubo Cesic-Rojs, and Mate Boban, as the President of the HDZ of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatian Defence Council and the collaborationist Croatian Community/Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia.284

President Franjo Tudjman, Minister Gojko Susak, and the “select top of the HDZ, as the ruling party in Croatia, organized and conducted the war against the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina”.285

From the Ministries of Defence and the Main Headquarters and “down the line of hierarchy”, the Croatian Army was giving “everything for Herzegovina, from responsible people, from generals, to the officers there”. Although, according to Tudjman, such an approach was not alright, because “then it only involves a lack of understanding that this is of strategic importance not only for the present but also to the future of the Croatian state…” Regardless of Croatia, according to Tudjman, being “in such a delicate situation that we do not get directly involved”, he claimed that “those people over there know that we are present there, so they are not nagging at us so much for that as much as they are because of what happened in the Gospic operation, in destruction of those Serb villages over there…”.286

284 M. Spegelj, the aforementioned work, pp. 363-364.

285 Ibid. When presenting this claim, general Martin Spegelj states that “all different claims and dry theories are only pushing of dirt under the carpet and creation of mortgage on the state of Croatia”. In relation to this, he writes that the aggression war for occupation of territories in the neighbouring state “is a purposeless, brother-killing war for the Republic of Croatia and the Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which has caused an exodus of more than 350,000 Bosnia-Herzegovina Croats,…” (Ibid., pp. 364-365).

The Croatian Army was also present in the area of the Operational Zone of Central Bosnia, subsequently the Military District of Vitez, commanded by Tihomir Blaskic, and particularly in the valley of Lasva. In the first half of June 1992, only one unit of the Croatian Army (a detachment) was found in the area of Novi Travnik, commanded by Andrija Kolobaric. From June 25, 1992, Zoran Pilicic, member of the 153rd “R” Brigade of the Croatian Army was found at the Command of the Operational zone of Central Bosnia, where he was deployed into the Croatian Defence Council. In May 1993, he was one of aides to the commander of the “Operational Zone of Central Bosnia”. His status (granting of rank and other rights and obligations), as well as those of the other members of the Croatian Army who participated in the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was resolved in the Croatian Army.

The unit of the 3rd Battalion of Kresevo (HVO Brigade Ban Jelacic, Kiseljak) was staffed from the Republic of Croatia.

The presence of the Croatian Army on the territory of Central Bosnia too was evidenced by the Hague Tribunal. The officers of the Croatian Army, specifically Colonel Vidosevic, from the Split Brigade, accompanied by two more officers of the Croatian Army, were often seen at the Vitez Hotel. In April 1993, the representatives of the Croatian Army, Dragan Curcic and Bozo Curchija, were also seen in Vitez. Soldiers with emblems stating HV were accommodated in a school in Dubravica (near the Vitez Hotel). The soldiers of the Croatian Army were also present in Busovaca during gathering of the Croatian Defence Council that occurred between May 1992 and January 1993, and at the Vitez Health Centre in January 1993.

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288 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2991, Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, Croatian Defence Council, Command of OZ Central Bosnia, IZM Vitez, no: 01-5-547/93, May 21, 1993 – to the GS HVO Mostar.

In the same period, soldiers of the Croatian Army arrived in the area of Kiseljak, too. Members of the Croatian Army units also took part in the attack on the Bosniak villages in the areas of Vitez and Busovaca.  

In early June 1992, the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia redeployed a number of its officers and soldiers to the Southern Frontline in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia). On June 5, 1992, defence minister of the Republic of Croatia Gojko Susak issued the order, class: confidential, 8/92-01/17, no. 5120-13-92-78, “pursuant to point IV, paragraph 2, of the Decision of the President of the Republic of Croatia on the organization and number of the members of the Croatian National Guard”, “assigning and deploying the following members of the Croatian Army for the execution of the temporary task on the Southern Frontline, to the Southern Frontline” (101st Brigade of the Croatian National Guard):

1. **Miro Andric, Colonel** — commander of the 1st infantry battalion;
2. **Mladen Labaz, Captain** — head of communications;
3. **Nenad Sagud, soldier** — communications officer;
4. **Ivan Zlatic, soldier** — technical services officer at the 1st Infantry Battalion;
5. **Nikola Raguz, soldier** — administration and legal officer;
6. **Ante Marusic, soldier** — medical technician;
7. **Andrija Kacic, captain** — aide to the commander for logistics;
8. **Hasim Hajric, soldier** — cook;
9. **Mirsad Sivac, soldier** — commander of the engineering squad;
10. **Blaz Andric, soldier** — driver — security;
11. **Branko Kozul, soldier** — driver — security;
12. **Josip Trubelja, soldier** — communications officer;
13. **Asim Mahmutovic, Captain** — commander of the patrolling platoon.  

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290 ICTY, Case: No. IT-95-14-T, paragraphs 77, 83, and 91.

From then on, throughout the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the aforementioned officers and soldiers from the 101st Brigade of the Croatian Army participated in the units of the Croatian Defence Council, in order to mask the participation of the Republic of Croatia in the crimes. In the first half of 1993, they were active in Herzegovina²⁹² and in Central Bosnia.²⁹³

In that order, Minister Gojko Susak determined that the material and technical resources “and all other that is needed” shall be ensured by the 101st “R” Brigade, then that the aforementioned members of the Croatian Army “shall be entitled to all rights” which they had “had and acquired thus far”.

Pursuant to that order, which “came into effect immediately”, the aforementioned members of the Croatian Army are obligated to report to army general Janko Bobetko at the Command of the South Sector – Ploce.

The aforementioned order was supplied in code form to the Command of the 101st “R” Brigade and to General Janko Bobetko (Ibid.).

Three days later, Colonel Jozo Petrasevic, commander of VP 2123 “R” of the Croatian Army, “pursuant to point IV, paragraph 2, of the Decision of the President of the Republic on Organization and Number of the Members of the Croatian National Guard, command dated June 5, 1992, class: confidential 8/92-01/17, reg. No. 5120-13-92-78”, issued the order “for execution of the temporary task on the Southern Frontline”, pursuant to which all the aforementioned officers and soldiers of the Croatian Army (however, he did add one soldier on top of this group – V. Kukolj) were sent to the Southern Frontline. In compliance with the order of minister Gojko Susak, in doing so, he specified all the rights they are entitled to and the obligation to report to general Janko Bobetko.


²⁹² AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2175, Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, Croatian Defence Council, Defence Department, Main Headquarters of the HVO, No: 01-472/93, Mostar, March 16, 1993 – to the 101st Brigade “R” of the HV, Personnel Department.

Ivan Zlatic, a member of the Croatian Army (soldier) was promoted all the way up from the technical services officer in the 1st Infantry Battalion of the 101st Croatian Brigade to the Chief of Staff of the Technical Services of the 2nd Brigade of the HVO in the Operational Zone of Southeast Herzegovina of the “HZ HB”. He “was performing his duties on the Southern Frontline from June 5, 1992, until March 15, 1993” (Ibid.).

Ivan Zlatic “was conscientious, and provided very good quality performance”. Upon his personal request, the Main Headquarters of the HVO granted him APPROVAL on March 16, 1993, so that he, as a member of the 101st “R” Brigade of the Croatian
In March 1993, Colonel Miro Andric, a member of the Croatian Army, was deputy commander of the Main Headquarters of the Croatian Defence Council.\footnote{AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2159, Main Headquarters of the HVO, Colonel Miro Andric, Vitez, May 3, 1993 — to the 101st Brigade of the HV, REPORT.}

Periodically, the Croatian Army also sent \textit{commando units} into Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly in such areas where the Croatian Army, should return to his mother unit, noting that all his rights and obligations \textit{“shall be resolved at the 101st Brigade “R” of the HV, so that he is to report to the commander of the 101st “R” Brigade, Colonel Jozo Petrasevic”} (Ibid.).

When he received approval to \textit{“return to the mother unit”} – 101st Brigade “R” of the Croatian Army, Ivan Zlatic was also granted \textit{“seven (7) days of award leave”}, \textit{“so it would be easier for him to resolve his obligations related to the further status at the 101st Brigade”} (Ibid).

\footnote{AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2159, Main Headquarters of the HVO, Colonel Miro Andric, Vitez, May 3, 1993 – to the 101st Brigade of the HV, REPORT.}

On May 3, 1993, from Vitez (“MAIN HEADQUARTERS OF THE HVO”), Colonel Miro Andric sent the REPORT to the 101st Brigade of the Croatian Army (at 11:30 hours, by fax at: 041 154 015), of the following contents:

\textit{“The below stated officials from the 101st Brigade of the HVO, who are at the Southern Frontline (HZ HB) upon the order of the Ministry of Defence of RH), are found on the same duties as in the month of March:

1. Col. Miro Andric
2. Blaz Andric
3. Mirsad Sivac
4. Branko Kozul
5. Captain Goran Vujic.

The officials spent thirty days of the month of April at their duties”} (Ibid.).

The memorandum of the aforementioned report, (in the upper left-hand corner), before stating of the rank and identity of Colonel Miro Andric, contained the following words: \textit{“GENERAL STAFF OF THE HVO”}. At the end of that report – in the lower right-hand corner, in addition to the text: \textit{“Col. MIRO ANDRIC”}, there was his personal signature and left to it there was a round seal, with the following inscription: \textit{“Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, Defence Department, Operational Zone of Central Bosnia, Travnik”} – Ibid.

\footnote{AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2159, Main Headquarters of the HVO, Colonel Miro Andric, Vitez, May 3, 1993 – to the 101st Brigade of the HV, REPORT.}

\footnote{AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2159, Main Headquarters of the HVO, Colonel Miro Andric, Vitez, May 3, 1993 – to the 101st Brigade of the HV, REPORT.}
Defence Council was trying to push through the defence lines of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition to that, the units of the Croatian Army were also sent in smaller groups, in order to avoid being recorded by the United Nations observers. These units also placed the emblems of the Croatian Defence Council on their clothing in order to thus conceal their participation in the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina.295

In the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina, in order to support the land forces, the Croatian Army also used the aviation, helicopters, as well as chemical and other weapons. Thus, for instance, on July 24, 1993, two piston engine aircrafts of the Croatian Army, with 5 bombs, fired on the village of Dracevica (they had taken off from the Mostarsko Blato airport). On August 2, 1993, piston engine aircraft bombed Rastani near Mostar, and then on August 5, and 24, they bombed Mostar (on August 5, using improvised bombs, and on August 24, using bombs filled with irritant gases). On September 7, airplanes with six bombs bombed Mostar (they had taken off from the Mostarsko Blato airport), and then repeated the attack in the night between September 17 and 18.296

In December 1993 and in January 1994, from the airport at Divulje (Split), the aviation of the Croatian Army on a number of occasions fired at the defence positions of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and on the areas populated by civilians.297

In April 1993, on Mt. Boksevica near Jablanica, and on November 15, 1993, on Mt. Vranica near Prozor, the Croatian Army carried out helicopter parachute attacks (both times unsuccessfully).298

On January 14, 1994, two attacks were carried out on the village of Poculica, accompanied by Croatian airplanes, on the relation of Busovaca-Nova Bila-Nov travnik, with three bombs. On the same day, the Brastvno factory was attacked with one bomb and an “air-land” missile. On January 30, 1994, one airplane and two helicopters of the Croatian Army shot the

295 Bosna, no. 1, February 11, 1994, pp. 15, and 23.
296 Ibid.
297 Ibid.
298 Ibid.
village of Kute with 16 “air-land” missiles. The next day, one airplane
took aim at the village of Laze.299

Obviously, the aforementioned and other data indicate upon direct
participation of the Republic of Croatia in the aggression against the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Namely, the helicopters and airplanes
were the property of the Republic of Croatia, and their activity was
reflected in flyovers, ejection of parachutes with material and technical
resources, and in attacks, such as, for instance, the case was on January
14, 1994. We also need to point out that for their activities they were
using the protection of the NATO airplanes, for instance, in the area of
Bucici and Mosun (January 14, 1994), and thus smoothly acted from
the air, thus offering support to the units of the regular Croatian Army
and its collaborationist formations – the Croatian Defence Council.300

Several hundreds of foreign mercenaries (Germans, Swedes and
Britons) also took part in the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina
in the units of the Croatian Army and the Croatian Defence Council. The
majority of the mercenaries were recruited through emigrant organizations
of Hrvatski drzavotvorni pokret (Croatian State-Building Movement), and
Hrvatsko revolucionarno bratstvo (Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood),
supported by Croatia after the arrival of Franjo Tudjman. Among them,
the one particularly standing out was the German Jürgen Schmidt, who
commanded the tank units in the attacks against Prozor and Gornji
Vakuf. During the attack on Mostar, in May 1993, one commando unit
was lead by German Hoffman. The training of the local unit Jokers in
Vitez was conducted by an Englishman and a Pole. The intervention
platoon of the Croatian Defence Council in Livno was conducted by
mercenary Patrich Chavier. A number of foreign nationals were also
recruited from among the released personnel of the German army.301

299 Ibid.

300 Ibid. The Republic of Croatia had also dislocated a number of the Mi-17
helicopters onto the territory of HR HB (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2976, Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, Croatian Defence Council, Main
Headquarters of the HVO, Department of RZ and PZO, reg. No. 02-2/1-05-2383/93, IZM
Citluk, September 9, 1993 – to the chief of staff of the Main Headquarters of the HVO).

301 Ibid.
During the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina, **military police** from Rijeka and Croatian Posavina was also present in West Herzegovina, being superimposed to the local one, whereas several units of the Croatian Army were constantly held in preparedness along the Dalmatian coast, which were permanently in movement from one city into the other, in order to be closer to the frontline and be sent to execution of “tasks” quicker.302

A significant number of the soldiers of the Croatian Army were killed in the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the attack on and against the units of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, more soldiers of the Croatian Army were killed than in the fights against the units of the JNA and the Army of Yugoslavia on the territory of Croatia. According to Mesic, coffins were regularly arriving to Croatia.303 General Martin Spegelj claims that General Bobetko himself has admitted that “in those combats, not with the Chetniks, but with the Army of BiH, there were 9,000 dead”. However, the generals who participated in the attack on Bosnia and Herzegovina “say that even more than 13,000 soldiers were killed”, claims Martin Spegelj. In addition to this, he also presents the information that in Slavonski Brod, Cakovec, Zagreb “and elsewhere, there are cemeteries of soldiers and officers who were killed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, while many of them were not even brought in at all”.304

Because of the armed aggression against its territory, on May 13, 1993, the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina filed a complaint against the Republic of Croatia, demanding that it unconditionally stops its attacks and withdraws its units from the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.305

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302 Ibid.
303 **RAT...**, pp. 129, and 134.
304 Ibid., p. 135.
305 **ICTY**, Case: No. IT-95-14-T, paragraph 87. In such a situation, the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina emphasized that it would be “forced to approach the international community and seek protection against the aggression” (Ibid.).
In a letter of September 4, 1993, sent to the command of the UNPROFOR for Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina describes the attack of the Croatian Army and the Croatian Defence Council on some cities in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Because of the open military intervention of large scope against the sovereign and independent Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a UN member country, both by the number of manpower and the equipment engaged, on January 28, 1994, the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina held an extraordinary session at which, among other things, it demanded for an urgent extraordinary session of the UN Security Council, in order to condemn that aggression and prompt undertaking of measures in compliance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and all the then passed relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly. The letter of the standing representative of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina at the United Nations, dated January 28, 1994, sent to the Security Council, contains the description of the military intervention carried out by the Croatian Army against Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The documents of the United Nations too confirm the participation of the Croatian Army in the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In resolutions 752, dated May 15, 1992, and 787, dated November 16, 1992, the Security Council too demanded that the Republic of Croatia should immediately withdraw its troops, suspend all forms of interference and respect the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

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306 Ibid.
307 Oslobodjenje, January 29, 1994, pp. 1, and 3. On the occasion of the murder of Paul Goodall (UNHCR driver, a British national), and injuring of two more persons, at this session, the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina condemned this crime, expressed the deepest condolences to the family of the murdered, to the Government of Great Britain and to UNHCR, and took on the obligation “to undertake all in order to have the perpetrators of this awful crime identified and punished as soon as possible” (Ibid.).
308 ICTY, Case: No. IT-95-14-T, paragraph 88.
309 . REZOLUCIJE..., pp. 31-35, and 49-53; S. Omeragic, the aforementioned work, pp. 157-158.

In Resolution 752 (1992), dated May 15, 1992, the Security Council demanded “that all forms of interference coming from outside of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including those coming from the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) and elements of
In the reports dated February 1, and 17, 1994, the Secretary General inform the Security Council on direct involvement of the Croatian Army in and against Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus, in his report of February 1, Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated:

“For a while, the Croatian Army has been directly supporting the Croatian Defence Council, supplying it with manpower, equipment and armament. Initially, this support was limited on individuals or small groups, often volunteers. However, it seems that the success of the offensives taken by the forces of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina against the Croatian Defence Council caused an increase in the number of Croatian soldiers. It is assessed that their total number in Bosnia and Herzegovina could correspond to the force of three brigades of regular Croatian Army, that is, roughly 3,000 to 5,000 people (this is an assessment, because, given the resources it has available, the UNPROFOR is not able to gather the data necessary for a more exact establishment of their number)”.

the Croatian Army, should be suspended immediately and that the neighbours of Bosnia and Herzegovina should undertake urgent action to terminate such interference and to respect the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

It demanded that such units of the JNA and elements of the Croatian Army in Bosnia and Herzegovina be immediately withdrawn or subordinated to the competency of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or be dismissed and disarmed, and their arms be placed under effective international observation, and sought from the secretary general to review what international assistance can be identified in relation to this without any delay;

It also demanded that all the irregular forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina be dismissed and disarmed;

It invited all parties and other parties concerned to ensure immediate suspension of any forced expulsion of persons from the areas of their residence and all attempts to change the ethnic composition of the population, anywhere in the former Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia… (REZOLUCIJE..., pp. 32-33).

ICTY, Case: No. IT-95-14-T, paragraph 89. Boutros Boutros-Ghali incorrectly states that the Croatian Army “is directly supporting the Croatian Defence Council…”.

Namely, the Croatian Army was not supporting the HVO, but the HVO units are collaborationist forces of the Croatian Army, acting in compliance with a single system of directing and commanding of the Croatian Army. Tudjman personally appointed the members of the supreme HVO body – its Main Headquarters.

Ibid., paragraph 89. The Republic of Croatia did not conceal the information on participation of its units against Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus, in the letter to Secretary
There were a large number of members of the Croatian Army (officers, junior officers and soldiers) from the Republic of Croatia in the units of the Croatian Defence Council, who participated in the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Upon the order of the Government of the Republic of Croatia (based on the orders of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia and the Main Headquarters of the Croatian Army), they were sent into the “redeployment in BiH”, where they were temporarily displaced for a certain time and deployed in the units of the Croatian Defence Council. In order to take a considerable part of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia mobilized its Army (the Croatian Army), whose members also served in the Croatian Defence Council, as the soldiers of the Croatian Army. All the high-ranking commanders of the Croatian Defence Council were appointed from single personnel lists of the Croatian Army, and their appointment was done by the Main Headquarters in Zagreb, and in doing so, they were sent to a foreign country (Bosnia and Herzegovina) just like they would be into any part of Croatia. The majority of the high-ranking officers of the Croatian Defence Council were members of the Croatian Army and nationals of the Republic of Croatia. High-ranking officers of the Croatian Army were appointed to all major directing and commanding positions in the Main Headquarters of the Croatian Defence Council. The commander of the Main Headquarters (until October 1992), was Milivoj Petkovic, brigadier of the Croatian Army. He was General, dated February 11, 1994, among other things, vice-President of the Government and minister of foreign affairs of the Republic of Croatia expressed the readiness of his Government “to withdraw certain units from the border areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina” (Ibid., paragraph 90).

312 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2961, Republic of Croatia, Croatian National Guard, 1st Brigade, 6th Battalion, Klek, May 18, 1992, Redeployment in BiH; Ibid., inv. No. 2-2972, Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, Ministry of Defence, Main Headquarters of the HVO, reg. no. 02-2/1-01-4144/93, Posusje, December 3, 1993 – to the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia, Main Headquarters of the HV, Attn. chief of staff Janko Bobetko; Ibid., inv. No. 2-2991, Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, Croatian Defence Council, Command of OZ Central Bosnia, IZM Vitez, no: 01-5-547/93, May 21, 1993 – to the GS HVO Mostar; Ibid., inv. No. 2-2991, Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, Croatian Defence Council, Command of OZ Central Bosnia, IZM Vitez, reg. no: 01-4-171/93, April 12, 1993 – to the commanders of brigades and autonomous units, and others; ICTY, PROSECUTOR AGAINST RAJIC, Case: No. It-95-12, paragraph 17.
born in Vrpolje near Sibenik, and is a national of the Republic of Croatia (during 1993, he was chief of staff of the Main Headquarters of the Croatian Defence Council). A member of the Main Headquarters of the Croatian Defence Council Ante Prkacin was born in Slavonski Brod. Commander of the Main Headquarters of the Croatian Defence Council from October 1992 to November 10, 1993, was General Slobodan Praljak, head of the political department of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia. General Ante Roso was commander of the special units of the Main Headquarters of the Croatian Army and was born in Slavonia. In November 1993, together with the complete composition of the Main Headquarters of the HVO and its headquarters-affiliated units, he was appointed commander of the Main Headquarters of the Croatian Defence Council by the head of the Republic of Croatia, Franjo Tudjman. One of the commanders of the battalion Ludvig Pavlovic (Zoran Delic) was a Croatian national, living in Zadar. Also, a number of the instructors of the Croatian Defence Council for training of officers at the centres in Tomislavgrad and Grude had come from the Republic of Croatia.313

A number of higher-ranking officers from the 101st Brigade of the Croatian Army, “who were commanded by the Ministry of Defence of the RH to the Southern Frontline (Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia)”, from the beginning of June 1992 until the beginning of May 1993, and later were also found in the units of the Croatian Defence Council. Reporting to that effect to the 101st Brigade of the Croatian

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In October 1992, soldier Josip Vujina (son of Ante) from Split (Kastel Novi) was in the Croatian Defence Council of Bugojno, \textit{in the 2nd Battalion}, commanded by Slavko Petricevic.\footnote{AIIZ, inv. No. 2-1883, Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, OZ S/Z Herzegovina [Operational Zone of Northwest Herzegovina – note by the author], no. 05/6-276, Tomislavgrad, April 12, 1993 – to all the brigades; Ibid., inv. No. Ibid., inv. No. 2-1751, Command of the OZ S/ZH, no. 59/92, October 6, 1992 – to the Brigades and Municipal Headquarters of the HVO of OZ Northwest Herzegovina, “Data for HV officers requested”; Ibid., inv. No. 2-1761, Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, Croatian Defence Council, Main Headquarters, Mostar, October 30, 1992 – to the OS HVO Bugojno.} With his 1st Infantry Party of the 4th Infantry Battalion, Ivan Sertic went to the terrains of the Zadar hinterland (Kasic, Buterinin), and the Southern Frontline, Mostar, Gornji Vakuf, Livno.\footnote{J. Bobetko, the aforementioned work, p. 676.} Frank Zagorcic was a member of the 4th Brigade of the ZNG. Upon the order of the brigade commander, General Ivo Jelic, in the second half of 1991, several times he was transporting arms to the \textit{Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia}.\footnote{Ibid., p. 671.} Soldier Igor (son of Bruno) Kapor, born on February 23, 1975, in Rijeka, as the citizen of the Republic of Croatia and member of the Croatian Army, took part in the attack against Bosnia and Herzegovina in May 11993, in Mostar.
(in the Neretva valley),\textsuperscript{318} where he was detained. In the Operational Zone of Southeast Herzegovina, there was also soldier of the Croatian Army \textit{Franjo (son of Franjo) Pakrac}, born in 1969 in the village of Drenovac, Zupanja Municipality.\textsuperscript{319} In 1992, junior officer \textbf{Rudolf Duplisak} was also in the Croatian Defence Council, as member of the 4\textsuperscript{th} Battalion of the 159\textsuperscript{th} Brigade of the Croatian Army from Zadar.\textsuperscript{320} \textbf{Tomislav Lukacevic}, from Virovitica,\textsuperscript{321} too, and \textbf{Miroslav Fabulic},

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{318} AIIZ, inv. No. 2-1881, Army of BiH, IVth Corps, Commission for Exchange of Detained and Expelled Soldiers and Civilians, Mostar, May 28, 1993 – to the International Red Cross, Delivery of Igor (son of Bruno) Kapor.
\item On May 28, 1993, Commission for Exchange of Detained and Expelled Soldiers and Civilians at the IVth Corps of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina delivered Kapor to the International Red Cross, upon their request, “\textit{provided that the International Red Cross delivers Igor (son of Bruno) Kapor to the Croatian Army of the state of Croatia}” (Ibid.).
\item AIIZ, inv. No. 2-1884, Croatian Defence Council, Operational Zone of Southeast Herzegovina, 3rd (?) Brigade, Department for Organization and Personnel, No: 03-309/93, Mostar, December 8, 1993.
\item On the back side of his Military Accreditation of the 101\textsuperscript{st} (not 111\textsuperscript{th}) Rijeka Brigade of the Croatian Army, in addition to the photograph (in the upper left-hand corner) and the ordinal number below it (R 473856), in the right-hand corner – below the Croatian flag, there was the following text: “\textit{REPUBLIC OF CROATIA MILITARY ACCREDITATION}”, with name and surname (“\textit{FRANJO PAKRAC}”). On the front side there was his JMBG number (01109693600553), rank, duty (soldier), number of accreditation (3638), date of issuance (June 17, 1992), unit number (2133), personal signature of the authorized person and seal.
\item AIIZ, inv. No. 2-1885, Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, Croatian Defence Council, MILITARY ACCREDITATION OF RUDOLF DULISAK. Rudolf Duplisak was born on April 1, 1954, in Backa Topola, and his residence was in Rijeka. He received a driver’s license from the Police Administration in Rijeka on September 11, 1991.
\item Thee of his military accreditations were preserved: the first one was issued to him by the 4\textsuperscript{th} Battalion of the 159\textsuperscript{th} Brigade of the Croatian Army (Ministry of Defence, Sector Zadar), on February 15, 1992; the second one by the Military Post 3065 in Zadar, on March 27, 1992, where the column “rank, duty” states “\textit{SOLDIER}”, and the third one by the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, Croatian Defence Council, on September 18, 1992, “\textit{proving the membership of the army of the Croatian Defence Council}”, where he had the rank of non-commissioned officer.
\item AIIZ, inv. No. 2-1886, Republic of Croatia, Military Accreditation of Tomislav Lukacevic; Ibid., Republic of Croatia, Personal ID of Tomislav Lukacevic.
\end{itemize}
from Slavonska Pozega, Drago Sandrk, from Beli Manastir, Sergej Filipovic, from Vinkovci, Darko Hofer, from Osijek, then Jure Brajkovic and many others participated in the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1992, at the Municipal Headquarters of the Croatian Defence Council of Kakanj, there was Tomo Juric, too, a soldier of the 108th Brigade of the ZNG from Slavonski Brod, “uniformed wit the emblems of HVO – HZ HB”.

Soldier Ivan Apica, born in Sinj in 1972, from April 4 to September 28, 1992 was in the HVO Brigade Tomislavgrad in Tomislavgrad. A month afterwards, he “served” in the 9th Battalion Rafael Vitez Boban, which was an autonomous unit at the 114th Brigade of the Croatian Army. Captain Denis Kapovic Denizio, lieutenant major Milivoj

322 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2155, Individual Card of the soldier of the Armed Forces of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia – Miroslav Fabulic.

Miroslav (son of Ante) Fabulic (JMBG number 2707944192252) was born on July 27, 1944, in Slavonska Pozega, Republic of Croatia, by profession an education worker (teacher).


Drago (son of Ljupko) Sandrk (JMBG number 26069588191254) was born on June 26, 1958, in Beli Manastir, Republic of Croatia, by profession a mechanic.


Sergej (son of Aleksandar) Filipovic (JMBG number 0909960191259) was born on September 9, 1960, in Vinkovci, Republic of Croatia, by profession a metal worker.


Darko (son of Stjepan) Hofer (JMBG number 070997030022) was born on September 7, 1970, in the place of Ivanovac – Osijek, Republic of Croatia.

326 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-1887, Republic of Croatia, MILITARY ACCREDITATION OF JURE BRAJKOVIC.

327 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-1889, Croatian Defence Council, Municipal Headquarters of the HVO Kakanj, No. 11-3306/92, December 1, 1992, PERMIT FOR MOVEMENT.


Even in 1993, Apica was the member of the 114th Brigade of the Croatian Army. On October 23, 1993, from deputy Commander of that Brigade, Major Slaven Zdilar, he received a permit to transfer into another unit, provided that “before his departure
Zrilic, and ensign Ivo Zrilic were members of the 1st Battalion Stjepan Radic in Bugojno.\textsuperscript{329}

In October 1993, at least six foreign national soldiers were in the units of the 3rd Brigade of the Croatian Defence Council in Mostar:

- **Ante** (son of Mate) Sistov, born on December 7, 1968, in Croatia;
- **Zoran** (son of Tadija) Kovac, born on April 29, 1967, in Croatia
- **Miro** (son of Kresimir) Raic, born on May 2, 1972, in Croatia
- **Roland Bartetzko**, from Germany
- **Stjepan** (son of Julijan) Grdjan, born on April 11, 1962, in Croatia,
- **Sandro Alfonso de Giaoni**, Italy.\textsuperscript{330}

In November 1993, a major number of foreign citizens were found in the units of the HVO, mainly from the Republic of Croatia. Thus, there were at least four foreign nationals in the VHO **Brigade of Rama** (Prozor):

- **Franz Elvis Richard Rosenberg**, born on November 20, 1970, in Gütersloh – Germany, a German citizen, in the tank unit;
- **Vinko Pavlovic** (son of Simun), born on December 15, 1965, citizen of the Republic of Croatia, in the 1st Battalion;
- **Goran Vucic** (son of Jozo), born on August 19, 1964, in Sinj, a citizen of the Republic of Croatia, in the 3rd Battalion;

he was obligated to return his arms to the brigade logistics” (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-1893, Republic of Croatia, Military Post 2136 Split, KL 802-04/93-04/92, REG. NO. 2136-01-01-93-2, Orasac – to the Autonomous Company at the 114th Brigade of HV, Attn. Mr. Marko Skeja).


\textsuperscript{330} AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2951, Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, Croatian Defence Council, Operational Zone of Southeast Herzegovina, Mostar, 3rd Brigade – HVO, no. B-583-23/93, Mostar, October 23, 1993 – OZ JIH, SIS, Attn. Ivica Pusic. In addition to the aforementioned, “the soldiers of the HV, THUNDERS AND TIGERS, were also added to the units of the 3rd Brigade of the HVO” (Ibid.).
- **Damir Haluzan**, born on March 18, in Brezno Gornje, a citizen of the Republic of Croatia, in the unit *Marinko Beljo.*\(^{331}\)

There were two foreign nationals in the *Lasva Battalion* (IZM Prozor) at the time:

- **Dragoljub** (son of Ljuban) **Erak**, born in Rostov
- **Ulrich** (son of Alfred) **Großfeld**, a citizen of the Republic of Austria.\(^{332}\)

In the *Brigade Hrvoje Vukic-Hrvatinic* (IZM Gracanica), there was **Josip Sikic**, born in 1951 in Sisak, a soldier of the Croatian Army, a citizen of the Republic of Croatia, on the position of Brigade Commander.\(^{333}\)

In November 1993, the following citizens of the Republic of Croatia were in the *Brigade Eugen Kvaternik* (Bugojno):

- **Josip** (son of Franjo) **Micic**, born on September 9, 1958, in Imotski (Battalion commander);
- **Stipo** (son of Nino) **Grbic**, born on October 20, 1946, in Bugojno (a horse leader in the Brigade);
- **Ivan** (son of Luka) **Ivankovic**, born on October 2, 1959, in Krizevci.\(^{334}\)

In early December 1993, the major of the Croatian Army, **Simon Petrisic**, an official of the Administration for Organization, Staffing and Mobilization of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia, was on the duty in the Department for Organization, Staffing and Legal Affairs of the Main Headquarters of the Croatian Defence Council.\(^{335}\)

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\(^{331}\) AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2981, Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, Croatian Defence Council, Center of the SIS Rama, no. 02-42-7-49/93, November 5, 1993, List of Foreign Citizens in the area of responsibility of the Center of the SIS Rama, by units.

\(^{332}\) Ibid.

\(^{333}\) Ibid.

\(^{334}\) Ibid.

On November 2, 1993, in the brigade of the Croatian Defence Council Kralj Tomislav (Tomislavgrad), there were 31 foreign nationals (all were in a single patrolling and commando platoon, directly subordinated to the brigade commander, Colonel Zeljko Glasnović).\textsuperscript{336}

During 1992 and 1993, on several occasions the higher-ranking officers of the Croatian Defence Council requested from their subordinate

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\textsuperscript{336} AIIZ, 2-2979-2980, Center of SIS, Tomislavgrad, No. 02-4/2-4-032/93, Tomislavgrad, November 3, 1993 – to the Department of Defence, Administration of SIS Mostar, HVO Brigade of Tomislavgrad, List of members of the Croatian Army. These are the following members of the Croatian Army:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Surname (Father's Name) Name</th>
<th>JMBG Number</th>
<th>Address and Phone Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Anders Moodj</td>
<td></td>
<td>Alvangen, Kapelly 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Anderson (David John) John-David</td>
<td></td>
<td>Llencelwn-Aberaeron, Crusdrewal, Melbourne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Armstrong (Albert) Anthony</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Barber (Daniel) Christophe</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Bardz (Sigmu) Markus</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Brodin (Frank) Mikael</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Casagrande (Marko) Mario Paulo</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mastal, Karajannmismmersiri, Bucici</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Clas Lindgren</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Deingine (Mathias) Matthias</td>
<td>1704973</td>
<td>Heidelberg, Plankst, Am Ungersgard 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Hansson (Robert) Christner</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Hend (Rudolf) Peter</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Holiday, David</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Holop, Tibor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Himeister, Michael</td>
<td>3112967</td>
<td>Norten-Hardenberg, Mariensteine 10</td>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Ipsen (Leo) Jasper</td>
<td>1706968</td>
<td>Ostermari, Gadbabsve 64</td>
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<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Jachim, Vladislav</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Johan Lexell</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Johansson Jan Christen Michael</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sodeltjale, Tyttourg, Vaglen, Pribram</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Kent (Bjorn) Ogvis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Knuelsen, Allan Asborn</td>
<td>3005967</td>
<td>Vordingburg, Sundeve 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Kolb (Andreas) Andreas</td>
<td>0107973</td>
<td>Muhhausen, Kreis Neumark, OPP 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Krause (Lotaro) Heiko</td>
<td></td>
<td>Tomislavgrad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Magnus Eklund</td>
<td></td>
<td>Kallered, Vommedalsu 104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Major (Janos) Janos</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mor, Szabadszko 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Myers K. (Gerald) Andrew</td>
<td></td>
<td>Manchester, Water Street 48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Rodeney Morga</td>
<td></td>
<td>Whitenhaven, Cumberland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Sanfilippo (Giuseppe) Giovan</td>
<td></td>
<td>Palermo, Via San Ugo Di Paolo 39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Stumpel, Marco</td>
<td>0107972</td>
<td>Weimar, Ferdinand Freileighacht 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Tyc (Statilac) Alexandre</td>
<td></td>
<td>Genezve, Route Florissanti 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Uwe (Joachim) Hermke</td>
<td>2003972</td>
<td>Hirschberg, Breitgasse 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Verduin Frederick Teunis</td>
<td></td>
<td>Santa Rosa, Yullupa Avenue, Suite 8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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units to supply the lists of members of the Croatian Army. On October 3, 1992, commander of the Main Headquarters of the Croatian Defence Council, brigadier Milivoj Petkovic, URGENTLY requested the commanders of the operational zones: Tomislavgrad, Citluk and Vitez (“MILITARY SECRET – CONFIDENTIAL”) to supply the information for the “HV officers”.337

Several times in 1992 and 1993, commander of the Operational Zone of Northwest Herzegovina, Colonel Zeljko Siljeg, requested from his units the data for the officers of the Croatian Army who were in the units of the Croatian Defence Council. The order dated October 6, 1992 (“STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL, MILITARY SECRET”), supplied to the brigades and municipal headquarters of the Croatian Defence Council of the Operational Zone of Northwest Herzegovina,338 also provided the instruction based on which a report was to be made and “the data for the HV officers” were to be supplied.339 It is interesting to point

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337 AIIZ, 2-1878, Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, Croatian Defence Council, Main Headquarters, reg. No. 01-2258/92, Mostar, October 3, 1992 – to the commanders of OZ – Tomislavgrad – Citluk – Vitez, “Data for the HV officers requested”.

“The data on the officers by functional duties” were to be supplied within three days (on October 6), using the format stating: the ordinal number, name, father’s name, surname, and JMB number, and then the rank (qualifications), “duty performed”, and the unit.

The data were requested “for the officers on duties at the Commands of the OZ of sectors, brigades, battalions, divisions (only the commanders)”.

The list needed to “also include the officers from [the] Republic of Croatia”. (Ibid).

338 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-1751, Command of the OZ S/ZH /Operational Zone of Northwest Herzegovina/, no. 59/92, October 6, 1992 – to the Brigades and Municipal Headquarters of the HVO of OZ Northwest Herzegovina, “Data for HV officers requested”.

Colonel Siljeg requested these data from five brigades and two municipal headquarters of the HVO (brigades: Petar Kresimir IV Livno; Rama Prozor; Kralj Tomislav Tomislavgrad; Eugen Kvaternik Bugojno, and Herceg Stjepan Konjic, and the municipal headquarters of the HVO: Gornji Vakuf, and Posusje).

339 Ibid. “Data for HV officers” found in the units of the HVO of the Operational Zone of Northeast Herzegovina were to be supplied “in concordance with the following:

- name, father’s name, surname;
- date of birth, place, municipality;
out that the piece of data was also to be supplied in terms whether some of the officers of the Croatian Army in the units of the Croatian Defence Council “are receiving the salary from the HV”.  

Each officer of the Croatian Army who was deployed into the units of the Croatian Defence Council, pursuant to the aforementioned order, had to have “a command on deployment into the HVO”. On “each of the HV officers” arriving in the HVO units, the brigade and municipal headquarters commanders were obligated to supply reports and data, in compliance with the aforementioned instructions.

On October 9, 1992, pursuant to the aforementioned order of Colonel Siljeg, the commander of the Brigade Eugen Kvaternik (Bugojno), Ivica Lucic, issued an order to the subordinated units on supplying of the data for officers of the Croatian Army who were found in their units, stating, among other things, the end date for submission of the requested data.

During 1993, too, the Main Headquarters of the Croatian Defence Council of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia requested data “for the HV officers in the HVO”. On April 12, “in order to obtain full records and regulate the status of the HV officers in the HVO”, brigadier Milivoje Petkovic, commander of that headquarters, issued the order no. 01-618/93, on supplying of this data.

| - JMB number, rank and number of promotion decree; |
| - Date of reporting to the higher-ranking unit, upon whose command; |
| - Duty performed at the HVO, whether receiving salary from the HV” (Ibid.). |

340 Ibid.
341 Ibid. “The end date for supplying of the requested data is October 10, 1992”.
342 AIIZ, 2.1879, Herzeg-Bosnia, Croatian Defence Council, Command of the Brigade Eugen Kvaternik Bugojno, no. 01-10-676/92, Bugojno, October 9, 1992.


Based on the instructions from Colonel Siljeg, “the data for the HV officers” were to be supplied on the same day.

343 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-1883, Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, OZ S/Z Herzegovina, no. 05/6-276, Tomislavgrad, April 12, 1993 – to all the brigades, Submission of Data on HV Officers in the HVO”.

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On the same day, that is, on April 12, 1993, pursuant to the aforementioned order from the Main Headquarters of the Croatian Defence Council, (“DEFENCE. MILITARY SECRET. STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL”), commander of the Operational Zone of Northwest Herzegovina and the Operational Zone of Central Bosnia (IZM Vitez), colonels Zeljko Siljeg and Tihomir Blaskic issued orders to the subordinated units to supply “the lists of all HV officers” that were deployed in their units and commands. The orders pointed out the format of listing, and stated the end date for their completion.344

The members of the Croatian Army who participated in the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina were obligated to

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344 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-1883, Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, OZ S/Z Herzegovina, no. 05/6-276, Tomislavgrad, April 12, 1993 – to all the brigades, Submission of Data on HV Officers in the HVO”; AIIZ, Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, Croatian Defence Council, OZ Central Bosnia, IZM Vitez, no. 01-4-171/93, Vitez, April 12, 1993 – to the commanders of brigades and autonomous units, COMMAND.

The order of Colonel Siljeg in full stated as follows:

“COMMAND

Pursuant to the order from the GS HVO HZ HB, no. 01-618/93, dated April 12, 1993, in order to obtain full records and regulate the status of the HV officers in the HVO.

I HEREBY COMMAND

1. Supply the list of all HV officers found in your units and commands.

2. In addition to name, father’s name and surname, also supply the commands deploying them to the HVO, rank and number of decree on promotion (reserve and active), and the duty he now performs with you, and duties performed previously and in which periods.

3. Supply the data to the command of the Oz S/Z H by April 16, 1993, until 12:00 hours” (Ibid.).

The aforementioned command was sent to the following brigades: Kralj Tomislav – Tomislavgrad; Petar Kresimir IV – Livno; Eugen Kvaternik – Bugojno; Dr. Ante Starcevic – Gornji Vakuf; Rama – Prozor; Hrvjec Vukcic-Hrvatinic – Jajce, and to the Battalion Rafael Boban – Posusje. (Ibid.).

The order by Colonel Blaskic stated as follows:

“COMMAND

1. Supply the list of the HV officers found in your units and commands.
wear the HVO emblems. The aim of this obligation was to use this way too to conceal the direct involvement of the Croatian Army in the crimes against Bosnia and Herzegovina and the genocide against the Bosniaks. Therefore, the commanders of the Croatian Defence Council forbade the members of the Croatian Army to wear the Croatian Army emblems when in the Croatian Defence Council, but only let them wear the Croatian Defence Council emblems. On November 26, 1992, deputy commander of the Headquarters of the Armed Forces of Zenica, Zoran Covic, issued the order to all the units of the Croatian Defence Council (“Military Secret. strictly confidential”), in which, among other things, he commanded: “The HV members present on this territory, wearing the HV emblems shall be warned to remove the emblems, because this draws the RH into problems”.346

In the units of the Croatian Army and the Croatian Defence Council, as well as with the members of bodies of civilian power of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, Ustasha symbols were a mass phenomenon. Some of their units carried names after prominent Ustasha members, and in the cabinet of the “minister” of police and in other offices of this collaborationist creation hung Pavelic’s pictures.347

In addition to the official emblem of the Croatian Defence Council, the members of the Croatian Defence Council were also wearing other

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2. In addition to name, father’s name and surname, also supply the numbers of commands deploying them to the HVO, rank and number of decree on promotion (reserve and active), and the duty he now performs with you, and the duty performed previously.

3. The end date for execution of this command is three (3) days” (Ibid.).

Colonel Siljeg requested that he be supplied with the “list of all the HV officers” by April 16 (until 12:00 hours), and Colonel Blaskic requested it by April 15, 1993.

345 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2993, Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, Croatian Defence Council, Operational Zone of Southeast Herzegovina, No. 01-286/1514, Mostar, November 27, 1992, COMMAND, See Order by I. Primorac, dated December 9, 1992.

346 AIIZ, 2-1880, Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, Command of the Headquarters of the OS Zenica, ZM Zenica, No. 540/92, Zenica, November 26, 1992 – to all of the HVO units.

symbols associating of the *Ustasha* movement and Fascism, about which certain texts were published in foreign media in the second half of 1992. “In order to remove this in the future and to ensure that the HVO members wear single emblems”, deputy commander of the Headquarters of the Armed Force of Zenica, Zoran Covic, commanded in the aforementioned command:

“1. Commands of the HVO HZ HB units are obligated to ensure that the members of the units and commands only wear HVO emblems on their uniforms. Members of the HVO have to remove all other symbols.

2. Talk to the individuals wearing other emblems – symbols, indicating to them what by wearing them they are reducing the reputation of the HVO in the world.

3. The HV members who are present on this territory wearing the HV emblems to be warned to remove the emblem because by this we are drawing RH into problems.

4. Command of the Headquarters should ensure the required number of emblems, and if lacking, the members may be without emblems.

5. This Command shall come into effect immediately”.

On November 27, 1992, commander of the Operational zone of Southeast Herzegovina issued the command “pertaining to carrying of various emblems, symbols on uniforms in the HVO units, not in compliance with the symbols determined in the Decree on the Armed Forces of Herzeg-Bosnia, and with their existence compromise the reputation of the HVO and HV members, which is interpreted in the world as a continuation of the Fascism.”

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348 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-1880, Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, Command of the Headquarters of the OS Zenica, ZM Zenica, No. 540/92, Zenica, November 26, 1992 – to all of the HVO units.

349 AIIZ, 2-1784, Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, Croatian Defence Council, Municipal Headquarters of Mostar, 3rd Brigade of the HVO, confidential, no. 02-01/11/92, Mostar, December 9, 1992, COMMAND.
The members of the Croatian Defence Council units were obligated “to wear only HVO emblems on their uniforms”. Pursuant to the orders of the chief of staff of the Main Headquarters of the HVO, brigadier Milivoj Petkovic, dated November 24, 1992, and commander of the Operational Zone of Southeast Herzegovina, brigadier Miljenko Lasic, dated November 27, 1992, and commander of the 3rd Brigade of the Croatian Defence Council, Ivan Primorac, dated December 9, 1992, the commanders of the Croatian Defence Council were obligated to ensure “that the unit members only wear the HVO emblems on their uniforms, while all other emblems and symbols” were to be removed. The individuals wearing other emblems and symbols were “to be talked to, and indicated to that by wearing them they reduce the reputation of the HVO in the world.

3. Wearing of the HV emblems by individuals is associated with the accusations on direct involvement of the HV units on the territory of the HZ HB, thereby accusing both the RH and the HZ HB. The HV members (with an explanation) are to be kindly requested to wear only HVO emblems while staying on our territory”.

Due to the accusations by the international community for its direct military participation in the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia was making efforts to conceal the presence of its (Croatian Army) in Bosnia and Herzegovina,

350 Ibid. The aforementioned order also included the following text:

“The Command of the 3rd Brigade shall invest additional efforts to ensure a sufficient number of the HVO emblems, and in case of lacking of emblems, individuals may be without them.

6. Any contacts with the UNPROFOR and European Community representatives, or provision of specific information, may only be done by the unit commanders and that under the approval of the GS HVO of the HZ HB.

Battalion commanders and autonomous parties shall be responsible for execution of this command.” (Ibid.).

Commander Primorac sent the aforementioned order to the following units: 6th Siroki Brijeg Battalion, 4th Battalion Tihomir Misic, 7th, 8th, and 9th Battalion, Buna Autonomous Party, Mixed Artillery Division, Engineering Party, Logistics Party, and Security Services (Ibid.).
as well as helicopter attacks in the Central Bosnia, and the missions of logistical security of the units of the Croatian Defence Council. Therefore, at crossing into Bosnia and Herzegovina, some generals of the Croatian Army “commanded to remove the HV emblems and put on the HVO emblems”. Pursuant to the order of the commander of the Operational Zone of Split, Mato Viduka, dated April 12, 1992, the members of the Croatian Army were obligated to remove “all the HV emblems” and to be kept as “volunteer defenders of their homeland”.351

According to General Janko Bobetko, the Croatian Army was removing Croatian Army emblems and putting on the Croatian Defence Council emblems. In doing so, the officers were told to introduce themselves as the members of the Croatian Defence Council and to say that they have been born in Bosnia and Herzegovina.352

Several times, the members of the Croatian Army who were serving in the Croatian Defence Council refused the orders to remove the Croatian Army emblems, so that the observers would not detect their presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina.353 However, pursuant to the order of Ivan Primorac, commander of the 3rd Brigade of the Croatian Defence Council, dated December 9, 1992, the soldiers of the Croatian Army had to wear the Croatian Defence Council emblems.354

The officers of the Croatian Army who participated in the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (in the Croatian Defence Council units) and wore the Croatian Defence Council emblems could not leave the Croatian Defence Council units without the order from the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia. In “case of variation

351 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-1680, Command of the OZ Split, IZM Ploce, class: 8/92-01/17, reg. No. 6030-08/91-01, April 12, 1992 - to the Commander 4/4 brigade of the ZNG; Bilten FHP, no. 15, p. 183.

352 See: J. Bobetko, SVE MOJE BITKE, Zagreb, 1996; RAT…, p. 134. However, according to general Martin Spiegelj, this was “a completely transparent and bad improvisation that could delude no one in the world…” (RAT…, p. 134).

353 ICTY, Case: No. IT-95-14-T, paragraph 93.

354 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-1784, Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, Croatian Defence Council, Municipal Headquarters of Mostar, 3rd Brigade of the HVO, confidential, no. 02-01/11/92, Mostar, December 9, 1992, COMMAND.
in proceeding”, “the Main Headquarters of the HVO was to be immediately informed”.355

“Issuance of all external documents” was forbidden for the soldiers from Croatia who were involved in the HVO.356

The highest-ranking officers of the Croatian Army in Bosnia and Herzegovina were also issuing orders on mobilization. Thus, as early as in spring, General Bobetko was commanding over the mobilization in the neighbouring state (Neum, Stolac). The letterhead of the majority of his documents stated *Republic of Croatia*, and when the orders only pertained to the units of the Croatian Defence Council, Janko Bobetko was using the letterhead of the *Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia – HVO*. There is also obvious evidence of the participation of the Republic of Croatia and the Croatian Army in the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.357

The planning and organization of intelligence work and coordination of the work of the Intelligence Administration at the Main Headquarters of the HVO was carried out by the commands, units and institutions of the Croatian Army.358

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On October 6, and 9, 1992, Colonel Zeljko Siljeg, commander of the Operational Zone of Northeast Herzegovina, and Ivica Lucic, commander of the Brigade *Eugen Kvaternik* (Bugojno), issued orders forbidding abandoning of the HVO units by the members of the Croatian Army without the order of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia. In relation to this, they warned “*all the officers who are found in the HVO that they can not leave the current HVO units without the order from the Ministry of Defence of the RH*” (Ibid.).

356 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2952, Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, Croatian Defence Council, Municipal Headquarters Mostar, reg. No. 01-286/1099/92, Mostar, August 21, 1992, COMMAND.

357 M. Culic, the aforementioned work, p. 90.

358 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-3010, Republic of Croatia, Ministry of Defence, Main Headquarters of the HV, class: 8/93-01/02, reg. no. 512-06-06/2-93-75, Zagreb, December 7, 1993, COMMAND. Thus, for instance, on December 7, 1993, “*based on the expressed*
The Republic of Croatia was also appointing the officer personnel of its collaborationists (Croatian Defence Council), directed and commanded over those forces, issued orders and instructions to them, provided advice, conveyed experiences, and the like. Thus, for instance, in the spring of 1992, General Bobetko was even appointing commanders in Central Bosnia.\footnote{J. Bobetko, the aforementioned work, p. 127; ICTY, Case: No. IT-95-14-T, paragraph 95; see. pp. 1098-1109, notes 133-156 of this work.} Commanders of commands, units, and institutions of the HVO, and the Ministry of Interior and the Military Police of the \textit{Croatian Community/Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia} were reporting to their supreme command – Main Headquarters of the Croatian Army and the Ministry of the need for more effective and complete intelligence securing of the units and commands subordinated to the IZM Ploce (“Southern Frontline”), as well as the units and commands from the HVO composition”, general Janko Bobetko (chief of staff of the Main Headquarters of the Croatian Army) issued the order for organization and personnel training of the Intelligence Departments on the Forefront Command Place of Ploce (“Southern Frontline”), appointed the chief of staff of that department (major Hrvoje Vlahov) and one of the advisors (Zoran Simic), determined the tasks and powers of the Intelligence Department of the IZM Ploce (“… he shall be in charge of planning and organization of the intelligence work in the scope of intelligence interests of the ‘Southern Frontline’ and in terms of that, he shall be empowered to coordinate the work of the intelligence departments of ZP Split and the ‘Southern Frontline’, and the Intelligence Administration of the GS HVO”), then the obligations of the intelligence departments of the ZP Split and the “Southern Frontline” and the Intelligence Administration of the GS HVO (Ibid.).

In claiming that the Croatian Army is “advising” the Croatian Defence Council and is conveying experiences to them, general Janko Bobetko writes that the forces of the Croatian Defence Council are “rather respectable”, they execute their tasks and defend that portion of the territory successfully, preventing the Chetniks from penetrating”. In relation to this, he falsely claims that the Croatian Defence Council is an autonomous force, responsible for its own territory (J. Bobetko, the aforementioned work, p. 127). The very fact that General Bobetko was the commander of the Southern Frontline speaks of the contrary.

On March 21, 1992, Pasko Ljubicic, commander of the \textit{Defence of Herzeg-Bosnia}, requested to be received by Gojko Susak, minister of defence of the Republic of Croatia, first of all, “in order to receive instructions for supplementary actions (in Central Bosnia)” (ICTY, Case: No. IT-95-14-T, paragraph 110). Among the proposed participants of that meeting was also Dario Kordic, President of the \textit{Crisis Headquarters of the Central Bosnia} and deputy President of the “Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia” (Ibid.).
of Defence of the Republic of Croatia in Zagreb about the situation in the units, organizational and other problems.\textsuperscript{360} Even with the proposals for promotions, the HVO commanders approached the Republic of Croatia.\textsuperscript{361}

Even through the **Croatian officers, who were redeployed from the Croatian Army into the HVO** or through the Bosnian Croats who had accepted the greater Croatia project or followed the instructions of the Government of the Republic of Croatia, the Republic of Croatia controlled the decisions in the **Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia**.\textsuperscript{362}

The involvement of Croatia in the establishment of the Croatian Defence Council after April 7, 1992, when Croatia recognized the autonomy of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was officially proclaimed by Franjo Tudjman, after that date constitutes interference in the interior affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which never ceased at all.\textsuperscript{363}

President of the Republic of Croatia, Dr. Franjo Tudjman, and his top officers were passing orders on formation of the Main Headquarters of the Croatian Defence Council and on appointment of the commanders. Two days after the Presidency of the **Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia** had formally established the Croatian Defence Council (April 8, 1992), on April 10, 1992, President Franjo Tudjman appointed general Janko Bobetko from Croatia the commander of the Southern Frontline. His duties included commanding over the units of the Croatian Army and Croatian Defence Council in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the period from April 10, through July 15, 1992, in the capacity of the Croatian Army general and commander of the Southern Frontline,

\textsuperscript{360} AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2943, Minutes from the meeting with Mr. minister G. Susak held at the Ministry of Defence on December 22, 1993; Ibid., inv. No. 2-3010, Republic of Croatia, Ministry of Defence, Main Headquarters of the HV, class: 8/93-01/02, reg. no. 512-06-06/2-93-75, Zagreb, December 7, 1993, COMMAND. The Intelligence Administration of the Main Headquarters of the HVO was sending all the intelligence data to the Intelligence Department of the IZM Ploce (“Southern Frontline”) – this was in fact its obligation, signed off by the chief of staff of the Main Headquarters of the Croatian Army – General Janko Bobetko (Ibid.).

\textsuperscript{361} Bilen FHP, No. 15, p. 108.

\textsuperscript{362} ICTY, Case: No. IT-95-14-T, paragraph 110.

\textsuperscript{363} Ibid., paragraph 111.
seated in Ploce, he commanded and directed all the units of the Croatian Army from Split to Dubrovnik, and all the units of the Croatian Army and Croatian Defence Council on the part of territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina – in the area of the collaborationist Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia. Afterwards, the duty of commanding over the units of the Croatian Defence Council was taken over by three officers of the Croatian Army, who were subordinated to General Bobetko. On April 15, 1992, in Grude, he formed a forefront command place of the Southern Front, and on the next day he determined the composition of this command; on April 20, he regulated the composition of the Command for “organization and defence” of the direction of Tomislavgrad, and on April 21, he ordered to general Ante Roso to take on the responsibility over the area of Livno, and to brigadier Miljenko Crnjec the responsibility for organization of “defence” in the area of Tomislavgrad; on May 19, he also established a Forefront Command Place in Gornji Vakuf; he issued orders for formation and equipping of units and other activities, in order to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina.364

On June 14, 1992, General Bobetko ordered the beginning of offensive activity and relocation of the forces of the Croatian Defence Council in certain direction, and taking over of specific activities within a single military operation.365 Among other things, in early November 1993, he planned the operations against Bosnia and Herzegovina.366


365 ICTY, Case: No. IT-95-14-T, paragraph 112.

366 See pp. 1156-1159 (notes 258-263) of this work.
On June 27, 1992, in the capacity of General of the Croatian Army, General Ante Roso promoted Tihomir Blaskic into the rank of Colonel of the Croatian Defence Council and appointed him into the Command of the “Operational Zone of Central Bosnia”. On the post of commander of the Main Headquarters of the HVO, General Milivoj Petkovic was replaced by General Slobodan Praljak, former assistant minister of defence of Croatia in Zagreb, and he himself was replaced by Ante Roso. These decisions on appointments were passed by the President of the Republic of Croatia and the Government of that country, which is one more proof that the HVO in Bosnia and Herzegovina was just a collaborationist formation of another, Croatian, state.

The Croatian Defence Council and the Croatian Army had joint personnel, who were often originating from Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to general Domazet, the officers of the Army of the Republic of Croatia “were voluntarily leaving the Croatian Army, in order to serve in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Those officers had to have official permit to do so, and they were considered temporarily detached officers. In fact, it seems that they continued to receive salaries from Croatia”. Those who wanted to return to Croatia could do that provided that they have an official permit from the Croatian Army authorities, which was just a formality.

The high-ranking officers of the Croatian Army, Ante Roso, Milivoj Petkovic, Slobodan Praljak, Ivan Tolj, and many others were deployed for temporary service into the Croatian Defence Council, following which they returned to the Croatian Army. Ante Roso, Milivoj Petkovic, and Slobodan Praljak were high-ranking officers of the Croatian Army before they became commanders and chiefs of staff of the Main Headquarters of the Croatian Defence Council. Ivan Tolj used to be a Parliament representative, General and Chief of Staff of the Political Administration of the Croatian Army, while simultaneously also a member of the Croatian

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367 ICTY, Case: No. IT-95-14-T, paragraph 112; AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2969, Union of the Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, Main Headquarters of the HVO, reg. No. 02-2/1-01-5390/93, IZM Citluk, November 10, 1993 – to all the Brigades / HVO, Command No. 1; M. Spigelj, the aforementioned work, p. 363.

368 ICTY, Case: No. IT-95-14-T, paragraph 114.
Defence Council. Colonel of the Croatian Army Miro Andric was also a member of the Croatian Defence Council. Even at the lower level, the Croatian Defence Council was mainly made up of Croats, who had returned from Croatia after having fought in the Croatian Army.

General Tihomir Blaskic was himself appointed in compliance with the procedure that “necessitated selection of people of trust, ready to conduct the policy dictated from Zagreb”. At the meeting in Grude, (November 12, 1991), chaired by Mate Boban, among other things, the positions were adopted to clearly profile and strengthen the personnel of the party policy of the Croatian Democratic Union in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to select people who are able to execute such tasks, and to prepare in the military way even better for fighting all such forces that will try to stop “the imminent process in creation of the free Croatian state”. General Tihomir Blaskic could not be appointed to the post at which he was if he had not fully supported that ideology, policy and practice. This is, among other things, also confirmed by his appointment (by the President of the Republic and the supreme commander of the Armed Forces of Croatia) to the duty of inspector at the Main Inspectorate of the Croatian Army, on November 14, 1995.

Obviously, with its regular troops and Croatian collaborationists from Bosnia and Herzegovina), the Republic of Croatia has participated

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369 Ibid., paragraph 115. Ivan Tolj, representative at the Croatian Parliament, “was the general of both armies” He and other “representatives of the Croatian Parliament were photographed there in the HVO uniforms, although they were at the same time the members of the Croatian Parliament. These same persons demonized the Muslims and their right to defend the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the most extreme extent.” (Ibid., paragraph 115, note 233).

370 Ibid.

371 S. Cekic, the aforementioned work, pp. 33-35, and 306-309; M. Culic, the aforementioned work, pp. 70-71; ICTY, Case: No. IT-95-14-T, paragraph 114.

372 ICTY, Case: No. IT-95-14-T, paragraph 117.

in the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that the case involves a conflict of **international character**. Based on the direct and indirect intervention by the Republic of Croatia in Bosnia and Herzegovina, “in an armed conflict against the Bosnian Muslims”, about which “there is more than sufficient evidence”, the Hague Tribunal characterized the conflict as an **international one**, which means that it is a crime against peace, that is, an aggression against the Republic of Croatia against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

It is obvious that the Croatian Army was planning, preparing and conducting the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, i.e., directing and commanding over all the Croatian military operations on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This means that the Croatian Defence Council never existed as an autonomous armed force. In order to conduct the aggression, Croatia, just like Serbia and Montenegro (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), formed its collaborationist military forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina under the name of Croatian Defence Council. However, afraid of the international sanctions, the Republic of Croatia insisted on the thesis that the Croatian Defence Council is in fact an autonomous armed formation, although in essence the Croatian Defence Council was included in the armed forces of the Republic of Croatia. In fact, the Croatian Defence Council was an integral part of the Croatian Army, which was from its formation completely involved into its organizational and command structure, and which Croatia, among

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“Pursuant to Article 100, paragraph 1, of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, and Article 159, paragraph 1, of the Law on Service in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia, (‘National Gazette’ nos. 23/95, and 33/95)”, on November 14, 1995, the President of the Republic and the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of Croatia, Dr. Franjo Tudjman passed the Decision on Appointment of General Tihomir Blaskic to the duty of inspector at the Main Inspectorate of the Croatian Army (Ibid.).

374 **ICTY**, Case: No. IT-95-14-T, paragraphs 77, 94, 102, and 123-124; **ICTY**, PROSECUTOR AGAINST RAJIC, Case: No. IT-95-12, paragraph 22. The defence of general Blaskic claimed that **the Croatian Army was directing the operations of the Croatian Defence Council** only in the period between March and June 1992, “before the Croatian Defence Council was organized and before the conflict arose between the Croatian and Muslim forces in Central Bosnia”. The ICTY agrees “that the interference by the Croatian Army and Croatia may seem more obvious in the beginning of the given period, but its assessment is that it continued for the whole period of the conflict” (ICTY, Case: No. IT-95-14-T, paragraph 102).
other things, also ensured huge funding for. The Croatian Defence Council and the Croatian Army acted towards execution of the single goal – occupation of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its joining to the neighbouring Republic of Croatia.  

In the valley of the Rama and Neretva rivers, and in Central Bosnia, the units of the regular Croatian Army and the Croatian Defence Council committed numerous crimes against the Bosniak civilian population (mass murders, forced resettlement, illegal arrests, detainment and torture of civilians in concentration camps and prisons, destruction of cities, villages, religious facilities, etc.). This was part of the planned ideology and systematically conducted policy and practice of genocide, committed in an organized way in the aforementioned areas by the members of the Croatian Army and the Croatian Defence Council.

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375 Bosna, no. 1, February 11, 1994, p. 23; ICTY, Case: No. IT-95-14-T, paragraph 120; ICTY, Case: No. IT-95-14/1-T, paragraph 78, note 182.

From the final statement of the Ministry of Defence of the HZ HB for 1993, it derives that in that year, the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia participated with 16,764,924,236 HRD of the regular financial contribution from the budget, and with 268,770,000 HRD of special grants for the needs of the Ministry of Defence of the HZ HB (C. Ribicic, the aforementioned work, pp. 95-95, note 167).
5. Logistical assistance of the collaborationist units of the Croatian Army

The participation of the Republic of Croatia in the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, besides its armed forces, can be positively determined on the basis of the logistical support to the HVO, without which it could not be formed nor operate. Namely, during the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, besides the personnel, mainly in live forces, the Republic of Croatia supported the Croatian Defence Council financially and logistically, as well as in other material assistance. The Republic of Croatia has spent a million of German marks daily on the assistance to all structures of the Croatian Community Herzeg-Bosnia, including the Croatian Defence Council. The Republic of Croatia has supplied the Croatian Defence Council with significant quantities of arms and military equipment, fuel, vehicles, food, as well as with ammunition. Among the material-technical resources, there were T-55 tanks and howitzers, with crews and Croatian army emblems. That is how, for instance, Croatian tanks T-53, operated by the Croatian army crews, were present in the area of Gornji Vakuf, fighting against the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.\(^{376}\)

The available information points at the significant role of the Republic of Croatia in arming of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Croats. That is how, for instance, on May 10, 1991, the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Croatia enabled the acquisition of arms and provided its transportation by trucks, on destination Zagreb-Capljina.\(^{377}\) The most

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\(^{376}\) ICTY, Case: Reference number IT-95-14-T, paragraph 120; ICTY, Case: Reference number IT-95-14/1-T, paragraph 78, annotation 182.

\(^{377}\) AIIZ, 2-51, Information from the Ministry of Interior of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina about certain occurrences and events that particularly affected the complication of the security situation in the Republic, dated June 11, 1991.
voluminous activities in the arming of Croatian population in Bosnia Herzegovina were organized at the end of 1991, after the attack of the Serbia and Montenegro aggressor on Dubrovnik. During that period, Croats have invested an enormous amount of money into arming, and therefore possessed huge quantities of conventional armaments. “Every capable individual has a gun”. Some wealthy businesspersons, besides Kalashnikov AK-40, acquired howitzers, all types of artillery, armour-piercing rocket launchers, and rocket systems “stinger”.378

Significant contingent of weaponry and military equipment intended for the defence of Vukovar, which was occupied on November 18, 1991, has been redirected to West Herzegovina. In companies Slobodan Princip Seljo and Vitez, the organization of secret export and stealing of explosives and gunpowder, which were, under the motto of the homeland war in Croatia, secretly distributed and exchanged for arms, mostly in Croatia, functioned quite well.379

Municipal Board of the Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ), on March 31, 1992, addressed the Minister of Defence of the Republic of Croatia, Gojko Susak personally, asking for assistance in armaments.380

In the evening of April 22/23, 1992, a group of some three hundred members of the armed formations of the Croatian Community Herzeg-Bosnia (Regional Board of the HVO of Central Bosnia), led by Dario

379 S. Salkic – S. Ahmic, STRADANJE MUSLIMANA I ISTRAZIVANJE RATNIH ZLOCINA NA PODRUCJU OPSTINE VITEZ (manuscript), Zenica, 1993, pp. 2-3
380 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-1900, Croatian Democratic Community, Municipal Board Bugojno, Bugojno, March 31, 1992, - to the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia (to the attention of the Minister, Mr. Susak), Zagreb.

Matko Lucic, the President of the Municipal Board of the Croatian Democratic Community Bugojno, in the mentioned request wrote: “We live in a dramatic situation. We are under Serb threats. The Serb population is departing Kupres and Bugojno in an organized manner. A group of reservists (one bus) arrived in civilian clothes, changed into military uniforms, and took positions within empty houses.

We have minimal arms at our disposal. All the Croats are ready for fight and a great dissatisfaction with the lack of equipment prevails. Our Regional Crisis Headquarters in Grude is not able to deliver the necessary equipment, and Colonel Mikulic refers us to you.

We request your intervention and assistance in armaments” (Ibid.).
Kordic, dragged out three multiple barrel rocket-launchers of types *Orkan* and *Oganj*, and a certain number of howitzers of 122 mm calibre, from the military equipment production facilities *Bratstvo* in Novi Travnik, which were further on transported towards West Herzegovina over Prozor. Consequently, while the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) was still stationed in Mostar, over 1.500 long barrels, 1.400 bombs, and over 40.000 meals have been transported to Herzegovina.381

The Republic of Croatia, besides the live forces (Croatian army), to, and against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, sent ammunition, tanks, cannons, napalm bombs and other material-technical resources and equipment. Acquisition of ammunition was organized with precision. The main delivery of ammunition went from Ploce, directly towards Mostar, "on the very same night when ordered". General Vinko Martinovic also received from Janko Bobetko "not only the assignment, but also all the authorization to gradually supply that front, because it was the closest, shortest, I have no long transportation, so that he from his front took the battery of cannons 122, mortars, mines, ammunition, namely all the requested ammunition, so in the shortest period, it had functioned, one can say, excellently… Further on, for the ammunition, of heavier calibres, 130, on three occasions were the consignments and given orders immediately delivered with priority and straight to the frontline." [linguistically incorrect in the original – note by the author]382 In such a manner, also on October 20, 1993 "one full consignment went, is going from here, of heavier calibre, 130, 105, 120, and from that front also goes all the other ammunition, so that, clearly, it gets spent…"383

Franjo Tudjman has sent weapons to Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, also including the area of Busovaca.384

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381 Dnevni izvjestaj, number 1, of April 25, 1992; Oslobodjenje, October 04, 1993, p. 5; ICTY, Case Kordic and Cerkez – IT-95-14/2-T, Bulletin FHP, issue 15, pp. 73 and 98., In April 1992, Dario Kordic, as a politician, has signed a requests for acquisition of heavy weaponry and military equipment (Bulletin FHP, issue 15, pp. 73 and 98).


383 Ibid.

384 Bilten FHP, issue 15, p. 98.
Commander-in-Chief of the 160 brigade of the Croatian army in Osijek, Colonel Dubravko Jezercic, on July 16, 1992, on the basis of the command by the commander of the Operation zone Osijek, commanded a hand over of one tank T-55 and one BVP M-80, with one battle set of ammunition without a crew “for the needs of the Operational Group “East Posavina””. The mentioned material-technical resources were the same day taken over in Osijek by Josip Jagodin, on behalf of “HVO Bugojno”.

Dario Kordic has, on behalf of the Regional Headquarters of the HVO Central Bosnia, residing in Busovaca, on June 10, 1992, issued a permanent permission to pass to Vjeran Mijatovic from Vares “through the Croatian Community Herzeg-Bosnia and the Republic of Croatia, for the purpose of performing tasks for the Municipal Headquarters of HVO Vares, namely acquisition of weaponry for HVO Vares, as well as food.”

Commander of the Municipal Headquarters of the Croatian Defence Council Konjic, Dinko Zebic, was authorized on June 18, 1992, to “in accordance with the verbal command of General Bobetko, undertake acquisition of material-technical resources to serve the needs of HVO Konjic”.

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385 AIIZ, inv. No. 6-437, Republic of Croatia, Croatian Army, 160 brigade, Class: 8/92-01/01, Reference No.: 3070-01-92-57, Osijek, July 16, 1992, ORDER.

At the end of that document in the left corner under the name and surname, and signature of Josip Jagodin there is a round seal, with “sahovnica” [Croatian state coat of arms and the flag] emblem in the middle and the following inscription: “Croatian Community Herzeg-Bosnia, Croatian Defence Council, Municipal Headquarters Bugojno”.

386 AIIZ, inv. No.: 2-1861, Croatian Community Herzeg-Bosnia, Croatian Defence Council, Regional Headquarters of Central Bosnia, Busovaca, No.: 02-347/92, Busovaca, June 10, 1992, PERMANENT PERMISSION TO PASS. With that permission to pass, Dario Kordic has approved Mijatovic to “possess personal short and long barrel weapons throughout the territory of the Croatian Community Herzeg-Bosnia and the Republic of Croatia”. In that regard, he requested all checkpoints of HVO to “provide undisturbed transit to the mentioned gentlemen, as well as provide them with special assistance, if needed” (Ibid.).

387 AIIZ, inv. No.: 2-1864, Croatian Defence Council, Municipal Headquarters Konjic, No.: 02-558/92, June 18, 1992, AUTHORISATION. Dinko Zebic has travelled by “a vehicle type Golf JX, license plates HVO-1-0-5, with personal driver Zlatan Arapovic” (Ibid.).
Commander of the First light artillery battalion of the anti-aircraft defence (1st LARD PZO), of the Operational Zone Northwest Herzegovina (Tomislavgrad), Marijan Maric, on June 21, 1992, issued a RECOMMENDATION for “Branimir Ivanovic, on check-points under control of HVO for the territories of Herzeg-Bosnia and the Republic of Croatia, is allowed to travel to Tomislavgrad – Divulje – Grude, for the activities related to PZO”.388

At the meeting between Franjo Tudjman, Janko Bobetko, Imre Agotic, and Josip Lucic, that was held in Presidential Palace in Zagreb, on October 22, 1993, Minister Gojko Susak presented the information that, to Herzegovina were sent “twelve tanks, batteries of cannons, ammunition. Consequently, everything that the brigade possesses has been transported, and that saved the situation down in the Neretva valley”.389

The Republic of Croatia, in the aggression on the Republic of Bosnia Herzegovina, also used napalm bombs390, as well as air forces. During 1992, 190 air flights were undertaken, all by night (“until the moment when the flights for Western Bosnia were forbidden), where 450 persons and 87 tons of cargo were transported.391 During 1993 (until

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388 AIIZ, inv. No.: 2-2154, Croatian Community Herzeg-Bosnia, Croatian Defence Council, Headquarters of the 1 LARD PZO SZH /light artillery battalion of the anti-aircraft defence of the Operational Zone Northwest Herzegovina/, Tomislavgrad, June 21, 1992, RECOMMENDATION. The recommendation states that “the mentioned individual travels in personal vehicle, license plates ZE 112-783”, “personal identification card number 1742/91). (Ibid.).


390 Ibid.. The information about the use of napalm bombs against Bosniaks was presented by Franjo Tudjman, at the meeting between himself, Janko Bobetko, Imre Agotic, Josip Lucic and Gojko Susak, in the Presidential Palace in Zagreb, held on October 22, 1993. (AIIZ, inv. No.: 2-2474; Dani, October 25, 2002, p. 24). In that regard, Franjo Tudjman stated: “…and that you napalm bombs, some kind of firecrackers, to be used there, with which you have previously frightened first the Yugoslavian army and at a later stage some Muslims. Think of something, it would be very important to us. Between us, listen, even these European negotiators expected that we will resolve this problem”. (Ibid.).

391 Ibid., p. 23.
October 22) 105 air flights were realized, 700 wounded were transported, as well as some 1,300 other persons and 50 tons of cargo.\footnote{392 Ibid. The mentioned participation of the Air Forces of the Republic of Croatia in the aggression on the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina went on, according to general Agotic, “all upon the request by HVO”. But, “air force support in terms of use of helicopters” Croatian Wartime Air Forces were, according to general Agotic “completely disorganized, from our side. That is because all those requests from them arrive through some, if I may dare say, irregular ways. That line of command over the Croatian Air Forces and Croatian Army was not respected at all. All of that goes, more or less, through the office of the Minister, or directly from Tola Zarko, or from people from the Main Headquarters of HVO, towards the Mixed Air force squadron in Divulje, which they, somehow, considered and consider the squadron in charge of them… I think that we should establish one unit from the Croatian Air force which would, together with helicopters of HVO or our helicopters, be based on the territory of the Croatian Community Herzeg-Bosnia… You know that you did not have objections to HRZ flying unannounced to Herzeg-Bosnia.. The situation happens that we send helicopter to Kiseljak, Nova Bila, or…” (Ibid.). Imre Agotic, on October 22, 1993, has sent his chief of the Headquarters, brigadier Culetic, to the Main Headquarters of the Croatian Defence Council, to see Bruno Stojic, and the commander, chief of the Air force base Headquarters. The objective of their trip to the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Mostar) was to coordinate, inspect and agree with the Main Headquarters of HVO “where the problems with regard to air force support are and what do they have to offer in that sense”. Talking about that at the meeting between Franjo Tudjman, Janko Bobetko, Imre Agotic, Josip Lucic and Gojko Susak in the Presidential Palace in Zagreb, held on October 22, 1993, Imre Agotic thought that after that, upon Franjo Tudjman’s command, “explicitly for that also”, because so far “all the assistance was given somehow bashfully”. In that respect, he “truly” stated: “…Dunja requests me to send a helicopter to Kiseljak, to Nova Bila, and Miss Dunja, tell me, no, no, urgently, they are wounded, and why should I say I will not. I only ask that everything follows the line of command, it will make us more efficient… Security officer comes to the airport Divulje and looks for people who will fly to Herzeg-Bosnia, I am not sure exactly what the fees were, but he takes marks out of his pocket, pays. That has a baleful impact on people’s moral. He is a member of HVO” (Ibid., p. 24).}

The Republic of Croatia used the aircrafts type Utva and helicopters of the Croatian Army, specially in the surrounded cities in Central Bosnia, for the immediate support to combat activities against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Aircrafts and helicopters were used for realization, transportation of men-power and material-technical resources and equipment, as well as for the fire support from the air. Engagement of aircrafts of the
Croatian Army was specially observed in the areas of Mts. Radusa and Vranica, then fly-over of helicopters towards the surrounded cities in Central Bosnia and air force support to military units of the Croatian Defence Council in Mostar and other places.\textsuperscript{393}

Helicopters from the Republic of Croatia were, for the central Bosnia as well (Travnik, Vitez, Busovaca, and other places), transporting weaponry for the Croatian Defence Council, as well. Thus, during June 1993, helicopters were transporting weaponry and unused Croatian dinars. During June and July of 1993, helicopters were landing near the \textit{Vitezit} arms factory. In addition, over the period from September until the end of 1993, those helicopters transported weaponry.\textsuperscript{394}

Collaborationist Croatian Community Herzeg-Bosnia established cooperation with many companies in the Republic of Croatia, from where nutritional and other products were furnished. The city of Bugojno was the supply centre for the area of central Bosnia. That decision was made on June 16, 1992 in Zagreb, at the meeting held in premises of the company \textit{Voce Export-Import}, with following participants: Jure Klaric, from Voce Zagreb; Ljupko Tabakovic, from the Directorate for Commodity Reserves of the Republic of Croatia; and representatives of the Municipal Headquarters of Croatian Defence Council Bugojno: Ante Bagaric, Branko Saric, Zvonko Mihaljevic, and Josip Pocrinja. At the meeting participants discussed about the bearers of the reception, warehousing, transportation, and distribution of nutritional supplies, authorized company, and individuals who will be in charge of the implementation. After that, a meeting was

\textsuperscript{393} AIIZ, inv. No.: 2-2294, \textit{Participation of the Croatian Army in Bosnia Herzegovina battlefield and other resources of support from the Republic of Croatia}. Giving support to the Croatian Defence Council, helicopters of the Croatian Army, were, mainly, landing in Vitez, Kiseljak, Busovaca and Sebesic, main logistics base for the central Bosnia, held by the Army of Bosnia Herzegovina as of July, 1993. After the surrounding of Vitez, helicopters were landing near the factory \textit{Slobodan Princip Seljo}. In December 1993, when the Army of Bosnia Herzegovina came nearer to the landing point, Vitez started acquiring parachutes, which were used to drop ammunition and grenades to HVO (Bosnia, issue 1, February 11, 1994, p. 23).

held in Bugojno, on July 03, 1992, at which the issue of “provision of the basic nutritional items for the local population, arrived refugees and military of the Municipality Bugojno” was discussed (the meeting was attended by: Vladimir Soljic, Anto Bagaric, Leon Cosic, Mihovil Strujic, Zvonko Brajkovic, and Ljupko Tabakovic, Head of the Department for agricultural-nutritional products of the Directorate for Commodity Reserves of the Republic of Croatia, and Ljupko Misura, member of the Homeland club in Zagreb).395

“Reviewing the overall problems regarding supplying the city of Bugojno and wider surrounding area, as well as the overall central Bosnia, with nutritional products, in the wartime circumstances in which the city of Bugojno and entire Herzeg-Bosnia were caught”, at the Bugojno meeting it was agreed that the main coordinator of the supplying with basic nutritional and “possibly” other products activities will be company Delta, and Josip Pocrnja be in charge of acquisition, reception and distribution of the goods.396 He managed, on July 31, 1992, to secure 25 tons of food


396 Ibid. The mentioned proposal about the selection of company Delta, from Bugojno, came from HVO Bugojno. That company was to negotiate all other details in further contacts with company Voce, from Zagreb. Ante Bagaric recommended Josip Pocrnja as person in charge of all the activities regarding the implementation of that project, first of all, wheat and floreg. He went to Zagreb, where he, on July 29, 1992, submitted a request to the Ministry of Trade of the Republic of Croatia regarding taking over of some 250 tons of the goods in the first cycle, “and which should be realized during the first week of August”. Successive taking over of the goods from the Directorate for State supplies reserves, Pocrnja thought might “satisfy our needs, meaning that we can organize trade”. Conditions for receiving the goods were 60 days with no interest (Ibid.).

Pocrnja also agreed with the Directorate for State supplies reserves of the Republic of Croatia, in Zagreb, upon the following:

- extraction of wheat “from the contingent that arrived from Austria, and was intended for the Republic of Bosnia Herzegovina”;  
- delivery of fresh yeast for the Bugojno Bakery (as a donation);  
- payment for 25 tons of meat cans, “which resources 70 days of meals for soldiers”, from certain companies from Zagreb;
from the German Humanitarian Society in Zagreb, and at the beginning of the month, the same contingent came from the Red Cross and Caritas.\textsuperscript{397}

Commander of the Municipal Headquarters of the Croatian Defence Council Bugojno, Zdravko Babic, on July 02, 1992, authorized the Chief of Logistics of the Croatian Defence Council Bugojno, Josip Jagodin, “to undertake all activities regarding the acquisition and transportation of the material-technical resources and armaments in the Republic of Croatia, on behalf of the Municipal Headquarters Bugojno” Jagodin was specially authorized for “activities regarding acquisition of armoured combat resources and their transportation to Bugojno”.\textsuperscript{398}

The Croatian Defence Council Bugojno entrusted Mihovil Strujic, a member of the Presidency of the Croatian Defence Council, “\textit{and the previously selected team}”, with the assignment of the acquisition of deficient ammunition for 76 mm cannons, 122 mm howitzers, armoured resources and other.\textsuperscript{399} Consequently, as of July 26, 1992, Strujic has travelled to Split, Sinj, Ston, Slano, Lozica, Zagreb, Slunj, Vinkovci, Varazdin, Bjelovar, Osijek and Sisak, where he had “tried with his team in each of these places separately to fulfil at least one of the assignments”. At that time, they managed to acquire:

- Tank T-55, with one combat set 1 piece
- Armoured combat vehicle M-30, with 20 mm canon and 12.7 mm PAM, plus one combat set
- Bullets 76 mm 435 pieces

\textsuperscript{397} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{398} AIIZ, inv. No.: 6-443, Croatian Community Herzeg-Bosnia, Croatian Defence Council, Municipal Headquarters Bugojno, No.: 01-120-95, July 02, 1992, Authorization.

\textsuperscript{399} AIIZ, inv. no.: 2-1865, Mihovil Strujic, member of the Presidency of HVO – to the Croatian Defence Council Bugojno, to the attention of the President, Report.

Mihovil Strujic, “\textit{with the selected team}”, has also had an assignment to find premises for the HVO office in Zagreb.
- Shells for howitzers 122 mm 350 pieces
- Shells for mortars 120 mm 245 pieces
- Shells for mortars 82 mm 200 pieces
- Mortars 82 mm 2 pieces
- rifle 1 piece
- Rocket-launcher 1 piece
- Bullets 7.9 mm 10,000 pieces
- Maljutka rockets 10 pieces
- Rotation (signal) lights 1 piece

The Municipal Headquarters of HVO Bugojno received the following from one military barracks in Zagreb:
- Tent-halves 250 - 300 pieces

400 Ibid. All the listed items were transported to Bugojno.

Strujic, with his team, rented business premises in Zagreb (two rooms, one of the size of 13.80 square meters, and the other size 12 square meters), with infrastructure (2 telephones, office tables, etc.).

Strujic has also, for the “forthcoming activities”, made an arrangement “with about 80% probability”, for the following:
- Tank T-84 1 piece
- Tank T-55 1 piece
- Armored transporters 2 pieces
- 130 mm canons, from Divulje 1 piece
- shells for ZIS 1,500 pieces
- shells for howitzers 120 mm 1,000 pieces
- 120 mm mines
- wires for field telephones 30 pieces
- sleeping bags and beds 500 pieces
- worm suits of 83 MED *
- assault rifles M-16, (at the price of some 650 DEM) *
- military snipers and grenade launchers *

(* no quantities were stated in the original document – note by S.C.)

The aforementioned activities were implemented by a team of: Mihovil Strujic, Josip Jagodin, Ivica Bodrusic, Mario Nevjestic, Zdravko Lucic, Mirko Crnjak, along with the Military police team from Bugojno).
- Combat back-packs ca. 250 pieces
- Military mess kits ca. 100 pieces
- New boots ca. 40 pieces
- Belts for trousers about 200 pieces.\textsuperscript{401}

The Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia has ensured provision of the material-technical resources for the Croatian Community Herzeg-Bosnia. Consequently, General Ivan Cermak, on August 03, 1992, signed an order to issue:

- Mines 120 mm 100 pieces
- Mines 82 mm 200 pieces.\textsuperscript{402}

for the Central rear-echelon (base) Grude, “to be at the disposal of the armed forces of BH – HVO Bugojno”

On the same day, General Cermak issued an order to the Department of technical/traffic administration, to issue material resources for want of the Central rear-echelon base Grude, “to be at the disposal of the armed forces of BH – HVO Bugojno”, as follows:

- Launcher “Strela” 2M 1 piece
- Rocket “Strela” 2M 6 pieces
- AP AK-74 30 pieces
- Ammunition 5.45 mm 40,000 pieces
- Uniforms 200 sets (for winter)

\textsuperscript{401} AIIZ, 2-1907, Croatian Defence Council, Municipal Headquarters Bugojno, Report (by Josip Pocrnja) to the Municipal Headquarters Bugojno, about the official travel to Zagreb, Bugojno, August 01, 1992.

The aforementioned equipment was acquired by Josip Pocrnja and Nikola Pavlovic.

\textsuperscript{402} AIIZ, inv. No.: 6-442, The Republic of Croatia, Ministry of Defence, Class: 003-05/92-01/252, Reference No.: 512-07-06/92-01/252, Zagreb, August 02, 1992, - to Rikard Bencic, Rijeka, Order.

Josip Jagodin was the responsible person, “who will overtake the resources”.

Colonel-General Cermak was in charge for the logistics of the Croatian Army, and he was, according to General Bobetko, “went to the frontline himself and his deliveries arrived punctually, right on a second…” (Janko Bobetko, the aforementioned work, p. 298).
- Bullets 122 mm Gvozdin 100 pieces.\(^{403}\)

The Secretariat of National Defence of the Municipality Beli Manastir handed over the following material resources to the Municipal Headquarters of the Croatian Defence Council Bugojno, as follows:

- RPG 2 2 pieces
- RPG 7 1 piece
- Mines for RPG 70 cases
- AP 50 pieces.\(^{404}\)

On the same day, the aforementioned Secretariat also handed over “to Mr. Jagodin Josip, authorized non-commissioned officer of HVO Bugojno – Municipal Headquarters Bugojno” the following material-technical resources:

- PHP (pistol) 10 pieces
- Sniper 1 piece
- Sniper bullets 60 pieces.\(^{405}\)

The Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia, General Cermak, Assistant Minister of Defence, on August 12, 1992, issued an order to the Department of technical/traffic administration regarding the issuance of material resources for want of the Croatian Defence Council Bugojno, as follows:

\(^{403}\) AIIZ, inv. No.: 6-440, The Republic of Croatia, Ministry of Defence, Class: 003-05/92-01/252, Reference No.: 512-07-06/92-01/252, Zagreb, August 03, 1992.— to the Department of technical/traffic administration, ORDER.

Responsible person “who will take over the resources is Josip Jagodin, Personal Identification No.: 2701960191760 Bugojno”.

\(^{404}\) AIIZ, inv. No.: 6-439, The Republic of Croatia, Municipality of Beli Manastir, Secretariat of National Defence, Bilje, August 06, 1992, CERTIFICATE.

The listed material-technical resources were taken over by Josip Jagodin, on August 07.

\(^{405}\) AIIZ, inv. No.: 6-438, The Republic of Croatia, Municipality Beli Manastir, Secretariat of National Defence, Osijek, August 06, 1992, CERTIFICATE.

Jagodin took over the listed material-technical items on August 07, and transported them “with his personal vehicle, license plates BU = 57-89”.

1212
- AK-47 150 pieces
- Ammunition 7.62 x 39 50,000 pieces
- Hand grenades 300 pieces
- Uniforms 400 pieces
- Mortars 60 mm 4 pieces
- Mortars 82 mm 4 pieces
- Mines 82 mm 100 pieces

The 156th Brigade of the Croatian Army also provided material-technical resources for the Croatian Defence Council Bugojno. Besides Josip Jagodin, Ante Zecevic, from Bugojno, member of the Croatian Defence Council Bugojno, was also authorized to take over and transport those items to Bugojno, on behalf of the Croatian Defence Council Bugojno. He was authorized on August 19, 1992, by Ivica Lucic, commander-in-chief of the Eugen Kvaternik brigade (Bugojno), to take over ammunition from the 156th Makarska brigade, on behalf of the Croatian Defence Council.

The Croatian Defence Council of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia was taking over material-technical resources, weaponry, medical material, medicines, equipment, food, cigarettes, and all other necessities, in the Republic of Croatia. For the acquisition of the aforementioned in the Republic of Croatia for the Croatian Defence Council – headquarters Zepce (commander of the IV Operational Zone Ivo Lozancic) has authorized Vinko Maric, on August 20, 1992.

The 4th brigade of the National Guard Corps was ensuring provision of the material-technical resources for the Croatian Defence Council

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406 AIIZ, inv. No.: 6-441, The Republic of Croatia, Ministry of Defence, Class: 003-05/92-01/252, Reference No.: 512-07-06/92-01/252, Zagreb, August 12, 1992, - to the Department of technical/traffic administration, ORDER.

Josip Jagodin was the responsible person “who will take over the items”.

407 AIIZ, inv. No.: 2-1866, Croatian Community Herzeg-Bosnia, Croatian Defence Council, Headquarters of the brigade Eugen Kvaternik Bugojno, No.: 02-128-668/92, Bugojno, August 19, 1992, AUTHORIZATION.

408 AIIZ, inv. No.: 2-1867, Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, Croatian Defence Council, Headquarters Zepce, No.: 02/2-28/92, Zepce, August 20, 1992, AUTHORIZATION.
Bugojno. Consequently, on September 11, 1992, from the 4th brigade of the National Guard Corps' warehouse in Orasac (Military Post 1114 Split), the following items were issued to members of the Croatian Defence Council Bugojno:

- Mines for mortars 60 mm 144 pieces
- Bullets 20 mm OERLIKON 360 pieces.409

On September 19, 1992, from the 4th brigade of the National Guard Corps warehouse, issuance and transportation of the material-technical resources to the Municipal Headquarters of the Croatian Defence Council were approved. On September 11, 1992, Colonel Mirko Sandrov, unit commander of the Military Post 1114 Split, in Orasac, confirmed that, from his unit, the following items were supplied to the members of the Croatian Defence Council Bugojno:

- Mines for mortars 60 mm 144 pieces
- Bullets 20 mm OERLIKON 360 pieces.410

Colonel Mirko Sundrov, on September 19, 1992, again for the Croatian Defence Council Bugojno approved the issuance and transportation of the following technical-material resources from the warehouse of the 4th brigade of the National Guard Corps warehouse:

- PAP 7.62 mm 10 pieces
- Bullets 7.62 and 39 (?) mm 10 cases
- Bullets 7.9 mm 10 cases
- Bullets 20 mm OERLIKON 180 pieces
- Uniform sets 30 sets.411

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409 AIIZ, inv. No.: 2-1869, Military Post 1114 Split, Orasac, September 11, 1992, CERTIFICATE. At the end of that document, there is a round seal, with “sahovnica” emblem in the middle, and inscription: “The Republic of Croatia, Ministry of Defence, National Guard Corps, 4th brigade”.

410 AIIZ, inv. No.: 2-1869, MILITARY POST 1114 SPLIT, Orasac, September 11, 1992, CERTIFICATE.

The Croatian Defence Council Vitez brigade, including the special unit Dzokeri, often received material-technical resources, food, equipment, and other necessities from the Republic of Croatia. For instance, they were receiving uniforms, weapons, boots, equipment, and other from the Karlovac brigade.412

Logistical equipment of the Croatian Army was present in the area of Prozor, Jablanica and other places. 413

The Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia and the Assistant Minister himself, General Ivan Cermak, has ensured provision of the material-technical resources and equipment also to the Croatian Defence Council of Vares, as well as personally gave “all available assistance and advice” continuously to the Municipal Headquarters of the Croatian Defence Council of Vares.414

Material-technical resources were handed over to Zdenko Sislav, member of HVO Bugojno (Personal Identification No.: 3105970191256, ID card number 1278), on the basis of the request from the commander of HVO Bugojno of September 12, 1992, and approval for Zdenko Sislav, “by which he is authorized to transport TMS, on behalf of the Headquarters, No.: 01-325/92, of September 09 , 1992”.


Remy Lendry, besides possessing evidence in the area of Prozor and Jablanica, “has personally seen logistical equipment of the Croatian Army, which was at that time reported by some military representatives of the Croatian Army as a fact that they have had logistical equipment in that area” (Ibid.).

414 AIIZ, inv. No.: 2-1871, Croatian Community Herzeg-Bosnia, Croatian Defence Council, Municipal Headquarters Vares, Vares, on October 02, 1992 – to the Minister of Defence of the Republic of Croatia, to the attention of the Assistant Minister of Defence, Mr. General Ivan Cermak, REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE TO HVO VARES.

The President of HVO Vares, Anto Pejcinovic, has, in his letter dated October 02, 1992, asked General Cermak for the following:

“1) Artillery, ammunition, means of communication (cell phones, VHF radio hand sets);
Military units of the Croatian Army, who participated in the aggression and other forms of crimes in the Republic of Bosnia Herzegovina, were supplied with the material-technical resources and equipment from the Republic of Croatia. That is also how the 55th light battery of the anti-aircraft defence from Sisak (55th LARD PZO), whose units were deployed in the area of Tomislavgrad and Posusje, received all their material-technical resources from Croatia. Major Josip Sikic, commander of Military Post 3033 Sisak, on September 08, and October 03, 1992, issued an order for provision of material-technical resources to serve that battery, ways of transportation and delivery. It was decided that the following resources and quantities are to be transported to Tomislavgrad:

- shells 20 mm 4,000 pieces
- shells 40 mm 410 pieces

2) Clothing and equipment for soldiers;

3) Office premises in Zagreb”.

Pejcinovic has elaborated in details on his “request for assistance to HVO Vares”, in order to enhance “defence with heavy artillery”, which is necessary to them “especially since the winter period is forthcoming bringing potential difficulties in connection with highland-mountain area, and similar. That is why we requested clothing, footwear, and equipment for winter conditions”.

Pejcinovic has also asked General Cermak to provide and cede office premises for HVO Vares of the military residences fond in Zagreb (40 – 60 m2), “since we have at our disposal certain reserves of companies (Coalmines and Steelworks Vares, Spare Part Factory TRD Vares, Facility RO ZRAK Sarajevo in Pajtin Han, etc.)…” The mentioned office premises would be necessary to HVO Vares, because it would enable the company TRD Vares to “establish immediate commercial contacts to meet the needs of HVO Vares, the company itself, namely its employees, thus through exchange again ensure food supplies for citizens”.

HVO Vares has established “very fruitful contacts with company Koncar – Factory of special equipment in Zagreb” (Ibid.).


Branimir Ivanovic, member of HVO Tomislavgrad, authorized (by Marijan Maric, commander of the 1st light battery of the anti-aircraft defence of the Operational Zone Northwest Herzegovina) for acquisition of material-technical resources and equipment in The Republic of Croatia, was also responsible for transportation of the mentioned shells to Tomislavgrad. That is to say, major Sikic, in his order of October 03, 1992,
The Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia and Assistant Minister of defence General Ivan Cermak himself, ensured provision of the material-technical resources and equipment also for the Croatian Defence Council Vares. He was personally giving “all the available assistance and advice” continuously to the Municipal Headquarters of the Croatian Defence Council Vares.416

designated Marijan Maric to take over the mentioned items in Tomislavgrad, of which event he will submit a written report, and ways of transportation. That order stated, as follows:

“........

3. I designate Mr. MARIJAN MARIC, commander of the Tomislav Grad [sic] unit, to take over the items, and report respectively to me, in writing.

4. I order that the items are to be transported by vehicle TAM 190, license plates ZE 853 29, which will be operated by Mr. BESTALJKO ZELJKO, and his co-drivers JUKIC JADRANKO and BRANIMIR IVANOVIC.

5. I order that the driving speed in populated area must not exceed 50 km/h, and out of the populated area 70 km/h. The shipment should be well taken care of, with no damage to occur, and I shall hold Mr. IVANOVIC personally responsible for it.

6. I order that stopping points will be Zadar and Split, on a route Sisak-Karlovac-Josipdol-Senj-Split-Tomislav Grad. Re-fueling should be undertaken in stopping points.

7. Upon arrival to Tomislav Grad, a report on the fulfilled assignment should be drafted, followed by a written report to a commander of the 55th LARD PZO Sisak, Mr. major: Josip Sikic” (AIIZ, inv. No.: 2-1888, The Republic of Croatia, Croatian Army, Military Post 3003, Reference No.: 1812/92, Sisak, October 03, 1992, ORDER).

President of HVO Vares, Anto Pejcinovic, in his letter of October 02, 1992, from General Cermak asked for the following assistance in:

“1) Artillery, ammunition, means of communication (cell phones, VHF radio hand sets);  
2) Clothing and equipment for soldiers;  
3) Office premises in Zagreb”.

Pejcinovic has elaborated in details his “request for assistance to HVO Vares”, in order to enhance “defence with heavy artillery”, which is necessary to them “especially since the winter period is forthcoming bringing potential difficulties in connection with highland-mountain area, and similar. That is why we requested clothing, footwear, and equipment for winter conditions”.
Croatian Defence Council Bugojno was obtaining material-technical resources from the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia. On behalf of the Croatian Defence Council Bugojno (brigade Eugen Kvaternik), that assignment was executed by Josip Jagodin. During period October 8 – 24, 1992, he collected the following commodities in Croatia:

- Under-caps 1,500 pieces
- T-shirts 1,500 pieces
- Warm underwear 1,500 pieces
- rockets 128 mm 50 pieces
- APK barrel 7.62 mm 300 pieces
- bullet 7.62 mm 200,000 pieces
- machine-gun 12.7 mm 1 piece
- ammunition 12.7 mm 4,000 pieces
- rocket RPG-7 50 pieces
- mines 120 mm 500 pieces
- bullet ZIS 76 mm 200 pieces
- bullet 7.62 mm 200,000 pieces
- bullet ZIS 76 mm 100 pieces
- bullet 14.5 mm 50,000 pieces
- raincoats 500 pieces
- jackets “Duplon” 1,000 pieces.

Ante Pejcinovic has also asked General Ivan Cermak to provide and cede office premises for HVO Vares of the military residences fond in Zagreb (40 – 60 m²), “since we have at our disposal certain reserves of companies (Coalmines and Steelworks Vares, Spare Part Factory TRD Vares, Facility RO ZRAK Sarajevo in Pajtin Han, etc.)…” The mentioned office premises would be necessary to HVO Vares, because it would enable the company TRD Vares to “establish immediate commercial contacts to meet the needs of HVO Vares, the company itself, namely its employees, thus through exchange again ensure food supplies for citizens”.

HVO Vares has established “very fruitful contacts with the Koncar company – Factory of special equipment in Zagreb” (Ibid.).

On October 12, 1993, the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia issued an order to the 300th Logistics Base Zagreb (Order to Issue MTS), to issue the following material-technical items to the Logistics Base Grude:

- Bullet 7, 62 mm x 39 600.000 pieces
- Mine 60 mm instantaneous, NATO 200 pieces
- Mine 82 mm for MB 200 pieces
- Mine 120 mm for MB, heavy 200 pieces
- Rocket launcher PRG-7 10 pieces
- Mine for RPG-7 300 pieces
- Launcher for SPG-9 1 piece
- Rocket for SPG-8 50 pieces
- Rocket for 9M22U 50 pieces

In October 1992, HVO Bugojno delivered the following commodities to the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia:

- TKM 71 3.000 pieces
- BRK M-75 2.004 pieces
- AU 20 E 2.266 pieces
- AU 20 A 2.738 pieces
- Trotyl bullet 500 pieces
- Slow burning fuse 2.000 meters
- TNT 700 kilograms
- nitro-penta cords 500 kilograms
- PMA-2 500 pieces
- PMA-3 560 pieces
- TMA-4 300 pieces (Ibid.).

The mentioned commodities were expedited from Bugojno by Ivica Bodrusic. Company “Slavko Rodic” credited HVO for the debit value of those commodities of 301.584 DEM.

During comparison of accounts’ balances between the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia and HVO Bugojno, the Ministry owed to HVO 390.000 DEM. HVO expected the remaining 122 mm grenades, which were supposed to arrive to Bugojno soon. 
- Bullet 86 mm for cannon M39/42, PZO 25 pieces
- Bullet 76 mm for cannon M39/42, instantaneous 25 pieces
- Bullet 76 mm, ZIS, TFG 30 pieces
- Bullet 76 mm, ZIS, subcaliber 35 pieces
- Bullet 105 mm for H M2 150 pieces
- Rocket 128 mm for VBR 100 pieces
- Hand grenade RB M91S 300 pieces
- Launcher 105 mm, COMANDO 4 pieces
- Rocket 105 mm, COMANDO 48 pieces
- Bullet 12, 7 x 99 mm, expanding 10,000 pieces
- Grenade, for grenade launchers, instantaneous 1,000 pieces
- Grenade for grenade launchers, cumulative 100 pieces
- Sniper rifle, 12, 7 x 99 mm 4 pieces
- Mortar 82 mm 10 pieces
- Helmet 500 pieces
- Automatic rifle 7, 62 x 39, AK-47, wooden butt-end 200 pieces

The following day the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia signed an Order (“The Defence of the Republic of Croatia Confidential”), to issue the following material-technical items to the Logistics Base Grude:

- Bullet 12, 7 x 107 mm for DSK, expanding, flammable 30,000 pieces
- Bullet 14.5 x 114 mm 30,000 pieces
- Bullet 5.5 x 45 mm 100,000 pieces

- Bullet 7.62 x 39 mm 400.000 pieces
- Bullet 7.62 x 51 mm 20.000 pieces
- Bullet 9 mm, PARA 10.000 pieces
- Mine for MB-60 mm NATO 200 pieces
- Mine for MB-82 mm 200 pieces
- Mine for RPG-7 100 pieces
- Mine for SPG-9 40 pieces
- Bullet 100 mm for T-55, TFG 200 pieces
- Rocket 128 mm for VBR, M91 80 pieces
- Mine for MB-120 mm, heavy 200 pieces
- Bullet 57 x 442 for PZO cannon S68 TOG 300 pieces
- Mine PP antimagnetic PMA-3 300 pieces.

On October 24, 1992, General Ivan Cermak, Assistant Minister of Defence of the Republic of Croatia, issued an order to the Department of technical/traffic administration of the Ministry of Defence, to issue the following material-technical items to the Croatian Defence Council through the Central rear-echelon base Grude:

- Bullet 7, 62 x 39 200.000 pieces

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419 AIIZ, inv. No.: 2-2983, The Republic of Croatia, Ministry of Defence, Zagreb, Class: 213-01/93-03, Reference No.: 512-08-93-01, October 13, 1993, Order to Issue MTS. That order also contains an instruction to issue the following material-technical items to the Tactic Group – 1 (TG-1):

- Bullet 12, 7 x 107 mm for DSK, expanding, flammable 10.000 pieces
- Bullet 14,5 x 114 mm 10.000 pieces
- Bullet 7,62 x 39 mm 100.000 pieces
- Bullet 9 mm, PARA 5.000 pieces
- Mine for MB-60 mm NATO 100 pieces
- Mine for MB-82 mm 100 pieces
- Mine for RPG-7 50 pieces
- Mine for SPG-9 20 pieces
- Bullet 100 mm for T-55, TFG 100 pieceses

(Ibid.).
Bullet 76 mm ZIS 100 pieces
Bullet 14, 5 mm 50,000 pieces

1st brigade of the Croatian Defence Council Herceg Stjepan from Konjic also obtained material-technical resources from the Republic of Croatia. On October 18, 1992, the commander of that brigade, Zdenko Sagolj authorized Velimir Pavlovic to implement those activities.

Branimir Ivanovic, member of the Croatian Defence Council Tomislavgrad, in accordance with the Recommendation from Marijan Maric, Commander of the 1st light battery of the anti-aircraft defence of the Operational Zone Northwest Herzegovina (Tomislavgrad), of June 21, 1992, regarding the acquisition of the material-technical resources and equipment, has established good cooperation with certain units in the Republic of Croatia. Accordingly, at the beginning of November 1992, the Croatian Defence Council of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia received two rocket-launchers arrows – 2M with four rockets and certain amount of medical material.

General Ivan Cermak bestowed an “exceptional support” to the Croatian Defence Council in terms of delivery of material-technical resources. Consequently, on November 16, 1992, he issued an order to the Republic of Croatia Ministry of Defence Department of technical/traffic administration to issue the following material-technical

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420 AIIZ, inv. No.: 6-123/1, The Republic of Croatia, Ministry of Defence, Zagreb, CLASS: 003-05/92/01/252, Reference No.: 512-07-06/92-01/252, Zagreb, October 24, 1992 – Department of the technical/traffic administration, Order.

“Person responsible to take over the items is Mr. JOSIP JAGODIN, Personal Identification Number 2701960191760”.

421 AIIZ, inv. No.: 2-1872, HVO / Brigade Herceg Stjepan Konjic, No.: 02-220/92, October 18, 1992. Commander Sagolj had asked for a provision of “undisturbed passage for Mr. VELIMIR PAVLOVIC, with vehicle Zastava 640 AD, license plates KNJ-160-48 through the territory of the Republic of Croatia and Herzeg-Bosnia on a route Osijek-Zagreb-Konjic, transporting material-technical resources for the Brigade Herceg Stjepan Konjic.” (Ibid.).

422 AIIZ, inv. No.: 2-2149, The Republic of Croatia, Ministry of Defence, Main Headquarters, Office of the Commander of the OZ Zagreb, 55th LTRD PZO, No.: 3091/92, Sisak, November 04, 1992, COMMAND.
items to the Croatian Defence Council Bugojno, through the Central rear-echelon base Grude:

- Bullet “ZIS” 76 mm 300 pieces
- Bullet 122 D-30 200 pieces
- Rocket RPG 7 50 pieces.

On November 28, 1992, General Ivan Cermak approved “the best” contingent of the material-technical resources so far, as follows:

- Bullet 76 mm “ZIS” 300 pieces
- Bullet 122 mm D-30 150 pieces
- Bullet 5.45 mm 8,800 pieces
- Bullet 7.62 x 39 500,000 pieces
- Mortar 60 mm 10 pieces
- Mortar 82 mm 6 pieces
- Mine 60 mm 500 pieces
- Mine 82 mm 500 pieces
- Mine 120 mm 500 pieces
- BR M-91 (hand grenade) 1,000 pieces
- TTM (Grenade for grenade launchers, instantaneous) 500 pieces
- LRL 107 mm (light rocket launcher) 1 piece
- Rocket 107 mm 100 pieces
- Pistol “Makarov” 200 pieces
- Bullet 9.3 mm 20,000 pieces
- PAM 14.5/2 (anti-aircraft machine-gun) 2 pieces
- Bullet 14.5 mm 30,000 pieces

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- RPG 22 (rocket launcher of Soviet production) 100 pieces.\textsuperscript{424}

At the end of 1992, the brigade \textit{Herceg Stjepan} Konjic of the Croatian Defence Council obtained material-technical resources, spare parts for vehicles and food from the Republic of Croatia. On November 19, 1992, the commander of that brigade Zdenko Sagolj, authorized Zdenko Grbavac, and Ivica Grbavac on December 09, 1992, for the implementation of the aforementioned activities.\textsuperscript{425}

In bigger cities of the Republic of Croatia, so-called Offices of the Croatian Defence Council or homeland clubs have been established, for


Josip Jagodin, “person responsible to take over the items”, has escorted the aforementioned goods to Split, along with the escort of the military police from Zagreb, “\textit{where we were supposed to be met by our military police who were informed on time}”. Trucks remained within the facilities of \textit{Spedicija} Split, where the transfer of load took place, for easier transportation. There were not enough trucks in Zagreb, so Jagodin has asked “\textit{Beovic from MORH [The Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia, note by the author] to approve of one truck, which he did}”.

General Ivan Cermak promised Josip Jagodin to receive in a couple of days an order for the 130 mm cannon, that needed to be taken over in Sibenik, and 1.000 grenades for it, “\textit{which would be taken over from the MORH warehouse}”.

Jagodin has promised the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia to try to “deliver fuses AU 18 or appropriate, and nitro-penta cords they urgently needed from the company \textit{Slavko Rodic}”. (Ibid.).

\textsuperscript{425} AIIZ, inv. No.: 2/1876, Croatian Community Herzeg-Bosnia, Croatian Defence Council, Brigade \textit{Herceg Stjepan}, Konjic, number 02-01-222/92, November 19, 1992, AUTHORIZATION; AIIZ, inv. No.: 2-1875, Croatian Community Herzeg-Bosnia, Croatian Defence Council, Brigade \textit{Herceg Stjepan} Konjic, number 01/45/92, December 1992, AUTHORIZATION.

Zdenko Grbavac from Konjic was authorized to “request humanitarian assistance (food, clothes, etc.) from the private company “Aeroba” Zagreb, for the Brigade \textit{Herceg Stjepan} Konjic 1st regiment – Klis”, and Ivan Grbavac, “as the authorized person from the 1st regiment - Klis on the territory of the Croatian Community Herzeg-Bosnia and the Republic of Croatia acquires food and spare parts for vehicles for the 1st regiment – Klis” (Ibid.).
the purpose of more organized acquisition of the material-technical resources, equipment, etc., whose authorized representatives directly communicated with relevant military and political authorities of the Republic of Croatia regarding provision of armaments, ammunition, equipment and other resources, as well as with emigrants in the United States, Canada and Australia, and Diaspora from Europe from whom they received money, and other. The Croatian Defence Council Bugojno, for instance, had its offices in Zagreb and Split and the Croatian Defence Council Konjic had its office in Zagreb, etc.

Certain offices of the Croatian Defence Council in the Republic of Croatia, besides the acquisition of the material-technical resources, equipment, food, spare parts, etc. also worked on bringing soldier and officers, as well as complete units from the Republic of Croatia to the Republic of Bosnia Herzegovina, more precisely to the territory of collaborationist Croatian Community Herzeg-Bosnia. In that respect, the Office of the Croatian Defence Council Konjic in Zagreb, at the end of March 1993, achieved an agreement regarding the arrival of two units from the Republic of Croatia to the territory of the Croatian Community Herzeg-Bosnia:

- unit Legija, under the command of Zvonko Lukic, and
- unit Uskoci.  

A major part of the tank arsenal from the Republic of Croatia has been transferred to Bosnia and Herzegovina. In and against the Republic of Bosnia Herzegovina, according to estimations of general Martin Speligj

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426 AIIZ, 2-1863, The Croatian Community Herzeg-Bosnia, Croatian Defence Council, Bugojno, Office of HVO in Split, - to the Presidency of HVO Bugojno; AIIZ, 2-1812, Croatian Community Herzeg-Bosnia, Croatian Defence Council, Main Headquarters of HVO, reference No.: 01-540/93 and 01-541/93, Mostar, March 27, 1993 – HVO Konjic Office in Zagreb, AGREEMENT.

427 AIIZ, inv. No.; 2-1812 and 2-1813, Croatian Community Herzeg-Bosnia, Croatian Defence Council, Main Headquarters of HVO, reference No.: 01-540/93 and 01-541/93, Mostar, March 27, 1993 / to the Office of HVO Konjic, Avenija Vukovar 22 B, Zagreb, AGREEMENT, general Milivoj Petkovic, on March 27, 1993, on behalf of the HVO Main Headquarters (as the commander-in-chief), gave “an agreement” as to the arrival of units from the Republic of Croatia to the Croatian Community Herzeg-Bosnia.
“there were 50-70 tanks of the Croatian Army, who, at that time, had a total of 245 tanks and about 200 pieces of heavy technical-rocket weaponry”. “All that martial material” has been, claims Spegelj, “more or less…. fired on the east part of Mostar”.

The Croatian Defence Council Bugojno also received medicines, medical supplies and canned food from the Republic of Croatia. On December 16, 1992, The Faculty of Medicine (Institute for Physiology and Immunology) of Rijeka sent a considerable quantity of medicines, medical supplies and canned food to the Croatian Defence Council Bugojno, as follows:

- 5 x acetyl digoxyn tablets
- 3 x marcumar tablets
- 7 x propranolol amp. 1 mg
- 4 x zentropil tablets
- 2 x lidocain
- 3 x homatropin
- 2 x isogutt
- 20 x gevisol bund (10 l package)
- 4 x polyvidol – iodine complex
- 4 x depot-penicillin 4 mega
- 20 x nexion powder 2%
- 2 x betasodona flussigseife
- 10 x atropinum sulfuricum amp
- 30 x zweidrittelektrolytlosung mit kohlenhydraten 500 ml
- 1 x dibromol tinktur gefaerbt
- 3 x cloran phenicol box of 100 pills
- 10 x ampicilin tablets 500 mg
- 5 x distramevrin
- 2 x disinfection liquid sagrotan 15 bottles of 1 kg

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428 RAT..., p. 135; S. Omeragic, the aforementioned work, p. 155.
- 10 x spinach
- 12 x carrot
- 13 x tomatoes
- 16 x raspberries.429

In Central Bosnia, the Croatian Community (Republic) Herzeg-Bosnia, performed all the supplying – overall logistics “through the Serb territories by exchanging fuel for weapons and joint planning of some actions where Serbs” were not providing men-power.430

The Croatian Defence Council Travnik, aiming at the provision of material-technical resources, “and because of the deteriorated political-security situation in the Municipality Travnik, as well as throughout the region” on the 56 session, held on April 10, 1993, reached the decision regarding the departure of the Croatian Defence Council delegation to meet Gojko Susak, the Minister of Defence of the Republic of Croatia.431

429 AIIZ, inv. No.: 2-1909, Faculty of Medicine, Institute for Physiology and Immunology, Rijeka, December 16, 1992 – HVO Bugojno, Bugojno.

The Faculty of Medicine has received the aforementioned goods form the German Red Cross (Dr Ritter) and various donors from Italy. The goods were taken, for further delivery, by Ljupko Lozancic, and Franjo Breljak, with van type Renault, license plates number HVO-375-M. The signatories to the letter are two teachers form the Faculty of Medicine (professor Dr. Stipan Jonjic and professor Dr. Miljenko Doric).

430 AIIZ, inv. No.: 2-2475, Shorthand records from the meeting of Franjo Tudjman with Jadranko Prlic, Mato Boban, Slobodan Praljak and Milivoje Petkovic, in the villa Dalmacija in Split, on November 05, 1993, Dani, October 25, 2002, p. 26. In that area, most probably around Vares, the Croatian Defence Council had “to retrieve the territories Serbs lost to Muslims” (Ibid.).

Jadranko Prlic, as a President of the collaborationist Government of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, on November 06, 1993, stayed in Velika Kladusa, where he spoke to “two sides”. Pointing at such activities, at the aforementioned meeting in Split, he highlighted that the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia with Serbs must “play the game because of these enclaves, for it is the only way to keep them alive and also to provide them with military force to protect themselves from Muslims.” (Ibid.).

431 AIIZ, inv. No.: 2-1897, HVO Travnik Municipality, No.: HVO-01-56/93, April 10, 1993, Abridged Minutes. That delegation, “with previous announcement with Mr. Bruno Stojic, representative of the Defence Department of HZ H-B in Mostar”,

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On the 57 special session of the Croatian Defence Council Travnik, which was held two days later, (on April 12), among other, Anto Valenta, co-President of the Croatian Defence Council of the Croatian Community Herzeg-Bosnia, and Pero Krizanac, co-President of the Croatian Defence Council of the Municipality of Travnik, were entrusted to speak to Tihomir Blaskic, commander of the Operational Zone Centra Bosnia, “with regard to announcement and visit to Mr. Gojko Susak, Minister of Defence of the Republic of Croatia, and Mr. Bruno Stojic, Head of the Defence Department of HZHB”.432

Large quantities of fuel were transported from the Republic of Croatia for the Croatian Defence Council, mostly from the former JNA warehouses from hills around Ploce, which are the property of the Croatian Army.433

The military and civil authorities of the Croatian Community (Republic) of Herzeg-Bosnia, dislocated the property of certain companies from the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Republic of Croatia, consisted of: Filip Filipovic, commander of the HVO Brigade Travnik, Tihomir Blaskic, commander of the Operational Zone Central Bosnia, Pero Krizanac, co-President of HVO Travnik, and Anto Valenta, co-President of HVO Croatian Community Herzeg-Bosnia. HVO of the municipality reached the aforementioned decision unanimously, after the explanation given by Pero Krizanac and the discussion by the majority of the participants.

That session of the HVO Travnik was attended by: “members of the Government: Pero Krizanac, co-President of HVO, Anto Spajic, Head of the Department for telecommunications and links, Davor Kolenda, Head of the General Operations Department, Drago Bilandzija, Head of the Economic Department, Josip Nevjestic, Head of the Finance Department, Ivo Fisic, Head of the Logistics Department, Branislav Kulis, Head of the Healthcare and Social Welfare Department, Vinko Pilisic, Head of the Department for refugees and diaspora, Vlado Martinovic, Head of the Constitutional Protection Department, Tomislav Rajic, Head of the Defence Department, Jozo Nevjestic, Head of the Treasury Department, Ivan Rajakovic, Head of the Department of Education, Culture and Sport.

Besides the members of the Government, the session was attended by Mr. Ante Valenta, co-President of the HVO HZ HB, Mr. Ivo Rezo, commander of the PU Travnik, Filip Filipovic, commander of HVO Travnik Brigade, Stipo Krizanac, co-commander of PS Travnik, Nikola Pjanić and Davor Sopf, representatives of the PRESS of HVO Travnik, Mr. Ivica Pavlic, President of OO HDZ.”

432 AIIZ, inv. No.: 2-1898, HVO of Municipality of Travnik, CONCLUSIONS of the 57 special session of HVO of Travnik Municipality, which was held on April 04, 1993.

433 Bosna, issue 1, February 11, 1994, p. 23.
and were compensated with material-technical resources and equipment. Thus, the Croatian Defence Council Bugojno exported numerous products from Slavko Rodic, where the military equipment industry was well developed (all documentation, numerous tools, fuses, armored panels, and other materials), to the Republic of Croatia, from where they received money or material-technical resources. Company *Universal* in Zagreb, on March 1993, owed S. Rodic about 150.000 DEM for the delivered machinery.

In December, 1992, *S. Rodic* delivered 4 pieces of armored panels to the *Koncar SUS* company in Zagreb.

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435 AIIZ, inv. No.: 6-402, Bodrusic Ivica, The Head, Sub-office of the military equipment industry, Bugojno, April 07, 1993 - to the President of HVO Bugojno and the Head of the Economic Department, Report of the business trip to Zagreb, from March 30 to April 04, 1993.

436 Ibid. Ivica Bodrusic, on March 30, 1993, visited the company Koncar SUS Zagreb, where he spoke to the Director, Dr. Blago Brkic. It was agreed that the armored panels be paid “in accordance with the international prices, but in their products, in which the Artillery of HVO Bugojno showed interest”, for which the agreement of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia was needed to be obtained. In discussion with the Assistant Head of the Production Department of the Ministry of Defence, on the same day, Mirjana Gambiroza, who informed him that a government agency named *Alan* was established within the Ministry, through which the complete transfer of the production materials and final products of the military equipment industry takes place, managed by Zagorac. In the meantime, *Koncar- SUS*, submitted a written request for agreement on compensation, to which Zagorac agreed, but for a smaller quantity of observation apparatus then agreed upon. In repeated discussions in Koncar SUS, on April 02, 1993, he insisted on the following observation apparatus:

- sighting *Panorama*, with collimators 2 pieces
- sighting apparatus UANU-2, with complementary set 1 piece
- sighting apparatus UANU-1 with complementary set 8 pieces.

For the realization of the aforementioned task, Josip Pocrnja received a written authorization.

Total amount that needed to be paid for the armored panels is 40.000 DEM “of which 10.000 was paid to the non-resident account of Rodic in HRD, and the rest is the subject of the compensatory deal” (Ibid.).
The Croatian Defence Council Bugojno, according to their Report, from April 1993, to the Republic of Croatia “helped in various ways with 3.500.000 DM, products TBM 2.000.000 DM. Leather for shoes worth about 3.000.000 DM. Delivery with luxurious vehicles – 126 pieces (worth 1.500.000 DM). Military equipment worth about 2.000.000 DM, everything was given without requiring and receiving some special counter value.”

The Croatian Defence Council Bugojno has been authorized Drago Bagaric, from Bugojno, to certify all the documents – bills of lading related to the transfer of goods from Bugojno to Croatia and from Croatia to Bugojno with designated seal and signature. Ante Krajinovic, from Bugojno, with designated seal and signature, was authorized for the travel of civilians.

A member of the Croatian Defence Council, Ivica Zulj from Bugojno, was authorized (by the Croatian Defence Council Bugojno) “to carry out the transportation of the material-technical resources from Bugojno to Zagreb”.

The Croatian Defence Council Bugojno, on March 31, 1992, transported to the Republic of Croatia certain goods stolen from Bugojno – i.e. “booty of HVO Bugojno” (drawers for cash registers, “pedestals for cash registers”), with the ‘objective to possibly exchange it for

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437 AIIZ, inv. No.: 6-109, Report HVO Bugojno.

438 AIIZ, inv. No.: 6-378, Croatian Community Herzeg-Bosnia, Croatian Defence Council Bugojno, No.: 02-128, Bugojno, June 16, 1992, AUTHORIZATION. The seal was round, with “sahovnica” emblem in the middle, and the following inscription: “CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL BUGOJNO”. To the right of the seal, was the personal signature of Drago Bagaric.

439 Ibid. The seal was round, with “sahovnica” emblem in the middle and inscription: “CROATIAN COMMUNITY HERZEG-BOSNIA, CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL MUNICIPALITY BUGOJNO”. To the right of the seal, was the personal signature of Anto Krajinovic.

440 AIIZ, inv. No.: 6-377, Croatian Community Herzeg-Bosnia, Croatian Defence Council Bugojno, Bugojno, AUTHORIZATION.

The President of HVO Bugojno requested “the formations of HVO and HV to assist [Zulj Ivica – remark by the author] in transportation of the aforementioned resources”.

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armaments or military equipment needed by the Municipal Headquarters of HVO Bugojno”.

At the end of May, and beginning of June 1992, the Croatian Defence Council Bugojno, dislocated certain quantities of leather, of the Semikron and Komerc Krupon types, “which was considered the property of HVO Bugojno”, “from the territory of Bugojno municipality to the territory of the Republic of Croatia, for security reasons”. Those goods were transported out of Bosnia and Herzegovina for sale.

On September 10, 1992, Branimir Ivanovic, member of the Croatian Defence Council Tomislavgrad, submitted the following material to the Military Post 3116 Split – Divulje:

- Aircraft plugs 1 parcel
- Ulmer mask 1 piece
- tire, external 500 x 150 4 pieces
- tire, external 50 x 180 2 pieces
- tire, external 615 x 225 2 pieces
- tire, external 5.005 2 pieces
- tire, external 6.006 4 pieces

Drawers for cash registers, “war prize of HVO Bugojno” were sent by “officer VINKO ZULJEVIC to the Republic of Croatia, for dislocation or exchange for uniforms that are necessary in Bugojno”. That is why the deputy commander of the Municipal Headquarters of HVO Bugojno, on May 31, 1992, issued a certificate to Vinko Zuljevic, asking “all formations of HVO and HV to assist, and create no problems during transportation”. (Ibid.).

Mladen Pavlovic, on behalf of the Economic Department of HVO Bugojno, on June 04, 1993, issued an authorization to Stipo Vujevic, to, for HVO Bugojno, offer the leather “for sale under conditions of the current market of such goods”. The particular realization of the sale was supposed to be effected through the Office of HVO Bugojno, “with presentation of all the needed documentation about the fulfilled task” (Ibid.).
- tire, external 6.50 x 5 1/2 1 piece
- anti G suit 1 piece

On September 24, 1992, Branimir Ivanovic and Goran Batalija, delivered the following items to the Mixed aviation squadron in Split –Divulje:

1. **for helicopters:**
- Generator brushes 1 package
- Induction pointer ID-2M 1 piece
- Feet indicator USV- K 1 piece (instrument)
- Rotation gauge N.R. 1 piece
- Indicator PDK-3 1 piece
- Pressure indicator SD-29 A 1 piece

2. **for other aircrafts**
- Air- horizon PDK-49 1 piece

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Colonel Mladen Katavic, commander of the Military Post 3116 Split unit – Divulje, on September 10, 1992, issued a CERTIFICATE, confirming that the mentioned unit has received the aforementioned material from Branimir Ivanovic.

That material was intended for the Croatian Air Force. In that regard, Colonel Katavic, on September 10, 1992, made the list of material “they would exchange in counter goods:

Tires – external of the following sizes and dimensions:
- tire 800 x 200 40 pieces
- tire 500 x 180 20 pieces
- tire 865 x 280 A 10 pieces
- tire 595 x 185 10 pieces
- tire 800x 260 20 pieces
- tire 470 x 210 10 pieces
- tire 6.00-6 20 pieces
- tire 5.00-5 10 pieces.

Various spare parts (samples) for aircrafts and helicopters are needed.

All parts of the flight equipment for pilots and aircraft mechanic are needed (Ibid.).
- plugs REM 40 E 6 packages x 12 for Lycoming
- plugs REM 38 P 6 packages x 12 for Lycoming

3. Other equipment
- Pilot oxygen mask 3 pieces
- Underpants anti-G 3 pieces
- paper shock-absorbers 2 pieces.444

Branimir Ivanovic had received certain material-technical resources and equipment for the aforementioned resources that were delivered to the units of the Republic of Croatia, in compensation for the delivered items and spare parts.445

The Military police of the Croatian Defence Council HZ (R) H-B has also received the material-technical resources mainly from the Republic of Croatia. Overall assistance and support was specially provided by general Mate Lausic and Colonel Zdravko Galic.446


On September 24 1992, Colonel Mladen Katavic, commander of the Military Post 3116 Split, Divulje, issued “on the basis of the received material, a CERTIFICATE, confirming that they have received the aforementioned resources from Goran Batalija and Branimir Ivanovic”.

445 AIIZ, inv. No.: 2-2191, The republic of Croatia, Ministry of Defence HRZ and PZO, Military Post 3116 Divulje, Divulje, December 20, 1992, CERTIFICATE.

Military Post 3116 Split – Divulje, in the second half of December 1992, issued, among other items, three sets of uniforms to Branimir Ivanovic, which was confirmed by the Colonel Mladen Katavic, commander of that unit, issuing the CERTIFICATE for it, on December 20, 1992.


Zeljko Dzidic, Commander of the Mostar military police, knew the aforementioned high-ranking officers of the Croatian Army. Colonel Galic, commander of the 72 battalion of the military police, delivered a lot of material-technical resources to Dzidic and others.
During the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia also used the **aviation** as the logistical back up to their forces. On December 01, 1993 form the airport Rumboci near Prozor, two flights took place, on which occasion, in the area around Visoko, four parachutes carrying material-technical resources were thrown out. On December 04, 1992, Mi-8 helicopters carried out a flight on the route Pidris-Vranica-Lasva valley. Mi-8 have, on December 16 (form Prozor airport), on the route Kute-Here-Scipe transported material-technical resources. Three days later (on December 19), on three occasions, Mi-8 have transported and thrown out material-technical resources (from Prozor airport) on the route Prozor – Gornji Vakuf. 447

**Helicopters of** the Croatian Army, on January 6, 11, and 13, 1994, carried out several flights in the area of Hum, OG Lasva, area OG Brajna and area Stoga OG Bosna, bringing material-technical resources.448

Helicopters (MI-8) of the Croatian Army with crews and technical equipment, including the technical maintenance, were used in accordance with the direct order from the Minister of Defence (Gojko Susak), in the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.449

Logistical support to functioning of the organization of the Intelligence Administration of the Croatian Defence Council Main Headquarters was provided by commands, units and institutions of the Croatian Army.450

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447 Bosna, issue 1, February 11, 1994, pp. 15, and 23.
448 Ibid.
449 AIIZ, inv. No.: 2-2998, the Republic of Croatia Ministry of Defence, Main Headquarters of HV, Special forces, Zagreb, September 15, 1993 / attn. major Mr. Mario Sunjic, ORDER. On September 15, 1993, Major-general Ante Roso (commander of the Special forces of the Main Headquarters of the Croatian Army, issued the following COMMAND to the major Mario Sunjic (“STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL”):

“1 - Major Mario Sunjic with all crews and technical equipment (MI-8) works together and unquestioningly with Mr. Colonel Katavic, until the new order arrives.

2- All the material from the Sinj airport (helicopters) is to be located in the Grude region. The technical maintenance and your multi-coordination remain joined.

3 - This command enters into force IMMEDIATELY!” (Ibid.).

450 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-3010, the Republic of Croatia, Ministry of defence, Main Headquarters of HV, Class: 8/93-01/02, reference number 512-06-06/2-93-75, Zagreb, December 07, 1993, COMMAND.
Certain experts ("the best experts") from Bugojno, as well, crossed over to the Republic of Croatia (Zagreb, Split, Slavonski Brod, etc.) supporting the development of the military industry in Croatia, such as, among others: Milan Prpic, Head of the technical unit of the Main Headquarters of the Croatian Army, Vladimir Grlica, Ship-construction Advisor at the Main Headquarters of the Croatian Army, then Ivan Bakovic, Pero Pejak and others.\footnote{AIIZ, inv. No.: 6-109, Municipal Headquarters HVO Bugojno, Report HVO Bugojno.}

The Republic of Croatia addressed certain institutions of the Croatian Community Herzeg-Bosnia, requesting approval to engage certain experts for the military purposes. Therefore, on March 29, 1993, Colonel Igor Fistonic, MS, Head of the Administration for Strategic Research of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia, addressed Pavo Dragun, Bugojno Head of the Defence, asking to engage Stipica Markovic as the external project associate, on the fire management systems project (SUV) for artillery.\footnote{AIIZ, inv. No.: 2-1905, the Republic of Croatia, Ministry of defence, Main Headquarters of HV, Administration of the Strategic research, Class: 644-01/93-02-01, reference No.: 512-06-16-93-35, Zagreb, March 29, 1993 — to the city of Bugojno defence commander, attn. Pavo Dragun.}

The cooperation between the Administration for Production of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia and companies from the Croatian Community Herzeg-Bosnia existed in the field of the military equipment production.\footnote{AIIZ, inv. No.: 2-1868, the Republic of Croatia, Ministry of Defence Zagreb, Administration for Production, Class: 035-01/92/01/3828, reference No.: 512-07-06/92-01/01, Zagreb, NOTE….}

\footnote{Stipica Markovic was specialized for the work on the project, since he finished Military-technical School, specialization in SUV. According to Fistonic, Head of the Department, he was foreseen “as an external associate to the artillery SUV team”\footnote{AIIZ, inv. No.: 2-1868, the Republic of Croatia, Ministry of Defence Zagreb, Administration for Production, Class: 035-01/92/01/3828, reference No.: 512-07-06/92-01/01, Zagreb, NOTE….}. Therefore, he asked to enable him “get involved in this very important project which should be finished in the foreseeable future, and its application would affect the increase of efficiency of the artillery formations, with the same, or lower consumption of ammunition and engagement of less number of people.”

Colonel Fistonic was sure “that you would meet our request regarding the engagement of Mr. Markovic, which will be the common gain, since it will help us reach our joint wishful results”\footnote{AIIZ, inv. No.: 2-1868, the Republic of Croatia, Ministry of Defence Zagreb, Administration for Production, Class: 035-01/92/01/3828, reference No.: 512-07-06/92-01/01, Zagreb, NOTE….}(Ibid.).
The Croatian Community Herzeg-Bosnia also leaned on the PTK system of the Republic of Croatia, whose staff managed and coordinated

At the meeting held on August 28, 1992, in the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia premises, between the representatives of the company NIB Bugojno and representatives of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia, some particular aspects of cooperation in the field of military equipment production were agreed upon:

“ 1. To provide the company NIB Bugojno with warehousing space in SPC – Precko, for warehousing of TK 130 fuse elements (UT M68-P1), which are needed by fuse producers for HV.

2. MORH expressed interest in urgent production of fuses TK-130 (or some other) which would be produced in Bugojno for the MORH. In that regard, representatives of the company NIB will submit their bid for the production of mine fuses TK-130, AU-29, PBD, AU-52, AU-18, P1 etc., by types and quantities they are able to produce.

3. MORH also expressed interest in the production of anti-infantry and anti-tank mines (MRUD, PROM-KD, TMRP-6 etc.), and the company NIB Bugojno is invited to submit their production bid to the MORH for that also.

4. Company NIB Bugojno expressed interest in production of mortar shells of 120, 82 and 60 mm, and consequently, the company representatives received construction design documentation for production of the mentioned shells.

Company NIB Bugojno remains under the obligation to hand over the technical-construction design documents, which are their property, to MORH, in case of need.

With regard to the production of mortar shells, MORH will provide technical assistance as well as ensure certain components (casings, stabilizers etc.) in exchange for scarce components needed by MORH (plastic explosives, TNT, etc.).

The agreement was signed by engineers Dr. Nikola Gambiroza, and Dr. Milan Prpic, on behalf of the Administration for Production of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia, and engineers Pero Pejak and Ivan Bodrusic, on behalf of the company NIB Bugojno.

The Head of the Administration for Production of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia, Dr. Nikola Gambiroza, on May 06, 1992, sent a Recommendation to BNT – Factory for machinery and hydraulics in Novi Travnik (attn. Mr. Marko Pranjkovic)” for dislocation of final products and vital elements for special machines”. He has also, “having in mind the overall security situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina” recommended that “the aforementioned goods and final products are to be urgently dislocated to the Republic of Croatia. In accordance with that, we are ready to provide you with free warehousing space, which satisfies demanding requirements. After the normalization of the overall situation we are ready to resolve the issue of the dislocated equipment, whether to return it, or keep it, to our mutual satisfaction” (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2144 / The Republic of Croatia, Ministry of defence Zagreb, Administration for Production, Zagreb, May 06, 1992 – BNT – Factory for machinery and hydraulics, attn. Mr. Marko Pranjkovic, Novi Travnik).
all the activities in that area.\textsuperscript{454} The same situation was also present in
the field of links and information,\textsuperscript{455} as well as between the Chamber of
Commerce of the Republic of Croatia and the Chamber of Commerce of
the Croatian Community Herzeg-Bosnia. During their mutual contacts,
they also talked about \textit{“the issues regarding the textile and the leather
industry in HZ H-B and Croatia”}. There was \textit{“mutual interest in
joint activities, especially since the textile and leather are the fields
where both Croatia and HZ H-B have significant built capacities,
and they are mutually complementary”}.\textsuperscript{456}

\textsuperscript{454} AIIZ, inv. No.: 2-1903, The Croatian Community Herzeg Bosnia, Croatian Defence
Council, Minutes of the meeting between the representatives of the H-B Post office, which
was held in Grude on October 09, and 10, 1992. That meeting \textit{“at which the current issues
connected to PT communications in the Herzeg-Bosnia region were discussed”} was
also attended by Anto Beljo, Deputy Minister of Information of the Republic of Croatia

Mladen Zulj, Manager of the Herzeg-Bosnia Post PT, informed the present participants
(Zeljko Vrankovic, Manager of RTV Herzeg-Bosnia, Ante Raguz, PT Kiseljak, Rudo
Vidovic, PT Vitez, Jerko Medvidovic, PT G Vakuf, Pero Turalija PT Bugojno, and Ivica
Smoljo, UNIS- telecommunications) that \textit{“one part of HB is already in function,
while there are some technical reasons why the other part is not (previous links
transited through Banja Luka, Sarajevo and Zenica). In addition, he informed the
present participants that three links with Kiseljak would also be realized. The
collection of equipment for the bigger system Plein Vrh-Cvrsnice is in process”}.

At the meeting, the following conclusions were made:

\textit{a) UNIS – telecommunications Mostar is obligated to design the project for
the uncovered part of H-B;}

\textit{b) Pero Turalija, Ante Raguz, Rudo Vidovic and Jerko Medvidovic will
review the existing condition of the equipment in the uncovered part of H-B.}

\textit{c) Mr. Vrankovic will collect the prices of the equipment for systems in
Zagreb (mini link 2 MB, 8 MB, 34 MB, 140 MB);}

\textit{d) Mr. M. Zulj will coordinate all the aforementioned activities, and possibly
find the passive spot-light 36m2 for Bugojno”}.

The next meeting was scheduled for October 17, where \textit{“all the aforementioned
participants will be present”} (Ibid.)

\textsuperscript{455} AIIZ, inv. No.: 2-1904, The Croatian Defence Council, Communication Center
of HVO Vitez, August 08, 1992. Experts from the Republic of Croatia were in the area
of Central Bosnia, making inquiries about the TV transmitters.

\textsuperscript{456} AIIZ, inv. No.2-1910, The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, HZ Herzeg-
Bosnia, Chamber of Commerce Mostar, No.: 01-34/93, Mostar, March 16, 1993 / to the
department of Commerce Bugojno.
“State” authorities of the Croatian Community Herzeg-Bosnia have also “cooperated” with the “State” authorities of the Republic of Croatia in mobilization of soldiers for the military formations of the Croatian Defence Council (and the Croatian Army). Municipal HVOs of the Croatian Community Herzeg-Bosnia have “because of the warfare situation”, and “the need of soldiers”, at the session held in Gornji Vakuf on October 16, 1992, reached the Decision to forbid the enrolment to all male students who are older than 18 to the Universities in the Republic of Croatia, as well as further studies for those students who have previously enrolled, but do not have complete documentation from the Croatian Defence Council.457

The Republic of Croatia also ensured the provision of financial resources to the Croatian Democratic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Consequently, the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Croatia secluded

Stating that textile (cotton, wool) make “the major export lot in Croatia (of the total Croatian export, textile makes 12,4%)”, the President of the Chamber of Commerce of the Croatian Community Herzeg-Bosnia, Jago Lasic, has, in his letter sent to companies in the Croatian Community Herzeg Bosnia, on March 16, 1993, and with regard to the organization of the meeting involving textile and leather industry in the Croatian Community Herzeg-Bosnia, considered “that the capacities of the HZ H-B have the most realistic chance in reaching the international market also through the production of textile producers from Croatia”. In that respect, he mentioned that textile made 31,5% of the total export of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and suggested for a meeting with participation of textile and leather producers from HZ H-B to be organized in company Frotea Citluk on March 23, 1993. Subsequently, he invited all companies from HZ H-B, including the department of Commerce from Bugojno to take part in that meeting. After the meeting, “another meeting would be organized on the level of chambers of commerce, of the groups of textile and leather producers of HZ H-B and Croatia, which would facilitate further bilateral deals between the directly interested partners” (Ibid.)

457 AIIZ, inv. No.: 2-1911, the Croatian Community Herzeg Bosnia, Croatian Defence Council Bugojno, No.: 02-127-1388/92, Bugojno, October 16, 1992 – to the Republic of Croatia through the Ministry of Interior of the Croatian Community Herzeg-Bosnia Mostar, REQUEST.

On the very same day, the Croatian Defence Council Bugojno, on the basis of that decision, sent a Request to the republic of Croatia to forbid “the enrolment to all male students who are older than 18 years who have the complete documentation about the approval for studying, issued by HVO Bugojno”, and forbid “further studies to previously registered enrolled male students who do not have complete documentation about the approval for continuation of studies, issued by HVO Bugojno”. That request referred to “men of the Croatian nationality who are residents of the Municipality Bugojno”.

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an amount of 540.000 DM to a special bank account in Vienna for the Municipal Board of HDZ Bugojno. At the beginning of March 1992, the Municipal Board of HDZ Bugojno gave an agreement to use those funds for “the agreed delivery of equipment needed for the defence of Bugojno”. On July 03, 1992, the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Croatia also delivered 10.000 DM to HDZ Bugojno.

The education and training, especially of the command staff, represented special aspects of the direct assistance and support of the Republic of Croatia to the formations of the Croatian Defence Council. Consequently, the soldiers, non-commissioned officers, and officers of the Croatian Defence Council were educated and trained at the Croatian Military Academy “Petar Zrinski” and other centres for education and specialist trainings of members of the Croatian Army, as well as the Centre for Education of the Special Forces and other institutions in the Republic of Croatia (Zagreb, Split, Ploce, and other places).

On May 04, 1992, in accordance with the letter from Main Headquarters of the Croatian Army, Class 813-01/92-01/02, reference number: 5120-04/1-92-4, dated April 28, 1992, and with the verbal

\[\text{footnote}{458} \text{AIIZ, inv. No.: 2-1899, Croatian Democratic Community, Municipal Board Bugojno, Bugojno, March 03, 1992 – to the Regional Crisis Headquarters Grude.}

The Municipal Board of HDZ Bugojno put those funds at the disposal of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia to compensate for the expenditures “regarding the agreed delivery of the equipment needed for the defence of Bugojno”.

\[\text{footnote}{459} \text{AIIZ, inv. No.: 2-1906, the Republic of Croatia, Ministry of Finance, Zagreb, June 03 1992, CERTIFICATE.}

The aforementioned funds were taken over by the priest Stipe Dzalto (born in 1931) from Bugojno, in the Ministry of Finance (the funds were handed over personally by the Minister of Finance, Jozo Martinovic, MA). The reverend Dzalto handed the funds over to Mirko Lozancic, on June 05, 1992.

command of the Commander of the South front, of April 29, 1992, General Bobetko issued an order for training of operators of the PO system Fagot. In that respect, the Headquarters of the Croatian Defence Council of the Croatian Community Herzeg-Bosnia was obliged to, within the two-day deadline, prepare and submit the list of 60 people from their units, future operators.461

Colonel Tihomir Blaskic, at the end of July 1992, issued an order for the education of a certain number of members of the Croatian Defence Council from Central Bosnia, on reconnaissance skills during a ten-day training in Croatia “for the purpose of executing specified-purpose assignments”. “On the basis of the recognized needs for establishing reconnaissance formations and their training”, on July 24, 1992, he issued an order to “determine a certain number of individuals, from each of the Operational Zones, namely municipal headquarters that are undergoing combat activities” “who will be trained in reconnaissance in the Republic of Croatia for the purpose of executing specified-purpose assignments”. With regard to that, each of the municipal headquarters of the Croatian Defence Council of Gornji Vakuf, Bugojno, Konjic, Jajce, Novi Travnik, Travnik, Zepce, Zavidovici and Maglaj were to assign one unit, by 7 soldiers each (“7 soldiers per unit”).462

461 AIIZ, inv. No.: 2-1695, the Republic of Croatia, Office of the Commander of the South Front, Office of the Commander of the OZ Split, IZM Ploce, Class: 8/92-01/64, reference No.: 6030-01/92-1, Ploce, May 04, 1992 – The Headquarters of HVO Herzeg-Bosnia, Command. Priority was given to individuals “who might have been trained by the former JNA to operate the same equipment”. If there were no such individuals, “the priority should be given to those who operated “Maljutka” rockets and individuals who possess certain technical skills for the purpose of rapid training.”

462 AIIZ, inv. No.: 2-1717, the Croatian Community Herzeg-Bosnia, Office of the Commander of the OS Central Bosnia, No.: 174/92, July 24, 1992.

The list of trainees was supposed to be sent by radio-package link or by courier before July 27, 1992 (by 14.00 hours). Staff selected for training was obliged to report to Grude on July 30, 1992 (by 14.00 hours). Trainees were to be sent to Grude “to the specified place and time, fully equipped with uniform and personal arms.

At the end of the document someone wrote a list of 7 names, who were obliged to report to GS HVO by July 30, 1992 at 7.00 hours, as follows: Drazen (son of Mladen) Pekic, born on December 16, 1971, textile technician; Dario (son of Jozo) Pekic, born on July 28, 1971; Goran (son of Slavko) Niksic, born on 1972; Ilija (son of Jozo) Azinovic, born on 1964; Renato (son of Pero) Marie, born on 1973, Klis; Marko (son of Jozo) Majic, born on 1970, Klis; and Ante (son of Pero) Tulo, born on 1962, Klis.
The training of intelligence officers of the Croatian Defence Council took place in the Republic of Croatia (“seminars for intelligence officers”). Thus, for instance, in the Operational Zone Split, during period September 10-16, 1992, a seminar for the Croatian Defence Council intelligence officers took place.463

Courses for corporals took place in the Republic of Croatia. Consequently, on the basis of the agreement with General Garaj of the General Staff of the Croatian Army of the republic of Croatia, general Milivoj Petkovic, Chief of staff of the Main Headquarters of HVO, on September 21, 1992, issued an order to send 50 soldiers from the Croatian Defence Council of the Croatian Community Herzeg-Bosnia formations to attend the aforementioned course in the Training Center Slavonska Pozega.465

The Commander of the 3rd Operational Zone, Ivica Rajic, on September 26, 1992, on the basis of the Command from GS Central Bosnia,

463 AIIZ, inv. No.: 2-1858, the Croatian Community Herzeg Bosnia, Croatian Defence Council, The Headquarters Tomislavgrad, Intelligence Service /Operational Zone /n/w/Northwest Herzegovina, September 05, 1992 / HVO Bugojno and Gornji Vakuf, attn. the Head of the Intelligence Service. In that strictly confidential document, the time and place of the seminar for intelligence officers has been set (10-16 September, 1992, in Split), time and place for reporting (Operational Zone Split, Suhoisanska number 6), details regarding departure (“One must arrive in camouflage uniform, with HVO emblems, and bring writing and drawing tools, personal hygiene kit, and the working map 1:100.000 of the respective zone of responsibility”) Accommodation and food were the responsibility of the Main Headquarters of HVO in cooperation with the Operational Zone Split, and for any “unclear issues” one should address “the Head of VOS GS HVO, by phone, number (088) 662-700, or package radio“.

464 AIIZ, inv. No.: 2-2964, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, The Croatian Community Herzeg-Bosnia, Croatian Defence Council, Main Headquarters, reference No.: 01-2171/92, Mostar, September 21 – to the Operational Zone of Southeast Herzegovina and others; Ibid., inv. No.: 2-1859, The Office of the Commander of the 3 Operational Zone, No.: 263-1/92, September 1992 – to the Office of the Commander of OS HVO Fojnica.

465 AIIZ, inv. No.: 2-2964, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, The Croatian Community Herzeg-Bosnia, Croatian Defence Council, Main Headquarters, reference No.: 01-2171/92, Mostar, September 21, 1992 – to the Operational Zone Southeast Herzegovina and others. By that order, general Petkovic listed the units from which soldiers were to be sent, stating the number of soldiers by Operational Zones, specified the beginning and the duration of the course, location and time of departure, transportation of trainees, etc.
Strictly Confidential, number: 811/92, issued an order regarding the organization of the course for corporals. The order determined the place of the course (Slavonska Pozega), units of municipal HVO for the selection and number of candidates; the beginning (October 05, 1992) and duration of the course (14 days); time of departure (October 03, at 07.00 hours); meeting place (HVO military barracks in Kiseljak); organization of transportation to Grude and to Slavonska Pozega; time of return from the course (October 18, 1992); candidates selection criteria, etc. The Commanders “of units that provided the course candidates, are obliged to take care of the quality, and their readiness to work as professional candidates after the completion of the course”. Each candidate was supposed to “receive 10.000 HRD and 2 s/d o (dry daily meal). Candidates travel to the course in their military uniform, without HVO emblems, bringing the personal arms, personal hygiene kit and writing and drawing tools”. The Commander of the Municipal Headquarters was personally responsible to Rajic “for their referral to the course’. For any unclear issues, one should personally address Rajic or “the intelligence service of this headquarter”.466

The Municipal Headquarters of HVO Fojnica, has, on the basis of the command from GS Central Bosnia, Strictly Confidential, number: 811/92, and order from the commander of the 3 Operational Zone, number: 263-1, of September 26, 1992, referred to the course Smiljan (son of Ilija) Golub from HVO Fojnica, and consequently Stjepan Tuka, commander of the HVO Fojnica, on September 30, 1992, requested the treasury office of HVO Fojnica to effect the payment “of 15.000 HRD to the course participants” for expenses.467

Training for unit commanders of the Croatian Defence Council for POB with POVRS was carried out in Zagreb. In that regard, General Milivoj Petkovic, the Chief of Staff of the Main Headquarters of the Croatian Defence Council, on June 25, 1993, “on the basis of information we received from GS HV, regarding better organization and better degree

466 AIIZ, inv. No.: 2-1859, The Office of the Commander of the 3rd Operational Zone, No.: 263-1/92, September 26, 1992 – to the Office of the Commander of OS HVO Fojnica.

of training of commanders of formations for POB with POVRS” issued an order regarding referral of soldiers to the course for unit commanders to the Croatian Military Academy HVU in Zagreb.468

A significant number of members of special units (Dzokeri, Vitezovi and Munje) in most cases attended training in centers located in the territory of the Republic of Croatia.469 In addition, the Republic of Croatia established military training centers of the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) in the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.470

A significant number of non-commissioned officers, officers, and police officers attended the courses, seminars, and schools at the Croatian Military Academy Petar Zrinski in Zagreb. In mid November 1993, Colonel Ante Luburic (Commander of Ante Bruno Busic Regiment) went to the Croatian Military Academy,471 to undergo additional training there. In

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468 AIIZ, inv. No.: 2-1848, the Croatian Community Herzeg-Bosnia, Croatian Defence Council, Department of Defence, Main Headquarters, No.: 02-2/1-01-1208/93, Mostar, June 25, 1993 – the 2 Herzegovina Brigade, and others.

With that order, General Milivoje Petkovic, set the duration of the course (June 28, to July 03, 1993), and names of soldiers, and their respective units:

1. Davor Jukic – the 2nd Herzegovina brigade.
2. Renato Raic - 3rd Herzegovina Brigade
3. Predrag Viskovic - E. Kvaternik Brigade
4. Blaz Ivanda - King Tomislav Brigade
5. Dinko Ivkovic - P. Kresimir IV Brigade

The Croatian Military Academy had provided course participants with accommodation and food, while their mother unit provided “the costs of transportation”. Miro Colic, commander of the artillery, was also supposed to attend the course, “as co-organizer of course and responsible for the transfer of the participants”.

469 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2294, Involvement of the Croatian Army in the BiH battlefield and other forms of support from the Republic of Croatia.

470 Bilten FHP, No. 15, p. 79. For instance, members of the Croatian Army trained HVO around Kupres, Mostar, in central Bosnia, Orasje and other places (Ibid., No. 15, p. 59.)

471 AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2970, Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, Croatian Defence Council, HVO Headquarters, Commander’s Office, Posusje, Reg. No. 02-2/1-01/4010/93, November 19, 1993 – to Ante Bruno Busic Regiment.)
mid December 1993, 23 HVO officers were sent to the Croatian Military Academy for additional training:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name /father's name/ last name</th>
<th>Home unit</th>
<th>Duty that the person performed before they were sent for training</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Damir /Pero/ Barun</td>
<td>Military District Tomislavgrad</td>
<td>VOS adviser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Sreco /Iozo/ Citic</td>
<td>Military District Mostar</td>
<td>VOS adviser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Ivan /Franjo/ Bajic</td>
<td>Military District Tomislavgrad</td>
<td>VOS adviser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Tadjia /Stipe/ Mazzar</td>
<td>Petar Kresimir brigade Livno</td>
<td>Battery commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Blaz /Mile/ Ivana</td>
<td>King Tomislav brigade Tomislavgrad</td>
<td>Deputy commander of sub-division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Dinko /Ante/ Ivankovic</td>
<td>Petar Kresimir brigade Livno</td>
<td>POVRS detachment commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Mato /Luka/ Satalo</td>
<td>Knez Domagoj brigade Capljina</td>
<td>POVRS detachment commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Renato /Anto/ Raci</td>
<td>HVO brigade Mostar</td>
<td>POVRS detachment commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Davor /Filip/ Juric</td>
<td>HVO brigade Mostar</td>
<td>POVRS detachment commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Domagoj /Simun/ Kristo</td>
<td>King Tomislav brigade Tomislavgrad</td>
<td>Squad commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Blazenko /Marko/ Peric-Komsic</td>
<td>Grdani Ciflik</td>
<td>Squad commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Miro /Ivan/ Jovice</td>
<td>King Tomislav brigade Tomislavgrad</td>
<td>Squad commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Ivan /Jozo/ Cerevic</td>
<td>Hama brigade Prozor</td>
<td>detachment commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Dragan /Ivan/ Simunovic</td>
<td>Military District Tomislavgrad</td>
<td>Battalion commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Drago /Petar/ Zrnsic</td>
<td>Artillery regiment Tomislavgrad</td>
<td>Division commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Ilija /Ivan/ Vidacek</td>
<td>Penitentiary</td>
<td>Squad commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>Berislar /Marko/ Karacic</td>
<td>Combined missile and artillery regiment Siroki Brijeg</td>
<td>Division commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>Marin /Rafael/ Soldo</td>
<td>Combined missile and artillery regiment Siroki Brijeg</td>
<td>Battery commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>Zeljko /Ivana/ Bosnjak</td>
<td>Combined missile and artillery regiment Siroki Brijeg</td>
<td>Battery commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>Mitjenc/ Bozo/ Musa</td>
<td>Combined missile and artillery regiment Siroki Brijeg</td>
<td>Battery commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>Boris /Jerko/ Karacic</td>
<td>Combined missile and artillery regiment Siroki Brijeg</td>
<td>Squad commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>Mile /Gajko/ Ljubic</td>
<td>Combined missile and artillery regiment Siroki Brijeg</td>
<td>Battery commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.</td>
<td>Ivica /Bozo/ Kraljevic</td>
<td>Anti-terrorist group Siroki Brijeg</td>
<td>Squad commander 472</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Military Police Headquarters of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia provided support to the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia in training of its staff in the Republic of Croatia.473

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Both the training and specialization of pilots and aviators – technicians on helicopters MI-8 MTV-1 was conducted in the Republic of Croatia.\textsuperscript{474}

The wounded of the Croatian Defence Council were treated in the hospitals of the Republic of Croatia.\textsuperscript{475}

\textsuperscript{474} AIIZ, inv. No. 2-3002, Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, Croatian Defence Council, Headquarters of HVO of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, Reg. No.: 02-2/1-01-2571/93, August 20, 1993 – MZE Divulje, Ibid., inv. No. 2-2976, Union of the Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, Headquarters of the Armed Force of Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, Reg. No.: 02-2/1-01-3149/93, IZM Citluk, October 24, 1993 – MZE Grude, Attn. Commander General Slobodan Praljak (Chief of Staff of the Main Headquarters of HVO), on August 20, 1993, “on the basis of an Instruction from the Minister of Defence of RH, Class: 560-02/93-1/09, reference No.: 512-01-93, Strictly confidential 2715 Zagreb August 10, 1993" sent the following request to the Mixed squadron in Divulje:

"To conduct additional training of six pilots on the helicopter MI-8 MTV-1 and four flight technicians for MI-8 MTV-1.

The training should start on September 29, 1993.

Accommodation and food to be regulated in the facilities of MZE Divulje"

On October 24, 1993, General Praljak re-issued an order regarding the training of pilots and flight technicians. In the meantime, form October 27, to December 10, 1993, 6 pilots and 4 flight mechanics were to be sent to ZB Pula "for the purpose of introduction into the unit and training on helicopter MI-8MTV-1 and MIJ 550" (AIIZ, inv. No.: 2-2967).

\textsuperscript{475} AIIZ, inv. No.: 2-2956, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, The Croatian Community Herzeg-Bosnia, Croatian Defence Council, the Office of the Commander of OZ Central Bosnia, IZM Vitez, No.: 01-8-176/93, August 10, 1993 - to the Welfare department for the wounded, Split.
CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION

On the basis of numerous relevant sources of different origin, including strictly confidential documents of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the Republic of Croatia, among other things, one can conclude with certainty that, in the end of the 20th century:

- First, a classical aggression, i.e. a crime against peace and security was committed in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which means that this was an international armed conflict, and

- Second, the most fatal crime was committed against the Bosniaks on the occupied territories of Bosnia and Herzegovina - the genocide.

These are crimes by two ideologies, projects for the establishment of two great states, two nationalist movements, two strategies of genocide, two criminal and Nazi policies, two states, two (i.e. three) collaborationist creations, two foreign armies, four collaborationist military formations and several other armed units and groups, including foreign hirelings. The goal of such criminal ideology, politics and practice, following the model of fascism and Nazism, was the establishment of the Greater Serbia and the Greater Croatia states. The goal of this ideology, politics and practice was a war to conquer territories, a “habitat”, to take another people’s country (Bosnia and Herzegovina.)

The aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the genocide against Bosniaks constitute the essence of the joint criminal undertaking of certain states, state governments and numerous
leaders from top political, governmental, military and police structures of Serbia, Montenegro and the Republic of Croatia, and their fifth column, collaborationists and hirelings.

The intention of this criminal act, based on Serb and Croat projects for the establishment of great states had the goal to conquer, divide and liquidate the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and exterminate the Bosniaks or reduce their number to a meaningless ethnical group. In this way, before the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina and the genocide against Bosniaks, there was a well-designed intention to commit these and other forms of crime.

Pursuing this goal, the constitutional concept of SFRY defence was broken; the Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina and certain other constituent elements of the Federation reduced and disarmed; the antifascist and multiethnic JNA “transformed” into a Greater Serbia army; the Greater Serbia and Greater Croatia movements renewed and escalated; methods, mechanisms and procedures of crime planning defined; a tentative agreement on the destruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina concluded (in March 1991); frontiers of the Greater Serbia and Greater Croatia drawn; the fifth columns (the Greater Serbian and the Greater Croatian) of the neighbouring states organized and armed in Bosnia and Herzegovina; command at the occupied territories unified in the hands of the neighbouring countries’ leaders and occupation forces; starting positions for the aggression and other criminal activities, including the crime of genocide against Bosniaks were taken, which enabled execution of the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina as planned. And the global goal, the aggression and occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was only partially achieved. Accordingly, the genocide could only be executed in the occupied parts of the country, i.e. in two-thirds of its territory.

* * *

It was not possible to achieve the goals of the two diametrically opposed nationalist movements. The stronger Greater Serbia movement,
rushed off in the already created crisis of the joint state, saw the achievement of its goals in turning the opposed yet weaker Greater Croatia movement into an ally in the joint criminal undertaking. By recognizing it in a situation when it had one-third of Croatia occupied, and a planned and compromised population exchange, and especially by drawing them into the division of neighbouring Bosnia and Herzegovina, they had possessed absolute superiority over all other victims of the undertaking, and a maximal possible implementation of Greater Serbia, in the given circumstances. Tudjman’s involvement in Milosevic’s project had given an important chance to its implementation, and disabled a joint resistance of the threatened peoples against the Greater Serbian fascism, conquest and genocide. Although turned into an aggressor satellite and collaborator, the Greater Croatia movement, lead by Tudjman, fascinated and frightened by the formal superiority of the competitor, hoped that it would stay on the scene, rounding the Croatian pretzel up into a Bosnian roundbread, and by division of Bosnia and Herzegovina and subsequent population exchange, that it would form Greater Croatia, however still incomplete. Otherwise, the loss of one-third of the already occupied country would have significantly worsened the already stretched out geopolitical position of Croatia and permanently prevent Tudjman from realizing his ambition – to include almost one million Croats into his mega-state (in Vojvodina and Bosnia and Herzegovina).

Such a sequence of events was supported by the unfavourable international constellation of forces in the world and, especially, by the inefficiency and disorientation of the United Nations, whose highest officials rather implemented policies of their governments or of the great forces, instead of the Organization they lead. Because of this, it was possible for this organization to fail to react to the obvious aggression and aggressive actions as defined by its Charter, which had disastrous consequences, especially for the greatest victim of these aggressive actions - Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Bosniaks.

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The aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina was planned (intellectually, ideologically, politically, militarily, economically, from
the aspect of media and intelligence, psychologically etc.) with a clearly set goal. It was ordered from the competent political and military positions and executed according to plan, in a systematic and organized way. Also, the aggressor states are known, as are the ideologists, planners, commanders, executers and the associates, and it is known how the crimes were executed, and for what reason.

The armed aggression with characteristics of fascism and crimes against peace and security, against Bosnia and Herzegovina, were committed by Serbia and Montenegro, i.e. the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia* (from September 1991 until the end of 1995) and the Republic of Croatia (from the end of 1991 until March 18, 1994.) These countries had deployed their regular armed forces (Yugoslav People’s Army/Army of Yugoslavia and Croatian Army) and their collaborationist formations (Army of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Army of the Republic of Serb Krajin, Croatian Defence Council and National Defence of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia), and special (police) and volunteer units, including foreign mercenaries that directly took part in the aggression, genocide and other forms of crime in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and Republic of Croatia are responsible for the most serious crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Serb and Croat fifth columnist parties (Serb democratic party of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Croat democratic community of Bosnia and Herzegovina) and para-state creations in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Republic of Serb Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croat Community/Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia and the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia), as mass participants who maintained occupation of the large part of the state territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, achieved through aggression, and their military and police forces not representing any kind of independent state, political or military factor, but collaborationist

* The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was formally proclaimed on April 27, 1992, but it actually started functioning on October 3, 1991 at latest, unlawfully usurping and keeping the name, image and basic government levers of the previous joint state for seven months. In such a situation, in the autumn of 1991 it committed aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the fact that it had preserved the name of the SFRY had, among other things, helped it to conceal the aggression.
creations of the aggressor states that were formed, organized and functioned in the name of, and as dictated by, Belgrade and Zagreb, i.e. Serbian and Croatian top political and state structures. The actual command relationship between the Yugoslavia People’s Army/Army of Yugoslavia and the Army of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the one side, and the Croatian Army and the Croatian Defence Council on the other, and the Army of the Republic of Serb Krajina and National Defence of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia was established in such a way, that the Yugoslav and Croatian state governments, among other things, represented single supreme commands in Belgrade and Zagreb towards their fifth column and collaborationists in Pale, Grude and Velika Kladusa. The regimes in Belgrade and Zagreb, lead by Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman, had planned, prepared and organized the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the genocide against Bosniaks, lead and commanded during the aggression, provided personnel, command staff, background units, logistics, fuel, food and other strategic materials, and took part in the genocide and other forms of crime for the purpose of destruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state and the “final resolution” of the Muslim issue. Servile fifth columnists and collaborationists from Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia obediently joined in the criminal activities, as associates and executors. This cooperation in the field and on the top, dictated by the current constellation of forces and relations, and opposite interests, with occasional collisions, mutually dishonest, was implemented on the level of local and sometimes wider, even global interests of Milosevic and Tudjman. In addition, sometimes it was a reflection of mutual relations between the great forces, because the circumstances in the field in Bosnia and Herzegovina had affected their mutual relations within the UN Security Council.

The armed aggression, the war of conquest against Bosnia and Herzegovina was a consisting part of Milosevic’s and Tudjman’s state politics, on whose behalf the largest part of Bosnia and Herzegovina was occupied and Bosniaks were killed, expelled and taken to concentration camps, only because of their ethnic background and religion. Apart from the occupation and division of Bosnia and Herzegovina between the two aggressors, the genocide against Bosniaks was an instrument for achieving the main goal of the aggression – the extension of the
aggressors’ lebensraum. An important condition for the fulfilment of this goal was the biological and spiritual extermination of the Bosniaks. The unexplainable passiveness of the international community, the inadequate attitude of the United Nations, the professed neutrality of the global players, and the inefficiency of the international system had enabled the aggressors and their collaborationists to use this instrument and try to exterminate Bosniaks and commit genocide against them.

* * *

The most extensive operations during the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the goal to occupy it, were mainly carried out through mid-1992, then in mid-1993, as well as in July 1995. During this time, the Yugoslav People’s Army/Army of Yugoslavia and the Croatian Army, and their collaborationist formations, had occupied most of eastern and northern Bosnia, eastern and western Herzegovina, a major portion of the Bosnian Krajina and some parts of the central Bosnia. Heavy battles were fought for the defence of Bosanski Brod, Zvornik, Brcko, Gradacac, Jajce, Maglaj, Sarajevo, Tuzla, Gorazde, Mostar, and other towns. Only few localities, particularly in the central and western parts of the country, were spared from serious destruction due to combat activities. Seats of the municipalities that the aggressors had already effectively occupied were also spared from direct war destruction. The non-Serb, primarily Bosniak population of these occupied areas, however, was not saved from murders, eviction, deportation and concentration camps.

Through mid-summer 1992, the Greater Serbian aggressor had occupied almost two-thirds of the Republic and established and strengthened the so-called Posavina corridor. At the same time, the Croatian Army had strengthened the established Croat authorities on the “southern battlefield”, leaving Bosnian Posavina to Serb occupation forces.
During the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1991-1995), apart from crimes against peace and security, numerous crimes against the civilian population were committed in the occupied areas and towns, including organized murders - actually the most frequent – mass and individual massacring of men, women, children and the old, mainly Bosniaks; arrests, deportation and imprisonment in concentration camps (especially Omarska, Manjaca, Keraterm, Brcko, and Trnopolje); intimidation, beating, torture, persecution and starvation of civilians in camps and prisons, of which many Bosniaks died on a daily basis; killing of doctors and medical workers, and religious officials; systematic and mass rape and sexual harassment of women (including old women), girls, even little girls, in camps, prisons, hotels, garages, private houses and other places; forced labour, forced digging of trenches on the front line; taking and killing of hostages; forced baptizing of Bosniaks; eviction and displacement of Bosniaks form their ancestral homes (turning the occupied areas into one-nation, ethnically clean Serb and Croat territories, which testifies of the horrific proportions of these crimes); cruel treatment of the wounded, the diseased and war prisoners; attacks on health institutions, injuring and killing the wounded; attacks on humanitarian convoys, obstructing of humanitarian aid and attacks on personnel of humanitarian organizations; non-selective and disproportional use of force and siege; inhumane treatment, including causing of major suffering and injuries of bodily and mental integrity; unlawful dismissal from employment; intentional demolition and destruction of cities, towns and villages; constant shelling of civilians and sniper activities in occupied Bosnian towns; separation of men from women and children; use of civilians as a living shield; heavy injuries to and maltreatment of civilians; intentional starvation, water, power, gas, and fuel supply interruption, as well as interruption of telephone communications and city traffic; use of forbidden (according to the international conventions) methods and means of warfare; raging people’s homes without any military justification; planned and selective plunders, demolishing and destruction of residential, educational, scientific, medical, religious and economic facilities; destruction and extermination of cultural, historical
and religious monuments, and the whole infrastructure of Bosnia and Herzegovina (roads, Post Office installations, radio and TV transmitters, power transmission lines, water supply systems and water tanks, health institutions etc.), as well as natural resources (forests, water flows, mines etc.)

Apart from numerous documents, data, statements, information, findings and other evidence, the large number of executed and expelled victims and numerous graves testify on the genocide against Bosniaks and other forms of crime, especially in the valleys of Drina, Neretva, Sana, Lasva rivers, and Bosnian Posavina.

Persecutions of Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina were committed in the territories occupied by the Yugoslav People’s Army/Army of Yugoslavia and the Croatian Army and their collaborationist military forces (Army of Republic of Srpska, Army of the Republic of Serb Krajina, Croat Defence Council and National Defence of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia), and with the assistance of the fifth column political parties, they organized the governments of the so-called Republic of Serb Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croat Community/Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia and Autonomous Province of the western Bosnia in these territories. Most mass slaughters took place in the regions covering around ten municipalities with Bosniak majority in Drina valley, Bosnian Posavina, Potkozarje and Sana valley. In the area of Sana and Una river basin, and in towns and villages of Kljuc, Sanski Most, Prijedor, Kozarac, Ljubija, Bosanska Krupa, Bosanski Novi, Bosanska Kostajnica, Bosanska Dubica and Bosanska Gradiska in summer of 1992, the Greater Serbian aggressor and their collaborationists liquidated tens of thousands of Bosniaks.

In July 1995, in and around Srebrenica, with the participation of the most numerous Serb collaborationist armed formations from Bosnia and Herzegovina, in one week, only the Greater Serbian aggressor killed thousands of men and buried them in mass graves, buried hundreds of alive people, mutilated and slaughtered men, women and young boys, killed children in front of their mothers, forced old men to eat the liver of their grandchildren, raped women and girls, deported around 30 000 people, mainly women and children, etc. There is numerous evidence of this, including mass graves covered by grass, where beasts carried Bosniak bones all around. According to the ICTY, these are “scenes from hell, written in the darkest pages of human history”.

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In the ruthless “Operation murder”, in five days only, the aggressor and their collaborationists (army and police of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina) killed over 8000 men and boys in the so-called fertile age, counting on the fact that renewal of families and lives in the Drina valley would be impossible without them. The horrifying number of the killed and shortness of time also shows that many organized and disciplined executors took part in preparation and execution of the crimes, actually the whole political, administrative, police and military potential of the Greater Serbia forces, and that it was the largest individual persecution in Europe since the Second World War. The fact is that numerous efforts were put in concealing of the crime, that it was a general concealing that took nine years. This only shows that perpetrators were aware of the criminal character of their actions and removes any doubt in their subjective guilt, i.e. in the existence of premeditation in execution of this, the most difficult form of crime. Victims of the mass murder, committed in such a short time period, were buried in mass graves in hidden locations, and then their remains were relocated several times into secondary and tertiary graves, in order to prevent revealing of the genocide and allow perpetrators to hide their crime.

In July 1995, a mass crime was committed against Bosniaks of Muslim faith in and around Srebrenica. The crime is an act of genocide against Muslims in this area. The wide area where the crime was committed, quickness of killing several thousands people, size of the area where corpses were buried and multiple relocation of bodily remains of the killed, and the number of people who necessarily took part in the execution and concealing of the crime absolutely shows that the crimes were known to a large number of people, and that they were persistently concealed. Genocide against the Bosniaks of a certain age from the UN protected zone of Srebrenica, committed in front of a global audience, in immediate preparations for Dayton, in a traditional manner of an accomplished fact in order to provide the strategically important borderline belt for Serbia, represents only the tip of the iceberg of crimes that were continuously committed through the period of four years, in almost three fourths of the state territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Units of the Croatian Army and the Croatian Defence Council committed numerous crimes against Bosniak civilian population in the
valleys of Rama and Neretva and in the central Bosnia (slaughter in Ahmici, crimes in the area of Vitez, in Mostar, Stolac, Vrbanja, Stupni Do and other locations.)

In the process of defence from biological and spiritual extermination, certain Bosniaks also committed war crimes. While the aggression was still underway, indictments were issued against a number of such individuals, verdicts were ruled and the culprits punished.

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The renewal of the second joint Yugoslav state during World War II, based on the platform of the National Movement for Liberation (i.e. turning of a unitary state into an egalitarian federal community of peoples and nationalities), was in its end burdened by the forced acceptance of the Exiled Government as an equal partner in the government of the Democratic Federative Yugoslavia, and by unitary tendencies of the initial decades that corresponded to the proclaimed construction of socialism. In early sixties, government of the country realized that this was leading towards break-up of the country and strengthened the organization of the country as foreseen in the platform by passing the 1974 Constitution. The Government of Serbia saw the adoption of the Constitution as “injustice for Serbs” and ordered, and then printed the Blue Book, just to officially abandon it later on.

Tito’s death in 1980 was followed by the acceleration of these tendencies that resulted in the Memorandum of the Serb Academy of Science and Arts and other manifestations of renewal of the Greater Serbian requests that were profiled in a specific political movement, lead by Slobodan Milosevic in mid eighties. The Constitution and constitutional concept of the country’s defence was the main obstacle for creation of the (hegemonic) Greater Serbia ideas, which is why the Constitution and its defence concept were the first to be attacked. By 1991, the constitutional system was paralyzed, and by disarmament of the Territorial Defence of several peoples, its defence concept was broken as well, which put survival of SFRY in question.
The escalation, establishment and profiling of the renewed Greater Serbian movement was generated from several sources (not only from the leadership of the Communist Union of Serbia and the military top, the Serb Academy of Science and Art, Association of Writers of Serbia, Serb Orthodox Church etc.), but only when Slobodan Milosevic broke through and took the lead (of the “Serb coordination” as well) and put important levers of the federal government under control (selection of Borisav Jovic for the president of SFRY Presidency and inclination of Veljko Kadijevic, minister of defence, frightened that his Army would lose the state), they started planning and preparing a joint criminal undertaking.

The first serious steps of these parallel centres of power in the undertaking were the War Plan to “expel Slovenia and Croatia” from the SFRY, which later became known as the Ram (“Frame”) plan, i.e. the plan of framing the Greater Serbia as the main goal of the Movement, and the Order to take over weapons from the territorial defence units of certain republics into JNA custody, formally issued by the Chief of Headquarters of SFRY Armed Forces.

After this Rubicon had been crossed, the power centres of the Greater Serbia movement had no alternative and, in 1991, two aggressive wars were conducted and had factually failed, with the international community inadequately involved in the resolution of the Yugoslav crisis. Instead of stopping the aggressive wars, the international community “kept” a non-established and non-existing peace.

The Greater Serbia movement thought that Bosnia and Herzegovina would fall in its lap like a ripe pear. In case of a successful attempt to end the war in Croatia, the issue of Bosnia and Herzegovina would not have been raised, and the Greater Serbian movement would be ready to divide it on the basis of the Cvetkovic-Macek Agreement from 1939. The movement used the interference of the international community in the Yugoslav crisis to occupy one third of Croatia for itself, and it used the weakness of the Tudjman regime to win them over as a partner in the mutual division of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The jointly established international Arbitrary (Badinter) Commission, and then the Declaration of the European Community dated December 17, 1991 confirmed the dissolution of Yugoslavia and left the republics...
to decide whether they wanted independence or to stay in the truncated state. Bosnia and Herzegovina needed to organize referendum on this issue.

In 1991, the Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina continued with the destruction of authorities in important territories, and by the armament of its members and other Serb extremists, it conducted preparations for staging a civil war, in case voters decided to vote for independence. Such illegal activity was possible due to intensified deployment through the territories of Bosnia and Herzegovina by dislocation of units from Slovenia and Croatia, and in this way Bosnia and Herzegovina had practically been silently occupied, although the occupation was not effective on the whole of its territory. The as yet non-proclaimed Federal Republic of Yugoslavia believed that the second ruling national party (HDZ of Bosnia and Herzegovina) would vote against independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina at the referendum, in accordance with the assigned task to destruct legal authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the project of regionalization of the “Croat areas.” This belief was further nurtured by the redefined referendum question about independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of the Croat Democratic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and its fifth column policy and agreements with Serb collaborationists from Bosnia and Herzegovina in February 1992. In this context, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia hurriedly conducted a further dislocation of storages with weapons and material war reserves as well as the JNA units to safe areas, in order to put primary strategic goals and corridors under control and make the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina effective.

The most influential part of the Croat intelligence and leadership of the Catholic Church in Bosnia and Herzegovina supported the referendum and voting for independent Bosnia and Herzegovina. Realizing that by the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina its survival would be threatened, the Archbishopric of the Catholic Church in Bosnia and Herzegovina recommended its congregation to vote for independence, and in this way enabled fulfilment of EC conditions for independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Although they had brought to an end reorganization and dislocation that started on January 2, 1992, the JNA and the whole Greater Serbian
movement were surprised by the result of the referendum, and even more, by the international recognition of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. At that moment, except for the police and a few mobilized reserve police units, together with the command and mobilization infrastructure of the Territorial Defence units, the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina had no armed forces. As the events proved, most of its citizens were ready for defence, even in those difficult circumstances. Difficulties were overcome by the mobilization of a large number of municipal units of Territorial Defence and with self-organized groups of directly threatened citizens.

Although insufficiently armed, this core of resistance confused the Greater Serbian aggressor that was prepared to play the role in “separating the conflicted national groups” for a while longer. In the following months, this core was transformed into the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, capable of defending the country, or at least its smaller part over several years, by constantly strengthening in very difficult circumstances, and by obtaining weapons in various ways.

The referendum issue was soon forgotten, and soon upon the proclamation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the beginning of May 1992, the joint actions of the two neighbouring states in destruction, liquidation and division of Bosnia and Herzegovina, had continued.

After initial discussions about the cessation of armed conflict with Serbia, by will of its president, itself a former victim of an aggression, the Republic of Croatia in autumn 1991 joined not only in the disintegration and division of neighbouring Bosnia and Herzegovina (by forming “Croat communities”, and especially the Croat Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, for the purpose of renewal of the collaborationist function i.e. secession from the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and establishment together with the Republic of Croatia, of a “joint Croat state”), but also the self-willed occupation of its parts, and agreements on leaving Bosnian Posavina to Milosevic for his (preventive) evacuation of Serbs from the western Slavonia and agreed demarcations, with occasional fighting activities at Kupres plateau and Neretva valley.

Upon formal and complete JNA withdrawal from Bosnia and Herzegovina by the summer of 1992, the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina defended the central part of the state territory and several
isolated enclaves. After that, both aggressors transferred their focus on the so-called **peace process**, expecting that by the persecution and exhaustion in the free territories, they would force the Army and Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to accept the division of the country, dictated by the international community.

In the spring of 1993, the Republic of Croatia openly joined the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina. Attacks of the Croatian Army and of the Croatian Defence Council on the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina only ended in the spring of 1994, which was, apart from the decisive defence of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, also caused by several agreements, deals and decisions in the period January-May 1994. This process was crowned by the *Washington Agreement* on March 18, 1994, which established the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (covering 58% of the state territory) as a part of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the intention to reach a similar agreement with Serbs for the remaining 42% of the state territory.

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The London Conference on Yugoslavia from August 26-28, 1992 that marked renewal of the peace process by the international community had to react to mass murders, concentration camps and deportation of Bosniak population in the occupied territories of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Stunned by the mass crimes in Foca, Zvornik, Brcko, Prijedor and Vlasic, frightened by the mass wave of exiles that flooded Western Europe, Chairman Cornelio Sommaruga and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata proposed the introduction of UN **safe areas**, in order to “provide for safety of the refugees *in situ*.”

The UN Secretary General and UNPROFOR Commander opposed this idea, and the Co-Chairs of the Conference said that introduction of UN safe areas was a “wrong idea”, because it would make other areas “unsafe” and allegedly encourage “ethnical cleansing.” This fairly
watered down the discussion and postponed the decision for eight months. Only then, faced with the impending massacre of 70,000 Bosniaks in the Drina valley and the confusion, the Security Council passed its Resolution 824 dated May 6, 1993, proclaiming Srebrenica, Zepa, Gorazde, Sarajevo, Tuzla and Bihac UN safe areas, “spared of any armed attack or hostile action.” The Resolutions ordered “immediate termination of any forced occupation of the territory”, as well as “withdrawal of Serb military and paramilitary forces at a distance from these cities at which they no longer present a danger for their citizens”.

Unfortunately, the resolutions were not implemented and the Greater Serbian aggressor took advantage of the indecisiveness of the international community to exhaust the population of the isolated areas, and make survival impossible for them so that they leave these areas, and then make NATO give up air strikes in support of defence of the safe areas by taking UN members as hostages. This allowed the Serb aggressor to liquidate the safe areas of Srebrenica and Zepa, killing more than 8000 fertile men and boys in Srebrenica alone, with an obvious intention to commit genocide.

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The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, an internationally recognized state and member of the United Nations, had suffered heavy losses during the aggression 1991-1995: some 200,000 killed, mainly Bosniaks, and a lot more wounded. More than half of the population were expelled from their homes. Over 200,000 men, women and children were kept in several hundreds of concentration camps and prisons. Over 20 000 civilians did not survive these camps, and numerous women were raped. Emigration to third countries was the condition for a large number of survivors to stay alive at all. Around 1200 objects of sacral Islamic architecture were demolished or systematically destroyed.

Unfortunately, the international community ignored these losses for a long time and hesitated with intervention. It intervened late and
in an inadequate manner. It tolerated the obvious genocide for a long time. Consequences are “the darkest pages of human history”, as the UN Secretary General admitted in November 1999. International courts undoubtedly found the existence of many crimes, including of the genocide against Bosniaks, pronounced several temporary measures of protection and verdicts, yet many war criminals are still to appear before them, including the main culprits.

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Bosnia and Herzegovina was not prepared for defence. The Government of the Republic was fairly destroyed. Mobilized reserve police units and self-organized groups of patriots organized the initial resistance and enabled the reunion of significant yet insufficiently armed forces, on the basis of the Platform for actions of the Presidency in the state of war, as the broadest framework for gathering of all patriotic forces, lead by the Territorial Defence General Staff of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. During the summer of 1992, these forces grew into the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina that constantly grew, while remaining insufficiently armed. From the initial detachments, battalions, divisions and groups, the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was transformed into brigades and corps, but its units remained related to certain territories. Apart from the central free territory, there were several separate free enclaves. It was difficult to obtain weapons, and it was mainly done by capturing the from the aggressor and its collaborationists.

During the defence war, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina managed to defend itself from the brutal Greater Serbia and Greater Croatia aggression, with the involvement of some members of each of the three of its peoples who took part in the aggression as allies or collaborationists, in order to justify the aggression and crimes, which is regularly done by fascistic regimes.

The defence war was primarily led with its own forces, in conditions bordering the impossible. The country was first disarmed, and then occupied,
and an effective occupation machine was constructed in one third of its territory. In the beginning, it was militarily secured by the main part of the Yugoslav People’s Army. As in the National War for Liberation 1941-1945, the beginning was very hard: available weapons and ammunition, seized weapons or ones made in primitive workshops, with a small number purchased for an expensive price, largely outnumbered by volunteers, which meant that several of them used the same rifle.

Through long-lasting efforts, the constellation of relations in the country and in the world had indeed changed. Although reduced to less than 30% of the whole state territory and mutually isolated, free territories were somehow still consolidated.

In the summer of 1995, the defence war was heading towards a complete success, because it was a defence war, and it did not strive towards occupation of other people’s territories, but only to defend its territories and its sovereign, internationally recognized state. However, getting closer to this final success was very painful and lengthy, and it was realized by employing the last atoms of strength of the people and the Army. When the final success was on the horizon, it was stopped by the preparation of the Dayton accords.

The degree and duration of these efforts were largely conditioned by the lack of resourcefulness and inadequate behaviour of the United Nations; primarily, by not understanding the essential nature of the shameful euphemism of “ethnic cleansing”, i.e. the “incomplete understanding of the Serb war goals”, which was the title of one of the final sections of the all-encompassing Report of the United Nations Secretary General, Kofi Annan to the General Assembly of the United Nations, on November 15, 1999.

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Despite the fact that different courts, including the Hague Tribunal on the former Yugoslavia, have found existence of almost all incriminated crimes, even genocide, the practice of denial and concealment of crimes
persists. With these goals, relevant institutions have taken different actions at various times, from different publishing projects and ruthless propaganda activities, to direct operations in order to conceal the crimes, as well as the destruction and seizure of registry and archive documents. According to the laws and regulations, registry materials were to be professionally managed after the war, and selected for adequate archives, that would be available to researchers after a certain time period. In addition, the documentation on the incriminated events from the period of war was to be submitted to the Hague Tribunal, pursuant to the laws on cooperation of governments with this institution. Instead of that, the registry materials of the authorities of the Republic of Srpska did not reach the appropriate archives, but remained scattered in different locations. The practice of the Commission of the Republic of Srpska Government with the task to investigate events in and around Srebrenica, July 10 – 19, 1995, proved that relevant materials were “destroyed” or hidden in secret locations, maybe even outside of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is also the case with registrar materials of the Croat Community/Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia that were mainly disposed at the State Archives of the Republic of Croatia. Archive materials of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina are an exception, as they are placed in the Archive of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is by its formation within the composition of the Army of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Apart from this, the described practice is opposed to the practice many countries had used after World War II, and without waiting for the usual 30-year period, making such materials available to researchers, and the Institute of Military History in Belgrade has also published a significant part of it in 15 volumes, with almost 200 books in B-5 format. After a certain period of time, in less than two decades, historians and researchers can at least count on materials that were requested and photocopied by the Hague Tribunal on several occasions.

Operations aimed at destroying written traces of the crimes were less successful than those to hide and destroy physical remains of more than 20,000 victims that are still recorded as missing, although it is certain that they were killed. To the regret of those that have issued orders and the executors, several thousands of individual, several hundreds of collective, and over 300 mass graves have already been discovered.
They present memorable evidence of the committed crimes, and especially genocide in the selected regions of the occupied areas, with the intention to exterminate the Bosniaks. More than a decade after the mass murders were committed, barely half of the bodily remains have been exhumed, and less than half have been identified, primarily because their ID documentation was taken away from them and because bodies were destroyed and transferred to secondary graves or other locations. The largest exhumed grave, Crni Vrh in Žvornik municipality contained over 600 complete or partial bodily remains. Since this is a secondary grave and machines were used to dig out and bury the victims, it is very difficult to establish their identity. The dominantly civilian structure of the exhumed and identified bodies, and their nationality, clearly indicate the intentions, policy and practice of genocide.
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ABBREVIATIONS
ABBREVIATIONS

“A”  - Klasifikacija jedinice JNA (popunjene 90-100% ljudstvom i 100% naoružanjem i opremom) [Classification of JNA units (90-100% staffed and 100% armed and equipped)]

ABH  - Atomsko-biološko, hemijsko (oružje, služba, sredstva itd.) [Atomic, biological and chemical (weapons, service, assets etc.)]

ABHO - Atomsko-biološko-hemijska odbrana [Atomic, biological, chemical Defence]

AF   - armijski fond [Army fund]

AFP  - Agence France Presse, francuska novinska agencija [Agence France Presse, French News Agency]

AVL  - aktivna vojna lica [active military personnel]

AVNOJ - Antifašističko vijeće narodnog oslobođenja Jugoslavije [Antifascist Council of the People’s Liberation of Yugoslavia]

AVS  - Aktivne vojne starješine [Active military commanders]

“B”  - Klasifikacija jedinice JNA (popunjene 30-50% ljudstvom i 100% naoružanjem i opremom) [Classification of JNA units (30-50% staffed and 100% armed and equipped)]

bb   - brdski bataljon [mountain battalion]
b/d - borbena dejstva [military activity]
b/g - borbena gotovost [combat preparedness]
b/k - borbeni komplet [combat set]
BiH - Bosna i Hercegovina [Bosnia and Herzegovina]
BOV - borbeno oklopnvo vozilo [combat armoured vehicle]
BST - bestrajni top [recoilless gun]
CIA - Central Intelligence Agency [Centralna obavještajna služba SAD]
CJB - Centar javne bezbjednosti [Public Security Center]
CK - Centralni komitet [Central Committee]
CK SK - Centralni komitet saveza komunista [Central Committee of the League of Communists]
CK SKJ - Centralni komitet saveza komunista Jugoslavije [Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia]
DFJ - Demokratska Federativna Jugoslavija [Democratic Federal Yugoslavia]
DIV - diverzantski vod [Commando platoon]
DO - Društvena organizacija [Public organization]
DP - društveno preduzeće [Public enterprise]
DPO - Društveno-politička organizacija [Socio-political organization]
DPZ - Društveno politička zajednica [Socio-political community]
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DŠK</td>
<td>vrsta protivavionskog mitraljeza 12,7 mm sovjetske proizvodnje [Type of antiaircraft 12.7 mm machine-gun, Soviet production]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DT</td>
<td>Državna tajna [State secret]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUMM</td>
<td>European Union Monitoring Mission [Posmatračka misija Evropske unije]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPM</td>
<td>European Union Police Mission [Policjska misija Evropske unije]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EZ</td>
<td>Evropska zajednica [European Community]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FHP</td>
<td>Fond za humanitarno pravo [Humanitarian Law Fund]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNRJ</td>
<td>Federativna Narodna Republika Jugoslavija [Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gmtbr</td>
<td>Gardijska motorizovana brigada [Guard motorized brigade]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GŠ OS SFRJ</td>
<td>Generalštab Oružanih snaga Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije [General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GŠ VJ</td>
<td>Generalštab Vojske Jugoslavije (Vojske SRJ) [General Staff of the Yugoslav Army (Army of FRY)]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GŠ VRS</td>
<td>Glavni štab Vojske Republike Srpske (Vojska Srpske republike Bosne i Hercegovine) [General Staff of the Republika Srpska Army]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GrŠTO</td>
<td>Gradski štab Teritorijalne odbrane [City Headquarters of Territorial Defence]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS HVO</td>
<td>Glavni stožer Hrvatskog vijeća obrane [Main Staff of the Croatian Defence Council]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDZ</td>
<td>Hrvatska demokratska zajednica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HINA</td>
<td>Hrvatska informativna novinska agencija</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOS</td>
<td>Hrvatske obrambene snage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR HB</td>
<td>Hrvatska republika Herceg-Bosna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRD</td>
<td>Hrvatski dinar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRSS</td>
<td>Hrvatska republikanska seljačka stranka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRZ</td>
<td>Hrvatsko ratno zrakoplovstvo (Zrakoplovstvo Republike Hrvatske)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSS</td>
<td>Hrvatska seljačka stranka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HVU</td>
<td>Hrvatsko vojno učilište</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HZ HB</td>
<td>Hrvatska zajednica Herceg-Bosna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IKM</td>
<td>Istureno komandno mjesto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbr.</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inž. puk</td>
<td>inžinjerijski puk [engineering regiment]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IZM</td>
<td>izmješteno zapovjedno (komandno) mjesto [Command Outpost]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIH</td>
<td>jugoistočna Hercegovina [Southeast Herzegovina]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JNA</td>
<td>Jugoslovenska narodna armija [Yugoslav People’s Army]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JRM</td>
<td>Jugoslovenska ratna mornarica [Yugoslav Military Navy]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>Korpus [Corps]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k-de</td>
<td>komande [Commands]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KEBS</td>
<td>Konferencija o evropskoj bezbjednosti i suradnji (vidi: KESS) [Conference on European Security and Cooperation- CESC (see: KESS)]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KESS</td>
<td>Konferencija o evropskoj sigurnosti i suradnji (vidi: KEBS) [Conference on European Security and Cooperation - CESC (see: KEBS)]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KGB</td>
<td>State Security Committee of the USSR (Комитет государственности безопасности) [Komitet državne bezbjednosti SSSR-a]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KK</td>
<td>krajiški korpus [Krajina Corps]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOS</td>
<td>Kontraobavještajna služba [Counter-Intelligence Service]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KoV</td>
<td>Kopnena vojska [Land forces]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPD</td>
<td>Kazneno popravni dom [Correctional Institution]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LARD</td>
<td>laki artiljerijski division [light artillery battalion]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lpbr</td>
<td>laka pješadijska brigade [light infantry brigade]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAD</td>
<td>motorizovani artiljerijski division [motorized artillery battalion]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mes</td>
<td>minske-eksplozivne sredstva [mines and explosive devices]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MO</td>
<td>Ministarstvo odbrane/obrane [Ministry of Defence]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MO HR HB</td>
<td>Ministarstvo obrane Hrvatske Republike Herceg-Bosna [Ministry of Defence of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MORH</td>
<td>Ministarstvo obrane Republike Hrvatske [Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPS</td>
<td>Moralno političko stanje [Moral and political situation]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mR</td>
<td>materijalne rezerve [material reserves]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mS</td>
<td>materijalna sredstva [material assets]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTS</td>
<td>materijalno tehnička sredstva [military equipment and assets]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUP</td>
<td>Ministarstvo unutrašnjih poslova [Ministry of Interior]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m/v</td>
<td>motorno vozilo [motor vehicle]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MZ</td>
<td>Mjesna zajednica [Local community]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>Naredba [Order/Ordinance]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation [Sjeverno-atlantski pakt]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDH</td>
<td>Nezavisna Država Hrvatska [Independent State of Croatia]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>acronym</td>
<td>description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGŠ</td>
<td>Načelnik Generalštaba [Chief of Staff of the Headquarters]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>narodna odbrana [National Defence]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOB</td>
<td>Narodno-oslobodilačka borba [People’s Liberation Struggle]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOR</td>
<td>Narodno-oslobodilački rat [People’s Liberation War]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOV</td>
<td>Narodno-oslobodilačka vojska [People’s Liberation Army]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NŠ</td>
<td>načelnik štaba [Chief of Staff]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVO</td>
<td>naoružanje i vojna oprema [Armament and Military Equipment]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OG</td>
<td>operativna grupa [operational group]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OK</td>
<td>Opštinska konferencija [Municipal Conference]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>okb</td>
<td>oklopni bataljon [armoured battalion]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OK SSRNJ</td>
<td>Opštinska konferencija Socijalističkog saveza radnog naroda Jugoslavije [Municipal Conference of the Socialist Union of Working People of Yugoslavia]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OkŠTO</td>
<td>Okružni štab Teritorijalne odbrane [District Staff of Territorial Defence]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OM</td>
<td>oklopno-mehanizovano … [armoured-mechanized …]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMJ</td>
<td>Oklopno mehanizovane jedinice [armoured mechanized units]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONO i DSZ</td>
<td>Opštenarodna odbrana i društvena samoaštitita [National Defence and Social Self-protection]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ONP - operativno-nastavni poslovi [Operational and teaching assignments]

OOUR - Osnovna organizacija udruženog rada [Primary Organization of Associated Workforce]

OpŠTO - Opštinski štab Teritorijalne odbrane [Municipal Staff of Territorial Defence]

ORg MOB - Organ za mobilizaciju [Mobilization bodies]

OS - Oružane snage [Armed Forces]

OSCE - Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [Organizacija za sigurnost i saradnju u Evropi]

Osr - Odjeljenje srednjeg remonta [Medium-scale overhaul department]

OUN - Organizacija ujedinjenih nacija [Organization of the United Nations]

OUR - Organizacija udruženog rada [Organization of Associated Workforce]

OZ - Operativna zona [Operational zone]

P SFRJ - Predsjedništvo Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije [Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]

P.P.N. - postrojba za posebne namjene [special-purpose formation]

partbr - partizanska brigada [Partisan brigade]

partd - partizanska divizija [Partisan division]

PAT - Protivavionski top [anti-aircraft gun]

pbr - pješadijska brigada [infantry brigade]
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PkPo</td>
<td>pomoćnik komandanta za pozadinu [Assistant Commander for background]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PO</td>
<td>protivoklopni .... [anti-armour ...]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PoB</td>
<td>Pozadinska baza [background base]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POB</td>
<td>protivoklopna borba [anti-armour combat]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POG</td>
<td>Protivoklopna grupa [anti-armour group]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POJ</td>
<td>Partizanski odredi Jugoslavije [Partisan detachments of Yugoslavia]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PoOb</td>
<td>Pozadinsko obezbjedjenje [Background security]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POV</td>
<td>Protiv-oklopni vod [Anti-armour platoon]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POVRS</td>
<td>protivoklopni vođeni raketni sistem/sredstva [anti-armour guided rocket system /means]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP</td>
<td>protivpješadijska (borba, mina i sl.) [anti-infantry (combat, mine and the like)]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>personalni i pravni poslovi [personnel and legal affairs]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRAMOS</td>
<td>Pravilo o mobilizaciji oružanih snaga (SFRJ) [Rule on Armed Forces Mobilization (SFRY)]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PU</td>
<td>Policijska uprava [Police Administration]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PZO</td>
<td>protivzračna odbran [anti-aircraft Defence]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PZT</td>
<td>Privremeno zauzeta teritorija [temporarily occupied territory]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;R&quot;</td>
<td>Klasifikacija jedinice JNA (popunjene 100% ljudstvom iz rezervnog sastava i 100% naoružanjem i opremom) [Classification of JNA]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
unit (100% staffed from the reserves and 100% armed and equipped)

r/d - rezervni dijelovi [spare parts]

RI - Radio izviđanje [radio reconnaissance]

RiK - Rukovodjenje i komandovanje [directing and commanding]

RJ - Ratna jedinica [war unit]

RK SSO - Republička konferencija Saveza socijalističke omladine [Republic Conference of the Union of Socialist Youth]

RK SSRN - Republička konferencija Socijalističkog saveza radnog naroda [Republic Conference of the Socialist Union of Working People]

RKM - Rezervno komandno mjesto [Reserve command post]

RMR - Ratne materijalne reserve [Wartime material reserves]

RO PTT - Radna organizacija pošta, telegraf, telefon [Work Organization of Post, Telegraph, Telephone]

RO - Radna organizacija [Work Organization]

RRPSt - Radio-relejna prislušna stanica [Radio-relay surveillance station]

RŠTO - Republički štab Teritorijalne odbrane [Republic Staff of Territorial Defence]

RTS - Radio Televizija Srbije [Radio Television of Serbia]

RV i PVO - Ratno vazduhoplovstvo i protivvazdušna odbrana [Air Force and Anti-Aircraft Defence]
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SAD</td>
<td>Sjedinjene Američke Države [United States of America]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SANU</td>
<td>Srpska akademija nauka i umjetnosti [Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAO</td>
<td>Srpska autonomna oblast [Serb Autonomous District]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>Socijalistička autonomna pokrajina [Socialist Autonomous Province]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sd/o</td>
<td>suhi dnevni obrok [meal ready-to-eat (MRE)]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDA</td>
<td>Stranka demokratske akcije [Party of Democratic Action]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDK</td>
<td>Služba društvenog knjigovodstva [Public Accounting Service]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDP</td>
<td>Socijaldemokratska partija [Social-Democratic Party]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDS</td>
<td>Srpska demokratska stranka [Serb Democratic Party]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFRJ/SFRY</td>
<td>Socijalistička Federativna Republika Jugoslavija [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIS</td>
<td>Sigurnosno-informativna služba (Republike Hrvatske) [Security Intelligence service (Croatia)]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIV</td>
<td>Savezno izvršno vijeće [Federal Executive Council]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK - PJ</td>
<td>Savez komunista - Pokret za Jugoslaviju [Union of Communists - Movement for Yugoslavia]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SKJ</td>
<td>Savez komunista Jugoslavije [League of Communists of Yugoslavia]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>slob</td>
<td>Središnja logistička baza [Central logistics base]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNO</td>
<td>Srpska narodna odbrana [Serbian National Defence]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNO</td>
<td>Sekretarijat narodne odbrane [Secretariat of National Defence]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SnU</td>
<td>Sanitetska uprava [Medical Administration]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO</td>
<td>Skupština opštine [Municipal Assembly]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPC</td>
<td>Srpska pravoslavna crkva [Serbian Orthodox Church]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPO</td>
<td>Srpski pokret obnove [Serbian Revival Movement]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPS</td>
<td>Socijalistička partija Srbije [Socialist Party of Serbia]</td>
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<td>TSB</td>
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VOS - Vojno-obavještajna služba [Military Intelligence Service]

VtmS - Veterinarska materijalna sredstva [Veterinary material assets]

VtU - Veterinarska uprava [Veterinary Administration]

VZ - Vazduhoplovni zavod [Aircraft Institute]

WWII - Drugi svjetski rat [Second World War]

YU - Jugoslavija [Yugoslavia]

ZNG - Zbor narodne garde [Croatian National Guard (Professional Army in Croatia)]

ZP - Zborno područje, korpusno [Corps Military District]
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Operational group for South Herzegovina and Dalmatia (2nd Operational group): 447.
6th operational group OG-6: 761.
7th operational group OG-7: 761.
8th operational group OG-8: 683, 761.

DIVISIONS

10th Partisan division: 604, 708, 759, 911, 942.
11th Partisan division: 669, 670, 762.
13th Partisan division: 726.
14th proletarian division “Boris Kidrič”: 750.
28th Partisan division “R”: 749, 750.
30th Partisan division: 515, 516, 517, 520, 608, 637, 638, 726, 734, 750, 759, 771, 776, 792, 820, 918.
33rd Partisan division: 749, 750.
36th Partisan division “R”: 762.
38th Partisan division: 671, 821, 890.
39th Partisan division: 726.
43rd Partisan division: 750.
47th Partisan division “R”: 750.
51st Partisan division: 785.

BRIGADES

1st motorized brigade: 760, 761, 783.
1st armored (tank) brigade (Vrhnika): 146, 775.
1st proletarian Gurd mechanized brigade: 388.
1st light infantry brigade “R”: 761.
1st Partisan brigade TO (Brčko): 124, 518, 519, 750, 760, 776.
1st Tuzlanska Partisan brigade of Territorial Defense (Tuzla): 110.
2nd motorized brigade of Territorial defense: 760, 761.
2nd mechanized brigade (Valjevci): 453, 520.
2nd light infantry brigade “R”: 759, 761.
2nd Tuzla Partisan brigade of TO (Tuzla): 110, 510.
3rd brigade (from Požarevac): 453.
3rd motorized brigade of Territorial Defense: 761.
3rd Tuzla Partisan brigade of TO (Tuzla): 124, 750, 760.
4th motorized brigade of Territorial defense: 761.
4th armored brigade (Jastrebarsko and Karlovač): 145, 762, 779, 780, 787.
4th light infantry brigade “R”: 761.
4th Sarajevo Partisan brigade TO (Ilidža): 110, 750.
5th infantry brigade: 759.
5th Kozaračka brigade: 518.
5th Sarajevo Partisan brigade TO Novo Sarajevo: 110, 750.
6th hill-brigade “B”: 750.
6th motorized brigade: 687, 758, 780, 973.
6th Sarajevo Partisan brigade TO Vogošća: 110, 604, 759.
7th motorized brigade of Territorial Defense: 761.
7th Krajina Partisan brigade of TO Banja Luka: 110.
8th infantry motorized brigade “A”: 761.
8th Krajina Partisan brigade of TO (Bihać): 124, 761.
9th motorized brigade: 761.
9th Partisan brigade: 780.
10th motorized brigade in Mostar: 145, 368, 769.
10th Herzegovina Partisan brigade of TO (Mostar): 124.
11th light infantry brigade “R”: 761.
11th motorized brigade: 760, 761, 783, 885.
11th Herzegovina Partisan brigade of TO (Mostar): 124, 819.
11th Middle-Bosnia Partisan brigade of TO (Zenica): 124, 759.
12th Middle-Bosnia Partisan brigade of TO (Zenica): 124.
12th proletarian mechanized brigade: 388.
13th proletarian motorized brigade (Ilirská Bistrica): 146.
13th Middle-Bosnia Partisan brigade (TO Bugojno): 110, 517, 519, 520, 521, 522.
13th Partisan brigade: 761, 776, 820.
14th proletarian motorized brigade: 750, 758, 775, 776, 890.
14th Herzegovina Partisan brigade TO (Konjic): 124.
15th Krajiska Partisan brigade TO Banja Luka: 110.
16th infantry motorized brigade “R”: 759.
17th motorized brigade of Territorial defense: 761.
17th light infantry brigade “R”: 762.
17th Partisan brigade: 762, 821, 890.
17th mixed anti-armor brigade: 779.
18th Partisan brigade “R”: 762.
19th Partisan brigade: 519, 759, 776, 780, 868.
22nd Partisan brigade (Brčko): 762, 785, 821, 822.
25th East-Bosnian Partisan brigade of TO (Lukavica): 110.
32nd mechanized brigade “A”: 750.
36th motorized brigade: 368, 388, 750.
37th motorized brigade “A”: 750.
49th motorized brigade: 822, 905, 1025.
49th mechanized brigade: 750, 758.
51st motorized brigade (Pančevo): 368, 388.
63rd independent parachute brigade (Niš): 76, 368.
73rd motorized brigade “R”: 750.
92nd motorized brigade: 762, 775, 776, 786, 787.
120th light infantry brigade: 758.
122nd light infantry brigade: 759, 788.
129th light infantry brigade “R” (Derventa): 762, 780.
134th light brigade: 759.
140th mechanized brigade “A”: 145, 750.
140th mechanized brigade: 145, 758.
145th light infantry Plaška brigade “R”: 761.
158th mixed anti-armor artillery brigade: 905.
160th motorized brigade “R”: 760.
180th motorized brigade: 782.
192nd light infantry brigade “R”: 762.
195th motorized brigade: 775.
216th hill brigade: 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 514, 515, 668, 693, 758, 813, 822, 855.
221st motorized brigade: 732, 760, 782.
228th motorized brigade “A”: 750.
236th motorized brigade “R”: 750.
253rd motorized brigade: 758.
257th motorized brigade “R”: 762.
265th mechanized brigade “A”: 146, 431, 750.
265th mechanized brigade (Bjelovar and Koprivnica): 146.
288th mixed anti-armor artillery brigade “A”: 750.
327th motorized brigade: 762, 774, 780, 820, 821.
329th armored brigade (Banja Luka): 145, 431, 759, 784.
336th motorized brigade: 763, 780, 785, 813, 820.
337th motorized brigade: 821.
343rd motorized brigade: 759, 864.
389th rocket artillery brigade “R”: 746, 763.
395th motorized brigade “R” (Brčko): 762, 774, 779, 787.
453rd motorized brigade: 368, 388, 785, 821.
454th mixed anti-armor artillery brigade: 671, 780.
461st mixed anti-armor artillery brigade: 763.
513th engineering brigade “B” (in peace and war): 751.
580th mixed artillery brigade “A”: 746, 763.
580th mixed anti-armor artillery brigade (Virovitica, Križevci): 146, 746, 763.
592nd motorized brigade: 761.
622nd motorized brigade “R”: 368.
Mountain brigade: 757.
Partisan brigade of Territorial defense “Veljko Lukić – Kurjak” (Bijeljina): 124.

REGIMENS

4th mixed anti-armor artillery regiment: 758, 822.
4th mixed artillery regiment “R”: 758, 795, 812, 822.
5th light artillery regiment of anti-aircraft defense “A”: 759.
5th mixed anti-armor artillery regiment “R”: 759.
5th mixed anti-armor artillery brigade “R”: 759.
5th mixed artillery regiment: 759, 785, 820.
6th infantry regimen: 670.
6th mixed artillery regiment “B”: 762.
9th mixed artillery regiment “R”: 760, 782.
12th mixed artillery regimen: 779, 905.
14th mixed artillery regimen: 758.
17th mixed artillery regimen “A”: 762, 779.
17th mixed anti-armor artillery regimen: 821.
17th light artillery regimen: 780, 786.
17th light artillery regiment of anti-aircraft defense “A”: 762.
32nd mixed artillery regiment “R” (in peace and war): 751.
32nd engineering regiment “R” (in peace and war): 751.
41st light artillery regiment of PVO “B”: 761.
46th protection regimen of SSNO: 795, 812.
65th motorized regiment: 746, 763, 815, 822.
76th motorized regiment “R”: 758.
111th helicopter regimen of the 2nd corps RV and PVO: 752.
127th engineering regiment “R” (in war and peace): 751.
240th independent rocket regimen of anti-aircraft defense: 746, 763, 813, 822.
258th engineering regiment “R” (in war and peace): 751.
271st light artillery regiment of anti-aircraft defense: 760, 782.
293rd engineering regiment “R”: 759.
313th light aircraft-regiment of anti-aircraft defense “R” (in peace and war): 751.
340th engineering regiment “R”: 746, 758, 768.
346th light artillery regiment of anti-aircraft defense: 758, 795, 812, 813, 822, 827.
367th regimen for connection “A”: 746, 763.
411th mixed anti-armor artillery regimen “R” (in peace and war): 751.
454th mixed anti-armor artillery regimen “R”: 762, 780.
471st mixed anti-armor artillery regimen “R” (in peace and war): 750.
497th engineering regimen “R”: 762, 787, 821.
557th mixed anti-armor and artillery regimen “R”: 760, 783.
593rd ABHO regimen “R”: 746, 763.
594th engineering regimen “B”: 760, 783.
652nd motorized regimen “B”: 758.
741st supplemental regimen “R”: 746, 763.
841st supplemental regimen “R” (in peace and war): 751.

DETACHMENTS

15th medical detachment “R” (in peace and war): 752.
37th medical detachment “R”: 746.

BATTALIONS

1st motorized battalion: 368, 775, 776.
1st armored battalion: 368, 787.
3rd hill battalion: 668.
4th battalion of Military police “A”: 758.
4th engineering battalion “R”: 758.
4th supplement battalion “R”: 758.
4th medical battalion “R”: 758.
4th vehicle battalion “R”: 758.
4th battalion “A”: 758.
5th vehicle battalion “R”: 759.
5th medical battalion on “R”: 759.
5th battalion “A”: 759.
5th battalion of Military police “A”: 759.
5th supplement battalion “R”: 759.
9th vehicle battalion “R”: 760, 782.
9th battalion of Military police “A”: 760.
9th battalion for connection: 782.
10th engineering battalion “A”: 762.
10th battalion for connection “B”: 760.
10th battalion of Military police “A”: 760.
10th vehicle battalion “R”: 761.
10th medical battalion “R”: 761.
10th supplement battalion “R”: 761.
17th battalion for connection “A”: 762.
17th battalion of Military police “A”: 762.
17th vehicle battalion “R”: 762.
17th medical battalion “R”: 763.
17th supplement battalion “R”: 763.
28th mortar battalion (in war): 751.
30th mortar battalion: 776.
32nd supplement battalion (in war): 751.
32nd battalion of Military police “A” (in peace and war): 751.
32nd battalion for connection “A” (in peace and war): 751.
32nd medical battalion “R” (in peace and war): 751.
32nd vehicle battalion “R” (in peace and war): 751.
33rd mortar battalion (in war): 751.
42nd border battalion “A” (in peace and war): 752.
43rd border battalion “A” (in peace and war): 752.
43rd mortar battalion (in war): 751.
70th battalion for connection “A”: 760, 782.
91st engineering battalion (OG-6): 751.
94th engineering battalion (OG-7): 751.
98th medical battalion “R”: 760, 782.
188th pontoniers’ battalion: 759.
228th battalion of Military police: 916, 919.
521st overhaul battalion “R” Overhaul Institute Hadžići: 746.
540th pontoniers’ battalion “R” (in peace and war): 751.
563rd vehicle battalion “B” Sarajevo: 746.
569th supplement battalion “R”: 760, 782.
670th pontoniers’ battalion “A”: 762, 780.
671st pontoniers’ battalion “R” (in peace and war): 751.

ARTILLERY BATTALIONS

2nd howitzer artillery-battalion: 785.
164th howitzer battalion: 778.

4. COLLABORATIONIST BODIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF SRPSKA KRAJINA

Assembly of Autonomous Region Krajina (Assembly of Srpska Krajina): 574, 736.

Government of Autonomous Region Krajina (Government of Serb Autonomous District Krajina): 574, 596.


Militia of the Republic of Srpska Krajina: 943.

Territorial defense of the Republic of Srpska Krajina: 718, 733, 1012, 1013, 1026.


SAO “Dubrovačka Republika”: 460.

Territorial defense – TO West Slavonija: 715, 716, 734.

5. COLLABORATIONIST BODIES and ARMED FORCES OF RS BiH/RS


Presidency of Republika Srpska BiH: 609, 937.

National security council of Republika Srpska BiH: 915.


Government of Republika Srpska BiH: 954, 963, 1005, 1266.
Ministry of Interior of Republika Srpska BiH: 721, 906, 907, 908, 909, 991.
Militia of Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina: 943, 1014.
Ministry of Defense of Republika Srpska BiH: 954, 955, 960, 1040.
Autonomous region Bosanska Krajina: 584, 603.
SAO Birač: 558.
SAO Herzegovina (SAO East Herzegovina): 551, 556, 558, 559, 561, 972, 979, 981, 982.
SAO Krajina: 557, 697, 713, 870, 994, 1012, 1033, 1036.
SAO Majevica: 561, 598.
SAO Semberija: 561, 598.
SAO North Bosnia: 558, 561, 584.
Crisis Staff of Autonomous region Krajina: 603.
Crisis Staff of Serb municipality Banja Luka: 603.
Crisis Staff of Serb municipality Bosanska Gradiška: 604.
Crisis Staff of Serb municipality Bosanska Krupa: 604.
Crisis Staff of Serb municipality Bosanski Šamac: 601.
Crisis Staff of Serb municipality Bratunac: 600, 604, 605.
Crisis Staff of Serb municipality Brčko: 601.
Crisis Staff of Serb municipality Čajniče: 599.
Crisis Staff of Serb municipality Doboj: 602.
Crisis Staff of Serb municipality Ključ: 607, 608.
Crisis Staff of Serb municipality Konjic: 600.
Crisis Staff of Serb municipality Kotor Varaš: 602.
Crisis Staff of Serb municipality Foča: 599, 606.
Crisis Staff of Serb municipality Višegrad: 600.
Crisis Staff of Serb municipality Pale: 599.
Crisis Staff of Serb municipality Prijedor: 604.
Crisis Staff of Serb municipality Rogatica: 600.
Crisis Staff of Serb municipality Sanski Most: 604.
Crisis Staff of Serb municipality Šipovo: 602.
Crisis Staff of Serb municipality Trnovo: 599.
Crisis Staff of Serb municipality Vogošća: 606, 607, 608.
Crisis Staff of Serb municipality Zvornik: 601.


Air Forces and anti-aircraft defense: 938, 940.
1st Krajina corps (Banja Luka): 603, 864, 937, 938, 939, 942, 944, 945, 947, 958, 961, 963, 967, 1040.
2nd Krajina corps: 937, 938, 939, 944, 958, 967.

Drina corps: 939, 940, 944.
Herzegovina corps: 938, 939, 949, 951, 1040.
Sarajevo-Romanija corps: 775, 871, 937, 939, 944, 945, 951, 1006, 1008, 1009, 1040.

1st Guard motorized brigade: 951.
1st Bratunac light infantry brigade: 962, 963.
1st Romanija infantry brigade: 952.
1st Sarajevo brigade: 1006.
1st Zvornik infantry brigade: 945, 947.
2nd Sarajevo mechanized brigade: 852.
2nd Sarajevo light infantry brigade: 852, 1007.
4th Ozrenska light infantry brigade: 943, 950, 957.
6th Sanska infantry brigade: 945.
14th Rear base: 967, 969.
27th Rear base: 951, 969.
30th Rear base: 969.
35th Rear base: 969.
“Serb volunteers”: 407, 528, 784, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 890, 891, 893, 895, 916, 917, 918, 920, 923, 924, 925, 926, 929, 944, 971, 973, 974, 975, 978, 979, 1003, 1006, 1008, 1014, 1025.

Armed formations of SDS (BiH): 823, 825, 831, 896, 902, 905, 915, 985.

Serb National Guard: 824, 970, 985, 1038.


“Žute ose” (yellow wasps): 971.

Kajmani: 989, 991.

Sivi vukovi: (grey wolves): 989.

Vukovarci: 971, 986.

“Specijaleci” (Radomir Kojić’s commandos): 832.

Royalists: 970.


“volunteers’” units: 810.

Chetnik Brčanski detachment: 672.

Chetnik detachment “Karadorde”: 651, 894.

Chetnik detachment Dragan Nikolić: 900, 995.

Chetnik detachment Janković: 900, 995.

Chetnik detachment Nikačević: 900, 901.

Chetnik detachment Zaga: 900, 995.

Chetnik detachment “Vuk Kalajit”: 995.

Chetnik detachment “Iron regimen”, “Gvozdeni puk Pavle Đurišić”: 995.

Weekend unit members “Vikendaši”: 995.

Volunteers’ detachment “Kraljica” (queen): 787.

Gučevska brigada: 823.

Commandos of the Federal secretariat for Interior (special brigades of SSUP): 971, 976, 987, 988, 989, 995.

Commandos of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic Serbia: 971, 978, 979, 991.
“Crvene beretke” (“Red berets” – units for special operations of the State security service of the Ministry of Interior (MUP) of Serbia (military police): 980, 989, 990, 994.
Veterans (from the aggression on Croatia): 995.
“Martićevci” (Martić’s commandos; Martić’s Serb police): 924, 971, 993, 994, 995.
Scorpions: 989, 991.
Blue: 989, 991.
Serb falcons: 995.
Dragoslav Bokan’s militia: 995.
National defense of Autonomous Province of the West Bosnia (followers of Fikret Abdić): 990, 1252, 1256.
Foreign Legion: 995.
“Knindže”: 998.
“Gerila” (querilla): 1000.
Territorial Defense of Serb Republic BiH: 131, 896, 913, 914, 920.
Territorial defense of Bosanska Krajina: 363, 649.
II

BODIES AND ARMED FORCES OF THE
REPUBLIC OF CROATIA

1. STATE AND ARMY CENTRAL INSTITUTIONS

Croatian National Parlament: 441, 470, 1076.


Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia: 1184, 1198.

Territorial Defense of Croatia: 100, 140, 143, 144, 294.

Croatian Army – HV: 131, 471, 955, 1051, 1076, 1077, 1086, 1087, 1089, 1090, 1091, 1094, 1096, 1097, 1098, 1100, 1101, 1102, 1106, 1107, 1108, 1111, 1112, 1114, 1115, 1116, 1117, 1118, 1122, 1123, 1125, 1127, 1129, 1131, 1137, 1138, 1140, 1141, 1142, 1143, 1144, 1146, 1147, 1148, 1149, 1150, 1151, 1152, 1154, 1155, 1156, 1158, 1159, 1161, 1162, 1163, 1164, 1165, 1166, 1167, 1169, 1170, 1171, 1172, 1173, 1175, 1176, 1177, 1178, 1181, 1183, 1186, 1187, 1188,
2. MILITARY DISTRICTS, CORPSES, OPERATIONAL GROUPS

South Military District: 1090, 1095, 1096, 1098, 1101, 1102, 1103, 1105, 1109, 1117, 1121, 1147, 1155, 1170, 1171, 1172, 1179, 1194.
- Command Outposts: Ploce (Ploče): 1100, 1102, 1194.
- East: 1123, 1124, 1126.
- Grude: 1101, 1102, 1103, 1105, 1118, 1196.
- Middle Bosnia and/or Gornji Vakuf: 1108, 1110, 1196.
Operational zone Middle Bosnia: 1139, 1169, 1172, 1183, 1197, 1228.
Operational zone South-East Herzegovina: 1190, 1241.
Operational zone North-West Herzegovina: 1136, 1138, 1152, 1158, 1186, 1188, 1193, 1205, 1222, 1241.
Operational zone Osijek: 1124, 1126, 1204.
Operational zone Split: 1096, 1097, 1100, 1102, 1192, 1241.
Operational group South-East Herzegovina Medugorje (Međugorje): 1119, 1121, 1171, 1181.
Operational group West Posavina: 1122, 1126, 1127, 1128, 1131, 1132.
Croatian National Guard: 398, 425, 431.
3. BRIGADES OF CROATIAN ARMY

Brigade “Zrinski – Frankopan”: 1113.
Karlovacka (Karlovčka) brigade: 1215.
Neretvanska brigade: 1141.
1st brigade “Tigrovi” (Zagreb): 1091, 1096, 1121, 1130, 1137, 1139, 1141, 1145, 1146, 1149, 1151, 1157, 1160, 1183.
1st “A” brigade of the Croatian National Guard – ZNG: 1091, 1109, 1160.
Guard
1st Medical brigade: 1091.
2nd brigade from Sisak: 1091, 1146, 1151.
2nd Guard brigade: 1156.
3rd ZNG “A” brigade: 1091, 1130, 1133, 1144, 1146, 1152, 1156, 1160.
4th ZNG brigade: 1096, 1109, 1116, 1119, 1146, 1214.
5th Zagreb Guard brigade: 1091, 1144, 1146, 1149, 1150, 1152, 1156, 1157, 1160.
7th Varazdin (Varaždin) brigade: 1091, 1146, 1157, 1160.
100th brigade: 1091, 1126.
101st brigade: 1091.
101st ZNG “R” brigade: 1109, 1170, 1171, 1179, 1181.
102nd brigade: 1091.
103rd brigade: 1091.
104th brigade: 1091.
105th (Bjelovar) brigade: 1091, 1130.
106th (Osijek) brigade: 1091, 1121, 1130.
108th (Slavonski Brod) brigade: 1091, 1123, 1124, 1127, 1130, 1131, 1132, 1133, 1141, 1182.
109th (Vukovar) brigade: 1091, 1121, 1130, 1144, 1160.
110th brigade: 1091.
111th brigade: 1091, 1130.
112th brigade: 1091.
113th (Split) brigade: 1131, 1136, 1139, 1140, 1141, 1144, 1156, 1160, 1069.
114th Sibenik (Šibenik) brigade: 1091, 1135, 1136, 1139, 1140, 1141, 1144, 1156, 1160, 1182.
115th brigade: 1091, 1096, 1109.
116th Metkovic (Metković) brigade: 1091, 1096, 1109, 1130.
117th brigade: 1091.
118th brigade: 1091.
119th brigade: 1091.
120th brigade: 1091.
123rd Varazdin (Varaždin) brigade: 1091, 1126, 1127, 1130, 1135, 1141, 1144.
126th (Sinj) brigade: 1091, 1109, 1121.
127th (Virovitica) brigade: 1091, 1130.
128th brigade: 1091.
131st brigade: 1123, 1127.
139th brigade: 1091, 1123, 1125, 1127.
140th brigade: 1091.
141st brigade: 1091.
145th brigade: 1091.
153rd brigade: 1091, 1109, 1169.
156th (Makarska) brigade: 1091, 1106, 1110, 1114, 1119, 1213.
157th brigade: 1091, 1123, 1126, 1133.
159th brigade: 1091, 1181.
160th brigade: 1133, 1204.
162nd brigade: 1091.
163rd brigade: 1091, 1141.
166th brigade: 1091.
175th brigade: 1091, 1159, 1160, 1161, 1163.
203rd brigade: 1091.
4. TACTICS GROUP AND SPECIAL UNITS

4th ordnance regimen: 1092.
5th Home-Guard regimen (from Osijek): 1091, 1157, 1159.
6th Home-Guard regimen: 1159.
11th Home-Guard regimen (Vinkovci): 1091, 1157, 1158, 1159.
Tactics group (TG) Sinj: 1107, 1110.
Tactics group 1 (TG-1): 1221.
Tactics group 2 (TG-2): 1092, 1110, 1119, 1145.
Tactics group 4 (TG-4): 1092, 1110.
Tactics group TG-11: 1128.
Tactics group 123 (TG-123): 1123, 1126.
1st independent battalion - Klis: 1224.
2nd independent battalion: 1092.
4th independent battalion “Zrinjski”: 1091.
60th independent battalion “Ludvig Pavlovic” (“Ludvig Pavlović”) (Special-purpose Unit “Ludvig Pavlovic” (“Ludvig Pavlović”): 1091, 1111, 1139, 1146, 1147, 1152, 1179.
66th military police battalion: 1091.
68th military police battalion Osijek: 1131.
72nd military police battalion: 1233.
33rd engineering battalion: 1091.
2nd motorized artillery battalion of Operational zone Osijek: 1092, 1123.
55th light artillery battalion of anti-aircraft defense from Sisak: 1092, 1134, 1216, 1217, 1222.
Special unit “Divovi” (Giants) from Zagreb: 1092, 1137, 1139, 1141.
Special unit “Skorpije” (“Škorpije”) (Scorpions) from Trogir: 1092, 1139.
Special unit “Alkari” from Sinj: 1092, 1139.
Special unit “Vukovi” from Split: 1092, 1139.
Special unit “Pume” (pumas) from Varazdin (Varaždin): 1092, 1144, 1160.
Special unit “Kune” from Osijek: 1092.
Special unit “Legija casti” (“Legija časti”) (Legion of honor): 1152, 1225.
Special unit “Paukovi” (spiders) from Split: 1092.
Special unit “Gromovi” (thunders) from Sisak: 1092, 1183.
Special unit “Sveti duh” (the Holy Ghost) (from Virovitica): 1140.
Marine-assault infantry mixed detachment: 1092.
350th commando detachment: 1156, 1159.
Independent reconnaissance company of the military district: 1109.
Company “Uskok” from Osijek: 1225.
Helicopter-borne squadron: 1092, 1156.

5. COLLABORATIONIST BODIES of HZ/HR
– HERCEG BOSNA

Presidency of Croatian Community Herceg-Bosna: 1070, 1071, 1074, 1075, 1087, 1195.
Government of Croatian Republic Herceg-Bosna: 1081.
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